1. What is the essence of absolutism?

Under absolutism, all power (legislative, executive and judicial) is in the hands of the monarch. However, it differs from Eastern despotism. First, the absolute monarch most often was not at the same time the head of the church. Secondly, despite his absolute power, the monarch had to take into account certain rights of the estates (for example, the nobility), as well as other restrictions formally confirmed by documents on behalf of the monarch himself (as in France, the special ordinances of the king confirmed many norms of local law).

2. What are the reasons for the transition of European countries to absolutism? What are the prerequisites for strengthening the central government in the countries of Western Europe?

Reasons and prerequisites:

In the conditions of religious wars, the church could no longer be a factor of stability, only the central government could become such, especially since it was often required to unite adherents of different faiths;

The increased effectiveness of regular armies weakened the influence of the feudal militia, and hence the local nobility;

Many strata of society that had already gained influence were interested in strengthening the central government (the petty nobility, including the younger branches of noble families, merchants and other financial elites);

The growth of colonial trade and the policy of mercantilism provided the monarchs with significant financial support;

The influx of precious metals and other valuables from the New World also financed the activities of certain monarchs.

3. What are the features of absolutism in England and France. Why did resistance to him take on religious forms?

Peculiarities:

All real power was concentrated in the hands of authorities completely controlled by the king (in England - the Privy Council and the Star Chamber, in France - the Great Royal Council);

The main opposition to absolutism was the big feudal nobility;

The bodies of class representation continued to sit, but no longer played their former role;

The kings did not want to resort to the help of the estate authorities, therefore they sought alternative means of replenishing the treasury, widely relied on financial circles and generally pursued a policy of mercantilism;

During the formation of absolutism, there were persecutions of royal power against large feudal nobility, many of whose representatives were subjected to executions, exile, and other punishments with confiscation of property.

Resistance to absolutism took on religious forms because the religious doctrine of the Middle Ages already contained an ideological justification for the struggle against power. Even according to the teachings of F. Aquinas, a monarch who did not righteously ruled was deprived of the right to the throne. The Protestants included the same provision in their doctrine from their first speech against Charles V, using in fact a ready-made Catholic model.

4. Tell us about the essence of the Edict of Nantes. Did he ensure real equality between Catholics and Huguenots? What consequences did he have?

The Edict of Nantes in 1598 equalized the rights of Catholics and Protestants in France. He even left the latter a certain autonomy, including control over certain fortresses. However, under the conditions of absolutism, the policy of the monarch plays the main role. The actions of subsequent rulers were aimed at the actual revision of the provisions of the edict until its complete abolition in 1685.

5. List the contradictions of European politics at the beginning of the 17th century. Which of them mattered the most?

Contradictions:

The struggle against the hegemony of the Habsburgs in Europe;

Confessional conflict in Europe.

Of greatest importance was the religious conflict between Catholics and Protestants. As a third force, Orthodox Russia participated in this contradiction, but its actions were limited to the neighboring Commonwealth and Sweden. By this time, the European countries had abandoned the idea of ​​a broad coalition against the threat of the Ottoman Empire with the involvement of Russia as an ally (this idea was periodically returned to later), therefore this knot of conflicts remained on the periphery.

The main conflict remained between Catholics and Protestants, because it included many contradictions as far back as the 16th century, and also continued to divide not only states, but the subjects of one monarch (for example, the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation), served as a reason for the disobedience of subjects to the monarch.

6. What are the main stages of the Thirty Years' War. What were the results of the Thirty Years' War?

Czech-Palatinate period (1618-1624);

Danish period (1625-1629);

Swedish period (1630-1635);

Franco-Swedish period (1635-1648).

The second part of the question is the same as the next question.

7. What were the results of the Thirty Years' War?

Confessional affiliation has almost ceased to be a factor in European politics;

Economics began to play a greater role than before in European politics along with dynastic interests;

The principle of the sovereignty of the state was finally established, also in the religious question;

There was a new system of international relations - Westphalian;

The Habsburgs retained most of their lands, but their position in Europe weakened;

France received a number of lands along the Rhine;

Sweden received land on the southern coast of the Baltic Sea;

Protestantism in the Czech Republic was completely destroyed, but Germany continued to be divided along confessional lines;

The lands of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, where most of the fighting took place, were completely devastated by the war, and the empire ceased to play an important role in the economy, politics, etc. for a long time.

8. What were the features of the Westphalian system of international relations? Are its principles still relevant today?

The Westphalian peace system was aimed at ending decades of conflict. Many of its mechanisms were aimed at minimizing confessional conflicts. Today, in a secular society, they are not relevant. But some of the principles enshrined then are still in effect, for example, the sovereignty of the government of an independent state.

The transition to absolutism - an order in which all
the fullness of power is concentrated in the hands of the monarch - there has been a
in the 16th century In most European countries.

Reasons for the transition to absolutism in England and France.

REASONS TO GO TO
TO ABSOLUTISM IN ENGLAND
AND FRANCE.

1. The Roman Catholic Church has lost its ability to influence
to the policies of the big powers.

2. The influence of the local feudal nobility was weakened by the fact that
that the heavy knightly cavalry supplied by her
has lost its meaning. The basis of the new armies were
professional troops. Their upkeep was expensive
was only within the means of the royal court.

3.
Feudal lords, merchants, industrialists are interested in a strong
central government to capture new lands and markets.

4.
The trade and business elite began to play more
significant role in the economic sphere. She demanded:
the abolition of customs duties and the introduction of additional
trade-damaging taxes.
carrying out a mercantilist policy (taking measures to
protection of the internal market)
monopolies (exclusive rights to trade in certain
other goods)

The theory of mercantilism XVI - XVII centuries. William Stafford and Thomas Man

THE THEORY OF MERCANTILISM
XVI - XVII centuries.
W I L Y M S T A F O R D I T O M A S M E N
first political economy
argued that for the prosperity of the state
it is necessary to constantly increase its finances:
buy as low as possible, sell as high as possible

The rise of absolutism

FORMATION
ABSOLUTISM
in England and France

Higher officials
rank, responsible
before the king
Dealt with affairs
high treason and
rooted out opposition
local feudal nobility

French
King
(Francis I)
Large
royal
advice
General
states
Never called

English
King
(Henry VII)
Parliament
Have not played in the life of the country
as significant as
before the role
Royal
yard
Influenced the composition
parliament and
the laws they pass

religious wars
(1562-1594)
between Catholics
feudal
know
Absolutism

religious wars

RELIGIOUS WARS
Between Catholics, supporters of the Counter-Reformation, and
Calvinists (Huguenots)
Bartholomew's Night - a massacre perpetrated by Catholics in
Paris, when about 2 thousand Hugents died
Formation of the Huguenot Confederation and the Catholic
league almost led to the split of France. Only accepted in
In 1598, the Edict of Nantes guaranteed the protection of the rights and
Catholics and Protestants.

Elizabeth I
Mary Stuart
(Queen of Scotland)
Philip II
(King of Spain)

Exacerbation of contradictions in Europe at the beginning of the XVII century.

EXAMINATION OF CONTRADICTIONS IN
E B R O P E V A L E X V I I C.
The end of the 16th-beginning of the 17th century were marked
exacerbation of contradictions between
leading European countries.
The first group of contradictions
led to the fight for
hegemony (dominance) in the European
continent to which they aspired
the Habsburg dynasty.

The second group of contradictions was generated by the conflict between
Catholic Poland, Protestant Sweden and Orthodox
Russia.
The third, most important group of contradictions was generated by
religious conflicts. With the development of the Counter-Reformation
the religious peace concluded in the empire in 1555 began to be violated.
Supported by the Habsburgs in many imperial cities and counties
power passed to the Catholics, who began to persecute the Protestants.

Completion

COMPLETION
Conflict between German Catholic and
Protestant princes in 1608 caused a split in
Reichstag. The Protestant lands created their union, the Evangelical Union. The Catholics formed
Catholic League.

Thirty Years' War (1618-1648)

THIRTS ATILE
WAR(1618-1648)
In 1618 the Emperor
Holy Roman Empire
German nation Ferdinand II
Habsburg abolished privileges,
used
Protestants in the Czech Republic. It has become
the cause of the uprising in the Czech Republic and
cause for war between her and
empire.

The course of the war.

PROGRESS OF WAR.
In 1625 Protestant Denmark entered the Habsburg War. Danish king
Christian IV feared that the wave of the Counter-Reformation would reach his lands.
The Catholic League fielded a 100,000-strong mercenary army led by
talented commander Albercht Wallenstein.
In 1629, Denmark was defeated and withdrew from the war.
The sharp rise of the Habsburgs alarmed the French. They convinced the Swedish
King Gustav II to make peace with Poland and provided him with subsidies for
waging war in Germany.
1630-1635 entered the history of the war as a Swedish period. swedish army
defeated the troops of the league and the emperor. Then she invaded Bavaria,
one of the strongholds of Catholicism in Germany.

The final stage of the war was the most destructive.
The troops of the opposing coalitions alternately devastated
German lands whose population during the war years
decreased by 60-75%, about 15 million people died. From
2.5 inhabitants of the Czech Republic, about 700 thousand people survived.

Outcomes of the war and withdrawal

RESULTS OF THE WAR AND CONCLUSION
The main result of the Thirty Years' War was a sharp
weakening the influence of religious factors on life
states of Europe. Their foreign policy is now
based on economic, dynastic and
political interests. The Westphalian system was formed
international relations, which was based on
principle of state sovereignty.

The decisive role in European foreign policy belonged to five states; France, England, Russia, Austria and Prussia. The main sphere of struggle between these powers is the fragmented Italy and Germany, Poland and the countries of the Balkan Peninsula, which were under the rule of Turkey.

During the XVIII century. the main conflicts between the European powers were the struggle of England and France for maritime and colonial hegemony, Austria and Prussia - for predominance in Germany, Russia - for access to the Baltic and Black Seas, which confronted it primarily with Sweden and the Ottoman Empire.

North War. Even in the XVI-XVII centuries. Russia tried to take control of the Baltic coast. Its main opponent was Sweden, whose territory included Livonia, Finland and Estonia, as well as the former Russian possessions - the Izhora lands and Karelia. Preparing for war, Peter I in 1699 concluded an alliance with Denmark, Saxony and Poland, and in 1700 signed a truce with Turkey and declared war on Sweden. In 1700, the Northern War began, which lasted until 1721.

Peter I moved the 35,000th army to the Swedish fortress of Narva, but its siege dragged on. The Swedish army was led by King Charles XII (1697-1718), a young and skillful commander. In November 1700, the Russian army was defeated near Narva. Charles XII, believing that Russia was finished, moved to Poland to defeat Russia's ally, the Saxon elector and, simultaneously from 1697, the Polish king Augustus II (1670-1733).

However, Peter I did not accept defeat and began to reorganize the army. Since 1702, the military initiative passed into the hands of Peter I. By the spring of 1703, the Russian army had liberated the entire basin of the river. Neva and went to the shores of the Baltic Sea.

At this time, the Swedes captured Warsaw and Krakow. In 1704, the Polish Sejm deposed August II and proclaimed Stanisław I Leszczynski (1677-1766) king. In 1704-1706. the Swedes inflicted a number of defeats on the Saxon, Polish and Russian troops and forced Poland out of the war (Treaty of Altranstadt 1706).

Russia was left alone with Sweden, the search for allies did not lead to anything. The Swedes made an attempt to recapture the Izhora lands, but failed. The main forces of Charles XII concentrated in Ukraine, he intended to move them to Moscow. In April 1709 the Swedes laid siege to Poltava. On June 27 (July 8) the Battle of Poltava took place. The Swedish army was defeated.

Charles XII fled to Turkey with the remnants of his army. There was a turning point in the war. The Northern Alliance was renewed, to which Prussia joined. On March 31, 1710, Russia and Sweden signed in The Hague an obligation not to conduct hostilities in Swedish possessions in Germany, England and Holland insisted on this. In the same year, Livonia and Estonia were occupied, Russian troops captured Vyborg, Kexholm and Vilmanstrand - the exit from the Gulf of Finland was free.

In 1712-1714. Russia's allies, with its support, won a number of victories in the European theater of operations. In 1713-1714. Russia occupied part of Finland. On July 27 (August 7), 1714, the Russian galley fleet defeated the Swedish one at Cape Gangut. On land, the Russian army reached Lulea.

In 1718 Charles XII died in Norway. In 1719, Russia transferred military operations to the territory of Sweden, whose human and financial resources were exhausted. In January 1720, Sweden concluded an alliance with England and peace with Prussia, and in June with Denmark. In May 1720, an English squadron entered the Baltic Sea, but its attempts to attack Revel were unsuccessful. In 1720, the Russian fleet won a victory near Grengam Island. On August 30 (September 10), a peace treaty with Sweden was signed in Nystadt.

As a result of the military victory, Russia gained access to the Baltic Sea and thus solved one of the most important tasks of its foreign policy. On October 11 (October 22), 1721, the Senate and the Holy Synod confer on Peter I the titles of "Father of the Fatherland, Emperor of All Russia" and "Great", and Russia becomes an empire.

Between the "Glorious English" of 1688 and the Great French Revolution, about 35 years fall on the wars between France and England. War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), War of the Polish Succession (1733-1738), War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), Seven Years' War (1756-1763). Moreover, other states were drawn into the orbit of these wars.

• Succession Wars
• Seven Years' War
• Russian-Turkish war 1768-1774
• Foreign policy of Catherine II in the 80s.

In October 1813, the forces of the new anti-French coalition (Russia, Great Britain, Prussia, Austria, Sweden, Spain and Portugal) defeated the French army in the Battle of the Nations near Leipzig. In March 1814, coalition troops entered Paris.

Louis XVIII, the brother of the executed king, was placed on the French throne. Napoleon retained the title of emperor, but was forced to sign an act of renunciation and go into exile on the island of Elba (see lesson). The Congress of Vienna was convened to discuss and create a new post-war order in Europe.

Events

May 1814. - Russia, England, Spain, Prussia, Portugal signed a peace treaty with France. Under this treaty, France was deprived of all the territories conquered during the years of revolutionary wars.

September 1814 - June 1815. - Congress of Vienna. The first diplomatic congress in world history met in Vienna. Almost all European states took part in it. Representatives of five powers had the greatest influence at the congress: Russia, Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and France.

Congress tasks:

1) return the pre-revolutionary borders of France, restore the Bourbon dynasty in France;

2) to carry out the territorial reorganization of Europe and the colonies;

3) take measures to prevent new revolutions and conflicts in Europe.

Results of the Congress of Vienna:

• Russia ceded most of the Duchy of Warsaw.
• Prussia received the Rhineland, Westphalia, and western Polish lands.
• Austria received Lombardy and Venice.
• Great Britain received the island of Malta, the island of Ceylon, the Cape in southern Africa.
• The German Union was created from 39 states (it included, among others, Austria and Prussia).
• The secular power of the pope over the Roman region was restored.
• At the congress, a whole system of alliances and agreements was adopted, which were designed to restrain the aggression of individual states. Thus, a legal (legitimate) order based on a system of universally recognized international treaties has developed.

1815. - The Holy Alliance was concluded between Russia, Austria and Prussia. Later, this treaty was signed by almost all the rulers of European states.

The treaty was intended to guarantee respect for the European borders adopted at the Congress of Vienna. The Union was aimed at preventing wars and revolutions in Europe, as well as protecting monarchical and religious values.

Members

Clemens Metternich - Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria, Chancellor from 1821 to 1848. He was chairman of the Congress of Vienna.

Alexander I- Russian emperor.

Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord - French politician and statesman. He headed the French delegation at the Congress of Vienna.

Louis XVIII- French king of the Bourbon dynasty.

Alphonse de Lamartine- French politician, poet, historian.

Conclusion

The Congress laid the foundations for the Vienna System of International Relations. One of its features is the desire for a peaceful settlement of international problems. The Vienna system began to collapse in the middle of the 19th century.

Among the reasons for the collapse of the Vienna system:

• Rise of national movements. The desire to revise the borders in accordance with the rights and interests of nations. The emergence of supporters of an independent foreign policy that would defend national interests.
• The aggravation of the Eastern Question and the beginning of the Crimean War (see lesson). Three great powers (Russia, France, Great Britain), whose cooperation within the framework of the Vienna system ensured peace, began to fight against each other.
• Revolutions in Europe 1848-1849 In the manifesto of A. de Lamartine, the treaties of 1815 were declared null and void.

The international political development of Europe in the last two decades demonstrates a very stable dynamics, both of an intra-regional nature and of the system of international relations as a whole. Moreover, European development leads to an adjustment of the very structure of the modern world system.
The dynamics of European political and economic processes, due to a number of circumstances, which primarily include the maximum maturity of the European system and most of its regional and subregional components, is not momentary, but strategic.
The interconnected logic of various trends in European development has been clearly traced since the very beginning of the 1990s, where the Charter of Paris for a New Europe can be taken as a conditional starting point.
The stage of European development that began two decades ago organically accumulated the changes that took place in several of the most important dimensions of the continental order. The evolution of these dimensions, which ultimately led to the overcoming of their original characteristics, is the essence of the dynamics of the European system.
Yalta-Potsdam, or historical and legal dimension. It is in the geographical areas and functional areas of the greatest localization of the decisions of Yalta and Potsdam that the most significant changes have taken place over the past twenty years. Breakdown of "border" agreements as a result of the unification of Germany, the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia; the erosion of the already decorative phenomenon of European neutrality associated with the early post-war period; the beginning of convergence, and then the self-liquidation of one of the two socio-economic systems - all this led to the marginalization of the original Yalta-Potsdam dimension already by the beginning of the 1990s.
Let us make the reservation that the Yalta-Potsdam dimension brought at least three elements to the treasury of European politics, which are preserved to this day. They are often understood as those values ​​that Russia allegedly does not share, although, surprisingly, it took an active part in their formation.
The first is the inevitability of punishing the military aggressor, including through positive collusion of the most powerful participants in the system, and the rejection of large-scale military operations in Europe. That is why the bombings of Belgrade or the events of 2008 in Transcaucasia caused such a serious outcry.
Second, Yalta gave birth to Helsinki and the pan-European process, one of the key elements of which was the voluntary consent of the former winners, who had reached the dead end of the bipolar confrontation, to democratize the system of multilateral relations in Europe. Democracy, insofar as it is possible, outside the nation-state has become a characteristic feature of the European system. Many European institutions are representative in form and often in essence.
Thirdly, the international legal doctrine and the historical and political logic of the Yalta-Potsdam establishments became guarantors of stability even for those borders that they did not directly affect. This concerns, first of all, the state-territorial delimitation in the post-Soviet space, the borders between the former proto-sovereign formations that were part of the Soviet state.
The next background dimension at the time of the adoption of the Charter of Paris existed as one of the successful paradigms, but had a much greater variability of alternatives competing with it. We are talking about Western European (at that time) integration, which later became one of the central and even dominant areas of continental development. Compared to today, the then European Communities of twelve countries look like a geopolitical dwarf.
At the same time, it was the Communities that were the very phenomenon that emphasized the special identity of the European system in world economic relations. It was the existence of the EU that made possible the emergence of the phenomenon of centro-power relations in the Western world and pluralistic multipolarity in the post-confrontational world.
Over the past two decades, the European Union's political ambitions have transcended their original geographic and conceptual boundaries, thanks both to their own efforts and to the accommodating international context.
The third dimension of the European situation is connected with US policy in Europe and Euro-Atlantic relations, the core element of which was, and to some extent still is, NATO. The maturity of the European system, coupled with the more or less regular manifestations of the opposition of European partner-competitors; liquidation of the European theater as the main arena of potential military confrontation; involvement in new geographical and functional spheres of world politics and economics - all this reduced the role of the United States on the continent. This trend has strengthened in subsequent years. Deviations from it in the form of ad hoc interference in European affairs (attempts to Americanize the elites of small post-socialist countries, Kosovo, “color revolutions”, missile defense) cannot be underestimated. However, they cannot be compared with the level of extremely close and attentive US guardianship over European politics, which was typical for several post-war European decades. Without putting an equal sign between the US and NATO, it can be stated that it is largely due to the change in US policy that the loss of a clear NATO identity and the permanent search for the Alliance's place in the modern world have become so obvious.
The institutional landscape of modern Europe, especially "big" Europe, which includes part of geographic Asia, is extremely mosaic, absorbs multidirectional trends, as well as causes many proposals for their systematization. One such proposal was the well-known Russian initiative on a new European security architecture.
In a series of European security institutions, the OSCE still occupies nominally the first place. This is partly a tribute to tradition, and partly the result of the activation of this direction, the manifestation of which was, first of all, the Corfu process and the summit in Astana. The OSCE faces two fundamental tasks. The first is internal consolidation. The second is an essential renewal of the content of traditional "baskets". Thus, if the humanitarian “basket” demonstrates enviable dynamics, then the problems falling into the first and second “baskets” run into the procedural and legal inefficiency of the OSCE and often the lack of political will of the leading players in the European system.
At the same time, such issues as conflict regulation, peace building, and the problems of the emergence of new state or quasi-state entities in the post-Soviet space are connected with these areas.
The third "basket" to a large extent contains the potential associated with issues of economic security, its energy segment. In other words, the OSCE, if desired, can turn from an organization with de facto curtailed functions into a full-fledged dialogue mechanism on the widest range of subjects.
Regardless of subjective desires, it is the OSCE that remains the structure of the most complete European participation.
The Atlantic dimension of European politics, of which NATO is a symbol, has been demonstrating ever greater pragmatism and a tendency to self-criticism in the past two years in relation to extensive expansion, including to the “new Eastern Europe”. This was also confirmed by the adoption of the Alliance's new strategic concept and the Russia-NATO summit in Lisbon.
In the meantime, the application for a de facto expansion of NATO's responsibility is facing an extremely difficult situation in Afghanistan and throughout the political arena at the junction of Central and South Asia. NATO's activity in other segments of the "big" Middle East is limited by the difference in approaches and the real interest of the Alliance member countries. The complexes and prejudices that have accumulated over decades hinder the Alliance's interaction both with Russia and with other significant regional actors, including institutional ones - the SCO, the CSTO.
Improving the overall political climate so far has little added value in the practical dimension of relations between Russia and the Alliance. Obvious, but constantly put aside "for later" topics here are the issues of the European missile defense segment, conventional weapons and the armed forces, an agreed understanding of military-strategic threats, the legal registration of the mutual interests of the Alliance and post-Soviet security structures.
The logic of the development of the European Union, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty position the EU in a completely different way in the new security architecture. Already, the activities of the EU almost completely fill the niche of "soft security". The activity of the EU provokes discussions about security in the Common Neighborhood/Eastern Partnership area and the nature of relations with Russia.
It is in relations with the European Union that Russia and its CIS neighbors may be able to find consensus on the energy aspects of security, on the movement of citizens, and issues related to the reliability and, at the same time, transparency of borders will be resolved. Russia's accession to the WTO actually brought our country closer to the scenario of the economic functioning of the European Union.
Most EU states do not feel the need to abandon a system of stability and security based solely on the growing potential of the European Union in the field of foreign policy and defense and on the traditional resources of NATO. However, it must be remembered that modern "big" Europe is wider than the western part of the continent. In case of dissatisfaction of countries, for one reason or another, not associated with the EU and NATO, with the parameters of the current situation, it is necessary to look for options for mutual adaptation of interests and institutions.
The European security system, which does not have a comprehensive character, becomes a palliative, which tends to provoke political tension when trying to solve real problems with its help both in its own geographical area and in neighboring regions - in the Greater Middle East or South Asia.
It is in this regard that the Europeans are faced with the task of a kind of gathering, creating an "intermodal" scheme of institutions of a large European space. This scheme should include various regional and sub-regional structures (from the "classic" European and Euro-Atlantic structures - the EU, the CoE, NATO to the "big" CIS, the EurAsEC/Customs Union, the CSTO) with the necessary support for niche structures such as the BSEC, the CBSS, long-term contact mechanisms.
Obviously, one can only dream of complete institutional harmony, but some revision and coordination of actions, at least, can lead to a reduction in the cross-waste of time, diplomatic and material resources.
The understanding of European stability and security has traditionally included issues of military security, control over arms and armed forces. It seems to many that this is a problem of yesterday. But an unresolved problem has a chance to "shoot" at the most inopportune moment. This is precisely the situation with the CFE Treaty. Paradoxically, on a continent that is still the most militarized, and at the level of the highest technological standards, for more than a decade there have been no modern rules for regulating military activities.
Additional elements of the stability of the European system are various stable, both bilateral and multilateral configurations of interstate relations. These include traditional axes: Moscow-Paris, Moscow-Berlin, Moscow-Rome. Apparently, the dialogue channel Moscow-Warsaw was starting to work. The Franco-German tandem and the slightly less stable Franco-British tandem are traditional, which have generated a significant number of initiatives in the field of European integration, EU foreign policy and security. Once having its own integration prospects, the Visegrad Group (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary) has become a mechanism for coordinating the interests of the CEE countries, and the Weimar Triangle (Poland, Germany, France) helps to coordinate the positions of the Franco-German motor of Europe with the largest country in Eastern Europe.