Introduction

The Battle of Narva is one of the first battles of the Great Northern War between the Russian army of Peter I and the Swedish army of Charles XII, which took place on November 19 (30), 1700 near the city of Narva, ending in the defeat of the Russian troops.

1. Background

Immediately after receiving the news of the conclusion of the Constantinople peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire, Peter I declared war on Sweden. On August 4, 1700, Russian troops advanced in the direction of Narva.

The summer and autumn of 1700 turned out to be very rainy, which caused great problems with the provision of the army. The carts broke down and got stuck in the mud, the loss of food already on the march began the death of horses, and the columns were greatly stretched. When approaching Narva, the uniforms of the soldiers were disheveled and spread at the seams, there was a shortage of food, the soldiers began to be fed little and poorly.

The concentration of troops was very slow. The advance detachment led by Prince Ivan Trubetskoy arrived at the fortress on September 20. On October 4, Ivan Buturlin's detachment arrived, led by Peter I. On October 25, the division of Avtomon Golovin and Boris Sheremetev's cavalry approached. Only on November 5, 1700, the army fully gathered under the city. Near Narva, Peter I concentrated about 32-35 thousand people and 184 artillery pieces. The garrison of the fortress under the command of Colonel Gorn consisted of 1,300 foot and 200 mounted soldiers and 400 militias.

Narva and Ivangorod were a single fortification connected by a permanent bridge. In this regard, both fortresses had to be besieged. Peter personally supervised the siege work. On the left bank of the Narova River, double lines of a continuous rampart were erected, flanked by the river. The distance between the rampart lines was 600 fathoms on the right flank, 120 fathoms in the center, and 41-50 fathoms on the left flank. The narrowness of the space between the ramparts, which was still built up with barracks for soldiers, deprived the army of maneuverability. The troops were divided into three groups: Golovin's troops, numbering about 14 thousand people, stood on the right flank; in the center on Mount Germansberg - a detachment of Prince Trubetskoy of 6 thousand people; on the left flank, the division of General Adam Weide, 3 thousand people; to the left of the Veide detachment, resting against the river bank - Sheremetev's cavalry of 5 thousand people. 22 guns and 17 mortars were located along the ramparts, while the rest of the artillery was located in positions near Ivangorod.

On October 31, the Russian army began regular shelling of the fortress. The charges lasted only two weeks, and the effectiveness of the fire was minimal. The poor quality of gunpowder and the lack of large-caliber artillery had an effect.

Having received news of the landing of the troops of Charles XII in Pernau, Peter I sent a cavalry detachment of 5 thousand people under the command of Boris Sheremetev, who stopped in Wesenberg, for reconnaissance. On November 5, a detachment of General Welling approached Wesenberg. Sheremetev, fearing for his left flank, retreated 36 miles to the village of Purtz. On November 6, the vanguard of the Swedish army attacked the Russian cover in the village of Vergle. Sheremetev sent a detachment of 21 squadrons to help, which managed to surround the Swedes. Despite the success achieved, Sheremetev retreated to the village of Pihayogi. Justifying himself to the tsar, Sheremetev wrote: “I didn’t stand there for that: unspeakable swamps and swamps and great forests. And from the forest, sneaking up one person would set fire to the village and cause great misfortunes, and moreover, it would be dangerous to bypass us around to Rugodiv (Narva) ". Peter ordered Sheremetev to hold positions at Pihayoga. From the prisoners captured in the battle near Purtz, it became known that there were 30 thousand people in the royal army, and an advanced detachment of 5 thousand people was in Rakvere. On November 23, the Swedish army advanced to Narva. Sheremetev, instead of holding positions, retreated to the city.

By this time, Russian troops had not sufficiently strengthened their positions in the western direction, and the Swedes were moving unhindered towards the city. On November 29, Peter I left the camp of Russian troops for Novgorod, leaving the command to Field Marshal de Croix. Peter I explained his departure by the need to replenish reserves, carts and meet with King Augustus II: “Against the 18th, the sovereign went from the army to Novgorod in order to encourage the marching regiments to promptly arrive at Narva, and especially to have a meeting with the King of Poland”. In the besieging army by this time there was a difficult situation with provisions. Before the battle, the soldiers of many regiments did not eat anything for a day.

2. The course of the battle

Having learned about the approach of the Swedes, the Duke de Croix ordered the troops to be put on alert and placed in one line between the ramparts, stretching the troops in a thin line for 7 miles and leaving no reserve.

On the night of November 30, 1700, the army of Charles XII, observing complete silence, marched towards the Russian positions. At 10 o'clock in the morning, the Russians saw the Swedish troops, who "At the sound of trumpets and timpani, two cannon shots offered a battle". The Duc de Croix urgently convened a council of war. At the council, Sheremetev, pointing to the stretching of the army's positions, proposed to leave part of the troops to blockade the city, and bring the rest of the army to the field and give battle. This proposal was rejected by the duke, who stated that the army would not be able to resist the Swedes in the field. At the council, it was decided to remain in place, which transferred the initiative into the hands of the Swedish king.

Unlike the Russian command, which believed that the 30,000-strong Swedish army was opposed to it, King Charles knew perfectly well the number and location of enemy troops. Knowing that the center of the Russian army was most strongly fortified, the king decided to concentrate attacks on the flanks, press the Russians against the fortress and throw them into the river. The king personally commanded the army. In the center, on the Germanensberg hill, the Swedish artillery was located under the command of Feldzeugmeister General Baron Johan Schöblad. The right flank was commanded by Karl Gustav Rehnschild (three columns of 10 battalions each), the left flank was commanded by Otto Welling (11 infantry battalions and 24 cavalry squadrons). In front of the columns were 500 grenadiers with fascines.

The battle began at 2 pm. Due to heavy snowfall (visibility no more than 20 steps) and the wind in the face of the enemy, the Swedes managed to carry out an unexpected attack, coming close to the enemy. The first blow was made with two deep wedges. Russian troops stood in one line with a length of almost 6 kilometers, and despite the multiple advantage, the line of defense was very weak. Half an hour later, the breakthrough was in three places. The grenadiers filled the ditches with fascines and climbed the rampart. Thanks to speed, onslaught and coherence, the Swedes broke into the Russian camp. Panic broke out in the Russian regiments. Sheremetev's cavalry took flight and tried to ford the Narova River. Sheremetev himself escaped, but about 1,000 people drowned in the river. The panic was heightened by the screams "The Germans are traitors!", as a result of which the soldiers rushed to beat the foreign officers. The infantry tried to retreat along the pontoon bridge near the island of Camperholm, but the bridge could not withstand a large crowd of people and collapsed, people began to drown.

The commander-in-chief, the Duke de Croix, and a number of other foreign officers, fleeing from being beaten by their own soldiers, surrendered to the Swedes. At the same time, on the right flank, the Preobrazhensky, Semyonovsky and Lefortovsky regiments, with soldiers from Golovin's division who joined them, fenced off with wagons and slingshots, put up fierce resistance to the Swedish troops. On the left flank, the Weide division also repulsed all the attacks of the Swedes, the Swedish column of General Renschild was upset by the fire of the Russian guards. King Charles himself appeared on the battlefield, but even his presence, which strengthened the morale of the soldiers, could not help the Swedes. The fight ended with the onset of darkness.

The night led to an aggravation of the disorder in both the Russian and Swedish troops. Part of the Swedish infantry, breaking into the Russian camp, plundered the convoy and got drunk. Two Swedish battalions in the dark mistook each other for Russians and started a fight between themselves. Russian troops, despite the fact that part of the troops maintained order, suffered from a lack of leadership. Communication between the right and left flanks was absent.

On the morning of the next day, the remaining generals - Prince Yakov Dolgorukov, Avtomon Golovin, Ivan Buturlin and Feldzeugmeister General Tsarevich Alexander Imeretinsky decided to start negotiations on surrender. So did General Weide. Prince Dolgorukov agreed on the free passage of troops to the right bank with weapons and banners, but without artillery and baggage. The Weide division capitulated only on the morning of December 2 after the second order of Prince Dolgorukov on the terms of free passage without weapons and banners. All night from December 1 to 2, Swedish sappers, together with the Russians, made crossings. On the morning of December 2, Russian troops left the Swedish coast of the Narova.

As booty, the Swedes received 20,000 muskets and the royal treasury of 32,000 rubles. The Swedes lost 667 people killed and about 1200 were wounded. The losses of the Russian army amounted to about 6-7 thousand people killed, wounded and drowned, including deserters and those who died from hunger and cold.

In violation of the terms of surrender, 700 officers remained in captivity with the Swedes, including 10 generals, 10 colonels, 6 lieutenant colonels, 7 majors, 14 captains, 7 lieutenants, 4 ensigns, 4 sergeants, 9 fireworks and scorer, etc.

3. Results

The Russian army suffered a heavy defeat: a significant amount of artillery was lost, heavy casualties were suffered, and the command staff was badly damaged. In Europe, the Russian army was no longer perceived as a serious force for several years, and Charles XII received the glory of a great commander. On the other hand, this tactical victory sowed the seed for the future defeat of Sweden - Charles XII believed that he had defeated the Russians for a long time and greatly underestimated them up to Poltava. Peter I, on the contrary, after the defeat near Narva, realized the need for military reforms and focused on the training of national command personnel.

Following the results of the battle, Peter I, drawing conclusions, wrote:

“So, over our army, the Swedes received victory, which is indisputable. But one must understand over which army it was received. For there was only one old Lefortovo regiment, and only Azov had two regiments of guards, and they never saw field battles, especially with regular troops: the other regiments, except for some colonels, both officers and privates themselves were recruits. Besides, because of the late hour and the great mud they could not deliver food, and in one word to say, it seemed that the whole thing was like an infantile play, and the arts were below the surface. Then what is the surprise of such an old, trained and practiced army over such inexperienced ones to find victory?

The defeat near Narva greatly worsened both the military and foreign policy situation in Russia. Repeated attempts by Peter, through the mediation of Austrian and French diplomats, to make peace with Charles remained unanswered. This led to the establishment of closer Russo-Saxon relations. The army of King Augustus, although retreated beyond the Western Dvina, still represented a significant force. On February 27, 1701, a meeting of the Russian and Saxon monarchs took place in the Exchanges. The negotiations ended with the conclusion of the Treaty of Birzhay, which determined the conditions for joint actions of the parties against Sweden. On March 11, 1701, Russians and Saxons drew up a detailed plan of military operations at a military council.

4. Memory of the battle

4.1. Monument to Russian soldiers on the Victoria bastion

In 1900, on the 200th anniversary of the first battle near Narva, at the initiative of the Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky regiments and the 1st Battery of the Life Guards of the 1st Artillery Brigade near the village of Vepskul, a monument was erected to the fallen Russian soldiers. The monument is a granite rock with a cross, mounted on a truncated earthen pyramid. The inscription on the monument reads: “To the heroes-ancestors who fell in battle 19 N0 1700. L.-Guards. Preobrazhensky, L.-Guards. Semyonovsky regiments, 1st battery of life-guards. 1st Artillery Brigade. November 19, 1900" .

4.2. swedish lion

The first Swedish monument to the battle was opened in Narva in 1938 and disappeared without a trace after World War II. The new one was opened in October 2000 by Foreign Minister Lena Helm Wallen. The funds were raised by the Swedish Institute. Engraved on granite: MDCC (1700) and Svecia Memor (Sweden Remembers).

Bibliography:

Carlson F.F. Sveriges historia under konungaraa av dct pfalziska huset, 6-7. 1881-1885.

Bespalov A.V. Northern War. Charles XII and the Swedish army. Way from Copenhagen to Perevolnaya. 1700-1709. - M: Reitar, 1998. S. 42

Bespalov A.V. Northern War. Charles XII and the Swedish army. S. 40

Bespalov A.V. Northern War. Charles XII and the Swedish army. S. 39

Bespalov A.V. Northern War. Charles XII and the Swedish army. S. 41

Bespalov A.V. Northern War. Charles XII and the Swedish army. pp. 40-41

Bespalov A.V. Northern War. Charles XII and the Swedish army. S. 42

Bespalov A.V. Northern War. Charles XII and the Swedish army. S. 43

Charles Duke de Croix, Tsarevich Alexander Imeretinsky, Prince Yakov Feodorovich Dolgorukov, Avtomon Mikhailovich Golovin, Adam Adamovich Weide, Prince Ivan Yurievich Trubetskoy, Ivan Ivanovich Buturlin, Ludwig von Gallart, Baron von Langen and General Schacher

Transfiguration Ernest von Blumberg, artillery Casimir Krage, Karl Ivanitsky, Vilim von Deldin, Yakov Gordon, Alexander Gordon, Gulitz, Westhof, Peter Lefort and Schneberch

Bespalov A.V. Northern War. Charles XII and the Swedish army. S. 44

Petrov A.V. City of Narva, its past and sights. St. Petersburg, 1901. S. 354-355

Svenska institutet - SI och Narva

Preparations for the first battle on Narva

Peter was looking forward to hearing from Ukraintsev. He urged the Duma clerk to complete peace negotiations with the Turks.

Reading Peter's letters, you involuntarily get used to his manner of demanding that the addressee quickly fulfill the assignment. It is rare that any of the letters does not contain indications of the need to carry out the command "without delay", "with haste", "immediately", etc. without delay" only the seal of the king's temperament. He himself knew how to instantly assess the situation, grasp the main thing, quickly make a decision, and if there was no performer at hand, then carry out this decision.

In this case, Peter hurried Ukraintsev not in vain - this was required by the obligations of the tsar to the allies.

Back in December 1699, Peter wrote to Ukraintsev: "Do not hesitate to pay, as God will give you help." In February 1700, the tsar's appeal to his diplomat resembles a spell: "Only of course make peace: it's great, it's necessary." In anticipation of the conclusion of a peace treaty, Peter even delayed the answer to the letter of Augustus II. “Truly, there is a reason for this,” the tsar explained to the king in July 1700, “that if they didn’t receive useful news from the other side, they didn’t want to write, which we constantly expect.” To the ambassador of Augustus II, who had specially arrived in Moscow to hasten the Russians to begin hostilities, Peter said: "If I receive news of peace today, then tomorrow I will send my troops to the Swedes."

Peter kept his word. On August 8, the long-awaited report from Ukraintsev arrived that peace had been concluded for 30 years, and the next day he already informed August II that he had ordered the troops to march. A convoy of 10,000 carts stretched for tens of miles, loaded with equipment, artillery, and food. The tsar himself, with the rank of captain of the bombardment company of the Preobrazhensky Regiment, was also part of the troops. In Tver, Peter received disturbing news: the courier of August II informed him that the Swedish king with an 18,000-strong army was preparing to arrive in Livonia. Peter expresses doubts about the reliability of the news: "And I thought about it many times, is it true or a forgery? And if it is true, then of course Datskaya is mastered by united caravans."

Unfortunately, the information turned out to be correct. On the same day, August 8, when a messenger from Ukraintsev arrived in Moscow, one of the participants in the Northern Union - Denmark - was taken out of the game. The Swedish king Charles XII unexpectedly landed at the head of a 15,000-strong army near the walls of Copenhagen. The landing was delivered by "connected caravans" - Swedish and English ships. Frederick IV capitulated.

On September 23, the first Russian regiments numbering 10 thousand people, overcoming the autumn impassability, reached Narva. The rest slowly pulled up to the fortress, and their concentration was basically completed only by mid-October. The king ordered the placement of batteries and siege work. The bombardment of the fortress began on October 20 and lasted for two weeks without any effect - exactly as long as there was enough gunpowder, cannonballs and bombs.

Meanwhile, Charles XII approached Narva as unexpectedly as he approached Copenhagen. Having received news of the approach of the enemy, Peter immediately leaves from Narva, transferring command of the army to Duke von Krui, who had just been hired for Russian service. This act of Peter is difficult to explain. Many years later, in the "History of the Northern War", edited by Peter, it is written as follows: "Against the 18th, the sovereign went from the army to Novgorod in order to induce the marching regiments to get to Narva as soon as possible, and especially to have a meeting with the king of Poland." It is unlikely, however, that the king could have a more important task in these troubled days than being in the troops on the eve of their battle with the enemy army.

The first thing that comes to mind when trying to understand the behavior of Peter in these memorable days of November 1700 is the assumption that the king was cowardly. But it is worth taking a closer look at his actions during the Azov campaigns and in the years after Narva, as this assumption disappears. Neither before nor after Narva did the tsar sit out in the wagon train, he was always in the thick of battles and put his life at stake many times. Most likely, in this case, Peter underestimated the measures of danger hanging over the Russian army, for he knew that its numbers were many times greater than the army of Charles XII.

The defeat of Russian troops near Narva

The Swedish army concentrated at Narva on 18 November. The battle took place the next day. The location of the Russian camp was focused on the siege of Narva, so its fortifications stretched out in a thin line seven miles long. Before the start of the battle, heavy snow fell, allowing the Swedes to approach the positions of the Russian troops unnoticed. The swift attack of the Swedes caused a general panic. "The Germans have betrayed us," shouts were heard. Sheremetev, together with the cavalry, rushed to swim across the Narova, losing over a thousand people during the crossing. The bridge, along which the infantrymen from Golovin's division fled, collapsed, and many fugitives immediately went to the bottom. Von Krui and the foreign officers who were in the Russian service hastened to surrender. Only two guards regiments and the Lefortovo regiment showed stamina and, in this general confusion, retained their combat capability. Multiple attempts by the Swedes to crush the guards were unsuccessful.

At night there was a lull and negotiations began for surrender. The Russian troops were given the right to leave Narva with all their weapons, with the exception of artillery. However, the king treacherously broke his word. As soon as the guards crossed over the restored bridge to the other side of the Narova, the Swedes attacked the rest of the Russians, disarmed the soldiers, took away their property, and declared the officers prisoners.

So, the beginning of the war, the very first contact with the enemy ended in a crushing defeat for the Russian troops. Near Narva, the Russians lost 6,000 people killed, drowned, starved to death and all their artillery, 135 guns of various calibers. The army lost almost completely its senior officers. And this despite the fact that there were several times fewer Swedes near Narva than Russians: under the command of Charles XII there were 8-12 thousand people, while the Russian army numbered 35-40 thousand.

There are no sources at the disposal of historians from which it would be possible to extract information about the state of mind of Peter after Narva: not a single letter from the tsar from those dark days has survived, and maybe [perhaps he did not write them; the memoirists are also silent on this score. Almost a quarter of a century has passed. Turning to the reasons for the failures of the Russian troops near Narva in the History of the Northern War, the tsar wrote: “So the Swedes got victory over our army, which is indisputable; previously called Shepeleva); two regiments of the guard were only on two attacks near Azov, field battles, and especially with regular troops, they were never seen. Other regiments, except for some colonels, both officers and privates, were most recruits, like it was mentioned above, besides, there was a great famine after a late time, it was impossible to bring provisions for the great mud, and in a single word to say, the whole thing was like an infantile play, and the art was below the surface. What a surprise to such an old, trained and practiced army to find victory over such unskillful ones? .. But when this misfortune (or, better, great happiness) was received, then captivity drove away laziness and forced day and night to industriousness and art a". Narva clearly showed Peter the backwardness of the country and the low combat effectiveness of the army. Narva was a cruel school from which lessons had to be drawn - to learn and teach to win.

The news of the victory of the eighteen-year-old Swedish king became the property of Europe and had a huge resonance. In a mockery of the Russian tsar, the Swedes knocked out a medal: on one side of it was Peter at the cannons that were shelling Narva, and the inscription: "Let Peter stand and bask." On the other, the flight of the Russians, led by Peter, from Narva: the cap falls from the head of the king, the sword is thrown, the king cries and wipes his tears with a handkerchief. The inscription read: "Gone out, weeping bitterly."

The prestige of Russia in Western European courts fell. The Russian ambassador in The Hague, Andrey Matveev, reported to Peter: "The Swedish ambassador, with great curses, himself going to the ministers, not only blasphemes your troops, but also slanders your very person, as if you, frightened by the arrival of his king, went to Moscow from the regiments in two days ..." A similar report was sent by the Russian ambassador in Vienna, Pyotr Golitsyn.

Charles XII had a choice. He could, building on the success achieved near Narva, continue military operations against Russia and dictate to her a peace that was pleasing to him, or send an army to Poland against Augustus II. The Swedish king saw fit to move to Poland. The choice of direction was influenced by the attitude of Charles XII to Augustus P. If the Swedish king underestimated the Russian tsar, then he fiercely hated the Saxon elector, for he considered him the initiator of the Northern Union. “His behavior is so shameful and vile,” the Swedish king spoke of Augustus, “that deserves vengeance from God and the contempt of all well-meaning people.”

And yet, it was not the desire to deprive August of the Polish crown that determined the decision of Charles XII to move the theater of operations to the west. The Swedish king could not go on a long campaign to Moscow, having a Saxon army in the rear, the combat capability of which was then higher than the Russian one. Moreover, it was clear that Poland was ready to take advantage of any favorable opportunity to oppose Sweden, and besides, Denmark was able to quickly recover from its recent defeat and join the Northern Alliance.

While ridicule was heard in the camp of Charles against the Russian Tsar, Peter wasted no time. He knows neither weakness nor fatigue. The king was not one of those people who gives up and bows his head before failures. Trials, on the contrary, tempered Peter's will. As after the first Azov campaign, failure spurred him on, and he energetically and purposefully began to forge a future victory. The dry chronicle of his travels testifies to the enormous strain of his forces and to the limit of mobilized energy. At the end of January 1701, he rushes to the Exchange, returning from there to Moscow, hurries to Voronezh, where he spends two and a half months, then goes to Novgorod and Pskov. In subsequent years, the king could be met in Arkhangelsk, near Noteburg, at the Olonets shipyard, at the walls of Narva and Derpt, in St. Petersburg.

Peter rushes like a courier - day and night, in any weather and at any time of the year. An ordinary cart or sleigh was for him both a place to sleep and a dining table. He stopped only to change horses. Each movement of the king is not only a milestone in his personal life, but also a certain stage in the mobilization of the country's efforts to fight the enemy. This is the daily work of the king, his personal, so to speak, contribution to the common cause.

Peter went to the Stock Exchange on a date with Augustus II. The Polish king, who was distinguished neither by courage, nor by loyalty, nor by the desire to mobilize all resources to fight the enemy, who did not value anything as much as the Polish crown, and therefore was ready for any step to save it, was nevertheless an invaluable ally for Russia. The longer Charles XII chases after Augustus, the more time Russia will have to heal the effects of Narva. That is why Peter spared neither effort and time, nor material and human resources to support Augustus. The union agreement was confirmed at the Stock Exchange, according to which Peter undertook to place at the disposal of the Polish king a corps of 15-20 thousand and, in addition to it, an annual subsidy of 100 thousand rubles.

Construction of defensive structures in Novgorod and Pskov and Arkhangelsk

The tsar goes to Novgorod and Pskov to supervise the construction of defensive structures. According to his decree, dragoons, soldiers, priests "and every church rank, male and female," were involved in the work, so that they even had to stop serving in parish churches.

Arkhangelsk attracted the attention of Peter in connection with the news of the attack on the city by Swedish ships. The Swedes' attempt to burn Arkhangelsk failed, but the tsar went on a long journey to strengthen the only port city that connected Russia with the West.

At first glance, Peter's frequent visits to Voronezh were strange and seemingly not caused by extreme necessity. In fact, the expediency of the long-term stay of the tsar in Voronezh before the start of the Northern War is beyond doubt - a fleet was created there, intended for military operations on the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov. But why did the tsar go to Voronezh now, when the theater of operations had shifted to the northwest and Russia was fighting not with Turkey, but with Sweden? Was it necessary to replenish the Azov fleet with new ships and incessantly renovate the recently launched galleys and frigates that quickly rotted in the fresh water of the Don? Moreover, none of the ships participated in any battle, and their guns did not fire a single salvo. Were these troubles of the king an aimless waste of national resources and a kind of tribute to his passion for the fleet and shipbuilding?

There can be no two opinions on this matter - Peter's unceasing concern for the Azov fleet paid off by the fact that they cooled the warlike ardor of the Turks and for a long time kept them from declaring war on Russia. The Russian resident in Turkey, Pyotr Andreyevich Tolstoy, reported to the tsar: "Most of all, they fear your naval fleet, sovereign."

Peter did not take his eyes off Turkey, closely following the changing moods of the Sultan's court. On June 24, 1701, the tsar wrote to the governor of Azov Fyodor Matveyevich Apraksin, who was placed in Azov to guard the acquisition on the southern sea: "Please be careful in this, both in Azov, and especially in Taganrog, to defend that place." Two weeks later, he again reminds: "Please be wary of the Turkish side." The fears turned out to be unfounded, and in September Apraksin received new news from the king: "wars with the Turks are not tea, because the peace was confirmed by the sultan willingly."

The inaccuracy of the information that the tsar supplied to his governor is quite understandable - at that time Russia did not have a permanent diplomatic representation in Turkey, and in Moscow they had to be content with only rumors that reached roundabouts.

Peter breaks the tradition and sends his representative to Adrianople, the residence of the Sultan. The choice fell on Pyotr Andreevich Tolstoy, a man as gifted as he was crafty. “Oh, head, head, you wouldn’t be on your shoulders if you weren’t so smart,” the tsar once said in a moment of frankness to Tolstoy, hinting at his involvement in the Miloslavsky and Sophia conspiracy back in 1682. Tolstoy zealously prayed for old sins. To please the king, he, being an adult, 40 years old, having a wife and children, voluntarily goes with volunteers to Venice to study naval affairs. Now, in 1702, the "smart head" had to leave for Turkey and follow the instructions drawn up by the king himself. Peter wanted to know the state of the Turkish army and navy; whether they train cavalry and infantry according to their old custom or use the services of European officers, and also whether the Turks are going to fill up the Kerch Strait in order to forever cut off the Russian access to the Black Sea.

Tolstoy was met in Adrianople more than cool. They reasoned: "It has never happened for a century that the Moscow ambassador lived near the Porte." Was it not for this that he granted to sow confusion among the Christians subject to the sultan?

It was not easy for Peter Andreevich to live in Turkey, but the tsar was pleased with his service. When the Sultan's court, sometimes obligingly affectionate, sometimes arrogantly rude, became such a burden to Tolstoy that he asked for a change, the king replied: his desire will be fulfilled, but not now - "do not get bored to be for a while; there is a great need for you to stay there ".

The "need" for Tolstoy's services was indeed "great," for the tides of peace-loving Porte alternated with the same tides of belligerence. This forced Peter to take care of the Voronezh shipyard among his most important concerns. He looked in there for several weeks, either alone or accompanied by his company. The laying of the ships and their descent were accompanied by a cheerful feast.

In Moscow, more precisely in Preobrazhensky, the tsar spent the winter months, that is, the time of the year when, as a rule, there was some calm in the theater of war: the enemy armies were located in habitable places and arranged a kind of respite in order to resume hostilities after the spring floods.

Restoration of the army after the defeat near Narva

Three worries overcame Peter: where to get money, where to get people and, finally, weapons to make up for the losses near Narva.

Andrei Nartov wrote down a story about how the money was obtained. The king thought about this in solitude for a whole day. To the "Prince-Caesar" Romodanovsky who entered, he says: there is no money in the treasury, the army is not supplied with anything, and there is no artillery, and this is needed soon. There is only one way out: "reduce treasures in gold and silver in the monasteries and squeeze money out of it." “This thing is ticklish, I must think of something else,” Romodanovsky objected and took the tsar to the Kremlin, where there was a secret storeroom. When they entered the chamber, "to his indescribable surprise, he saw his royal majesty piles of silver and gilded dishes and harness, small silver money and Dutch efimki." Romodanovsky told Peter the secret of treasures: “when your parent, Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, went on campaigns at different times, then, by his proxy to me, he gave extra money and treasures to keep me. At the end of his life, having called me to him, bequeathed, so that I don’t give this to any of the heirs until then, unless there is an extreme need for money during the war.

It is not possible to separate the authentic from the legendary in this legend, especially since, according to other sources, the tsar had this conversation not with Romodanovsky, but with Prozorovsky. However, it is known for certain that Peter overcame financial difficulties in an equally simple, but not very reliable way - he increased the productivity of the Mint: machine tools worked day and night, flooding the market with depreciated money: until 1700 they were produced from 200 to 500 thousand rubles a year , in 1700 about 2 million rubles were thrown into circulation, and in 1702 - over 4.5 million rubles. The royal treasury from this operation, accompanied by a decrease in the share of silver in the coin, derived a short-term income and the opportunity to fill the gaps in the budget.

Peter supplemented this old method of increasing incomes with two new ones.

On a January day in 1699, in the Yamsky Prikaz, someone found a sealed package planted with the inscription: "bring it to the pious sovereign, Tsar Peter Alekseevich, without opening it."

The author of the letter, as it turned out later, was the butler of Boris Petrovich Sheremetev, Alexei Kurbatov, who accompanied the master on a trip abroad. Kurbatov suggested that the tsar use a new source of income - the sale of stamped paper. Peter took care of the first profit-maker, appointed him a deacon of the Armory Department, rewarded him with villages. Thus began the brilliant career of Kurbatov, the future president of the City Hall, and then the vice-governor of the Arkhangelsk city. But no matter what position Kurbatov occupied, he did not leave the service of a profitmaker. "Command me," he turned to the king, "where it is possible to inflict what kind of orders arrived or what kind of encroachments in the affairs of the judge, to report fearlessly in private, in which I promise to show my zeal to you, the sovereign, like God himself."

Kurbatov's example was followed by many other inventors of taxes. They were ordered, as a contemporary testified, "to sit and repair the sovereign's profit."

The efforts of profitmakers, however, did not provide significant cash receipts. The income from the minting of money was also soon exhausted, and then Peter resorted to the introduction of an infinite number of taxes for a special purpose: for the purchase of saddles and horses, for the purchase of ammunition and the construction of ships, for carts and provisions, etc., etc.

Without much difficulty, it was possible to solve the second task - to make up for human losses. As needed, a certain number of households of the urban and rural population supplied one recruit to the army. This system of manning the army and navy, formalized in the first years of the 18th century, operated flawlessly throughout the Northern War.

Finally, the artillery park was restored in a short time. True, when casting copper cannons, due to a lack of copper, it was necessary to use the bells of churches and monasteries. But there was no shortage of cast-iron cannons - metallurgical plants, urgently erected at the beginning of the century, provided the army with excellent artillery, and Peter would repeatedly have the opportunity to note its high fighting qualities.

Peter encountered the greatest difficulties in staffing the army with officers, and primarily because in Russia until the 18th century there were no special educational institutions that trained military specialists. Peter in 1701 founded the first such educational institution - the School of Navigation, where mathematics, geometry, trigonometry, navigation, and astronomy were studied. According to the tsar, "this school is needed not only for sea traffic, but also for artillery and engineering."

Peter took advantage of the knowledge of the graduates of the Navigation School and other educational institutions created after it, only many years later. Meanwhile, time did not wait, military specialists were needed at the moment. And although the tsar knew that foreign officers did not show themselves at Narva in the best way, the need forced him to turn again to hiring military specialists abroad. In 1702, Peter's manifesto, translated into German, was distributed in the countries of Western Europe, inviting foreign officers to serve in Russia.

On December 5, 1700, that is, two weeks after the Narva defeat, the tsar, while in Novgorod, orders Boris Petrovich Sheremetev to “go into the distance, for better harm to the enemy. impossible to capture. What I am writing about: do not make excuses with anything. "

Sheremetyev's first victories over the Swedes

Sheremetev opened a series of victories over the Swedes. So far, he acted cautiously, daring to engage in battles, having only a double or triple superiority in forces, but at first any victories were important, they raised the morale of the army and gradually freed it from its stupor after Narva.

The first significant victory was won at the very beginning of 1702. Sheremetev, at the head of the 17,000th corps, attacked the Swedish General Schlippenbach and utterly defeated his 7,000th detachment near the village of Erestfer, not far from Derpt. Half of the Swedish troops were killed here. "We can finally beat the Swedes!" - Peter exclaimed, having received Sheremetev's report. The tsar generously rewarded the winners, noting everyone - from the soldier to the commander. Sheremetev Menshikov, on behalf of Peter, took the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called and a notice that he had been awarded the rank of field marshal.

From the autumn of 1702 to the spring of 1703, the main forces of the Russian troops were busy driving the Swedes from the banks of the Neva. Peter also took part in this campaign. Hostilities began with the siege of Noteburg, located on an island at the exit of the Neva from Lake Ladoga. High walls about two sazhens thick, erected near the water, numerous cannons dominating both banks, turned Noteburg into an impregnable fortress. For its siege, Peter concentrated 14 regiments. After a three-day cannonade, the wife of the commandant of the fortress, on behalf of all the officers' wives, sent a drummer to the Russian camp. In the report, this episode is described in a playful tone characteristic of Peter: the wives asked the field marshal "so that they could be released from the fortress, for the sake of great anxiety from fire and smoke and the disastrous state in which they find themselves." To which he, bombardier captain Pyotr Mikhailov, gallantly replied to the garrison ladies: he does not dare to convey their request to the field marshal, “he really knows that his lord field marshal will not deign to grieve them by this separation, but if they deign to leave, they would deign to leave their kind spouses with bring out a lot."

The ladies, however, did not heed the kind advice of the bombarding captain, and the continuous shelling of the fortress continued for about two weeks. Then the buglers sounded the attack, and a 12-hour assault began, according to Peter's recall, cruel and extremely difficult. The feat of the Russian soldiers aroused the surprise of a foreign observer: "it is truly amazing how the Russians could climb such a fortress and take it with the help of siege ladders alone."

Russian troops captured the ancient Russian Oreshok. The tsar punned, using the consonance of the words "nut" - "Nutlet": "It is true that this nut was very cruel, however, thank God, it was happily gnawed. Our artillery miraculously corrected its work." Oreshek - Noteburg Peter renamed Shlisselburg (key city), emphasizing with this name the key position of the city on the Neva, which opened the way to enemy lands.

In mid-March, Peter arrived in Shlisselburg to lead military operations in the 1703 campaign. In April, the tsar informs Sheremetev about the readiness of the troops to start the operation: “and I can’t write anymore, it’s just time, time, time, and so as not to let the enemy forestall us, what we will grieve about later.” It was about an attack on Nyenschantz - a fortress that blocked the mouth of the Neva. After inspecting Nienschanz, Peter shared his impressions with Menshikov: “The city is much larger, as they said; however, it will not be with Schlutelburch. not overlaid, but with a rim (i.e., a circle) larger than Rugodev "(Narva). The Nyenschantz garrison laid down their arms without waiting for the assault. On May 2, Peter wrote to "Prince Caesar" Romodanovsky in Moscow: "I know to Your Majesty that yesterday the fortress of Nyenshanskaya was fired from martyrs for 10 hours (also from cannons, only 10 shots were fired) on the acort." And then the order: "If you please, send this celebration well and that after the conciliar prayer from the cannons in the square, according to custom, it would be fired."

Peter's first naval victory over the Swedes

At Nyenschantz, three days later, the first combat clash with the enemy fleet took place. Two Swedish ships from the Numers squadron, not knowing about the surrender of Nyenschantz, entered the mouth of the Neva. Peter decided to attack them. Under his pen, the operation looked like this: on May 5, “an enemy squadron came to the mouth under the rule of Vice Admiral Mr. Numbers; about which, having learned, our Mr. Field Marshal sent us in thirty trays. And on the 7th day, having come to the mouth, they examined the enemy much, and in a deliberate battle they took 2 frigates, one Gedan with ten, the other Astril with eight guns, and fourteen windows. I even dare to write what is true from eight boats, but in fact it was.

Attacking ships with primitive boats, the crews of which had only guns and grenades, was associated with great risk. It took a lot of courage to take on this venture. Peter did not like to take risks, he preferred to act for sure, and the operation that ended successfully, it seems, was the only one where the king retreated from his rule.

In subsequent years, battles won on such a scale became so accustomed that, although they were celebrated with salutes, they were considered everyday events of military life. This victory led Peter into genuine delight, for she was the first on the water. He called her "the never-before Victoria." It laid the foundation for the glorious fighting traditions of the Russian Navy.

By order of Peter, special searches were even made in the archive - whether something similar had happened in bygone times. Peter hastened to notify his friends of the victory by sending letters. The content of these, as well as many others, letters and communications with a notice of victory reveals the essential feature of Peter. The tsar writes “we”, “us”, “our troops”, “hit the enemy”, “got the victory”, and he uses the plural not at all in relation to his own person, as the monarchs did before and after him. For him, "we" means "Russian troops." At the same time, the author of the letters himself remained in the shadows; there is not a single line in the text about his actions and orders that determined the outcome of the victorious battle. But the most detailed information about the trophies, captured prisoners, losses of the enemy and the damage suffered by the Russian troops is reported. With this dry list, Peter, as it were, invited his correspondent to evaluate the degree of success that accompanied the Russian troops, and the extent of the catastrophe that befell the enemy.

The plan of attack for the two ships of Numers was drawn up by the king. 30 boats were divided into two groups: one of them cut off the Swedes' access to the sea, and the other attacked from the upper reaches of the Neva. Peter directly participated in the attack, commanding one of the detachments, the actions of the second were led by Menshikov. However, from Peter's letters, one can only guess that he was not an outside observer of what was happening: "Although we are unworthy, however, from the lords of the field marshal and the admiral, the lord lieutenant (i.e. Menshikov) and I were made cavaliers of St. Andrew."

In honor of this event, the king ordered a medal to be knocked out with the following laconic inscription on it: "The impossible happens."

Nor did Peter say a single word about his personal participation in the siege of Noteburg. Only from Sheremetev's travel log do we learn that the tsar, "taking several soldiers with him, came under the city to the banks of the Neva River," was under fierce enemy fire.

Bookmark Peter St. Petersburg

After the capture of Nyenschanets, the entire course of the Neva from the sources, where Shlisselburg stood, to the mouth, was in the hands of the Russians. The tsar had no doubt that the Swedes considered their failures in this theater of war to be temporary and that in the coming months they would make desperate attempts to push the Russians back from the banks of the Neva. Therefore, measures were immediately taken to strengthen the mouth of the river. “After the capture of Kanets (i.e., Nyenschantz), - it is written in the History of the Northern War, - a military advice was sent, whether to fix the trench or find another convenient place (after all, it is small, far from the sea and the place is not much strong from nature ), in which it is supposed to look for a new place, and for several days a convenient place was found for that - an island that was called Lust Elant (that is, the Merry Island), where on the 16th day of May (in the week of Pentecost) the fortress was founded and named St. Petersburg. Thus, the future capital of the empire, Petersburg, arose. Its cradle was a fortress with six bastions hastily built by the forces of soldiers. At the same time, next to the fortress, the first civil building was erected - Peter's house, which has survived to this day.

The builders of the wooden fortress had a chance to experience the hardships of the harsh climate and the vagaries of the Neva. “City affairs are managed properly,” Menshikov, who was appointed governor of St. Petersburg, reported to Peter in July 1703. “Many working people from cities have already come and are constantly being added. walks high."

“Zelo, sir,” wrote General Anikita Ivanovich Repnin a month later, “we have severe weather from the sea, and in our place, where I stand with regiments, water is right up to my camp, and the night in the Preobrazhensky regiment at midnight and taverns of many sleepy people and their junk helped. And the locals say that at the present time it always floods that place. And here is a picture depicted by the tsar himself from life on September 11, 1708: “In my mansions, the top floor was 21 inches, and they freely traveled around the city and on the other side of the street on trays; however, it did not last long, less than 3 hours. it was very comforting to see that people were sitting on the roofs and on the trees as if during the flood, not only men, but also women.

All these inconveniences did not bother Peter. In his eyes, the new city was presented as "Paradise", that is, paradise. In the letters of the king there are such phrases: "I cannot but write to you from the local Paradise"; "It is true that we live here in paradise"; "Do not hesitate to doubt the local behavior, for there can be no evil in God's paradise." Even the letter describing the flood, when the water flooded the royal house, and the men and women fled to the trees, is marked: "From Paradise." According to Peter's original plan, Petersburg was supposed to be just a port city: "His Royal Majesty, not far from Schlotburg by the sea, ordered to build a city and a fortress, so that henceforth all the goods that came to Riga, Narva and Shants would have a haven there, also peach and Chinese goods would also come there. However, already in the autumn of 1704, Peter had the idea to turn St. Petersburg into the capital of the country. On September 28, he wrote to Menshikov from the Olonets shipyard: "We will finish tea on the second or third of the next month from here, and, if God wills, we will be in the capital in three days or four." So that the addressee would not doubt what is meant by the "capital", the tsar explained in brackets: "Petersburg".

But before the transformation of a small fortress into the capital and a major economic center of the country was still far away. This will happen many years later, and now, in 1704, it was necessary to defend the returned lands from a strong and treacherous enemy, who had repeatedly tried to break through at the mouth of the Neva. The king takes two urgent measures. First of all, he creates on the island of Kotlin, which is 30 miles from St. Petersburg, the fortress of Kronstadt. The commandant of the fortress had to be guided by the instruction signed by Peter on May 3, 1704: "Contain this citadel, with God's help, if it happens, even to the last man." The king often visited the island, watching the construction of fortifications. When the matter came to an end, he said: "Now Kronstadt is in such a state that the enemy does not dare to appear in the sea close. Otherwise, we will break the ships into chips. We will sleep peacefully in Petersburg."

The defense of the territory only by the garrisons of the built fortresses gave the initiative of offensive operations to the enemy. To deprive the enemy of this advantage, a fleet was needed. A figurative thought belongs to Peter: "Every potentant (i.e., ruler), who has a single land army, has one hand, and which he also has a fleet, has both hands." Having hooked on the banks of the Neva, Peter immediately set about creating a fleet. Already in 1703, the laying of 43 ships of various types took place at the Olonets shipyard, and the tsar himself, who supervised the construction, returned to St. Petersburg on a frigate with the symbolic name Shtandart. The name of the first ship of the Baltic Fleet was given "in that image, because then the fourth sea was added." Previously, a double-headed eagle was depicted on the royal flag, holding in its beaks and claws maps of the three seas that belonged to Russia. Now the image of the fourth sea appeared on the standard.

At the same time, the tsar founded a shipyard in St. Petersburg itself. The famous Admiralty shipyard, which ensured Russia's naval superiority in the Baltic by the end of the war, began building ships in 1705. The first warship was launched in April 1706.

The decree officially declaring St. Petersburg the capital was not issued. However, it is customary to consider 1713 as the date when the city on the Neva became the capital, when the court, the Senate and the diplomatic corps finally moved to St. Petersburg.

Reasons for the move of Peter 1 from Moscow to St. Petersburg

What guided Peter when he moved the capital from Moscow, the geographical center of the country, which had long-standing economic ties with the periphery, to a new unsettled place on the outskirts of the state?

This decision was partly explained by personal motives - antipathy towards the old capital, manifested at least in the fact that from a young age he preferred Preobrazhenskoye to the Kremlin Palace. With Moscow, Peter associated forces that opposed him personally and against the cause he served: the old capital turned out to be the arena of his struggle for power with Sophia and the stronghold of Old Testament traditions.

But, of course, it wasn't just that. The new capital was a window to Europe, it symbolized the transformation of Russia into a maritime power, which had the shortest routes for economic and cultural ties with the countries of Western Europe. Petersburg acquired the importance not only of a political center, but also of the most important naval harbor.

Calling Petersburg Paradise, Peter had in mind not so much the present city, built up with unsightly wooden houses and huts, as its future - a comfortable capital with luxurious palaces and parks, straight, stone-lined streets. Peter knew how to look far ahead, knowing that future generations would reap the fruits of his efforts. Once Peter, planting acorns, noticed that one of the nobles present at the same time smiled skeptically. The enraged king said: “I understand! You think I won’t live to see mature oaks. True! But you are a fool; I leave an example for others to do the same, the descendants build ships from them over time. ".

Surveying a small fortress and his modest one-story house with three chambers, cut down from pine logs and covered with shingles, but painted so that it seemed like it was made of brick and with a tiled roof, the king dreamed of a lively city with a harbor no worse than Amsterdam. At the berths there are barns with overseas and Russian goods, the multilingual dialect of foreign merchants who arrived from afar for Russian hemp, flax, mast wood, resin, linen. "If God prolongs life and health, Petersburg will be another Amsterdam," Peter used to say. In the meantime, I had to be content with little. In the autumn of 1703, the masts of a foreign merchant ship appeared on the horizon. To celebrate, the governor of St. Petersburg generously rewarded the entire crew of the ship that brought wine and salt to the new city. So modestly began its life the future capital of the empire - a window to Europe.

Peter, as we see, began the construction of St. Petersburg immediately after mastering Nyenschanets. When this was reported to Charles XII, he arrogantly declared: "Let the king work on the laying of new cities, we only want to reserve the honor of subsequently taking them." But the king was by no means going to give Charles a new city. On the contrary, he intended to multiply his Baltic acquisitions in order to "set a firm foot by the sea." The campaign of 1704 brought two significant victories to the Russian troops, obtained with the most active participation of Peter - the Russians captured Derpt and Narva.

Assault on Dorpat

Field Marshal Sheremetev led the siege of Derpt (Old Russian Yuryev), and for a long time the besiegers acted in vain. Peter found out about this, being near Narva, and immediately rushed to Dorpat. He rode there on July 3, examined the fortress and siege work with the experienced eye of an artilleryman and engineer, and was extremely dissatisfied with what he saw. Sheremetev, who was accompanying the tsar, mumbled something in excuse, but fell silent as soon as he noticed that the inflamed interlocutor threw back his head and his face convulsed - a sign that the tsar's irritability had reached its highest intensity.

Sheremetev fully deserved Peter's dissatisfaction: instead of building aproshi against a dilapidated and weakly fortified wall, which, in the words of the tsar, "is only waiting for a decree where to fall," the field marshal ordered to prepare an assault on the most powerful wall.

The assault on the fortress began on the evening of July 12. "This fiery feast continued from evening even until another day until 9 o'clock." The description of this "fiery feast" is found in Peter. Infantry poured into the three breaches pierced by artillery. On the ravelin, the attackers captured five cannons and immediately turned them against the enemy. The situation of the besieged became hopeless. One after another, four Swedish drummers died, trying to notify the readiness of the besieged to start negotiations - the drum beat was drowned in the roar of battle. Only the trumpeter managed to stop the assault.

Negotiations began. Peter, who for a long time remembered the behavior of the Swedish king near Narva, opposed the treachery of Charles XII with generosity and a chivalrous attitude towards the vanquished. Under the conditions of capitulation, the commandant of the fortress stipulated the right to unhindered exit from the city of the entire garrison with officers, banners, and weapons. He asked the soldiers, officers and their families to be supplied with a monthly supply of food. Peter, on behalf of Sheremetev, reasonably answered the commandant: “Mr. Field Marshal is very surprised that such requests are made from the commandant, when the soldiers of His Majesty are already at their gates, and who are so embittered that they are barely appeased; but when you wanted to make such a chord, then it would be necessary to repair it in advance, "that is, before the start of the assault. But as a sign of high appreciation of the courage of the besieged, Peter nevertheless allowed the officers to leave their swords, and the soldiers a third of their weapons. Soldiers and officers with their families, who were going home, were provided with the requested monthly supply of food, as well as carts for the removal of property.

Hastily celebrating the return of the "forefather city" with three shots of guns and cannons, Peter boarded a yacht, took captured banners and standards, and hurried across Lake Peipsi to Narva. How much the tsar was in a hurry to get there is evidenced by the fact that, contrary to his custom, he sent couriers to his friends about the victory from the battlefield only on July 20, that is, after a three-day stay near Narva.

Success inspired Peter and at the same time led to sad reflections. The assault on Dorpat cost the Russians more than 700 killed and wounded, while the losses of the Swedes amounted to about 2,000 people. And how many Russians would have died in the implementation of Sheremetev's plan, if he, Peter, had not been at hand? There were still few specialists among the Russians who knew their business. I had to resort to the services of foreigners, among whom were conscientious officers, but they are just mercenaries. And the one who led the technical side of the siege work near Derpt turned out to be "a kind man, but very quiet." However, the tsar was irritated most of all by Sheremetev's indiscipline.

The siege of Narva by Russian troops in 1704

Following Derpt, Narva fell. Its siege began in the last days of May, but went sluggishly: there was no siege artillery. The shelling of the fortress began only after cannons and mortars were delivered from near Dorpat and St. Petersburg. The commandant of Narva was the same Horn who commanded the garrison of the fortress in 1700. Much has changed since then in the Russian army, but Gorn, like his master Charles XII, had the same ideas about it. The Narva commandant believed that the same poorly trained and poorly armed Russian army stood at the walls of the fortress, as they had four years ago. When Gorn was offered honorable terms of surrender with the right to withdraw the garrison, he rejected them, mockingly reminding the besiegers of their past sad experience. Thorn's proud and insulting refusal Peter ordered to be read before the army.

For arrogance and arrogance Horn paid twice. The first time the tsar taught the arrogant commandant a subject lesson was back in June. Peter took advantage of Menshikov's advice and equipped several Russian regiments in Swedish uniforms. They moved towards Narva from the side where the besieged expected help from the Swedish general Schlippenbach. At the walls of the fortress, a staged battle unfolded between the "Swedes", commanded by Peter, and the Russian troops. Gorn heard the sounds of artillery and rifle fire, and for a long time he looked at the "battlefield" through a telescope, but did not notice the catch. Visible were the blue uniforms of soldiers and officers, the yellow and white standards of the Swedish army. Confident that the long-awaited "sikurs" approached Narva, Gorn ordered to attack the Russian troops from the rear and thereby help "his own" break through to the fortress. Together with the detachment, the civilian population left the garrison, hoping to profit from all the good things from the Russian convoy.

The stratagem succeeded. Lured from the fortress, the Swedes were successfully attacked and suffered significant losses. Let us recall the laughter heard in the Swedish camp and in the capitals of European states after the first Narva. Now it's time for fun in the Russian camp. Peter threw a catchphrase:

The highly respected gentlemen of the Swedes put a big nose.

It is in vain this time to look in the tsar's letters for information about his personal participation in this episode. In two surviving letters, Peter writes about what happened so dully that if the historian did not have other sources at his disposal, it would be impossible to decipher their content: to him," wrote Pyotr Tikhon Streshnev. “I don’t know what else to write,” the tsar shared the news with Kikin, “just what happened recently before this, how smart fools were deceived, and, reasoning about this, I can’t figure out more than two things: the first thing that God enlightened, the other, that before their eyes a mountain of pride stood, through which they could not see this forgery.

Commandant Gorn learned another lesson after the successful completion of the 45-minute assault on Narva. Swedish resistance was as desperate as it was senseless. Russian soldiers, enraged by the arrogance of the Swedes and heavy losses, broke into the fortress, did not spare anyone, and Peter, in order to stop the excesses, was forced to draw his sword against his own soldiers. The tsar considered Horn to be the culprit of the bloodshed, who only at the last moment grabbed the drum and beat it with his fists, signaling surrender. But it was too late. Are you not to blame for everything? - Peter asked Gorn. With no hope of help, no means of saving the city, could you not have raised the white flag? Then, drawing a sword stained with blood, Peter said:

"Look, this blood is not Swedish, but Russian. I stabbed mine to keep the frenzy that you brought my soldiers to with your stubbornness." The king in his hearts gave the former commandant a heavy slap in the face.

Laconically, without boasting, Peter informed his friends about the victory. Using the play on words "Narva" - "abscess", he wrote to Kikin: "I can’t write Inova, just now Narva, which for 4 years abscessed, now, thank God, has broken through, which I will tell myself at length."

Russian victory near Narva

Having mastered two "forefather" cities - Derpt (Yuriev) and Narva (Rugodev) within a month, Peter, it seemed, could afford a respite. But he didn't sit still. First, he went from Narva in mid-August to Dorpat, taking with him generals and ministers. This voyage had an educational and instructive character, where the fortress walls, tunnels and aproshi were used as a visual aid. Fulfilling the duties of both a guide and a mentor, the tsar explained in detail to the listeners how the "fiery feast" took place near Derpt. From Derpt, Peter, through Pskov and Novgorod, was on his way to the north, where he was drawn by two urgent matters: at the Olonets shipyard, he had to look after the ships under construction, and in St. Petersburg they were waiting for his orders to build the Paradise. From Petersburg, the tsar rushes to Narva to give a farewell audience to the Turkish ambassador there. Peter deliberately chose Narva as the place of the ceremony: let the Turkish ambassador, having examined the powerful fortress, himself assess the strength of Russian weapons. From Narva, the tsar leaves for Moscow. There he intended to spend a happy year for him in 1704 and celebrate his victories. In Vyshny Volochek, Peter stopped for several days to inspect Tvertsa and Meta, in order to determine the place of their junction. Here the tsar ordered to dig the Vyshnevolotsky canal. On December 14, a solemn entry of the winners into the capital took place. The column of prisoners was led by Major General Gorn, followed by 159 officers. They carried 80 guns. "The people looked with amazement and curiosity at the captured Swedes, at their weapons drawn with contempt, at their triumphant compatriots and began to put up with innovations." These words belong to Pushkin.

Peter had many reasons to see off the year 1704 in an optimistic mood. Only four winters separated the first Narva from the second, but how strikingly they differed from each other! Then the Russian army was able to engage in "infant play", now it has entered the time of youth. Then she was defeated; now she triumphed. What Peter happened to observe was pleasing to the eye, and in his letters of 1704 there are previously unseen assessments of what he saw. "Here we found people in good order," he writes from near Dorpat. From Pskov: "Everything is good and fun with us." From the Olonets shipyard: "here, thank God, everything is pretty good." From Voronezh: "Here they found everything in good order."

News of the "good order" Peter sought to make the property of the population. The most important means of promoting reforms and military successes was the first printed newspaper in Russia, Vedomosti, founded by him at the end of 1702.

In the 17th century, handwritten "chimes" came out in one copy at the royal court, reporting foreign news for the tsar and his entourage. Petrovsky Vedomosti was designed for a wider readership, and the list of issues covered became more diverse. The newspaper printed materials about the construction of industrial enterprises, the search for minerals, military operations, and the most important events in international life.

The first issue of Vedomosti reported: “In the Verkhotursk district, many cannons were poured from Novosibirsk iron ore and a lot of iron was made. pood in 12 Altyn. And here is a note about the partisan actions of priest Ivan Okulov in the Olonets region, published on January 2, 1703: "The city of Olonets priest Ivan Okulov, having gathered hunters on foot with a thousand people, went abroad to the Sveiskaya border and defeated the Sveiskaya Rugozenskaya, and Sumerskaya, and Kensurskaya outposts And at those outposts he beat a lot of Swedes, and took the Reiter banner, drums and swords, enough fuses and horses. pick up, burn everything." Readers learned from the newspaper about the capture of Shlisselburg, Derpt, Narva by Russian troops, that “Moscow schools are multiplying”, that at the Navigation School “more than 300 people study and accept science well”, etc.

The theater also played the role of promoter of change. This was new. In the past, theatrical performances were watched only by courtiers. Now the spectacles were designed for a wide audience. The public theater was established in 1702. Peter instructed him to glorify the victories over the Swedes. Peter's contemporary Ivan Afanasyevich Zhelyabuzhsky wrote about this: "And in Moscow on Red Square, for such joy, the sovereign's wooden mansions and a canopy for a banquet were made; and against those in the choir, various funs were made on the same Red Square."

"Good order" did not escape the observant foreign diplomat either. The English ambassador Whitworth writes a report to London: the Russian tsar "by the power of his own genius, almost without outside help, by 1705 achieved success beyond all expectations, and soon, of course, he will raise his state to a level of power that is formidable for its neighbors."

The goal for which the war was waged was achieved: access to the sea was won, the fleet was launched. However, no one, including the tsar, imagined that the salute with which Moscow on December 14, 1704 greeted the winners who captured Derpt and Narva would be separated from the salute in honor of the victorious peace for another seventeen years and that the next of them would be the most difficult years of trials. and hopes.

Plans of King Charles XII. Charles XII brought 8,000 soldiers near Narva (5,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry; according to other sources, 10,000 soldiers came with the king). On November 19, the Swedes managed to covertly approach the defense line of the Russian army. They concentrated in the area of ​​the Germansberg height, on which they installed their artillery. With blows to the center of the Russian position, Charles XII planned to divide the Russian army into parts and break them one by one.

The Swedes are coming. During the battle, which began in the middle of the day, the Swedes managed to implement part of their plan. Thick snowfall allowed them to quietly approach the Russian positions. The Swedes filled the ditches with bundles of brushwood and quickly took possession of the fortifications and the cannons located there. The thin line of defense was broken through, and the Russian troops were divided into two parts. In addition, the Russian army was left without a general leadership, because foreign military experts, led by the Duke de Croa, surrendered at the beginning of the battle. An eyewitness justified this transition by the fact that there were cases of reprisals against Russian soldiers with foreign officers. There were shouts of "The Germans have betrayed us!" On the right flank of the Russians, a stampede began in the direction of the bridge. There was a crush, and the bridge collapsed.

Semyonovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments rebuff the Swedes. At this critical moment, only the Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments were able to repulse the enemy. They surrounded themselves with wagons and steadfastly held the line. They were joined by other troops who did not have time to cross the river. Charles XII himself led his troops to attack the Russian Guards regiments, but to no avail. On the left flank, A. Weide also managed to stop the flight of his soldiers. Sheremetev's local cavalry swam across to the right bank of the Narva, while more than a thousand people went to the bottom. Each of the remaining parts of the Russian army was no less than the army of Charles XII.

Negotiations and withdrawal of Russian troops. Therefore, the king willingly went to the negotiations offered to him by the Russian side. An agreement was concluded according to which Russian troops with weapons and banners were to leave for the right bank of the river. The Swedes got all the Russian artillery.

On the morning of November 20, the bridge was repaired and the withdrawal of Russian troops began. After Golovin's division, Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments crossed, Charles XII violated the agreement and demanded that the troops of the left flank surrender their weapons. The Veida division had to comply with this requirement, after which it was allowed to cross the bridge. The Swedes plundered the convoy, 79 Russian generals and officers were captured, including Ya.F. Dolgorukov, A.M. Golovin, A. Veide, Tsarevich Alexander Imeretinsky, I.Yu. Trubetskoy and other notable persons. Entering Narva, liberated from the blockade, Karl ordered noble Russian captives to be led through the streets.

Causes of defeat and loss. The battle near Narva was lost by the Russian army. Losses amounted to 6-8 thousand people - killed and died of hunger and disease. 145 guns were lost. The reasons for the defeat are in the poor preparation of the Russian army. Only a few of its regiments (Semenovsky, Preobrazhensky, Lefortovsky and Gordonov) had little combat experience. Unlike the two guards, the old soldier regiments, whose leaders were no longer alive by this time, did not show their good side. The leadership of the Russian army turned out to be inexperienced and disunited. Some historians consider the "disorganization of command" the main reason for the defeat, but the entire system of the Russian army was imperfect. The use of foreign military specialists also did not justify itself.

Assessment of Peter I. Twenty years after the event, Peter I himself gave a completely objective assessment of the events near Narva: “And so the Swedes received victory over our army, which is indisputable; but one must understand which army they committed this, for only one old Lefortovsky regiment was ... two regiments of the guard were on two attacks near Azov, and field battles, and especially with regular troops, were never seen. The other regiments ..., both officers and privates, were the most recruits ... In addition, there was a great famine after the late time, it was impossible to bring provisions for the great mud, and in a single word to say, the whole thing was like infantile play, and art below the view.

Danger for Russia. After the battle near Narva, the Russian army actually lost its combat capability. It is hardly possible to agree with the existing opinion that even after the battle of Narva, Karl was afraid of the Russians, he supposedly "not only hastened to let the entire Russian army go, but he himself retreated to Dorpat, not looking for a new meeting." If Charles XII at that moment had wanted to realize plans of conquest against Russia, he could well develop his success, seize significant territories, etc. The consequences could be catastrophic for Russia. Peter was afraid of such a course of events; on pain of death, he forbade the remaining troops to retreat from the line of Novgorod and Pskov and ordered the northwestern borders of the state to be hastily strengthened.

But the worst didn't happen. Charles XII focused on fighting Augustus II, whom he considered the most dangerous of his opponents. An easy victory near Narva deceived the conceited Swedish king and turned his head. As modern Swedish historians note, the contemptuous attitude towards the Russians and the Russian army that arose in Charles near Narva turned out to be fatal in 1708 and 1709. He believed that Russia was already finished. On the Swedish medal, knocked out in honor of the victory near Narva, Peter I was running, losing his sword and hat; the inscription was a quotation from the Gospel: "I went out crying bitterly." The European press and journalism picked up this idea. Russia's diplomatic prestige plummeted. European diplomats openly laughed at their Russian counterparts. Rumors spread in Germany about new, more severe defeats for the Russian army and about the coming of Princess Sophia to power. The European press spread the idea of ​​the Narva defeat as an irreparable catastrophe for the Russian state. For almost a decade, Europe will look at Russia through the bad experience of Narva.

Read also other topics part III ""Concert of Europe": the struggle for political balance" section "West, Russia, East in the battles of the XVII-beginning of the XVIII century":

• 9. "Swedish Deluge": from Breitenfeld to Lützen (September 7, 1631-November 16, 1632)
  • Battle of Breitenfeld. Winter Campaign of Gustavus Adolphus
• 10. Marston Moor and Nasby (July 2, 1644, June 14, 1645)
  • Marston Moor. The victory of the parliamentary army. Cromwell's army reform
• 11. "Dynastic wars" in Europe: the struggle "for the Spanish inheritance" at the beginning of the XVIII century.
  • "Dynastic Wars". The struggle for the Spanish inheritance
• 12. European conflicts take on a global dimension
  • War of the Austrian Succession. Austro-Prussian conflict
  • Frederick II: victories and defeats. Treaty of Hubertusburg
• 13. Russia and the "Swedish question"

[…] Hello for many years! And if you please, you will mention me. God gave this scripture in the service of the great sovereign near Rugodiv, good health, and henceforth I trust in the all-merciful God. And we flock under Rugodiv for the fourth week and die a cold and starving death: bread has become expensive, we buy penny bread for two altyns. And perhaps, father Stepan Prokofievich, it will be possible for you to visit yourself, and you will bring me some kind of fur coat, and a shirt with trousers, and good clothes or slippers, soon, without delay. But if it’s impossible on your own, and you’ve come with someone, you really need it, but even if it’s a hryvnia worth of bread, I’ll pay all the money here. Yes, write to me about your health, so that from above I can rejoice about your health in Christ. Then I write to you a little, but I hit you with a lot of foreheads.

SIEGE OF NAVA

[…] There were reports that Narva was poorly fortified and there were few troops in it. On September 23, Peter stood near Narva and immediately began preparing for the siege, together with the Saxon engineer general Gallart, who was sent by King Augustus. Difficulties were revealed immediately: military supplies were prepared much less than what was needed, according to Gallart. Another misfortune: due to the bad autumn road and the lack of supplies, the troops moved very slowly, and valuable time was running out. In total, the troops gathered near Narva from 35 to 40,000, exhausted by a difficult campaign and a lack of food supplies: the guns turned out to be unusable. Finally, on October 20, fire was opened on the city from all Russian batteries; they hoped that the city, with its small means, would not last long, when suddenly the news came that Charles XII had landed in Pernau with a large, as they said, army. After a council of war, the Russians fortified their camp. The shooting continued in the city, until finally the lack of cannonballs, bombs and gunpowder forced a ceasefire. We had to wait for their delivery.

Soloviev S.M. History of Russia since ancient times. M., 1962. Prince. 14. Chap. 4. http://magister.msk.ru/library/history/solov/solv14p4.htm

DISPOSITION AT NARVA

It was a strong fortress for that time. It was located on the left bank of the river. Narova, 12 km from its mouth. On the right bank of the river there was a bridgehead - the ancient Ivangorod castle, built at the beginning of the 17th century. The area around Narva was swampy. After the autumn rains, it became impassable for the troops. The fortress had solid fortifications and walls that required strong artillery to break through breaches. Its garrison, headed by Colonel Gorn, numbered 2 thousand people.

Russian troops numbering 34 thousand people were encamped on the left bank of the Narova in one line, which in the form of a semicircle covered the Narva and adjoined the flanks to the river. The front of the camp, about 7 km long, was not facing the fortress, but to the west and consisted of fortifications in the form of an embankment with a moat (aproshi), behind which the troops were located. To ensure siege work and conduct reconnaissance, an irregular cavalry under the command of B.P. Sheremetev was advanced to the Revel road.

Rostunov I. I., Avdeev V. A., Osipova M. N., Sokolov Yu. F. History of the Northern War of 1700-1721 http://militera.lib.ru/h/rostunov_ii2/02.html

FORTRESS BOMBING

On November 1, after the attack, a new line was drawn near Ivan-gorod, and during the attack near the shlos, 2 people were killed, 5 people were wounded. Today, cannons were fired hard at the city, and bombs were also thrown, from which a small fire started in the city, but was soon extinguished. Our guns against the city had more defense; Moreover, it was observed that some of the guns were torn apart, because several charges were not discharged.

2. G. Allart ordered to make one lodgement on a fake attack on the right side; then partly hard shot, where 3 were killed and 20 people were wounded. Then one line on the left side of the batteries for 16 guns was drawn for 70 steps. Similarly, during an attack, one line was drawn per 100 steps; with 2 killed and 6 wounded.

3. The aforementioned lodgement has been repaired, also the line and batteries for 60 steps have been added; also, during the shlos attack, they moved 36 steps. 5 people were injured and no one was killed. Also, strong cannon fire and bomb throwing was held back, because the impoverishment in regimental guns and bombs happened.

"GREATEST VICTORY" KARL

A quick victory over Denmark, won by the eighteen-year-old Charles XII, untied his hands for immediate action against the Russians who besieged Narva, and with extraordinary speed he moved his army by sea to Pernov (Pernau) and from there moved to Narva. At this time, the entire noble class ruling in Sweden supported the king with special enthusiasm. On November 18, 1700, Karl attacked the Russian army, which was besieging Narva, and inflicted a heavy defeat on it. The Russian command was in the hands of a Frenchman in the Austrian service, Duke de Croa, who happened to turn up, although he received excellent recommendations (Russian sources call him de Crouy or von Croy). This adventurer, invited to the Russian service in 1700, brought with him eighty officers from Vienna. Half of the “officers” recruited by de Croa, I note by the way, surrendered near Narva along with their commander, who later, already in Swedish captivity, begged Peter for efimki for a whole year, because “with great grubs 42 people were forced to eat” and feed these "poor captives".

The officers, hastily recruited, untrained, commanded recruits, taken in the majority directly from the plow, who had never been in battle. As a strategist, this de Croa proved beyond all criticism. He stretched out his army in a long thin strip and was content with that. During the battle, almost no orders came from him at all, and if they were given to him, then they were understood only by the Germans, who were hastily taken as officers, but by no means Russian officers, and certainly not soldiers. The weapons of the Russians were very bad, the guns exploded and killed the servants. Finally, the delivery of provisions was arranged in such a way that the soldiers of some regiments did not eat for a day just before the moment of Karl's attack on them. The soldiers considered their unknown commander-in-chief de Croa and the German officers to be completely traitors who would betray them to "their" king. Under such conditions, it is not strange that the Russians suffered damage, but that the battle lasted so long: from morning until dark night. This is due to the courage and stamina of several detachments, and above all of two guards regiments (Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky), and in fact that the Swedes had won, Charles XII found out only when the Russians offered such conditions: they get a free exit with weapons, across the river, on all four sides. In captivity, contrary to the conditions, insidiously violated, Charles detained generals, colonels and officers of noble birth.

This "great victory" of Charles was trumpeted for years by the Swedes, the Germans, the French and the British who sympathized with him. If we compare Narva with Poltava, where the Swedes scatter in a panic flight after only two hours of general battle and where (counting with the surrender at Perevolnaya) the entire army that survived after the battle surrendered without any conditions, then it may seem strange that the Narva the defeat of the Russians was considered such an unheard-of military feat of the Swedish king.

The army moved to Narva, numbering about 35 thousand, consisted mostly of recruits under the command of bad officers and foreign generals who did not enjoy confidence. There were no strategic paths; along the dirty autumn roads they could not bring enough shells or food. They began to shell the fortress, but the guns turned out to be useless, and they soon stopped firing due to a lack of gunpowder. The besiegers, according to an eyewitness, walked around the fortress like cats around hot porridge; measures against the offensive of Charles XII were not taken. In an evil November blizzard, the king crept up to the Russian camp, and the Swedish 8,000th brigade smashed the Russian corps. However, victory was every minute a hair away from trouble. The king was most afraid that the noble and Cossack cavalry of Sheremetev would not hit him in the rear; but she, according to Karl, was so kind that she rushed to swim across the river Narova, drowning a thousand horses. The winner was so afraid of his vanquished that during the night he hurried to build a new bridge instead of the one that had collapsed under the pressure of the fugitives, in order to help them get away to their side of the river as soon as possible. Peter left the camp on the eve of the battle, so as not to embarrass the commander-in-chief, a foreigner, and he really did not hesitate, the first surrendered and dragged along other foreign commanders, frightened by the bitterness of his Russian team.

Klyuchevsky V.O. Russian history. Full course of lectures. M., 2004. http://magister.msk.ru/library/history/kluchev/kllec61.htm

CONSEQUENCES OF DEFEAT

Narva was besieged by a strong Russian army (35-40 thousand people). But Peter began the campaign in the fall, the weather interfered with military operations, impassability left the army without bread and fodder. The shortcomings of the military organization made themselves felt: although the troops stationed near Narva were regular, of a new order, Peter himself admitted that they were "not trained", that is, bad. In addition, most of the officers were foreigners, not loved by the soldiers, who did not know Russian well, and there was no one power over the entire army. Peter entrusted the command to the Russian General Golovin and the Frenchman recommended by the Germans, Duke de Croa. And Peter himself did not refuse orders for military operations. There was thus a plurality of command. Under all these conditions, a natural fear arose among the Russian troops of a collision with the army of Charles, covered with laurels of recent victories in Denmark.

And Charles, after the defeat of Denmark, went to Peter. The Russians near Narva learned about the approach of the Swedes already when Karl was only 20–25 versts away. Peter immediately left the army, leaving de Croa's command. Knowing the courage and personal courage of Peter, we cannot explain his departure by cowardice; it would be more correct to think that Peter considered the case near Narva lost and left to prepare the state for defense against the Swedish invasion. November 20, 1700 Charles really defeated the Russian army, took away the artillery and captured the generals. Peter was in a hurry to strengthen Novgorod and Pskov, instructed Repnin to collect the remnants of the returned defeated army and waited for Charles on the borders of the Moscow state.

But Karl's mistake saved Peter from further troubles. Karl did not take advantage of his victory and did not go to Moscow. Some of the votes in his military council spoke in favor of a campaign in Russia, but Karl looked short-sightedly at the forces of Peter, considered him a weak enemy - and went to Augustus. Peter could breathe easier. But the situation was still difficult: the army was upset, there was no artillery, the defeat had a bad effect on the mood of the spirit within the state and destroyed the prestige of Russia abroad. […] Under the fresh impression of defeat, Peter had the idea to seek peace, but Peter did not find anyone abroad willing to help Russia […].

Russian troops were drawn to the fortress of Narva for a very long time and extremely disorganized. The time for the trip was chosen extremely unfortunate - it was autumn, it was constantly raining. Due to bad weather, carts with ammunition and food constantly broke down. The supply was poorly established, because of this, the soldiers and horses were constantly malnourished - this led to the fall of the horses towards the end of the campaign.

By the beginning of hostilities, Peter 1 expected to gather about 60 thousand soldiers, but due to the above problems, 2 large detachments with a total number of more than 20 thousand soldiers did not have time to approach. In total, by the beginning of hostilities near Narva, Peter 1 had at his disposal from 35,000 to 40,000 soldiers and 195 artillery pieces.

The garrison of the Narva fortress consisted of only 1900 soldiers, 400 of which were militias. The fortress of Narva was located on the banks of the Narva River, on the other side there was another fortress called Ivangorod. Both fortresses were connected by a bridge and this allowed the defenders to move from fortress to fortress during the siege.

To avoid the replenishment of the fortress with provisions and soldiers, Peter 1 had to besiege both fortresses, and this stretched his army and made it weaker. To protect against an attack from the rear, Peter 1 built a defense line of 2 shafts with a length of more than 7 kilometers.

On the last day of October, Russian artillery began daily shelling of the fortress of Narva. But due to the fact that the ammunition was enough for only 2 weeks and the caliber of the guns was too small, the fortress suffered practically no losses.

Battle of Narva 1700

Before the approach of the main forces of the Swedish king, Peter did not know the exact number of soldiers in the army of Charles. According to the captured Swedes, an army of 30 to 50 thousand soldiers was moving towards the Russian army. But Peter 1 could not confirm the words of the prisoners, because the Sheremetev detachment of 5 thousand people, who was sent to cover the Russian troops from the Swedes, did not conduct reconnaissance and did not enter into serious battles with the Swedish army. The day before the battle, Peter 1 leaves the army, leaving command to the general from Holland, Duke de Croix.

There is a version that Peter did not expect such a quick attack by the Swedes and left the army to come with reinforcements and surround the Swedish army.

The Russian generals understood that Karl would attack with his main forces from the west, so the Russian army prepared a defensive line with a length of seven and a half kilometers. One of the main mistakes of the Russian commander was the decision to put the entire army in line between the ramparts for the entire length of the defensive ramparts - more than 7 km. This made the Russian army very vulnerable in the event of a breakthrough in the defense line. The Swedish king put his army in 2 lines.

On the night of November 30, 1700, the Swedish army moved towards the Russian troops. The Swedes tried to keep quiet so as not to be noticed until the last. The Russian army saw Charles's army only at 10 o'clock in the morning.

It was snowing heavily that day. Thanks to this, Karl's troops managed to make an unexpected attack and break through the defense lines of the Russian army. Although the Russians were outnumbered, this did not help them, because the troops were too stretched.

Soon the breakthrough of the Russian defense line was already in 3 places. Panic began in the ranks of the Russian army. The main part of the soldiers began to run away from the battlefield in the hope of escaping, but many drowned in the river. Foreign officers of the Russian army began to surrender.

Only the right flank, which was defended by the Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky regiments, as well as the Lefortovsky regiment, did not retreat and continued to resist the Swedes. On the left flank, the division under the command of the Russian General Veide Adam Adamovich also successfully repulsed the attacks of the Swedes. The battle continued until nightfall, but the Swedish army was never able to rout the flanks of the Russian army, there was no connection between the surviving flanks.

The next morning, the remaining generals decided to start negotiations with Charles XII about the surrender of the Russian army. Prince Yakov Dolgorukov agreed on the passage of the Russian army without weapons and banners to the other side of the river.

The next day, December 2, the division of General Weide also capitulated. On the same day, the surviving Russian army left the coast of Narva. From the Russian army after the battle of Narva, the Swedes were left with:

• about 20 thousand muskets,
• 210 banners,
• 32 thousand rubles.

The Russian army lost over 7,000 men wounded and killed. The Swedes lost only 677 killed and 1,250 wounded. Seven hundred people remained in captivity, including 10 generals, 10 colonels, as well as other officers and soldiers.

Results of the Battle of Narva

The army of Peter 1 suffered a severe defeat at the very beginning of the Northern War. Almost all artillery was lost, a huge number of soldiers were killed and wounded, and the officers were significantly thinned.

This defeat at Narva was perceived in Europe as a sign of the incapacity of the Russian army, and the Swedish army began to be feared even more. But there were also pluses in this battle near Narva. This victory of the Swedes allowed Peter 1 to carry out a number of military reforms to replenish the army with new regular troops and Russian command staff, because. Karl hoped that the Russian army would no longer be able to provide decent resistance for the next few years.