State University of Management

Institute *****

Abstract on the discipline "History of Economics"

"Restoration of the national economy after the Great Patriotic War of 1945 - 1964."

1. Introduction

2. Restoration of the economy of the USSR: achievements and difficulties. Stalin's last ideological campaigns.

3. The struggle for leadership in the highest echelons of power in 1953 - 1957. XX Congress of the CPSU.

4. Reforms N.S. Khrushchev. "Thaw" in the public life of the USSR.

5. Conclusion.

6. Literature.

INTRODUCTION

This topic was not chosen by me by chance. In my opinion, the period from 1945 to 1964 is one of the significant periods in the history of the USSR that deserves attention. These almost two decades are full of events. This is the post-war period of the labor feat of the Soviet people to restore the destroyed national economy, the successful testing of the first Soviet atomic bomb, the beginning of the Cold War.

With the end of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet people got the opportunity to start peaceful creative work. It was necessary to revive hundreds of destroyed cities and towns, to restore railways and industrial enterprises, to raise the material standard of living of people. The main priorities and directions of the country's development were determined, as in the prewar years, by national economic five-year plans. The party and state leadership of the country saw the strategic task of the development of society in building a socialist society.

In March 1953, the reign of I.V. Stalin ended. A whole era in the life of the Soviet Union was connected with the life of this man. Everything that has been done for 30 years has been done for the first time. The USSR was the embodiment of a new socio-economic formation. Its development took place under the most severe pressure from the capitalist environment. The socialist idea that had taken possession of the minds of the Soviet people worked wonders. The great genius of the Soviet man managed to turn backward Russia into a powerful industrial power in the historically shortest possible time. It was the Soviet Union, and not the United States or any other country in the world, that utterly defeated Nazi Germany, saved the world from total enslavement, saved its sovereignty and its territorial integrity.

The main purpose of this work is to try, on the basis of a variety of material, to understand the important historical period of our Motherland.

ECONOMIC RECOVERY OF THE USSR:

ACHIEVEMENTS AND DIFFICULTIES.

STALIN'S LAST IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN

Transition to peaceful construction. The restructuring of the economy on the rails of peaceful development was carried out in difficult conditions. The war brought numerous casualties: about 27 million people died in battles for their homeland and in fascist captivity, died of starvation and disease. Military operations on the territory of the country caused enormous damage to the national economy: the country lost about 30% of the national wealth.

At the end of May 1945, the State Defense Committee decided to transfer part of the defense enterprises to the production of goods for the population. Somewhat later, a law was passed on the demobilization of thirteen ages of army personnel. These resolutions marked the beginning of the transition of the Soviet Union to peaceful construction. On August 29, 1945, a decision was made to prepare a five-year plan for the restoration and development of the national economy. Describing the goals of the new five-year plan, on February 9, 1946, Stalin emphasized that they boil down to “restoring the affected areas of the country, restoring the pre-war level of industry and agriculture, and then surpassing this level on a more or less significant scale.” In September 1945, the GKO was abolished. All functions of governing the country were concentrated in the hands of the Council of People's Commissars (in March 1946 it was transformed into the Council of Ministers of the USSR).

Measures were taken to restore normal work in enterprises and institutions. Mandatory overtime work was abolished, the 8-hour working day and annual paid holidays were restored. The budget for the third and fourth quarters of 1945 and for 1946 was considered. Appropriations for military needs were reduced and spending on the development of civilian sectors of the economy increased. The restructuring of the national economy and public life in relation to peacetime conditions was completed mainly in 1946.

In March 1946, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR approved a plan for the restoration and development of the national economy for 1946-1950. The main objective of the five-year plan was to restore the areas of the country that had been occupied, to reach the pre-war level of development of industry and agriculture, and then to surpass them. The plan provided for the priority development of heavy and defense industries. Significant financial resources, material and labor resources were directed here. It was planned to develop new coal regions, expand the metallurgical base in the east of the country. One of the conditions for the fulfillment of planned targets was the maximum use of scientific and technological progress.

The year 1946 was the most difficult in the post-war development of industry. To switch enterprises to the production of civilian products, the production technology was changed, new equipment was created, and retraining of personnel was carried out. In accordance with the five-year plan, restoration work began in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. The coal industry of Donbass was revived. Zaporizhstal was restored, Dneproges was put into operation. At the same time, construction of new and reconstruction of existing plants and factories was carried out. Over 6,200 industrial enterprises were restored and rebuilt during the five years. Particular attention was paid to the development of metallurgy, mechanical engineering, fuel and energy and military-industrial complexes. The foundations of nuclear energy and the radio-electronic industry were laid. New industrial giants emerged in the Urals, in Siberia, in the republics of Transcaucasia and Central Asia (Ust-Kamenogorsk lead-zinc plant, Kutaisi automobile plant). The country's first long-distance gas pipeline Saratov - Moscow was put into operation. The Rybinsk and Sukhumi hydroelectric power stations began to operate.

Enterprises were equipped with new technology. The mechanization of labor-intensive processes in ferrous metallurgy and the coal industry has increased. The electrification of production continued. The electric power of labor in industry by the end of the five-year plan was one and a half times higher than the level of 1940.

A large amount of industrial work was carried out in the republics and regions included in the USSR on the eve of the Second World War. In the western regions of Ukraine, in the Baltic republics, new industries were created, in particular, gas and automobile, metalworking and electrical engineering. The peat industry and electric power industry have been developed in Western Belarus.

Work on the restoration of industry was basically completed in 1948. But at individual metallurgical enterprises, they continued even in the early 50s. The mass industrial heroism of the Soviet people, expressed in numerous labor initiatives (the introduction of high-speed methods of work, the movement for metal savings and high product quality, the movement of multi-machine operators, etc.), contributed to the successful fulfillment of planned targets. By the end of the five-year plan, the level of industrial production exceeded the pre-war level by 73%.

The restoration of industry and transport, new industrial construction led to an increase in the size of the working class.

Difficulties in the development of agriculture. The war severely affected the state of agriculture. The sown areas have been reduced, the processing of fields has worsened. The number of able-bodied population decreased by almost a third. For several years, almost no new equipment was supplied to the village. The situation in the agricultural sector of the economy was complicated by the fact that in 1946 a severe drought swept Ukraine, Moldova, the right-bank regions of the Lower Volga region, the North Caucasus, and the Central Black Earth regions. The outbreak of famine caused a massive outflow of the rural population to the cities.

In February 1947, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considered the question "On measures to improve agriculture in the post-war period." The main ways of its rise were determined: providing the village with tractors, agricultural machines and fertilizers, improving the culture of agriculture. Attention was drawn to the need to improve the management of the agricultural sector of the economy. To implement the plan, the output of agricultural machinery was increased. During the five-year period the number of tractors increased by 1.5 times, combine harvesters by 1.4 times. Work was underway to electrify the village. Emergency measures were taken to strengthen collective farm and state farm production. At the turn of the 1940s and 1950s, small collective farms were enlarged. Within a few years, their number decreased by almost three times. New collective farms were created in the western regions of Belarus and Ukraine, in the Baltic republics, in Right-bank Moldavia.

An increase in the production and supply of equipment to the countryside and measures for the organizational restructuring of collective farms did not change the difficult situation in the agricultural sector. All production activities of collective farms and state farms were under the control of party and state authorities.

On October 20, 1948, at the initiative of Stalin, a resolution was adopted "On the plan for protective afforestation, the introduction of grass-field crop rotations, the construction of ponds and reservoirs to ensure high and stable yields in the steppe and forest-steppe regions of the European part of the USSR." This program, designed for 1950 - 1965, was called in the press "Stalin's plan for the transformation of nature." Although the plan was abandoned after Stalin's death, the shelterbelts built during his lifetime have become a memorable and useful testament to the efforts of the first post-war years to increase agricultural production and protect the environment.

Socio-economic situation in the early 50s. The economy in the early 1950s developed on the basis of the trends that had developed in the previous period. In the fifth five-year plan (1951-1955), as before, priority was given to the heavy and especially the defense industry. The output of consumer goods (cotton fabrics, shoes, etc.) lagged significantly behind the planned targets and the needs of the population.

At the turn of the 1940s and 1950s, the centralization of industrial management intensified. The ministries (coal, oil industry, etc.) were enlarged, new departments were created.

Measures were taken to improve the living conditions of the population. During the Fourth Five-Year Plan, prices for consumer goods fell several times. In 1947, the rationing system for the distribution of a number of foodstuffs was abolished.

Simultaneously with the abolition of the card system, a monetary reform was carried out, during which 10 rubles of the old model of 1938 were exchanged for 1 ruble of 1947. The need for monetary reform was substantiated in a special resolution, in the preparation of which Stalin actively participated. It drew attention to the fact that the huge military spending in 1941-1945 “required the release into circulation of a large amount of money ... At the same time, the production of goods intended for sale to the population was reduced, and retail trade decreased significantly. In addition, as is known, during the Great Patriotic War, on the temporarily occupied Soviet territory, German and other invaders issued a large amount of counterfeit money in rubles, which further increased the surplus of money in the country and clogged our money circulation. As a result of this, much more money turned out to be in circulation than is necessary for the national economy, the purchasing power of money has decreased, and now special measures are required to strengthen the Soviet ruble.

Despite the fact that, in accordance with the terms of the monetary reform, the value of money was reduced by 10 times, a significant part of the people who became impoverished during the war years did not suffer from it. The losses of those who kept deposits in savings banks were much smaller. Deposits up to 3,000 rubles were revalued ruble for ruble. If the deposits were more than 3,000 rubles, then the amount from 3,000 to 10,000 was exchanged at the rate of 3 old rubles for 2 new rubles, and the amount over 10,000 rubles was changed at the rate of 2 old rubles for 1 new ruble. Those who kept large sums of money at home suffered the most. Thus, another radical expropriation of funds from people who profited from the market and did not trust state savings banks was carried out.

At the same time, retail prices for basic foodstuffs and industrial consumer goods were announced to be lower than average market prices. The result of these measures was a steady increase in the material well-being of the population, which created confidence among the Soviet people in the constant improvement of life.

Cities and villages destroyed during the war years were revived from the ruins and ashes. The scale of housing and cultural and household construction has increased. However, the pace of construction work lagged behind the scale of urban population growth. In the early 1950s, the lack of housing turned into an acute housing problem.

In 1952, the work of I.V. Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR. In it, the head of state theoretically substantiated the principles of the economic policy pursued in the country. It was about the priority development of heavy industry, the need to curtail cooperative-collective farm property by turning it into state property, and to reduce the sphere of commodity circulation. Compliance with these principles, according to I.V. Stalin, was supposed to ensure high growth rates of the national economy in the USSR.

Soviet society after the war. Stalin's last ideological campaigns. Having endured the incredible hardships of wartime, the population expected improvement in working and living conditions, positive changes in society. As in previous years, the majority of these hopes were associated with the name of I.V. Stalin. At the end of the war, I.V. Stalin was relieved of his duties as People's Commissar for Defense, but retained the post of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. He continued to be a member of the Politburo and the Orgburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. The authority of I.V. Stalin was supported by the entire system of the administrative-bureaucratic and ideological apparatus.

In 1946-1947. on behalf of I.V. Stalin, drafts of the new Constitution of the USSR and the program of the CPSU (b) were developed. The constitutional project provided for some development of democratic principles in the life of society. So, simultaneously with the recognition of the state form of ownership as the dominant one, the existence of a small peasant economy based on personal labor was allowed. During the discussion of the draft Constitution, wishes were expressed for the decentralization of economic life. Proposals were made to expand the economic independence of local administrative organizations. It was proposed to supplement the draft Program of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks with a provision on limiting the terms of elective party work, etc. However, all proposals were rejected.

The development of all legislative acts and resolutions, formally approved then by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, was carried out in the highest party instances. The leadership of all spheres of society's life was concentrated in the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Party. Here the plans for the activities of the Supreme Council were determined, candidates for the positions of ministers and their deputies were considered, and the highest command staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR was approved. The resolutions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks obliged the primary party organizations to control the work of the administration of industrial enterprises and collective farms, to reveal "mistakes and blunders of economic leaders."

In order to ensure the production of labor force, several decrees were adopted on the responsibility of persons who evade labor activity. "Ukazniki" were subject to deportation, the Kemerovo and Omsk regions, the Krasnoyarsk Territory were chosen as the place for their new settlement and work. Administrative and punitive measures were applied in relation to collective farmers who did not work out the mandatory minimum of workdays, and to urban "parasites".

The position of two camps, of confrontation on the world stage between two social systems, underlay the foreign policy views of the party and state leadership of the USSR. These views are reflected, in particular, in the work of I.V. Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR. The work also contained a conclusion about the inevitability of wars in the world as long as imperialism exists.

In 1949, in order to expand economic cooperation and trade between countries, an intergovernmental economic organization was created - the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). It included Albania (until 1961), Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and since 1949 the GDR. Moscow was the seat of the CMEA Secretariat. One of the reasons for the creation of the CMEA was the Western countries' boycott of trade relations with the USSR and the states of Eastern Europe.

Since the end of the Patriotic War, there have been changes in the relations between the USSR and the former allies. "Cold War" - this is the name given to the foreign policy pursued by both sides in relation to each other in the second half of the 40s - early 90s. It was characterized, first of all, by the hostile political actions of the parties.

The confrontation of the parties was clearly manifested in 1947 in connection with the Marshall Plan put forward by the USA. This program provided for the provision of economic assistance to European countries that suffered during the Second World War. The Soviet government regarded the Marshall Plan as a weapon of anti-Soviet policy and refused to participate in the conference. The Eastern European countries invited to the conference also announced their refusal to participate in the Marshall Plan.

One of the manifestations of the Cold War was the formation of political and military-political blocs. In 1949, the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) was created. It included the USA, Canada and several states of Western Europe. Two years later, the signing of the military-political alliance between the United States, Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS) took place.

The Soviet Union carried out work against the propaganda of a new war. The main arena of his activity was the United Nations (UN). It was created in 1945 and united 51 states. Its goal was to strengthen peace and security and develop cooperation between states. At UN sessions, Soviet representatives came up with proposals for the reduction of conventional types of weapons and the prohibition of atomic weapons, and for the withdrawal of troops from the territories of foreign states. All these proposals, as a rule, were blocked by representatives of the United States and its allies. The USSR unilaterally withdrew its troops from the territories of several states, where they were introduced during the war years.

Although the country could not recover from the consequences of the war for a long time, the entire pre-war experience of the rapid development of the USSR convinced the Soviet people that the Stalinist program for the restoration of the national economy had to quickly and organically develop into an accelerated movement of the country forward and turning it into the most developed and most prosperous state peace.

THE STRUGGLE FOR LEADERSHIP IN THE HIGHEST Echelons OF POWER IN

1953 -1957

XX CONGRESS OF THE CPSU

struggle for political leadership. On March 5, 1953, I.V. died. Stalin - First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and on March 14 the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held and the secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee was elected. Changes were made in the leadership of the CPSU and the Soviet government. The secretariat of the Central Committee of the party was headed by N.S. Khrushchev is a well-known party leader who for many years led the largest party organizations in the country. G.M. was appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Malenkov, Minister of Foreign Affairs - V.M. Molotov, Minister of Defense - N.A. Bulganin. K.E. was approved as the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Voroshilov. L.P. became the head of the new Ministry of the Interior. Beria, formerly Deputy Minister of the Interior. The new leaders announced their readiness to exercise "collective leadership" of the country. However, from the very first days of being in power, a struggle began between them for political leadership. The main rivals in it were L.P. Beria, G.M. Malenkov and N.S. Khrushchev.

A hidden struggle was waged between Malenkov and Beria, and after Stalin's death this struggle escalated, taking on a deadly character, although it seemed that Malenkov and Beria "made friends" and would rule the country together. The fact that they entered into a temporary alliance between themselves was indicated by the fact that Malenkov approved all the new appointments of Beria in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Having far-reaching plans to seize power in the country, through all sorts of combinations, Beria unites the USSR Ministry of State Security and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs into one ministry for the fourth time in Soviet history. He strives to urgently place his proteges in key positions, freeing himself from objectionable to him, although honest workers. Beria came up with a cunning move with an amnesty after Stalin's death. It was extremely necessary for Beria to send the objectionable back into exile, to detain those who remained there. It was then that they began to release criminals and recidivists. They immediately returned to their old ways. Discontent and instability could give Beria a chance to return to the old methods. Beria launched an offensive against the party, subordinating it to the Ministry of the Interior.

Khrushchev understood, of course, what might await him. And it was he who organized the overthrow of Beria from all his high posts. The essential thing was that Nikita Sergeevich received the full support of Marshal Zhukov and General Moskalenko, and it was they who announced to Beria that he was under arrest. He was expelled from the party as an "enemy of the people" and put on trial.

In the verdict, announced on December 23, 1953, Beria was accused of having put together a treacherous group of conspirators hostile to the Soviet state, who aimed to use the internal affairs bodies against the Communist Party and the Soviet government, to put the Ministry of Internal Affairs over the party and the government in order to seize power, liquidate the Soviet system, the restoration of capitalism and the restoration of the rule of the bourgeoisie.

The court accused Beria and his accomplices of committing terrorist reprisals against people from whom they were afraid of exposure, etc. In connection with all this and other grave crimes, the court sentenced all the defendants to death, indicating that the sentence was final and not subject to appeal. On the same day, the sentence was carried out.

One of the central places in the activities of the new leadership was occupied by the work to overcome the personality cult of I.V. Stalin. The main role in it belonged to N.S. Khrushchev, who was elected in September 1953 First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The press began criticizing the personality cult of I.V. Stalin. The reorganization of the structure and renewal of personnel in the internal affairs bodies were carried out.

Transformations in social and political life. At the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU (February 1956) the report on the work of the Central Committee of the Party and the directives of the Sixth Five-Year Plan of National Economic Development were discussed. The congress devoted much attention to questions of the international situation and the prospects for world development. The congress documents drew conclusions about the possibility of preventing a new world war and about the variety of forms of transition to socialism. (In 1957, A.A. Gromyko, a professional diplomat who had represented the interests of the country in the UN for a long time, was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.) N.S. Khrushchev with a report "On the cult of personality and its consequences."

Conducted by N.S. Khrushchev, the policy of de-Stalinization, numerous restructurings in the political and economic spheres caused growing dissatisfaction with part of the party and state apparatus. According to many leaders of the country, the exposure of the cult of I.V. Stalin led to the fall of the authority of the USSR and the Communist Party in the international arena. In 1957, a group of party leaders headed by G.M. Malenkov, V.M. Molotov and L.M. Kaganovich, tried to remove N.S. Khrushchev from the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. They accused Khrushchev of violating the principles of "collective

leadership” and the establishment of their cult, in unauthorized and thoughtless foreign policy actions, in economic voluntarism. However, the open resistance of some party and state leaders to the reform policy ended in failure. A significant part of the party and Soviet leaders at that moment supported N.S. Khrushchev. The June (1957) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU recognized the group of G.M. Malenkova, V.M. Molotov and L.M. Kaganovich guilty of speaking out against the political course of the party. The members of the group were expelled from the highest party bodies and removed from their posts.

After the elimination of the "opposition", changes were made in the composition of the highest authorities. He was relieved of his duties as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR K.E. Voroshilov - his place was taken by L.I. Brezhnev. Minister of Defense G.K. was removed. Zhukov, who in June 1957 played a decisive role in the preservation of N.S. Khrushchev as leader of the CPSU.

Thus, by 1958, the struggle for leadership in the highest echelons of power, which began as early as March 1953, ended. Accordingly, the cult of N.S. Khrushchev. Since 1958, he has already combined two positions: the first secretary of the Central Committee of the party and the head of government.

REFORMS N.S. KHRUSHCHEV IN ECONOMY AND MANAGEMENT.

"THAW" IN THE PUBLIC LIFE OF THE USSR.

Economic course in the countryside. In the second half of 1953, cardinal transformations began in the country's economy. Their nature and direction testified to some changes in the economic course. The changes concerned, first of all, agriculture, its accelerated rise in order to provide the population with food and light industry - raw materials. Improving the well-being of the people was declared one of the central tasks of the new leadership. To resolve it, the development of a new agrarian policy began, the foundations of which were approved at the September (1953) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The central place in it was occupied by: an increase in state purchase prices for agricultural products, an increase in financing of agricultural sectors, and an improvement in tax policy. The system of planning agricultural production has changed. From now on, the state determined only the volume of procurement of products to be delivered. The prices for agricultural products handed over to the state have risen several times. Taxes were reduced from private subsidiary plots of peasants and a new system of taxation was introduced (per unit of land area). Steps were taken to improve the technical equipment of collective farms and state farms. Deliveries of tractors and agricultural machinery to the countryside have increased.

Since 1954, the development of virgin and fallow lands began. Over 350,000 settlers arrived in the eastern regions of the country - in the Southern Urals, in Siberia, Kazakhstan - to lift the virgin lands.

In 1958, the MTS was reorganized. Collective farms received the right to buy equipment from the MTS. On the basis of MTS, repair and technical stations were created. The expediency of this measure was neutralized by the haste in its implementation and unjustifiably high prices for obsolete equipment.

The inconsistency of the agrarian policy was also manifested in other transformations that affected the agricultural sector. A new stage of consolidation of collective farms and resettlement of unpromising villages began. Massive

transformation of collective farms into state agricultural enterprises

(state farms). Forceful methods of managing the branches of the agrosphere were used. At the end of the 1950s, a line began to be drawn towards curtailing personal subsidiary plots. After the visit of N.S. Khrushchev in the USA (1959), all farms - at his insistence - were recommended to move on to sowing corn, the "queen of the fields" and even those regions where it could not grow and ripen normally due to climatic conditions.

The totality of economic measures made it possible to achieve certain successes in the development of agricultural production. So in January 1964, for the successful development of animal husbandry, the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR awarded the Vologda Oblast the challenge Red Banner of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR. But there was no fundamental improvement in the development of agriculture. The result of ill-conceived measures was the aggravation of the food problem. In connection with the reduction of state grain reserves, the USSR began to regularly buy it abroad.

Industrial management reforms. The reorientation of the economy towards the development of the agricultural sector and light industry was short-lived. The country's leadership did not have a detailed concept of transformations in the field of the economy. At the beginning of 1955 G.M. Malenkov - a supporter of the strategy for the development of light industry - was forced to leave the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers. The principle of the priority development of the production of means of production was restored, which was reflected in the plans for the sixth five-year plan and the seven-year plan (1959-1965).

Thousands of large industrial enterprises were built and put into operation. Among them are the Cherepovets Metallurgical Combine and the Omsk Oil Refinery. New industries developed - radio electronics, rocket science. The Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party, held in July 1955, drew attention to the need to improve the introduction of the latest achievements of science and technology into production.

In the second half of the 1950s, the country's industry rose to a qualitatively new level. At the same time, a rigid, centralized control system hindered the development of industry. In 1957, a law was passed on the restructuring of the management of industry and construction. In accordance with it, the former sectoral system of leadership, carried out through ministries and departments, was abolished. The main organizational form of management became the Councils of the National Economy - Economic Councils. 105 economic regions were created in the country on the basis of the existing administrative division. All industrial enterprises and construction sites located on their territory were transferred to the jurisdiction of local economic councils. Most of the sectoral ministries were abolished.

Development of science. Immediately after the Great Patriotic War, work began on the restoration of scientific centers. New research institutes were opened, including atomic energy, physical chemistry, precision mechanics, and computer technology. Research centers were created related to industries working for defense. Soviet scientists have carried out the synthesis of a controlled nuclear reaction in an atomic reactor. In 1949, an atomic bomb was tested in the USSR, and on August 12, 1953, the first hydrogen bomb was tested. In 1954, the world's first industrial nuclear power plant was launched in the USSR. Designing new high-speed

aircraft were engaged in aircraft designers Tupolev, Ilyushin and others.

The entry of the USSR into the era of the scientific and technological revolution required the expansion of the network of research institutions and the creation of new branch institutes. The Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences was organized. Increased allocations for scientific purposes.

Soviet scientists worked successfully in the rocket and space field. Under the leadership of S.P. The Queen created a ballistic missile and manned spacecraft. On October 4, 1957, the world's first artificial Earth satellite was launched. On April 12, 1961, Yuri Alekseevich Gagarin was the first to fly around the Earth on the Vostok spacecraft. In subsequent years, several flights of multi-seat spacecraft were carried out. On March 18, 1965, the whole world was informed about the new victory of the Soviet people in space exploration. During the flight of the Voskhod-2 spacecraft, cosmonaut A.A. Leonov was the first in history to step out of a ship into outer space. The ship was commanded by Colonel P.A. Belyaev, a native of the village of Chelishchevo, Babushkinsky district of the Vologda region. The flights of cosmonauts opened up opportunities for further exploration of outer space.

Researchers have achieved significant results in the field of cybernetics, electronics and computer technology. A. Prokhorov and N. Basov (together with the American physicist C. Townes), Academicians N.N. Semenov (together with the American researcher S. Hinshelwood), L.D. Landau et al. Entered into the practice of Soviet scientists speaking at international congresses and conferences. It became obvious that the "Iron Curtain" separating the East and the West was beginning to collapse.

In the early 1960s, anti-religious propaganda was placed on a scientific basis. Religion was seen as the main opponent of the scientific worldview. In order to strengthen the atheistic education of citizens, the journal “Science and Religion” was published, and Houses of Scientific Atheism were opened. The circulation of anti-religious literature increased. All these measures contributed to the education of the scientific and materialistic worldview among the Soviet people.

Social sphere. By the end of the 1950s, changes had taken place in the social structure of society, which was reflected by the All-Union Population Census of the USSR conducted in 1959. The population of the country has grown. The development of the natural resources of the eastern regions led to an increase in the population of Western and Eastern Siberia, the Far East. The city dwellers accounted for about half of the country's population. The number of workers in the total population has increased, the number of workers has decreased

percentage of rural residents and collective farm peasantry.

Measures were taken to improve the well-being of the people. For teenagers, a 6-hour working day was established. For other workers and employees, it was reduced by two hours on Saturdays and holidays. In July 1956, the Law on State Prizes was adopted. The gradual implementation of a program to increase wages for low-paid groups of workers and employees has begun.

The scale of housing construction has increased. The industrialization of construction work and the use of prefabricated reinforced concrete contributed to the acceleration of its pace. In the second half of the 1950s, almost a quarter of the country's population moved into new apartments.

"Thaw" in the public life of the country. In the second half of the 1950s, the policy aimed at establishing law in the socio-political sphere continued. The justice system was reformed to strengthen the rule of law. New criminal legislation was developed and approved. A regulation on prosecutorial oversight was adopted. The legislative powers of the Union republics were expanded.

Under the leadership of N.S. Khrushchev, a draft of a new program of the CPSU was prepared, the approval of which took place in 1961 at the XXII Party Congress. The new program proclaimed the entry of countries into the period of "full-scale communist construction." The program defined the tasks of building communism: achieving the highest per capita output in the world, transition to communist self-government, education of a new person. Implementation of program tasks was planned for the next two decades. “The current generation of Soviet people will live under communism,” N.S. Khrushchev. The congress adopted a new charter of the CPSU, providing for the expansion of the rights of local party cells, the introduction of a system for updating parties -

ny posts, expansion of the public beginnings in party work.

In 1962, in connection with the aggravation of the food situation, retail prices for certain foodstuffs (meat, milk, butter, etc.) were raised. This resulted in mass protests of the urban population. The workers of one of the largest factories in Novocherkassk went on strike. Weapons were used against the strikers who organized the demonstration. Innovations in domestic policy caused dissatisfaction among many social groups. Part of the party economic apparatus showed growing dissatisfaction with the instability of society and the measures taken to restructure the party, in particular, the reorganization of party committees along the lines of production.

Thus, the result of ill-conceived measures was the aggravation of the food problem. A unified technical and technological policy within industrial sectors was violated. The new Program of the CPSU, especially the provision on the speedy resolution of social issues, found a response in the country and caused a massive labor upsurge of the population. However, the deterioration of the economic situation, the inconsistency and ill-conceivedness of the ongoing reforms in the country led to an increase in opposition sentiments in society.

CONCLUSION

So, we have considered one of the periods in the history of our Motherland. It was not an easy period. It was a period of post-war restoration of the national economy, a period of reforms and transformations.

The Great Patriotic War ended, and the Soviet people began peaceful creative work. The destroyed cities and villages were reborn from the ruins and ashes. The mass labor heroism of the Soviet people contributed to the restoration of the national economy.

Gradually, the revival of the Soviet Union began. Reforms came one after another. Nikita Sergeevich was in a hurry - he wanted to see a lot during his lifetime. He hurried and made mistakes, suffered defeats from the opposition and rose again. The reason for many failures of N.S. Khrushchev, indeed, was in a hurry and his explosive character. However, in all his affairs, the desire to ensure that our country was the first was always clearly visible. From now on, not a single important international issue could be resolved without the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union owned not only nuclear weapons, but also intercontinental missiles capable of delivering them to a given point in the world. Since that time, the United States has lost invulnerability from across the ocean. Now they are under the same threat as the USSR. If until that moment there was one superpower in the world, now a second one has appeared, weaker, but having sufficient weight to determine the entire world politics. The Americans, who underestimated the capabilities of their enemy, were shocked. From now on, the United States had to reckon with the Soviet Union and reckon seriously.

The price of the victories of the Soviet people was considerable. World leadership presented a bill, and this bill was no small one. Less and less funds remained in the budget for improving the life of an ordinary Soviet person. Naturally, this did not arouse the delight of people. But still, concern for the needs was manifested not in words, but in deeds. The Soviet people saw with their own eyes that such an acute problem as housing is being solved and is being solved tangibly. More and more manufactured goods appeared in stores. Aimed to feed people agriculture. However, difficulties continued to occur. The opposition of N.S. played on these difficulties. Khrushchev.

In 1964, the policy of reforms carried out by N.S. Khrushchev. The transformations of this period were the first and most significant attempt to reform Soviet society, but only partially succeeded in overcoming the Stalinist legacy and updating political and social structures.

In October 1964 N.S. Khrushchev was relieved of all posts and dismissed. (The first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU was L.I. Brezhnev, one of the initiators and organizers of the removal of N.S. Khrushchev.)

N.S. Khrushchev died in 1971 and was buried at the Novodevichy Cemetery. An original bust was erected on the grave, made by the now famous Ernst Neizvestny, who at one time did not find mutual understanding with N.S. Khrushchev and was forced to emigrate. One half of the bust is dark, and the other is light, which really objectively reflects the activities of N.S. Khrushchev, who left a significant mark on the history of the Soviet Union.

LITERATURE

1. History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. - M., 1976.

2. History of the Soviet Union. v.2. - M., 1990.

3. Light and shadows of the "great decade": N.S. Khrushchev and his time. - L., 1989.

4. Foreign policy of the Soviet Union. 1949 M., 1953.

5. Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. Short biography. M., 1947.

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The program for mobilizing the country's forces to fight the aggressor, formulated in the directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of June 29

1941 and in a speech by the Chairman of the GKO I.V. Stalin on July 3, determined the direction, nature and scope of practical measures to create a well-coordinated military economy in a short time.

In developing its economic policy for the period of the war, the Communist Party proceeded from Lenin's proposition that the restructuring of the economy on a war footing was of a comprehensive nature, that the entire national economy should be placed at the service of the front and the interests of organizing a stable rear. A powerful industrial base, created in the prewar years, ensured the successful solution of this problem.

In restructuring the country's economy, the party directed all its forces and means to achieve a sharp increase in the level of military production by the maximum and purposeful use of the military-economic potential of the socialist state, to achieve a decisive material and technical superiority of the Soviet Armed Forces over the troops of fascist Germany and thereby ensure the achievement of complete victory over the enemy.

The most important military-economic measures were the mobilization and redistribution of material, financial and labor resources to meet the needs of the front, the switching of civilian industries to the production of military products; the evacuation of the main productive forces from the threatened areas, the fastest deployment and their introduction into the number of those operating in the east of the country; maintaining the level of agricultural production in the amount necessary to supply the front and rear with food and raw materials; restructuring of the work of transport on a military basis; redistribution of foreign trade turnover; reorganization of economic management.

In the complex process of restructuring the national economy on a war footing, special attention was paid to the defense industry. First of all, the front was supposed to receive military equipment, weapons, ammunition, and equipment from it. Moreover, the new nature of the work of defense enterprises did not consist in changing the range of products, but mainly in the transition to mass production of the most advanced types of weapons and military equipment.

The restructuring of the military and civilian industries was a single, interconnected process. It required an increase in the production of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, chemical products, raw materials and electricity. Perestroika entailed a change in technology and production technology, required further intensification and technical improvement of production processes. At the same time, it was necessary to ensure the strictest economy in all branches of the national economy, in the expenditure of the most important materials, in order to create additional opportunities for increasing the output of military products. All this was carried out under the direct supervision of the Central Committee of the Party and the State Defense Committee. The main branches of the military economy were in charge of members and candidate members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. So, in addition to the State Planning Committee of the USSR, N. A. Voznesensky was in charge of the production of weapons and ammunition, V. M. Molotov - tanks, G. M. Malenkov - aircraft and aircraft engines, A. I. Mikoyan - food, fuel and clothing property, A. A. Andreev and L. M. Kaganovich - rail transportation. Experienced party and economic workers headed the main industrial people's commissariats: A. I. Shakhurin - aviation industry, V. A. Malyshev - medium machine building, and then the tank industry, D. F. Ustinov - weapons, P. I. Parshin - mortar industry, B. L. Vannikov - ammunition, I. F. Tevosyan - ferrous metallurgy, A. I. Efremov - machine-tool industry, V. V. Vakhrushev - coal. Almost three-quarters of all members of the Central Committee and half of the candidate members of the Central Committee took a direct part in the organization of the war economy ( History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, vol. 5, book. 1, page 276.). The efforts of workers from all levels of the party apparatus were directed to the solution of military-economic problems.

A well-thought-out arrangement of leading party cadres ensured the necessary unity of the political, economic and military leadership of the country. Lenin's position on the strictest centralization "at the disposal of all the forces and resources of the socialist republics" ( V. I. Lenin. Full coll. cit., vol. 38, p. 400.) was rigorously implemented. The Communist Party and the Soviet government carried out a number of organizational and economic measures, which began with a revision of economic plans. Following the commissioning of the mobilization plan for the production of ammunition and the national economic plan for the third quarter of 1941, it was considered expedient to have a general military economic plan for a longer period.

On July 4, the State Defense Committee instructed a specially created commission headed by N. A. Voznesensky "to develop a military-economic plan for ensuring the country's defense, bearing in mind the use of resources and enterprises existing on the Volga, in Western Siberia and the Urals, as well as resources and enterprises, exported to the indicated areas in the order of evacuation "( Decisions of the party and government on economic issues. Collection of documents for 50 years. Vol. 3, 1941-1952 M., 1968, p. 42.).

On August 16, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution approving a new military-economic plan for the 4th quarter of 1941 and 1942 for the regions of the Volga region, the Urals, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia ( Decisions of the party and government on economic issues. Collection of documents for 50 years. Vol. 3, 1941-1952 M., 1968, pp. 44-48.). In essence, the plan defined the basic principles for the accelerated development of the Soviet military economy and the tasks of deploying a military-industrial base of the Soviet Union in the eastern regions of the country, where it was planned to establish mass production of aircraft engines, aircraft, tanks, tank armor, small arms, all types of artillery pieces, mortars and ammunition. A program was developed to increase the production of electricity, aviation gasoline, iron, steel, rolled products, aluminum, copper, ammonium nitrate, nitric acid, coal and oil production in the eastern regions. In the general plan for capital construction, the share of defense people's commissariats increased. The number of construction projects for industrial enterprises, deployed during the years of the third five-year plan, was reduced from 5700 to 614. Only construction projects continued that could be completed within a year. The plan for the fourth quarter envisaged funding for the restoration of 825 evacuated enterprises, primarily of defense significance.

In the field of agriculture, it was planned to increase the area under grain and industrial crops in the eastern regions of the RSFSR, in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Almost all large agricultural engineering plants were transferred to the jurisdiction of the people's commissariats of the military industry.

The role of the Ural-Siberian railways increased. The military-economic plan provided for the reconstruction and expansion of railway junctions and stations, the construction of second tracks on the lines connecting Siberia with the Urals and the Urals with the Volga region.

The creation of a powerful military-industrial base in the east, begun on the eve of the war, continued at an increasing pace. All the metal, materials and equipment received under the accumulation plans for the previous quarters of 1941 were redistributed to the enterprises of the central and eastern regions, and the state reserves of fuel, metal, food and industrial goods were increased.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the State Defense Committee paid special attention to the development of the metallurgical industry. A significant addition to the plan was the decision to further deploy in the east in the shortest possible time a powerful metallurgical base capable of fully satisfying the growing needs of military production, especially in high-quality metal and rolled products. In the Urals and Western Siberia, within a year and a half, it was planned to build and put into operation 15 blast furnaces, 41 open-hearth furnaces, 8 Bessemer converters, 13 electric furnaces, 14 rolling and 3 pipe mills, 10 coke oven batteries. For the fastest commissioning of new capacities, the production bases of the Magnitogorsk, Novo-Tagil, Kuznetsk, Zlatoust metallurgical, Pervouralsk and Sinarsk pipe plants were used, as well as technological and power equipment transferred from the metallurgical enterprises of the south and center ( IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 6312, ll. 1-5.).

Significant changes were made to the state budget. Allocations for military needs in the second half of 1941 increased by 20.6 billion rubles in comparison with the first half of the year.

The restructuring of the national economy and the creation of a well-coordinated military economy, capable of providing the front with the necessary material and technical means, largely depended on the level of party leadership in all spheres of the country's economic life.

The Communist Party raised and put into action all the forces of the country in the interests of the successful implementation of the military-economic plan adopted by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

Already the first weeks of the war convincingly showed that the party, its leading bodies, the party apparatus, having the experience accumulated in the course of socialist construction, successfully solved complex military and economic problems. However, this did not exclude the need to change some of the usual forms and methods of organizational and political work of the party in relation to the management of economic life in war conditions. The changes went along the line of strengthening organizational centralism in the system of party leadership, increasing the personal responsibility of party leaders for the state of the economy, and the formation, if necessary, of emergency party bodies.

Established before the war (at the end of 1939) sectoral industrial departments in the central committees of the Communist Parties of the Union republics, in the regional committees, regional committees and in many city committees and district committees of large industrial centers were closely connected with enterprises, knew well their production capabilities, needs, degree of readiness for military orders. As new branches of production were deployed, corresponding departments headed by secretaries were created in the party organs. This made it possible to promptly and directly participate in the implementation of plans approved by the State Defense Committee, to achieve the rapid establishment of the production of military products, intersectoral production cooperation. Knowledge of local economic conditions made it possible for party organs, in cases where the operational ties between people's commissariats and enterprises of their industries, were violated, to take responsibility for solving not only economic issues of a general nature, but also special ones - of an industrial and technical order. This was facilitated by the fact that the first secretaries of the regional committees and regional committees of the party, as a rule, were authorized GKOs in the field.

The Party organizations, through their intense activity, ensured the implementation of the directives and instructions of the State Defense Committee on questions of economic construction.

Increasing the role of party leadership of the national economy by no means diminished the responsibility of state organs for managing the economic life of the country. In its day-to-day activities in developing the military economy, the State Defense Committee relied on the apparatus of the Council of People's Commissars and the State Planning Committee of the USSR, the union-republican people's commissariats and other state institutions. The role of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR as a body of state management of the economy in wartime not only did not weaken, but even increased.

One of the important acts of the Soviet government, which to a certain extent gave direction to changes in the state apparatus, was the decree of July 1, 1941 "On the expansion of the rights of people's commissars of the USSR in wartime conditions." Under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Committee for the Food and Clothing Supply of the Soviet Army and the main departments for supplying the sectors of the national economy with coal, oil, and timber were formed. In the process of reorganization of the state apparatus, there was a sharp reduction in the staff of people's commissariats, institutions and administrative units. Specialists from institutions were sent to plants and factories, to production.

The work of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, the system of planning and supply of the economy were reorganized. Departments of armaments, ammunition, shipbuilding, aircraft building and tank building were created in the State Planning Commission. On the basis of the instructions of the Central Committee of the Party and the State Defense Committee, they developed plans for the production of military equipment, weapons, ammunition by enterprises, regardless of their departmental subordination, and controlled the state of the material and technical support of military production. Gosplan received daily reports on the fulfillment of GKO assignments. It had its representatives in 25 economic regions of the country for operational communication with production.

The special conditions for the development of the Soviet military economy gave rise to operational forms of economic planning, including short-term production schedules (from one to three months), task plans for all branches of the defense industry and transport.

On the basis of the directives of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the State Defense Committee, the central committees of the Communist Parties of the Union republics, the regional and regional committees, and Soviet authorities developed plans for the restructuring of industry and agriculture in their economic regions.

The military-economic measures of the Communist Party for the restructuring of the national economy organically included the task of providing it with personnel, since the front immediately diverted significant human resources from work at enterprises. For the correct and planned distribution and redistribution of labor resources, on June 30, 1941, the party and the government established a committee for the distribution of labor under the Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR ( Later - the Committee for accounting and distribution of labor force.) under the chairmanship of P. G. Moskatov, who headed the Main Directorate of Labor Reserves.

Relying on objective economic laws and using the advantages of the Soviet social and state system, the Communist Party brought into action all the forces of the country to organize a rebuff to the enemy.

The transfer of the productive forces of the USSR to the east. The relocation of the main productive forces from the threatened regions of the country to the east was a forced measure caused by the extremely unfavorable situation at the front. At the same time, it became the most important link in the economic policy of the Communist Party, aimed at deploying the country's main military-industrial base deep in the rear.

The Nazis hoped to repeat their "European experience", to capture the huge industrial potential, material and human resources of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet people had to take effective and urgent measures to frustrate the plans of the enemy. The deployment of the production of military equipment, the provision of quantitative and qualitative superiority over the Nazi invaders in all types of weapons largely depended on the pace of the movement of population and production resources from west to east.

The Central Committee of the Party, the State Defense Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR launched an enormous amount of work to relocate the country's productive forces. It was led by the Evacuation Council, whose chairman was N. M. Shvernik, and his deputies - A. N. Kosygin and M. G. Pervukhin. The Council also included A. I. Mikoyan, M. Z. Saburov and others ( On September 26, 1941, the State Defense Committee, by a special resolution, organized the Department for the Evacuation of the Population under the Council for Evacuation. The department was headed by the deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR K. D. Pamfilov, who at the same time was introduced to the Evacuation Council as one of the deputy chairmen.). Since July 11, control over the movement of enterprises has been carried out by a special group of inspectors, created by decision of the State Defense Committee under the Council for Evacuation, headed by A. N. Kosygin.

The Council determined the procedure, terms, sequence and final points for the evacuation of people and material values. Its decisions, approved by the government, were binding on all party, Soviet and economic bodies.

A well-organized operational system of evacuation agencies has developed in the center and in the localities. At all allied people's commissariats, authorized by the Council ( By the end of 1941, the apparatus of authorized people for the evacuation of the population numbered about 3 thousand people (Echelons go to the east. From the history of the relocation of the productive forces of the USSR in 1941 - 1942. M., 1966, pp. 10, 18).) became deputy people's commissars, and commissions were created from experienced, qualified employees of the apparatus, which developed specific proposals and plans for relocation in various sectors of the economy and individual large enterprises. In addition, the people's commissariats sent their representatives to the evacuated plants and factories and to the points of their new location.

In the republics and regions under the threat of enemy occupation, evacuation commissions were formed, and at many railway junctions, stations and marinas - evacuation centers.

The export of industrial equipment and other material values ​​to the eastern regions of the country has become the most important business not only of local party and Soviet organizations, but also of the rear services of the fronts and armies.

From the very beginning of the evacuation, a huge responsibility fell on the shoulders of transport workers, especially railway workers. On the instructions of the Central Committee of the Party, the State Defense Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the transport people's commissariats urgently developed specific plans and measures to ensure the unhindered movement of goods exported to the east.

To provide practical assistance to the bodies of the People's Commissariat of Railways (NKPS), they were sent to large railway stations and nodes authorized by the Council for Evacuation ( Central archive of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (hereinafter - CA AUCCTU), f. 1, d. 39, l. 45.). Later, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks instructed to send deputy people's commissars of the navy and senior officials of the political department of the People's Commissariat for Marine Fleet to all sea basins ( Echelons heading east, p. 155.).

The transfer to the rear from the western regions of the country of enterprises that had defense significance began from the first days of the war. Already on June 29, 1941, a decision was made to move 11 aircraft factories to the east from the threatened zone. Two days later, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks issued decisions on the evacuation of 10 enterprises of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition from Leningrad and on the transfer to the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works of the armored mill of the Ilyich Mariupol Plant ( Institute of History of the USSR of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (hereinafter referred to as II of the USSR). Documents and materials, inv. No. 91, ll. 83-83a.). Soon the State Defense Committee recognized the need to transfer 26 factories of the People's Commissariat of Arms from the central regions and Leningrad to the cities of the Volga region, the Urals, Siberia and Central Asia. On the basis of these enterprises in new places, it was planned to expand the production of weapons, cartridges and various devices for weapons ( IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 5418, l. one.).

On July 20, the State Defense Committee ordered the people's commissar of the aviation industry A.I. Shakhurin to establish the order of transferring the factories' shops so that the evacuation was carried out without violating the production plan.

The difficult situation on the fronts of the Patriotic War forced a mass evacuation almost simultaneously from Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Moldova, Crimea, the North-Western, and later the Central industrial regions. The evacuation from the western border areas was especially tense. Enormous efforts were required by local party, Soviet, trade union, Komsomol and military bodies, the population, workers of enterprises and transport to ensure the salvation of millions of people, the most important industrial equipment and other material and cultural values ​​from the enemy.

A significant burden of this most difficult task fell on the shoulders of the youth. More than 32 thousand production youth groups, brigades and detachments were employed in evacuation work at enterprises in the frontline zone ( Central archive of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth Union (hereinafter - "CA VLKSM"), f. 1, he. 1, d. 255, l. 67.). They dismantled, loaded and shipped equipment around the clock.

Echelons with cargo and people were moving eastward in a continuous stream, and primarily to the regions of the Middle and Southern Urals, the Volga region, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Within three months alone, more than 1,360 large, mainly military, enterprises were relocated ( N. Voznesensky. The military economy of the USSR during the Patriotic War. M., 1948, p. 41.).

With incredible difficulties, under continuous enemy bombing and shelling, the evacuation of enterprises and the population of the Ukrainian SSR took place. On July 4, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine and the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR sent a special directive to all party and Soviet organizations of the republic, in which an urgent task was put forward to speed up the "shipment of valuables, equipment of enterprises and food" ( II of the USSR. Documents and materials, inv. No. 91, ll. 56-58.).

Party organs made great efforts to ensure the clarity and coherence of the redeployment. Recalling the evacuation of large factories, the former secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk regional party committee, K.S. They were acquainted with the GKO resolution. Following this, the workers of the regional committee themselves went there. To the engine plant - L. I. Brezhnev, to the machine-building plant - the head of the department of the regional committee N. L. Telenchak and I. At meetings of the heads of workshops and secretaries of party organizations, all comrades were acquainted with the plan and procedure for the evacuation of equipment and personnel. The evacuation was carried out in an organized manner, without nervousness and haste. The equipment, literally to the last screw and nut, was installed and laid on timely submitted platforms. Engineering and technical personnel, workers and employees were provided with food, money.. By mid-July, the last one was sent, as we called it "special" echelon" ( K. Grusheva. Then, in the forty-first ... M., 1972, p. 38.).

In early August 1941, due to the threat of Nazi troops reaching the Dnieper, the evacuation of industrial facilities in the Dnieper region and the Crimea reached its limit. Only through the Kyiv junction, 450 echelons were sent to the east, which took out the equipment of 197 large enterprises of the Ukrainian capital and over 350 thousand Kyivans ( Whale hero. Kiev, 1961, pp. 191-194; History of Kiev. T. P. Kiev, 1960, p. 487.),

Since mid-August, a mass evacuation of enterprises and the population of Zaporozhye and the eastern regions of the Dnepropetrovsk regions began, primarily units of the Dnieper hydroelectric power station, large plants, factories and power plants.

In an extremely difficult situation, many enterprises of Zaporozhye were evacuated under enemy fire. By the end of August, about 5,500 workers were employed in the dismantling and shipment of equipment from large Zaporozhye metallurgical facilities.

The scale of the evacuation of enterprises and the population can be judged at least by the fact that it took about 8 thousand wagons to evacuate Zaporizhstal alone ( Zaporozhye region during the Great Patriotic War (1941 - 1945). Collection of documents. Zaporozhye, 1959, p. 56.). In total, about 320 thousand tons of machine tools, structures, metal and other cargo were dismantled from the Zaporozhye group of factories and transferred to the rear. By the beginning of October, the removal of the main equipment of the Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk plants was completed. In total, from Ukraine during June - December, about 550 large industrial enterprises were taken to the rear (taking into account the construction organizations of the republic, plants and factories of the Crimea).

In extremely difficult conditions, the population was evacuated and the productive forces were relocated from the territory of the Byelorussian SSR. On June 23, the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belarus issued a decision on the immediate evacuation of children and property from cities that were under shelling and bombardment. However, the rapid advance of the fascist troops did not allow for the evacuation of the Brest, Belostok, Baranovichi and Pinsk regions, which were occupied a few days after the start of the war. The evacuation from the eastern part of the republic was more organized. Thus, the operational headquarters of the Gomel regional committee of the CP(b)B organized the removal of 38 enterprises of union-republican significance. For three days, the largest plant in Belarus, Gomselmash, was dismantled. More than 1000 wagons with people, valuable equipment and materials went to the Urals from this enterprise ( P. Lipilo. The CPB was the organizer and leader of the partisan movement in Belarus during the Great Patriotic War. Minsk, 1959, p. 21.).

In total, 109 large and medium-sized industrial enterprises (39 of federal and 70 of republican significance) were relocated from the territory of Belarus to the eastern regions of the country.

In no less tense atmosphere, the evacuation from the Baltics took place. Despite the continuous raids of enemy aircraft and the actions of saboteurs, railway workers and workers of enterprises in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia loaded 4-5 times more wagons than usual. Transport ships located in the ports of the Baltic coast were also used. But due to lack of time, it was not possible to take out a significant part of the material values ​​from the Baltic republics.

Evacuation transportation from Leningrad and the region, mainly by rail, began even before the appearance of a direct enemy threat to the city on the Neva. The entire organization of this work was under the control of A. N. Kosygin, who was sent to the city as an authorized GKO. First of all, the equipment of those defense enterprises that could not produce products under the created conditions was exported. The GKO decision to move the Kirov and Izhora plants to the rear was made on August 26, 1941, but two days later their export was temporarily stopped ( The evacuation of factories resumed on October 4, 1941.).

On August 29, 1941, the enemy cut the last railway line. By this time, according to the operational reports of the NKPS (from June 29 to August 26), 773,590 people were evacuated from the city of Lenin, including refugees from the Baltic states and the Karelian-Finnish USSR ( Central Archive of the Ministry of Railways of the USSR (hereinafter - CA MPS), f. 33a, he. 49, d. 1241, l. 80.), as well as dozens of large enterprises.

Later, already in winter, the removal of the population and equipment from Leningrad was carried out by air and through Lake Ladoga - along the Road of Life. Only from January 22 to April 15, 1942, 554,186 people were transported from Leningrad across the ice of Lake Ladoga ( 900 heroic days. Collection of documents and materials about the heroic struggle of the working people of Leningrad in 1941-1944. M.-L., 1966, p. 106.).

For several months, the evacuation of the population, enterprises and institutions of the central regions of the RSFSR, Moscow and the Moscow region continued. It took on a particularly large scale in the fall in connection with the threat hanging over the capital, and continued until December 1941. By the end of November, most of the equipment of 498 of the most important enterprises was removed from Moscow and the Moscow region to the rear areas. By this time, the total number of evacuated Muscovites had reached 2 million people ( History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941 -1945, v. 2, pp. 148, 258.).

Despite the enormous difficulties, the transfer of productive forces to the rear areas of the country proceeded on the whole smoothly and in accordance with the scheduled dates. In the second half of 1941, 1,523 industrial enterprises, including 1,360 large plants and factories, were completely or partially taken out of the front-line zone to the east. Of these, 226 are located in the Volga region, 667 in the Urals, 244 in Western Siberia, 78 in Eastern Siberia, 308 in Kazakhstan and Central Asia.

Together with the relocated enterprises, up to 30-40 percent of workers, engineers and technicians arrived. Thanks to the initiative of the Party, Soviet, trade union, Komsomol, military and economic bodies of the eastern regions of the country, the entire able-bodied population was immediately actively involved in work at these enterprises.

At the same time, stocks of grain and food, tens of thousands of tractors and agricultural machines were evacuated to the rear. Kolkhozes and state farms in the eastern regions of the country in the second half of 1941 accepted 2393.3 thousand head of livestock displaced from the front line ( Y. Harutyunyan. Soviet peasantry during the Great Patriotic War. M., 1970, p. 52.).

Hundreds of scientific institutes, laboratories, schools, libraries, as well as unique works of art from the museums of Moscow, Leningrad, Kyiv and other cities were taken deep into the country.

The evacuation traffic in 1941 required about 1.5 million railroad cars.

From July to the end of navigation, the river fleet managed to take out more than 870 thousand tons of cargo to the rear.

The most important condition for the successful movement of productive forces from west to east was the selfless work of the teams of the evacuated enterprises and institutions. Workers, employees, collective farmers, all working people showed exceptional endurance, courage, selfless loyalty to the cause of the Party and the socialist Motherland in those difficult days.

In the process of evacuation, the friendship of the peoples of the USSR, cooperation and fraternal mutual assistance of the Soviet republics manifested themselves with renewed vigor. The relocation of industrial enterprises has become a matter not only for the working people of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic republics, Moldova, the western regions of the RSFSR, but also for the workers of all rear areas.

The deployment of evacuated enterprises in the eastern regions was largely possible because during the years of the pre-war five-year plans large-scale industry, a fuel and energy base were created here, mineral deposits were explored, and new transport routes were laid.

The relocation of productive forces to the east is one of the brightest pages in the history of the Great Patriotic War. “It is impossible not to admire the feat of Soviet workers, engineers, production commanders, railway workers, who ensured the evacuation of many hundreds of large enterprises and more than 10 million people to the east,” noted Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. the country was displaced thousands of kilometers. There, in uninhabited places, often in the open air, machines and machine tools were literally put into action from railway platforms "( L. Brezhnev. Lenin's course. Speeches and articles. T. I. M., 1970, p. 133.).

By their heroic efforts, the Soviet people frustrated the Nazis' calculations of disorganizing the Soviet military economy.

Industrial restructuring. The interests of the all-round development of military production required the expansion of the country's raw materials and fuel and energy base, and above all in the eastern regions, where the main arsenal of the Soviet Union was being built at an accelerated pace.

In this regard, the most difficult tasks faced the metallurgists of the East. They had to not only significantly increase the output of metal, but also significantly change the technology of its production, in the shortest possible time to master the production of new grades of cast iron, steel, armored products.

Before the war, the proportion of quality steels in the metallurgy of the eastern regions was small. At the Magnitogorsk plant, for example, it was no more than 8.2 percent.

On June 22, the Magnitogorsk City Party Committee took control of the work of the plant in fulfilling military orders, and especially in producing high-quality steel grades. An active participation in the organization of the production of such steel was taken by a committee of scientists created under the city committee. As a result, already during the second half of 1941, the steelmakers of Magnitogorsk managed to master the production of more than 30 new grades of steel and set up its special rolling. Due to the lack of the necessary rolling mills in the Urals, for the first time in the history of world and domestic metallurgy, blooming was adapted for this purpose.

On July 23, the pressing shop of the plant produced the first armor plate. In October 1941, Magnitogorsk residents increased its output by 3 times compared to August, and by 7 times in December. Metallurgists of the Urals gave high-quality armor for tanks for a month and a half, ahead of the deadline set by the government. The Communist Party and the Soviet government appreciated the labor feat of the Magnitogorsk metallurgists, equal in value to winning a major battle. Many of them were awarded orders and medals, and the director of the plant G. I. Nosov and the deputy chief mechanic N. A. Ryzhenko were awarded the State Prize.

In a short time, the Kuznetsk Iron and Steel Works was transferred to the production of high-quality steel and rolled products. The Zlatoust plant in the second half of 1941 mastered the smelting of 78 new grades of metal.

Soviet scientists in collaboration with engineers, technicians and workers in an unprecedentedly short time managed to solve an extremely important task: to master the smelting of high-grade steel in ordinary open-hearth furnaces.

Previously, the metallurgy of the Urals and Western Siberia received manganese from Ukraine and Transcaucasia for the production of high-quality metal. In 1940, the share of the eastern regions in the extraction of manganese ore did not exceed 8.4 percent. Therefore, the organization of forced production of manganese has become of paramount importance. The miners of Nikopol, who arrived in the Northern Urals, began to carry out this important military and economic task. And already at the end of 1941, the first Ural manganese went to the ferrous metallurgy plants of the eastern regions. The Urals and Eastern Siberia began to produce 13.7 percent of the manganese mined in the country ( IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 32, l. 143.). Ural and then Kazakh manganese ore made it possible to start producing blast-furnace ferromanganese at metallurgical enterprises in the Urals and Siberia. This was a major victory for the miners and metallurgists, which made it possible to sharply increase the output of high-quality rolled products. Its share rose from 23 percent in the first half of 1941 to 49 percent in the second, and in the eastern metallurgical plants from 36.9 percent in July to 70.8 percent in October.

In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the extraction of tungsten ore, vanadium, molybdenum and other rare metals necessary for the production of alloyed steels was developed at an accelerated pace.

The military industry absorbed a huge amount of non-ferrous metals. Therefore, in the second half of 1941, the Soviet government increased capital investments in the development of non-ferrous metallurgy by 25 percent compared with the second half of 1940. In order to speed up the commissioning of new production capacities, in July 1941 the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR was instructed to send ten construction battalions.

At the same time, aluminum plants were being built in the Sverdlovsk region and Kuzbass.

Five factories for the processing and rolling of non-ferrous metals were built at a rapid pace. The production capacity of the country's largest Balkhash copper smelter in Kazakhstan was increased.

In connection with the temporary loss of Donbass and the heavy damage inflicted by the Nazis on the coal basin near Moscow, the fuel problem sharply worsened in the country. At the same time, the restructuring of the metallurgical industry and the expansion of military production in the eastern regions required a significant increase in coal production, primarily coking. The Kuznetsk basin, which provided about 14 percent of its all-Union production before the war, soon became, along with the Karaganda basin, the main supplier of coking coal and chemical products.

In order to increase coal production, it was necessary to improve the use of existing mines, to establish the sinking of additional workings, to lengthen the lines of faces and equip them with mechanisms. A group of economic, engineering and technical workers, experienced specialists from the Donbass, who at the end of 1941 - the beginning of 1942 arrived in the Kuzbass and the Karaganda basin, rendered great assistance to the miners of the east. Following her, miners arrived, trains with equipment and various units. The coal engineering plant named after Parkhomenko moved from Voroshilovgrad to Karaganda, and the Mining Institute with faculty and students moved from Moscow.

The delivery of Kuznetsk and Karaganda coal to metallurgical plants, especially to the Urals, was extremely difficult due to the maximum load on the railways. Therefore, the construction of new mines and coal cuts in the eastern regions was of great importance for increasing coal production.

The oil industry found itself in more favorable conditions compared to other industries. All oil refineries were quickly switched to the production of aviation gasoline (primarily high-octane), fuel and lubricating oils for tanks and ships.

During June - October 1941, the level of oil production was higher than in the same months of the previous year ( ). However, by the end of the year, due to the lack of pipes, as well as due to transport difficulties, the total oil production was reduced and in December amounted to only 65.8 percent of the June 1941 level ( IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 32, l. 172.).

Taking into account the huge demand for oil products, the party and the government, in accordance with the military-economic plan for the fourth quarter of 1941 and 1942, outlined a large capital construction in the regions of the Second Baku, in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Along with this, the task was set to speed up the construction of new and the expansion of a number of operating oil refineries and plants in Ufa, Saratov, Syzran, Orsk, Ishimbai and other places.

From the very first months of the war, measures were taken to further develop the country's electric power economy. The existing capacities in the east were not enough to meet the needs of the growing military industry. The redistribution of electricity resources was carried out: first of all, it was supplied to the military, metallurgical and coal industries; the consumption of electricity by a number of other industries and the population was significantly limited. On July 10, the Soviet government adopted a decision "On speeding up the construction of power plants in the Urals." Work was carried out at an accelerated pace to put into the number of operating power plants in Western Siberia.

To speed up the start-up of new power plants, the volume of construction and installation work was reduced, thermal and electrical circuits, and the structures of buildings and structures were simplified.

An exceptionally important role in military production was played by machine building and enterprises of metal products. A number of the largest machine-building plants were transferred to the defense people's commissariats. Heavy engineering switched almost entirely to the production of tanks, guns, mortars, and ammunition.

To organize a well-coordinated military economy, it was necessary, along with the restructuring of the work of existing enterprises, to launch new capital construction.

The organization of construction work, terms and norms of design, construction methods changed radically. The list of shock construction projects included military enterprises, power plants, enterprises of the metallurgical, fuel and chemical industries, and railways.

By decision of the State Defense Committee of July 8, 1941, special construction and assembly units (OSMCH) were created in the Narkomstroy system on the basis of existing construction and assembly trusts, which were, to a certain extent, paramilitary organizations. They secured permanent engineering and technical personnel and skilled workers.

On September 11, 1941, in order to accelerate the commissioning of industrial enterprises with the minimum amount of materials, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a decision "On the construction of industrial enterprises in wartime conditions" ( Decisions of the party and government on economic issues, vol. 3, p. 49.), providing for the use of wooden and other materials in construction and limiting the use of metal and reinforced concrete for this purpose.

The front of construction work has moved to the east. The main construction projects were concentrated in the Urals, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia, where, along with the construction of new power plants, mines, and factories, evacuated enterprises were restored.

A great deal of work on the relocation of enterprises and the deployment of shock construction in the east of the country was carried out by such major organizers of industrial and construction business as N. A. Dygai, V. E. Dymshits, L. B. Safrazyan, K. M. Sokolov, P. A. Yudin and others.

The shock construction projects of the first war year were blast furnaces at the Magnitogorsk and Chusovoy plants, the Chebarkul high-quality steel plant, automobile plants in Ulyanovsk and Miass, the Altai tractor plant in Rubtsovsk and Sibtyazhmash in Krasnoyarsk, a number of aviation, tank plants, ammunition production plants and other enterprises of the defense industry. values.

The rapid concentration of forces and means in decisive sectors made it possible to build defense facilities of paramount importance in the shortest possible time.

The deployment of military production was accompanied by the mobilization and redistribution of not only material, but also labor resources. The problem of personnel during the war became especially acute. Conscription into the army, exclusion from the sphere of production of the population that ended up in the occupied territory, led to a reduction in the number of workers and employees from 31.5 million by the beginning of 1941 to 18.5 million by the end of the year.

The shortage of labor force in the leading branches of industry was partially compensated for by other branches of the national economy, the introduction of mandatory overtime work, and the abolition of regular and additional holidays. This made it possible to increase the equipment load by about a third ( History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, vol. 5, book. 1, page 286.).

Hundreds of thousands of Soviet patriots voluntarily came to industry, construction and transport, primarily women and youth. In the second half of 1941 alone, 500,000 housewives and 360,000 students in grades 8-10 entered production. The system of state labor reserves remained a significant source of replenishment of the ranks of qualified personnel.

Thanks to the help and assistance of party, trade union and Komsomol organizations, from July 1941 to January 1942, the Committee for the Registration and Distribution of Labor managed to transfer to the defense industry from local industries, from the service sector, industrial cooperation, public utilities and mobilize from among the unemployed urban and rural population 120,850 people. In addition, construction battalions and work columns of 608.5 thousand people were sent to coal mines, oil fields, power plants, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, construction and railway transport.

All these extraordinary measures largely determined the favorable prospects for the development of military production.

The restructuring of agriculture. Agriculture occupied one of the most important places in the mobilization of the country's economic resources. He was faced with the task of providing the front and the population in the rear with food, and industry with raw materials, and creating state stocks of food.

At the same time, it was necessary to harvest crops in a timely manner and evacuate agricultural machinery and livestock from threatened areas.

The restructuring of agriculture proceeded under exceptionally difficult and difficult conditions. The most able-bodied and qualified part of the male population of the village went to the front. Hundreds of thousands of collective farmers and collective farmers, workers of state farms were mobilized to work in industry, logging, and in front-line areas - for the construction of defensive structures. The entire able-bodied rural population, from teenagers to the elderly, took to the fields of the country. Women on the collective and state farms have always been a great force, but now all the worries are almost entirely on their shoulders. Hundreds of thousands of women have mastered tractors and combines. During the first one and a half to two months of the war, the machine and tractor stations (MTS) trained 198,000 tractor drivers and 48,000 combine operators. Almost 175 thousand of them were women ( "Peasant Woman", 1941, No. 13-14, p. 7.).

Due to the lack of people in the countryside, harvesting in 1941 was delayed. The working people of the cities of the country came to the aid of the collective farms and state farms. Millions of citizens, including schoolchildren and students, took part in the field work. In July - August 1941, after accelerated training, 25,155 tractor drivers and 16 thousand students worked on the fields of the country ( Y. Harutyunyan. Agricultural mechanics. M., 1960, p. 80.).

However, the lack of equipment adversely affected the course of agricultural work. There were not enough spare parts. Almost the entire fleet of powerful diesel tractors, most of the vehicles and a significant number of horses were sent to the active army. The total number of tractors in agriculture in terms of 15-horsepower decreased by the end of 1941 to 441.8 thousand against 683.8 thousand in 1940. The number of trucks decreased from 228.2 thousand in 1940. up to 66 thousand in 1941. Therefore, in the harvesting of the first war year, along with the use of equipment, manual labor was used. On collective farms in the rear regions of the country, 67 percent of cereal crops were harvested by horse-drawn machines and manually, and on state farms - 13 percent ( History of the USSR from ancient times to the present day. T. X. M., 1973, p. 81.).

The labor heroism of collective farmers and workers of state farms was a match for the heroism of soldiers at the front. On the collective farm and state farm fields there was a real battle for bread, for victory. In the frontline areas, every day lost for harvesting threatened the loss of the entire crop. Pravda wrote in those days: “A rich harvest is reaping, cultivated by laboring hands ... The thievish, envious fascist eyes will hoot at it. Hitler ... robbed the countries of Western Europe. And now, sowing death, ruin, poverty, hunger on its way, he is getting close to the bread of the Soviet peasant. This will not happen "( Pravda, July 28, 1941).

In Ukraine, Belarus, Moldavia, Leningrad, Smolensk, Kalinin and other regions of the RSFSR, which became the scene of battles, collective farmers, workers of state farms and MTS often harvested bread under enemy fire. In order to preserve the harvest, save herds and public buildings, the rural population in these areas organized fire protection and air defense on their own initiative. Thus, millions of poods of grain and other agricultural products were saved. The collective farms of the eastern regions of Ukraine fulfilled the grain harvesting plan in 1941 by 93.8 percent. More than 2.3 million tons of grain were harvested in the republic.

Taking measures to maintain grain production at the required level in subsequent years, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on July 20 considered and approved the plan submitted by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR to increase the sowing of winter crops in the Volga region, the Urals, Siberia and Kazakhstan ( IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 6347, l. one.). It was also recognized as expedient to expand the sowing of grain crops in the cotton-growing regions of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.

The unfavorable development of events at the front had a severe impact on agriculture. The number of collective farms decreased from 236.9 thousand in 1940 to 149.7 thousand by the end of 1941, state farms - from 4159 to 2691, MTS - from 7069 to 4898. The gross grain harvest decreased from 95.6 million tons in 1940 to 55.9 million tons in 1941. The country did not receive thousands of tons of sugar beets, sunflowers and potatoes.

The livestock population has drastically decreased. As of January 1, 1942, in comparison with the same month of the previous year, it decreased: cattle - from 54.8 million; heads to 31.4 million, pigs - from 27.6 million to 8.2 million, sheep and goats - from 91.7 million to 70.6 million, horses - from 21 million to 10 million. ( IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 32, l. 325.). Accordingly, state purchases of agricultural products also decreased.

Under these conditions, the role of the eastern regions of the country increased significantly, where already in the autumn of 1941 the total area of ​​winter crops increased significantly compared to 1940. The 1942 plan provided for a further increase in the sown area for grain, industrial, vegetable and melon crops and potatoes by more than 4 million hectares ( History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945, v. 2, pp. 167-168.).

In preparation for the spring of 1942, the collective and state farms felt even more acutely the shortage of people and draft power. Party organizations took measures to involve in collective farm and state farm production the entire population capable of work.

The problem of labor resources was not limited only to the lack of workers. Large-scale agricultural production needed experienced managers, qualified specialists, and machine operators. Most of these personnel before the war were men. The Party recommended that the local authorities more boldly nominate advanced collective farmers, mostly women, to leadership positions - to the posts of chairmen and foremen.

The problem of restoring technology has become acute. Worn-out cars needed repairs, spare parts were needed, and their production was reduced. At the beginning of 1942, on the initiative of the Komsomol members of the Ilovlinskaya MTS of the Stalingrad region, a movement began throughout the country to collect and restore parts for agricultural machines.

The city provided constant assistance to the village in the repair of equipment. Industrial enterprises, together with work teams, sent machine tools, metal and tools to the workshops of the MTS and state farms.

As a result, by the spring sowing campaign of 1942, the repair plan was almost completely completed, the main part of the tractor fleet was in working condition.

Animal husbandry experienced great difficulties: there was not enough feed, the construction of farms stopped, and veterinary services deteriorated.

In Kazakhstan, in particular, the land authorities were only half staffed with livestock specialists and veterinarians. The use of cows for field work reduced milk yields. Increased mortality and slaughter of livestock.

On March 11, 1942, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks made a decision on measures to preserve young animals and increase the number of livestock. The party and the government demanded that the young animals be fully preserved in the collective farms, state farms, private farms of collective farmers, workers and employees. The state in every possible way encouraged the collective farms that raised young animals, provided them with loans, tax benefits, allocated additional land for hayfields and pastures.

Despite the reduction in agricultural production, the Soviet peasantry did everything not to remain indebted to the front. Thanks to socialist relations of production, the country's agriculture was able to become a strong support for the front. Having mobilized all human and material resources, it was able to make full use of its material and technical base, maintain the necessary level of production of basic products and, at the cost of intense, selfless efforts of rural workers, provide food for the army and the population.

Reorganization of transport. The transfer of the economy to the rails of war was closely connected with transport, especially with the railroad. Its important role during the war consisted primarily in the fact that it ensured the uninterrupted delivery to the front of a huge number of troops, military equipment, weapons, ammunition, food and equipment, as well as mass transportation of the national economy. V. I. Lenin pointed out the special place of railway transport in modern military conflicts, calling it "the most important material factor of the war, which is of paramount importance not only for the performance of military operations, but also for supplying the Red Army with military and clothing equipment and food" ( V. I. Lenin, Poly. coll. cit., vol. 38, p. 400.).

It was possible to successfully solve the entire complex of the most complex tasks that confronted transport only by quickly restructuring its work on a military basis. The beginning of this big deal was the transfer of train traffic from June 24 to a special military schedule - letter "A", which was introduced by order of the NKPS dated June 23, 1941 instead of the military schedule of 1938 ( CA MPS, f. 43, op. 49, d. 1421, l. 2; file 1443, l. 2.). The new schedule provided for the priority advancement of military echelons and especially mobilization cargo. It was designed for maximum throughput of road sections.

In transport, a special system for regulating cargo flows began to be applied, taking into account the increased number of goods planned in a centralized manner. A significant part of the rolling stock was reequipped for the transportation of military units, military equipment, ammunition, and the wounded. In the fronts, positions of authorized NKPS were established, endowed with great rights. Measures were taken to increase the throughput capacity of the most important hubs in the eastern regions. In the rear, the construction of new railways and highways began.

The relocation of industry to the east and the new location of military enterprises required the organization of transport, taking into account changes in the economic structure of the eastern regions. Before the war, the network of Ural-Siberian roads was underdeveloped and worked with great stress. The relocation of a large industrial base here further increased the disproportion between the level of industrial development and the state of transport.

The insufficient capacity of the country's eastern railways, which was especially felt with the onset of winter, hampered economic transportation, and a number of large enterprises did not receive the required amount of raw materials and fuel. In early February, coal reserves at the Magnitogorsk Combine remained for 5-6 days. Due to the lack of ore, the Kuznetsk metallurgical plant was under threat of stopping work.

Finished products were not exported from enterprises. In January 1942, the average daily loading on railway transport was more than two times lower than pre-war figures ( G. Kumanev. Soviet railway workers during the Great Patriotic War (1941 - 1945). M., 1963, p. 99.).

The railroads lacked locomotives and fuel. At the beginning of the year, there were up to 3,000 trains without locomotives. Two-thirds of them were carrying evacuated equipment ( "Military History Journal", 1961, No. 6, p. 80.).

Urgent measures were needed to remedy the situation. On January 24, 1942, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR issued a resolution on accelerating the pace of loading and moving trains with coal along the roads of the Urals and Siberia. For the eastern highways, specific tasks were set for the implementation of this government decision.

On February 14, 1942, the Transport Committee was created under the State Defense Committee, which included I. V. Stalin (chairman), A. A. Andreev (deputy), A. I. Mikoyan, I. V. Kovalev, A. V. Khrulev, G. V. Kovalev, Z. A. Shashkov, P. P. Shirshov, A. G. Karponosov, and others. His task included the planning and coordination of transportation on the main modes of transport, the development of effective measures to improve the material and technical base of the entire transport system.

Due to the acute shortage of coal, by decision of the State Defense Committee, the locomotive fleet of a number of roads was transferred to wood fuel and fuel mixture.

At the same time, the State Defense Committee changed the structure of railway management and strengthened the leadership of the NKPS. Instead of L.M. Kaganovich, who, as noted in the GKO resolution of March 25, 1942, was unable to cope with the work in a military situation, was appointed the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, the head of the rear of the Soviet Army, General A.I. V. Khrulev.

In March and April 1942, the party and the government adopted a number of new measures to improve the operation of transport. The wages of railway workers of train and shunting crews were increased. Excess rolling stock from the western front lines moved to the east.

Thanks to these measures and the selfless work of the railway workers, transportation for the army and the national economy increased. By the beginning of May 1942, the volume of loading and unloading increased by 50 percent only along 10 central highways, and the demurrage of wagons noticeably decreased.

Other modes of transport were also rebuilt. As a result, the level of its cargo turnover gradually increased, as can be seen from Table 3.

Soviet transport workers have taken a worthy place in the selfless struggle of home front workers for the creation of a well-coordinated military economy capable of ensuring victory over the enemy.

At 3:30 am, when the fascist German troops received the prearranged signal "Dortmund", an artillery strike was suddenly launched at the Soviet border outposts and fortifications, and a few minutes later the enemy hordes invaded the USSR. Large German aviation forces unleashed thousands of tons of lethal cargo on Soviet airfields, bridges, warehouses, railways, naval bases, communication lines and centers, on sleeping cities. A giant fiery tornado raged in the border regions of the country. For the Soviet people, the cruel and incredibly difficult Great Patriotic War began.

The invading army numbered 5.5 million people, about 4,300 tanks and assault guns, 4,980 combat aircraft, 47,200 guns and mortars.

She was opposed by the forces of five Soviet western border districts and three fleets, which were almost twice as inferior to the enemy in manpower, had a slightly smaller amount of artillery, and outnumbered the enemy in tanks and aircraft, however, for the most part obsolete models. As for the first echelon of the armies, here the Hitlerite command deployed 103 divisions, including 10 tank divisions, while in the first echelon of our covering armies there were only 56 rifle and cavalry divisions.

The superiority of the fascist German troops in the directions of the main attacks was especially overwhelming. By the end of the first day of the war, their powerful tank groups in many sectors of the front wedged into the depths of Soviet territory at a distance of 25 to 35, in some places even up to 50 km. By July 10, the depth of the enemy invasion in the decisive directions was already from 300 to 600 km. Nearly 200 warehouses with fuel, ammunition and weapons located in the border zone fell into the hands of the enemy.

The suddenly attacked units of the Red Army were forced to engage in heavy fighting without the necessary training and without completing the strategic deployment, being 60-70% manned to wartime states with a limited amount of materiel, transport, communications, often without air and artillery support.

Under the blows of the advancing aggressor, the soldiers of the Red Army were surrounded, suffered heavy defeats and setbacks. During the three weeks of the war, the enemy managed to completely defeat 28 Soviet divisions. In addition, more than 72 divisions suffered losses in people and military equipment (from 50% and more). Our total losses in divisions alone, excluding reinforcement and combat support units, during this time amounted to about 850 thousand people, up to 6 thousand tanks, at least 6.5 thousand guns of 76 mm caliber and above, more than 3 thousand anti-tank guns, about 12 thousand mortars, as well as about 3.5 thousand aircraft.

The enemy lost about 100 thousand soldiers and officers, more than 1700 tanks and assault guns and 950 aircraft (History of the USSR. 1992. No. 2. P. 4).

Describing the reasons for the failures of the Soviet Armed Forces in the first months of the war, many historians refer to very serious mistakes made by the Soviet leadership in the prewar years. First of all, it should be noted that the weakening of the command staff caused by pre-war repressions played a negative role. By the beginning of the war, about 75% of commanders and 70% of political workers had been in their positions for less than one year. Even the Chief of the General Staff of the Land Forces of Nazi Germany, Colonel General F. Halder, noted in his diary in May 1941: “The Russian officer corps is exceptionally bad. It makes a worse impression than in 1933. It will take Russia 20 years until it reaches its former heights".

Among the serious mistakes of the Soviet leadership, one should also include a miscalculation in determining the time of a possible attack by fascist Germany on the USSR.

Stalin and his entourage believed that the Nazi leadership would not dare to violate the non-aggression pact concluded with the USSR in the near future. All the information received through various channels about the upcoming German attack was considered by Stalin as provocative, aimed at exacerbating relations with Germany. This may also explain the government's assessment of the TASS statement of June 14, 1941, in which the rumors of an impending German attack were declared provocative. This also explained the fact that the directive on bringing the troops of the western military districts to combat readiness and occupying combat lines by them was given too late. Essentially, the directive was received by the troops when the war had already begun.

Tens of thousands of works have been published on the history of the Great Patriotic War, including fundamental multi-volume publications that comprehensively reflect the events of the war years, major military operations that had a turning point in World War II, and much more. Anyone interested in more detailed history of the war can study this literature. We will focus on showing the main areas of activity of the Soviet rear and the combat operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in military-strategic operations on the war fronts.

The offensive of the Nazi troops caused enormous damage to the country's economy. The territory of the country, where more than 31 thousand industrial enterprises, about 100 thousand collective farms, a huge number of state farms and MTS, tens of thousands of kilometers of railway lines, fell under the blow of enemy troops. Huge damage was done to the production of military products. From August to November 1941, more than 30 enterprises manufacturing ammunition were out of order. The situation developed in such a way that with the outbreak of the war, the country temporarily lost a number of large regions that were the most economically developed. Suffice it to say that on the territory of these regions before the war, products worth 46 billion rubles were produced, which accounted for about 40% of the country's total gross output. The share of the occupied regions in the production of heavy industry products was especially high. The most important areas for the extraction of strategic raw materials fell into the hands of the enemy. enterprises for the production of handling and power equipment.

Heavy damage was also done to the light and food industries. In essence, the raw material base of food industry enterprises was undermined, since 88% of sugar beet crops, about 60% of sunflower crops, more than 50% of tobacco and shag plantations and other crops were concentrated in the areas covered by hostilities. More than 30 canning factories were devastated for raw materials.

The temporary loss of the most important economic regions caused enormous damage to the economy of the USSR. For a long time, the large production capacities of many of its important branches were put out of action. In order to give a fuller picture of the losses of heavy industry, we note that before the war these capacities accounted for about 1/2 of the output of ferrous metals and 2/3 of the entire coal production in the country. As a result of the losses incurred at the beginning of the war, fixed production assets in 1941 decreased by 28% in comparison with the pre-war level, and in 1942 they decreased even more.

The restructuring of the entire life of the country on a military basis began from the first days of the war, on June 23, 1941, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was formed, designed to exercise the highest strategic leadership of the Armed Forces.

On June 29, 1941, the Directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was adopted by the Party and Soviet organizations of the front-line regions, which clearly spoke of the danger hanging over our country, and outlined a number of priority tasks for restructuring the economy on a war footing. To mobilize all the forces and means of the country to fight the Nazi aggressor, it was necessary to create other government bodies. Such a form of organization of power in military conditions was found in the State Defense Committee, created on June 30, 1941 under the chairmanship of I. V. Stalin. It also included V. M. Molotov, L. P. Beria, K. E. Voroshilov, G. M. Malenkov and others. All power in the state was concentrated in the hands of the GKO: all citizens, party and Soviet, Komsomol and military bodies were obliged to unquestioningly carry out the decisions and orders of the State Defense Committee. In order to further concentrate the power of the State Defense Committee of the USSR, in the autumn of 1941, in more than 60 cities of the front line, local emergency authorities - city defense committees - were established. They were headed by the first secretaries of the regional committees or city committees of the party. City defense committees promptly supervised the mobilization of the population and material resources for the construction of defensive lines, the creation of a people's militia, organized the conversion of local enterprises to the production of weapons and military equipment.

Speaking of the State Defense Committee, it should be emphasized that a similar form of power organization already existed in the Soviet state. A peculiar prototype of the State Defense Committee was the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense, created back in the years of the Civil War and foreign intervention.

However, the emergency authorities during the years of the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War differed significantly. The main feature of the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense was that it did not replace party, government and military bodies. The fundamental questions of the conduct of an armed war were considered at the same time at the Politburo and Orgburo of the Central Committee, at meetings of the Council of People's Commissars.

During the Great Patriotic War, no plenums, let alone party congresses, were held, all cardinal issues were decided by the State Defense Committee (GKO).

Operational issues, as a rule, were considered solely by its chairman or individual members. It was also characteristic of the work of the State Defense Committee that even the most important problems of state life and military development were often solved by questioning. This approach often led to subjectivism, but in the current situation it turned out to be inevitable. It is known that during the war Stalin held a number of important party, state and military posts. He was the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, and headed the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

In the emergency conditions of the war, the result of strict centralization was the prompt and concrete solution of practical issues. Every day they appeared in dozens, hundreds, required coordination and clarification. The scope of the activities of the GKO can be judged at least by the fact that during its existence (from June 30, 1941 to September 4, 1945) it adopted about 10 thousand resolutions and decisions. About 2/3 of them in one way or another related to the economy and the organization of military production.

The decrees and orders of the State Defense Committee had the force of martial law and were subject to unquestioning implementation. The State Defense Committee directly supervised the creation of the military economy, its development, the strengthening of the Armed Forces, coordinated the needs of the active armies and navy with the capabilities of industry. This contributed to the most complete and expedient use of the military industry in the interests of victory. For the prompt resolution of issues under the State Defense Committee, special committees were created, commissions were formed.

The formation of the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters introduced appropriate changes into the practice of the work of party and Soviet bodies that had developed in peacetime conditions. From the subordination of the Council of People's Commissars stood out everything that was directly connected with the conduct of the war: the military economy, and above all military production, strengthening and supplying the Armed Forces, and, finally, the leadership of military operations. The People's Commissariats of Defense, the Navy, the People's Commissariats of the Defense Industry and many other departments and departments that were directly related to the conduct of the war came under the jurisdiction of the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters. Under these conditions, the Council of People's Commissars is focusing its attention on those sectors that were not directly connected with military production, in particular, on the management of agricultural production.

An extraordinary form of party leadership was also introduced in the Armed Forces. It became the institute of military commissars. Simultaneously with the creation of the institution of military commissars, the Central Committee of the party reorganized the army and navy organs of political propaganda into political departments that directed both organizational-party and political-mass work. With the beginning of the war, the importance of military councils in the troops increased. In the first six months, 10 military councils of the fronts and about 30 military councils of the armies were created. A large number of experienced workers, major party and state leaders were introduced into their composition.

From the first days of the war, another emergency institution was also expanded - the institution of party organizers of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, as well as party organizers of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union republics, regional committees, and regional committees at the most important enterprises. Party organizers of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks were appointed to all military factories and enterprises of the defense industry, and to smaller ones - party organizers of the Central Committee of the parties of the union republics, regional committees, and regional committees. Party organizers were at the same time secretaries of factory party organizations, carried out their direct connection with the Central Committee of the party, local organizations. This system of emergency bodies of party leadership of the economy was supplemented by the political departments of machine and tractor stations and state farms created in November 1941. Thanks to all these measures, the national economy of our country was able to overcome the difficulties of military restructuring and, on the whole, provided the front with everything necessary. At the same time, the parallel existence of people's commissariats, local Soviet bodies and party structures for managing the national economy sometimes led to mistakes and incompetent decisions.

An important part of perestroika was the redistribution of party forces from rear organizations to military ones, as a result of which a significant number of communists went over to military work. Prominent party workers with extensive experience in organizational and mass political work were sent to direct military work in the army. As a result, in the initial period of the war, more than 500 secretaries of the Central Committee of the parties of the union republics, regional and regional committees, city committees, district committees were sent to the army and navy. All in all, during the Great Patriotic War, about 14,000 executives were mobilized into the Armed Forces.

One of the main tasks that had to be solved from the first days of the war was the fastest transfer of the national economy, the entire economy of the country, to a military footing. The main line of this restructuring was determined in the Directive of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of June 29, 1941. Specific measures for the restructuring of the national economy began to be carried out from the first days of the war. On the second day of the war, a mobilization plan for the production of ammunition and cartridges was introduced. And on June 30, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR approved a mobilization national economic plan for the third quarter of 1941. However, events at the front developed so unsuccessfully for us that this plan was not fulfilled. Given the current situation, on July 4, 1941, a decision was made to urgently develop a new plan for the development of military production. The commission, headed by N. A. Voznesensky, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, was instructed to develop "a military-economic plan for ensuring the country's defense, bearing in mind the use of resources and enterprises located on the Volga, in Western Siberia and the Urals." In two weeks this commission developed a new plan for the fourth quarter of 1941 and for 1942 for the regions of the Volga region, the Urals, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia.

For the speedy deployment of a production base in the regions of the Volga region, the Urals, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia, it was recognized as necessary to transfer the industrial enterprises of the Narkommunitions, Narkomvooruzheniya, Narkomaviaprom, etc. to these areas.

Members of the Politburo, who were at the same time members of the State Defense Committee, carried out general management of the main branches of the military economy. N. A. Voznesensky dealt with the production of weapons and ammunition, G. M. Malenkov - aircraft and aircraft engines, V. M. Molotov - tanks, A. I. Mikoyan and others - food, fuel and clothing. A. I. Shakhurin - aviation industry, B. L. Vannikov - ammunition, I. F. Tevosyan - ferrous metallurgy, A. I. Efremov - machine-tool industry, V. V. Vakhrushev - coal, I. I. Sedin - oil .

The main link in the transition of the national economy to a military footing was the restructuring of industry. The transfer of industry to a military footing meant a radical restructuring of the entire process of social production, a change in its direction and proportions. Almost all mechanical engineering was transferred to military rails. In November 1941, the People's Commissariat for General Engineering was transformed into the People's Commissariat for Mortar Weapons. In addition to the people's commissariats of the aviation industry, shipbuilding, armaments and ammunition, created before the war, two people's commissariats were formed at the beginning of the war - the tank and mortar industries. Thanks to this, all the decisive branches of the military industry received specialized centralized management. The production of jet mortars, which existed before the war only in prototypes, was started. Their production was organized at the Moscow plant "Compressor". The front-line soldiers gave the name "Katyusha" to the first missile combat installation.

At the beginning of the war, a change was made to the distribution of food resources. Significant food supplies were lost during the hostilities. The available resources were directed primarily to supply the Red Army and provide for the population of industrial areas. The card system was introduced in the country.

Military restructuring required a centralized redistribution of the country's labor resources. If at the beginning of 1941 there were more than 31 million workers and employees in the country, then by the end of 1941 their number had decreased to 18.5 million people. In order to provide personnel for the military industry and related industries, it was necessary to rationally distribute the remaining labor resources and involve new sections of the population in production. For these purposes, already on June 30, 1941, the Committee for the Distribution of Labor was formed under the Council of People's Commissars.

At the same time, mandatory overtime work was introduced and vacations were cancelled. This made it possible to increase the utilization of production capacities by about a third without increasing the number of workers and employees. In July 1941, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR granted the right to the union and autonomous republics, the executive committees of the regional and regional Soviets, if necessary, to transfer workers and employees to work at other enterprises, regardless of their departmental affiliation and territorial location. This allowed local authorities to more quickly maneuver personnel in the interests of strengthening the defense industries.

Thanks to this, by the second half of 1941, it was possible to do a lot of work on the redistribution of personnel. As a result, by January 1942, more than 120 thousand people were additionally sent to the defense industry.

At the same time, the process of training workers through the system of labor reserves was actively carried out. In just two years, about 1,100,000 people were trained through this system for work in industry.

For the same purposes, in February 1942, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On the mobilization of able-bodied urban population for work in production and construction" was adopted in February 1942, which provided for appropriate mobilization. In the very first days of the war, a decision was made to restructure the work of scientific institutions of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, subordinating their activities to the interests of strengthening the defense capability of the state. In the course of perestroika, the Academy of Sciences solved three interrelated tasks: 1) the development of scientific problems of defense importance; 2) scientific assistance to industry in improving and developing production; and 3) mobilization of the country's raw materials, replacement of scarce materials with local raw materials, organization of scientific research on the most pressing wartime issues.

Thus, the redistribution of the country's material, financial and labor resources, carried out from the very beginning of the war, played a decisive role in the restructuring of the entire national economy on a war footing. The change in economic proportions, the switching of all forces and means to serve the front laid a solid foundation for creating a well-coordinated economy in war conditions. During the restructuring of the national economy, the eastern industrial base became the main center of the war economy of the USSR, which was significantly expanded and strengthened with the outbreak of war.

In 1942, the production of military products in the Urals increased by more than 6 times compared to 1940, in Western Siberia - by 27, and in the Volga region - by 9 times. On the whole, during the war, industrial production in these regions more than tripled. This was a great military and economic victory achieved by the Soviet people during the difficult war years. It laid a solid foundation for the final victory over fascist Germany.

With the outbreak of war, in the conditions of unfavorable developments in military events, the fastest evacuation of the population, industrial enterprises, agricultural products, cultural and other state values ​​from the front-line regions into the interior of the country was the most important political, military-economic problem facing the Soviet people. In the memoirs of A. I. Mikoyan, who was a member of the GKO during the war years, interesting information is provided on this subject: “Two days after the start of the war ... the question arose of the need to lead the evacuation from the front line. The idea of ​​​​organizing an organ with such functions we have had never occurred before... It became clear that the evacuation was on a huge scale. It was impossible to evacuate everything in a row, there was not enough time or transport. We had to literally choose on the go what was in the interests of the state to evacuate ... "(Military History Journal 1988, No. 3, pp. 31-38). In the complex of these problems, the fastest removal and saving of millions of Soviet people from physical destruction was one of the priorities.

The accomplishment of such a difficult task required enormous efforts. The resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated June 27, 1941 "On the procedure for the removal and placement of human contingents and valuable property" defined specific tasks and the order of evacuation. In addition to this, on July 5, 1941, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR issued a decision on the procedure for evacuating the population in wartime and on the removal of workers and employees of evacuated enterprises. Plans were developed for the evacuation of people from the front line, indicating resettlement points, terms, order and sequence of removal.

By the decision of the government, the "Regulations on the evacuation point for the evacuation of the civilian population from the front line" was approved. The evacuation centers set up locally took care of the evacuated population, kept a record of the arrivals, etc. Departments for the evacuation of the population were created under the councils of people's commissars of the union republics, regional executive committees and regional executive committees. By decision of the government, first of all, children's institutions, women with children and the elderly were taken out. By January 1942, 10 million people were transported into the interior of the country by rail alone (World War II. General problems. Book 1, p. 74).

Great difficulties arose with the evacuation of the population in areas that were in the zone of military operations. These included the republics located in the Baltic states, the western regions of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, and Karelia.

At the beginning of the war, the evacuation of the population was also carried out from Moscow and Leningrad. The following facts testify to the scale of this work: in the autumn of 1941, 1.5 million people were evacuated from Moscow alone, and from January 22, 1942 to April 15, 1942, more than 55 thousand people were evacuated from Leningrad. This was the most difficult period of the evacuation. In general, during the war years, including the blockade period, about 2 million people were evacuated from Leningrad.

As a result of the successful evacuation, by the spring of 1942, up to 8 million evacuees were placed in the eastern regions of the country. By this time, the main wave of evacuation subsided.

However, this situation did not last long. In the summer of 1942, in connection with the breakthrough of the Nazi troops to the North Caucasus, the problem of mass evacuation of the population again arose with all its acuteness. This time the evacuation was carried out mainly from the central and southern regions of the European part of the USSR. In July 1942, the evacuation of the population from the Voronezh, Voroshilovgrad, Orel, Rostov, Stalingrad regions and the Stavropol and Krasnodar regions began.

The Soviet government showed great concern for the creation of material and living conditions for the evacuated population. In the state budget for the fourth quarter of 1941, 200 billion rubles were allocated for housing construction. In wartime conditions, these were large funds. Workers and employees of the evacuated enterprises were given a long-term loan for individual housing construction.

During the stay of the evacuees in new places, the local population surrounded them with care and attention. Families in need were given allowances, clothes and shoes were sold. In many agricultural artels, courses were organized to train evacuees in various agricultural professions.

The fraternal friendship of the Soviet peoples manifested itself during the evacuation, in the employment of the evacuated population, in the adoption of children whose parents had died. In less than a year of the war, by May 1, 1942, up to 2 thousand orphaned children were adopted by the working people of Kazakhstan alone. In Uzbekistan, a public movement to help evacuated children has developed widely. Thousands of children - Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians and other nationalities - were taken to Uzbek families for education. The evacuated children felt great in the families that sheltered them. They spoke not only Russian, but also learned to speak Uzbek. Orphanages were created at large agricultural artels, the maintenance of which was completely taken over by the collective farms.

As a result of the evacuation, millions of Soviet people were saved from physical extermination by the fascist invaders.

The evacuation of the population, industrial enterprises, agricultural products and cultural values ​​in different economic regions took place at different times, depending on the situation on the fronts. The specific conditions of the military situation demanded that the evacuation be carried out twice: the first time - in the summer and autumn of 1941, the second time - in the summer and autumn of 1942. The evacuation of 1941 was the most massive.

Without dwelling in detail on the evacuation of industry, I would like to note only the following. During the war years, more than 2 thousand industrial enterprises were evacuated to the eastern regions. Almost 70% of them were located in the Urals, Western Siberia, Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The transfer of industry to the rear made it possible not only to preserve the main production assets, but also to gradually increase them, meeting the growing needs of the front.

The evacuation of the population, industry, food and raw materials carried out by the Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War, the export of cultural property to the deep rear contributed to the speedy restructuring of the entire national economy of the country on a war footing and the approach of victory. As noted by the outstanding Soviet commander, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov: "It was an incomparable labor epic, without which our victory over the strongest enemy would be absolutely impossible."

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• • Russia in the second half of the 20th century
  • Socio-economic and political reasons that made it difficult for the country to reach new frontiers
    • Socio-economic and political reasons that made it difficult for the country to reach new frontiers - page 2
    • Socio-economic and political reasons that made it difficult for the country to reach new frontiers - page 3
  • The collapse of the USSR. Post-communist Russia
    • The collapse of the USSR. Post-communist Russia - page 2

Post-war restoration of the national economy

As a result of hostilities, the temporary occupation of part of the territory, the barbarism and atrocities of the German fascists, our state suffered economic damage unprecedented in history and damage to human resources. The Soviet Union lost about 30% of the national wealth and 27 million people. 1710 cities and towns, more than 70 thousand villages and villages were destroyed. In industry alone, fixed assets worth 42 billion rubles were disabled. The total economic damage caused to our state amounted to 2.6 trillion. rub. at pre-war prices.

After the end of the war, despite the efforts of the Soviet people to restore the national economy during the war, the destruction was so great that, according to the main indicators, the pre-war level of its development was not reached and amounted (in%): The volume of industrial production - 91 to the level of 1940. , coal mining - 90, oil - 62, iron smelting - 59, steel - 67, textile production - 41, cargo turnover of all types of transport - 76, retail trade turnover - 43, the average annual number of workers and employees - 87. The area under crops decreased by 37 million ha, and the number of livestock decreased by 7 million heads. Under the influence of these factors, the country's national income in 1945 amounted to 83% of the 1940 level.

The war most severely affected the state of the country's labor resources. The number of workers and employees decreased by 5.3 million people, including in industry - by 2.4 million people. In rural areas, the number of able-bodied population decreased by 1/3, able-bodied men - by 60%.

Thus, the Soviet Union was deprived of foreign economic assistance and had to rely on its own forces in restoring the economy destroyed by the war, seeking resources within the national economy for its revival, as well as for the development and development of new technology.

Such were the state of the Soviet economy and the foreign policy situation when the Soviet people adopted the first post-war five-year plan.

The five-year plan was aimed at the fastest possible restoration of the areas affected by the fascist occupation, at the inclusion of the natural, industrial and human resources available in them into the economic potential of the state.

A distinctive feature of the post-war period was the combination of restoration work with the new construction of industrial enterprises. Only in the republics and regions liberated from the fascists, the construction of 263 new enterprises was started.

The war took a heavy toll on agriculture. The Nazis destroyed and plundered more than 40% of all collective farms and state farms. The able-bodied population in rural areas decreased from 35.4 million to 23.9 million people.

The number of tractors in agriculture amounted to 59% of the pre-war level, and the number of horses decreased from 14.5 million to 6.5 million heads. The volume of gross agricultural output decreased by 40%. After the Great Patriotic War, the level of agricultural production compared to the pre-war level was lower than the level after the First World War and the Civil War.

In the first year of the post-war five-year plan, a natural disaster was added to the enormous damage inflicted on agriculture by the war. In 1946 Ukraine, Moldavia, the regions of the Central Black Earth Zone, the Lower and part of the Middle Volga region were engulfed in drought. It was the most severe drought to hit our country in the last fifty years.

This year the collective and state farms harvested 2.6 times less grain than before the war. The drought had a severe impact on livestock production. In drought-stricken areas, the number of cattle alone decreased by 1.5 million heads. The state and the workers of other regions of the country came to the rescue of the areas affected by the drought, allocating material and financial resources from their meager resources.

The state was faced with the acute task of creating shelterbelts to transform the nature of the country's arid regions in order to reduce the dependence of agricultural production on weather conditions.

In order to give afforestation in the steppe and forest-steppe regions an organized character and national scale, a Plan was adopted for field plantations, the introduction of grass-field crop rotations, the construction of ponds and reservoirs to ensure high and stable yields in the steppe and forest-steppe regions of the European part of the USSR.

In the spring of 1949, afforestation work began on a broad front. They were especially active in the Krasnodar Territory, in the Stalingrad, Ryazan, Rostov and Tula regions.

Work begun during the years of the first post-war five-year plan to transform the land and improve conditions for agricultural production has yielded positive results. Until 1951, collective farms, state farms, and forestries laid shelterbelts on an area of ​​1,852,000 hectares. State forest belts were created in the country: Kamyshin-Volgograd, Voronezh-Rostov-on-Don, Penza-Kamensk, Belgorod-Don, Chapaevsk-Vladimirovka, etc. Their length was more than 6 thousand km.

Forest plantations created more than 40 years ago still protect about 25 million hectares of agricultural land and are an example of the peaceful application of human strength and a wise attitude to land and nature.

Thus, during the years of the first post-war five-year plan, as a result of the restoration of industrial and agricultural production, the rapid conversion of military production, the volume of industrial output compared to 1940 increased by 73%, capital investments - three times, labor productivity - by 37%, and produced national income - by 64%.

In the 1950s, the country's economy developed dynamically. Over 10 years, the average annual growth rate of gross industrial output amounted to 11.7%, gross agricultural output - 5.0%, fixed production assets - 9.9%, national income generated 10.27%, trade turnover - 11.4%.

This was facilitated by the renewal and modernization of fixed assets in industry, the strengthening of the material and technical base of agriculture, the expansion of the production of consumer goods, the development of virgin lands, and the improvement of the management system.

The change in the internal political situation in the country was of no small importance in the successes achieved. Death in 1953 I.V. Stalin was the beginning of the end of the totalitarian system he created and the beginning of the transition to a new course in domestic politics.

Elected to the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU N.S. Khrushchev (1894-1971) began to pursue a course related to the social orientation of the economy, an increase in capital investments in the B-group industries and agriculture, and the expansion of the rights of heads of enterprises and collective farms.

• Post-war restoration of the national economy - page 2

The end of the war brought to the fore the task of restoring the normal functioning of the national economy. The human and material losses caused by the war were very heavy. The total losses of the dead are estimated at 27 million people, among which there were only a few more than 10 million military personnel. 32 thousand industrial enterprises, 1710 cities and towns, 70 thousand villages were destroyed. The amount of direct losses caused by the war was estimated at 679 billion rubles, which was 5.5 times higher than the national income of the USSR in 1940. In addition to the huge destruction, the war led to a complete restructuring of the national economy on a war footing, and its end necessitated new efforts to his return to peacetime conditions.

The restoration of the economy was the main task of the Fourth Five-Year Plan. As early as August 1945, Gosplan began drawing up a plan for the restoration and development of the national economy for 1946-1950. When considering the draft plan, the country's leadership revealed different approaches to the methods and goals of restoring the country's economy: 1) a more balanced, balanced development of the national economy, some mitigation of coercive measures in economic life, 2) a return to the pre-war model of economic development, based on the predominant growth of heavy industry.

The difference in points of view in the choice of ways to restore the economy was based on unequal assessments of the post-war international situation. Supporters of the first option (A.A. Zhdanov - Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, First Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Party Committee, N.A. Voznesensky - Chairman of the State Planning Commission, M.I. Rodionov - Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, etc.) believed that with return to peace in the capitalist countries, an economic and political crisis should come, a conflict between the imperialist powers is possible due to the redistribution of colonial empires, in which, first of all, the USA and Great Britain will clash. As a result, in their opinion, a relatively favorable international climate is emerging for the USSR, which means that there is no urgent need to continue the policy of accelerated development of heavy industry. Supporters of a return to the pre-war model of economic development, among which the main role was played by G.M. Malenkov and L.P. Beria, as well as the leaders of heavy industry, on the contrary, viewed the international situation as very alarming. In their opinion, at this stage, capitalism was able to cope with its internal contradictions, and the nuclear monopoly gave the imperialist states a clear military superiority over the USSR. Consequently, the accelerated development of the country's military-industrial base should once again become the absolute priority of economic policy.

Approved by Stalin and adopted by the Supreme Soviet in the spring of 1946, the five-year plan meant a return to the pre-war slogan: the completion of the construction of socialism and the beginning of the transition to communism. Stalin, believing that the war only interrupted the fulfillment of this task. The process of building communism was considered by Stalin in a very simplified way, first of all, as the achievement of certain quantitative indicators in several industries. To do this, it is enough, allegedly, to bring the production of pig iron to 50 million tons per year within 15 years, steel - up to 60 million tons of oil - up to 60 million tons of coal - up to 500 million tons, i.e. produce 3 times more than what was achieved before the war.

Thus, Stalin decided to remain true to his pre-war industrialization scheme, based on the priority development of several basic branches of heavy industry. Later return to the development model of the 30s. was theoretically substantiated by Stalin in his work “Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR” (1952), in which he argued that in the conditions of the growth of the aggressiveness of capitalism, the priorities of the Soviet economy should be the predominant development, heavy industry and the acceleration of the process of transforming agriculture towards greater socialization . The main direction of development in the postwar years again becomes the accelerated development of heavy industry at the expense and to the detriment of the development of the production of consumer goods and agriculture. Therefore, 88% of investments in industry were directed to the engineering industry and only 12% to light industry.

In order to increase efficiency, an attempt was made to modernize the governing bodies. In March 1946, a law was passed on the transformation of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR into the Council of Ministers of the USSR. However, the number of ministers grew, the administrative apparatus increased, and wartime forms of leadership were practiced, which became familiar. In fact, the government was carried out with the help of decrees and resolutions published on behalf of the party and government, but they were developed at meetings of a very narrow circle of leaders. For 13 years the Congress of the Communist Party was not convened. Only in 1952 did the next 19th congress meet, at which the party adopted a new name - the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Central Committee of the party, as an elected body of the collective management of the multi-million ruling party, also did not work. All the main elements that made up the mechanism of the Soviet state - the party, the government, the army, the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, diplomacy, were directly subordinated to Stalin.

Relying on the spiritual uplift of the victorious people, the USSR already in 1948 succeeded in increasing the national income by 64% and reaching the pre-war level of industrial production. In 1950, the pre-war level of gross industrial production was surpassed by 73%, with an increase in labor productivity by 45%. Agriculture also reached pre-war levels of production. Although the accuracy of these statistics is criticized, the sharp positive dynamics of the process of restoring the national economy in 1946-1950. noted by all experts.

Science and technology developed at high rates in the postwar years, and the USSR reached the most advanced frontiers in a number of areas of science and technology. Domestic rocket science, aircraft engineering, and radio engineering have achieved major achievements. Significant progress has been made in the development of mathematics, physics, astronomy, biology, and chemistry. On August 29, 1949, an atomic bomb was tested in the USSR, developed by a large group of scientists and engineers led by I.V. Kurchatov.

The solution of social problems improved much more slowly. The post-war years were difficult for the vast majority of the population. However, the first successes in the restoration of the national economy made it possible already in December 1947 (earlier than in most European countries) to cancel the card system. At the same time, a monetary reform was carried out, which, although at first infringed on the interests of a limited segment of the population, led to a real stabilization of the monetary system and ensured the subsequent growth in the well-being of the people as a whole. Of course, neither the monetary reform nor the periodic price cuts led to a significant increase in the purchasing power of the population, but they contributed to the growth of interest in work and created a favorable social climate. At the same time, enterprises voluntarily-compulsorily carried out annual loans, subscription to bonds in the amount of at least a monthly salary. However, the population saw positive changes around, believed that this money goes to the restoration and development of the country.

To a large extent, the high rates of recovery and development of the industry were ensured by withdrawing funds from agriculture. During these years, the countryside lived especially hard, in 1950, in every fifth collective farm, cash payments for workdays were not made at all. Egregious poverty stimulated a massive outflow of peasants to the cities: about 8 million rural residents left their villages in 1946-1953. At the end of 1949, the economic and financial situation of the collective farms deteriorated so much that the government had to adjust its agrarian policy. Responsible for agrarian policy A.A. Andreev was replaced by N.S. Khrushchev. The subsequent measures to enlarge the collective farms were carried out very quickly - the number of collective farms decreased from 252 thousand to 94 thousand by the end of 1952. The enlargement was accompanied by a new and significant reduction in the individual allotments of the peasants, a reduction in payment in kind, which constituted a significant part of collective farm earnings and was considered a great value , because it gave the peasants the opportunity to sell surplus products in the markets at high prices for cash.

The initiator of these reforms, Khrushchev, intended to complete the work he had begun with a radical and utopian change in the entire way of peasant life. In March 1951, Pravda published his project for the creation of "agrocities". The agro-city was conceived by Khrushchev as a real city in which the peasants, resettled from their huts, had to lead urban life in apartment buildings far from their individual allotments.

The post-war atmosphere in society carried a potential danger for the Stalinist regime, which was due to the fact that the extreme conditions of wartime awakened in a person the ability to think relatively independently, critically assess the situation, compare and choose solutions. As in the war with Napoleon, the mass of our compatriots went abroad, saw a qualitatively different standard of living for the population of European countries and asked the question: “Why do we live worse?” At the same time, in peacetime conditions, such stereotypes of wartime behavior as the habit of command and subordination, strict discipline and unconditional execution of orders remained tenacious.

The common long-awaited victory inspired people to rally around the government and an open confrontation between the people and the government was impossible. Firstly, the liberating, just, nature of the war assumed the unity of society in confronting a common enemy. Secondly, people, tired of destroying, strove for peace, which became for them the highest value, excluding violence in any form. Thirdly, the experience of the war and the impressions of foreign campaigns forced us to reflect on the justice of the Stalinist regime, but very few thought about how, in what way to change it. The existing regime of power was perceived as an unchangeable given. Thus, the first post-war years were characterized by a contradiction in people's minds between a sense of the injustice of what was happening in their lives and the hopelessness of attempts to change it. At the same time, complete trust in the ruling party and the leadership of the country was predominant in society. Therefore, post-war difficulties were perceived as inevitable and surmountable in the near future. In general, the people were characterized by social optimism.

However, Stalin did not really count on these sentiments and gradually revived the practice of the repressive whip against the associates and the people. From the point of view of the leadership, it was necessary to "tighten up the reins" that had been loosened somewhat in the war, and in 1949 the repressive line became noticeably tougher. Among the political processes of the post-war period, the most famous was the "Leningrad case", under which they unite a whole series of cases fabricated against a number of prominent party, Soviet and economic workers of Leningrad, accused of departing from the party line.

Odious historical fame acquired "the case of doctors." On January 13, 1953, TASS announced the arrest of a terrorist group of doctors, which allegedly aimed to shorten the lives of leading figures of the Soviet state through sabotage treatment. Only after Stalin's death was the decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the full rehabilitation and release of doctors and members of their families adopted.