Let's say you can't remember the last digit of your friend's phone. What is the maximum number of numbers you have to dial to reach him?

Since the end of the phone number can be any of ten digits, then in the worst case you will have to make ten attempts, thereby going through all the possible options.

Often in everyday life we ​​meet with tasks, the solution of which requires consideration and calculation of all possible combinations. Therefore, such tasks are called combinatorial.

Example 1 . Classmates Olya, Valya and Katya are on duty at the school. In how many ways can the class teacher place the girls one at a time on each of the three floors of the school?

Solution. Suppose that Olya was assigned to be on duty on the third floor. Then Valya or Katya can be on duty on the second floor, and Katya or Valya, respectively, on the first floor.

We get two ways (two combinations, two options) of duty distribution (girls are indicated by the first letters of their names).

Now let Valya be appointed duty officer on the third floor. Then Olya or Katya can be on duty on the second floor, and Katya or Olya, respectively, on the first floor. We get two more ways to distribute duty.

And finally, suppose that Katya was appointed to be on duty on the third floor. We get two more ways to distribute duty.

Thus, six ways of distributing duty were obtained.

Answer: 6 ways.

When solving combinatorial problems, it is important to consider (enumerate) all cases. Therefore, it is desirable to make the enumeration process convenient and visual.

For example, the solution to the duty distribution problem can be illustrated using the following scheme:

This scheme allows you to record six combinations, each of which corresponds to one option for the distribution of duty: OVK, OKV, VOK, VKO, KVO, KOV.

The diagram depicted resembles an inverted tree. Therefore it is called tree of options.

Example 2 . How many angles are shown in figure 182?

Solution. The designation of any corner shown in the figure consists of three letters, the second of which is necessarily the letter O, and the other two are chosen from the letters A, B, C, D. Therefore, the required number of corners is equal to the number of ways to choose from the letters A, B, C , D two letters.

When writing down all possible variants, one must take into account that, for example, the combinations AB and BA correspond to the same angle AOB.

First, we list all pairs of letters starting with the first A:

AB, AC, AD.

Now let's list the pairs in which the first letter is B, and the second is not the letter A:

BC, BD.

It remains to list the pairs whose first letter is C and the second is neither A nor B:

Thus, we got six combinations:

AB, AC, AD, BC, BD, CD.

Therefore, figure 182 shows six corners.

Answer: 6 corners.

When solving this problem, you can use the following visual scheme.

Consider four points marked with letters A, B, C, D (Fig. 183).

Then the number of segments connecting every two points is equal to the number of angles shown in Figure 182. For example, segment AC in Figure 183 corresponds to angle AOC in Figure 182, segment BC corresponds to angle BOC. And vice versa, each corner in figure 182 corresponds to a certain segment in figure 183.

In figure 183, only six segments can be drawn. Therefore, the desired number of angles is six.

With the help of circuits like the one shown in Figure 183, a number of problems can be solved. Use this diagram to solve this problem. At the meeting, the four rectifiers shook hands. How many handshakes were made in total? (Answer: 6).

Stalin awarded the title of marshal even to Tukhachevsky. But does anyone consider Tukhachevsky a strategist?

The fact that Stalin awarded Zhukov orders and titles does not mean anything. Among the Stalinist people's commissars, ministers, marshals and generals were scoundrels, and rogues, and sadists, and debauchees, and thieves, and fraudsters. Here you have Yezhov, and Yagoda, and Blucher, and Bukharin, and Radek, and Khrushchev, and a whole gang.

FORWARD TO SYCHEVKA!

When it comes to war, we remember Stalingrad, and when we remember Stalingrad, we remember Zhukov. It was he, the greatest commander of the twentieth century, who was the creator of one of the most brilliant operations of the Second World War, and, perhaps, of the entire world history. Stalingrad is a confirmation of the undeniable truth: where Zhukov is, there is victory! Stalingrad is proof of Zhukov's genius: he glanced at the map and immediately found a solution!

Let's shout three times "Hurrah" to the genius, and then we will ask a question about the reliability of the information. Let's get to the roots. Let's find out how it became known that the plan for the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation was proposed by Zhukov?

The source is easy to find: Zhukov himself told this. It was he who declared himself the author of the plan of the operation, however, recognizing that there was also a co-author - A. M. Vasilevsky. It is described like this:

“In the afternoon of September 12, I flew to Moscow and four hours later I was in the Kremlin, where the Chief of the General Staff A. M. Vasilevsky was also summoned ...

The Supreme Commander took out his map showing the location of the Headquarters' reserves, examined it for a long time and intently. Alexander Mikhailovich and I moved away from the table to the side and very quietly talked about the fact that, apparently, we should look for some other solution.

What is the "other" solution? - suddenly, raising his head, I. V. Stalin asked.

I never thought that I. V. Stalin had such a keen ear. We went to the table...

The whole next day, A. M. Vasilevsky and I worked at the General Staff ... Having gone through all the possible options, we decided to propose to Stalin the following plan of action ... "(" Memories and Reflections ". M. APN. 1969. S. 401-402)

It follows from the foregoing that three people stood at the origins of the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation: Stalin, Zhukov and Vasilevsky. Stalin's merit is that his hearing is sharp. Stalin heard that Zhukov and Vasilevsky were whispering, became interested, and it was then that Zhukov and his comrade-in-arms threw a brilliant idea to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief ...

Zhukov said that Stalin doubted success, was afraid to take risks, suggested that the operation be carried out, but not on such a scale, but more modestly. But Zhukov persuaded Stalin, and everything turned out as it should.

About Stalingrad, through the mouths of his literary blacks, Zhukov broadcasts in detail and a lot: “The Headquarters on July 12 created a new Stalingrad Front ...” “By the end of July, the Stalingrad Front included ...” “A great organizational work was carried out by the regional committee and the city committee of the Stalingrad party on the formation and training of the people's militia ... »

All this is true, all this is interesting, but let us pay attention to a trifle: in July 1942, Zhukov was not in Stalingrad and could not be. He was in a completely different direction, very far from Stalingrad. Everyone who is interested in the war has the opportunity to restore the chronology of Zhukov's work at the front day by day, from the first to the last day of the war. Sometimes - up to hours and minutes. From October 11, 1941 to August 26, 1942, Zhukov commanded the troops of the Western Front, which fought in a completely different direction, a thousand kilometers from Stalingrad.

IN THE MARINES

"It was clear that the upcoming battle was of major military and political importance.
With the fall of Stalingrad, the enemy command got the opportunity to cut off
south of the country from the center. We could also lose the Volga.
After going through all the possible options, we decided to offer I.V. Stalin
the next plan of action: the first is to continue to wear down the
enemy; the second is to start preparing a counteroffensive.
JV Stalin said that another commander should be placed at the head of the Front.
Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky was presented as a candidate for this post.
The map-plan of the counteroffensive was signed by G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky. "I approve!" -
signed by the Supreme.
G.K. Zhukov

Led fate-road
Shout - "Happy journey!"
If you go for a very long time -
You'll get there somehow!
Get there with an honest thought
Along the path and virgin lands -
Where in a multi-seat caravan,
Where - on painted armor!
Distinguish between lights and signs -
Here by the stream, there - by the bank:
"To Stalingrad!" the warriors shout
"To Stalingrad!" - said the People's Commissar!
"To Stalingrad!" - and the train rushes,
"To Stalingrad!" - and a hard run,
Everything will be decided soon.
What was the Commander-in-Chief thinking!
It can be seen - the hour has already been appointed,
A terrible battle is coming -
Who does not know - puzzled
Who is sure - just waiting!
Half-stations and lanes -
Everything is packed to the top
Vanya Pchelkin was surprised -
"So many guns and cars!"
Immediately took gullies,
An hour - and a ruble for transportation,
These trucks would be for tractors,
Yes to the village, yes to the collective farm!
There - Pasha! Plows - bulk,
Furrow? Hurry - plant!
The harvest would be - "what you need",
Real harvest!
Plans are on time! Then - chants
The slogan in the sky is golden!
... Not about that, Vanya Pchelkin,
You're not thinking about it!
What are fields and sowing?
What is a gray-haired collective farm grandfather?
This is your home country
At the peak of Glory and Victory!
So consider! Count from now on
To be mistaken is not a sin!
... Don't think so in Berlin
There is something else decided!
There are other people's plans-arrows,
There is a fascist row in business -
Vaughn, the enemy is stunned,
Rushing to the city of Stalingrad!
He is confident in every company -
The rear is strong and the front is strong,
He's already on the horizon
He is at the Stalinist gates!
The whole panorama - in binoculars -
Dymka, Volga and dawn:
The question here is about timing.
And no other questions!
Who will ask in a crazy run?
Here decide in the madness of days -
Whose field marshals-strategists
Nobler and smarter?
Whose swords and edges are sharper?
Whose stronger soldier's bayonet?
What's the dispute? On the battlefield
Reveal who is great!
... In the meantime - a wagon and shelves,
It's a pity, not a bath and shelves -
You are not a strategist, Vanya Pchelkin,
You are a division and a regiment,
You are the Front! There is no dispute here
Dispute - idle and to the detriment,
You are a great support
And the parent of all Victories!
You are a fighter for home and truth,
You are the breadwinner of poor mouths,
Approaching Stalingrad,
Be ready for anything!
Get ready for random food
About the dream - while silent:
You see, in this cramped place
Has the sailor settled down?
Everything with him - a pea jacket and a flask,
And a lot of icons
Capless and vest,
Black ribbon - "Baltflot!"
Flared trousers! Size - for force,
The look is intentionally harsh,
It is clear even without a question -
He is from the Baltic cruisers!
Talk? Yes, for God's sake -
In words - ahead:
“I have been in the marine brigade for a long time,
From forty-one, go!
Curiosity is on the rise
They know it's not time for lies
“You, brother, about the Aurora!” -
Tell me about Aurora!
What to say? Yes, it's all honor
I'm glad to report
What does she stand in place
Defending Leningrad!
Who is capable - all at the Front,
The battle is sometimes urban,
All Aurors in the infantry
But, as is customary, in the sea!
... Conversation is a joy to the soul,
Not home, but rushing to death -
Stalingrad from Leningrad,
Surprised, we distinguish
And appreciate the fact and the truth
A glass of vodka, strong tea -
“I wish I were in your brigade!” -
Threw Pcholkin by chance!
It's like this - seething stretches,
Surprise honest people -
“There you have only sailors,
Or is there a platoon of soldiers?
What's the answer? Fate is darkness
Blood flows like water -
“We are knocked out before the deadline,
Sailors ahead!
But on the other hand, the enemies are cursed,
Sailors are all heroes
Replenishment - soldiers,
Ask - and you will get!
Yes, we have empty states,
Sometimes we sit without fighters -
Here are the coordinates
Come - we will determine!
"Okay, boy, don't worry -
I'll ask for the Fleet too!
What's your name? "Terkin Vasya,
Just know that I'm not "the one"!
"That" Smolensk, not Pskov,
I'm definitely not related -
Tvardovsky wrote about "him",
About "him" - not about me!
If you look at God's scroll -
Made all one workbench,
You can see the excess of Terkins,
If you count it, it's true!
All - a single sign
And a single seal -
It can be seen the gift of the poet,
To notice the merry!
... The choice is right - in a minute,
I dreamed - and a dream came out:
Pcholkin was at the assembly point
Destined for sailors!
In this whirlwind - like a plate,
But not broken and not crushed:
From the "marine" only a vest,
Like a gift from the kids!
That's all the equipment
And a projectile over your head -
It seems to feel awkward
He doesn't seem to be his!
Turkin is a friend! Severe and cheerful -
"Be yourself, brother,
What did you hang up your nose before?
Get ready! Fight tomorrow!"
That's the whole point of clarity -
We must follow orders!
...mood danger
Raises every time!

On the night of September 14-15, 1942, the 13th Guards Rifle Division under the command of General Rodimtsev crossed from the left bank of the Volga to the center of Stalingrad, when the fate of the city was decided in a fierce battle with the enemy. The 13th Guards fought in Stalingrad for 140 days and nights. Its fighters defended Pavlov's House, fought for the central railway station, Mamaev Kurgan. Marshal Nikolai Krylov, chief of staff of the legendary 62nd Army during the defense of Stalingrad, wrote in his memoirs: “The glory given to the guardsmen of Major General Rodimtsev is well deserved by them. If they did not cross that night, it might turn out that there was nowhere to cross. If we managed to prevent the enemy from cutting through the remnants of our army and establishing ourselves on the Central Embankment on September 14, then we will probably hold back the next enemy onslaught of such force (and now - from the starting positions, which were a little over a kilometer from the Volga in places), without receiving reinforcements by morning, probably , could not ... Reinforcements were not late, and this made it possible to keep the city. For eleven days - until the Nazi command changed the direction of the main attack - Rodimtsev's division played a decisive role in the defense of Stalingrad. The crossing was carried out on motor ferries, minesweepers, armored boats, tugboats and even fishing boats. The boat, which had a company of submachine gunners on board, died from artillery fire, and there were losses on other ships. The artillery regiment of the 13th division, which had taken up firing positions on the left bank, was able, like other artillery stationed beyond the Volga, to support the infantry only when its forward edge became clearer.

In many places, between the embankment and the railway, something like a layer cake was created: houses, courtyards, shelters, captured by the Nazis and held by us, were interspersed. Staff operators by no means always knew which pencil - red or blue - to circle such and such a building on the city plan. Here is how Krylov recalled his first meeting with Rodimtsev: “I don’t remember exactly at what time the commander of the 13th Guards Alexander Ilyich Rodimtsev got to the army command post. In any case, by that time, his regiments had already significantly deepened into the city, clearing the Nazis of a water pump, a department store, a nail factory and other objects (an isolated group of Germans continued to hold the House of Specialists). The guide who accompanied Rodimtsev was killed on the way. The divisional commander himself must have had to take refuge in ruins or craters more than once, and he, like everyone else who came from the city, entered the dungeon, shaking off lime and dust. Chuikov (Vasily Chuikov, commander of the 62nd Army - author) asked Rodimtsev what his mood was like here in Stalingrad. Alexander Ilyich replied: - I am a communist and will not leave here anywhere. Meanwhile, the position of the division, more precisely, of its two regiments that had crossed over, became more and more difficult with every passing hour. The guardsmen reached the line of the railway passing through the city, but they did not have time to gain a foothold there before the enemy resumed the offensive. The enemy, having not decided on a major attack at night, although he missed the moment when we actually had only small detachments in the center of the city, even now had a huge numerical superiority: each of Rodimtsev's regiments was opposed by a division, reinforced by a significant number of tanks. And as usual, the attacks of the Nazis were preceded by massive air strikes. None of those who fought in Stalingrad knew that at the Headquarters at that time work had already begun on preparing a large-scale counteroffensive near Stalingrad.

This is how it all began, according to the memoirs of Marshal Georgy Zhukov: “The Supreme Commander took out his map with the location of the Headquarters reserves, examined it for a long time and intently. Alexander Mikhailovich (Vasilevsky, Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army - author) and I moved away from the table to the side and very quietly talked about the fact that, apparently, we should look for some other solution. - And what is the "other" solution? - suddenly raising his head, I.V. Stalin asked. I never thought that I. V. Stalin had such a keen ear. We approached the table. “That’s what,” he continued, “go to the General Staff and think carefully about what needs to be done in the Stalingrad region. Where and what kind of troops can be transferred to strengthen the Stalingrad group, and at the same time think about the Caucasian front. Tomorrow at 9 pm we will gather here again ... Having gone through all the possible options, we decided to propose to I.V. Stalin the following plan of action: first, continue to wear down the enemy with active defense; the second is to start preparing a counteroffensive in order to inflict such a blow on the enemy in the Stalingrad region that would sharply change the strategic situation in the south of the country in our favor. As for the specific plan of the counteroffensive, naturally, we could not prepare detailed calculations in one day, but it was clear to us that the main blows should be delivered on the flanks of the Stalingrad group, covered by the royal Romanian troops. The tentative calculation showed that it would be impossible to prepare the necessary forces and means for the counteroffensive before mid-November.

On November 19, 1942, the plan for an offensive operation called "Uranus" began to be implemented. The idea of ​​a breakthrough through the positions of the Romanian royal troops turned out to be brilliant and fully justified itself. The “other decision”, the conversation about which Stalin overheard Zhukov and Vasilevsky, turned out to be one of the most successful in the history of the Red Army ...

In accordance with the military-political goals set by the Communist Party and the government for the Soviet people at a new stage of the war, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command developed a strategic plan for the actions of the Soviet Armed Forces in the winter campaign of 1942/43. to the conclusion about the need for a consistent defeat of the enemy. Therefore, the concept was based on the idea of ​​conducting a system of successive offensive operations on a huge front from Lake Ladoga to the foothills of the Main Caucasian Range. Its implementation was supposed to lead to the defeat of the most powerful enemy groupings, the seizure of the strategic initiative and the achievement of a decisive turning point in the armed struggle on the main front of the Second World War.

The Soviet troops were to first defeat the enemy grouping in the interfluve of the Volga and the Don, and then strike in the North Caucasus, the Upper Don and near Leningrad. In order to pin down the enemy and deprive him of the ability to maneuver forces, it was also envisaged to carry out offensive operations in the regions of Velikie Luki, Rzhev and Vyazma. In the event of a successful solution of these tasks, it was supposed to develop a strategic offensive in the Kursk, Kharkov directions and in the Donbass.

The main efforts in the winter campaign of 1942/43 were concentrated on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. It was here that the largest and most active enemy groupings were located, the defeat of which ensured the capture of the strategic initiative and created favorable conditions for launching an offensive in other important areas.

The situation that developed on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front facilitated the carrying out of large-scale offensive operations here with decisive goals. The enemy strike groups operating near Stalingrad and in the North Caucasus had not yet managed to create a strong defense and were scattered along a huge front - from Voronezh to Elista and from Mozdok to Novorossiysk. As a result of the extremely stubborn and active defense of the Soviet troops in the summer and autumn of 1942, they suffered heavy losses. The strategic and operational reserves of the Wehrmacht on the Soviet-German front were largely depleted, while the Soviet command was completing the accumulation of large reserves, fully equipped with all means of armed struggle.

According to the general plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, at the first stage of the campaign, it was planned to concentrate large forces in the Stalingrad-Rostov direction and, having moved them to a decisive counteroffensive, encircle and destroy the main enemy grouping (about 40 divisions as of November 1, 1942) in the Stalingrad area. Subsequently, with the introduction of additional reserves into battle, it was meant to expand the front of the strategic counteroffensive, defeat the enemy troops on the Middle Don and strike in the general direction on Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, Rostov-on-Don, cut off the escape routes to the Donbass of a large enemy group located on North Caucasus 1. Thus, it was supposed to create the prerequisites for the completion of the defeat of the entire southern wing of the German eastern front.

Taking into account the experience of the previous period of the war, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command refused to conduct simultaneous offensive operations in all strategic directions of the Soviet-German front. Initially, she concentrated her main efforts on the main operation of the campaign in the interfluve of the Volga and Don. Therefore, the action plan of the fronts, which were to advance in the Stalingrad-Rostov direction, was developed in most detail.

Based on the plan of the Soviet Supreme High Command, the most important strategic operation of the campaign was to be the counteroffensive near Stalingrad. It was planned to start a powerful winter offensive from it.

The principal decision on the counter-offensive near Stalingrad was made on September 13, 1942, after the Supreme Commander-in-Chief heard the reports of Generals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky. “Having gone through all the possible options,” recalled the former Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, “we decided to propose to I.V. Stalin the following plan of action: first, continue to wear down the enemy with active defense; the second is to start preparing a counteroffensive in order to inflict such a blow on the enemy in the Stalingrad region that would dramatically change the strategic situation in the south of the country in our favor "2. At the same time, it was taken into account that the decisive defeat of the enemy in the Stalingrad-Rostov direction would put the army group in a difficult situation "A", which operated in the North Caucasus, and will force it to either hastily retreat, or fight, in essence, in the conditions of encirclement. The date for the start of the counter-offensive was not set, however, from the report of the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, it followed that it could not have been undertaken before the last decade of October 19423.

In developing preliminary considerations for the plan of the counter-offensive near Stalingrad, the General Staff took into account the comprehensive analysis of the situation on the Soviet-German front, and in particular on its southern flank. Based on this analysis, it was supposed to use the advantageous position of the Soviet troops, covering the 6th and 4th tank armies of the German armies, and deliver powerful concentric strikes on their flanks in order to encircle and defeat all the main forces of the enemy group operating in the interfluve of the Volga and Don.

2 N. Voronov. In the service of the military. M., 1963, p. 287.

3 G. Zhukov. Memories and reflections. T. 2. Ed. 2. M., 1974, p. 86.:; T. 1, p.

The operation was proposed to be carried out in two stages. At the first stage, break through the defenses and surround the main forces of the 6th field and 4th tank armies, as well as create a solid outer front of the encirclement. The content of the second stage was to be the reflection of attempts to deblockade the encircled troops and their destruction.

The views of the Stavka representatives were approved in principle. After that, the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the General Staff departed for the Stalingrad region in order to study on the spot all issues related to the counteroffensive and submit concrete proposals to the General Headquarters on the plan of this decisive operation. Particular attention was paid to the strict observance of secrecy in the preparation of the counteroffensive.

The results of the work of representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in the fronts of the Stalingrad direction were discussed at the end of September at a meeting with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Then the operational plan of the counteroffensive was basically approved, the directions of the main attacks of the fronts involved in the operation, the forces and means necessary for them, the areas for the deployment of reserves advanced to the front and the approximate dates for their concentration were determined. At the same time, decisions were made on the organization of command and control in the forthcoming operation. In particular, the Stalingrad and South-Eastern fronts, which were previously led by the commander of the South-Eastern Front, were renamed respectively the Don and Stalingrad with direct subordination to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. In the zone of the middle reaches of the Don, a new, South-Western Front was created, which was assigned the main task in the operation - to deliver a powerful blow to the flank of the Stalingrad enemy grouping, go to its rear and play a decisive role in its encirclement. Experienced military leaders were placed at the head of the fronts that were to launch a counteroffensive in the south: the commander of the Don Front was General K. K. Rokossovsky, who had previously been commander of the Bryansk Front; commander of the Southwestern Front - General N. F. Vatutin, who in the summer and autumn of 1942 was the commander of the Voronezh Front; General A.I. Eremenko remained commander of the Stalingrad Front.

After an additional thorough study on the spot of the real possibilities for conducting a counteroffensive, the plan of operation was finally approved. The operation received the code name "Uranus". The transition of troops to the counteroffensive was determined for the Southwestern and Don Fronts on November 9, and for the Stalingrad Front on November 10. The difference in the timing of the transition of the fronts to the offensive was due to the different depth of tasks and the need to ensure the simultaneous exit of shock groups to the Kalach-on-Don, Sovetsky region, where their meeting was envisaged.

Taking into account the fact that the success of the attack on the enemy that was being prepared near Stalingrad was to have a decisive influence on the entire course of the winter campaign and therefore acquired not only military, but also important political significance, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command recognized it necessary to “consider the upcoming operation in the Stalingrad region as the main event until the end of 1942 on the entire Soviet-German front, concentrating on it the main attention and efforts of the party, government and the entire Soviet people.

1 Cited. Quoted from: The Stalingrad epic. M., 1968, p. 83.

The commands of the fronts of the Stalingrad direction were involved in practical work on the counteroffensive plan in the first days of October. These days, representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command briefed the leading staff of the fronts in general terms with the idea and plan of the Stalingrad operation to encircle the enemy. The fronts were instructed to develop concrete proposals on the most expedient use of forces and means in the operation. On October 9, the front commanders presented their initial considerations to the Headquarters.

In the central departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the headquarters of the combat arms and services of the Armed Forces, the fundamental issues of using aviation, artillery, armored forces in the counteroffensive and the logistics of the operation were developed. This work was headed by General N. N. Voronov, commander of artillery of the Soviet Army, General A. A. Novikov, commander of the Air Force, General G. A. Vorozheykin, his deputy, General G. A. Vorozheykin, commander of long-range aviation, General A. E. Golovanov, head of the Main Armored Directorate, General Ya. N. Fedorenko. The head of the Logistics of the Soviet Army, General A.V. Khrulev, and the head of the Main Artillery Directorate, General N.D. Yakovlev, took part in direct work on planning the logistics of the counteroffensive.

Thus, the creative work of a large team of military leaders, commanders and staffs was invested in the development of the concept and plan of the Stalingrad offensive operation. The main role in planning and supporting this operation belonged to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, its representatives and the General Staff.

Simultaneously with the deployment of preparations for a counteroffensive in the Stalingrad direction, the Headquarters ordered the command of a number of other fronts to prepare troops for active offensive operations.

Until further notice, the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts were ordered not to carry out any private operations, but to prepare troops to break the blockade of Leningrad 2.

The Northwestern, Kalinin and Western fronts were to conduct a joint offensive operation in the Moscow direction in October - November 1942 with the aim of defeating the enemy in the Rzhev and Novo-Sokolnikov regions. The operation was provisionally called "Mars". The initial deadline for its readiness was determined on October 21, and the start of operations - on October 23 3.

The Transcaucasian Front was ordered to firmly defend the occupied lines, and the troops of the Northern Group 4 were to be ready for an offensive in order to defeat the enemy's Mozdok grouping. The deadline for the readiness of the Northern Group of Forces for the operation was determined on November 3, and the start of operations - by special order of the Headquarters.

The successful creation of reserve formations allowed the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in mid-November to begin preparing a new operation, which received the code name "Saturn". The concept of this operation, which was an integral part of the strategic counteroffensive, provided for, two to three weeks after the start of the counteroffensive near Stalingrad, to deliver a deep cutting blow from the Don line (in its middle reaches) through Millerovo to Rostov by the troops of the left wing of the Voronezh and the right wing of the Southwestern Fronts. According to the plan for conducting operations "Uranus" and "Saturn", up to 60 enemy divisions fell under the blow of Soviet troops. If the Saturn was successful, Army Group A, operating in the North Caucasus, could also be surrounded. Specific planning of operations in other directions, provided for by the general plan of the winter campaign, was carried out in the course of the counteroffensive near Stalingrad. Subsequent events fully confirmed the correctness of this method of planning strategic offensive operations.

1 Archive of Moscow Region, f. 48a, op. 1640, d. 27, ll. 240, 247.

2 Archive of Moscow Region, f. 48a, op. 1640, d. 180, ll. 295, 302.

3 Ibid., l. 275.

4 The Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front included the 9th, 37th, 44th, 58th, 4th Air Armies, separate units and formations.

Skillfully organized interaction between groups of fronts operating in various directions was supposed to create favorable conditions for the implementation of the Stavka's plan. The foundations for the interaction of groups of fronts were laid in the very idea of ​​conducting a strategic offensive.

In planning and organizing the counter-offensive at Stalingrad, the Stavka provided for the fettering of enemy forces by active operations of troops in the western, northwestern directions and in the North Caucasus. She took into account that as soon as the enemy gets into a difficult situation near Stalingrad and in the North Caucasus, the Wehrmacht high command will try to transfer part of the troops from other areas, in particular from the Rzhev and Vyazma regions, to help the southern group. It was then that the offensive operation "Mars" was to begin. Its goal was not only to tie up the enemy forces and inflict defeat on him in the area of ​​​​the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge, but also to attract additional enemy reserves to this direction. The same role in the course of the Stalingrad offensive operation was assigned to the counterattacks of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front in the area of ​​Mozdok.

In preparing for winter offensive operations, much attention was paid to the use of aviation. She had to continue the struggle to gain strategic air supremacy, as well as support the shock groups of the fronts until they completed their tasks. In one of the telegrams sent by the Supreme Commander II. V. Stalin told General G.K. Zhukov, who was in the Stalingrad area, that based on the experience of the war with Germany, “an operation against the Germans can only be won if we have air superiority.” For success in the operation, three tasks had to be completed: “First, to concentrate the actions of our aviation in the area of ​​​​the offensive of our strike units, suppress the German aircraft and firmly cover our troops. The second is to break the way for our advancing units by systematic bombing of the German troops standing against them. The third is to pursue the retreating enemy troops through systematic bombing and assault operations in order to completely upset them and prevent them from gaining a foothold on the nearest defense lines. postpone the operation for a while and accumulate more aviation. These directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command were directly related not only to Stalingrad, but also to all subsequent operations of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The navy was supposed to assist the troops of the fronts in offensive operations in coastal areas, continue to disrupt enemy communications and reliably protect their maritime communications. Particular importance was attached to the protection of the northern communications, through which more than 40 percent of the supplies provided for by the agreements arrived from the United States and England to the ports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. Great importance was attached to ensuring communications in the Caspian Sea.

1 Archive of Moscow Region, f. 132a, op. 2642, d. 32, l. 193.

The main tasks of the Air Defense Forces of the country, as before, were to reliably cover large economic, political centers and communications from enemy air strikes. They also had to solve new tasks: to defend objects in the liberated territory and to strengthen the cover of front lines of communication.

The Headquarters attached great importance to the intensification of the nationwide struggle behind enemy lines. Back in September 1942, she demanded to intensify attacks on the enemy in the occupied Soviet territory. Somewhat later, during the period of direct preparation of the offensive campaign, many partisan formations were given the task of carrying out raids from the Bryansk forests to the territory of the Right-Bank Ukraine in order to launch sabotage activities there on enemy communications, disable important railway junctions, and conduct reconnaissance.

Thus, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command most carefully developed the initial operation - the strategic counteroffensive near Stalingrad. In his interests, it was planned to carry out offensive operations with the aim of actively pinning down the enemy in the western direction and in the North Caucasus. All subsequent operations were to be planned in detail already in the course of the counter-offensive that had begun, when tendencies towards a decisive change in the general situation on the Soviet-German front should have been clearly manifested.

The high military skill of the Soviet Supreme High Command was clearly manifested in the strategic concept and methods of developing a counteroffensive plan.