Changes in spiritual life. Goals and stages of political reform

During the years of the second five-year plan, major changes took place in the spiritual life of Soviet society and ideology. They are marked by the growth of two tendencies. On the one hand, the establishment of "Stalinism" in society, that is, Marxism-Leninism in the Stalinist interpretation, the ideology of leaderism and cult consciousness. On the other hand, as the economic and political power of the USSR strengthens, the state-patriotic principles and the corresponding design of state traditions and symbols are strengthened. The Marxist thesis of the withering away of the state was condemned as Trotskyist. Instead, the thesis of the all-round strengthening of the socialist state and the need to protect it from external and internal encroachments was actively introduced.

In 1934-1935. a campaign to revise the country's history began. History faculties were reopened in universities. Continuity was restored in the development of the Russian Empire and the USSR. If earlier everything that concerned the pre-revolutionary past was subjected to desecration and reproach, now it was presented in a slightly different light. The history of Russia was now considered in the context of the country's movement towards revolution and towards socialism. Names and events that contributed to strengthening the power of the state were noted (Alexander Nevsky, Dmitry Donskoy, Ivan the Terrible, Minin and Pozharsky, Peter I, Catherine II, etc.). If earlier, according to the same Stalin, Russia was a country that was constantly beaten for its economic backwardness, now it is beginning to present itself more and more as a victorious power. Anniversaries dedicated to the Patriotic War of 1812, the liberation of Moscow from the Polish invaders in 1612 and other events were celebrated with great fanfare. Were "rehabilitated" many figures of science and culture, contributed to the progress of Russia and its glorification. The position on the colonial policy of Russia was subjected to a complete revision, now it was becoming "civilizing and progressive" in relation to the peoples that became part of it. The history of the Soviet state and the ruling party was built in the same context. The idea of ​​the identity of Marxism-Leninism and state patriotism, personified by the personality of Stalin, was introduced into the public consciousness. In this spirit, "A Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" and "The History of the Civil War in the USSR" were created.

Similar trends were reflected in literature, art, and cinema. Writers sat down to write historical novels. Pompous painting and architecture were approved, designed to glorify the power and greatness of the state and its leaders in a rather primitive and naturalistic manner, accessible to the still culturally underdeveloped Soviet society. Creative quests lying outside this were subjected to scolding and condemnation as a manifestation of formalism and degeneration. Poets, writers, artists, etc., who insisted on freedom of creativity, fell into the "risk zone" and were either doomed to oblivion or persecuted.

The return to state-patriotic foundations to some extent contributed to the consolidation of public opinion in the country and reconciliation with the regime. In this regard, even in emigre circles, increased attention to the USSR became noticeable. At the same time, there was a revival of traditional norms of behavior and morality. The experiments of the first five-year plan in this area were rejected. A course was taken to strengthen the family, which was now officially recognized as the primary unit of Soviet society. In 1936, a decree was adopted to ban abortion and help mothers with many children. The fight against divorce, crime, and homelessness intensified. Implemented by administrative and repressive measures, these actions sometimes brought unexpected effects, giving rise to new problems and difficulties, which are yet to be discussed.

Along with the spread of the former ideals of universal equality and sacrifice for the sake of a brighter future as essential features of the "socialist way of life", the idea of ​​personal well-being and career begins to acquire its value in society, which affected primarily the ruling party-state nomenklatura and resulted in the creation of a hierarchy of positions and privileges. , which formed one of the hallmarks of the Soviet regime.

Of course, no changes in society are possible without changes in the spiritual life. What is expected in this area? If the possession of information becomes the most important social value, then the the value of education. It is possible that the prioritization will change in the education system. After all, the development of the service sector, especially humanitarian, requires the development of relevant branches of knowledge.

As we remember, one of the problems of modern spiritual and social life is scientism. Now it becomes obvious that science, left to itself, easily turns from a creative force into a destructive force. The reason is not only that it is deliberately directed to evil. Science is neutral because its purpose is to gain knowledge. And knowledge says nothing and cannot say anything about how the world should be. Therefore, in itself, the growth of knowledge and even its application in practice is not yet a guarantee of achieving the public good. After all, we cannot predict what consequences scientific discoveries and their implementation in life will lead us to. That is why many modern thinkers believe that it is necessary connection of science with the worldview. This is called "cultural orientation". If the 20th century was characterized by the growth of specialization and separation of all spheres of spiritual life, then the 21st century can become a century of integration. This means that scientific discoveries should be determined by value orientations, and, above all, by a clear awareness of the consequences that scientific research can entail.

Changing the place and nature of scientific research is impossible without changing the value orientations themselves. After all, the development of science was largely determined and is determined by the desire for an uncontrolled growth of needs, and these needs were reduced to material ones. As a result, production is pushed to the limit. And this leads to unprecedented pressure on nature, which remains the main source of all created benefits. That is why modern thinkers talk about the need to change the nature of needs. The speech must go on the orientation towards the production and consumption of cultural and environmental benefits.



One of the causes of global problems and international conflicts has been and is the persistent idea that there are cultures that are superior and inferior in terms of their level of development. This often resulted in industrial civilizations seeking to impose their way of life, which they considered progressive, on other peoples and cultures. Therefore, many thinkers believe that the post-industrial world should be built on principles of tolerance, openness and dialogue of cultures. The value of diversity must underlie the existence of a new world. It allows you to take into account and coordinate the interests of different cultures, as well as enrich your world and your way of life with original achievements from other worlds.

The processes taking place in the modern world require not only the coordination of interests, but also integration at the level of the world community. The fact is that the existing global problems cannot be solved by the forces of individual states. Therefore, there is a need creation of intergovernmental and non-governmental global public organizations that could coordinate their efforts at the international level. And this is possible only when the value of any culture is recognized.

2. Researchers believe that the characteristic features of the new civilization are: in the economy - globalization, the transition from the production of goods to the production of services, the individualization of consumption, the transformation of information into the main resource for the development of the economy; in social life - the growth of telecommunication systems, the possession and control of information as a condition for high status, the growth of social differentiation, the transition from a status-role system to an orientation towards the implementation of individual biographies and life style, the transition from a hierarchy to a network society; in political life - the search for new forms of the world community to solve global problems; struggle for equality of various social minorities in societies; in the spiritual life - increasing the value of education; refusal to consume at the limit of possibilities, overcoming the isolation of science from the forms of worldview, the growth of tolerance and openness for dialogue with different types of cultures.

test questions

1. What is the importance and features of information for the development of the economy and social life?

2. What is "life style orientation" and when does it become possible?

3. What are the features of the "network society"?

(answer only "yes" and "no")

1. In a post-industrial society, services focused on an individualized circle of consumers will be of decisive importance.

2. Scarcity of natural resources is and will continue to be the main obstacle to the growth of abundance of goods.

3. In a post-industrial society, the individuality and originality of a person and culture as a whole will have value, and not compliance with the standards of even the most developed countries in the world.

4. The post-industrial society is characterized by the solution of the problem of survival as getting rid of hunger and disease.

5. Post-industrial society is a quantitative increase in all the basic properties of an industrial society.

Reference material for preparing for the seminar on the theme "SOVEREIGN RUSSIA: THE CHOICE OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY PATHWAYS (SECOND HALF OF THE 80S - BEGINNING OF THE XXI CENTURY)"

Appendix 1

Features of the political and spiritual development of the country in the 60-70s.

Peculiarities Social Consequences
The gap between the proclaimed ideals of developed socialism and real life Increasing ossification of party-state structures
Unresolved problems of development of national republics Gradual awakening of the national self-consciousness of peoples
Departure from the analysis of real contradictions of social development Growing mass skepticism, political apathy, cynicism; dogmatism in the ideological sphere
Aggravation of the ideological struggle Prohibitions and restrictions in the spiritual life; creating the image of an "external enemy"
Ideological rehabilitation of Stalinism The exaltation of the new leader - L.I. Brezhnev
Confrontation between official dogmatic and humanistic, democratic culture Formation of the spiritual prerequisites for perestroika

Appendix 2

USSR in the early 80s.

Economy

o Sharp drop in economic growth

o Strengthening the command-administrative system of farm management

o Attempts to further strengthen the centralization of administration during the 1979 reform

o Crisis of rigid bureaucratic management of agriculture

o The crisis of the system of non-economic coercion

o inefficient use of material and labor resources and delayed transition to intensive production methods

o inflationary processes, trade deficit, huge pent-up demand.

Political system

o Stiffness of party-state structures tougher repressions against dissidents

o Strengthening the bureaucratization of the state machine

o Strengthening contradictions in the social class structure of society

o Crisis of interethnic relations

spiritual realm

o Growing gap between words and deeds



o Moving away from an objective analysis of the state of affairs in society

o Tougher ideological dictate

o Ideological rehabilitation of Stalinism

o Growing mass skepticism, political apathy, cynicism

The emergence of a pre-crisis state of our society can be explained by both objective and subjective reasons. The objective features include the development of our country in the 70s. The difficult demographic situation, the removal of sources of raw materials and energy carriers from their traditional areas of use, the aggravation of economic problems, the unfavorable world economic situation, and the growing burden of spending on maintaining military-strategic parity and helping allies played a role here. In this regard, it is worth paying attention to the fact that the share of the USSR under the Warsaw Pact was 90% of total spending, and only 10% was accounted for by the allies (for comparison: within NATO, US spending is 54%).

Features and results of previous years of the country's development also contributed to the formation of the pre-crisis state. Such processes as, for example, the excessive centralization of economic management, the nationalization of the cooperative form of ownership were identified and gained momentum much earlier. But in the 70s, along with the growth of the scale of production, they began to manifest themselves more clearly.

The diagnosis of the situation in which the development of our society found itself is stagnation. In fact, a whole system of weakening the instruments of power has emerged, a kind of mechanism for slowing down socio-economic development has been formed. The concept of "braking mechanism" helps to understand the causes of stagnation in the life of society.

The braking mechanism is a set of stagnant phenomena in all spheres of the life of our society: political, economic, social, spiritual, international. The braking mechanism is a consequence, or rather a manifestation of the contradictions between the productive forces and production relations. The subjective factor played a significant role in folding the braking mechanism. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the party and state leadership turned out to be unprepared to actively and effectively counter the growing negative phenomena in all areas of the country's life.

Annex 3

The main stages of perestroika in the USSR

Appendix 4

Stages of economic reform in the USSR (1985 - 1991)

Annex 5

Production of main types of food products (in % to the previous year)

Appendix 6

Perestroika and changes in the spiritual life of society at the turn of the 1990s.

1985 became a milestone in the spiritual life of the USSR. The principle proclaimed by M. S. Gorbachev publicity created conditions for greater openness in decision-making and for an objective rethinking of the past (this was seen as continuity with the first years of the “thaw”). But the main goal of the new leadership of the CPSU was to create conditions for the renewal of socialism. It is no coincidence that the slogan "More glasnost, more socialism!" was put forward. and no less eloquent “We need publicity like we need air!”. Glasnost assumed a greater variety of topics and approaches, a more lively style of presenting material in the media. It was not tantamount to affirming the principle of freedom of speech and the possibility of unhindered and free expression. The implementation of this principle presupposes the existence of appropriate legal and political institutions, which in the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s. did not have.

The membership of the CPSU in 1986, when the 27th Congress was held, reached a record level in its history of 19 million people, after which the ranks of the ruling party began to decline (to 18 million in 1989). Gorbachev's speech at the congress was the first to say that without glasnost there is, and cannot be, democracy. It turned out to be impossible to keep glasnost in check, in metered volumes, especially after the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (April 26, 1986), when the unwillingness of the country's leadership to give objective information and raise the question of responsibility for the tragedy was revealed.

In society, glasnost began to be seen as a rejection of ideological narrow-mindedness in covering current events and in assessing the past. This opened up, as it seemed, inexhaustible opportunities for the formation of a new information field and for an open discussion of all the most important issues in the media. The focus of public attention in the first years of perestroika was journalism. It was this genre of the printed word that could most sharply and promptly respond to problems that worried society. In 1987-1988 the most topical topics were already widely discussed in the press, and controversial points of view on the ways of the country's development were put forward. The appearance of such sharp publications on the pages of censored publications could not have been imagined a few years ago. Publicists for a short time became real "rulers of thoughts". New authoritative authors from among prominent economists, sociologists, journalists and historians were in the epicenter of attention. The popularity of printed publications grew to an incredible level, publishing stunning articles about failures in the economy and social policy - Moskovskiye Novosti, Ogonyok, Arguments and Facts, and Literaturnaya Gazeta. A series of articles about the past and present and about the prospects of the Soviet experience (I. I. Klyamkina “Which street leads to the temple?”, N. P. Shmeleva “Advances and debts”, V. I. Selyunin and G. N. Khanina “Sly Digit", etc.) in the journal "New World", in which the writer S.P. Zalygin was the editor, caused a huge reader response. The publications of L. A. Abalkin, N. P. Shmelev, L. A. Piyasheva, G. Kh. Popov, and T. I. Koryagina on the problems of the country’s economic development were widely discussed. A. A. Tsipko offered a critical reflection on the Leninist ideological heritage and the prospects for socialism, the publicist Yu. Chernichenko called for a revision of the agrarian policy of the CPSU. Yu. N. Afanasiev organized in the spring of 1987 the historical and political readings "The Social Memory of Mankind", they had a response far beyond the Moscow Historical and Archival Institute, which he led. Collections that printed publicistic articles under one cover were especially popular; they were read like a fascinating novel. In 1988, with a circulation of 50,000 copies, the collection “No Other Is Given” was released and immediately became a “deficit”. Articles by its authors (Yu. N. Afanasiev, T. N. Zaslavskaya, A. D. Sakharov, A. A. Nuikin, V. I. Selyunin, Yu. F. Karyakin, G. G. Vodolazov and others) - The representatives of the intelligentsia, known for their public position, were united by a passionate and uncompromising call for the democratization of Soviet society. Every article read the desire for change. In a short foreword by the editor, Yu. Perhaps this is precisely what gives particular credibility to the main idea of ​​the collection: perestroika is a condition for the vitality of our society. Nothing else is given."

The "finest hour" of the press was 1989. Circulation of printed publications reached an unprecedented level: the weekly "Arguments and Facts" was published with a circulation of 30 million copies (this absolute record among weeklies was included in the Guinness Book of Records), the newspaper "Trud" - 20 million, "Pravda" - 10 million. It jumped sharply subscriptions to “thick” magazines (especially after the subscription scandal that broke out at the end of 1988, when they tried to limit it under the pretext of paper shortages). A public wave arose in defense of glasnost, and the subscription was successfully defended. Novy Mir in 1990 came out with a circulation of 2.7 million copies unprecedented for a literary magazine.

Live broadcasts from the meetings of the Congresses of People's Deputies of the USSR (1989-1990) gathered a huge audience, people did not turn off their radios at work, they took portable TVs from home. There was a conviction that it was here, at the congress, in the confrontation of positions and points of view that the fate of the country was being decided. Television began to use the method of reporting from the scene and live broadcast, this was a revolutionary step in covering what was happening. “Live speaking” programs were born - round tables, teleconferences, discussions in the studio, etc. The popular, without exaggeration, popularity of journalistic and information programs (“Look”, “Before and after midnight”, “The Fifth Wheel”, “600 Seconds ”) was due not only to the need for information, but also to the desire of people to be in the center of what is happening. Young TV presenters proved by their example that freedom of speech is emerging in the country and free polemics around the problems that worried people are possible. (True, more than once during the perestroika years, TV management tried to return to the old practice of pre-recording programs.)

The polemical approach was also distinguished by the brightest documentary films of the journalistic genre that appeared at the turn of the 1990s: “It’s impossible to live like this” and “The Russia we have lost” (dir. S. Govorukhin), “Is it easy to be young?” (dir. J. Podnieks). The last film was directly addressed to the youth audience.

The most famous art films about modernity, without embellishment and false pathos, told about the life of the younger generation (“Little Vera”, dir. V. Pichul, “Assa”, dir. S. Solovyov, both appeared on the screen in 1988). Solovyov gathered a crowd of young people to shoot the last shots of the film, announcing in advance that V. Tsoi would sing and act. His songs became for the generation of the 1980s. what the work of V. Vysotsky was for the previous generation.

“Forbidden” topics have essentially disappeared from the press. The names of N. I. Bukharin, L. D. Trotsky, L. B. Kamenev, G. E. Zinoviev and many other repressed political figures returned to history. Party documents that had never been published were made public, and the declassification of archives began. It is characteristic that one of the “first signs” in understanding the past were the works of Western authors already published abroad on the Soviet period of national history (S. Cohen “Bukharin”, A. Rabinovich “The Bolsheviks Go to Power”, the two-volume “History of the Soviet Union” of the Italian historian J. Boffa). The publication of the works of N. I. Bukharin, unknown to the new generation of readers, caused a heated discussion about alternative models for building socialism. The very figure of Bukharin and his legacy were opposed to Stalin; the discussion of development alternatives was conducted in the context of modern prospects for the "renewal of socialism". The need to comprehend the historical truth and answer the questions “what happened” and “why did this happen” to the country and people aroused great interest in publications on Russian history of the 20th century, especially in the memoir literature that began to appear without censored cuts. In 1988, the first issue of the magazine "Our Heritage" was published, and unknown materials on the history of Russian culture, including from the heritage of the Russian emigration, appeared on its pages.

Contemporary art also sought answers to the questions that tormented people. The film directed by T. E. Abuladze "Repentance" (1986) - a parable about the world's evil, embodied in the recognizable image of a dictator, without exaggeration, shocked society. At the end of the picture, an aphorism was sounded, which became the leitmotif of perestroika: “Why the road if it does not lead to the temple?” The problems of a person's moral choice turned out to be the focus of attention of two masterpieces of Russian cinematography different in themes - the film adaptation of M. A. Bulgakov's story "Heart of a Dog" (Dir. V. Bortko, 1988) and "Cold Summer of 53rd" (dir. A. Proshkin , 1987). In the box office there were also those films that had not previously been allowed on the screen by censorship or came out with huge bills: A. Yu. German, A. A. Tarkovsky, K. P. Muratova, S. I. Parajanov. The strongest impression was made by A. Ya. Askoldov's picture "Commissioner" - a film of high tragic pathos.

Appendix 7

"New political thinking" in international relations

In the mid 1980s. the new leadership of the USSR sharply intensified foreign policy. The following tasks, traditional for Soviet foreign policy, were defined: achieving universal security and disarmament; strengthening the world socialist system as a whole, and the socialist community in particular; strengthening relations with the newly-free countries, primarily with the countries of "socialist orientation"; restoration of mutually beneficial relations with capitalist countries; strengthening of the international communist and workers' movement.

These tasks were approved by the XXVII Congress of the CPSU in early 1986. However, in 1987-1988. significant changes have been made to them. For the first time they were reflected in the book by M. S. Gorbachev "Perestroika and new thinking for our country and the whole world" (autumn 1987). The Minister of Foreign Affairs, a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee E.A. Shevardnadze and Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU A. N. Yakovlev. The change of course was symbolized by the replacement of the highly experienced Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia E. A. Shevardnadze, who had previously only had experience in Komsomol and police work and did not speak any foreign languages.

"New political thinking"(NPM) in foreign policy was an attempt to implement the "ideas of perestroika" in the international arena. The main principles of the NPM were as follows:

· rejection of the conclusion that the modern world is split into two opposite socio-political systems - capitalist and socialist, and the recognition of the modern world as a single, interconnected;

· rejection of the belief that the security of the modern world rests on the balance of power of two opposing systems, and recognition of the balance of interests as a guarantor of this security;

· rejection of the principle of proletarian, socialist internationalism and recognition of the priority of universal human values ​​over any others (national, class, etc.).

In accordance with the new principles, new priorities of Soviet foreign policy were defined:

De-ideologization of interstate relations;

· joint solution of global supranational problems (security, economy, ecology, human rights);

· joint construction of a "common European home" and a single European market, which was planned to enter in the early 1990s.

As a decisive step along this path, the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact countries, on the initiative of the Soviet leadership, adopted in May 1987 the "Berlin Declaration" on the simultaneous dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and primarily their military organizations.

In the second half of the 1980s. The Soviet Union has taken major practical steps to normalize interstate relations, ease tensions in the world, and strengthen the international prestige of the USSR. In August 1985, on the fortieth anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, the USSR imposed a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, inviting other nuclear powers to support his initiative. In response, the US leadership invited representatives of the USSR to attend their nuclear tests. Therefore, the moratorium was temporarily lifted in April 1987. In 1990, it was returned to. On January 15, 1986, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, M. S. Gorbachev, made a statement "In the year 2000 without nuclear weapons." It proposed a plan for the phased and complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the 21st century. In February 1987, in Moscow, at the international forum "For a nuclear-free world, for the survival of mankind", Gorbachev called on representatives of over 80 countries to "humanize" international relations, combine morality and politics, replace the ancient principle "if you want peace, prepare for war" with the modern "if you want peace - fight for peace.

The course towards a nuclear-free world was consistently pursued in the course of the Soviet-American summit meetings. They were renewed in November 1985 and became annual. Meetings and negotiations between M. S. Gorbachev and US Presidents R. Reagan and George W. Bush Sr. contributed to the destruction of the image of the enemy, the establishment of comprehensive relations between the two states and led to the signing of two treaties on military issues. In December 1987, an INF treaty (intermediate and short-range missiles) was signed in Washington. It marked the beginning of a turn from an arms race to disarmament through the destruction of an entire class of weapons. Ratified in both countries in May 1988, it led to the elimination by May 1990 of more than 2,500 missiles (including 2/3 of Soviet ones). This amounted to approximately 4% of the world stock of nuclear weapons. In July 1991, an agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms (OSNV-1) was signed in Moscow. It was the second treaty that provided for the elimination of some of the nuclear weapons.

Appendix 8

FROM THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE USSR ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS "ON THE POLITICAL EVALUATION OF THE DECISION ON THE INTRODUCTION OF SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN"

As a result of a thorough analysis of the available data, the committee came to the conclusion that the decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan deserved moral and political condemnation. The general international environment in which the decision was made was undoubtedly complex, characterized by acute political confrontation. In that situation, there were ideas about the intention of certain circles of the United States of America to take revenge in Afghanistan for the loss of positions after the fall of the Shah's regime in Iran, the facts pointed to the possibility of such a development of events. In the official statements that followed the introduction of troops, one of the motives for the action taken was the desire to strengthen the security of the Soviet Union on the outskirts of the southern borders and thereby protect its positions in the region in connection with the tension that had developed in Afghanistan by that time. Elements of armed intervention from outside were growing. There were appeals from the Afghan government to the Soviet leadership for help. It has been documented that the Afghan government, starting from March 1979, more than 10 times expressed a request to send Soviet military units to the country. In response, the Soviet side rejected this form of assistance, stating that the Afghan revolution must defend itself. However, in the future, this position has undergone, frankly speaking, dramatic changes.

<…>The Committee states that the decision to send troops was taken in violation of the Constitution of the USSR... In this context, we inform you that the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and its Presidium did not consider the issue of sending troops to Afghanistan. The decision was made by a narrow circle of people. As established by the Committee on International Affairs, the Politburo did not even meet in full force to discuss this issue and make a decision on it. Giving a political and moral assessment of the introduction of troops into Afghanistan, it is necessary, it is our duty, to name the names of those who, engaged in the study of the most important foreign policy issues since the mid-70s, decided to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan. These are Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, who at that time held the posts of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of our country, Chairman of the Defense Council and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the USSR; these are the former Minister of Defense of the USSR Ustinov, Chairman of the State Security Committee Andropov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Gromyko.<...>Politically and morally condemning the decision to bring in Soviet troops, the Committee considers it necessary to state that this in no way casts a shadow on the soldiers and officers heading for Afghanistan. Faithful to their oath, convinced that they were defending the interests of the Motherland and providing friendly assistance to the neighboring people, they were only fulfilling their military duty.<...>

Appendix 9

Appendix 1

Features of the political and spiritual development of the country in the 60-70s.

PeculiaritiesSocial Consequences
The gap between the proclaimed ideals of developed socialism and real lifeIncreasing ossification of party-state structures
Unresolved problems of development of national republicsGradual awakening of the national self-consciousness of peoples
Departure from the analysis of real contradictions of social developmentGrowing mass skepticism, political apathy, cynicism; dogmatism in the ideological sphere
Aggravation of the ideological struggleProhibitions and restrictions in the spiritual life; creating the image of an "external enemy"
Ideological rehabilitation of StalinismThe exaltation of the new leader - L.I. Brezhnev
Confrontation between official dogmatic and humanistic, democratic cultureFormation of the spiritual prerequisites for perestroika

Appendix 2

USSR in the early 80s.

Economy

o Sharp drop in economic growth

o Strengthening the command-administrative system of farm management

o Attempts to further strengthen the centralization of administration during the 1979 reform

o Crisis of rigid bureaucratic management of agriculture

o The crisis of the system of non-economic coercion

o inefficient use of material and labor resources and delayed transition to intensive production methods

o inflationary processes, trade deficit, huge pent-up demand.

Political system

o Stiffness of party-state structures tougher repressions against dissidents

o Strengthening the bureaucratization of the state machine

o Strengthening contradictions in the social class structure of society

o Crisis of interethnic relations

spiritual realm

o Growing gap between words and deeds

o Moving away from an objective analysis of the state of affairs in society

o Tougher ideological dictate

o Ideological rehabilitation of Stalinism

o Growing mass skepticism, political apathy, cynicism

The emergence of a pre-crisis state of our society can be explained by both objective and subjective reasons. The objective features include the development of our country in the 70s. The difficult demographic situation, the removal of sources of raw materials and energy carriers from their traditional areas of use, the aggravation of economic problems, the unfavorable world economic situation, and the growing burden of spending on maintaining military-strategic parity and helping allies played a role here. In this regard, it is worth paying attention to the fact that the share of the USSR under the Warsaw Pact was 90% of total spending, and only 10% was accounted for by the allies (for comparison: within NATO, US spending is 54%).

Features and results of previous years of the country's development also contributed to the formation of the pre-crisis state. Such processes as, for example, the excessive centralization of economic management, the nationalization of the cooperative form of ownership were identified and gained momentum much earlier. But in the 70s, along with the growth of the scale of production, they began to manifest themselves more clearly.

The diagnosis of the situation in which the development of our society found itself is stagnation. In fact, a whole system of weakening the instruments of power has emerged, a kind of mechanism for slowing down socio-economic development has been formed. The concept of "braking mechanism" helps to understand the causes of stagnation in the life of society.

The braking mechanism is a set of stagnant phenomena in all spheres of the life of our society: political, economic, social, spiritual, international. The braking mechanism is a consequence, or rather a manifestation of the contradictions between the productive forces and production relations. The subjective factor played a significant role in folding the braking mechanism. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the party and state leadership turned out to be unprepared to actively and effectively counter the growing negative phenomena in all areas of the country's life.

Annex 3

The main stages of perestroika in the USSR

Appendix 4

Stages of economic reform in the USSR (1985 - 1991)

Annex 5

Production of main types of food products (in % to the previous year)

Appendix 6

Perestroika and changes in the spiritual life of society at the turn of the 1990s.

1985 became a milestone in the spiritual life of the USSR. The principle proclaimed by M. S. Gorbachev publicity created conditions for greater openness in decision-making and for an objective rethinking of the past (this was seen as continuity with the first years of the “thaw”). But the main goal of the new leadership of the CPSU was to create conditions for the renewal of socialism. It is no coincidence that the slogan "More glasnost, more socialism!" was put forward. and no less eloquent “We need publicity like we need air!”. Glasnost assumed a greater variety of topics and approaches, a more lively style of presenting material in the media. It was not tantamount to affirming the principle of freedom of speech and the possibility of unhindered and free expression. The implementation of this principle presupposes the existence of appropriate legal and political institutions, which in the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s. did not have.

The membership of the CPSU in 1986, when the 27th Congress was held, reached a record level in its history of 19 million people, after which the ranks of the ruling party began to decline (to 18 million in 1989). Gorbachev's speech at the congress was the first to say that without glasnost there is, and cannot be, democracy. It turned out to be impossible to keep glasnost in check, in metered volumes, especially after the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (April 26, 1986), when the unwillingness of the country's leadership to give objective information and raise the question of responsibility for the tragedy was revealed.

In society, glasnost began to be seen as a rejection of ideological narrow-mindedness in covering current events and in assessing the past. This opened up, as it seemed, inexhaustible opportunities for the formation of a new information field and for an open discussion of all the most important issues in the media. The focus of public attention in the first years of perestroika was journalism. It was this genre of the printed word that could most sharply and promptly respond to problems that worried society. In 1987-1988 the most topical topics were already widely discussed in the press, and controversial points of view on the ways of the country's development were put forward. The appearance of such sharp publications on the pages of censored publications could not have been imagined a few years ago. Publicists for a short time became real "rulers of thoughts". New authoritative authors from among prominent economists, sociologists, journalists and historians were in the epicenter of attention. The popularity of printed publications grew to an incredible level, publishing stunning articles about failures in the economy and social policy - Moskovskiye Novosti, Ogonyok, Arguments and Facts, and Literaturnaya Gazeta. A series of articles about the past and present and about the prospects of the Soviet experience (I. I. Klyamkina “Which street leads to the temple?”, N. P. Shmeleva “Advances and debts”, V. I. Selyunin and G. N. Khanina “Sly Digit", etc.) in the journal "New World", in which the writer S.P. Zalygin was the editor, caused a huge reader response. The publications of L. A. Abalkin, N. P. Shmelev, L. A. Piyasheva, G. Kh. Popov, and T. I. Koryagina on the problems of the country’s economic development were widely discussed. A. A. Tsipko offered a critical reflection on the Leninist ideological heritage and the prospects for socialism, the publicist Yu. Chernichenko called for a revision of the agrarian policy of the CPSU. Yu. N. Afanasiev organized in the spring of 1987 the historical and political readings "The Social Memory of Mankind", they had a response far beyond the Moscow Historical and Archival Institute, which he led. Collections that printed publicistic articles under one cover were especially popular; they were read like a fascinating novel. In 1988, with a circulation of 50,000 copies, the collection “No Other Is Given” was released and immediately became a “deficit”. Articles by its authors (Yu. N. Afanasiev, T. N. Zaslavskaya, A. D. Sakharov, A. A. Nuikin, V. I. Selyunin, Yu. F. Karyakin, G. G. Vodolazov and others) - The representatives of the intelligentsia, known for their public position, were united by a passionate and uncompromising call for the democratization of Soviet society. Every article read the desire for change. In a short foreword by the editor, Yu. Perhaps this is precisely what gives particular credibility to the main idea of ​​the collection: perestroika is a condition for the vitality of our society. Nothing else is given."

The "finest hour" of the press was 1989. Circulation of printed publications reached an unprecedented level: the weekly "Arguments and Facts" was published with a circulation of 30 million copies (this absolute record among weeklies was included in the Guinness Book of Records), the newspaper "Trud" - 20 million, "Pravda" - 10 million. It jumped sharply subscriptions to “thick” magazines (especially after the subscription scandal that broke out at the end of 1988, when they tried to limit it under the pretext of paper shortages). A public wave arose in defense of glasnost, and the subscription was successfully defended. Novy Mir in 1990 came out with a circulation of 2.7 million copies unprecedented for a literary magazine.

Live broadcasts from the meetings of the Congresses of People's Deputies of the USSR (1989-1990) gathered a huge audience, people did not turn off their radios at work, they took portable TVs from home. There was a conviction that it was here, at the congress, in the confrontation of positions and points of view that the fate of the country was being decided. Television began to use the method of reporting from the scene and live broadcast, this was a revolutionary step in covering what was happening. “Live speaking” programs were born - round tables, teleconferences, discussions in the studio, etc. The popular, without exaggeration, popularity of journalistic and information programs (“Look”, “Before and after midnight”, “The Fifth Wheel”, “600 Seconds ”) was due not only to the need for information, but also to the desire of people to be in the center of what is happening. Young TV presenters proved by their example that freedom of speech is emerging in the country and free polemics around the problems that worried people are possible. (True, more than once during the perestroika years, TV management tried to return to the old practice of pre-recording programs.)

The polemical approach was also distinguished by the brightest documentary films of the journalistic genre that appeared at the turn of the 1990s: “It’s impossible to live like this” and “The Russia we have lost” (dir. S. Govorukhin), “Is it easy to be young?” (dir. J. Podnieks). The last film was directly addressed to the youth audience.

The most famous art films about modernity, without embellishment and false pathos, told about the life of the younger generation (“Little Vera”, dir. V. Pichul, “Assa”, dir. S. Solovyov, both appeared on the screen in 1988). Solovyov gathered a crowd of young people to shoot the last shots of the film, announcing in advance that V. Tsoi would sing and act. His songs became for the generation of the 1980s. what the work of V. Vysotsky was for the previous generation.

“Forbidden” topics have essentially disappeared from the press. The names of N. I. Bukharin, L. D. Trotsky, L. B. Kamenev, G. E. Zinoviev and many other repressed political figures returned to history. Party documents that had never been published were made public, and the declassification of archives began. It is characteristic that one of the “first signs” in understanding the past were the works of Western authors already published abroad on the Soviet period of national history (S. Cohen “Bukharin”, A. Rabinovich “The Bolsheviks Go to Power”, the two-volume “History of the Soviet Union” of the Italian historian J. Boffa). The publication of the works of N. I. Bukharin, unknown to the new generation of readers, caused a heated discussion about alternative models for building socialism. The very figure of Bukharin and his legacy were opposed to Stalin; the discussion of development alternatives was conducted in the context of modern prospects for the "renewal of socialism". The need to comprehend the historical truth and answer the questions “what happened” and “why did this happen” to the country and people aroused great interest in publications on Russian history of the 20th century, especially in the memoir literature that began to appear without censored cuts. In 1988, the first issue of the magazine "Our Heritage" was published, and unknown materials on the history of Russian culture, including from the heritage of the Russian emigration, appeared on its pages.

Contemporary art also sought answers to the questions that tormented people. The film directed by T. E. Abuladze "Repentance" (1986) - a parable about the world's evil, embodied in the recognizable image of a dictator, without exaggeration, shocked society. At the end of the picture, an aphorism was sounded, which became the leitmotif of perestroika: “Why the road if it does not lead to the temple?” The problems of a person's moral choice turned out to be the focus of attention of two masterpieces of Russian cinematography different in themes - the film adaptation of M. A. Bulgakov's story "Heart of a Dog" (Dir. V. Bortko, 1988) and "Cold Summer of 53rd" (dir. A. Proshkin , 1987). In the box office there were also those films that had not previously been allowed on the screen by censorship or came out with huge bills: A. Yu. German, A. A. Tarkovsky, K. P. Muratova, S. I. Parajanov. The strongest impression was made by A. Ya. Askoldov's picture "Commissioner" - a film of high tragic pathos.

Appendix 7

"New political thinking" in international relations

In the mid 1980s. the new leadership of the USSR sharply intensified foreign policy. The following tasks, traditional for Soviet foreign policy, were defined: achieving universal security and disarmament; strengthening the world socialist system as a whole, and the socialist community in particular; strengthening relations with the newly-free countries, primarily with the countries of "socialist orientation"; restoration of mutually beneficial relations with capitalist countries; strengthening of the international communist and workers' movement.

These tasks were approved by the XXVII Congress of the CPSU in early 1986. However, in 1987-1988. significant changes have been made to them. For the first time they were reflected in the book by M. S. Gorbachev "Perestroika and new thinking for our country and the whole world" (autumn 1987). The Minister of Foreign Affairs, a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee E.A. Shevardnadze and Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU A. N. Yakovlev. The change of course was symbolized by the replacement of the highly experienced Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia E. A. Shevardnadze, who had previously only had experience in Komsomol and police work and did not speak any foreign languages.

"New political thinking"(NPM) in foreign policy was an attempt to implement the "ideas of perestroika" in the international arena. The main principles of the NPM were as follows:

  • rejection of the conclusion that the modern world is split into two opposite socio-political systems - capitalist and socialist, and the recognition of the modern world as a single, interconnected one;
  • rejection of the belief that the security of the modern world rests on the balance of power of two opposing systems, and recognition of the balance of interests as a guarantor of this security;
  • rejection of the principle of proletarian, socialist internationalism and recognition of the priority of universal human values ​​over any others (national, class, etc.).

In accordance with the new principles, new priorities of Soviet foreign policy were defined:

  • de-ideologization of interstate relations;
  • joint solution of global supranational problems (security, economy, ecology, human rights);
  • joint construction of a "common European home" and a single European market, which was planned to enter in the early 1990s.

As a decisive step along this path, the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact countries, on the initiative of the Soviet leadership, adopted in May 1987 the "Berlin Declaration" on the simultaneous dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and primarily their military organizations.

In the second half of the 1980s. The Soviet Union has taken major practical steps to normalize interstate relations, ease tensions in the world, and strengthen the international prestige of the USSR. In August 1985, on the fortieth anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, the USSR imposed a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, inviting other nuclear powers to support his initiative. In response, the US leadership invited representatives of the USSR to attend their nuclear tests. Therefore, the moratorium was temporarily lifted in April 1987. In 1990, it was returned to. On January 15, 1986, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, M. S. Gorbachev, made a statement "In the year 2000 without nuclear weapons." It proposed a plan for the phased and complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the 21st century. In February 1987, in Moscow, at the international forum "For a nuclear-free world, for the survival of mankind", Gorbachev called on representatives of over 80 countries to "humanize" international relations, combine morality and politics, replace the ancient principle "if you want peace, prepare for war" with the modern "if you want peace - fight for peace.

The course towards a nuclear-free world was consistently pursued in the course of the Soviet-American summit meetings. They were renewed in November 1985 and became annual. Meetings and negotiations between M. S. Gorbachev and US Presidents R. Reagan and George W. Bush Sr. contributed to the destruction of the image of the enemy, the establishment of comprehensive relations between the two states and led to the signing of two treaties on military issues. In December 1987, an INF treaty (intermediate and short-range missiles) was signed in Washington. It marked the beginning of a turn from an arms race to disarmament through the destruction of an entire class of weapons. Ratified in both countries in May 1988, it led to the elimination by May 1990 of more than 2,500 missiles (including 2/3 of Soviet ones). This amounted to approximately 4% of the world stock of nuclear weapons. In July 1991, an agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms (OSNV-1) was signed in Moscow. It was the second treaty that provided for the elimination of some of the nuclear weapons.

Appendix 8

FROM THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE USSR ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS “ON THE POLITICAL EVALUATION OF THE DECISION ON THE INTRODUCTION OF SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN”

As a result of a thorough analysis of the available data, the committee came to the conclusion that the decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan deserved moral and political condemnation. The general international environment in which the decision was made was undoubtedly complex, characterized by acute political confrontation. In that situation, there were ideas about the intention of certain circles of the United States of America to take revenge in Afghanistan for the loss of positions after the fall of the Shah's regime in Iran, the facts pointed to the possibility of such a development of events. In the official statements that followed the introduction of troops, one of the motives for the action taken was the desire to strengthen the security of the Soviet Union on the outskirts of the southern borders and thereby protect its positions in the region in connection with the tension that had developed in Afghanistan by that time. Elements of armed intervention from outside were growing. There were appeals from the Afghan government to the Soviet leadership for help. It has been documented that the Afghan government, starting from March 1979, more than 10 times expressed a request to send Soviet military units to the country. In response, the Soviet side rejected this form of assistance, stating that the Afghan revolution must defend itself. However, in the future, this position has undergone, frankly speaking, dramatic changes.

The Committee states that the decision to send troops was taken in violation of the Constitution of the USSR... In this context, we inform you that the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and its Presidium did not consider the issue of sending troops to Afghanistan. The decision was made by a narrow circle of people. As established by the Committee on International Affairs, the Politburo did not even meet in full force to discuss this issue and make a decision on it. Giving a political and moral assessment of the introduction of troops into Afghanistan, it is necessary, it is our duty, to name the names of those who, engaged in the study of the most important foreign policy issues since the mid-70s, decided to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan. These are Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, who at that time held the posts of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of our country, Chairman of the Defense Council and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the USSR; these are the former Minister of Defense of the USSR Ustinov, Chairman of the State Security Committee Andropov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Gromyko.<...>Politically and morally condemning the decision to bring in Soviet troops, the Committee considers it necessary to state that this in no way casts a shadow on the soldiers and officers heading for Afghanistan. Faithful to their oath, convinced that they were defending the interests of the Motherland and providing friendly assistance to the neighboring people, they were only fulfilling their military duty.<...>

Appendix 9

FROM B.N. YELTSIN AT THE IV CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES OF THE USSR

It must be frankly admitted that the Union leadership does not have a clear political course for the renewal of the country. Outwardly, his actions are in the nature of improvisation, non-reaction to emerging circumstances, endless maneuvering. But behind them is a rigid political logic aimed at disrupting the sovereignties of the republics, at sabotaging radical reforms. As a result, today we have an allied center of “people's mistrust”. The so-called revolution from above is over. The Kremlin has ceased to be the initiator of the renewal of the country and an active conductor of the new. Update processes blocked at the center level have moved to the republics. The deputy corps in a number of republics for the first time seriously weakened the control over itself by the totalitarian system. A real opportunity emerged to start radical transformations precisely in the republics. The unlimited power of the party-state bureaucracy was threatened. And this is not a transfer of power functions from the Union to the Republican bureaucracy, as they are trying to present it here, but the only real opportunity under the conditions of a totalitarian system to protect the independence of enterprises, their peoples, each person from the arbitrariness of departments.<...>

Annex 10

FROM THE DECLARATION OF THE I CONGRESS OF PEOPLE

OF THE RSFSR DEPUTIES “ON THE STATE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE RSFSR”

The First Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, - realizing the historical responsibility for the fate of Russia, - testifying respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples that make up the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, - expressing the will of the peoples of the RSFSR, solemnly proclaims the state sovereignty of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic throughout its territory and declares about the determination to create a democratic legal state as part of the renewed USSR.<...>

Appendix 11

FROM B.N. YELTSIN ON

III EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES OF THE RSFSR

By now, two opposing political courses have been clearly identified in the country: the first is the course towards the implementation of a strategy of profound transformations in all spheres of life; - dismantling the political and ideological monopoly of one party, the development of democratic institutions; - creation of effective mechanisms for the social protection of a person, the implementation of a social policy aimed at emancipating the activity of a person, his initiative and creativity; - and, finally, it is a course towards an open foreign policy. Another, opposite in nature, political course is nothing but the return of the policy that was carried out before April 1985 and caused enormous damage to Russia. This course can only ensure today's bleak existence and its deterioration... The following political conditions must be met at the union and republican levels. The immediate start of a dialogue of all political forces and professional associations of all republics on the principles of a "round table", the formation of a broad democratic coalition of parties, labor movements and various associations. Official renunciation of the use of force, including military force, as a means of political struggle. The development of a system of direct democracy, the implementation of the decisions of the union and republican referendums. Real departization of the organs of the Prosecutor's Office, justice, the KGB, the army, the state apparatus, a ban on combining party positions with senior positions in government and administration, including for the President of the country. The introduction of a system of separation of powers as the beginning of the construction of a rule of law... Cancellation of all unconstitutional decisions of federal and republican bodies that infringe on the political, economic, social and personal rights and freedoms of citizens, the creation of an effective system of guarantees for their provision. Real provision of political pluralism, guarantees of a multi-party system. Creation of conditions for the implementation of the constitutional right of citizens to reliable information, ensuring the independence of the media.<....>

Appendix 12

FROM DECISION No. 1 OF THE STATE COMMITTEE FOR THE STATE OF EMERGENCY IN THE USSR

In order to protect the vital interests of the peoples and citizens of the USSR, the independence and territorial integrity of the country, restore law and order, stabilize the situation, overcome the most difficult crisis, prevent chaos, anarchy and fratricidal civil war, the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR decides:

1. To ensure strict observance of the state of emergency in accordance with the Union SSR Law “On the Legal Regime of the State of Emergency” and the resolutions of the USSR State Emergency Committee. In cases of failure to ensure the implementation of this regime, the powers of the relevant authorities and administration are suspended, and the implementation of their functions is assigned to persons specially authorized by the USSR State Emergency Committee.

2. Immediately disband the structures of power and control, paramilitary formations acting contrary to the Constitution of the USSR and the laws of the USSR.

4. Suspend the activities of political parties, public organizations and mass movements that impede the normalization of the situation.

5. Due to the fact that the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR is temporarily assuming the functions of the USSR Security Council, the activity of the latter is suspended.

Appendix 13

DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE RSFSR “ON THE ILLEGALITY OF THE ACTIONS OF THE GKChP”

In connection with the actions of a group of persons who declared themselves the State Committee for the State of Emergency, I decide:

2. All decisions taken on behalf of the so-called committee on the state of emergency are to be considered illegal and not valid on the territory of the RSFSR. On the territory of the Russian Federation, there is a legally elected authority represented by the President, the Supreme Council and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, all state and local authorities and administrations of the RSFSR.

3. The actions of officials executing the decisions of the said committee are subject to the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and are subject to legal prosecution.

This Decree shall enter into force from the moment of its signing.

President of the RSFSR B. Yeltsin

Red or white? Drama of August-91: facts, hypotheses, clash of opinions. M., 1992. S. 71.

Annex 14

FROM THE APPEAL OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE RSFSR B.N. YELTSIN “TO THE CITIZENS OF RUSSIA!”

Whatever the reasons for this dismissal, we are dealing with a right-wing, reactionary, anti-constitutional coup.

With all the difficulties and hardships that the people are going through, the democratic process in the country is acquiring an ever deeper scope and an irreversible character. The peoples of Russia are becoming masters of their own destiny. The uncontrolled rights of non-constitutional bodies, including party bodies, are significantly limited. The leadership of Russia took a decisive position on the Union Treaty, striving for the unity of the Soviet Union, the unity of Russia. Our position on this issue made it possible to significantly accelerate the preparation of this Treaty, to coordinate it with all the republics, and to determine the date for its signing - August 20 this year. G.

This development of events embittered the reactionary forces, pushed them to irresponsible, adventurous attempts to solve the most complex political and economic problems by force. There have been previous coup attempts.

We believed and continue to believe that such forceful methods are unacceptable. They discredit the USSR before the whole world, undermine our prestige in the world community, return us to the era of the Cold War and the isolation of the Soviet Union from the world community.

All this forces us to declare illegal the so-called committee that came to power. Accordingly, we declare illegal all decisions and orders of this committee.

We are confident that local authorities will strictly follow the constitutional Laws and Decrees of the President of the RSFSR.

We call on the citizens of Russia to give a fitting response to the putschists and demand that the country be returned to normal constitutional development.

Of course, it is necessary to provide an opportunity for the President of the country, Gorbachev, to address the people. We demand the immediate convocation of the Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR.

We are absolutely sure that our compatriots will not allow the arbitrariness and lawlessness of the putschists, who have lost all shame and conscience, to take hold. We appeal to the servicemen to show high citizenship and not to take part in the reactionary coup.

Until these demands are met, we call for a general indefinite strike.

We have no doubt that the world community will give an objective assessment of the cynical attempt at a right-wing coup.

President of the RSFSR Yeltsin B.N.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR Silaev I. S.

Acting Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR Khasbulatov R. I.

Red or white? Drama of August-91: facts, hypotheses, clash of opinions. M., 1992. S. 63 - 72.

Appendix 15

APPEAL OF THE PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA TO SOLDIERS AND OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR, KGB OF THE USSR, MIA OF THE USSR.

Servicemen!

Compatriots!

An attempted coup d'etat. The President of the USSR, who is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR, was removed from office. The vice-president of the USSR, the prime minister, the chairman of the KGB of the USSR, the ministers of defense and internal affairs of the USSR entered the anti-constitutional body, thereby committing high treason - the gravest state crime.

The country faced the threat of terror. The “order” that the newly-minted saviors of the Fatherland promise us will turn into a tragedy, the suppression of dissent, concentration camps, nighttime arrests. “Better Life” will remain a propaganda hoax. Soldiers and officers of Russia! At this tragic moment for Russia, for the whole country, I turn to you. Do not let yourself be caught in a network of lies, promises and demagogic arguments about military duty! Do not become a blind instrument of the criminal will of a group of adventurers who have violated the Constitution and laws of the USSR.

Soldiers! I'm talking to you. Think of your loved ones, friends, your people. In a difficult moment of choice, do not forget that you took an oath of allegiance to the people. The people against whom they are trying to turn your weapons.

You can build a throne out of bayonets, but you can't sit on it for long. There is no return to the past and never will be. The days of the conspirators are numbered.

Soldiers, officers and generals! An hour ago I appointed the Chairman of the RSFSR Committee on Defense Questions. Your comrade in arms, Colonel General K. I. Kobets, became it. A decree was issued according to which all territorial and other bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the KGB, the Ministry of Defense on the territory of the RSFSR are obliged to immediately comply with all orders of the President of the RSFSR, the KGB of the RSFSR, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR, the State Committee of the RSFSR for Defense Issues.

Clouds of terror and dictatorship have gathered over Russia, over the whole country. But they cannot turn into eternal night. The law will prevail on our land and our long-suffering people will regain their freedom. Now, once and for all!

Soldiers! I believe that in this tragic hour you will be able to make the right choice. The honor and glory of Russian weapons will not be stained with the blood of the people.

Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation.

7 hours 10 minutes.

Red or white? Drama of August-91: facts, hypotheses, clash of opinions. M., 1992. S. 73.

Appendix 16

AGREEMENT ON THE CREATION OF THE CIS

Article 1 The High Contracting Parties form the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).<...>

Article 4. The High Contracting Parties will develop equal and mutually beneficial cooperation between their peoples and states in the fields of politics, economics, culture, education, healthcare, environmental protection, science, trade, humanitarian and other fields, promote a broad exchange of information, conscientiously and strictly comply with mutual obligations. The parties consider it necessary to conclude an agreement on cooperation in these areas.

Article 5 The High Contracting Parties recognize and respect each other's territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders within the Commonwealth. They guarantee the openness of borders, the freedom of movement of citizens and the transfer of information within the Commonwealth.<...>

Article 7. The High Contracting Parties recognize that the scope of their joint activities, implemented on an equal footing through common coordinating institutions of the Commonwealth, includes:

  • coordination of foreign policy activities;
  • cooperation in the formation and development of a common economic space, common European and European markets, in the field of customs policy;
  • cooperation in the development of transport and communication systems;
  • cooperation in the field of environmental protection, participation in the creation of a comprehensive international system of environmental safety;
  • issues of migration policy;
  • fight against organized crime.

Article 14. The official seat of the coordinating bodies of the Commonwealth is the city of Minsk.<...>

For the Republic of Belarus S. Shushkevich

For the RSFSR B. Yeltsin, G. Burbulis

For Ukraine L. Kravchuk

Appendix 17

Independent states

Republic of Azerbaijan, Republic of Armenia, Republic of Belarus, Republic of Kazakhstan, Republic of Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation (RSFSR), Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Republic of Uzbekistan and Ukraine,

striving to build democratic legal states, relations between which will develop on the basis of mutual recognition and respect for state sovereignty and sovereign equality, the inalienable right to self-secession, the principles of equality and non-interference in internal affairs, the rejection of the use of force and the threat of force, economic and any other methods of pressure , peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for human rights and freedoms, including the rights of national minorities, conscientious fulfillment of obligations and other generally recognized principles and norms of international law;

recognizing and respecting each other's territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders;

Considering that the strengthening of relations of friendship, good neighborliness and mutually beneficial cooperation, which have deep historical roots, meets the fundamental interests of the peoples and serves the cause of peace and security;

realizing their responsibility for the preservation of civil peace and interethnic harmony;

Being committed to the aims and principles of the Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, declare as follows:

interaction between the members of the Commonwealth will be carried out on the principle of equality through coordinating institutions formed on a parity basis and operating in the manner determined by agreements between the members of the Commonwealth, which is neither a state nor a supranational entity.

In order to ensure international strategic stability and security, a unified command of the military-strategic forces and a unified control over nuclear weapons will be maintained; the parties will respect each other's aspirations to achieve the status of a nuclear-free and (or) neutral state.

The Commonwealth of Independent States is open with the consent of all its participants for accession to it by the member states of the former USSR, as well as other states that share the goals and principles of the Commonwealth.

The commitment to cooperation in the formation and development of a common economic space, the pan-European and Eurasian markets is confirmed.

With the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ceases to exist.<...>

Appendix 18

FROM SPEECH M.S. GORBACHEV ON CENTRAL TELEVISION

Dear compatriots! Fellow citizens! Due to the current situation with the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, I cease my activities as President of the USSR. I make this decision on principled grounds. I firmly stood for the independence, independence of the peoples, for the sovereignty of the republics. But at the same time, for the preservation of the union state, the integrity of the country. Events took a different path. The line on the dismemberment of the country and the division of the state prevailed, with which I cannot agree. And after the Alma-Ata meeting and the decisions taken there, my position on this matter has not changed. In addition, I am convinced that decisions of this magnitude should have been made on the basis of the people's will.<...>I leave my post with anxiety. But also with hope, with faith in you, in your wisdom and fortitude. We are the heirs of a great civilization, and now it depends on everyone and everyone that it be reborn to a new modern and dignified life.

Annex 19

FROM THE DECLARATION OF THE COUNCIL OF REPUBLICS OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR IN CONNECTION WITH THE CREATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

Relying on the will expressed by the highest state bodies of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan and Ukraine on the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Council of the Republics of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR states that with the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the USSR as a state and subject of international law ceases to exist.

The Council of the Republics of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR addresses the heads of the Independent States with a proposal to consider the following questions:

  • the succession of the USSR and allied bodies of state power and administration in connection with the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States;
  • creation of an inter-parliamentary body of the Commonwealth in order to preserve a single legal, economic, humanitarian and environmental space in the territories of the member states of the Commonwealth;
  • ratification, execution and denunciation of international treaties concluded by the USSR before the formation of the Commonwealth.

The Council of the Republics of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR calls on the highest representative bodies of state power and heads of state members of the Commonwealth to take all measures in their power to ensure the rights and freedoms of citizens, regardless of their nationality, in accordance with the Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms, the peaceful coexistence of the peoples of the Commonwealth, and the democratic development of their statehood, good-neighborly relations and cooperation with the states and peoples of the world community, the steady fulfillment of international obligations arising from treaties and agreements of the USSR.

Chairman of the Council of the Republics A. Alimzhanov

Vedomosti of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. 1991. No. 52. Art. 2058 - 2059.

START-1

Treaty on the Limitation of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

Treaty on the Limitation of Conventional Forces in Europe, signed definitively in Paris November 19, 1990 was the most important act of ending the Cold War. The Soviet Union under this treaty promised the West a phenomenal reduction in its conventional superiority in Europe.
Although it was a multilateral treaty, the whole thing came down to US pressure on the USSR, where Gorbachev promised to make colossal cuts. The West has reduced the whole thing to the fact that the military in the Soviet Union is trying to use every kind of reticence or ambiguity in the treaty in order to save part of their reduced forces.
On May 27, 1991, Gorbachev had a very important telephone conversation with Bush.
Three topics dominated: CFE, START and economic cooperation. Bush told Gorbachev that if the Soviet side moved "just a little", the road would open for President Bush's trip to Moscow. Gorbachev replied that he had received Bush's letter and gave instructions to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (since January 1991) A. A. Bessmertnykh to introduce "new ideas" into the CFE. A key decision was made at a meeting between Baker and the Immortals in Lisbon on June 1, 1991.
On June 14, 1991, at a special session of ambassadors in Vienna, the CFE Treaty was signed.
For many years, the USSR had a significant predominance over the West in the European theater in conventional weapons: 60 thousand tanks (plus 4.4 thousand new tanks produced annually) gave a weighty argument to the ground forces of the USSR.
Now this argument is no longer valid. As a price to pay for normalizing relations with the West, Russia limited itself to 6,400 tanks. There is a drop in production in industries that created conventional weapons. The accumulated reserves may still be enough for 5-10 years, until it becomes clear that Russia needs to re-create its weapons.

US President George W. Bush Sr. arrived in Moscow in July 1991. The main issue of the meeting in Moscow was the signing on July 31, 1991 of the Agreement on the reduction strategic offensive weapons - START-1. 8 years were allotted for the implementation of START-1. American pressure on the Soviet side in 1991 was overtly brutal. This, in particular, was admitted by Secretary of State J. Baker: “For many years we have sought to convince the Soviet Union to reduce the number of their warheads. Now they finally agree with us, and we suddenly say to them: “No, wait! We've come up with an even more sophisticated way to disarm you."
Each side had the right to maintain 1,600 strategic launchers in land mines and submarines. The parties were limited to 6,000 nuclear warheads (4,900 ground-based ballistic missiles; 1,540 charges on heavy missiles; 1,100 charges on mobile launchers).
High-speed missile systems were subjected to the greatest reduction.
The cuts were unequal: 25% cuts for the United States and 35% for the Soviet Union. The USSR pledged to halve the number of heavy ICBMs.
The negotiation process was supposed to continue. The Soviet side wanted to know when it came to reducing tactical nuclear weapons, but the US leadership rather harshly rejected such ideas. The American side responded just as harshly to Gorbachev on another important issue - the cessation of underground tests. The answer was short: the American side not ready consider this issue.
Deterioration of the internal economic situation in the USSR in 1989-1991. forced the leaders of the country to seek financial and economic assistance from the leading countries of the world, primarily the countries of the "seven" (USA, Canada, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Japan). In 1990-1991 they provided the USSR with "humanitarian aid" (food, medicines, medical equipment). Serious financial assistance was not forthcoming. The G7 countries and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), promising such assistance, refused it in the summer of 1991, referring to the unstable internal political situation in the USSR. They were more and more inclined to support individual republics of the USSR, politically and materially encouraging their separatism. Nevertheless, through closed channels, large-scale assistance with loans was provided. As a result, the external debt of the USSR during the period of Gorbachev's rule increased from 13 to 113 billion dollars (excluding Lend-Lease debt).
On December 8, 1991, the leaders of the three Slavic republics, having decided to liquidate the USSR and create the CIS, first of all informed the US President about this.



1985 became a milestone in the spiritual life of the USSR. Proclaimed by M. S. Gorbachev principle publicity created conditions for greater openness in decision-making and for an objective rethinking of the past (this was seen as continuity with the first years of the “thaw”). But the main goal of the new leadership of the CPSU was to create conditions for the renewal of socialism. It was no coincidence that it was put forward slogan "More glasnost, more socialism!" and no less eloquent “We need publicity like we need air!”. Glasnost assumed a greater variety of topics and approaches, a more lively style of presenting material in the media. It was not tantamount to affirming the principle of freedom of speech and the possibility of unhindered and free expression. The implementation of this principle presupposes the existence of appropriate legal and political institutions, which in the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s. did not have.
The membership of the CPSU in 1986, when the 27th Congress was held, reached a record level in its history of 19 million people, after which the ranks of the ruling party began to decline (to 18 million in 1989). Gorbachev's speech at the congress was the first to say that that without glasnost there is not and cannot be democracy. The lack of unanimity on the question of the prospects for the country's development, which manifested itself in the course of the discussions gaining momentum in the party organizations, spilled over under the conditions of publicity into a stormy public discussion of sore problems. It turned out to be impossible to keep glasnost in check, in metered volumes, especially after the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (April 26, 1986), when the unwillingness of the country's leadership to give objective information and raise the question of responsibility for the tragedy was revealed. The term "glasnost" was used in Gorbachev's speech at the XXVII Congress of the CPSU in February 1986 Under the policy of glasnost began to understand openness, accessibility of information about all spheres of life. Freedom of speech, thought, lack of censorship of the media. Respect for the rights and freedoms of man and citizen. This opened up, as it seemed, inexhaustible opportunities for the formation of a new information field and for an open discussion of all the most important issues in the media. The focus of public attention in the first years of perestroika was journalism. It was this genre of the printed word that could most sharply and promptly respond to problems that worried society. In 1987-1988 the most topical topics were already widely discussed in the press, and controversial points of view on the ways of the country's development were put forward. The appearance of such sharp publications on the pages of censored publications could not have been imagined a few years ago. Publicists for a short time became real "rulers of thoughts". The popularity of printed publications grew to an incredible level, publishing stunning articles about failures in the economy and social policy - Moskovskiye Novosti, Ogonyok, Arguments and Facts, and Literaturnaya Gazeta. A series of articles about the past and present and about the prospects of the Soviet experience (I. I. Klyamkina “Which street leads to the temple?”, N. P. Shmeleva “Advances and debts”, V. I. Selyunin and G. N. Khanina “Sly Digit", etc.) in the journal "New World", in which the writer S.P. Zalygin was the editor, caused a huge reader response. The publications of L. A. Abalkin, N. P. Shmelev, L. A. Piyasheva, G. Kh. Popov, and T. I. Koryagina on the problems of the country’s economic development were widely discussed. A. A. Tsipko offered a critical reflection on the Leninist ideological heritage and the prospects for socialism, the publicist Yu. Chernichenko called for a revision of the agrarian policy of the CPSU. Historian Yu. N. Afanasiev organized in the spring of 1987 the historical and political readings "The Social Memory of Mankind", they resonated far beyond the Moscow Historical and Archival Institute, which he led. Collections that printed publicistic articles under one cover were especially popular; they were read like a fascinating novel. In 1988, with a circulation of 50,000 copies, the collection “No Other Is Given” was released and immediately became a “deficit”. Articles by its authors (Yu. N. Afanasiev, T. N. Zaslavskaya, A. D. Sakharov, A. A. Nuikin, V. I. Selyunin, Yu. F. Karyakin, G. G. Vodolazov and others) - The representatives of the intelligentsia, known for their public position, were united by a passionate and uncompromising call for the democratization of Soviet society. Every article read the desire for change. In a short foreword by the editor, Yu. Perhaps this is precisely what gives particular credibility to the main idea of ​​the collection: perestroika is a condition for the vitality of our society. Nothing else is given."
The "finest hour" of the press was 1989. Print circulation has reached an unprecedented level: the weekly "Arguments and Facts" was published with a circulation of 30 million copies (this absolute record among weeklies was entered in the Guinness Book of Records), the newspaper "Trud" - 20 million, "Pravda" - 10 million. Subscriptions to "thick" magazines jumped sharply (especially after the subscription scandal that erupted at the end of 1988, when they tried to limit it under the pretext of paper shortages). A public wave arose in defense of glasnost, and the subscription was successfully defended. Novy Mir in 1990 came out with a circulation of 2.7 million copies unprecedented for a literary magazine.
Live broadcasts from the meetings of the Congresses of People's Deputies of the USSR (1989-1990) gathered a huge audience, people did not turn off their radios at work, they took portable TVs from home. There was a conviction that it was here, at the congress, in the confrontation of positions and points of view that the fate of the country was being decided. Television began to use the method of reporting from the scene and live broadcast, this was a revolutionary step in covering what was happening. “Live speaking” programs were born - round tables, teleconferences, discussions in the studio, etc. The popularity of journalistic and information programs, without exaggeration, is universally popular (“ Look", "Before and after midnight", "The Fifth Wheel", "600 Seconds") was conditioned not only by the need for information, but also by the desire of people to be in the center of what is happening. Young TV presenters proved by their example that freedom of speech is emerging in the country and free polemics around the problems that worried people are possible. (True, more than once during the perestroika years, TV management tried to return to the old practice of pre-recording programs.)
The polemical approach distinguished the most bright non-fiction documentaries that appeared at the turn of the 1990s: “It’s impossible to live like this” and “The Russia we lost” (dir. S. Govorukhin), “Is it easy to be young?” (dir. J. Podnieks). The last film was directly addressed to the youth audience.
The most famous art films about modernity, without embellishment and false pathos, told about the life of the younger generation (“Little Vera”, dir. V. Pichul, “Assa”, dir. S. Solovyov, both appeared on the screen in 1988). Solovyov gathered a crowd of young people to shoot the last shots of the film, announcing in advance that he would sing and act V. Tsoi. His songs became for the generation of the 1980s. what the work of V. Vysotsky was for the previous generation.
From the press, essentially , "forbidden" topics disappeared. The names of N. I. Bukharin, L. D. Trotsky, L. B. Kamenev, G. E. Zinoviev and many other repressed political figures returned to history. Party documents that had never been published were made public, and the declassification of archives began. It is characteristic that one of the “first signs” in understanding the past were the works of Western authors already published abroad on the Soviet period of national history (S. Cohen “Bukharin”, A. Rabinovich “The Bolsheviks Go to Power”, the two-volume “History of the Soviet Union” of the Italian historian J. Boffa). The publication of the works of N. I. Bukharin, unknown to the new generation of readers, caused a heated discussion about alternative models for building socialism. The very figure of Bukharin and his legacy were opposed to Stalin; the discussion of development alternatives was conducted in the context of modern prospects for the "renewal of socialism". The need to comprehend the historical truth and answer the questions “what happened” and “why did this happen” to the country and people aroused great interest in publications on Russian history of the 20th century, especially in the memoir literature that began to appear without censored cuts. Into the light in 1988 the first issue of the Our Heritage magazine was published, on its pages appear unknown materials on the history of Russian culture, including from the heritage of the Russian emigration.
Contemporary art also sought answers to the questions that tormented people. Director's film T. E. Abuladze "Repentance"(1986) - a parable about world evil, embodied in the recognizable image of a dictator, without exaggeration, shocked society. At the end of the picture, an aphorism was sounded, which became the leitmotif of perestroika: “Why the road if it does not lead to the temple?” The problems of a person's moral choice turned out to be the focus of attention of two masterpieces of Russian cinematography different in themes - the film adaptation of M. A. Bulgakov's story "Heart of a Dog" (Dir. V. Bortko, 1988) and "Cold Summer of 53rd" (dir. A. Proshkin , 1987). In the box office there were also those films that had not previously been allowed on the screen by censorship or came out with huge bills: A. Yu. German, A. A. Tarkovsky, K. P. Muratova, S. I. Parajanov. The strongest impression was made by A. Ya. Askoldov's picture "Commissioner" - a film of high tragic pathos.
The intensity of the public discussion found visible expression in the perestroika poster. From a propaganda tool familiar to Soviet times, the poster turned into a tool for exposing social vices and criticizing economic difficulties.

At the turn of the 1990s. there was a period of rapid growth of the historical self-awareness of the nation and the peak of social activity. Changes in economic and political life were becoming a reality, people were seized by the desire to prevent the reversibility of changes. However, there was no consensus on the priorities, mechanisms and pace of change. Around the "perestroika" press, supporters of the radicalization of the political course and the consistent implementation of democratic reforms were grouped. They enjoyed wide support public opinion that took shape in the first years of perestroika.

Along with glasnost, another keyword of perestroika appears - pluralism , meaning diversity of opinion on the same issue

The presence of public opinion, based on the media, was a new phenomenon in Russian history. Leaders of public opinion appeared in the country from among the representatives of the creative intelligentsia - journalists, writers, scientists. Among them were many people of civic duty and great personal courage.
At the end of 1986 AD Sakharov returned from his exile in Gorky. Widely known as one of the creators of the hydrogen weapon, human rights activist and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize (1975), the scientist was also a tireless champion of morality in politics. His civil position was not always met with understanding. Sakharov was elected to the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. "A prophet in the ancient, primordial sense of the word, that is, a man who called his contemporaries to moral renewal for the sake of the future," Sakharov was called in his farewell speech by an outstanding scientist, philologist and historian D. S. Likhachev.
The name of D.S. Likhachev is associated with a whole era in the development of the domestic humanities. In the conditions of growing disillusionment in socio-political ideals in the last Soviet years, he gave a personal example of the selfless public service of a Russian intellectual. "To be intelligent" he considered "the social duty of a person", investing in this concept, first of all, "the ability to understand the other." His works on the history of ancient Russian literature and culture are imbued with the conviction that the preservation and enhancement of the national spiritual heritage is the key to the country's successful development in the 21st century. During the years of perestroika, this call was heard by millions of people. The scientist was known for his uncompromising position in the protection of historical and cultural monuments and tireless educational activities. More than once, his intervention prevented the destruction of historical heritage.
With their moral and civil position, such people as D.S. Likhachev and A.D. Sakharov had a huge impact on the spiritual climate in the country. Their activities have become a moral guide for many in an era when the usual ideas about the country and the world around us began to collapse.
Changes in the spiritual climate in society stimulated the rise of civic activity. During the years of perestroika, numerous public initiatives independent of the state were born. So called informals(i.e. non-state organized activists ) gathered under the "roof" of scientific institutes, universities and such well-known public (actually state) organizations as the Soviet Peace Committee. Unlike in the past, community initiative groups created from below people of very different views and ideological positions, all of them were united by the willingness to personally participate in achieving radical changes for the better in the country. Among them were representatives of emerging political movements, they created debating clubs (“ Club of Social Initiatives”, “Perestroika”, then “Perestroika-88”, “Democratic Perestroika”, etc.). At the end of 1988, the Moscow Tribune club became an authoritative socio-political center. Its members - well-known representatives of the intelligentsia, leaders of public opinion - gathered for an expert discussion of the most significant problems for the country. A whole range of various non-political and near-political initiatives focused on human rights activities has appeared (such as “ civic dignity"), to protect the environment (Socio-ecological union), on the organization of local self-government, on the sphere of leisure and a healthy lifestyle. The groups that set the task of the spiritual revival of Russia were mainly of a pronounced religious nature. At the beginning of 1989, there were about 200 informal clubs, similar forms of social self-organization existed in large industrial and scientific centers of the country. Such groups had a noticeable impact on public opinion and were able to mobilize supporters and sympathizers. On this basis, during the years of perestroika, a civil society was born in the country.
The flow of Soviet people who traveled abroad also increased sharply, and mainly not due to tourism, but as part of public initiatives (“people's diplomacy”, “children's diplomacy”, family exchanges). Perestroika opened a “window to the world” for many.
But a significant part of society, mindful of the unfulfilled hopes of the previous generation for change, took a wait-and-see attitude. There were loud calls "protect socialism" and the Soviet legacy from "falsification". A storm of responses was caused by an article published in the newspaper "Soviet Russia" in March 1988 by a teacher from Leningrad, N. Andreeva, under the telling title "I can't give up my principles." From other positions - the struggle against the penetration of "Western influences destructive for the nation" and for the preservation of identity - famous writers and artists spoke - V. I. Belov, V. G. Rasputin, I. S. Glazunov and others. The clash between supporters of Western-style democratic reforms and those who advocated the “reform” of socialism itself, for a return to “real” socialist ideals, adherents of openly anti-communist views and those who supported the idea of ​​a renewed restoration of the Soviet system, threatened to go beyond the bounds of passionate polemics in the press and on the podium of the Congress of People's Deputies. It reflected the beginning of the political division in society.
In 1986, Znamya magazine published A. A. Beck’s “thaw” novel The New Appointment, which was never published in the 1960s, a passionate exposure of the vices of the administrative-command system of the Stalin era. The most interested and sensitive reader had novels A. Rybakov "Children of the Arbat", V. Dudintsev "White clothes", Y. Dombrovsky "Faculty of unnecessary things", D. Granin's story "Zubr". They are united, like the brightest films of perestroika, the desire to rethink the past and give it a moral and ethical assessment. Ch. Aitmatov in the novel "The Scaffold" (1987) first addressed the problems of drug addiction, about which in Soviet society it was not customary to speak aloud. New on the topics raised, all these works were written in the "educational" tradition of Russian literature.
Works that had previously been banned for publication in the USSR began to return to the reader. In Novy Mir, 30 years after B. L. Pasternak was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature, the novel Doctor Zhivago was published. Books were published by writers of the first wave of emigration - I. A. Bunin, B. K. Zaitsev, I. S. Shmelev, V. V. Nabokov and those who were forced to leave the USSR already in the 1970s - A. A. Galich, I. A. Brodsky, V. V. Voinovich, V. P. Aksenov. For the first time in the homeland, "The Gulag Archipelago" by A.I. Solzhenitsyn and "Kolyma Tales" by V.T. Shalamov, A.A.

AT In June 1990, the law “On the Press and Other Mass Media” was adopted, finally abolishing censorship . Thus, the Soviet system of cultural management was basically destroyed. It was a great victory for the supporters of democratic reforms.

Changes in political life led to a gradual normalization of relations between the state and the church. Already in the 1970s. the development of interaction between the state and religious organizations was facilitated by the active peacekeeping activities of representatives of the leading confessions (especially the Russian Orthodox Church). In 1988, the millennium of the Baptism of Russia marked as an event of national importance. The center of the celebration was the Moscow St. Danilov Monastery, transferred to the church and restored.
In 1990, the USSR Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations” was adopted, it guaranteed the right of citizens to profess any religion (or not to profess any) and equality of religions and denominations before the law, secured the right of religious organizations to participate in public life. Recognition of the significance of the Orthodox tradition in the spiritual life of the country was the appearance in the calendar of a new public holiday - the Nativity of Christ (for the first time on January 7, 1991.

The wave of enthusiasm that rose after the new leadership came to power, after 2-3 years, sharply subsided. Disappointment in the results of the announced Gorbachev's course on "acceleration of socio-economic development". There is visible evidence that the country is rapidly on the path of deepening social inequality. The first alternative forms of employment and get rich quick emerged. The proliferation of trading and intermediary cooperatives that bought goods at state prices and resold them, or used state equipment to support their work, led to the appearance of the country's first rich people in an environment where many industries began to stand idle due to interruptions in the supply of raw materials, and wages quickly depreciated. A stunning impression was made by the appearance in the country the first "legal" millionaires: businessman, member of the CPSU A. Tarasov, for example, paid party dues from millions of incomes . At the same time, the announced campaign of "fighting unearned income" (1986) hurt those who earned money by tutoring, selling flowers on the street, private cabs, etc.
The beginning disorganization of production led to the destruction of redistribution mechanisms, and the economy continued to be pumped up with unsecured money supply. As a result, in peacetime and for no apparent reason, literally everything began to disappear from the shelves - from meat and butter to matches. In order to somehow regulate the situation, they introduced coupons for some essential goods (for example, soap), there were long queues in stores. This made the older generation remember the first post-war years. Goods could be purchased from resellers and in the market, but here the prices were several times higher and most of the population were not available. As a result, for the first time in many years, state prices for everyday goods crept up. The standard of living of the people began to fall.
The last large-scale campaign of the Soviet era left a very ambiguous impression - anti-alcohol.(1986) Shortly after MS Gorbachev came to the leadership of the country, emergency measures were announced to limit alcohol consumption. The number of outlets selling alcoholic beverages was sharply reduced, “non-alcoholic weddings” were widely promoted in the press, and plantations of elite grape varieties in the south of the country were destroyed. As a result, the shadow turnover of alcohol and moonshine brewing jumped sharply.
These and other emergency measures discredited the social and economic course of the Gorbachev leadership. Trying to "pat up the holes", the state began to cut funding for defense and scientific programs. Millions of people continued to be formally registered in production and scientific institutions, but in fact they stopped receiving salaries or received them at a level below the subsistence level. As a result, many were left without a livelihood and were forced to look for any employment opportunities that were not related to their qualifications, primarily in trade. The level of state social protection continued to fall, failures began in the healthcare sector, in the provision of medicines. To late 1980s the country's birth rate has plummeted. Man-made disasters (Chernobyl, the death of the nuclear submarine "Komsomolets") exacerbated disappointment in the management's ability to cope with the crisis. Uncertainty about the correctness of the chosen course was also inspired by the "falling away" from the Soviet system of the countries of the socialist camp (1989).
characteristic trend of the late 1980s. there was a stormy interest in "soap operas" - the first Mexican and Brazilian series to appear on the screen. Non-traditional cults and beliefs, including aggressive sectarian ones, began to spread, foreign preachers appeared in the country. Healing has acquired the character of a mass hobby, which was broadcast on television. This testified to the confusion of people in the face of the growing socio-economic crisis. In the context of a sharp drop in income, for many, labor on the garden plot has become the main means of maintaining a standard of living. The Soviet people, accustomed to counting on the help of the state, found themselves face to face with these problems. A stormy discussion of topical issues in the press did not lead to visible changes for the better. Disappointment in the results of glasnost known publicist V.I. Selyunin expressed in a capacious formula: "There is publicity, there is no audibility."
"We want change!" - the heroes of the popular film "Assa" demanded. Characteristic were the words of the song by Viktor Tsoi (1988):

Our hearts demand change
Our eyes demand change.
In our laughter and in our tears
And in the pulsation of the veins ...
Change, we are waiting for change.

The Soviet era in the history of the country was ending