In the summer of 1943, one of the most grandiose and important battles of the Great Patriotic War took place - the Battle of Kursk. The Nazis' dream of revenge for Stalingrad, for the defeat near Moscow, resulted in one of the most key battles, on which the outcome of the war depended.

Total mobilization - selected generals, the best soldiers and officers, the latest weapons, guns, tanks, planes - such was the order of Adolf Hitler - to prepare for the most important battle and not just win, but do it spectacularly, indicatively, avenging all the previous lost battles . A matter of prestige.

(In addition, it was precisely as a result of the successful Operation Citadel that Hitler assumed the opportunity to negotiate a truce from the Soviet side. German generals repeatedly stated this.)

It was for the Battle of Kursk that the Germans prepared a military gift for Soviet military designers - a powerful and invulnerable tank "Tiger", which there was simply nothing to resist. Its impenetrable armor was too tough for Soviet-designed anti-tank guns, and new anti-tank guns had not yet been developed. During the meetings with Stalin, Marshal of Artillery Voronov said literally the following: "We do not have guns capable of successfully fighting these tanks"

The Battle of Kursk began on July 5, and ended on August 23, 1943. Every year on August 23, Russia celebrates the "Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of the Victory of the Soviet Troops in the Battle of Kursk."

Moiarussia has collected the most interesting facts about this great confrontation:

Operation Citadel

In April 1943, Hitler approved a military operation code-named Zitadelle ("Citadel"). For its implementation, a total of 50 divisions were involved, including 16 tank and motorized; more than 900 thousand German soldiers, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, 2 thousand 245 tanks and assault guns, 1 thousand 781 aircraft. The location of the operation is the Kursk salient.

German sources wrote: “The Kursk ledge seemed to be a particularly suitable place for delivering such a blow. As a result of the simultaneous offensive of German troops from the north and south, a powerful grouping of Russian troops will be cut off. They also hoped to defeat those operational reserves that the enemy would bring into battle. In addition, the elimination of this ledge would significantly shorten the front line ... True, even then someone claimed that the enemy was expecting the German offensive in this area and ... that therefore there was a danger of losing more of their forces than inflicting losses on the Russians ... However, it was impossible to convince Hitler , and he believed that the operation "Citadel" would succeed if it was undertaken soon"

The Germans were preparing for the Battle of Kursk for a long time. The start of it was postponed twice: either the guns were not ready, or the new tanks were not delivered, or the new aircraft did not have time to pass the tests. On top of that, Hitler's fears that Italy was about to withdraw from the war. Convinced that Mussolini was not going to give up, Hitler decided to stick to the original plan. Fanatic Hitler believed that if you strike at the place where the Red Army was strongest and crush the enemy in this particular battle, then

"The victory at Kursk," he declared, would strike the imagination of the whole world.

Hitler knew that it was here, on the Kursk ledge, that the Soviet troops numbered more than 1.9 million people, more than 26 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, about 2.9 thousand aircraft. He knew that he would lose this battle by the number of soldiers and equipment involved in the operation, but thanks to an ambitious strategically correct plan developed and the latest weapons, which, according to the assurances of the military specialists of the Soviet army, would be difficult to resist, this numerical superiority would be absolutely vulnerable and useless.

Meanwhile, the Soviet command did not waste time in vain. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command considered two options: attack first or wait? The first option was promoted by the commander of the Voronezh Front Nikolai Vatutin. The commander of the Central Front insisted on the second . Despite Stalin's initial support for Vatutin's plan, Rokossovsky's safer plan was approved - "wait, wear down and go on the counteroffensive." Rokossovsky was supported by the majority of the military command and, first of all, by Zhukov.

However, later Stalin doubted the correctness of the decision - the Germans were too passive, who, as mentioned above, had already postponed their offensive twice.

(Photo by: Sovfoto/UIG via Getty Images)

Having waited for the latest technology - the tanks "Tigers" and "Panthers", the Germans on the night of July 5, 1943 began their offensive.

That same night, Rokossovsky had a telephone conversation with Stalin:

- Comrade Stalin! The Germans are on the offensive!

- What are you happy about? - asked the surprised leader.

“Now victory will be ours, Comrade Stalin!” - answered the commander.

Rokossovsky was not mistaken.

Agent Werther

On April 12, 1943, three days before Hitler approved Operation Citadel, an exact text of Directive No. 6 “On the plan for Operation Citadel” translated from German by the German High Command appeared on Stalin’s desk, signed by all services of the Wehrmacht. The only thing that was not on the document was the visas of Hitler himself. He put it in three days after the Soviet leader got acquainted with it. The Fuhrer, of course, did not know about this.

Nothing is known about the person who obtained this document for the Soviet command, except for his code name - "Werther". Various researchers put forward different versions of who "Werther" really was - some believe that Hitler's personal photographer was a Soviet agent.

Agent "Werther" (German: Werther) - the code name of the alleged Soviet agent in the leadership of the Wehrmacht or even in the top of the Third Reich during the Second World War, one of the prototypes of Stirlitz. For all the time he worked for Soviet intelligence, he did not allow a single misfire. It was considered the most reliable source in wartime.

Hitler's personal translator, Paul Karel, wrote about him in his book: “The heads of Soviet intelligence addressed the Swiss residency as if they were asking for information in some kind of information bureau. And they got everything they were interested in. Even a superficial analysis of radio interception data shows that in all phases of the war in Russia, the agents of the Soviet General Staff worked first-class. Part of the transmitted information could only be obtained from the highest German military circles.

- it seems that the Soviet agents in Geneva and Lausanne were dictated to the key directly from the Fuhrer's Headquarters.

Biggest tank battle

"Kursk Bulge": Tank T-34 against the "Tigers" and "Panthers"

The key moment of the Battle of Kursk is considered to be the largest tank battle in the history of the war near the village of Prokhorovka, which began on July 12.

Surprisingly, this large-scale clash of armored vehicles of the warring parties to this day causes fierce disputes among historians.

Classical Soviet historiography reported 800 tanks for the Red Army and 700 for the Wehrmacht. Modern historians tend to increase the number of Soviet tanks and decrease the number of German ones.

None of the parties managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the Germans failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of the Soviet troops and enter the operational space, and the Soviet troops failed to surround the enemy grouping.

Based on the memoirs of German generals (E. von Manstein, G. Guderian, F. von Mellenthin and others), about 700 Soviet tanks took part in the battle (some of them probably fell behind on the march - “on paper” the army had more than a thousand vehicles ), of which about 270 were shot down (meaning only the morning battle on July 12).

Also preserved is the version of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, son of Joachim von Ribbentrop, commander of a tank company, a direct participant in the battle:

According to the published memoirs of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, Operation Citadel pursued not strategic, but purely operational goals: to cut off the Kursk salient, destroy the Russian troops involved in it, and straighten the front. Hitler hoped to achieve military success during the front-line operation in order to try to enter into negotiations with the Russians on a truce.

In his memoirs, Ribbentrop gives a detailed description of the disposition of the battle, its course and result:

“In the early morning of July 12, the Germans had to take Prokhorovka, an important point on the way to Kursk. However, suddenly, units of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army intervened in the course of the battle.

The unexpected attack on the deep-seated spearhead of the German offensive - by units of the 5th Guards Tank Army, deployed overnight - was undertaken by the Russian command in a completely incomprehensible way. The Russians inevitably had to go into their own anti-tank ditch, which was clearly shown even on the maps we captured.

The Russians drove, if they ever got that far at all, into their own anti-tank ditch, where they naturally became easy prey for our defenses. Burning diesel fuel spread a thick black fumes - Russian tanks were burning everywhere, partly colliding with each other, Russian infantrymen jumping between them, desperately trying to orient themselves and easily turning into a victim of our grenadiers and artillerymen, who also stood on this battlefield.

The attacking Russian tanks - there should have been more than a hundred of them - were completely destroyed.

As a result of the counterattack, by noon on July 12, the Germans "with surprisingly small losses" occupied "almost completely" their previous positions.

The Germans were stunned by the extravagance of the Russian command, which threw hundreds of tanks with armored infantrymen to certain death. This circumstance forced the German command to think deeply about the power of the Russian offensive.

“Stalin allegedly wanted to court-martial the commander of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army, General Rotmistrov, who attacked us. In our opinion, he had good reasons for this. Russian descriptions of the battle - "the grave of German tank weapons" - have nothing to do with reality. We, however, felt unmistakably that the offensive had run out of steam. We saw no chance for ourselves to continue the offensive against the superior forces of the enemy, unless significant reinforcements were given. However, there were none."

It is no coincidence that after the victory at Kursk, Army Commander Rotmistrov was not even awarded, as he did not justify the high hopes placed on him by the Headquarters.

One way or another, the Nazi tanks were stopped on the field near Prokhorovka, which actually meant the disruption of the plans for the German summer offensive.

It is believed that Hitler himself ordered the termination of the Citadel plan on July 13, when he learned that the Western allies of the USSR had landed in Sicily on July 10, and the Italians had failed to defend Sicily during the fighting and it became necessary to send German reinforcements to Italy.

"Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev"

Diorama dedicated to the Battle of Kursk. Author oleg95

When they talk about the Battle of Kursk, they often mention Operation Citadel - the German offensive plan. Meanwhile, after the onslaught of the Wehrmacht was repulsed, the Soviet troops carried out their two offensive operations, which ended in brilliant successes. The names of these operations are much less known than Citadel.

On July 12, 1943, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. Three days later, the Central Front began its offensive. This operation was codenamed "Kutuzov". During it, a major defeat was inflicted on the German Army Group Center, whose retreat was stopped only on August 18 at the Hagen defensive line east of Bryansk. Thanks to Kutuzov, the cities of Karachev, Zhizdra, Mtsensk, Bolkhov were liberated, and on the morning of August 5, 1943, Soviet troops entered Oryol.

On August 3, 1943, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began an offensive operation. "Rumyantsev", named after another Russian commander. On August 5, Soviet troops captured Belgorod and then proceeded to liberate the territory of the Left-Bank Ukraine. During the 20-day operation, they defeated the opposing forces of the Nazis and went to Kharkov. On August 23, 1943, at 2 am, the troops of the Steppe Front launched a night assault on the city, which ended in success by dawn.

"Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev" became the reason for the first victorious salute during the war years - on August 5, 1943, it was held in Moscow to commemorate the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

Maresyev's feat

Maresyev (second from right) on the set of a film about himself. The painting "The Tale of a Real Man." Photo: Kommersant

The book of the writer Boris Polevoy "The Tale of a Real Man", which was based on the life of a real military pilot Alexei Maresyev, was known to almost everyone in the Soviet Union.

But not everyone knows that the glory of Maresyev, who returned to combat aviation after the amputation of both legs, was born precisely during the Battle of Kursk.

Senior Lieutenant Maresyev, who arrived at the 63rd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment on the eve of the Battle of Kursk, faced distrust. The pilots did not want to fly with him in pairs, fearing that the pilot with prostheses would not be able to cope in difficult times. The regiment commander did not let him into battle either.

Squadron commander Alexander Chislov took him to his pair. Maresyev coped with the task, and in the midst of the fighting on the Kursk Bulge he made sorties on an equal basis with everyone else.

On July 20, 1943, during a battle with superior enemy forces, Alexei Maresyev saved the lives of two of his comrades and personally destroyed two enemy Focke-Wulf 190 fighters.

This story immediately became known all over the front, after which the writer Boris Polevoy appeared in the regiment, immortalizing the name of the hero in his book. On August 24, 1943, Maresyev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Interestingly, during his participation in the battles, fighter pilot Alexei Maresyev personally shot down 11 enemy aircraft: four before being wounded and seven after returning to service after amputation of both legs.

Battle of Kursk - losses of the parties

The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including seven tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The losses of the Soviet troops surpassed the German ones - they amounted to 863 thousand people, including 254 thousand irretrievable. Near Kursk, the Red Army lost about six thousand tanks.

After the Battle of Kursk, the balance of forces on the front changed dramatically in favor of the Red Army, which provided it with favorable conditions for launching a general strategic offensive.

In memory of the heroic victory of Soviet soldiers in this battle and in memory of the dead, the Day of Military Glory was established in Russia, and in Kursk there is the Kursk Bulge Memorial Complex, dedicated to one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War.

Memorial complex "Kursk Bulge"

Hitler's revenge did not take place. The last attempt to sit down at the negotiating table was destroyed.

August 23, 1943 is rightfully considered one of the most significant days in the Great Patriotic War. After the defeat in this battle, the German army began one of the longest and longest retreat routes on all fronts. The outcome of the war was a foregone conclusion.

As a result of the victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, the greatness and stamina of the Soviet soldier was demonstrated to the whole world. Our allies have no doubts and hesitations about the right choice of side in this war. And the thought that let the Russians and the Germans destroy each other, and we look at it from the side faded into the background. The foresight and foresight of our allies prompted them to intensify their support for the Soviet Union. Otherwise, the winner will be only one state, which at the end of the war will get vast territories. However, that's another story...

Found an error? Select it and left click Ctrl+Enter.

Thousands of books have been written about this battle, but many facts are still little known to a wide audience. Russian historian and writer, author of more than 40 publications on the history of the Battle of Kursk and the Battle of Prokhorov Valery Zamulin recalls the heroic and victorious battle in the Black Earth region.

The article is based on the material of the program "The Price of Victory" of the radio station "Echo of Moscow". The broadcast was conducted by Vitaly Dymarsky and Dmitry Zakharov. You can read and listen to the original interview in full here.

After the encirclement of the Paulus group and its dismemberment, the success at Stalingrad was deafening. After February 2, a number of offensive operations were carried out. In particular, the Kharkov offensive operation, as a result of which the Soviet troops captured a significant territory. But then the situation changed dramatically. In the Kramatorsk area, a group of tank divisions, some of which were transferred from France, including two SS divisions - Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler and Das Reich - the Germans launched a crushing counterattack. That is, the Kharkov offensive operation turned into a defensive one. I must say that this battle came at a high cost to us.

After the German troops occupied Kharkov, Belgorod and adjacent territories, the well-known Kursk ledge was formed in the south. Around March 25, 1943, the front line finally stabilized in this sector. Stabilization occurred due to the introduction of two tank corps: the 2nd Guards and the 3rd "Stalingrad", as well as the operational transfer at the request of Zhukov from the Stalingrad of the 21st Army of General Chistyakov and the 64th Army of General Shumilov (hereinafter it is 6 -I and 7th Guards armies). In addition, by the end of March, mud had set in, which, of course, helped our troops to hold the line at that moment, because the equipment was very bogged down and it was simply impossible to continue the offensive.

Thus, given that Operation Citadel began on July 5, then from March 25 to July 5, that is, for three and a half months, preparations were underway for summer operations. The front stabilized, and in fact a certain balance was maintained, balance, without sharp, as they say, movements on both sides.

The Stalingrad operation cost the Germans the 6th Army of Paulus and himself

Germany suffered a colossal defeat at Stalingrad, and most importantly, the first such deafening defeat, so the political leadership had an important task to consolidate its bloc, because Germany's allies began to think that Germany was not so invincible; and what will happen if suddenly another Stalingrad? Therefore, Hitler needed after a rather victorious offensive in Ukraine in March 1943, when Kharkov was recaptured, Belgorod was taken, the territory was captured, another, perhaps small, but impressive victory.

No, it's not small though. If Operation Citadel were successful, which the German command naturally expected, then two fronts would be in the ring - Central and Voronezh.

Many German military leaders took part in the development and implementation of Operation Citadel. In particular, General Manstein, who initially proposed a completely different plan: to cede the Donbass to the advancing Soviet troops so that they go there, and then, with a blow from above, from the north, press them, throw them into the sea (there were the Azov and Black Seas in the lower part).

But Hitler did not accept this plan for two reasons. First, he said that Germany could not make territorial concessions now, after Stalingrad. And, secondly, the Donetsk basin, which the Germans needed not so much from a psychological point of view, but from a raw material point of view, as an energy base. Manstein's plan was rejected, and the forces of the German General Staff concentrated on the development of Operation Citadel to eliminate the Kursk salient.

The fact is that from the Kursk ledge it was convenient to deliver flank strikes to our troops, so the area for the start of the main summer offensive was precisely determined. However, the task formation process and the preparation process took a long time because there were disputes. For example, Model spoke and persuaded Hitler not to start this operation because of the understaffing of both manpower and technical. And, by the way, the second date of the Citadel was set for June 10 (the first date was for May 3-5). And already from June 10, it was moved even further - to July 5.

Here, again, we must return to the myth that only "Tigers" and "Panthers" were involved in the Kursk Bulge. In fact, this was not the case, because these machines began to be produced in a relatively large series precisely in 1943, and Hitler insisted that about 200 Tigers and 200 Panthers be sent to the Kursk direction. However, this entire 400-machine grouping was not involved, because, like any new technique, both those and other tanks suffered from “childhood illnesses”. As Manstein and Guderian noted, the Tigers quite often caught fire in their carburetors, the Panthers had problems with the transmission, and therefore no more than 50 vehicles of both types were actually used in the fighting during the Kursk operation. God forbid, the remaining 150 of each type would have been brought into battle - the consequences could have been much more deplorable.

It is important to understand here that the German command initially planned the Belgorod grouping, that is, Army Group South, which was headed by Manstein, as the main one - it was supposed to solve the main task. The blow of the 9th Army of the Model was, as it were, auxiliary. Manstein had to go 147 kilometers before joining the troops of the Model, so the main forces, including tank and motorized divisions, were concentrated near Belgorod.

The first offensive in May - Manstein saw (reconnaissance reports, photography) how quickly the Red Army, the Voronezh Front, in particular, was strengthening its positions, and understood that his troops would not be able to reach Kursk. With these thoughts, he first arrived at Bogodukhov, at the command post of the 4th Panzer Army near Goth. What for? The fact is that Goth wrote a letter - there was still an attempt to develop the operation "Panther" (as a continuation in case of success of the "Citadel"). So, in particular, Goth opposed this operation. He believed that the main thing was not to rush to Kursk, but to destroy, as he assumed, about 10 tank mechanized corps, which the Russians had already prepared. That is, destroy mobile reserves.

If all this colossus moves on the Army Group "South", then, as they say, it will not show enough. That's it for this it was necessary to plan at least the first stage of the "Citadel". On May 9-11 Goth and Manstein discussed this plan. And it was precisely at this meeting that the tasks of the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force were clearly defined, and the plan for the Prokhorov battle was also developed here.

It was near Prokhorovka that Manstein planned a tank battle, that is, the destruction of these mobile reserves. And after they are defeated, when an assessment of the state of the German troops is carried out, it will be possible to talk about an offensive.

In the area of ​​the Kursk ledge, both in the north and in the south, the Germans concentrated up to 70% of the armored vehicles available to them on the Eastern Front for Operation Citadel. It was assumed that it was these forces that would be able to ram the three most fortified lines of the Soviet defense and destroy, given the qualitative superiority of German armored vehicles at that time over our tanks, mobile reserves. After that, with a favorable set of circumstances, they will also be able to advance in the direction of Kursk.

For the battles near Prokhorovka, the SS corps, partly the 48th corps and part of the forces of the 3rd Panzer Corps, were planned. These three corps were supposed to crush the mobile reserves, which were supposed to approach the Prokhorovka area. Why in the Prokhorovka area? Because the area was favorable there. In other places it was simply impossible to deploy a significant number of tanks. This plan was largely implemented by the enemy. The only thing is that our defense forces did not calculate.

A few more words about the Germans. The fact is that they already had a seam situation in Africa. After the loss of Africa, it automatically followed that the British establish complete control over the Mediterranean Sea. Malta is an unsinkable aircraft carrier from which they hammer Sardinia first, Sicily, and thus prepare the possibility of landing in Italy, which was eventually carried out. That is, the Germans in other areas, too, everything was not thank God. Plus the vacillation of Hungary, Romania and other allies...

The planning of the summer military operations of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht began approximately at the same time: for the Germans - in February, for us - at the end of March, after the stabilization of the front line. The fact is that the holding of the enemy, who was advancing from Kharkov in the Belgorod region, and the organization of the defense were controlled by the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Zhukov. And after the stabilization of the front line, he was here, in the Belgorod region; together with Vasilevsky they discussed further plans. After that, he prepared a note in which he stated the point of view, which was developed jointly with the command of the Voronezh Front. (By the way, Vatutin became commander of the Voronezh Front on March 27, before that he commanded the South-Western Front. He replaced Golikov, who, by decision of the Headquarters, was removed from this post).

So, in early April, a note lay on Stalin's desk, which set out the basic principles for conducting hostilities in the south in the summer of 1943. On April 12, a meeting was held with the participation of Stalin, in which a proposal was approved to switch to a deliberate defense, to prepare troops and a defense in depth in case the enemy goes on the offensive. And the configuration of the front line in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge assumed a high probability of such a transition.

Despite local successes, the Nazi operation "Citadel" failed

Here we should return to the system of engineering structures, because until 1943, before the Battle of Kursk, the creation of such powerful defensive lines by the Red Army was not carried out. After all, the depth of these three defense lines was about 300 kilometers. That is, the Germans had to plow, ram, drill 300 kilometers of fortified areas. And these are not just trenches dug to their full height and fortified with boards, these are anti-tank ditches, gouges, this is the most powerful system of minefields made during the war for the first time; and each, in fact, the settlement in this territory also turned into a mini-fortress.

Neither the German nor our side have ever erected such a strong and saturated defensive line with engineering barriers and fortifications on the Eastern Front. The first three lanes were the most fortified: the main army lane, the second army lane and the third rear army lane - approximately to a depth of 50 kilometers. The fortifications were so powerful that two large, strong enemy groupings could not break through them for two weeks, despite the fact that, in general, the Soviet command did not guess the main direction of the German attack.

The fact is that in May fairly accurate data were received about the enemy’s plans for the summer: periodically they came from illegal agents from England and Germany. The headquarters of the supreme command knew about the plans of the German command, but for some reason it was determined that the Germans would inflict the main blow on the Central Front, on Rokossovsky. Therefore, Rokossovsky was additionally transferred significant artillery forces, an entire artillery corps, which Vatutin did not have. And this miscalculation, of course, influenced how the fighting developed in the south. Vatutin was forced to repulse the attacks of the enemy's main tank grouping with tanks, not having sufficient artillery to fight; in the north there were also tank divisions that were directly involved in the attack on the Central Front, but they dealt with Soviet artillery, and numerous ones at that.

But let's move smoothly to July 5, when, in fact, the event began. The canonical version is Ozerov's film "Liberation": the defector says that the Germans are concentrated here and there, a colossal artillery raid is being carried out, almost all Germans are killed, it is not clear who else is fighting there for a whole month. How was it really?

There really was a defector, and not one - there were several of them both in the north and in the south. In the south, in particular, on July 4, a soldier of the reconnaissance battalion from the 168th Infantry Division went over to our side. According to the plan of the command of the Voronezh and Central Fronts, in order to inflict maximum losses on the enemy prepared for the offensive, it was supposed to carry out two measures: firstly, to conduct a powerful artillery attack, and, secondly, to strike the aircraft of the 2nd, 16th and 17th air armies at the base airfield. Let's say about the air raid - it failed. And moreover, it had unfortunate consequences, since the time was not calculated.

As for the artillery attack, it was partially successful in the zone of the 6th Guards Army: the telephone communication lines were mostly disrupted. There were losses in both manpower and equipment, but insignificant.

Another thing is the 7th Guards Army, which took up defense along the eastern bank of the Donets. The Germans, respectively, on the right. Therefore, in order to launch an offensive, they needed to force the river. They pulled up significant forces and watercraft to certain settlements and sectors of the front, and previously built several crossings, hiding them under water. Soviet intelligence recorded this (engineer intelligence, by the way, worked very well), and artillery strikes were carried out precisely on these areas: on crossings and on settlements where these assault groups of the 3rd tank corps of Routh were concentrated. Therefore, the effectiveness of artillery preparation in the zone of the 7th Guards Army was much higher. Losses from it both in manpower and in technology, not to mention management and so on, were high. Several bridges were destroyed, which slowed down the pace of the offensive, and in some places paralyzed.

Already on July 5, Soviet troops began to split the enemy strike force, that is, they did not allow the 6th Panzer Division, Kempf's army group, to cover the right flank of Hausser's 2nd Panzer Corps. That is, the offensive of the main strike force and the auxiliary along divergent lines began. This forced the enemy to enlist additional forces to cover his flanks from the point of impact. Such a tactic was conceived by the command of the Voronezh Front and perfectly implemented.

Since we are talking about the Soviet command, many will agree that both Vatutin and Rokossovsky are famous people, but the latter has a reputation, perhaps, of a greater commander. Why? Some say that he fought better in the Battle of Kursk. But Vatutin, in general, did a lot, because he still fought with smaller forces, fewer numbers. Judging by the documents that are now open, it can be said with confidence that Nikolai Fedorovich very competently, very sensibly and skillfully planned his defensive operation, given that the main grouping, the most numerous, was advancing against his front (although it was expected from the north). And until the 9th, inclusive, when the situation turned around, when the Germans had already sent strike groups to the flanks to solve tactical problems, the troops of the Voronezh Front fought excellently, and management went, of course, very well. As for the next steps, the decisions of the front commander Vatutin were influenced by a number of subjective factors, including the role of the supreme commander.

Everyone remembers that Rotmistrov's tankers won a great victory on the tank field. However, before that, at the turn of the German attack, at the forefront, was the notorious Katukov, who, in general, took all the bitterness of the first blows upon himself. How did it happen? The fact is that the defense was built as follows: ahead, on the main line, were the troops of the 6th Guards Army, and it was assumed that the Germans, most likely, would strike along the Oboyan highway. And then they were supposed to be stopped by the tankers of the 1st Tank Army of Lieutenant General Mikhail Efimovich Katukov.

On the night of the 6th, they advanced to the second army line and almost in the morning took the main blow. By the middle of the day, Chistyakov's 6th Guards Army was divided into several parts, three divisions were dispersed, we suffered significant losses. And only thanks to the skill, skill and stamina of Mikhail Efimovich Katukov, the defense was held up to the 9th day inclusive.

Commander of the Voronezh Front, General of the Army N. F. Vatutin accepts the report of one of the unit commanders, 1943

It is known that after Stalingrad our army suffered huge losses, including among the officers. I wonder how these losses were replenished in a fairly short period by the summer of 1943? Vatutin received the Voronezh Front in a very deplorable state. A number of divisions numbered two, three, four thousand. Replenishment was due to the call of the local population, which came out of the occupied territory, marching companies, as well as due to the replenishment arrived from the Central Asian republics.

As for the command staff, its shortage in the spring of 1942 was made up by officers from the academies, from the rear units, and so on. And after the battles near Stalingrad, the situation with the command staff of the tactical level, especially the commanders of battalions and regiments, was catastrophic. As a result, on October 9, the well-known order to abolish the commissars, and a significant part of the political staff was sent to the troops. That is, everything that can be done was done.

The Battle of Kursk is considered by many to be the largest defensive operation of the Great Patriotic War. Is it so? At the first stage, no doubt. No matter how we evaluate the battle in the Chernozem region now, it was after August 23, 1943, when it ended, that our enemy, the German army, was no longer able to conduct a single major strategic offensive operation within the army group. He simply had nothing to do with it. In the south, the situation was as follows: the Voronezh Front was given the task of exhausting the enemy forces and driving out his tanks. During the defensive period, until July 23, they could not do this completely. The Germans sent a significant part of the repair fund to repair bases, which were located not far from the front line. And after the troops of the Voronezh Front went on the offensive on August 3, all these bases were captured. In particular, in Borisovka there was a repair base of the 10th tank brigade. There, the Germans blew up part of the Panthers, up to forty units, we captured part. And at the end of August, Germany was no longer able to replenish all the tank divisions on the Eastern Front. And this task of the second stage of the Battle of Kursk during the counteroffensive - to knock out the tanks - was solved.

The Battle of Kursk (Battle of the Kursk Bulge), which lasted from July 5 to August 23, 1943, is one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into three parts: the Kursk defensive operation (July 5-23); Orel (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive.

During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counteroffensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a ledge up to 150 km deep and up to 200 km wide was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front, facing the west (the so-called "Kursk Bulge"). The German command decided to conduct a strategic operation on the Kursk salient. For this, a military operation was developed and approved in April 1943 under the code name "Citadel". Having information about the preparation of the Nazi troops for the offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go on the defensive on the Kursk Bulge and, during the defensive battle, bleed the enemy’s strike groups and thereby create favorable conditions for the transition of the Soviet troops to a counteroffensive, and then to a general strategic offensive. .

To carry out Operation Citadel, the German command concentrated 50 divisions in the area, including 18 tank and motorized divisions. The enemy grouping, according to Soviet sources, consisted of about 900 thousand people, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2.7 thousand tanks and more than 2 thousand aircraft. Air support for the German troops was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th air fleets.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command had created a grouping (Central and Voronezh fronts), which had more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2650 aircraft. The troops of the Central Front (commander - General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the northern front of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin) - the southern front. The troops that occupied the ledge relied on the Steppe Front as part of the rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized and 3 cavalry corps (commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev). The fronts were coordinated by representatives of the Headquarters Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.

On July 5, 1943, according to the plan of Operation Citadel, German strike groups launched an attack on Kursk from the Orel and Belgorod regions. From the side of Orel, a grouping under the command of Field Marshal Günther Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) was advancing, from Belgorod, a grouping under the command of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (Task Force Kempf of the Army Group South).

The task of repelling the offensive from the side of Orel was entrusted to the troops of the Central Front, from the side of Belgorod - the Voronezh Front.

On July 12, in the area of ​​​​the Prokhorovka railway station, 56 kilometers north of Belgorod, the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place - a battle between the advancing enemy tank group (Task Force Kempf) and the Soviet troops inflicting a counterattack. On both sides, up to 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in the battle. The fierce battle lasted all day, by the evening the tank crews, together with the infantry, fought hand to hand. In one day, the enemy lost about 10 thousand people and 400 tanks and was forced to go on the defensive.

On the same day, the troops of the Bryansk, Central and left wing of the Western Fronts launched Operation Kutuzov, which had the goal of crushing the Oryol grouping of the enemy. On July 13, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts broke through the enemy defenses in the Bolkhov, Khotynets and Oryol directions and advanced to a depth of 8 to 25 km. On July 16, the troops of the Bryansk Front reached the line of the Oleshnya River, after which the German command began to withdraw its main forces to their original positions. By July 18, the troops of the right wing of the Central Front completely eliminated the enemy's wedge in the Kursk direction. On the same day, the troops of the Steppe Front were introduced into the battle, which began to pursue the retreating enemy.

Developing the offensive, the Soviet ground forces, supported from the air by the strikes of the forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies, as well as long-range aviation, by August 23, 1943, pushed the enemy back to the west by 140-150 km, liberated Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov. According to Soviet sources, the Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The losses of the Soviet troops surpassed the German ones; they amounted to 863 thousand people. Near Kursk, the Red Army lost about 6,000 tanks.

Battle of Kursk: its role and significance during the war

Fifty days, from July 5 to August 23, 1943, the Battle of Kursk continued, including the Kursk defensive (July 5 - 23), Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive strategic operations of the Soviet troops. It is one of the largest battles of the Second World War in terms of its scope, attracted forces and means, tension, results and military-political consequences.

General course of the Battle of Kursk

Huge masses of troops and military equipment were involved in a fierce clash on the Kursk Bulge from both sides - more than 4 million people, almost 70 thousand guns and mortars, more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, up to 12 thousand aircraft. The fascist German command threw more than 100 divisions into the battle, which accounted for over 43% of the divisions that were on the Soviet-German front.

The ledge in the Kursk region was formed as a result of stubborn battles in the winter and early spring of 1943. Here the right wing of the German Army Group "Center" hung over the troops of the Central Front from the north, and the left flank of the Army Group "South" covered the troops of the Voronezh Front from the south. During the three-month strategic pause that began at the end of March, the belligerents consolidated on the achieved lines, replenished their troops with people, military equipment and weapons, accumulated reserves and developed plans for further actions.

Given the great importance of the Kursk ledge, the German command decided in the summer to carry out an operation to eliminate it and defeat the Soviet troops occupying the defense here, hoping to regain the lost strategic initiative, to achieve a change in the course of the war in their favor. He developed a plan for an offensive operation, which received the conditional name "Citadel".

To implement these plans, the enemy concentrated 50 divisions (including 16 tank and motorized), attracted over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2.7 thousand tanks and assault guns and over 2 thousand aircraft. The German command had high hopes for the use of new heavy tanks "tiger" and "panther", assault guns "Ferdinand", fighter "Focke-Wulf-190D" and attack aircraft "Henschel-129".

On the Kursk ledge, which had a length of about 550 km, the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts, who had 1336 thousand people, more than 19 thousand guns and mortars, over 3.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 2.9 thousand aircraft, occupied the defense. To the east of Kursk, the Stepnoy Front, which was in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, was concentrated, which had 573 thousand people, 8 thousand guns and mortars, about 1.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, up to 400 combat aircraft.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command, having timely and correctly determined the enemy’s plan, decided to switch to a deliberate defense on pre-prepared lines, during which to bleed the shock groups of German troops, and then go on a counteroffensive and complete their defeat. There was a rare case in the history of the war when the strongest side, which had everything necessary for the offensive, chose from several possible the most optimal variant of its actions. During April - June 1943, a defense in depth was created in the area of ​​the Kursk salient.

The troops and the local population dug about 10,000 km of trenches and communication passages, 700 km of wire fences were installed in the most dangerous directions, 2,000 km of additional and parallel roads were built, 686 bridges were restored and rebuilt. Hundreds of thousands of residents of the Kursk, Orel, Voronezh and Kharkov regions participated in the construction of defensive lines. The troops were delivered 313 thousand wagons with military equipment, reserves and supplies.

Having data on the time of the start of the German offensive, the Soviet command carried out pre-planned artillery counter-preparation in the areas of concentration of enemy strike groups. The enemy suffered tangible losses, his hopes for a surprise offensive were frustrated. On the morning of July 5, German troops went on the offensive, but the enemy's tank attacks, supported by the fire of thousands of guns and aircraft, crashed against the invincible stamina of the Soviet soldiers. On the northern face of the Kursk ledge, he managed to advance 10 - 12 km, and on the southern - 35 km.

It seemed that nothing living could resist such a powerful steel avalanche. The sky was black with smoke and dust. Corrosive gases from the explosions of shells and mines blinded my eyes. From the roar of guns and mortars, the clanging of caterpillars, the soldiers lost their hearing, but fought with unparalleled courage. Their motto was the words: "Not a step back, stand to death!" German tanks were shot down by the fire of our guns, anti-tank rifles, tanks and self-propelled guns dug into the ground, were hit by aircraft, and were blown up by mines. The enemy infantry was cut off from the tanks, exterminated by artillery, mortar, rifle and machine-gun fire or in hand-to-hand combat in the trenches. Hitler's aviation was destroyed by our planes and anti-aircraft artillery.

When German tanks broke through into the depths of the defense in one of the sectors of the 203rd Guards Rifle Regiment, Senior Lieutenant Zhumbek Duisov, deputy battalion commander for political affairs, whose crew was wounded, knocked out three enemy tanks from an anti-tank rifle. The wounded armor-piercers, inspired by the feat of the officer, again took up arms and successfully repelled a new enemy attack.

In this battle, the armor-piercer Private F.I. Yuplankov knocked out six tanks and shot down one Yu-88 aircraft, junior sergeant G.I. Kikinadze knocked out four, and Sergeant P.I. Houses - seven fascist tanks. The infantrymen boldly let enemy tanks through their trenches, cut off the infantry from the tanks and destroyed the Nazis with machine gun and machine gun fire, and the tanks were burned with Molotov cocktails and knocked out with grenades.

A bright heroic feat was performed by the crew of the tank, Lieutenant B.C. Shalandina. The company in which he operated was bypassed by a group of enemy tanks. Shalandin and members of his crew senior sergeants V.G. Kustov, V.F. Lekomtsev and Sergeant P.E. Zelenin boldly entered the battle with a numerically superior enemy. Acting from an ambush, they let the enemy tanks into direct range, and then, hitting the sides, burned two "tigers" and one medium tank. But Shalandin's tank was also hit and caught fire. On a burning car, the crew of Shalandin decided to ram and crashed into the side of the "tiger" on the move. The enemy tank caught fire. But our entire crew also died. Lieutenant B.C. Shalandin was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. By order of the Minister of Defense, he was forever enrolled in the lists of the Tashkent Tank School.

Simultaneously with the fighting on the ground, there were fierce battles in the air. An immortal feat was accomplished here by the pilot of the guard, Lieutenant A.K. Gorovets. On July 6, as part of a squadron on a La-5 aircraft, he covered his troops. Returning from a mission, Gorovets saw a large group of enemy bombers, but due to damage to the radio transmitter, he could not inform the leader about this and decided to attack them. During the battle, the brave pilot shot down nine enemy bombers, but he himself died.

On July 12, the largest oncoming tank battle in World War II took place in the Prokhorovka area, in which up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns participated on both sides. During the day of the battle, the opposing sides lost from 30 to 60% of tanks and self-propelled guns each.

On July 12, a turning point occurred in the Battle of Kursk, the enemy stopped the offensive, and on July 18 he began to withdraw all his forces to their original position. The troops of the Voronezh, and from July 19 and the Steppe Front, began to pursue and by July 23 they threw the enemy back to the line that he had occupied on the eve of his offensive. Operation "Citadel" failed, the enemy failed to turn the tide of the war in their favor.

On July 12, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts launched an offensive in the Oryol direction. On July 15, the Central Front launched a counteroffensive. On August 3, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts launched a counteroffensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction. The scale of hostilities expanded even further.

Our troops during the battles on the Oryol ledge showed mass heroism. Here are just a few examples.

In the battle for a stronghold southwest of the village of Vyatka on July 13, the commander of a rifle platoon of the 457th rifle regiment of the 129th rifle division, Lieutenant N.D. Marinchenko. Carefully disguised, he unnoticed by the enemy led a platoon to the northern slope of the height and from close range brought down a shower of fire from machine guns on the enemy. The Germans began to panic. They ran, dropping their weapons. Capturing two 75-mm cannons at a height, Marinchenko's men opened fire on the enemy. For this feat, Lieutenant Nikolai Danilovich Marinchenko was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

On July 19, 1943, in the battle for the settlement of Troena, Kursk Region, a heroic feat was accomplished by the gunner of a platoon of 45-mm guns of the 896th Infantry Regiment of the 211th Infantry Division, Sergeant N.N. Shilenkov. The enemy here repeatedly went over to counterattacks. During one of them, Shilenkov let German tanks 100 - 150 meters away and set fire to one of them with cannon fire and knocked out three of them.

When the cannon was smashed by an enemy shell, he took the machine gun and, together with the arrows, continued to fire at the enemy. Nikolai Nikolaevich Shilenkov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

On August 5, two ancient Russian cities, Orel and Belgorod, were liberated. On the evening of the same day, an artillery salute was fired in Moscow for the first time in honor of the troops that had liberated them.

By August 18, the Soviet troops, having inflicted a heavy defeat on the Army Group Center, completely liberated the Oryol bridgehead. The troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts at that time were fighting in the Kharkov direction. Having repulsed the strong counterattacks of the enemy's tank divisions, our units and formations liberated Kharkov on August 23. Thus, the Battle of Kursk ended with a brilliant victory for the Red Army.

The date of August 23 is now celebrated in our country as the Day of Military Glory of Russia - the defeat of the Nazi troops in the Battle of Kursk (1943).

At the same time, it should be noted that the victory in the Battle of Kursk went to the Soviet troops at a very high price. They lost over 860 thousand people killed and wounded, more than 6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 5.2 thousand guns and mortars, over 1.6 thousand aircraft. Nevertheless, this victory was joyful and inspiring.

Thus, the victory at Kursk was new convincing evidence of the loyalty of Soviet soldiers to the oath, military duty and combat traditions of our Armed Forces. Strengthening and multiplying these traditions is the duty of every soldier of the Russian army.

The historical significance of the victory at Kursk

The Battle of Kursk is one of the most important stages on the way to victory in the Great Patriotic War. The crushing defeat of fascist Germany on the Kursk Bulge testified to the increased economic, political and military power of the Soviet Union. The feat of arms of the soldiers merged with the selfless work of the home front workers, who armed the army with excellent military equipment and provided it with everything necessary for victory. What is the world-historical significance of the defeat of the Nazi troops near Kursk?

Firstly, the Nazi army suffered a severe defeat, huge losses, which the fascist leadership could no longer make up for with any total mobilizations. The grandiose battle of the summer of 1943 on the Kursk Bulge demonstrated to the whole world the ability of the Soviet state to defeat the aggressor with its own forces. The prestige of German weapons was irreparably damaged. 30 German divisions were defeated. The total losses of the Wehrmacht amounted to more than 500 thousand soldiers and officers, over 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, 3 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft. By the way, pilots of the French Normandie squadron fought selflessly together with Soviet pilots in the battles on the Kursk Bulge, who shot down 33 German aircraft in air battles.

The enemy's armored forces suffered the heaviest losses. Of the 20 tank and motorized divisions that took part in the Battle of Kursk, 7 were defeated, and the rest suffered significant losses. The chief inspector of the Wehrmacht tank forces, General Guderian, was forced to admit: “As a result of the failure of the Citadel offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were put out of action for a long time due to heavy losses in people and equipment ... The initiative finally passed to the Russians.

Secondly, in the Battle of Kursk, the enemy's attempt to regain the lost strategic initiative and take revenge for Stalingrad failed.

The offensive strategy of the German troops suffered a complete collapse. The Battle of Kursk led to a further change in the balance of forces on the front, made it possible to finally concentrate the strategic initiative in the hands of the Soviet command, and created favorable conditions for the deployment of a general strategic offensive of the Red Army. The victory near Kursk and the exit of Soviet troops to the Dnieper ended in a radical change in the course of the war. After the Battle of Kursk, the Nazi command was forced to completely abandon the offensive strategy and go on the defensive on the entire Soviet-German front.

However, at present, some Western historians, shamelessly falsifying the history of the Second World War, are trying in every possible way to belittle the significance of the victory of the Red Army near Kursk. Some of them argue that the Battle of Kursk is an ordinary, unremarkable episode of the Second World War, others in their voluminous works either simply keep silent about the Battle of Kursk, or speak about it sparingly and unintelligibly, other falsifiers seek to prove that the German The fascist army was defeated in the Battle of Kursk not under the blows of the Red Army, but as a result of Hitler's "miscalculations" and "fatal decisions", due to his unwillingness to listen to the opinion of his generals and field marshals. However, all this has no basis and is in conflict with the facts. The German generals and field marshals themselves recognized the groundlessness of such assertions. “Operation Citadel was the last attempt to keep our initiative in the east,” admits the former Hitlerite Field Marshal, who commanded the group ar
Miy "South" E. Manstein. - With its termination, tantamount to failure, the initiative finally passed to the Soviet side. In this regard, the Citadel is a decisive turning point in the war on the Eastern Front.

Thirdly, the victory in the Battle of Kursk is a triumph of Soviet military art. In the course of the battle, Soviet military strategy, operational art and tactics once again proved their superiority over the military art of the Nazi army.

The Battle of Kursk enriched the Russian military art with the EXPERIENCE of organizing a deeply echeloned, active, stable defense, conducting a flexible and decisive maneuver of forces and means in the course of defensive and offensive operations.

In the field of strategy, the Soviet Supreme High Command took a creative approach to planning the summer-autumn campaign of 1943. The originality of the decision was expressed in the fact that the side that had the strategic initiative and overall superiority in forces went over to the defensive, deliberately giving an active role to the enemy in the initial phase of the campaign. Subsequently, within the framework of a single process of conducting a campaign, after the defense, it was planned to switch to a decisive counteroffensive and develop a general offensive. The problem of creating an insurmountable defense on an operational-strategic scale was successfully solved. Its activity was ensured by the saturation of the fronts with a large number of mobile troops. It was achieved by conducting artillery counter-preparation on the scale of two fronts, extensive maneuvering of strategic reserves to reinforce them, and delivering massive air strikes against enemy groupings and reserves. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command skillfully determined the plan for conducting a counteroffensive in each direction, creatively approaching
choosing the directions of the main attacks and methods of defeating the enemy. Thus, in the Oryol operation, Soviet troops used concentric strikes in converging directions, followed by fragmentation and destruction of the enemy grouping in parts. In the Belgorod-Kharkov operation, the main blow was delivered by the adjacent flanks of the fronts, which ensured a quick break-in of the enemy's strong and deep defenses, cutting his grouping into two parts and the exit of Soviet troops to the rear of the enemy's Kharkov defensive area.

In the Battle of Kursk, the problem of creating large strategic reserves and their effective use was successfully solved, strategic air supremacy was finally won, which was held by Soviet aviation until the end of the Great Patriotic War. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command skillfully carried out strategic interaction not only between the fronts participating in the battle, but also with those operating in other directions.

Soviet operational art in the Battle of Kursk for the first time solved the problem of creating a deliberate positional insurmountable and active operational defense up to 70 km deep.

During the counteroffensive, the problem of breaking through the enemy’s defense in depth was successfully solved by decisive massing of forces and means in the breakthrough areas (from 50 to 90% of their total number), skillful use of tank armies and corps as mobile groups of fronts and armies, close interaction with aviation , which carried out in full on the scale of the fronts an air offensive, which to a large extent ensured the high pace of the offensive of the ground forces. Valuable experience was gained in conducting oncoming tank battles both in a defensive operation (near Prokhorovka) and in the course of an offensive when repelling counterattacks by large enemy armored groupings.

The active actions of the partisans contributed to the successful conduct of the Battle of Kursk. Striking at the rear of the enemy, they fettered up to 100 thousand soldiers and officers of the enemy. The partisans made about 1.5 thousand raids on railway lines, disabled more than 1 thousand steam locomotives and defeated over 400 military trains.

Fourthly, the defeat of the Nazi troops during the Battle of Kursk was of great military-political and international significance. He significantly increased the role and international prestige of the Soviet Union. It became obvious that fascist Germany was faced with inevitable defeat by the might of Soviet weapons. The sympathy of ordinary people for our country increased even more, the hopes of the peoples of the countries occupied by the Nazis for an early liberation were strengthened, the front of the national liberation struggle of resistance movement fighters in France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway expanded, the anti-fascist struggle intensified both in Germany itself and and other countries of the fascist bloc.

Fifthly, the defeat at Kursk and the results of the battle had a profound effect on the German people, undermined the morale of the German troops, faith in the victorious outcome of the war. Germany was losing influence over its allies, disagreements within the fascist bloc intensified, which later led to a political and military crisis. The collapse of the fascist bloc was laid - the Mussolini regime collapsed, and Italy withdrew from the war on the side of Germany.

The victory of the Red Army near Kursk forced Germany and its allies to go on the defensive in all theaters of World War II, which had a huge impact on its further course. The transfer of significant enemy forces from the west to the Soviet-German front and their further defeat by the Red Army facilitated the landing of Anglo-American troops in Italy and predetermined their success.

Sixth, under the influence of the victory of the Red Army, cooperation between the leading countries of the anti-Hitler coalition strengthened. She had a great influence on the ruling circles of the USA and Great Britain. At the end of 1943, the Tehran Conference took place, at which the leaders of the USSR, the USA, and Great Britain, I.V. Stalin; F.D. Roosevelt, W. Churchill. At the conference, it was decided to open a second front in Europe in May 1944. Assessing the results of the victory at Kursk, the head of the British government, W. Churchill, noted: "Three huge battles - for Kursk, Orel and Kharkov, all carried out within two months, marked the collapse of the German army on the Eastern Front."

The victory in the Battle of Kursk was achieved thanks to the further strengthening of the military and economic power of the country and its Armed Forces.

One of the decisive factors that ensured the victory at Kursk was the high moral, political and psychological state of the personnel of our troops. In a fierce battle, such powerful sources of victories for the Soviet people and their army as patriotism, friendship of peoples, faith in one's own strength and success were manifested with all their might. Soviet fighters and commanders showed miracles of mass heroism, exceptional courage, steadfastness and military skill, for which 132 formations and units received the title of guards, 26 were awarded the honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, Kharkov. More than 100 thousand soldiers were awarded orders and medals, and 231 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The victory at Kursk was also won thanks to a powerful economic base. The increased capabilities of Soviet industry, the heroic feat of the home front workers, made it possible to provide the Red Army in huge quantities with perfect models of military equipment and weapons, surpassing the military equipment of Nazi Germany in a number of decisive indicators.

Highly appreciating the role and significance of the Battle of Kursk, the courage, resilience and mass heroism shown by the defenders of the cities of Belgorod, Kursk and Orel in the struggle for the freedom and independence of the Fatherland, by Decrees of the President of the Russian Federation of April 27, 2007, these cities were awarded the honorary title "City of Military Glory ".

Before a lesson on this topic and during its conduct, it is advisable to visit the museum of a unit or unit, organize a viewing of documentary and feature films about the Battle of Kursk, and invite veterans of the Great Patriotic War to speak.

In the opening remarks, it is advisable to emphasize the importance of such a historical event as the Battle of Kursk, to emphasize that a radical turning point in the course of the war ended here and a mass expulsion of enemy troops from our territory began.

When covering the first issue, it is necessary, using a map, to show the location and balance of forces of the opposing sides at different stages of the Battle of Kursk, while emphasizing that it is an unsurpassed example of Soviet military art. In addition, it is necessary to tell in detail about the exploits, give examples of the courage and heroism of the soldiers of their kind of troops committed in the Battle of Kursk.

In the course of considering the second question, it is necessary to objectively show the significance, role and place of the Battle of Kursk in Russian military history, to consider in more detail the factors that contributed to this great victory.

At the end of the lesson, it is necessary to draw brief conclusions, answer questions from the audience, and thank the invited veterans.

1. Military encyclopedia in 8 volumes. T.4. - M.: Military publishing house. 1999.

2. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941 - 1945: A Brief History. - m., 1984.

3. Dembitsky N., Strelnikov v. The most important operations of the Red Army and Navy in 1943//Landmark. - 2003. - No. 1.

4. History of the Second World War 1939 -1945 in 12 volumes. T.7. - M., 1976.

Lieutenant colonel
Dmitry Samosvat,
Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences, Lieutenant Colonel
Alexey Kurshev

The Battle of Kursk is a turning point in the course of the entire Second World War, when the Soviet troops inflicted such damage on Germany and its satellites, from which they could no longer recover and lost their strategic initiative until the end of the war. Although before the defeat of the enemy there were many sleepless nights and thousands of kilometers of battles, but after this battle in the hearts of every Soviet citizen, private and general, there was confidence in victory over the enemy. In addition, the battle on the Oryol-Kursk ledge became an example of the courage of ordinary soldiers and the brilliant genius of Russian commanders.

The radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War began with the victory of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad, when a large enemy grouping was liquidated during Operation Uranus. The battle on the Kursk ledge became the final stage of a radical change. After the defeat at Kursk and Orel, the strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Soviet command. After the failure, the German troops were already mostly on the defensive until the end of the war, and ours were mainly engaged in offensive operations, freeing Europe from the Nazis.

On June 5, 1943, German troops went on the offensive in two directions: on the northern and southern faces of the Kursk salient. Thus began Operation Citadel and the Battle of Kursk itself. After the offensive onslaught of the Germans subsided, and its divisions were significantly bled, the command of the USSR launched a counteroffensive against the troops of the Army Groups "Center" and "South". On August 23, 1943, Kharkov was liberated, which marked the end of one of the largest battles of World War II.

History of the battle

After the victory at Stalingrad in the course of the successful Operation Uranus, the Soviet troops managed to carry out a good offensive along the entire front and push the enemy back for many miles to the West. But after the counter-offensive of the German troops in the area of ​​Kursk and Orel, a ledge arose, which was directed towards the West, up to 200 kilometers wide and up to 150 kilometers deep, formed by the Soviet group.

From April to June, a relative calm reigned on the fronts. It became clear that after the defeat at Stalingrad, Germany would try to take revenge. The Kursk ledge was considered the most suitable place, striking which in the direction of Orel and Kursk from the North and South, respectively, it was possible to create a cauldron on a larger scale than near Kyiv, Kharkov at the beginning of the war.

As early as April 8, 1943, Marshal G.K. Zhukov. sent his report on the spring-summer military campaign, where he expressed his thoughts about Germany's actions on the Eastern Front, where it was assumed that the Kursk Bulge would become the site of the main enemy strike. At the same time, Zhukov expressed his plan of countermeasures, which included exhausting the enemy in defensive battles, and then inflicting a counterattack and his complete destruction. Already on April 12, Stalin listened to General Antonov A.I., Marshal Zhukov G.K. and Marshal Vasilevsky A.M. on this occasion.

Representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief unanimously spoke in favor of the impossibility and futility of delivering a preventive strike in the spring and summer. Indeed, based on the experience of past years, an offensive against large enemy groupings preparing to strike does not bring significant results, but only contributes to losses in the ranks of their troops. Also, the formation of forces for the main strike was supposed to weaken the groupings of Soviet troops in the directions of the main German strike, which would also inevitably lead to defeat. Therefore, it was decided to conduct a defensive operation in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge, where the main blow of the Wehrmacht forces was expected. Thus, the Headquarters hoped to wear down the enemy in defensive battles, knock out his tanks and deliver a decisive blow to the enemy. This was facilitated by the creation of a powerful defensive system in this direction, in contrast to the first two years of the war.

In the spring of 1943, the word "Citadel" appeared more and more often in the intercepted radio data. On April 12, intelligence put a plan code-named "Citadel" on Stalin's table, which was developed by the General Staff of the Wehrmacht, but had not yet been signed by Hitler. This plan confirmed that Germany was preparing the main attack, where the Soviet command expected it. Three days later, Hitler signed the plan for the operation.

In order to destroy the plans of the Wehrmacht, it was decided to create a defense in depth in the direction of the predicted strike and create a powerful grouping capable of withstanding the pressure of the German units and carrying out counterattacks at the moment of the climax of the battle.

Composition of armies, commanders

To strike at the Soviet troops in the area of ​​the Kursk-Oryol ledge, it was planned to attract forces Army Group Center commanded by Field Marshal Kluge and Army Group South commanded by Field Marshal Manstein.

The German forces included 50 divisions, including 16 motorized and tank divisions, 8 assault gun divisions, 2 tank brigades, and 3 separate tank battalions. In addition, the SS Panzer Divisions Das Reich, Totenkopf and Adolf Hitler, considered elite, were brought up to attack in the direction of Kursk.

Thus, the grouping amounted to 900 thousand personnel, 10 thousand guns, 2700 tanks and assault guns, and more than 2 thousand aircraft, which were part of two Luftwaffe air fleets.

One of the key trump cards in the hands of Germany was to be the use of heavy tanks "Tiger" and "Panther", assault guns "Ferdinand". It was precisely because the new tanks did not have time to get to the front, were in the process of being finalized, that the start of the operation was constantly postponed. Also in service with the Wehrmacht were obsolete tanks Pz.Kpfw. I, Pz.Kpfw. I I, Pz.Kpfw. I I I, having undergone some modification.

The main blow was to be delivered by the 2nd and 9th armies, the 9th tank army of the Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal Model, as well as the Kempf task force, the tank 4th army and the 24th corps of the group armies "South", which were entrusted to command General Goth.

In defensive battles, the USSR involved three fronts - Voronezh, Stepnoy, Central.

General of the Army Rokossovsky K.K. commanded the Central Front. The task of the front was to defend the northern face of the ledge. The Voronezh Front, the command of which was entrusted to General of the Army Vatutin N.F., was to defend the southern front. Colonel General Konev I.S. was appointed commander of the Steppe Front, the reserve of the USSR during the battle. In total, about 1.3 million people, 3,444 tanks and self-propelled guns, almost 20,000 guns and 2,100 aircraft were involved in the area of ​​the Kursk salient. Data may differ from some sources.

Armament (tanks)

During the preparation of the Citadel plan, the German command did not look for new ways to achieve success. The main offensive power of the Wehrmacht troops during the operation on the Kursk Bulge was to be carried out by tanks: light, heavy and medium. To strengthen the strike groups before the start of the operation, several hundred of the latest Panther and Tiger tanks were delivered to the front.

Medium tank "Panther" was developed by MAN for Germany in 1941-1942. According to the German classification, it was considered heavy. For the first time he participated in the battles on the Kursk Bulge. After the fighting in the summer of 1943 on the Eastern Front, the Wehrmacht began to actively use it in other directions. It is considered the best German tank in World War II, despite a number of shortcomings.

"Tiger I"- heavy tanks of the German armed forces during the Second World War. At long distances, the battle was slightly vulnerable to the firepower of Soviet tanks. It is considered the most expensive tank of its time, because the German treasury spent 1 million Reichsmarks to create one combat unit.

Panzerkampfwagen III Until 1943, it was the main medium tank of the Wehrmacht. The captured combat units were used by the Soviet troops, self-propelled guns were created on their basis.

Panzerkampfwagen II produced from 1934 to 1943. Since 1938, it has been used in armed conflicts, but it turned out to be weaker than similar models of equipment from the enemy, not only in terms of armor, but even in terms of weapons. In 1942, it was completely withdrawn from the Wehrmacht tank units, however, it remained in service and was used by assault groups.

Light tank Panzerkampfwagen I - the brainchild of "Krupp" and "Daimler Benz", discontinued in 1937, was produced in the amount of 1574 units.

In the Soviet army, the most massive tank of the Second World War was supposed to resist the bulk of the German armored armada. Medium tank T-34 had many modifications, one of which T-34-85 is in service with some countries to this day.

The course of the battle

Calm reigned on the fronts. Stalin had doubts about the correctness of the calculations of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander. Also, the thought of competent disinformation did not leave him until the last moment. Nevertheless, at 23.20 on July 4 and 02.20 on July 5, the artillery of the two Soviet fronts dealt a massive blow to the alleged positions of the enemy. In addition, bombers and attack aircraft of the two air armies carried out an air raid on enemy positions in the Kharkov and Belgorod regions. However, this did not bring much result. According to the reports of the Germans, only communication communications were damaged. Losses in manpower and equipment were not serious.

Exactly at 06.00 on July 5, after a powerful artillery preparation, significant forces of the Wehrmacht went on the offensive. However, unexpectedly for themselves, they received a powerful rebuff. This was facilitated by the presence of numerous tank barriers, minefields with a high frequency of mining. Due to significant damage to communication communications, the Germans failed to achieve clear interaction between units, which led to disagreements in actions: the infantry was often left without the support of tanks. On the northern face, the blow was directed at Olkhovatka. After minor success and serious losses, the Germans directed their attack at Ponyri. But even there it was not possible to wedge into the Soviet defense. Thus, on July 10, less than a third of all German tanks remained in service.

* After the Germans went on the attack, Rokossovsky called Stalin and announced with joy in his voice that the offensive had begun. Perplexed, Stalin asked Rokossovsky about the reason for his joy. The general replied that now the victory in the Battle of Kursk would not go anywhere.

To inflict defeat on the Russians in the South was the task of the 4th Panzer Corps, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps and the Kempf Army Group, which was part of the 4th Army. Here events unfolded more successfully than in the North, although the planned result was not achieved. The 48th Panzer Corps suffered heavy losses in the attack on Cherkasskoye, without moving significantly forward.

The defense of Cherkassky is one of the brightest pages of the Battle of Kursk, which for some reason is practically not remembered. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps was more successful. He was given the task of reaching the Prokhorovka area, where, on a tactically advantageous terrain, to fight the Soviet reserve. Thanks to the presence of companies consisting of heavy "Tigers", the divisions "Leibstandarte" and "Das Reich" managed to quickly break through the defenses of the Voronezh Front. The command of the Voronezh Front decided to strengthen the defensive lines and sent the 5th Stalingrad Tank Corps to carry out this task. In fact, Soviet tankers received an order to occupy a line already captured by the Germans, but threats of a tribunal and execution forced them to go on the offensive. Hitting the Das Reich on the forehead, the 5th Stk failed and was thrown back. The Das Reich tanks went on the attack, trying to surround the forces of the corps. They partially succeeded, but thanks to the commanders of the units that were outside the ring, communications were not cut. However, during these battles, the Soviet troops lost 119 tanks, which is undeniably the largest loss of the Soviet troops in one day. Thus, already on July 6, the Germans reached the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front, which made the situation difficult.

On July 12, in the Prokhorovka area, after mutual artillery preparation and massive air strikes, 850 tanks of the 5th Guards Army under the command of General Rotmistrov and 700 tanks from the side of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps collided in a head-on battle. The fight lasted all day. The initiative changed hands. The opponents suffered enormous losses. The entire battlefield was covered with thick smoke from fires. However, the victory remained with us, the enemy was forced to retreat.

On this day, the Western and Bryansk Fronts went on the offensive on the Northern Front. The very next day, the German defenses were broken through, and by August 5, Soviet troops managed to liberate Orel. The Oryol operation, during which the Germans lost 90 thousand soldiers killed, was called Kutuzov in the plans of the General Staff.

Operation "Rumyantsev" was supposed to defeat the German forces in the Kharkov and Belgorod region. On August 3, the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe Front launched an offensive. By August 5, Belgorod was liberated. On August 23, Kharkov was liberated by Soviet troops on the third attempt, which marked the end of Operation Rumyantsev, and with it the Battle of Kursk.

* On August 5, the first salute in the entire war was given in Moscow in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod from the Nazi invaders.

Side losses

Until now, the losses of Germany and the USSR during the Battle of Kursk are not exactly known. To date, the data diverge dramatically. In 1943, the Germans in the battle on the Kursk ledge lost more than 500 thousand people killed and wounded. 1000-1500 enemy tanks were destroyed by Soviet soldiers. And the Soviet aces and air defense forces destroyed 1696 aircraft.

As for the USSR, the irretrievable losses amounted to more than a quarter of a million people. 6024 tanks and self-propelled guns were burned out, out of action for technical reasons. 1626 aircraft were shot down in the sky over Kursk and Orel.

Results, meaning

Guderian and Manstein in their memoirs say that the Battle of Kursk was the turning point of the War on the Eastern Front. Soviet troops inflicted heavy damage on the Germans, who forever missed the strategic advantage. In addition, the armored power of the Nazis could no longer be restored to its former scale. The days of Hitler's Germany were numbered. The victory on the Kursk Bulge was an excellent tool for raising the morale of the fighters on all fronts, the population in the rear of the country and in the occupied territories.

Day of Military Glory of Russia

The day of the defeat of the Nazi troops by the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk in accordance with the Federal Law of March 13, 1995 is celebrated annually. This is the day of memory of all those who in 1943 in July-August, during the defensive operation of the Soviet troops, as well as the offensive operations "Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev" on the Kursk ledge, managed to break the back of a powerful enemy, predetermining the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. Large-scale celebrations are expected in 2013 to mark the 70th anniversary of the victory at the Fiery Arc.

Video about the Kursk Bulge, the key moments of the battle, we definitely recommend viewing: