Andrey FEDOROVYKH - post-graduate student of the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences
The scientific analysis of the events connected with the collapse of the Russian Empire and the USSR, which manifested themselves especially acutely in the Black Sea region, is of great theoretical and practical importance. In particular, the problem of the status of the Black Sea Fleet of the former USSR and its main naval base, the city of Sevastopol, is perhaps the least studied today, despite the active discussion of these issues at the interstate and public levels and, as a result, the presence of a large amount of various literature. on this topic.
In accordance with the Marine Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by the President of Russia V.V. Putin, the protection of the territory of the Russian Federation from maritime directions, its sovereignty to internal sea waters, the territorial sea, including the Black Sea region, “belongs to the category of the highest state priorities”1. At the same time, the document set the task of maintaining the base of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol for the long term. Following the results of the Conference on military-diplomatic issues of the Azov-Black Sea region on September 17, 2003, the President of the Russian Federation emphasized that this is a zone of Russia's strategic interests, which "provides Russia's direct access to the most important global transport routes, including energy ones." At the same time, the real challenges to the security of the Russian Federation in the Azov-Black Sea region are the activity of terrorist structures, ethnic crime and illegal immigration. In order to strengthen the positions of the Russian Federation in the region, a decision was made to create an additional base for the Black Sea Fleet in Novorossiysk. At the same time, it was emphasized that the decision to develop the system of basing the Black Sea Fleet on the Caucasian coast of Russia "does not mean that we will leave our main base in Sevastopol"2. The problem of the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol has become one of the most difficult consequences of the collapse of the USSR. However, the possibility of its occurrence for about forty years lurked in the decision of the top leadership of the USSR in 1954 to transfer the Crimean region from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR. This decision meant “a break in the historical continuity of the state-territorial structure”3 of the Russian Federation, without taking into account the interests and opinions of its multinational people. Ideas about the inviolability of the USSR, underestimation of the internal contradictions of the Soviet federation and the role of the national factor led to the oblivion of historical experience in many respects similar events during the collapse of the Russian Empire, accompanied by a sharp struggle for the Black Sea Fleet, Sevastopol and Crimea. After the collapse of the USSR, the military-political problem of the Black Sea Fleet turned out to be inextricably linked with the territory of its Main Base - the city of Sevastopol - and the potentially conflict ethno-political situation in the Crimea, where the majority of the population was in favor of reunification with Russia. This circumstance caused the particular complexity of the situation and the search for political ways to solve it. The choice of a political way of solving the problem of the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol to a large extent depended on the stability and interethnic harmony in general in the Black Sea region and the Caucasus. According to one of the authoritative experts in this field, V.A. Pechenev, the Black Sea Fleet has always been and remains "the most important component of the unified system for ensuring the strategic interests of Russia in the entire Black Sea-Caspian region"4. The problem of the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol turned out to be so complicated that at the highest state level it seemed at times practically insoluble. Ultimately, achieving compromise political and legal solutions to the problem of the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol is of particular relevance in the context of the interest of the Russian Federation to maintain its naval presence in Sevastopol and Crimea after 2017 - the deadline for the presence of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol and Crimea, in accordance with the 1997 agreements with the Ukrainian side.
Chronologically, the problem of the status of the Black Sea Fleet covers the period from late 1991 - early 1992, when this issue first arose at the interstate level, which immediately led to confrontation and the subsequent protracted crisis in Russian-Ukrainian relations - to 2000, when the partition process was basically completed the legacy of the former Red Banner Black Sea Fleet of the USSR and on its basis the Naval Forces of Ukraine and the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation were finally formed. By this time, the problem of the status of Sevastopol as the main naval base of the two fleets on the Black Sea was also formally resolved. The interim date is May 28, 1997, when three intergovernmental agreements on the Black Sea Fleet were signed in preparation for the signing of the "Great Treaty" of friendship and cooperation between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Thus, the “process of determining the fate” of the Black Sea Fleet of the former USSR was formally completed. Thus, in the history of the problem of the Black Sea Fleet, two large chronological segments can be distinguished - the first - from 1992 to 1997 - a period of difficult negotiations at the interstate and interdepartmental level in the context of constantly arising conflict situations and crisis phenomena in relations between Russia and Ukraine. The next period (June 1997 - the end of 2000) embodies a no less complex process of filling with concrete content the main provisions of the agreements reached at the interstate level.
The fate of the Armed Forces of the former USSR was decisive for the events of 1991, when, along with the "parade of sovereignties" of the former Soviet republics, the principle of "new independent states - their own armed formations" began to be strictly implemented. The most painful process of division and determination of the status of the Soviet inheritance took place in Ukraine. The danger of the created situation was largely due to the fact that after the collapse of the Union, most of the weapons and facilities of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet, the largest, more than 100,000-strong strategic grouping of the former unified Navy of the USSR with an indefinite status, ended up on its territory.
With the collapse of the Union, the Black Sea Fleet found itself in an extremely difficult situation. The situation developed as follows. On August 24, 1991, Ukraine, in accordance with the Declaration of Independence and the results of the all-Ukrainian referendum, began to build a sovereign independent state, the guarantor of security and territorial integrity of which was to be its own armed forces5. In accordance with the resolution of the Supreme Council of Ukraine "On military formations in Ukraine", all military formations stationed on its territory were formally subordinate to the Supreme Council of Ukraine, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine was created. On December 6, 1991, the Supreme Council of Ukraine adopted the law "On the Armed Forces" and "On Defense", officially proclaiming the creation of its own national armed forces on the basis of associations, formations and units of the USSR Armed Forces, which were deployed on its territory. On December 8, in Belovezhskaya Pushcha, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus signed the Agreement on the Commonwealth of Independent States6. The USSR finally ceased to exist. This was preceded by a meeting in the union ministry, at which the defense ministers of sovereign states that were still part of the USSR agreed on a share in the formation of the country's military budget. Even then, Ukraine firmly declared its intention to create its own army. Other problems were also not resolved, which on the whole did not make it possible to come to a common opinion on questions of defense and security. With the formation of the CIS, any attempts to prevent the division of the Armed Forces by Ukrainian leaders were seen as a violation of the laws of Ukraine and interference in its internal affairs.
The meeting of the heads of the Commonwealth states, which took place on December 30, 1991 in Minsk, brought clarity to the current situation to a certain extent, during which the CIS member countries signed a number of documents on military issues, according to which the Ministry of Defense of the former Union was subject to liquidation, and instead of it The General Command of the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States was created. The CIS states received the right to create their own armed forces on the basis of units and subunits of the USSR Armed Forces that were stationed on the territory of these states, with the exception of those that were recognized as “strategic forces” and were to remain under the unified command of the CIS7. However, subsequent events showed that the leaders who signed the package of military documents did not have a common idea either about what is included in the understanding of "strategic forces" or about what the status and conditions for deploying these forces on the territory of new states should be.
The fleet had the status of an operational-strategic association. However, it is precisely this status, the realization of which is possible only if the unity of the fleet is preserved in all the interconnection of its structure as an association, that was revised by the political leadership of Ukraine and its Ministry of Defense. The basis of their position was a different interpretation of the agreements reached in Minsk. In fact, Ukraine initially headed for the division of the Black Sea Fleet. Naturally, the leadership of Russia, in fact the legal successor of the Union, the personnel and command of the Black Sea Fleet and the mostly pro-Russian population of Crimea and Sevastopol could not agree with this. A confrontation began that lasted a total of more than five years, during which the parties several times found themselves on the verge of open confrontation.
The events around the Black Sea Fleet after the collapse of the USSR developed as follows.
In October 1991, the Supreme Council of Ukraine decided to subordinate the Black Sea Fleet to Ukraine. On April 5, 1992, President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk signed the Decree "On the transfer of the Black Sea Fleet to the administrative subordination of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine."
On April 7, 1992, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin issued a Decree "On the transfer of the Black Sea Fleet under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation."
The "war of decrees" ended with a meeting on June 23, 1992 in Dagomys between Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk. An agreement was signed on the further development of interstate relations, which indicates the need to continue the negotiation process on the creation of the Russian Navy and the Ukrainian Navy on the basis of the Black Sea Fleet.
On August 3, 1992, Russian-Ukrainian summit talks took place in Mukhalatka near Yalta. The Presidents of Russia and Ukraine signed an agreement on the principles for the formation of the Russian Navy and the Ukrainian Navy on the basis of the Black Sea Fleet of the former USSR, according to which the Black Sea Fleet becomes the Joint Fleet of Russia and Ukraine with a joint command. The parties agreed that within three years the issue of dividing the Black Sea Fleet would be resolved. Thus, the first protracted crisis in interstate relations was resolved.
On June 17, 1993, negotiations between Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk took place in the Moscow region. An agreement was signed on the formation of the fleets of the two states on the basis of the Black Sea Fleet.
On September 3, 1993, in Massandra (Crimea), at a working meeting of the presidents of Russia and Ukraine, a protocol was signed according to which the Black Sea Fleet with all its infrastructure in Crimea will be used by Russia.
On April 15, 1994, in Moscow, the presidents of Russia and Ukraine signed an agreement on a phased settlement of the problem of the Black Sea Fleet, according to which the Ukrainian Navy and the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation are based separately. In accordance with the agreement, up to 20% of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet should go to Ukraine.
On February 7–8, 1995, an agreement was reached in Kyiv on basing the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol.
On June 9, 1995, a meeting between Boris Yeltsin and the new president of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, took place in Sochi. An agreement was signed according to which the Black Sea Fleet of Russia and the Naval Forces of Ukraine are based separately; the main base and headquarters of the fleet are located in the city of Sevastopol; property issues should be settled taking into account the previously reached agreement on the division of property in half. Russia receives 81.7%, Ukraine - 18.3% of ships.
On May 28, 1997, final intergovernmental agreements were signed in Kyiv on the status and conditions for the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet on the territory of Ukraine, on the parameters for dividing the Black Sea Fleet, on mutual settlements related to the division of the fleet and the presence of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on Ukrainian territory8. The Ukrainian parliament ratified these documents on March 24, 1999. The State Duma ratified on June 18, 1999.
Graphically, the process of dividing ships and vessels of the Black Sea Fleet can be depicted as follows: (see Appendix 1 on p. 104).
The situation of uncertainty of the legal status and the further fate of the Black Sea Fleet, which persisted for more than five years, had an extremely unfavorable effect on its combat capability. What happened to the Black Sea Fleet in the period from 1991 to 1997 was perceived by many as the process of its death. Indeed, if approached from a formal point of view, the 1991 Black Sea Fleet is not comparable to the 1997 Black Sea Fleet. This conclusion can be reached by comparing the data at the time of the conclusion of the Russian-Ukrainian agreements:
In 1991, the Black Sea Fleet numbered about 100 thousand personnel and 60 thousand workers and employees, included 835 ships and vessels of almost all existing classes. Including: 28 submarines, 2 anti-submarine cruisers, 6 missile cruisers and large anti-submarine ships of the 1st rank, 20 BODs of the 2nd rank, destroyers and patrol ships of the 2nd rank, about 40 TFRs, 30 small missile ships and boats, about 70 minesweepers, 50 landing ships and boats, more than 400 units of naval aviation. The organizational structure of the fleet included 2 ship divisions (anti-submarine and landing), 1 submarine division, 2 aviation divisions (fighter and sea attack missile carriers), 1 coastal defense division, dozens of brigades, separate divisions, regiments, units. The forces of the Mediterranean squadron were in constant combat readiness. Every year, up to a hundred warships and ships entered the world ocean through the Black Sea straits. The fleet had an extensive base network from Izmail to Batumi (Izmail, Odessa, Nikolaev, Ochakov, Kyiv, Chernomorskoe, Donuzlav, Sevastopol, Feodosia, Kerch, Novorossiysk, Poti, etc.), its parts were deployed on the territory of Ukraine, Crimea, Moldova, Russia , Georgia, North Caucasian autonomies. According to experts from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, by the beginning of 1992. the cost of all property of the Black Sea Fleet, including warships, exceeded 80 billion US dollars.
The most complete data on the quantitative and qualitative composition of the Black Sea Fleet in 1992–1993. cites in his publications D. Clark, an expert on military issues of the analytical journal RFE / RL Re-search Report. According to him, “Despite the fact that the Black Sea Fleet, like the Baltic, is smaller than the Pacific and Northern Fleets of the former USSR, it is still a formidable force, larger than most other fleets in the world, including NATO members, except the United States. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies9 (IISS), it has more than 400 ships, of which 45 belong to the strike surface forces, of which the most significant are naval warships, including two missile-carrying cruisers Moskva and Leningrad, three missile carriers with nuclear weapons, ten destroying missile carriers and thirty missile-carrying frigates. The weak part of the Navy is its submarine component, which consists of 26 mostly obsolete diesel-powered submarines... The strength of the land-based naval aviation, however, more than compensates for this weakness. According to the IISS, this component includes 151 combat aircraft and 85 helicopters. Separate Russian sources claim that there are even more, about 400 units, including 140 capable of carrying nuclear weapons and solving tasks at long distances ... The fleet also includes a marine brigade based in Sevastopol, and coastal defense units - a motorized rifle division in Simferopol". D. Clark defined the probable number of personnel as 75,000 officers and sailors.
In November 1996, the Black Sea Fleet included 383 combat surface ships, 56 combat boats, 49 special-purpose ships, 272 boats and raid vessels, 190 support vessels, 5 submarines, in total - 655 units. The Ukrainian Navy included 80 ships and vessels of various classes.
According to the results of the Kyiv agreements of May 28, 1997, the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation consists of 338 ships and vessels. The number of personnel cannot exceed 25 thousand people, including 2 thousand in the marines and strike aircraft. The fleet includes 106 aircraft, of which there can be no more than 22 combat aircraft. Russia cannot have more than 24 artillery systems with a caliber of more than 100 mm; 132 armored vehicles. Of the 80 command posts of formations and formations of the fleet, 16 (20%) remain behind the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation, 11 (28%) out of 39 communication facilities, 11 (27%) out of 40 radio-technical service facilities, 9 out of 50 logistics facilities ( 18%), out of 16 facilities for providing rocket-artillery and mine-torpedo weapons - 5 (31%), out of 7 ship repair facilities - 3 (42%).
The Ukrainian Navy received 30 warships and boats, one submarine, 90 combat aircraft, 6 special-purpose ships, and 28 support vessels.
Thus, after the division of the Black Sea Fleet, the ratio of warships in the Black Sea basin became 1:2.5 in favor of Turkey.
Russia has three naval bases left - Sevastopol, Feodosia and temporarily - Nikolaev; one place of deployment of coastal troops (Sevastopol). In Sevastopol, Russia can use three of the five main bays: Sevastopol, Yuzhnaya, Karantinnaya, and Kazachya to deploy a Black Sea Fleet marine brigade. Streletskaya Bay will be used jointly by the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation and the Navy. Also, the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation can use two main airfields in Gvardeisky and in Kacha (Sevastopol), two alternate airfields in Sevastopol (m. Khersones, Yuzhny), a military sanatorium in Yalta, a communications post and a test center in Feodosia and some other facilities outside Sevastopol. Russia's rent of facilities and bases costs it $97.75 million a year, which is written off to pay off Ukraine's debt. Russia undertakes not to deploy nuclear weapons in Ukraine as part of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation, in addition, the procedure for using most naval facilities is established by Kyiv. The routes of movement of personnel and military equipment of the Black Sea Fleet are also determined by local authorities. According to the Russian military doctrine, the forces of the Black Sea Fleet should consist of two operational-tactical groupings - Eastern with a base in Novorossiysk and Western with a base in Sevastopol, which retained the status of the main base of the Fleet10.
According to data published in early 2002, the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation includes more than 50 warships, over 120 auxiliary ships, and about 430 units of military equipment and weapons. Aviation of the Black Sea Fleet has about 90 aircraft and helicopters. In accordance with the agreements on the deployment of the Black Sea Fleet on the territory of Ukraine, a military group of at least 25,000 people, 24 artillery systems with a caliber of more than 100 mm, 132 armored vehicles, 22 combat aircraft are located in Crimea. This number remains unchanged to this day. The Ukrainian Navy has about 40 warships and boats and about 80 auxiliary vessels. It should be noted that by this time the command of both fleets as a whole managed to establish constructive cooperation after almost a decade of confrontation. This became possible largely because, despite all the difficulties, a political decision was made at the interstate level, which put an end to the process of determining the fate of the Black Sea Fleet of the former USSR. Since 1999 The Black Sea Fleet and the Naval Forces of Ukraine conduct annual joint exercises as part of the Peace Fairway program and solve common tasks in the Black Sea basin. Nevertheless, to this day, quite complex controversial issues remain related to the basing of both contingents, the military doctrines of the two countries, the status of the main base of the Black Sea Fleet - the city of Sevastopol, the attitude towards partnership with NATO, etc., which means that the point in the negotiation process on the problem of the Black Sea Fleet has not yet been set11.
Summing up more than a decade of discussion on the problem of the Black Sea Fleet, it should be said that in the course of many years of political battles over the Black Sea Fleet, none of the conflicting parties - neither Russia nor Ukraine - has achieved its originally set goals. Initially (after the collapse of the USSR), the Russian political leadership, apparently, sought not to interfere in the course of the "objective process" of the Black Sea Fleet's transfer to the jurisdiction of the new independent Ukrainian state. However, the principled position taken by the command of the Black Sea Fleet and its personnel, despite the increasing pressure from the Ukrainian authorities and various political forces of Ukraine, aimed at forcing the politicians of the two states to start a negotiation process on the status of this part of the former USSR-CIS Navy with with the aim of making a final political decision on this issue, forced the leadership of the two countries to enter into a dialogue at the interstate level, which lasted for many years and often put both sides on the verge of open confrontation. In the course of a long-term negotiation process, the Russian side sought to retain the Black Sea Fleet as the successor to the USSR, as well as seriously strengthen itself on the coast, transferring most of the Black Sea Fleet infrastructure, along with its main naval base, the city of Sevastopol, under its jurisdiction. At the same time, during the negotiations on the problem of the Black Sea Fleet, Russia's actions were extremely inconsistent, due to the difficult internal political and economic situation in the country and the obvious unwillingness of the top political leadership to take serious steps that could worsen the already difficult relations with Ukraine and thereby push it into the orbit of influence Western countries, and above all the United States and the NATO bloc. This was expressed in the readiness of the Russian side to make serious concessions during the preparation and signing of fundamental interstate agreements, which, as a result, bore traces of haste and legal negligence, largely did not correspond to realities and, therefore, did not contribute to the speedy resolution of the current situation around the Black Sea Fleet. dangerous political and economic situation. This policy was erroneous and did not justify itself. As a result of more than a decade of negotiations on the status of the Black Sea Fleet on the territory of another state and its division between the two countries, accompanied by its sharp quantitative reduction, the Russian Federation, formally remaining the successor of the Soviet Union, received only a small part of the Black Sea Fleet of the former USSR. At the same time, the Russian side was unable to defend its vision of the status of Sevastopol as the main base of its Black Sea Fleet, the status of the Black Sea Fleet as a single operational-strategic formation of the CIS Navy, as well as the principle of separate basing of the fleets, and as a result, it received at its disposal not the entire crew of the Black Sea Fleet and about 5% of the territory of the base and infrastructure facilities of the Fleet on extremely unfavorable lease terms. As a result, Russia actually lost a colossal part of the property of the former USSR, which it had every right to claim, and also significantly weakened its influence in the Black Sea region and the Mediterranean.
The Ukrainian side, claiming its rights to the Black Sea Fleet, sought to transfer under its jurisdiction this naval formation, if not entirely, then its best part, as well as all Black Sea Fleet infrastructure facilities located on its territory, often acting by illegal, violent methods. , by capturing and reassigning military facilities of the Black Sea Fleet, and creating secret structures of the Ukrainian Navy, while violating the agreements reached at the interstate level on the division of the Fleet, which was largely facilitated by the policy of concessions to Ukraine pursued by the political leadership of the Russian Federation, as well as the interest of Western countries in weakening influence Russia in the Black Sea region. At the same time, the Ukrainian political and military leadership, receiving comprehensive financial and political support from the NATO bloc, which is interested in minimizing Russian influence in the strategically important Black Sea region, set a course for the actual destruction of the Black Sea Fleet, officially declaring its intention to create a small naval force to protect the borders of an independent states and at the same time striving to subordinate as many infrastructure facilities and ships of the Black Sea Fleet as possible to itself, without being able at the same time to keep them in proper combat readiness for economic, organizational and technical reasons. It was these actions of the Ukrainian side, combined with the criminal indifference of the then authorities of the Russian Federation, that caused a sharp rejection among the command and personnel of the Black Sea Fleet, which made it impossible for Ukraine and its Western "allies" to implement their intentions regarding the Black Sea Fleet. During the fifteen years of its independence, Ukraine has failed to create a full-fledged naval force in the Black Sea capable of influencing the situation in the region. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian side managed to reassign most of the infrastructure of the Black Sea Fleet to itself, formally confirm its jurisdiction over Sevastopol, and also force the Russian side to sign a major interstate agreement on extremely favorable terms for itself. However, Russia, in turn, managed to retain even a small, but the most combat-ready part of the Black Sea Fleet, its basis, and also defend the so-called. a “package” approach to the agreements reached and future negotiations with Ukraine on the issue of prolonging the agreements on the Black Sea Fleet, according to which the Russian side intends to conduct all negotiations without exception strictly on the basis of the principles of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership of May 31, 1997 of the year and in close connection with the Basic Agreements on the fleet of May 28, 1997, not allowing their revision or free interpretation by Ukraine, in particular, under the threat of otherwise making territorial claims, etc.
In general, speaking about the results of a kind of confrontation between Ukraine and Russia, it should be noted that the Russian side won the battle for ships, but Ukraine was left with “land”, that is, Sevastopol and most of the coastal infrastructure. However, these are only visible results, behind which there is undoubtedly a deeper problem: the entire ten-year conflict between the two states related to the problem of the Black Sea Fleet boiled down to one fundamental question: will an independent Ukraine remain in the orbit of Russia’s military-political influence or gain independence from it, then is will enter any other global military-political system. The dispute over the Black Sea Fleet was only one of the aspects of this problem and in many respects evidence of its discussion and solution. The results of this dispute can be defined as follows: Russia, of course, managed to some extent maintain its presence in the Crimea and a powerful lever of influence on the situation in the Black Sea region. The preservation of the Black Sea Fleet with its main base in Sevastopol indicates that Ukraine still remains in the orbit of the Russian military-political strategy, but at the same time, Ukraine, having left behind very serious positions, has turned from a simple object of Russian policy into a serious factor influencing this policy, without taking into account which it is rather difficult to imagine the preservation of the “status quo” in the region in the future. Whether the current relations between Russia and Ukraine will eventually turn into a true partnership, or after the twenty-year lease expires, disputes over the future fate of the Navy will flare up with renewed vigor (which seems very likely in the light of recent events in Ukraine) - time will tell.
1 Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020. Approved by the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin July 27, 2001 // Marine collection., 2001. No. 9. P. 5.
3 Abdulatipov R.G. The national question and the state structure of Russia., M., S. 12.
4 Pechenev V.A. Who benefits from returning Russia to pre-Petrine times. // Russian newspaper. September 24, 1996
5 Russia-Ukraine (1990–2000) Documents and materials. T. 1. M., 2001. S. 18–24.
6 Ibid. pp. 33–37.
7 Indestructible and legendary” in the fire of political battles of 1985–1993. M., 1994. S. 265–271; Shaposhnikov E.I. Choice. M., 1995. S. 143–144.
8 See: Russia-Ukraine (1990–2000) Documents and materials. T.2. pp. 125–142.
10 Gorbachev S.P. Pessimistic tragedy... S. 26–27; Crimean Truth. 1992. No. 5. January 9; Myalo K.G. Decree. op. S. 144; D.L. Clark. The Saga of Black Sea Fleet... p. 45; Mirror of the Week. 1997 May 31; The tragedy of the Black Sea Fleet (1990–1997).//Moscow-Crimea. Issue. No. 2. M., 2000; http://legion.wplus.net/guide/navy/flots/cher_l.shtml; http://www.janes.com http:// www.Sevastopol.org.
11 Island Crimea. 1999. No. 2; Malgin A. Decree. op. S. 48; Kommersant-Power. 2002. #17–18.
After the events of 2014, Crimea again attracted the attention of not only Russians, but, perhaps, the whole world. And the point here is not only in the political scandal between the two states - Russia and Ukraine. And not in the speed with which the Crimean operation was carried out by Russia. And the fact that after the return of the Crimea, the Black Sea found a second life.
It is no secret that during the years of Ukraine's ownership of the Crimean shores, the development of Crimea was greatly slowed down, and very few financial resources were allocated from the treasury for the maintenance of the peninsula. This also affected the naval bases of the Crimean peninsula. In the article we will try to describe as fully as possible what prospects Russia has for the development of the Black Sea Fleet on the Crimean Peninsula.
Balaklava bay. A bit of history
From history it is known that the field of how the Crimea came under the possession of Russia, it was in the Balaklava Bay that the ships of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia were stationed. Since 1776, the Balaklava Greek infantry battalion has been located in this place. The basis of this battalion was made up of emigrants, participants in the anti-Ottoman uprising on the islands of the Aegean Sea. It should be noted that the Queen Catherine the Great herself noted her favor of the brave Hellenes.
From 1853 to 1856, during the Crimean War, Balaklava and the bay were captured by British troops. They turned Balaklava Bay into a military base and, in fact, assaults were carried out from there, and there was military support during the siege of Sevastopol.
When the fleet was divided between Ukraine and Russia, as of August 1994, the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea included the 153rd and 155th brigades of the 14th division.
At the same time, the 475th division had 14 large and 9 medium submarines and a submarine floating base.
But it must be said that the Zaporozhye submarine (project 641), transferred to Ukraine during the division of the fleet, turned out to be unsuitable for this base in terms of technical parameters.
And after the division of the fleets, she was sent to the docks for repairs, which the Ukrainian Navy is still trying to carry out.
After the Russian military sailors finally left the waters of Ukraine in 1995, the Balaklava base was abandoned. And its actual "owners" were hunters for non-ferrous and ferrous metals, since the base had huge stocks of equipment and machine tools.
And after a short period of time, when the Russian Black Sea Fleet left the territorial waters of Ukraine, the Balaklava base was a heartbreaking sight.
Also, the underground plant for the restoration and repair of submarines of the Black Sea Fleet became the object of excursions around the city and the bay. The top-secret base was actively used by the Soviet Union during the Cold War and as a nuclear weapons depot.
The Ukrainian authorities did not find a better use of the secret base, except for conducting tours of tourists around the military underwater base.
How the Black Sea Fleet was divided
An agreement on the procedure and conditions for the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the territorial waters and ports of Ukraine was signed in Kyiv on May 28, 1997, following the results of an intergovernmental agreement. The conditions for the division of the Black Sea Fleet and mutual settlements associated with such a division were also stipulated. These documents were ratified by the State Duma and the Ukrainian Parliament in 1999.
The signed agreement made it possible to separate the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian Navy. It was decided to leave the main base and headquarters in Sevastopol. And property disagreements should have been taken into account by an agreement on the division of property. At the same time, Russia got 87.7%, and Ukraine - 12.3% of all ships.
This entire period of agreeing on the legal status of the Black Sea Fleet and its future fate, of course, had a negative impact on its combat capability. Many from 1991 to 1997. what was happening was perceived as that the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy was slowly but surely dying.
Black Sea Fleet in numbers
Comparison of the strength over this period could not strengthen the morale of the personnel.
So let's compare the numbers.
1. Black Sea Fleet for 1991:
Personnel - 100 thousand people.
Number of ships - 835 of all existing classes:
- submarines - 28;
- missile cruisers - 6;
- anti-submarine cruisers - 2;
- BOD II rank, destroyers and patrol ships II rank - 20;
- TFR - 40 units;
- small and ships - 30;
- minesweepers - 70;
- landing ships - 50;
- naval aviation - more than four hundred units.
2. The Black Sea Fleet of Russia for 1997:
- The number of personnel - 25 thousand people. (including 2 thousand people in attack aircraft and marines).
- The number of ships and vessels - 33.
- There are 106 aircraft in the fleet (of which 22 are combat).
- Armored vehicles - 132.
- Command posts - 16 (was 80).
- Communication objects - 11 (out of 39).
- Objects of radio engineering service - 11 (was 40).
- Rear facilities - 9 (out of 50).
- Ship repair facilities - 3 (out of 7).
Under the 1997 section, the Ukrainian Navy was:
- Warships - 30.
- Submarines - 1.
- Combat aircraft - 90.
- Special purpose ships - 6.
- Support vessels - 28 units.
The current state of the Black Sea Fleet
The Black Sea of Russia has always been and remains one of the main factors of stability and security in the southern maritime directions. The combat ships of the Black Sea Fleet are doing everything possible to ensure these tasks on the borders of the Black and Mediterranean Seas.
But the Black Sea Fleet is also able to carry out combat missions in different areas of the World Ocean.
The ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet successfully perform tasks in the Sea of Japan, interacting with the Baltic Fleet. Vessels from the command of this fleet participated in the transport escort operation for transporting Syrian chemical weapons in the Mediterranean Sea.
On an ongoing basis, Black Sea Fleet support ships successfully carry out tasks to counter piracy.
Increasing the combat level
The return of Crimea to the Russian structure has undoubtedly improved the combat effectiveness of the Black Sea Fleet. The Russian Federation, on a planned basis, received the opportunity to properly develop the Navy on the Crimean Peninsula.
The naval forces will have an integrated system in Crimea, which also includes land bases. The Black Sea Fleet of Russia acquired the main base for the placement of ships - Sevastopol.
The basic principles for deploying basing systems and fleet infrastructure are self-sufficiency and functionality. It will be necessary to re-equip the bases of surface and submarine ships, coastal troops with everything necessary to ensure full-fledged service and life.
List of ships of the Black Sea Fleet
The directories provide detailed data that can be used to assess what the Russian Black Sea Fleet is today.
List of surface ships of the 30th division:
- Guards
- "Kerch" is a large anti-submarine ship.
- watchdog
- Patrol ship "Okay".
- Patrol ship "Inquisitive".
The composition of the landing ships of the 197th brigade:
Large landing ships:
- "Nikolai Filchenkov".
- "Orsk".
- "Saratov".
- "Azov".
- "Novocherkassk".
- "Caesar Kunikov".
- "Yamal".
The composition of the 68th brigade of guard ships:
Small anti-submarine ships:
- "Alexander".
- "Murometz".
- "Suzdal".
Sea minesweepers:
- "Kovrovets".
- "Ivan Golubets".
- "Turbinist".
- "Vice Admiral Zhukov".
Submarines:
- "Rostov-on-Don" - B237.
- "Novorossiysk" - B261.
- (ex-Zaporozhye) - B435.
- "Alrosa" - B871.
Missile boats of the 41st brigade:
- Bora.
- "Simoom".
- "Calm".
- "Mirage".
The composition of the 295th Sulinsky division:
Missile boats:
- "R-60".
- "R-71".
- "R-109".
- "R-239".
- "Ivanovets".
The composition of the 184th brigade (Novorossiysk):
Anti-submarine ships:
- "Povorino".
- "Eysk".
- "Kasimov".
Minesweepers:
- "Zheleznyakov".
- "Valentin Pikul".
- "Vice Admiral Zakharyin".
- "Mineral water".
- Lieutenant Ilyin.
- "RT-46".
- "RT-278".
- "D-144".
- "D-199".
- "D-106".
It did not take long to look for a site where the headquarters of the Russian Black Sea Fleet would be located. Sevastopol turned out to be the most suitable for this (in the same place where the headquarters of the Ukrainian Navy was located until March 19, 2014).
Prospects for the development of the submarine fleet
After the division of the ships, the Black Sea residents are armed with one submarine - the diesel Alrosa.
To date, Russia has a program for the gradual build-up of the Black Sea Fleet's submarine forces. Russia's submarine Black Sea Fleet will see the return on these efforts as early as 2016.
By this time, six new diesel submarines are expected to be replenished. Such a replenishment of the submarine fleet will radically change the balance of power in the Black Sea.
The Black Sea Fleet will now be able to solve various tasks at underwater depths and will create groupings to achieve combat goals.
Estimated dates for the commissioning of submarines are different. So, for example, already on August 22, 2015, the Andreevsky flag was raised in St. Petersburg on the diesel-electric submarine Novorossiysk. After full-scale tests at the Northern Fleet's sea range, it will undoubtedly be sent to a place of long-term deployment.
The third submarine from the series of ships for the Black Sea Fleet of program 636 - "Stary Oskol" - was launched on August 28, 2015. After a set of sea and state trials, it will take its place in the Black Sea Fleet.
But that's not all. The completion of the hull of the submarine "Krasnodar" continues and the launched "Rostov-on-Don" is being completed.
Two more submarines from the project to strengthen the Black Sea submarine fleet - Kolpino and Veliky Novgorod - will be laid down.
All 6 submarines of the 636 diesel program are electric, and by 2016 they will be transferred to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The composition of the crews for these submarines has been formed and is being trained at the training centers of the Navy.
carrier-based aviation
Of course, the Black Sea Fleet must have a full-fledged carrier-based aircraft. Now there is an opportunity to increase the pace of renewal of the fleet of naval aviation. It is planned to replace the Su-24 aircraft with the new Su-30 MS.
It is also important not to forget that it is in the Crimea that the unique NITKA complex is located. For many years, carrier-based aircraft of the Northern Fleet in the Crimea have honed their skills at this unique complex.
The pace of repair of the fleet already available to the Black Sea Fleet is also increasing. All this will make it possible to reach the set level and provide the Black Sea Fleet of Russia with aviation. The composition of aircraft ready for combat missions will be within 80% of the required number.
Reconstruction of the basing system
It is supposed to recreate on the Crimean peninsula such a basing system that will meet all the requirements for performing combat missions in the region.
The main base is located in the city of Sevastopol, where the points for the deployment of the Black Sea Fleet will be located.
The main requirement for the deployment of basing systems is their full independence based on the principle of ensuring functionality and self-sufficiency. This port, where the Black Sea Fleet of Russia will be located, the composition of ships, both surface and underwater, will be provided with everything necessary for full-fledged service and life.
So, at the plants in the Crimea, such production sites will be created in the shortest possible time that would meet modern requirements and technologies. In order to serve the latest ships that enter the Russian Black Sea Fleet, a phased replacement of machine equipment with new ones begins.
Now the federal unitary enterprise in Sevastopol has literally come to life. Two large anti-submarine ships of the Northern Fleet have already been repaired (they are part of the Navy's task force in the Mediterranean Sea).
Also at the plant, work is underway to repair Alrosa. In addition, it should be noted that the wages of workers were brought up to the all-Russian level.
Now the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol has received a modern repair base.
The same work is being carried out in Novorossiysk under the federal target program, which is designed until 2020. Within the framework of this program, it is planned to build a place of deployment of the Black Sea Fleet forces in Novorossiysk. Just like Sevastopol, this port, with its rare protective pier, will undoubtedly be another combat location for Russian ships and submarines.
Equipment ships for the Black Sea Fleet
To ensure the safety of navigation in the Black Sea region, hydrographers of the Black Sea Fleet have a large range of work to do. It will be necessary to carry out comprehensive studies of coastal waters, which will lead to the adjustment of navigation charts. Hydrographic ships of the Black Sea Fleet check the operation of radio navigation systems with subsequent repairs and modernization.
This whole complex of works will have a significant impact on the safety of navigation in this region, which, in turn, will secure the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the composition of whose ships is constantly replenished.
Thus, in order to comprehensively equip submarines and surface vessels, the Black Sea Fleet will be replenished with six more vessels, which will undoubtedly have a positive effect on defense capability and will allow performing tasks not only in the area of responsibility provided by the Black Sea Fleet, but also beyond its borders.
Basing system
Command
Story
recent history
The most serious blow to the Black Sea Fleet of the USSR was the collapse of the USSR and the ensuing period of general political and economic confusion.
Chronicle of political confrontation
According to the leadership of the Russian Federation, the aggravation of relations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation was caused by the election in 2004 of the new President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko, who, being the guarantor of the Constitution of Ukraine, is obliged to guarantee the fulfillment of the requirements of Part 7 of Article 17 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which states that “the deployment of foreign military bases”, as well as paragraph 14 of the Transitional Provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine, which states that “the use of existing military bases on the territory of Ukraine for the temporary stay of foreign military formations is possible on a lease basis in the manner determined by international treaties of Ukraine ratified by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.”
2005
The development of events is reminiscent of a similar Russian-Ukrainian confrontation in 2003 over the Tuzla spit in the Kerch Strait, when a dispute over a 3 sq. km almost escalated into a military clash. In December 2003, it took the "intervention" of the Russian president to resolve the Tuzla crisis with the Ukrainian president.
Meanwhile, Russia is building new naval bases and Black Sea Fleet facilities on its own territory. On January 1, the implementation of the federal target program for the development of the coastal infrastructure of the Navy in the Krasnodar Territory began. The construction of the Novorossiysk naval base will last until.
Representatives of Ukrainian nationalist organizations are constantly picketing objects of the Russian fleet in Crimea, demanding "to stop the occupation of Ukraine."
2008
Fleet today
The payroll of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet (2009)
| Type of | Name | Manufacturer | Board number | Bookmark date | Launching | Commissioning | State | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cruisers - 1 | ||||||||
| Missile cruiser project 1164, type "Atlant" | "Moscow" | 121 | 05.11.1976 | 27.07.1979 | 30.12.1982 | In line. Fleet flagship. In 1991-1999 underwent a major overhaul with modernization. Mon.d. re-equipped from the Basalt SCRC to the Vulkan SCRC Ex. "Glory". |
||
| Destroyers \BOD - 2 (1) | ||||||||
| Large anti-submarine ship pr. 1134B, type "Berkut-B" | "Ochakov" | Plant named after 61 Communards (Nikolaev) | 707 | 19.12.1969 | 30.04.1971 | 04.11.1973 | Since 1990, under repair and modernization. A complete replacement of weapons and electronics was supposed, according to some reports, it was intended to test the first domestic multifunctional combat information and control system "Alliance". At the end of 2008 p.m. work is frozen. The ship was withdrawn from the territory of the plant. |
|
| "Kerch" | Plant named after 61 Communards (Nikolaev) | 713 | 30.04.1971 | 21.07.1972 | 25.12.1974 | In service In the late 80s, radar weapons were modernized. In the mid-2000s, it underwent an average (?) repair and additional modernization (?). In the spring of 2007, after a long break, the ships of the "first line" were commissioned. Classified as a "cruiser" in some Western sources. |
||
| Large anti-submarine ship of project 61m, type "Komsomolets of Ukraine" | "Smart" | Plant named after 61 Communards (Nikolaev) | 713 | 15.07.1966 | 26.08.1967 | 25.09.1969 | In service Officially classified as a patrol ship (SKR) Modernized in 1990-95. on pr. 01090 - a new marine non-acoustic complex MNK-300, 8 anti-ship missile launchers Kh-35 "Uranus", additional radars, jamming systems were installed. Despite its "age", one of the most "running" ships of the fleet. |
|
| Frigates - 2 | ||||||||
| Patrol ship pr. 1135-1135M | "Okay" | Shipyard "Zaliv" (Kerch) | 801 | 25.05.1979 | 07.05.1980 | 29.12.1980 | In line. | |
| "Inquisitive" | Shipyard "Yantar" (Kaliningrad) | 808 | 27.06.1979 | 16.04.1981 | 30.11.1981 | In line. Project 1135M. |
||
| Corvettes (MPK, MRK, BRK) - 16 | ||||||||
| 197th Landing Ship Brigade | ||||||||
| 152 | 1171 | Nikolay Filchenkov | BDK | in service | ||||
| 148 | 1171 | Orsk | BDK | It will be commissioned again in the near future after repairs at the Tuapse plant. | ||||
| 150 | 1171 | Saratov | BDK | in service | ||||
| 151 | 775M | Azov | BDK | in service | ||||
| 142 | Novocherkassk | BDK | in service | |||||
| 158 | Caesar Kunikov | BDK | in service | |||||
| 156 | Yamal | BDK | in service | |||||
| # | Project | Name | Class | Year | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 400th division of anti-submarine ships | |||||
| 059 | 1124 | Aleksandrovets | IPC | in service | |
| 071 | 1124M | Suzdalets | IPC | in service | |
| 064 | 1124M | Muromets | IPC | in service | |
| 060 | 11451 | Vladimirets | IPC | in service | |
| 418th Minesweeper Battalion | |||||
| 913 | Kovrovets | MTS | in service | ||
| 911 | 266M | Ivan Golubets | MTS | in service | |
| 912 | 266M | Turbinist | MTS | in service | |
| 909 | 266M | Vice Admiral Zhukov | MTS | in service | |
| # | Project | Name | Class | Year | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 166th Novorossiysk division of small missile ships | |||||
| 615 | 1239 | Bora | RKVP | in service | |
| 616 | 1239 | Simoom | RKVP | in service | |
| 620 | 12341 | Calm | RTOs | in service | |
| 617 | 12341 | Mirage | RTOs | in service | |
| 295th Sulina Missile Boat Battalion | |||||
| 966 | 2066 | R-44 | RCA | Cutting in Inkerman March 2009 | |
| 955 | 12411 | R-60 | RCA | Modernized in 2005-06. in service | |
| 953 | 12411 | R-239 | RCA | in service | |
| 952 | 12411 | R-109 | RCA | in service | |
| 962 | 12417 | R-71 | RCA | in service | |
| 954 | 12411M | R-334 Ivanovets | RCA | in service | |
| 47th link of support boats | |||||
| 1293 | KM-593 | KM | |||
| 1293 | KM-731 | KM | |||
| 1232V | KVM-332 | KVM | |||
| 1232V | KVM-702 | KVM | |||
| BUK-645 | BEECH | ||||
| # | Project | Name | Class | Year | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 053 | 1124M | Povorino | IPC | in service | |
| 054 | 1124M | Yeysk | IPC | in service | |
| 055 | 1124M | Kasimov | IPC | in service | |
| 901 | 12660 | Zheleznyakov | MTS | in service | |
| 770 | 266ME | Valentin Pikul | MTS | in service | |
| 426 | 1265 | Mineral water | BTS | in service | |
| 438 | 1265 | Lieutenant Ilyin | BTS | in service | |
| 1251 | RT-168 | ||||
| 12592 | RT-278 | ||||
| 506 | Dauria | 1968 | in service |
| # | Project | Name | Class | Year | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SSV-201 | 864 | Sea of Azov | in service | ||
| 861M | Equator | in service | |||
| 861M | Kildin | in service | |||
| 861 | Liman | in service |
Teachings of the Black Sea Fleet
- On November 4, 2007, in the waters of the southeastern part of the Black Sea, in order to check the combat readiness, training events were held for the diverse forces of the Black Sea Fleet. The Russian authorities claimed that the exercises were planned. Large landing ships "Yamal", "Caesar Kunikov", patrol ship "Ladny", rescue tug "Shakhtar" took part in the exercises.
GPS g. 44.614162,33.520412 (the format is used in online maps)
GPS g.m. 44°36.849", 33°31.224" (format used in navigators and geocaching)
GPS h.m.s. 44°36"50.98", 33°31"13.48"
The coordinate indicates the place where tourist boats depart from - the Kornilov embankment in the Artillery Bay.
Sevastopol is an unusual city. Often the embankment is the most beautiful thing in the village, the center of the city, the water soothes and gives us peace, but here the embankments are everywhere - here and there, along and across, beauty! And numerous and various boats float on the water.
From the water, Sevastopol is completely different, especially at sunset, when the colors of the sky shimmer on the waves, the world darkens, and the lanterns become brighter and more beautiful. Therefore, a water excursion is definitely worth taking.
The world is voluminous, which means that you can look at everything from the other side. Handsomely.
Oleksandr Okhrimenko now has a home port of Odessa, that is, he managed to sail away during the whole mess with the Crimea.
Large landing ship "Yamal" 156 since 1988 is still in service.
The medium reconnaissance ship "Priazovye" SSV-201 was built in 1986 and is now based in the South Bay of the city of Sevastopol.
Medical vessel 320 "Yenisei" has a rich history of "floating hospital" and a huge list of rescued and cured people.
The warship "General Ryabikov" was built in 1978 and is still used for its intended purpose.
The floating workshop "PM-56" has been operating since 1973, representing a mobile repair base for the "treatment" of ships at great distances from home.
Patrol ship 808 "Inquisitive" was created in 1979 and originally belonged to the Baltic Fleet, but three years later was transferred to the Black Sea Fleet.
The medium sea tanker "Koida" belongs to the supply ships.
Since 1959, the Epron rescue ship has been carrying out search and rescue operations, conducting diver descents. Participated in the operation to raise the BOD "Ochakov". And besides, it was Epron that found the Narwhal submarine from the First World War near Sevastopol.
Patrol ship 810 "Sharp-witted" and Large anti-submarine ship 713 "Kerch" have been in service since 1968 and 1969, respectively.
Small missile ship "Mirage" tail number 617.
Rocket hovercraft "Samum" with the number 616.
"Samum" was laid down in 1991, one of the youngest ships on this page.
Small anti-submarine ship U 205 "Lutsk", launched in 1993, in 2014 the Russian flag was hoisted over it.
All ships are equipped with the most complex and incomprehensible equipment for ordinary people, which, nevertheless, is impressive - so many pieces of iron on one ship!
The small anti-submarine ship U209 "Ternopil" was launched in 2002, and in 2014 joined the Russian Navy.
The large landing ship "Konstantin Olshansky" U402 is named after the commander of the detachment that liberated the city of Nikolaev from Nazi invaders. Built in 1985, since 2014 began to serve in the Russian Navy.
Patrol ship U130 "Getman Sahaydachny" was launched in 1992, now the flagship of the Ukrainian Navy, and then only because it was in the Mediterranean at the time of the mess.
Warships are beautiful even for those for whom they are all the same. But everyone has their own history, which Sevastopol bays allow you to touch.
Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy
Emblem of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy
common data
Number of members
Technique (as of March 2014):
- Underwater equipment - 1;
- Surface equipment - 47;
- Personnel - 25,000 people.
Military conflicts
War in South Ossetia (2008),
Crimean Crisis (2014)
Order of the Red Banner
The Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation is an operational-strategic association of the Navy of the Russian Federation on the Black Sea. Assignee of the Black Sea Fleet of the USSR and the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Empire
History of the Russian Black Sea Fleet
After the collapse of the USSR, since August 1992, the Black Sea Fleet existed as a combined fleet of the Russian Federation and Ukraine. In 1995-97. The Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation and the Ukrainian Navy were created with separate bases on the territory of Ukraine. In 1997, Russia and Ukraine signed a basic agreement. The conditions for renting the base for it are $98 million. The period of stay is until May 28, 2017.
On April 21, 2010, the Presidents of the Russian Federation and Ukraine, Dmitry Medvedev and Viktor Yanukovych, signed an Agreement on the issues of the presence of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine in Kharkov (ratified by the State Duma of the Russian Federation and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on April 27, 2010). The stay of the Russian base in the Black Sea was extended for 25 years (until 2042) with the right to extend for the next five-year period if neither side declares the need to terminate this agreement.
On April 2, 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on the termination of four Russian-Ukrainian agreements on the Black Sea Fleet of 1997 and 2010.
Organization
The Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy includes surface and submarine forces, coastal fleet troops and their constituent marine infantry units, coastal defense troops and naval aviation.
In addition, the Black Sea Fleet includes ships and vessels, special-purpose units, part, rear units and the Hydrographic Service of the Navy.
Locations
The main bases of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy are the Sevastopol and Novorossiysk naval bases.
The main base of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia is the Sevastopol Naval Base, which is located on the administrative territory of the hero city of Sevastopol and is located in three bays of this city - Northern, Southern and Karantinnaya and has several berths.
The second base is the Novorossiysk Naval Base. It is the youngest association of the Russian Navy and is located on the Caucasian coast of the Black Sea.
The main tasks of the NVMB are to assist the forces of the Southern Military District in the coastal direction, protect the state border of Russia in cooperation with the forces of the border troops, ensure the deployment of fleet forces, and also ensure military sea transportation.
The Crimean Naval Base is a heterogeneous operational-territorial association of the Black Sea Fleet of the USSR Navy and the Russian Navy, which existed in 1976-1996 and was recreated in 2014.
Equipment and weapons
As of 2014, the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy includes the 11th brigade of anti-submarine ships, the 197th brigade of landing ships, the 68th brigade of ships for the protection of the water area, the 41st brigade of missile boats, which are based in Sevastopol and the 184th brigade protection of the water area, based in Novorossiysk.
Prefix of ships and ships
Ships and vessels belonging to the Russian Navy do not currently have prefixes in their names.
Marks of Excellence
