I would like to start the story about the Russo-Japanese War with a revolutionary proposal. Or maybe stop clinging to the dating of events in the old style? In the end, isn’t it tired to put “not ours” behind the “true” date in parentheses. The whole world knows that the battle in the Yellow Sea took place on August 10, 1904, and only in Russia they claim that the battle at Shantung took place on July 28 of the same year. But such a change would avoid much confusion, because nowhere else is the Julian style used. Of course, Patriarch Alexy II declared the Gregorian calendar "a diabolical invention invented to the detriment of true Christians," but we still live according to it. So, we will most likely be forgiven for a small sin in dating the events of the distant past.

Well, okay, back to the subject of conversation. The first big war, in which not only the ideas of the theorists of naval warfare, but also the ideas of shipbuilding engineers, were tested, was the Russo-Japanese War. With all the interesting facts and conclusions of the Japanese-Chinese and Spanish-American wars, they were still small local conflicts, although the second was formally fought on two oceans. But remember: Admiral Dewey's squadron first stood peacefully in Chinese ports, then reached Manila, defeated the Spanish squadron and again anchored until the end of the war. Attempts by the Spaniards to send a squadron of Admiral Camarra to the Philippines and launch a cruising war in the Atlantic ended in nothing. And only the Russo-Japanese War forced the admirals and engineers to think seriously about a lot of things. In particular, about the role of cruisers.

The fact is that in this war all aspects of the combat activity of this class of ships were tested, but not always the cruisers successfully coped with the assigned tasks. By the beginning of the war, both opponents had a large number of cruisers of various types and sizes - from small scouts of the Novik type to ocean raiders like the Thunderbolt. Fast cruisers were supposed to serve as scouts for armored squadrons; the Japanese were forced to use their armored cruisers as "battleships for the poor"; the Russians tried to wage a cruising war; Japanese cruisers monitored and blocked Port Arthur; both opponents used cruisers to support their light forces and fight enemy destroyers. Interestingly, the Japanese did not even try to use their cruisers to protect communications and fight Russian raiders. Let's consider everything in order.

The odyssey of the Novik cruiser deserves a separate story. After the battle on August 10, the cruiser, together with the Askold, broke through the Japanese fleet, but at night the ships separated. The commander of the Novik, Captain 2nd Rank von Schultz, decided to go to Qingdao to take on an additional supply of coal. The loading took place in a hurry, the full supply could not be accepted, but the cruiser managed to slip out of the port before dark and did not meet the Japanese detachment sent by Admiral Togo to block the port.

Von Schultz decided to try to break through to Vladivostok, bypassing Japan from the ocean. Given the far from the best state of the cruiser's machines, this was the best solution. Arguments that it was necessary to break through the Tsushima Strait are not serious. The cruiser had long lost its record speed, and such an attempt bordered on suicide. Even during a calm passage, the mechanics had to constantly fight so that the cruiser's machines would not fail. Fuel consumption jumped to 54 tons per day instead of the norm of 30 tons, so von Schultz decided to go to Sakhalin at the Korsakov post to receive coal, although at first he intended to break through the Sangar Strait. But it was there that the Novik was guarded by the Japanese cruisers Chitose and Tsushima, stationed in Hakodate.

However, on August 19, the commander of the Chitose, Captain 1st Rank Takagi, received a telegram stating that the Novik had been seen from the Atoya lighthouse, and immediately led his ships north to the La Perouse Strait. However, the Japanese did not find a Russian cruiser there, which caused them serious concern - the Novik could already slip into Vladivostok. Takagi remained to cruise in the strait, but sent the Tsushima to inspect the Korsakov post. The Japanese hoped that the Russians would mistake the three-pipe cruiser for the Bogatyr and be able to take them by surprise. It was naive, because the Arthurian sailors more than once encountered the same type of cruiser "Niytaka", so the enemy was identified immediately.

At 16.25, smoke was noticed on the Novik, the cruiser weighed anchor and tried to jump out of the bay, which became a mousetrap, but the Tsushima went to the intersection. At 17.10, when the distance was reduced to 40 cables, Novik opened fire, the Japanese immediately responded. For Tsushima, this was a combat debut, but the Russian ship participated in many clashes, and its gunners had a lot of experience, so the inequality of forces was smoothed out to a certain extent. However, the superiority of the Japanese, who had 6 152 mm and 10 76 mm guns against 6 120 mm Russian guns, was too much great. The skirmish lasted 45 minutes, after which von Schultz turned back to the Korsakov post. "Novik" received 3 underwater holes and began to land astern. "Tsushima" also got a leak, but the Japanese managed to cope with it, although they had no desire to continue the battle.

The next morning, the Chitose approached the Korsakov post, but found that the Novik was at the bottom. All attempts by the team to close the holes were unsuccessful, and the captain of the 2nd rank von Schultz ordered the cruiser to be flooded. It was not possible to blow it up, as the explosive cartridges remained in the flooded steering compartment. The city looked abandoned, so the Japanese began to calmly shoot the sunken cruiser. Then the Chitose came closer and made sure that the Novik was on the ground with a list of 30 degrees to starboard. The service of the brave cruiser has ended.

The Vladivostok detachment of cruisers stood out throughout the war for its activity. Yes, his actions were far from always successful, and he lost his only battle, but one cannot but agree with the famous historian V. Semenov, who argued that if Admiral Jessen did not win resounding victories, then he did not drop the honor of the Russian flag. As expected, Russia appreciated this: when after the war the armored cruisers "Gromoboy" and "Russia" returned to their homeland, Jessen received a reprimand based on the results of the inspection review and was dismissed the same year. After all, he didn’t sit out in dugouts like Admiral Grigorovich, but stood on the bridge under shells, and any fool will be able to do this. On the sea lanes of the enemy, the detachment sank 10 transports and 12 schooners, captured 4 transports and 1 schooner.

The first campaign of the detachment in the Sea of ​​Japan began with the replacement of the commander - Captain 1st Rank Reitsenstein was appointed instead of Admiral Stackelberg. The result was the sinking of a small Japanese steamer. The next campaign was already under the command of Admiral Jessen - to Genzan. For this, ocean raiders were clearly not required, but another Japanese transport became the prey of the cruisers. Unfortunately, in May 1904, the detachment lost the Bogatyr cruiser, which landed on the rocks of Cape Bruce and did not go to sea until the end of the war. The Japanese could well have destroyed it, but the mythical system of total espionage failed. For some reason, the Japanese assured themselves that the Russian cruiser would remain on the rocks forever.

A new campaign to the Tsushima Strait was carried out under the command of Admiral Bezobrazov. He was appointed head of the battleship detachment, but never got to Port Arthur. Japanese official history briefly reports that on June 15, the Hitachi Maru and Izumi Maru transports were sunk, and the Sado Maru transport was also damaged. But this is a forced brevity, because otherwise one would have to admit that due to the frivolity of their own admirals, 18 280-mm howitzers, which were sent to Port Arthur, and about 1000 soldiers of the reserve guards regiment went to the bottom. The passivity of the Russian fleet led the Japanese to neglect elementary security measures and paid the price. At the time of the attack, only the small cruiser Tsushima was next to the transports, which, of course, could not do anything. Admiral Kamimura and his armored cruisers were too far away to help the transports. However, the Russians also showed frivolity, they did not make sure that the Sado Maru sank, although the losses of the Japanese turned out to be great without that. They could only console themselves with the manifestation of the unbending samurai spirit - Colonel Suti, who commanded the battalion, solemnly burned the banner and committed hara-kiri. Some consolation...

On the Russian cruisers they listened to the radio communications of the Japanese, and Admiral Bezobrazov correctly decided that Kamimura was not too far away. Since the "Rurik" could not develop high speed, he decided to deceive the Japanese and went to Vladivostok not directly, but leaned towards the shores of Japan. Meanwhile, the weather worsened, and this helped the Russians. Kamimura reached the island of Okinoshima, did not find anyone or anything, and stopped the pursuit.

This raid can be considered very successful in the sense that it delayed the fall of Port Arthur, terrible howitzers appeared there only in the fall. By the way, the Japanese also removed them from the coastal fortifications of Tokyo Bay, not only the Russians did strange things. The next raid on Genzan almost led to a collision with Kamimura, but the meeting took place in the evening, and the Russian cruisers safely avoided an unequal battle.

The next raid was made by Russian cruisers to the Pacific Ocean, and again under the flag of Jessen. Admiral Bezobrazov doubted the success of the campaign too much, and he had to be replaced by Jessen, who was temporarily removed from business after the accident of the Bogatyr. On July 17, the cruisers went to sea, and on the 19th they passed through the Sangar Strait. The Japanese could not prevent them - the entire defense of the strait at that moment consisted of 2 ancient gunboats and 3 tiny destroyers with a displacement of 50 tons. Having broken into the ocean, the Russians began operations in the coastal waters of Japan. They sank several transports, not only Japanese, but also English, the ships "Arabia" and "Calhas" were taken as prizes. It seems to be a success, but, on the other hand, the destroyed cargo was not of exceptional value, most often it was railway rails. By the way, this confirms that the cruising war at that time simply could not be particularly effective, the list of strategic cargoes was too short, and in addition, none of them were vital, like, say, aluminum during the Second World War.

Still, this raid gave the impression of an exploding bomb. Sums of insurance jumped sharply, shipping decreased. At the same time, one should not take seriously the tale of how outraged Japanese shipowners burned the house of Admiral Kamimura. I personally read a story about this, and in a book that few people pay attention to - the memoirs of the Belgian envoy to Tokyo, Baron d'Anetan, and still I don't believe it. Well, do with me what you want - I do not believe! By the way, where was he, Kamimura, at that time? The actions of the admiral, or rather inaction, during this period are rather difficult to explain. He hung around the southern entrance to the Tsushima Strait and seemed to expect Jessen to attempt to break into Port Arthur, although such an act would have been completely pointless.

On the way back, the Russian cruisers ran into an unexpected problem. The weather worsened, everything was covered in thick fog, and the squadron simply could not find the entrance to the Sangar Strait. After chatting for some time in the ocean, the cruisers managed to see the mountains around the strait and squeezed into it. The campaign lasted 16 days, and the ships practically used up the entire supply of coal. Somehow, quite unexpectedly for the admirals, it turned out that the raiders could no longer act as before. It was earlier famous sailing ships like the Alabama, which used a steam engine only as an auxiliary engine, could not think about coal. Now the organization of cruising should have been approached more thoroughly, and the Germans, preparing for a new war, took this into account when creating their famous system of stages.

No happiness lasts forever, and soon the Vladivostok detachment had to be convinced of this. When the Arthurian squadron went on a breakthrough, on the evening of August 11, the cruiser detachment received an order to meet it. An order is an order, Admiral Jessen led sailors who had barely had time to rest south to the Tsushima Strait. But when the cruisers were already at sea, it turned out that the campaign was useless, the Arthurian squadron was defeated, partially dispersed to neutral ports, and partially returned. That's when you should have contacted Jessen by radio and brought him back, that's where those same "200 miles of radio communication" would come in handy, if they weren't pure linden.

At dawn on August 14, the cruisers reached the Fuzan parallel, where they had already been, but this time the Japanese were much better prepared. At 04.50, the detachments of Kamimura and Jessen noticed each other, and the corresponding radiogram of Kamimura was received by all nearby patrol cruisers - 5 units. So, even if Jessen had missed the Japanese armored cruisers, he would probably have run into one of the sentinels, but if he was not lucky, then he was not lucky right away and thoroughly, because the Japanese were to the north of the Russian squadron and blocked her way to Vladivostok. However, in fact, the Japanese tried to watch for the Novik and Askold cruisers they had lost.

But then things began to happen that were not entirely clear, and Russian and Japanese descriptions differ sharply. The Russians claim that the battle began at 05.18, the Japanese - that at 05.23, this is not too significant. But the discrepancy in distances is already more serious, the Russians claim that it exceeded 60 cables, but according to Japanese data, it barely reached 46 cables, which looks much more realistic.

The battle developed according to the classical canons - an artillery duel on parallel courses, in this regard, the battle near Ulsan looks like the most “classic” of all naval battles of this war. The Japanese had some superiority in speed and gradually overtook the Russian squadron. And this is where one of the many incomprehensible moments arises. Looking at paper specifications, the Japanese had a noticeable advantage in speed, but it is also well known that their cruisers could only reach the nominal 20 knots in the most ideal conditions. On the other hand, the cars of the Russian cruisers were far from being in perfect condition, Rurik especially suffered from this, and here in the morning due to an accident on Rossiya 4 boilers failed, so in any case, Kamimura should have had superiority 2 or more nodes. But every time he needed to catch up with the Russian squadron, it happened painfully slowly.

And yet, by 05.52, the Japanese were exactly on the beam of the Russians, reducing the distance to 27 cables. Their superiority in artillery was beginning to show, and now the Japanese were directly in front of the rising sun, which prevented the Russians from aiming. Admiral Jessen first turned to the southeast, as if intending to pass the Tsushima Strait, but at 0600 sharply turned to the right, described a loop and went to the northwest, hoping to slip under the stern of the Japanese. Kamimura reacted to this turn late and turned left. The squadrons were on diverging courses, the distance increased to 50 cables, and the Japanese temporarily ceased fire. But it was at this moment that the trailing Iwate, which was walking, received a hit that could have been fatal. A 203-mm projectile exploded in the forward casemate of the upper deck, simultaneously detonating a projectile in the gun. The casemate was completely destroyed, part of the armor flew overboard. The casemate a deck below was out of order, and the 12-pounder gun standing above simply disappeared along with the crew. Another 152-mm gun failed, 32 people died, 43 were injured.

At 06.23 the battle resumed, and almost immediately the Rurik received a fatal hit that damaged the steering, from that moment the cruiser kept losing control. In addition, he began to gradually lag behind the lead cruisers. Shooting from both sides was chaotic and uncontrollable, no matter what historians try to write. Even in official Japanese works, it is recognized that Izumo is the flagship! - fired simultaneously at all three Russian cruisers. The fact that all the ships received hits from the Japanese indicates the lack of organization of fire in the Russian squadron.

Further events are not of particular interest. The Russian squadron tried twice to return to Rurik, apparently, Admiral Jessen hoped that he would be able to cope with his difficulties, but it was in vain. "Rurik" received more and more new hits and soon completely lost its combat capability. But still, he diverted the attention of Admiral Kamimura. The Japanese commander, apparently, decided to destroy at least one of the Russian cruisers for sure and at times almost stopped firing at Jessen's ships. For example, around 08.00, he generally ordered all fire to be concentrated on the damaged cruiser, and only the return of Rossiya and Gromoboy forced the Japanese to fire on them again.

At 0820, Admiral Jessen realized the futility of his attempts, besides, two other cruisers received noticeable damage, so he finally turned north towards Vladivostok. The Japanese, carried away by finishing off Rurik, were on his right shell and could not prevent a breakthrough. Kamimura followed him, but he couldn't - or didn't he want to? - shorten the distance. As we can see, this Japanese admiral showed the same caution as Admiral Togo in the battle in the Yellow Sea, although in this segment of the battle he had a double superiority in ships and almost a quadruple in artillery. By 09.45, the Japanese managed to reduce the distance to 27 cables, but then, as if frightened by their own courage, they dropped the course, and at 10.00 the distance again increased to 37 cables.

“The battle was protracted (about 5 hours). During the chase, all crews were ordered to fire slowly and carefully aim their guns. But at 1000, Admiral Kamimura was informed that the Izumo was running out of ammunition. Seeing that the enemy’s speed was not decreasing at all, although his fire had noticeably weakened, the admiral decided to use the remaining ammunition to sink the Rurik in order to definitely prevent his rescue, ”reports the Japanese Confidential History. In fact, by this time, Izumo had used up only half of its ammunition: 2255 203-mm shells, 1085 152-mm shells and 910 12-lb shells. Another factor that influenced the decision of the Japanese admiral was that he did not know about the results of the battle of the Togo squadron and could well expect a collision with the Arthurian squadron, and in the very near future

All this time, "Rurik" tried to finish off the approaching cruisers "Naniva" and "Takatiho", which prudently kept at a distance of 35 cables. But this did not save them from a couple of accidental hits, although Rurik, of course, had much worse. Both of these cruisers fired a total of over 650 152mm shells. At about 10.20 "Rurik" sank, calm weather allowed the Japanese to save almost all the surviving sailors.

Another proof of the inadequacy of the senior command staff of the Russian fleet was the ratio of losses on the "Russia" and "Gromoboy". The newer and much better armored Gromoboy lost twice as many people simply because Captain 1st Rank Dabich ordered the crews of small-caliber guns, obviously useless under the prevailing conditions, to be at combat posts. Moreover, he ordered the dead to be replaced by new sailors, which entailed new losses.

And one more strange nuance. For a hundred years now, a story has been circulating on the pages of books that on Russian ships, when firing at long distances, deck guns failed - the teeth of lifting arcs and gears were bent and broken. But no one bothered to compare the real distances of the battle with the limit. The battle near Ulsan took place mainly at distances of 30-35 cable, a couple of times the distance was briefly reduced to 25 cable, a couple of times it increased to 45. These values ​​are far from the maximum range of the 152-mm Kane guns, what are the maximum elevation angles? But it seems that the assumption that the famous Obukhov plant supplied a frank marriage to the fleet does not suit anyone.

“After the death of Rurik, the active combat service of the Vladivostok detachment practically ceased,” one of the historians sadly writes. But attempts to conduct a cruising war did not stop, although now it was entrusted to auxiliary cruisers. The result was disgusting - without achieving anything serious, these ships, by their actions, managed to spoil Russia's relations with many European powers. By the way, if you look at the reference books, it suddenly turns out that the Japanese, not trying to officially start a cruising war, nevertheless caught more transports with smuggling than the Russians. The region of Vladivostok was especially fruitful for them.

In preparing for the cruising war, the Russian military-political leadership made several gross mistakes. First of all, the Russian command, without knowing it, let the genie out of the bottle, introducing a fundamentally new interpretation of the concept of "military smuggling" in Order No. 42 of the Maritime Department. Previously, only military goods were considered such: weapons, ammunition, uniforms, vehicles (read - horses). The Russians implicitly introduced the notion of “dual-use goods”, which is so fashionable today, that is, goods that may be used for military purposes though may and not be. Moreover, the Russian admirals immediately realized that anything could be dragged under such a definition. For example, cotton, which accounted for almost a third of Japan's imports, immediately turned out to be a forbidden product, because it could be used to produce nitrocellulose gunpowder and make uniforms.

Moreover, it was decided to start a cruising war in European waters, which obviously could bring nothing but scandals and exacerbation of tensions with Great Britain, which in 1905 owned half of the world's merchant fleet. This is not “the breadth and boldness of the strategic plan”, but outright stupidity. Along the way, it turned out that the preparation of Russia for a cruising war turned out to be zilch. The ships of the Voluntary Fleet, specially built for this, turned out to be unsuitable for this, only Petersburg and Moskva were converted into auxiliary cruisers, and the Maritime Department managed to turn even this quite ordinary business into an international scandal. These two ships were in Sevastopol, where gun platforms were installed and a trial installation of guns was made. After that, the guns were lowered into the hold and camouflaged. It was supposed to lead them through the Black Sea straits under the guise of merchant ships, and already at sea to install guns and raise the St. Andrew's flag. According to the international treaties in force at that time, Russia could not lead warships through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, but the Russian admirals hoped in this way to deceive everyone and everything. It would seem that it would be easier to prepare everything in the same Sevastopol, since the ports of the Baltic Sea were overloaded with work with the ships of the Second Pacific Squadron, bring them to Libau and officially turn them into auxiliary cruisers there. The loss of a couple of weeks meant absolutely nothing. But no, the main thing is to create problems for yourself.

These ships were intended for cruising in the Indian Ocean and left Sevastopol in June 1904. Only in the Red Sea, after the passage of the Suez Canal, they changed the commercial flag to a war flag and began operations in the Red Sea. "Petersburg" examined several ships and detained the English steamer "Malacca" with contraband cargo for Japan. In mid-July, the ships headed for the Indian Ocean. At Cape Gvardafuy, the cruisers split up: Petersburg headed north of the island of Madagascar, Smolensk went south. Having received an order to stop cruising on August 24, both ships arrived in Libau at the end of September. During this time, they examined 19 ships, of which they detained four and gave rise to the infamous case of the Malacca steamer.

Russian and English historians describe these events from directly opposite points of view, and the Russian one looks much less solid, and it is the cited "evidence" that undermines it. Russia at that time considered it completely natural for itself to violate any international obligations and therefore shouted the loudest about the violation of the rules by others. To begin with, the Russo-Japanese War itself broke out due to the fact that Russia violated every single one multilateral and bilateral treaties concerning China, Manchuria and Korea. Therefore, the “war for Korean firewood” became inevitable.

So, on June 30, 1904, the auxiliary cruiser Petersburg stopped and detained the British steamship Malacca of the Peninsular and Oriental company. under the pretext the presence of military contraband on it. The English newspapers of that time describe the colorful details of the search: the captain of the Malacca nailed the British merchant flag to the flagpole, and the Russian officer, threatening him with a revolver, tore off the flag. Captain 2nd rank Skalsky decided to send him to Libau with a prize team, without spending inspection of the cargo on the basis of mere "suspicions that the matter is unclean." Information about the allegedly smuggled nature of the cargo "came" from a variety of places that had nothing to do with the voyage of this steamer, for example, from Russian consuls in Malta and Alexandria, where "Malacca" did not enter.

Already on July 7, a note from the British ambassador followed, of course, completely unfounded, as all Russian authors have been writing in unison for a hundred years in a row. Yes, there were military supplies on the Malacca destined for Hong Kong, which the Russians stubbornly did not notice and do not notice today. There were proper documents, the cargoes were marked “Property of the EB government”, but if you really want to, you can not notice this, but say that “from the survey of the team” it turned out the presence of military contraband. Indeed, stokers and deckhands know better than anyone what, where and to whom the ship is carrying.

On June 10, a meeting was held on Malacca, at which opinions were sharply divided. Diplomats demanded the release of the ship, referring to the violations of international law committed by the sailors, the naval faction, led by "Prince Tsushima" Alexei Alexandrovich, defended the point of view "what I want, I turn back." The Grand Duke argued that England was so sharp in defense of Malacca on the grounds that the English king was among the shareholders of P&O. Imagine, as the French say! There are two different explanations for this delusion. Either the general-admiral was a complete fool and broadcast the rotten Russian experience to other countries, because in the famous scam with Korean firewood, the Romanov family was smeared up to their ears. Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich became one of the leaders of the concession, and the largest block of shares belonged to the "EB cabinet", that is, simply the king. It can be assumed that Aleksey Aleksandrovich bought into the title of "P&O" - "royal privileged" (Royal Charter), but this only means that the king granted certain privileges to the company, but by no means that he receives money for this. And again, such an interpretation means that the Admiral General was remarkably stupid. The second explanation is much shorter - the Grand Duke deliberately lied.

And the explanation for the sharp reaction of the British may be quite simple. Since 1841, P&O has been the official carrier of the British Admiralty mail, and a little later became the official carrier of the Royal Mail. In fact, in England, for an attack on the Royal Mail, they simply hung up without much ranting, because this was considered an attempt on the guarantees given by the EB.

After some squabbling, already on July 14 the ship was released and continued the transition. In order to get rid of them completely, the Russians are launching a campaign of lies, in which Russian consuls in Shanghai and Hong Kong began to play the first fiddle. Now the Malacca is going to Singapore not for repairs, but to cover its tracks, then the French journalists have “reliably established” that the ship is going to Yokohama, but for some reason ends up in Sasebo. It suddenly turns out that the Iwate cruiser was equipped with 152-mm guns brought by the Malacca, although such guns did not exist in nature. In general, as Dr. Goebbels advised, in order for a lie to be believed, it must be monstrous.

The reliability of the work of these "sources of information" is well illustrated by the fable about the German transport "Sambia". The Russian agent in Berlin, Colonel Schebeck, reported that this transport was leaving Hamburg for Japan with 329 guns on board. The Russian admirals, without hesitation, immediately sent the auxiliary cruiser Ural to catch the smuggler. No one even bothered to think whether it is possible to believe these nonsense. After all, this is the artillery park of an entire army, the real deal of the century. It would be simply impossible to keep such a secret, but there were no other confirmations, except for the colonel's tales, then, and have not appeared now. But earlier, and especially today, most historians for some reason consider these tales to be true facts.

Smolensk also made a scandal when it detained the German steamship Prince Heinrich. Russian historians shyly write that they checked the mail on it and seized two letters containing documents about the shipment of military contraband from Germany to Japan. In fact, everything was much more stupid and vile. The ship was confiscated all mail, after which it all perused and seized the two mentioned letters. All other letters were “sealed and set aside for transfer to the first postal steamer they met,” which was done two days later, when the English steamer Persia met. Is it any wonder after this that the Russian auxiliary cruisers were treated like pirates of the 18th century who had fallen out in our time?

In general, the actions of the Russian auxiliary cruisers brought nothing but trouble to Russia. Admiral Rozhdestvensky dragged the Kuban, Terek, Dnepr, Rion and Ural around the world, but they did nothing significant, except that the Ural ingloriously died in the Battle of Tsushima. The only auxiliary cruiser of the Vladivostok detachment "Lena" distinguished itself only by the fact that "due to a breakdown of the machines that prevented the continuation of cruising", it reached San Francisco!

Purely for reference, we give data on merchant ships captured by the Japanese fleet. The total number is 64, including 16 Russian, 22 English, 10 German and 5 American. And what will you say after that, who was helped by the British and Americans?

Probably the easiest way to deal with the reconnaissance and patrol activities of the cruisers. With what words the famous “dogs” of the Japanese fleet were not honored by the Arthurians! But, what is most interesting, the obviously stronger "Askold" never tried to drive away the observers who settled on the outer raid. Even in the most tense moments, when the Japanese squadron fired across Liaoteshan, shelling the harbor of Port Arthur, no one tried to interfere with the Japanese cruisers that were correcting the fire. These episodes, by the way, prove that the radio communication among the Japanese was two orders of magnitude better, and stories about pre-war experiments in communication at a distance of 200 miles are not convincing. Why did no one try to repeat them during the war?!

Another example of a well-established intelligence service is the organization of patrols in front of the Tsushima Strait. Both amateur and professional historians like to speculate about whether Rozhdestvensky's squadron could have slipped through the strait undetected by the Japanese. The answer is simple - it couldn't. Just to get this answer, I had to wait a very long time until the Japanese maps, considered secret for almost 100 years, finally appear. It turned out that four lines of patrols were organized, advanced almost to the island of Quelpart. Rozhdestvensky was lucky to slip through them at night, but what could happen if he passed this area during the day, hoping to be in the Tsushima Strait at night? It would have resulted in a total attack by Japanese destroyers and in the morning finishing off a battered squadron with the main forces of Admiral Togo. But what happened happened, in square 203, the auxiliary cruiser Shinano Maru discovered the Russians ...

On August 14 (August 1 according to the old style), 1904, a fierce battle took place between the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers and the Japanese squadron, as a result of which the cruiser Rurik heroically died. The feat of the crew of this ship is akin to the feat of the Varyag, and even surpasses it in the intensity of the battle and the tragedy of the situation. However, by chance and fate, it happened that the name "Varyag" is still well-known, and few people remember and know about "Rurik" today. However, as about the legendary Vladivostok detachment ...

Vladivostok detachment "invisible"

After in the very first days of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. our squadron was blocked in Port Arthur by the enemy fleet, in the Pacific Ocean there was only one formation of Russian ships capable of cruising operations on the communications of the Japanese - the Vladivostok detachment consisting of the cruisers "Russia", "Rurik", "Gromoboi", "Bogatyr" and several "dogs" attached to him - destroyers.

After 80 years, the famous writer Valentin Pikul dedicated his novel “Cruisers” to the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers, and the local prose writer Anatoly Ilyin wrote a story called “The Vladivostok detachment”. It is clear that no one dedicates stories and novels to ships just like that. The Vladivostok detachment entered the annals of history forever with its daring raids to the shores of Japan, which caused panic in the enemy. At the same time, the cruisers themselves remained elusive for the Japanese fleet for a long time, in connection with which the foreign press called them "ghost ships".

cruiser raids

Already in the first days of the war, our cruisers managed to sink several Japanese transports carrying soldiers and fuel. After this sortie of Russian cruisers, the commander of the Japanese fleet, Admiral Togo, was forced to weaken his forces at Port Arthur in order to reinforce Kamimura's squadron to fight our cruisers. This is what our naval commanders were trying to achieve: to divert some of the enemy ships that were besieging Port Arthur.

And soon the cruiser "Bogatyr" (commander captain of the 1st rank A. Stemman) was unlucky: on May 15 (2), 1904, in the Posiet Bay, during the fog, he sat tightly on the rocks near Cape Bruce. With great difficulty and not immediately, the cruiser was removed from the stones and escorted to Vladivostok for repairs, where it remained until the end of the war. Having so absurdly lost a fellow, "Russia", "Rurik" and "Gromoboi" remained the three of them. To the entire Sea of ​​​​Japan and its environs ...

At the end of May, the cruisers went on another raid. In the Korea Strait, they intercepted the Izumo-Maru military transport. Realizing that it would not be possible to escape, the Japanese captain, having landed the crew on the boats, scuttled the ship. Then the Thunderbolt overtook another Hitatsi-Maru transport, which had 1,100 soldiers, 320 horses and 18 Krupp 280-mm siege guns on board to crush the fortifications of Port Arthur. The captain of the Japanese ship, the Englishman J. Campebel, tried to ram our cruiser. Evading, "Thunderbolt" shot "Hitatsi-Maru" from the guns. Meanwhile, "Russia" and "Rurik" caught up with another large military transport "Sado-Maru", where there were about 15 thousand builders, a railway battalion of soldiers, pontoons, a telegraph park, machine tools for siege weapons (which drowned along with "Hitatsi-Maru ”), boxes of gold and silver. "Rurik" put alternately on the torpedo into the right and left side of the ship. The cruisers went further, believing that the transport settling under water would be on the seabed. But, alas, he did not drown. Haste did not allow our sailors to finish the job ...

Enemy ships scoured the entire Sea of ​​Japan, looking for the Vladivostok invisibles, but they burned coal in the furnaces in vain. "We're just unlucky!" the Japanese admirals lamented. In the meantime, all of Japan was alarmed by the raids of our cruisers, and newspapers published offensive cartoons against Admiral Kamimura. The foreign press also responded to these events. So, one of the English newspapers was forced to note: “The cruising of the Vladivostok detachment is the most daring enterprise of all done by the Russians. The fact that their ships managed to escape from the Kamimura squadron aroused public opinion in Japan.

Things eventually got to the point that on June 19, 1904, embittered representatives of Japanese business, suffering millions of dollars in losses due to unpunished attacks by the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers on trade communications, smashed and set fire to the apartment of Admiral Kamimura. If he had been at home at that moment, the brutal crowd would obviously have torn him to pieces, especially since the police preferred not to interfere in what was happening. Japanese newspapers in those days added fuel to the fire, demanding "on behalf of the Japanese people that the government make the most serious remark to the Kamimura squadron."

And our cruisers, meanwhile, continued to smash the enemy’s transport communications, now in the Pacific Ocean, where the Japanese were forced to move the paths of their ships with cargo and troops, hoping thereby to protect them from Russian ghost ships. In the July raid they sank several Japanese transports and schooners. They captured the German steamer Arabia with a cargo of locomotive boilers and rails for Japan. They detained and blew up the English ship "Night Commander" with cargo for the Japanese railway. Then the German steamship Tea was unlucky with a cargo of fish in its holds, en route from America to Yokohama. He was stopped, the team removed, and then blown up. And the English ship "Calhas" with smuggling was taken as a prize.

About the daring sorties of our cruisers, the world press rustled. The business circles of not only Japan, but also England, Germany, and America became worried. Still would! Cargo tariffs and insurance rates increased sharply, contracts for the supply of goods to Japan were disrupted. Panic reigned in the ports and on the stock exchanges...

Skirmish with the Japanese squadron. The death of "Rurik"

At dawn on August 11, 1904, the cruisers Rossiya (commander 1st rank captain A. Andreev), Rurik (commander 1st rank captain E. Trusov) and Gromoboy (commander 1st rank captain N. Dabich) under the leadership of the commander of the detachment, Rear Admiral K. Jessen, went to sea in accordance with the order received to support the breakthrough of the ships of the Port Arthur squadron to Vladivostok. However, the order was late - the squadron, badly battered in battle, had already returned to Port Arthur, having failed to break through. And "Russia", "Rurik" and "Gromoboy" went to Tsushima, not knowing that they had no one to meet ...

Early in the morning of August 14, the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers in the Korean Strait, 40 miles from the port of Fuzan (Pusan), was intercepted by the Japanese squadron and with all its might fell on the Russian ships, cutting off the escape route. "Russia", "Rurik" and "Gromoboy" were in a trap. The Japanese were superior in numbers, artillery, speed, and armor strength. In a fierce battle, "Rurik", which was walking at the end, had the hardest time of all. It was on him that the Japanese concentrated their main fire. "Russia" and "Gromoboy", having received injuries themselves, tried to alleviate his fate by covering themselves, and then began to retreat to the north, hoping to distract the Japanese from Rurik. But the enemy clung to him with a death grip.

Reference. Rurik is the lead ship of a series of ocean-going armored cruisers-raiders. Built at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg and entered service in 1895. Not suitable for squadron combat, because. to improve seaworthiness, it had incomplete armor protection of the hull and almost did not have it for deck guns to protect against gunnery fragments. Displacement 11,690 tons, speed 18 knots. Cruising range 6,700 miles. Armament: 4 guns - 203 mm, 16 - 152 mm, 6 - 120 mm, 6 - 47 mm, 10 - 37 mm guns and 6 torpedo tubes. Crew 763 people.

Tormented during an unequal battle, settling in the sea as a stern, shrouded in steam from broken boilers, the Rurik seemed to the Japanese an easy prey. They hoped to capture him. However, the junior artillery officer, Lieutenant Konstantin Ivanov, who led the cruiser after the death of the commander and senior officers, and the surviving officers and sailors were not going to lower the flag. They stood to the death. When the Rurik's guns failed, the Japanese moved closer. But the crew of the Russian cruiser suddenly made a desperate attempt to ram their nearest ship, and a torpedo hit the Izumo cruiser ...

Pulling back, the Japanese ships opened fire again. By the end of the fight they were 14 against one. By 10 o'clock. in the morning, after a five-hour (!) battle (“Varangian”, note, only an hour participated in the battle and had no mortal injuries), “Rurik” was turned into a pile of twisted iron and only miraculously kept afloat. The Japanese began to approach the stationary cruiser again. In order to prevent the enemy from getting Rurik, Lieutenant Ivanov ordered the kingstones to be opened. Admiral Kamimura, realizing that there would be no surrender from the Russians, became furious and ordered a flurry of fire to be brought down on the cruiser. Before the sinking of the ship, Lieutenant K. Ivanov ordered everyone to leave the agonizing "Rurik", and throw the wounded overboard. Such was the dire need.

At 10 o'clock. 42 min. On August 14, 1904, the armored cruiser of the Russian fleet "Rurik" with the St. Andrew's flag raised and the signal "I die, but do not give up!" disappeared under water ... On the "Rurik" 204 people died and 305 sailors were wounded (on the "Varyag" 22 sailors were killed in battle, 12 died of wounds). The fallen Rurikites remained forever where they took their last battle - at the bottom of the Korea Strait. "Russia" and "Gromoboy" in that battle lost 129 lower ranks and officers. Historians then wrote: "You need to be iron creatures to withstand such a hellish battle."

With the death of the Rurik, the legendary raids of the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers practically ceased. Until the fall, "Russia" and "Gromoboy" were under repair. Then an order came from the main naval headquarters: “The ships of the Vladivostok cruiser squadron should be saved for the second squadron. Cruise operations with the risk of further damage should be avoided.” And only our destroyers sometimes raided enemy communications, sinking several more Japanese schooners. April 25, 1905 "Russia" and "Gromoboy" made their last joint raid, reaching the Sangarsky Strait, where they sank several Japanese schooners. On April 28 they returned to the base. And on May 2, the Gromoboy, having gone out to sea to test the radiotelegraph, hit a mine and got under repair until the end of the war. "Russia" is orphaned.

Curious detail. After the war of 1904-1905. a ship named "Rurik II" entered the Baltic Fleet. The name "Varyag" was not assigned to any warship either under the tsar or in the Stalin era ...

As for the 18 Japanese heavy cruisers that became the subject of this monograph, the first of them appeared as 7100-ton long-range reconnaissance fleets that went to the ocean, and their projects were approved even before the signing of the Washington Treaty. However, they were created with an eye on the British cruiser-defenders of trade of the end of the First World War of the type "Hawkins" ("Hawkins"), which are considered the immediate predecessors of all "Washingtonians". Having built 4 ships with weapons that were noticeably inferior to the first "10,000-tons" of probable opponents, the Japanese more than compensated for their lag in the next two series, due to all sorts of tricks (and they did not disdain violating agreements) giving them 1-2 guns more, than others, as well as the most powerful torpedo and aircraft weapons. As a result, 8 cruisers of the Myoko and Takao types, not without reason, began to be considered the strongest in the world. Japanese admirals pinned great hopes on these ships in a night battle against the numerically strongest battle fleet of the United States - a battle that, according to their plans, was supposed to precede a pitched battle. The functions of reconnaissance in the interests of the battle fleet faded into the background, especially with the development of carrier-based aviation.

The appearance of the last 6 heavy cruisers in the Japanese fleet has no analogues in the practice of world shipbuilding: they were built as light ones (class “b”) with an unprecedentedly powerful armament of 15 155-mm guns, but with the possibility of re-equipping with 203-mm caliber, they were quickly rebuilt into heavy ones as soon as the Japanese refused to comply with all treaties. As a result, by the beginning of the war in the Pacific, the number of ships of this class among the main rivals - Japan and the United States - turned out to be equal.

The publication was released in a format similar to the "Warships of the World" series.

1.2. General doctrine of the development of the Japanese fleet after the Russo-Japanese war. The first projects of reconnaissance cruisers.

The war with Russia, which ended in the complete defeat of the enemy at sea, which culminated in the Battle of Tsushima, fully confirmed the correctness of the organization and tactics chosen by the Imperial Navy. However, the change in the foreign policy situation, the experience gained in the course of hostilities and the significant progress in military shipbuilding caused by the war required a corresponding reorganization of the fleet. In October 1906, Emperor Mutsuhito demanded that Marshal Arimoto Yamagata formulate a policy for the defense of the Empire, taking into account the lessons of the past war and the strengthening of US interests in the Pacific Ocean and the Far East. Fulfilling the instructions of the emperor, Prime Minister Kinmochi Saioniji in January-April of the following year held a series of meetings with the Chief of the Naval General Staff (MGSH) Admiral Heihachiro Togo, the new Naval Minister Vice Admiral Minoru Saito, the Minister of War General Masatake Terauchi and the chiefs of staff. Issues relating to the fleet were discussed at these meetings on the basis of a new treatise written by a captain of the 2nd rank. Sato, who spent the entire war at the headquarters of the commander of the Second Squadron, and after it became a college teacher at the Moscow State School. Adopted on April 7, 1907, the new "Imperial Defense Policy" established the main directions of Japan's defense planning for the next 11 years. In the list of potential adversaries, in the first place, most likely due to inertia or because of dissatisfaction with territorial acquisitions after the victory, was Russia, followed by the United States and France, which owned large colonies in Southeast Asia. Regarding the ship composition, T. Sago argued the need to have by 1920 "a battle fleet (Kaizen Kantai) of three squadrons of 8 new battleships each, a sin of squadrons of 4 armored cruisers and three squadrons of 4 cruisers of the 2nd class, not counting" auxiliary fleet "of the ships of the shore line. But the adopted" Policy "indicated a more modest composition of the linear fleet of eight battleships, supported by a squadron of eight armored cruisers of the latest project and with an age of no more than 8 years. March 31, 1912 in accordance with the new standards instead of armored ships were supposed to have the same number of battlecruisers.This ambitious project, which became known in history under the name "Fleet 8-8" (Hachi-hachi Kantai), Japan could not implement due to political and financial difficulties, but for several years it was used as a weapon of politics.When, finally, it seemed that all difficulties could be overcome, the signing of the Washington Naval Treaty I in 1922 finally buried this project of building a powerful fleet.

Based on the experience of the Russo-Japanese war, the MGSH also put forward a requirement to have cruisers with powerful weapons and protection, high speed and a long range in the naval forces, which could perform the functions of scouts in the battle fleet. The main characteristics of the new reconnaissance cruisers were detailed in the “Program for the Creation of a New Fleet”, presented to the Cabinet of Ministers by the Minister of Marine M. Saito on May 15, 1910. And here the Japanese were helped by the Russian trophies, in particular, long-range scouts - the armored cruiser "Bayan" (renamed "Azo") and the armored "Varyag" ("Soya"), the short-range reconnaissance armored "Novik" ("Suzuya") and an auxiliary cruiser “ ” (“Anegawa”). The latter, sunk in shallow water in Port Arthur, the Japanese introduced into their fleet as early as March 1906, using a messenger ship (tsuhokan) as a messenger. It was the experience of operating the Anegava, which amazed its new owners with its cruising range and ability to maintain 19-knot speed even in heavy seas, that showed what an ocean reconnaissance aircraft should be like. In total, the 1910 program requested the construction of 51 single ships over the next eight financial years (1911-1918): 7 battleships, 3 1st class cruisers, 4 2nd class cruisers, 1 “special purpose” cruiser (for ocean reconnaissance) , 26 destroyers and 10 submarines. With ships already planned for construction, a fleet of 8 new battleships (dreadnought Fuso plus 7), 8 cruisers of the 1st class (armored Kurama with 305-mm and 203-mm guns + 4 future battleships Kongo + 3 ) and 8 cruisers of the 2nd class (“Tone” and 3 types of “Tikum” under construction, plus 3 and 1 “special”) no older than 8 years could be ready by April 1, 1919. Moreover, all battleships and battlecruisers of this program (except Kurama) were supposed to carry 356-mm guns, and ships already built after the Russo-Japanese War and under construction with 305-mm main caliber (“pre-dreadnoughts” “Kashima”, “ Katori "Aki" and "Satsuma", dreadnoughts "Kawachi" and "Settsu", large armored cruisers "Tsukuba" "Ikoma" and the same type "Kurame" "Ibuki") were taken out of the scope of "Fleet 8-8".

But the cabinet rejected the submitted program and in September 1911 the fleet proposed another one, which provided for the readiness by April 1, 1920 of 8 battleships, 6 cruisers of the 1st and 8 cruisers of the 2nd class. According to it, 7 battleships should have been built, two cruisers of the 1st class (in addition to 4 of the Congo type), five of the 2nd class, two “special” ones (one of them was supposed to replace the “Aiegawa” delisted in August 1911 year to return as a gift to the Russian Tsar). The number of destroyers and submarines remained unchanged. However, the construction of none of these ships was not approved, and the political confusion in the country led to the rejection of the new shipbuilding program at two regular sessions of parliament.

In 1914, the new Minister of the Navy, Vice Admiral Mutsuro Yashiro, presented proposals to bring the fleet to the composition of "8-8" in the shortest possible time, and the defense department of the ruling cabinet, on the eve of a big war in Europe, approved them on June 22. A month later, on Yashiro's advice, the cabinet presented an abridged version of this plan to Parliament as part of a routine naval replenishment. The new program, which provided for bringing the fleet up to the “8-4” composition, also included three reconnaissance cruisers of 6000 tons each, armed with four 20-cm guns. It is interesting that the Russian fleet was equipped with long-range scouts of just such a displacement before the war with Japan (“Varyag”, “Askold” and the type “Bogatyr”). The Russian Naval Ministry soon considered them suboptimal, given their size, cost and armament (of course, they could not compete with Asama-class armored cruisers, which simply did not exist in the Russian fleet), but the Japanese, apparently, turned out to have a higher opinion of them . Such ships could fill an empty niche in the Japanese fleet between armored and small armored cruisers.

The outbreak of World War II prevented the adoption of this program. On September 10, 1915, the next Minister of the Navy, Tomosaburo Kato, presented his plan to bring the fleet to the “8-4” composition, approved in principle by the Defense Department of the Cabinet of Ministers, but only partially approved. This partial plan (the battleship Nagato, the 2nd class cruisers Tenryu and Tatsuta, 1 destroyer, 3 submarines and a tanker) was adopted at the 37th session of Parliament in February 1916, but the reconnaissance cruisers were deleted from there. No technical data has been found regarding the reconnaissance cruisers of the pre-war programs. This program itself was interesting in that it marked the transition to the construction of capital ships with 410-mm guns. The MGSH was no longer satisfied with the 4 battleships under construction (“Fuso”, “Yamashiro”, “Ise” and “Hyuuga”) and 4 battlecruisers (“Kongo”, “Haruna”, “Hii”, “Kirishima”) from 356- mm main caliber and he hatched plans for the construction of the “8-8 Fleet” with guns that far exceeded those of other powers.

The Tenryu and Tatsuta were the fast leaders of the destroyer fleets that rolled off the stocks in large numbers. The construction of just such 2nd class cruisers was then considered more urgent, but a few months later the Marine Technical Council (1) (MTS) received the task of developing a preliminary design for a reconnaissance cruiser (“scout”, as the British called it). At the same time, the arsenal at the base of the fleet in Kure, the development of a new 20-cm gun was entrusted, which was supposed to replace the 20-cm 45-caliber type 41 years (2) (41st year of the reign of Meiji - Emperor Mutsuhito, i.e. 1908), created on the basis of an earlier model of the English company Vickers.Already on September 22, 1916, MTS submitted for consideration to the Moscow State School a draft scout project with the following characteristics: normal displacement 7200 tons, maximum speed 36 knots, range 6000-8000 miles at 14 knots, artillery weapons - at least 12 new (taken into service just before the World War) 14-cm / 50 guns (two twin installations in the bow and stern and 4 single on the sides) or a smaller number of developed 20-cm guns, torpe bottom - 4 twin-tube fixed on-board vehicles for new 61-cm torpedoes, protection - 76-mm belt made of HT-steel (high tension steel - High Tensile Steel) and an armored deck over vital parts. The 14 cm (140 mm) caliber was new to the Japanese Navy, which had previously made do with 152 mm and 120 mm English-style rapid-firing guns. But 152-mm shells weighing 45.4 kg were too heavy for manual loading by a Japanese sailor of normal conditions, and a 120-mm gun was already considered too small for the main caliber of cruisers.

In general, they liked the project and the “8-4 Fleet Construction Program”, prepared in July-September 1916, included three such “scouts” (estimated cost of building 6,915,078 yen each), and in total it requested funds for the construction of three battleships (“ Mutsu”, “Kata”, “Tosa”), two battlecruisers (“Amachi”, “Akagi”), 9 cruisers (three 7200-ton “scouts” and six 3500-ton leaders of torpedo fleets of the “improved Tenryu” type) , 27 destroyers, 18 submarines and 3 auxiliary vessels, which should have been allocated within 7 years, starting from 1917. Parliament was unable to adopt this program at the 38th session, as it was dissolved on January 25th. But when the Japanese learned about the 3-year shipbuilding program adopted by the United States on August 29, 1916, certain political circles managed to convene an extraordinary 39th session of parliament, which on July 14, 1917 made the necessary decision.

The Americans, in particular, planned to build 10 “scout” cruisers of 7100 tons each, with a speed of 35 knots and armament of 8 152-mm / 53 guns, 2 twin-tube rotary torpedo tubes (TA) and 2-4 seaplanes with two catapults (future type "Omeha"). Having suppressed these data, the Japanese MGSH decided to redo the project of the 7200-ton “scout”, but for now, change the composition of the light cruisers of the latest program. At the end of 1917, the 9 cruisers envisaged by the program were replaced by eight 5500-ton cruisers, which could serve as scouts and destroyer leaders, and one experimental “small” project. Three more cruisers of 5500 tons each (3) were included in the “8-6 Fleet Construction Program” (battlecruisers Takao and Atago, 3 light cruisers, 27 destroyers, 48 ​​submarines and 6 auxiliary ships), adopted by the 40th session of Parliament on March 12, 1918.

The project of a 5500-ton cruiser, the so-called "medium model" was developed by the 4th - shipbuilding - department of the MTD (Marine Technical Department) (4) based on the Tenryu. A significant increase in size made it possible to strengthen the armament (from 4 to 7 14-cm guns with a side salvo of 6 trunks) and increase the cruising range by one and a half times (from 6000 to 9000 miles at 10 knots). In parallel, the MTD began to improve the design of the 7200-ton cruiser and at the beginning of 1918 presented the following characteristics to the MGSH:

Displacement (normal)	8000 t
Speed ​​(maximum)	36.5 knots
Armament (artillery)	10 or 12 14-cm/50 guns of type 3 years in 2-gun turrets along the diametrical plane (DP), arranged according to the “pyramid” scheme - 3 turrets in the bow and 2-3 in the stern. Alternatively, it was proposed to use the new 20-cm / 50 guns, the development of which was carried out in the Kure arsenal. As they were ready, it was supposed to install 8 barrels on each cruiser.
Armament (torpedo)	4x2 TA for new 61 cm torpedoes in fixed side mounts, 2 per side.
Protection	side and deck armor throughout vital parts.
cruising range	6000 miles at 14 knots.

Four ships under the new project, officially called “large model cruisers”, were included in the first post-war “8-8 Fleet Construction Program”, which also included 4 giant battleships (Nos. 9-12) and battlecruisers (Nos. 13-16) ), 8 cruisers of the “medium model” of 5500 tons each, 32 destroyers, 28 submarines, 5 gunboats and 18 auxiliary vessels. The results of the last world war strengthened the financial position of the Land of the Rising Sun, which gave hope to its admirals to finally realize their plans without restrictions from the government and parliament. The Council of Ministers approved this last phase of the Fleet 8-8 (5) program on June 2, 1919, but Parliament was only able to adopt it a year later at its 43rd Extraordinary Session (the previous session had been dissolved in February). Published on August 1, 1920, it planned to place an order for one 8,000 ton cruiser and one 5,500 ton cruiser annually over 4 years (fiscal years 1920/21-1923/24), and then during fiscal 1924/25 and 1925/26. years to order 2 5500-ton. The last ship of the Fleet 8-8 program should have been completed by April 1, 1928 (that is, by the beginning of the next financial year). The cruiser's cost of 8,000 tons was estimated in 1919 as 8,039,200 yen, but by June 1920 this figure already exceeded 11 million.

In 1868, the Meiji Ishin coup took place in Japan, as a result of which the power of the emperor was restored. The country got out of the power of the feudal clans, and the fleet became one. The Ministry of War (whose jurisdiction initially included the Navy) got a strange set of ships that could hardly be called combat and which clearly did not represent the navy. It included both the ships of the bakufu - the feudal government, and the ships inherited from its defeated opponents, primarily the powerful Satsuma clan. Among them was the only ironclad purchased from the rebellious American Confederacy of the southern states, a wooden corvette and a gunboat, as well as several armed steamers and sailboats. Japan was faced with a dilemma, either to restore old ships or to renew the fleet. The Japanese took the second path. In 1870, the most powerful fleet in the world, the British, was chosen as a landmark.

Several English instructors arrived in a country that had recently been completely closed from the rest of the world, and began to train sailors and transfer modern technologies. However, the Japanese were quite cautious and the British operated within numerous restrictions. But over the years allotted to them, the British managed to do a lot of useful things. In addition to organizing the fleet and training personnel, they arranged the purchase of warships.

corvette "Tsukuba"

True, for him the beginning did not look inspiring among the first acquisitions, for example, the Tsukuba corvette with a displacement of about 1900 tons, built almost 20 years ago in the British colony of Burma and then modernized in the Old Man metropolis (which the language does not dare to call a cruiser ) developed under pairs no more than 10 knots. However, the Japanese treated this antiquity, as well as all their warships, with great care and love. Artillery was changed on it twice and, according to some reports, in 1892 the Tsukuba even received four 152-mm rapid-fire guns. The veteran retired after the Russo-Japanese War. The 1,400-ton Asama corvette purchased in France did not shine with dignity either.

corvette "Asama"

However, British experts were by no means limited to these obsolete ships. Already quite modern armored units of the Fuso frigate (essentially a small battleship) and the Hiei and Congo corvettes were created at the shipyards of England. The project of the latter was developed by Edward Reed himself, the chief designer of the Admiralty. With a displacement of 2200 tons, they could develop 14 knots and had an iron belt up to 114 mm thick. The Hiei still managed to actively participate in the Sino-Japanese war and get its share of enemy shells in the battle at the mouth of the Yalu River.

frigate "Fuso"

Deciding quite reasonably "not to put all your eggs in one basket," the War Department abruptly changed the main supplier of ideas and ships. The choice fell on Britain's main rival. By the early 1880s, French metallurgists and engineers began to arrive in the Far East. They managed to complete the work of their predecessors and set up the construction of cruisers at Japanese shipyards. It is quite natural that at first everything did not go too smoothly. Wooden corvettes "Kaimon" and "Tenryu" with a displacement of only about 1500 tons were built painfully for about seven years each, entering service only in 1885 - 1886. However, they turned out to be quite successful and served until the Russo-Japanese War, during which in July 1904 the Kaimon hit a mine in Talienwan Bay and died, and the Tenryu, who survived it safely, was excluded from the lists shortly after the end of hostilities.

corvette "Kasuga"

A successful project was modernized, and the following corvettes, Musashi and Katsuragi, were laid on the vacant stocks in Ekosuka. Another corvette of the same type, Yamato, was built at the second state shipyard in Kobe. The ships had a composite set with steel frames and wooden plating and carried full sailing equipment, removed at the turn of the century, in 1900. Construction also accelerated, although the five-year period for rather simple units was still insurmountable.

Practical "pieces of wood" were quite suitable for study, but for a serious war, larger ships and more powerful weapons were required. The Japanese wanted to get the most powerful and at the same time cheap modern cruiser, and the French engineers, who usually very vigilantly followed such a characteristic as stability, gave "weakness". The Wenby, built in Le Havre, had all the external signs of a typical French, such as the Sfax, Cecile or Taj, had a rather thick armored deck and good speed. However, in an effort to satisfy the customer as much as possible, the designers went too far with artillery, which consisted of four heavy 240-mm Krupp guns, not counting 150-millimeters and other “little things”. As a result, the overloaded cruiser, under full sail, listed dangerously and did not want to return to an even keel. In this state, he left Le Havre on a long journey to the Far East. But he never arrived there, disappearing without a trace somewhere between Singapore and Taiwan in October 1887.

The first high-profile "puncture" was followed by further ones, albeit not so serious and of a completely different plan. The reorientation to France brought to Japan the ideas of the "young school", which turned out to be quite consistent with the fighting spirit of the samurai. Small ships attacking armored giants, in addition to a good opportunity to show the valor of warriors, were also inexpensive, just affordable for a rapidly developing power that had too many desires and needs.

Corvette "Matsushima"

To implement new ideas from Europe, "heavy artillery" arrived, the famous French shipbuilder Emile Bertin signed a three-year contract to stay in Japan. He proposed a super-original project for a trio of cruisers armed with the heaviest guns and designed as a response to fight even with large battleships - ordered for the most powerful Northern squadron of the Chinese fleet, Matsushima, Hasidate and Itsukushima received the designation of the San Keikan type. ”- “landscape ships”, since each unit bore the name of one of the three most famous species in Japan - Matsushima Bay in Miyagi Prefecture, Amano Hashidate Sandbank in Miyazu Bay, Kyoto Prefecture and Ikutsushima Island in Hiroshima Bay.

They were conceived to act as a single detachment, forming, as it were, one “composite battleship”, in which the Hasidate and Itsukushima were the “bow towers”, and the “Matsushima” was the “stern”. Accordingly, the main gun, one of the most powerful at that time in the world, the 320-mm Kane gun, was located on the first pair in the bow, and on the "closing" one - in the stern. In addition to the monster guns located in a lightly armored barbette, each of the cruisers carried a solid battery of 120-mm rapid-fire guns, just "introduced into use." The rapid firers were located in a large battery in the center of the hull, firing through ports on both sides in the manner of ancient frigates. It was they who, in fact, were the main weapons of the "Sunkeykans". But the small size of the ship did not allow them to be protected, and therefore they were very vulnerable.

Therefore, neither the strange Bertan idea nor its implementation could be called successful by any means. The Matsushima failed to develop an already non-sprint 16.5-knot design speed, their boilers constantly leaked and failed. However, their main drawback was their monstrous 320-graph paper, for the installation of which too much had to be sacrificed. The huge guns themselves on such small ships turned out to be practically useless. The 65-ton long barrel, when aimed directly at the side, noticeably heeled the hull, creating additional difficulties for firing, not only for its own, but also for much more effective quick-shooters. As a result, even when the sea was calm, no more than four shots per hour could be fired from the "monster".

All the shortcomings of the project were fully manifested in battle. Severe trouble awaited the type "Sankeikan" in the battle with the Chinese at the mouth of the Yalu River. There, in four hours of battle, 320-millimeters fired 14 shots for the entire trinity, but unlike later battles, when the Matsushima prudently kept out of effective return fire, they had to experience the impact of enemy shells. And then all the shortcomings of the cramped and unprotected 120-mm battery appeared. One of the few hit shells from Chinese battleships exploded among the ammunition on the Matsushima, causing a strong fire in which almost 100 people were injured - about a third of the crew, and half of them died .

Without a doubt, this hit was the most successful in the entire war and showed the extreme vulnerability of the “pseudolinkor”. In the Russo-Japanese War, the “landscape trinity” participated in both major battles, but neither in the Yellow Sea nor at Tsushima did they achieve a single hit, firing at all less than two dozen shells. In general, the main benefit of the "landscapes" was, perhaps, the process of "assembling" the "Hashidate" at the shipyard in Ekosuka (Two other units were built in France). It was "assemblies", since almost all mechanisms, equipment, materials and drawings came to Japan from Europe, and French engineers led the work. Equipment and skills were clearly lacking so far, and the construction of the Hasidate took twice as long. It entered service three years later than the "sisters". Nevertheless, the experience in creating a modern combat ship turned out to be very useful.

"Hashidate"

The failure to implement Bertin's extravagant ideas did not go unnoticed by the attentive Japanese three years before the Matsushima disaster. In 1892, it was decided to no longer use the services of the French. Mikado ministers were quickly diverted back to their main rivals, the British. And very successfully, just in the 1890s, the rapid ascent along the pyramid of glory of the Armstrong company and its designers began. Actually, it was they who largely created the modern Japanese fleet. We have already talked about the Elswick Esino, armed exclusively with rapid fire and developing 23 knots, which did so much to defeat the Chinese at Yalu. Under the flag of Admiral Tsuboi, he led the “flying squadron”, which consisted of the fastest cruisers, attacking the enemy from the flank and completely ruining his system.

Akitsushima

The “flying squadron” included the fastest and most modern cruisers, in addition to the Yoshino, the Elswick Naniwa and Takatiho, as well as the first modern Japanese-built product, the Akitsushima. It strongly resembled a smaller version of the American "Elswick" - "Baltimore" (which is not surprising, since both projects were Armstrong's chief designer William White) and was built from materials brought from Britain.
The first fully Japanese-built cruisers were the Suma and Akashi pair.
Finally, almost everything was domestic, from the project to materials, mechanisms and equipment. The exception was artillery so as not to produce unnecessary types of guns and shells, they were left English, produced by the same Armstrong.

British influence, albeit indirectly, was still very strong, both ships in many ways resembled the Akitsushima in layout and performance. Some step forward was the introduction of triple expansion steam engines with a vertical arrangement of cylinders, however, the boilers clearly "pulled back" the locomotive type by that time had almost completely disappeared from all more or less large warships. They became a real headache for the mechanics and did not allow to develop the contract speed, which is already quite modest compared to the high-speed Elswicks. Not everything was immediately possible with such qualities as seaworthiness. The Suma, which was the first to enter service, turned out to be insufficiently stable and was heavily flooded with waves, so the completion of the Akashi was delayed by changing the design of the hull, which became smooth-deck. Subsequently, archaic locomotive boilers were replaced on both cruisers with modern water-tube boilers, but during the Russo-Japanese War, these ships had to suffer a lot on campaigns, trying to maintain something similar to full speed.

"Takasago"

Domestic cruisers were still being built for too long, from four to five years. At this pace, with only two shipyards capable of producing relatively large ships, the Japanese fleet would be hopelessly behind its ambitious plans. Therefore, searches abroad continued. And not without success in 1898, Armstrong delivered another beautiful cruiser. With a displacement of just under 4200 tons, the Takasago had very powerful armament, which included a pair of 203 mm, ten 120 mm and twelve 76 mm rapid-fire guns. At the same time, the ship had excellent protection, which, according to its creators, could withstand even 8-inch shells. Thus, the thickness of the deck bevel in the central part reached 114 mm. In addition, the hull had a large number of watertight compartments, the number of which exceeded a hundred. A couple more almost completely similar units were ordered in the United States of America from Crump and Union Iron Works.

Since at that time overseas technology was still lagging behind the capabilities of the Elswick “wizards”, the Kasagi and Chitose had a slightly larger size and displacement with the same armament and protection. It should be noted that the "Englishman" turned out to be faster, reaching the design 23.5 knots, while the "Americans" had to limit themselves to 22.5. The main drawback of these very powerful combat units for their size was caused precisely by their strength. Two and a half dozen guns, protected only by small shields, were located on the deck so closely that any shell that exploded there could cause complete devastation among the crews. There were understandable problems with eight-inchers.

A heavy 113-kilogram projectile would be difficult to keep even a hefty grenadier on a by no means wide swinging deck, and even more so for Japanese sailors who were not at all heroic. Therefore, the designers tried to help the servants as much as possible by supplying the installation and supply with electric motors. The shells delivered by the elevator from the ammunition cellars were laid out on a special cart that ran along rails laid on the deck behind the gun. It was, of course, much easier to push a projectile from such a cart into the breech of the gun, but all this “railway facilities” remained highly vulnerable to enemy hits, including fragmentation.

It is clear that such thoroughly loaded ships had very moderate seaworthiness.

Nevertheless, this trinity, together with the tested and equally fast Yoshino, made up the 3rd detachment of cruisers in the Russo-Japanese War, which was very actively used for reconnaissance and aiming its main forces at the enemy. They delivered a lot of unpleasant minutes to our sailors, who called them "dogs" for their stubbornness. However, one of the "mutts" did not live to see Tsushima "Takasago" hit a mine in December 1904.

It should be noted that these strong ships were built surprisingly quickly. Takasago entered service exactly two years after the laying, and its American "cousins" even faster.

But the Japanese did not stand still. The next pair of domestic cruisers, Tsushima and Niitaka, became much more successful than the long-suffering Suma and Akashi. By increasing the displacement by about 700 tons, they received a single armament of six 6-inch guns, supplemented by a dozen 76-mm guns. The ships turned out to be quite seaworthy and had enviable stability. Of course, their 20-knot speed was somewhat lost against the background of foreign records, but it was possible to develop it without special problems. The construction time of the country's main shipyard in Ekosuka also decreased, and Niitaka was put into operation two years and 20 days after the laying, practically catching up with the leading firms of the main maritime powers. It is interesting that both had capricious boilers of the notorious Niklos type, usually strongly criticized by our specialists and historians (mainly on the example of the Varyag), but throughout their careers, Japanese sailors did not experience any special problems with them.

But the next cruiser of domestic construction, Otova, became the first to have domestic boilers as well. No wonder called "Kanpon" (that is, "naval" or "naval"), they had higher steam parameters than the vast majority of Western models (including the same Niklos products) and proved to be very unpretentious and reliable in operation. The slightly smaller size of the ships compared to their predecessors forced them to return to a mixed armament of 6- and 4.7-inch Akashi-type ships, but the speed was increased to 21 knots.

All Japanese armored cruisers, both high-speed "dogs" and slower units that left the stocks in Kure and Ekosuke, were actively used in the Russo-Japanese War. They turned out to be literally servants of all trades, carrying patrols at Port Arthur and carrying out tactical reconnaissance and search in battles. I must say that the command was afraid of the larger and superior in armament (all but the "dogs") Russian "6-thousanders" and preferred to keep their light cruisers at a considerable distance from them, and even more so from our battleships. However, the "trifle" took a very active part in the search for and finishing off the defeated 2nd Pacific squadron, taking advantage of their numerical superiority.

So, "Otova" and "Niitaka" without any problems caught up with the damaged "Svetlana" and drowned her after an hour and a half battle. But this immediate combat success was rather an exception. The same pair plus Admiral Uriu's detachment (Naniva, Takachiho, Akashi and Tsushima) six of them could not cope with the old armored cruiser Dmitry Donskoy, although they severely damaged it. The speed was not always enough, since the active service thoroughly "hooked" the cars and boilers of almost all units, few of which could develop more than 18 knots for the Tsushima battle. So, Chitose and Akitsushima were unable to catch up with the Emerald, which broke through the enemy’s ring during the surrender of the remnants of the squadron. Nevertheless, the activities of Japanese small cruisers should be recognized as both useful and successful.

Evidence of this is the fact that only four Russian light ships reached Vladivostok.

After the end of the war with Russia, the already very diverse composition of the Japanese cruiser fleet was also enriched with trophies. As a result, by 1907 a unique situation had arisen. The Mikado fleet now had cruisers manufactured by literally all the major maritime countries of England, France, the USA, Germany, Russia and Italy. An unimaginable mixture of systems of mechanisms and weapons, various shipbuilding principles and techniques. However, it was the experience of their operation that opened up for Japanese designers an opportunity inaccessible to engineers of other powers to choose the best. And this experience was soon embodied in original and strong ships.

At the time of its entry into serviceKongowas the most advanced battlecruiser in the world, which caused a heated debate in the British Parliament: “Why should a foreign power, even a friendly one, receive from English industry a more powerful ship than its domestic prototype?”

The late 19th and early 20th centuries were a turning point for Japan. Heading towards the creation of a "Great Eastern Empire", the Japanese ruling elite developed the country's armed forces, based on the belief that only a powerful fleet can protect the island state from direct invasion and guarantee its regular supply of the necessary raw materials. To defend the islands, the Japanese needed a fleet of battleship armored ships, and to protect sea lanes, a fleet of cruisers. Thus, the doctrine of the Japanese navy provided for the presence in its composition of an equal number of battleships and large armored cruisers. Forced to embark on a large-scale naval renewal program (after the advent of dreadnought-type battleships) and with limited financial resources, the Japanese acted with their characteristic pragmatism and decided to build battlecruisers. This decision was based on a sober assessment of the strength of potential adversaries: the British and American battle fleets were incomparably stronger, and the Russian was incomparably weaker than the Japanese naval forces. Battlecruisers allowed Japan to both protect its own communications from Russian cruisers and inflict serious damage on the communications of the British and Americans when they tried to block the Japanese coast (due to the small number of British and American ground forces, as well as the remoteness of Japan, the threat of landing could be neglected).

Initially, the Japanese tried to develop the project on their own, but quickly realized that due to their lack of experience in creating such ships, they were doing it more slowly than the British were building new ships. The first Japanese project became obsolete after the British built the battlecruiser Invincible, the second - the cruiser Lion:

Realizing this, the Japanese turned for help to the British - the leading experts in this industry. The designs of the Vickers and Armstrong firms were proposed for consideration by the Japanese admirals. Despite the fact that Armstrong already had experience in building ships for the Imperial Navy, the Vickers project, developed by Sir George Thurston (later the creator of the British battlecruiser Tiger), won the competition. Thurston's project was an improved version of the British cruiser Lion (translated from English - "lion").

Tactical and technical characteristics

The contract with Vickers was signed on October 17, 1910 (some authors erroneously list the year 1912). In accordance with the agreement, the lead ship was built in England, and the rest - in Japan. A total of four battlecruisers were built.

Naval literature mentions two somewhat dubious stories related to the construction of Kongo-class cruisers. According to one of them, there was a long time interval between the signing of the contract with Vickers and the start of construction, caused by disputes over the range of weapons. In fact, the lead ship was laid down three months after the signing of the contract, and it is possible that January 17, 1911 was only the official laying date, and the work itself began even earlier. According to another story, two ships were originally planned, but "the huge superdreadnought cruiser made such a strong impression on the miniature Japanese admirals that it was decided to build two more ships of the same type". Most likely, the Japanese initially planned to build four cruisers, based on a rational calculation (one cruiser is under repair, another one is making the transition, two are in the patrol zone), and the delay in laying down the ships was caused by preparatory work to localize production at Japanese shipyards (according to According to available data, up to 30% of imported components were used in the construction of Hiei, and Haruna and Kirishima were almost completely assembled from Japanese materials). The Kongo-class battlecruisers were emblematic of Japanese shipbuilding, as the project's lead ship was the last major warship built outside of Japan, while the Haruna and Kirishima were the first ships built by private domestic contractors.

Hull design

In accordance with the requirements of the Marine Technical Department of Japan, the Kongo's hull has been significantly modified. In particular, the ship received a larger camber and a clipper-type stem than on the prototype, which had a positive effect on its seaworthiness. As a result of the alterations, the geometric dimensions of the Kongo were somewhat different from those of the cruiser Lion.

The cruiser retained the tripod foremast and mainmast, as well as three chimneys of different diameters, but changed their location. The chimneys on the Kongo were arranged more compactly, and the smaller diameter pipe, which was the bow on the Lion cruiser, became medium on the Japanese ship. The foremast and mainmast, located between the bow and middle pipes and behind the stern pipe, were placed, respectively, in front of the bow and between the middle and stern pipes (this somewhat weakened the smoke of the ship's bridge). It should be noted that, unlike the Kongo with pipes of the same height, on the other cruisers of the same type, the bow pipe was initially about two meters higher than the others, which solved the problem of smoke (on the Kongo, the bow pipe was extended only in 1920).

Power plant

The increase in the width of the ship compared to the prototype and the movement of the pipes was the result of a significant reconstruction of the power plant.

Despite an almost ten percent reduction in the power of the installation, the Kongo, due to its better seaworthiness, even somewhat surpassed the Lion in maximum speed. The high speed of the cruisers was achieved not least due to the use of mixed fuels (oil was used to achieve maximum speed, and coal was used to sail at an economical speed). At the same time, it is impossible to compare the efficiency of the installations of the two ships: most reference books indicate the range of the Japanese cruiser at 8,000 miles at an economical speed of 14 knots, and the English cruiser at 2,420 miles at a speed of 24 knots. The location of the engine and boiler rooms inside the ships was also different. On the Lion cruiser, the midship (medium) tower of the main caliber divided the power plant into the bow of two boiler rooms and the aft one from the boiler room and the engine room, and on Kongo, due to the shift of the tower behind the stern pipe, the bow of the plant consisted of three boiler rooms, and stern - only from the machine. The statement about the greater efficiency of the Japanese installation is rather controversial, but the refusal to place the main caliber tower between the chimneys, of course, increased its angle of fire and protected the superstructure from the effects of powder gases.

Battlecruiser Kongo, June 1914
Source: tsushima.su

Armament

The Japanese thoroughly revised the artillery armament of the cruiser Lion (eight 343-mm guns in four twin-gun turrets and sixteen 102-mm guns in armored bow and stern superstructures), increasing the caliber of the main and medium caliber guns and adding anti-mine caliber guns. According to a common version, initially it was supposed to use 305-mm guns as main caliber artillery on Kongo. However, having received confidential information from the British that "305-mm guns had a lower survivability and rate of fire than 343-mm installations", The Japanese decided to arm their cruiser with the latest English 356-mm guns with a barrel length of 45 calibers (a prototype was made and tested at the British training ground in Sheerness in March 1911). As a result, the Japanese ship received main caliber guns, "the firing range of which was limited only by the horizon line". Usually, for cruisers of the Kongo type of the early period, a firing range of 25,000 m is indicated at an elevation angle of 20 degrees, forgetting that the lead ship built in England exactly had an elevation angle of up to 25 degrees (according to some sources, the elevation angle of cruisers built in Japan was 20 degrees, others - 25).

Installation of 356-mm guns of the battlecruiser Kongo
Source: milay.ru

The main caliber guns were located in four twin-gun turrets (on Kongo and Hiei they were made multifaceted, on Haruna and Kirishima - rounded), placed in the diametrical plane of the ship (two - in the bow with an elevation, one (middle) - behind the third chimney, one more - in the stern). The aforementioned transfer of the midship tower by the pipes made it possible to increase from two to four the number of main battery guns firing into the stern. In addition to the numerical advantage, the transfer also gave a qualitative one, since at least four guns were required to quickly adjust the fire. For unknown reasons, until 1917, Japanese cruisers did not have a command and rangefinder post, which negatively affected their combat capabilities.

The medium-caliber artillery of the Kongo-class cruisers consisted of sixteen 152-mm guns with a barrel length of 50 calibers placed in single-gun casemates. Eight guns were installed on each side with a horizontal sector of fire of 130 degrees and a maximum elevation of 15 degrees (mass of a high-explosive projectile - 45.36 kg, firing range - 21,000 m, combat rate of fire - 4-6 rounds per minute). Most authors explain the increase in caliber by the experience gained by the Japanese fleet during the naval battles of the Russo-Japanese War. At the same time, the question why the Japanese armed their cruisers with absolutely useless 76-mm guns remains unanswered. The Kongo anti-mine artillery consisted of sixteen 76-mm guns with a barrel length of 40 calibers (eight guns were installed on each main battery turret (two), eight more onboard in the middle part of the ship on the open deck on top of the battery), as well as seven machine guns. Probably, the Japanese themselves initially had doubts about the need for such guns (on the three subsequent ships they limited themselves to installing eight guns on the open deck), but the 76-mm guns and machine guns were finally dismantled only in 1918. The Japanese were in no hurry to install anti-aircraft weapons: four 80-mm anti-aircraft guns were installed on cruisers only in 1923. Another riddle of the Kongo-class cruisers, which does not have a clear answer, is the installation of eight 533-mm underwater torpedo tubes on them (on the British cruiser Lion there were only two tubes).

Booking

The cruiser Kongo retained the concept of booking its British prototype.

Booking of the battlecruiser Kongo and its contemporaries, mm

			King George V
ship type	Battle cruiser	Battle cruiser	Battleship	armored cruiser
		United Kingdom	United Kingdom	Germany
Main armament	eight 356 mm guns	eight 343 mm guns	ten 343 mm guns	twelve 210 mm guns
Armor thickness, mm
main belt
Upper Belt
Casemates

The main element of the cruiser's vertical protection was the main armor belt (thickness in the middle part - 229 mm). The main belt was closed in the bow by a traverse (thickness - 127-152 mm), and in the aft part - by bulkheads that closed behind the aft barbette (thickness - 152-203 mm). Above the main one was the upper armor belt, which covered the middle part of the hull and reached the upper deck (thickness in the middle part - 203 mm). The upper belt was closed by traverses near the barbette of the main tower (thickness - 152-254 mm) and behind the barbette of the third (middle) tower (thickness - 152 mm). The armor thickness of casemates was 152 mm, barbettes - 254 mm, main battery towers - 229 mm. The thickness of the armor of the bow conning tower was 254 mm, the aft cabin - 152 mm. It is easy to see that the cruisers received more protection from longitudinal fire from the bow than from the stern, which indicates plans to use ships for attacking operations. The vertical protection of the battlecruisers Kongo and Lion was weaker than that of the battleships, but left them with a chance to survive even in battle with enemy dreadnoughts. So, during the Battle of Jutland, Lion retained its buoyancy after being hit by thirteen 305-mm shells and an explosion in the middle tower, and losses on the Princess Royal of the same type after being hit by thirteen "heavy projectiles" 22 killed and 81 wounded.

Significantly more criticism is caused by horizontal booking, which the English sailors with bitter irony called "cardboard". On Kongo, the thickness of the armored deck was only 38-51 mm, which was significantly less than, for example, the German armored cruiser Blucher. The lack of horizontal protection cost the British dearly during the Battle of Jutland: the battlecruiser Queen Mary (Lion type) sank as a result of a shell hitting the cellar of the bow towers through the deck (as a result of an explosion of ammunition, it broke into two parts and sank almost instantly).

There is no exact data on the mine protection of the cruisers, but it is known that the cruiser Haruna, which was blown up by a German mine, was seriously damaged, although it remained afloat and did not even lose its course. In general, the armor of Kongo-class cruisers was typical for battlecruisers - excessive for combat with enemy cruisers and insufficient for combating battleships.

At the time of its entry into service, Kongo was the most advanced battlecruiser in the world, which caused heated debate in the British Parliament:

“Why should a foreign power, even a friendly one, receive from British industry a more powerful ship than its domestic prototype?”