The alignment of forces in Europe on the eve of the execution of the Barbarossa plan.

"BARBAROSSA PLAN" ("Barbarossa Fall"), on behalf of the German Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, is the code name for the plan of aggressive war of fascist Germany against the USSR (see the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945). The fascist leaders of Germany began to develop this plan as early as the summer of 1940 during World War II. In planning a war against the USSR, German fascism sought to destroy the world's first socialist state as the main obstacle in the struggle of the German imperialists for world domination. The history of the "Barbarossa plan" reveals the inconsistency of the version of the German fascist historians about the allegedly "preventive" nature of the war of fascist Germany against the USSR. The first order to prepare a plan for this war was given by Hitler to Field Marshal Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, on July 21, 1940. At the same time, the transfer of Nazi troops to the East began. At the end of July, the entire future Army Group Center (Field Marshal von Bock) was already concentrated in Poznan, and new divisions were formed in Germany. Formations of Nazi troops arrived in Poland, Finland and Romania. The main decisions were made at a meeting of the military leadership in the Berghof on July 31, 1940. On August 1, General E. Marx (Chief of Staff of the 18th Army, stationed near the Soviet borders) presented the first version of the war plan, the basis of which was a "blitzkrieg campaign" with the capture of Moscow and the exit of the Nazi troops to the line Rostov, Gorky, Arkhangelsk, and then - to the Urals, with a period of implementation from 9 to 17 weeks. In connection with the fear of flank counterattacks by Soviet troops from the North and South, this version of the plan, after being tested by military games, was revised. From August 9, on the orders (under the name "Aufbau Ost") of the Nazi command, intensive preparations were underway for the theater of war against the USSR; railroads, highways, airfields, warehouses, etc. were built and repaired. Based on the decisions of the meeting, Directive No. 21 on the plan of war against the USSR called "Operation Barbarossa". This ended the first period of preparation of the Barbarossa Plan, when the strategic principles of warfare were developed, the forces and means for the attack were determined, and the most important measures were taken to organize the concentration of fascist forces on the borders of the USSR. On January 31, 1941, the headquarters of the OKH (OKN - Ober Kommando des Heeres) - the main command of the German ground forces, issued the "Directive on the Concentration of Troops", which formulated the main strategic idea of ​​the "Barbarossa Plan": "to split the front of the main forces of the Russian army concentrated in the western parts of Russia, with fast and deep strikes by powerful mobile groups north and south of the Pripyat marshes and, using this breakthrough, destroy disunited groupings of enemy troops. South of Polissya (see the map), Army Group South (Field Marshal General Rundstedt) was heading, inflicting the main attack on Kyiv. To the north of Polissya, Army Group Center (General Field Marshal von Bock) was to advance, delivering the main blow from the Warsaw and Suwalki area in the direction of Smolensk; in the future, with tank troops, together with Army Group North, advancing from East Prussia in the general direction of Leningrad, it was supposed to destroy Soviet troops in the Baltic states, and then, with the Finnish army and German troops from Norway, finally eliminate the resistance of Soviet troops in the North. The implementation of subsequent tasks was planned in the interaction of army groups "Center" and "South". In the central direction, the Nazi command hoped to quickly take Moscow, which, according to its plan, was to bring a decisive success to the entire campaign, and in the South - to capture the Donbass. The concentration directive set out in detail the tasks of army and army groups, the deployment of headquarters, demarcation lines, interaction with the Air Force and Navy, the actions of the Romanian and Finnish armies, the procedure for the transfer of troops to the Soviet borders, camouflage and preparatory work. In addition to the main documents - Directive No. 21 and the Directive on Concentration, the Barbarossa Plan was supplemented by a set of other instructions, orders and directives. The "Enemy Disinformation Directive" demanded that the concentration of fascist German armed forces against the USSR be presented as "the greatest disinformation maneuver" to divert attention from the preparations for the invasion of England; "Special Instructions" determined the system of the most severe fascist terror in the occupied Soviet territories and political administration on it under the leadership of the Reichsführer - the head of the SS troops Himmler. The date for the start of the attack on the USSR according to the "Barbarossa plan" - May 1941 - in connection with the actions planned in the spring of 1941 against Yugoslavia and Greece, was postponed on April 30 by the fascist high command to June 22 (the final order on this date was given on June 17). The intensified transfer of German troops to the Soviet border (last of all, tank and motorized divisions were transferred for the purpose of camouflage) began in February 1941. At the last 2 meetings of the senior command staff of Nazi Germany on June 6 and 14, 1941, before the attack on the USSR, reports were heard about the readiness of the troops according to the Barbarossa plan. Hitler called this attack "the last great campaign of the war," in which no considerations of a moral or ethical order should be stopped. The political foundations of the "Barbarossa plan" were outlined by one of the fascist leaders Rosenberg at a secret meeting on June 20 and boiled down to the complete destruction of the Soviet state, the implementation of the physical extermination and eviction of the indigenous inhabitants throughout the entire territory to the Urals, replacing them with German colonists. An addition to the Barbarossa Plan were special directives on the merciless destruction of the recalcitrant civilian population, partisans and prisoners of war of the Soviet Army political workers on Soviet soil, on a starvation regime for the entire population, on the capture and merciless plunder of the Soviet economy (approved by Goering "Directive for the management of the economy in the new occupied eastern regions"), on the forced labor of the Soviet population.

In connection with the Barbarossa Plan, fascist Germany's ties with its allies in Europe and with Japan were strengthened and formalized. On March 5, 1941, Hitler approved a special directive on cooperation with Japan, the basis of which was the active operations of the Japanese armed forces in the Far East. Italy and the puppet government of Slovakia were involved in the war against the USSR. In accordance with the "Barbarossa plan" from September 1940 in Romania, a military mission led by General Hansen and Speidel, with a large staff of military instructors, was engaged in the reorganization and retraining of the Romanian army according to the German model. In January-February 1941, General Halder and the Chief of the General Staff of Finland, General Geinriks, together with the Chief of Staff of the German troops in Norway, Colonel Buschenhagen, developed a plan for joint operations of German and Finnish troops in Finland. In Hungary, a similar work was done from the end of March 1941 by the mission of General Paulus. By June 21, the concentration of German, Finnish and Romanian formations to the Soviet borders was completed and everything was prepared for an attack in accordance with the Barbarossa plan.

Bourgeois German military historians seek to confuse many questions connected with the preparation and planning of the war against the USSR, they distort the political causes of the war, the time of the beginning of the practical development of the war plan, and the role of the German generals and higher staffs in the preparation of the war. Former Chief of the General Staff of the OKH, F. Halder, without any grounds, claims that representatives of the high command of all branches of the armed forces, including Goering, allegedly warned Hitler against war against the USSR (see "Hitler als Feldherr. Der ehemalige Chef des Generalstabes berichtet die Wahrheit", Münch., 1949, § 21). Blumentritt (served in the General Staff), contrary to the truth, also writes that Generals Brauchitsch and Halder dissuaded Hitler from war with Russia ("Fatal Decisions", translated from English, M., 1958, p. 66). K. Tippelskirch resorted to the same falsification in the book "History of the Second World War" (translated from German, M., 1956), Dietmar, Butlar and others in the book. "World War 1939-1945" (collection of articles, translated from German, M., 1957), historian Görlitz (W. Görlitz, Der deutsche Generalstab, Frankf./M., 1951, S. 5). Thus, a completely false thesis is being developed about supposedly fundamental and fundamental differences between the fascist leaders of Germany and its generals on the question of a war against the USSR. The purpose of these statements is to whitewash him. the general staff and high command, who lost the war, and put all the blame for the failure of the Barbarossa Plan on Hitler. Documents, the entire course of the development of the "Barbarossa Plan" by the General Staff of Nazi Germany and the preparation of an attack on the USSR show that this attack was not "the fruit of improvisation", as portrayed by West German historians, but was prepared according to a strictly thought-out plan. The "Barbarossa Plan" was fundamentally adventurous; it exaggerated the possibilities of fascist Germany and underestimated the political, economic and military might of the USSR. The defeat of fascist Germany by the Soviet Army showed the complete failure of the calculations of Hitler's strategists and the authors of the Barbarossa Plan.

1.Hitler's goals and arrangements for the Russian campaign

Hitler's "improvised plan" for war

When Hitler signed OKW Directive No. 35 on the attack on Moscow on September 6, 1941, the implementation of his “impromptu plan” for war, adopted in the autumn of 1940, was already significantly behind schedule. Although the German troops were still successfully advancing in the East, and the number of trophies and prisoners was constantly increasing, it was impossible to foresee the end of the eastern campaign and, in connection with the current situation, it was impossible to even think about withdrawing formations from the Eastern Front. The change in the timing of the planned military operations called into question not only the entire "impromptu plan" of the war, but also the implementation of Hitler's entire program.

Hitler's plan was to end the Soviet Union in a three to four month campaign. This “lightning campaign” was to provide the Great German Reich with the necessary territory and raw materials to such an extent that Germany, as a “blockade-resistant, territorially cohesive and economically independent continental European empire from the import of strategic raw materials” was able to confidently withstand a long war against Anglo-Saxon powers, and above all against the United States. This first step was to create an economic as well as a political basis for the implementation of the second stage of Hitler's "world lightning war", which included extensive operations against the countries of the Middle East, the advance of German troops up to Afghanistan and African countries, as well as the capture of the Azores.

In this second phase, Germany was to force Britain to peace, and the United States - in close cooperation with Japan - to encourage the preservation of its neutrality. As part of the implementation of these plans, Hitler hoped to elevate Germany to the level of a world power that could wage war with any of the remaining states.

This plan of Hitler, calculated on aggression and war, had its Achilles' heel in the economic potential of Germany, which was too small for waging a prolonged war with one or more world powers. Hitler, realizing this, saw the solution to this problem in a "blitzkrieg". It was envisaged to defeat each of the opponents separately in "lightning", like duels, campaigns before they were able to fully deploy their military potential and use it against Germany. This required extensive armament, i.e., the availability of relatively modern and effective weapons ready for immediate use, the sudden introduction of which would allow the troops to defeat the enemy very quickly. In the period between individual campaigns, new material reserves were to be created that would meet the requirements of the next military campaign. Hitler hoped in this way to avoid a war on two fronts and an exhausting economic war.

The concept of wide armament was opposed by the concept of "deep" armament, the supporter of which was primarily the department of the military economy and armaments of the headquarters of the Supreme High Command (OKW). The disagreements of this department with Hitler were reflected in the notes of the head of the department of military economy and armaments, General of the Infantry Georg Thomas, dated December 12, 1939, where he wrote that the blame for the insufficient preparation of the German Reich for war lies solely with the political leadership. The concept of "deep" armament proceeded from the fact that Germany is able to withstand a long war and for this it should expand its domestic raw material base, increase the number of enterprises for the production of weapons, spare parts, and create extensive reserves of raw materials and weapons.

Hitler rejected the concept of "deep" armament, believing that a "fast" solution to the armament problem would not cause economic difficulties and everything depended on the desire to solve this problem. He also believed that "deep" armament would undoubtedly require great sacrifices from the population in favor of the war. Hitler hoped through the rapid creation of "necessary facilities" to decisively rebuild the economy for the production of the required types of weapons, while not restricting in any way the production of non-military products for the population. One of the main difficulties of the German war economy - the lack of raw materials - he tried to eliminate in the framework of the four-year plan, which was designed to prepare the German economy for war. Additional stocks of raw materials were supposed to be captured in upcoming campaigns.

Thus, the situation with raw materials in Germany at the time of the attack on Russia did not give Hitler any reason for concern and looked even more favorable than in 1939, at the beginning of the war. In addition, the consumption of military materials and ammunition in previous "lightning campaigns" was less than expected. This, it seemed, was refuted by the very practice of the assertion of the head of the department of military economy and armaments, General of the Infantry Georg Thomas, that Germany could win the war only by creating a developed military industry and directing all the forces of the people to military purposes.

Planning for Operation Barbarossa. The underlying idea of ​​Hitler's "improvised plan" for war was primarily to achieve dominance over Europe, and this could only be achieved by defeating the Soviet Union. These considerations were based on the assumption that Russia was Britain's "continental sword". The plan proceeded from the fact that the defeat of the USSR should force Great Britain to make peace. Thus, Germany could avoid a long war on two fronts. Therefore, the war in the East was for Hitler that decisive campaign, which he aspired to from the early years of his political activity and which he wanted to wage within the framework of a racial-ideological war of annihilation. Since, in his opinion, in the spring of 1941, the Great German Reich had reached the highest level in the organization of command and control, in military affairs and weapons, and Russia, quite obviously, was at a low level of development of military affairs, it was considered necessary to use this chance and strike in a timely manner.

Preparations for the campaign against the Soviet Union began during the final phase of hostilities in France in July 1940. In the following months, a whole series of campaign plans was prepared and worked out by the General Staff of the High Command of the Ground Forces, which Hitler presented on December 5, 1940.

Already at this preparatory stage, serious contradictions arose between Hitler and the high command of the ground forces regarding the priority of solving problems in the Russian campaign. The OKH proceeded from the fact that it was necessary to impose a battle on the enemy as soon as possible in order to prevent his withdrawal into the interior of the country. For this purpose, three army groups were to be used, to which one general direction of the main attack was indicated, namely the area north of the Pripyat marshes. There it was expected to meet the main forces of the Red Army, concentrated for the defense of Moscow. In the south, it was easier for the troops of the Red Army to evade the battle, and the Russians could not surrender Moscow as a military, economic, political center, as well as a road junction. The OKH did not think about achieving economic benefits, but first of all about the quick solution of military problems, and only about that.

This plan was contrary to the views of Hitler, who saw the most important goal in weakening Russia to a decisive extent in military and economic terms, capturing the economic and raw material potential of the Soviet Union. Since the main sources of supply for Russia were located in the outlying areas, Hitler's plan provided for two directions of the main attack on both flanks. In the south, Ukraine and the rich agricultural Don region, coal mines and industrial enterprises of the Donets Basin, as well as Caucasian oil, were to be captured. In the north, the capture of Leningrad would cut off the USSR from the sea and provide the Germans with sea routes in the Baltic Sea for the export of Swedish ore and Finnish nickel. In addition, with this option of using forces, the fastest contact was achieved in the land theater of operations with an ally in the war - Finland. These different points of view subsequently ran like a red thread in the contradictions between the OKH and Hitler on the further use of forces until the start of the offensive against Moscow in October 1941.

On December 18, 1940, the principles of conducting the Russian campaign put forward by Hitler were set out in Directive No. 21 "Operation Barbarossa", which was to form the basis of the plan for the first operations.

In accordance with this directive, the Wehrmacht, after the end of the war with Great Britain, was to prepare for "the defeat of Soviet Russia in one quick campaign" (30). For this, it was supposed to use all the available formations of the ground forces, with the exception of the forces necessary to prevent any surprise on the territory of the occupied regions of Europe. The Air Force was ordered, depending on the circumstances, to release as much forces as necessary to support the ground forces during the war in the East in order to ensure the rapid development of operations and the maximum cover of East German areas from enemy aircraft. The main task of the navy during this campaign remained operations against England.

The purpose of the operation, which was scheduled to begin on May 15, 1941, was to defeat the Red Army troops stationed in the western regions of Russia during a swift offensive to reach the Dnieper-Western Dvina line. The widespread use of shock tank groups was envisaged in order to prevent the withdrawal of combat-ready Russian formations deep into Soviet territory. As a result of the rapid pursuit of the retreating enemy, it was supposed to advance to such a depth that Russian aviation could no longer strike at the German Reich. Ultimately, the advancing troops were to reach the Volga, so that, if necessary, it would be possible to suppress the last industrial region in the Urals remaining in the USSR with aviation forces.

The ground forces operating in the direction of the area north of the Pripyat marshes were to include the Army Groups "North" and "Center". At the same time, the Center Army Group was tasked with the forces of shock tank and motorized formations advancing from the area east and north of Warsaw to defeat the enemy troops in Belarus and, at the first stage of the operation, to seize the heights east of Smolensk as key positions for a subsequent attack on Moscow. Thus, it was necessary to create the prerequisites in order to advance from this line with significant forces in a northerly direction and, in cooperation with Army Group North, which was advancing from East Prussia through the Baltic to Leningrad, defeat the Red Army forces located in this area.

Only after the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt was it planned to carry out an offensive operation to capture the most important road junction and military center - Moscow. Only the sudden and rapid collapse of the Russian defense could become a prerequisite for achieving such goals. Army Group South was to move from Lublin in the general direction to Kyiv, in order to quickly reach the flanks and rear of the Russian troops in Ukraine with large forces of tank formations and reach the Dnieper. Pursuing the retreating enemy, the troops were to capture the Donets Basin, which is extremely important in the military and economic terms, in the south, and capture Moscow in the center.

In this directive, the main idea was lost - the idea of ​​\u200b\u200bdefeating, first of all, the enemy's military force, and the attack on Moscow was given only second place. The preparations for Operation Barbarossa took place in an atmosphere of such optimism and such confidence in victory that one cannot even understand today. The question arises: for what reasons did the German leadership assess the situation in Russia so optimistically? Enemy assessment was in charge of the "Foreign Armies of the East" department in the General Staff of the Ground Forces, but it did not have sufficient information to properly assess the situation. The department received intelligence reports that came from the front through department 1C to the general staff of the ground forces. German air reconnaissance was limited to the front line or areas located in relative proximity to the front line, since the German Air Force had almost no aircraft for long-range reconnaissance.

In the first months of the war, air reconnaissance of the deep regions of Russian territory was almost not carried out, since in February 1941 an order was given to conduct air reconnaissance only as far as the line Rostov, Moscow, Vologda, Murmansk. All this led to the fact that almost completely there was no data on the preparation of reserves, the supply of reinforcements and the supply of troops deep behind enemy lines, on new construction and on the industrial production of the USSR. When the German leadership received information about Russia from other sources that did not correspond to its own ideas, this information was ignored or recognized as implausible.

In addition, Hitler did not trust intelligence and reproached her for her inability to work. At the same time, he did not see that he was becoming a prisoner and victim of his own propaganda and "cultural and ideological ideas" about the world. The belief that the Russians were incapable of waging war, which he hammered into his officers, led to the fact that before the start of the war among German officers, an underestimation of the Red Army, its morale and weapons prevailed.

The prevailing opinion was that Russia could be defeated even more easily than France, that the eastern campaign did not carry much risk. In a conversation with Jodl and Keitel on June 28, 1940, Hitler said: “Now we have shown what we are capable of. Believe me, Keitel, a war against Russia, in contrast to a war with France, would only look like a game of Easter cakes. The basis for such statements was the idea that the Russian officer corps would not be able to carry out qualified leadership of the troops. At the same time, the warnings of the German military attache in Russia, Major General of the Cavalry Ernst August Koestring, who at first also adhered to this opinion, but eventually came to a different conclusion, about which he informed the OKH and Hitler, were not taken into account.

The military leadership saw confirmation of their views in the difficulties experienced by the Red Army in the winter war with Finland. At the same time, it was not taken into account that only the troops of the Leningrad Military District of the Russians participated in this war and that the Red Army achieved great victories in Mongolia, defeating the 6th Japanese Army in a successfully fought battle. Celebrating this Russian victory, Koestring again warned Hitler, but he was not heeded. The German leadership adhered to its own opinion, which it had formed during a meeting with the Red Army in the Polish campaign (32). This assessment of the Red Army was not positive and coincided with the opinion that had developed about the Russian soldier and his commanders in the First World War.

One example of the idea of ​​the Red Army that was spread among the German military leaders is the notes of the Chief of Staff of the 4th Army, Colonel Günther Blumentritt, prepared by him for a meeting in the operational department of the headquarters of the ground forces on May 9, 1941.

“The history of all wars involving Russians shows,” these notes say, “that the Russian fighter is steadfast, immune to bad weather, very undemanding, not afraid of blood or losses. Therefore, all the battles from Frederick the Great to the World War were bloody. Despite these qualities of the troops, the Russian Empire almost never achieved victory! Lower-level commanders act in a stereotyped way, not showing independence and sufficient flexibility.

In this we are far superior to the Russians. Our junior officers act boldly, without fear of responsibility. The Russian high command is inferior to ours, as it thinks formally, does not show self-confidence. The top military leaders who remain today, with a few exceptions, should be even less afraid than the former, well-trained Russian generals of the tsarist army.

At the present time, writes Blumentritt, we have a considerably greater numerical superiority. Our troops are superior to the Russians in combat experience, training and weapons, our command and control system, organization and training of troops are the most correct. We have stubborn battles ahead for 8-14 days, and then success will not keep us waiting and we will win. We will be accompanied by the glory and the halo of invincibility, going everywhere ahead of our Wehrmacht and especially paralyzing the Russian achievements in battle, caused the underestimation of the Soviet Army.

This underestimation of the enemy was also associated with an overestimation of our own successes based on the experience of the first campaigns and the campaign in the Balkans. The whole world considered Hitler's war machine invincible and therefore did not believe that Germany, having attacked the Soviet Union, could be defeated. This shows that the leading officers of the ground forces and the air force saw no danger in Hitler's offensive plans in the East, and no risk in a new war. And although the chief of the general staff of the ground forces, Colonel-General Franz Halder and the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch were not convinced of the need for a war against Russia in this period of time, but believed that before Germany opposes another enemy, there should be England was finally defeated, but they still believed that the eastern campaign could be victoriously completed in a short time.

This statement was based on a number of statistical data. In the initial plans for the war with the Soviet Union, Brauchitsch proceeded from the fact that 80-100 German divisions would be enough to defeat 50-70 Russian divisions. The chief of staff of the 18th Army, Major General Erich Marks, based his calculation in the draft of Operation Ost on August 5, 1940, on the proposal that 147 Soviet divisions and brigades would be opposed by 147 German divisions. During the discussion of the operation plan on December 5, 1940, the German command considered it possible to get by with 130-140 divisions in order to defeat an enemy of the same size.

Subsequently, this total number of divisions remained almost unchanged. On June 22, 141 German divisions came out against Russia. By the end of June, the number of divisions had risen to 153. These forces were supplemented by German allied troops, which were taken into account in advance in the campaign plans and whose appearance was not a direct reaction to receiving data on an increase in the number of Russian formations. The reassessment of their own forces by the German command becomes quite clear if we consider that on January 15 the Foreign Armies of the East department reported not about 147, but about 155 Russian formations. On February 2, 1941, Halder spoke of increasing this number to 178. On April 4, he stated that "the size of the Russian army has greatly increased compared to what was previously assumed."

Finally, on June 22, he announced that the enemy had 213 divisions. (In fact, by this time, the Russian command had 303 divisions at its disposal, of which 81 were being formed.) This increase in the number of Soviet troops by 63 divisions from August 1940 to June 1941 and the understanding that the USSR not only had a total of 221 divisions and the brigade, but that this total number could continue to increase, the German command did not attach any importance and did not take any countermeasures to strengthen the Eastern Army (39). The opinion that it was possible to quickly defeat the Red Army did not change even after receiving information about its numerical growth. The calculation was based on the fact that the available forces are able to defeat the Russian army, which is almost equal in number, although the forces of the latter have increased by an average of 43%.

The consequences of this mistake became clear to Halder only on August 11, 1941, when he learned that the Red Army already had 360 divisions and brigades, and the OKH did not have the opportunity to strengthen its troops accordingly. Goering did not see great difficulties in the new war, recognizing mainly the problem of organizing the necessary supply of troops. Only the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, protested against the conduct of the Russian campaign, but also not because he was afraid of defeat in the East, but due to the fact that this war did not correspond to the operational intentions of the Navy and led to a decrease in the role of the fleet in the system of three branches of the armed forces of the Wehrmacht. After all, the main efforts would no longer be concentrated in the West against England, but in the East against Russia, which unequivocally brought to the fore the ground forces and the air force.

Considering in general the above reasons for underestimating the enemy and overestimating one's own forces, one can note that the initial victories in the East and the exaggeration of the successes achieved in combat reports and reports played an important role in this. Although the command of the troops at the front already a month after the start of the campaign realized that the previous assessment of the Red Army was incorrect, this reached the highest authorities very slowly. Thus, Halder began to realize that he had misjudged the enemy only on August 11, 1941. But even in the future, he continued to tend to underestimate the forces and capabilities of the Russians. Despite all the difficulties and failures, the German command was dominated by a sense of superiority over the Red Army, which again and again led to incorrect assessments and the resulting incorrect actions.

Soon after the end of the war in France, Hitler came to the conclusion that it was necessary to reorganize the production of armaments in accordance with the requirements of the campaign against the Soviet Union. This primarily meant the need to increase the production of weapons for the ground forces. As a result of this restructuring, the total volume of military production, however, did not increase, only the main directions of this production changed. When the war against the USSR began, Germany, according to the belief that existed at that time, was armed enough to achieve a quick victory. The reserves were also significant, so that the campaign could be brought to an end without additional efforts.

In July 1941, Hitler issued an order according to which only tank formations participating in hostilities were to be used for the entire eastern campaign, and tank replenishment was to be carried out only in small sizes when absolutely necessary and directly with his sanction. In the "Report on the implementation of the plan for the production of weapons for the Wehrmacht in the period from September 1, 1940 to April 1, 1941," the department of the military economy and armaments concluded that "the envisaged programs for the production of weapons for the branches of the armed forces of the Wehrmacht, despite great difficulties , in general, were completed on time. This made it possible to believe that the Russian campaign would be financially secure and not threatened by a shortage of weapons.

2. The course of the eastern campaign until mid-July 1941

It seemed that the optimists were indeed right. Army Group South, which had the task of disabling the Russian forces west of the Dnieper in Galicia and Ukraine and seizing the crossings across the Dnieper as soon as possible, already in border battles met unexpectedly stubborn resistance from the enemy, who began to retreat on a large scale only on July 3. After twelve days of fighting, formations of the left wing of the army group reached the area west of Sluch. The formations operating in the center of the operational formation of the army group reached the upper reaches of the Dniester, the southern wing still remained at the Prut. And although the enemy also suffered heavy losses, the troops of the Army Group "South" failed to surround him and prevent the withdrawal. The army group was unable to achieve freedom of operational maneuver.

At the cost of heavy losses as a result of subsequent battles, the cities of Berdichev and Zhitomir were captured, and the troops were given the task of capturing Uman, but heavy rains temporarily halted their advance. On July 18, during the renewed offensive in the Vinnitsa region, a bridgehead was created on the eastern bank of the Bug and there was hope to destroy the retreating enemy. Army Group North had the task of defeating the enemy in the Baltic and capturing the Baltic ports as soon as possible in order to complete this operation by taking Leningrad and Kronstadt. Russian border positions were broken through here faster than in the south. On June 26, Dunaburg was taken, and on June 29, Riga. Until July 10, they managed to reach the Opochka-Pleskau line and occupy Estonia, as well as reach the Dorpat-Pernau line. Army Group North also failed to encircle and destroy the enemy forces in the Baltic.

The relative failure on the flanks was to some extent compensated by the successful operations of the troops of the Army Group Center, which was faced with the task of defeating the enemy grouping in Belarus, bypassing Minsk from the south and north with mobile formations, and reaching Smolensk as soon as possible. The next task was to turn to the north with large forces of mobile formations and, having destroyed the enemy in the Baltic states, in cooperation with Army Group North, capture Leningrad.

Since the offensive of Army Group Center was unexpected for the Red Army, the operations proceeded almost according to plan. The crossings over the Bug were captured intact, and this created the prerequisite for the rapid infliction of further attacks. Already on June 24, tank columns reached Slonim and Vilnius. It was possible to encircle significant enemy forces in the Bialystok region (on June 29, the encirclement closed). Until July 1, the enemy made attempts to break out of the encirclement, and then the fighting in this area ceased.

Mobile formations were quickly transferred to take part in the operation to encircle the group near Minsk. In total, 330,000 prisoners, more than 3,000 guns and 3,332 tanks were taken in operations near Bialystok and Minsk (Germany had about the same number of tanks when starting the war in the East). After crossing the Dnieper, the forward formations of Army Group Center managed to reach Smolensk on July 16, and thus, as it seemed, successfully complete the task. Therefore, it is not surprising that even greater successes were expected from the German army, and Hitler believed that he could already move on to the implementation of the second stage of his program.

3. Hitler's measures to implement the plan for the period after Barbarossa

The rapid successes on the Eastern Front, achieved before the beginning of July 1941, prompted Hitler to concretize his plans for the period after Barbarossa.

Already on July 4, 1941, the first meetings in the OKH began. These plans for the post-Barbarossa war called for a full resumption of the "siege of England" after the end of the eastern campaign, using naval and air forces to prepare for a landing in England. Along with this, it was planned to close the Mediterranean Sea to the Western powers by capturing Gibraltar. The main direction in the actions of the ground forces, however, remained the continuation of the fight against British positions in the Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East through concentrated offensive operations, which were planned to be carried out from Libya through Egypt, from Bulgaria through Turkey to Suez and, under favorable circumstances, from the Transcaucasus against Iraq (with case of Iran).

Since Hitler considered the defeat of the Soviet Union and the end of the first stage of the "impromptu plan" of the war to be a matter of the near future, he could already suspend the production of weapons for the eastern campaign and, intending to proceed to the implementation of the operations of the second stage, vigorously take up the military-technical support of the campaigns of the plan for the period after Barbarossa. In an order dated July 14, 1941, he demanded a significant reduction in the total number of ground forces, though significantly increasing the proportion of tank formations. The order demanded that the military industry concentrate its efforts primarily on the production of aircraft and continue the implementation of the submarine construction program. These new armaments production programs were to be completed by the spring of 1942. As part of the rearmament of the ground forces, Hitler initially planned to increase the number of available tank and motorized infantry divisions by 36 and 18, respectively, by May 1, 1942.

In accordance with this, the production of tanks was to increase on average per month from 227 in 1941 to 900. The program for the construction of the air force provided for an increase in the production of aircraft twice - from 1200 to 2400 units per month, with the ultimate goal of up to 3000 vehicles per month. Due to the shortage of raw materials and manpower, in order to fully implement these programs, it was necessary to steadily curtail or limit the implementation of all previously adopted programs, and above all programs for the production of guns and ammunition. The released workforce, raw materials and enterprises were to be used to solve the main tasks, primarily for the implementation of an extensive program for the construction of the Air Force. Hitler put forward new demands to increase by all means the extraction of coal, as well as light metals, the production of fuel and synthetic fuel.

Since the increase in arms production had to be achieved with the same amount of labor and the same situation with raw materials, Hitler was forced to suspend the implementation of current programs for the ground forces in order to create the material prerequisites for military operations in the period after Barbarossa. Despite the vast resources of Europe, which were at the disposal of Hitler in the summer of 1941 and which he could not fully use in a short period of time, the German military industry was unable to continue to produce the same volume of weapons for the Russian campaign and at the same time carry out extensive production for implementation of the second phase of Hitler's program. The reasons lay primarily in the lack of labor and raw materials, which subsequently had an ever-increasing impact on the military and economic potential of Germany.

By the beginning of the Russian campaign, there was no longer enough German labor, as a significant part of the able-bodied male population was called up for military service. Of the 39.17 million men in 1941, 12.24 million were employed in industry and 7.66 million were in the military. Thus, 68.5% of the male population of Germany was involved, and it was difficult to count on more. A fuller use of women's labor, which could create labor reserves, Hitler rejected on ideological grounds.

The state secretary of the imperial ministry of labor, Zirup, determined the shortage of labor as of June at 1 million workers, although by this time about 3 million foreigners from 27 countries were already employed in German industry and agriculture. But even this was not enough to cover the lack of labor force. Similar was the situation in 1941 with raw materials, which were only enough to carry out the most important tasks. Due to the decrease in coal production, the production of iron and steel in July fell by 350 thousand tons compared to the previous month, which led to a reduction in the supply of iron and steel for the needs of the Wehrmacht.

Stocks of heavy metals, primarily copper and lead, have been significantly reduced. Along with the fact that the demand for soft metals increased, their reserves and production decreased.
Specialists of the Department of the War Economy and Armaments then understood that during the year a further reduction in the receipts of various raw materials was to be expected if vast stocks were not seized in Russia and Russian production facilities could not be used.

In his triumphant euphoria in early and mid-July, Hitler seemed to be close to carrying out both phases of his program. He no longer wanted to take only a defensive position in a military conflict with the United States, but he thought about it. so that at the end of the eastern campaign, together with Japan, defeat the United States of America and eliminate this competitor forever. So Hitler hoped to achieve the implementation of his plans for the conquest of world domination.

4. Measures taken by the Soviet Union in connection with the German attack

The situation in the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941 could in no way be called favorable, but it was not catastrophic either, as the German leadership imagined. Despite the suddenness of the German attack, the Soviet top leadership quickly took control of the situation and took countermeasures, the most important of which was the immediately launched organized evacuation of Russian industry from the European part of the USSR to the east. Under the leadership of a specially created evacuation council, 1,360 large, mainly defense, enterprises were transferred to the east, mostly together with workers, as well as a number of small enterprises. Of the total number of large enterprises evacuated, 455 were transferred to the Urals, 250 - to Central Asia and Kazakhstan, 210 - to Western Siberia. This redeployment of the defense industry was completely unexpected for the Germans and decisively influenced the fact that the German military industry was unable to fulfill its tasks, because a significant part of the production was to be produced according to new plans directly in the captured areas.

Thus, under the expanded program for the production of aircraft, at least one third was to be produced in well-equipped firms located on Russian territory. The initial stubborn resistance of the Red Army should be explained by the implementation of evacuation measures. The Russians suffered heavy losses, experienced difficulties in transferring reserves to the front, but had to hold positions for a certain time in order to carry out their program of industrial evacuation. At the same time, the Russians destroyed all industrial enterprises, and above all mines and mines, so that they would not fall into the hands of the enemy. The implementation of this decision also took time and caused corresponding losses at the front. At the same time, the German military industry could not, as expected, immediately use Soviet raw materials.

In connection with the evacuation measures, the production of weapons in the USSR at times greatly decreased. If we take the production index in June as 100, then, according to Soviet data, in December, steel production was 36, coal production - 35, oil production - 66. Expansion of the production of tanks, aircraft and guns, envisaged and forced in accordance with the third five-year plan , and the inability of the German army to capture the important center of the Russian military industry - the city of Leningrad - made it possible to increase the production of tanks from 100% in the second quarter of 1941 to 160.8% in the fourth quarter of the same year, guns - up to 279%, and only aircraft had place decline in production by 10.6%.

After the commissioning of industrial enterprises relocated to the east, the number of military equipment produced in the first quarter of 1942 even increased: tanks - by 342.9%, aircraft - by 102.5%, guns - by 396%. True, the loss of most of the enterprises for the production of ammunition was not compensated, which, starting in the autumn, led to a significant limitation of the combat power of the Soviet troops. Ammunition production in the third quarter of 1941 increased by 187% compared to the first quarter. Then it dropped in the fourth quarter to 165%, and in the first quarter of 1942 even to 120%. Simultaneously with the implementation of measures to evacuate and disable abandoned industrial enterprises, on July 23, 1941, Stalin issued an order to mobilize Russian industry and “turn” it only to the production of military products.

In contrast to the German leadership, the Soviet leadership placed the main emphasis on the production of military products during the war itself, and the construction of numerous new enterprises became generally possible only at the end of 1941 - in the spring of 1942.

Immediately after the start of the war, the Soviet Union began the formation of new reserve formations, the appearance of which was unexpected for the German command. By the beginning of the campaign, the OKH expected to meet 213 divisions in the European part of Russia, of which, as of July 8, 1941, only 46 motorized rifle and 9 tank divisions were considered fully combat-ready. The formation of more compounds was considered impossible (58). In mid-August, these overly optimistic calculations became more sober. Halder wrote in his diary on 11 August:
“We believed that the enemy would have about 200 divisions by the start of the war. Now we already number 360. Of course, these divisions are not as armed and equipped as ours, and their tactical use is many times weaker. But they are. And if a dozen of them are defeated, then the Russians will fill them with a new dozen.

By quickly committing these new divisions to battle, the Russians were able to almost compensate for the heavy losses at the front and create more and more additional lines of defense against the advancing German groupings. First of all, they succeeded, by constant counterattacks, in forcing Army Group Center to go on the defensive near Smolensk, the abandonment of which Stalin considered a very important loss.

5. The first difficulties in implementing Hitler's plans

On July 4, 1941, Hitler confidently declared: “I always try to put myself in the position of the enemy. In fact, he has already lost the war. Ten days later, in a conversation with the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, Hiroshi Oshima, the Fuhrer predicted that not him, but Stalin this time would face the fate of Napoleon. At the same time, Hitler admiringly called his military leaders "personalities of historical proportions", and the officer corps "exceptional in its kind." However, by the end of July, in the course of further developments on the Eastern Front, not a trace of this confidence remained.

Despite the successful military operations, the encirclement of the enemy in the area of ​​Bialystok and Minsk and the subsequent attack on Smolensk, despite the first successes of Army Group North in the Leningrad direction and Army Group South in Ukraine, in the second half of July it became obvious that both army groups operating on the flanks will not be able to cope with the enemy forces opposing them within the scheduled time frame and therefore will be forced to use part of the formations of Army Group Center to carry out the assigned tasks. Hitler, when deciding where to turn the formations of Army Group Center - north or south, called it the most difficult decision of this war. Hitler's confidence that the campaign would proceed according to plan was reflected in a series of directives in late July and early August.

On July 19, in OKW Directive No. 33, Hitler demanded that infantry and tank units and formations be turned south to support Army Group South and at the same time also conduct an offensive with mobile units and formations in a northeast direction to support Army Group North, and forces infantry formations of the Army Group "Center" to continue the offensive on Moscow. On July 23, in addition to this directive, he even gave the order for the final transfer of the 2nd Panzer Group to the subordination of Army Group South and the temporary subordination of the 3rd Panzer Group to Army Group North. On July 30, Hitler was forced in the new OKW Directive No. 34 to temporarily cancel his decision set out in addition to OKW Directive No. 33. The 3rd Panzer Group was not allowed to enter the battle, Army Group Center was ordered to suspend the offensive, and the 3rd Panzer Group were to receive reinforcements. This directive was also supplemented by a new directive of August 12, which ordered Army Group Center to conduct offensive operations on the flanks, ensuring close cooperation with neighboring army groups to repel the threat of enemy counterattacks.

These directives testified to the divergence of opinions in assessing the situation, to Hitler's disagreements with his military advisers, and also to the fact that it remained unclear how to continue the campaign, since it was not possible, as planned, to defeat the enemy west of the Dnieper-Zapadnaya Dvina line. In his training developments, General Marx already in the autumn of 1940 proceeded from the fact that the campaign should end west of the Dnieper-Zapadnaya Dvina line. During the war games, which were held under the leadership of Lieutenant General Friedrich Paulus, who at that time was the chief quartermaster of the ground forces, their participants also came to the conclusion that the Red Army should be defeated west of this line, because otherwise the German armed forces would be too weak in order to defeat the Soviet Union in the wide Russian expanses.

But this was such a task that Hitler could not solve when planning operations at the end of January 1941. All the initial plans for the campaign against Russia were based on preventing the Red Army from withdrawing deep into the territory of the Soviet Union. In the event that this could not be done, the plans were not prepared, since the high command of the ground forces, having overestimated its capabilities, did not take into account the likelihood of such a development of the situation. At the end of July, Hitler realized that his dreams of occupying Moscow on August 15, and ending the war with Russia on October 1 turned out to be unrealizable: the enemy did not reckon with his plans. These days, Hitler is increasingly thinking about the time factor, which has become a defining moment in the deployment of all subsequent operations.

A convincing picture was drawn by the Chief of Staff of the OKW, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, in a conversation with Field Marshal von Bock during a visit on July 25 to the headquarters of Army Group Center in Borisov.

“Hitler's hope that Japan would use the moment to settle scores with Russia does not seem to be justified. In any case, one cannot count on her performance in the near future. But in the interests of the Germans, it is necessary to deal a crushing blow to Russia as soon as possible, since otherwise it is impossible to conquer it. Assessing the current situation, the Fuhrer anxiously asks himself the question: “How much time do I still have to finish Russia, and how much time will I still need?”

Keitel arrived at the headquarters of Army Group Center to inform Bock of the political situation, and mainly of Hitler's new instructions "to move from large-scale encirclement operations to tactical actions of a limited scale with the aim of completely destroying the encircled enemy." These reflections of Hitler indicated that, while recognizing the shortcomings of his previous plans, he was looking for new ways to achieve his goals, and that his confidence in the completion of the military campaign in a short time was shaken.

Hitler was so impressed by the data on the size of the Red Army, its equipment and weapons that this was another reason for his uncertainty and hesitation.

On July 14, Hitler, in a conversation with Oshima, spoke of the many surprises that Germany had to endure. On July 21, in a conversation with the Slovak Marshal Kvaternik, he said that the Russians had produced such a large number of aircraft and tanks that if he had been informed in advance, he, the Fuhrer, would not have believed it and decided that this, apparently, was disinformation. In a conversation with Guderian, who indeed warned him about the well-established production of tanks by the Russians, Hitler stated on August 4, 1941 that if he knew that the figures named by Guderiap were true, then it would be significant for him to decide on an attack on the USSR harder.

Although Hitler considered the capture of Leningrad as the "citadel of Bolshevism" as the main goals of further offensive operations, as well as the capture of Ukraine and the Donets Basin for reasons of a military-economic nature, for a long time he could not come to a decision on how to achieve these goals.

Only as a result of the fact that a difficult situation had developed on the front of Army Groups North and South, as well as under the influence of strong Russian counterattacks east of Smolensk, did Hitler decide to give the order to suspend the offensive of Army Group Center and to switch it to the defensive, as well as the destruction of enemy forces on the flanks of the Eastern Front. Of course, the main reason for the transition of the German troops to the defense east of Smolensk was not the difficulties encountered in the logistics of the troops of Army Group Center, but the Russian counterattacks.

Bock wrote:
“I am now forced to bring into battle all my combat-ready divisions from the army group reserve ... I need every man on the front lines ... Despite huge losses ... the enemy attacks daily in several sectors in such a way that it has not been possible to regroup until now forces, to pull up reserves. Unless a devastating blow is dealt to the Russians somewhere in the near future, the task of completely defeating them will be difficult to accomplish before the onset of winter.

Although at the end of August Hitler still believed that Germany would defeat the Soviet Union before the end of October, by this time the Führer had thoughts of the possibility of a longer war on the Eastern Front, beyond the winter of 1941/42. In an OKW aide-mémoire of 27 August 1941 on the strategic situation at the end of the summer of that year, these doubts appeared even more clearly:
“The defeat of Russia is the immediate and decisive goal of the war, which must be achieved using all the forces that can be drawn off from other fronts. Since this cannot be fully realized in 1941, in 1942 the continuation of the eastern campaign should become the number one task ... Only after Russia has been militarily defeated, should military operations be launched in full force in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean against England , if possible, with the help of France and Spain. Even if a crushing blow is dealt to Russia this year, it is unlikely that before the spring of 1942 it will be possible to release ground forces and air forces for decisive operations in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Iberian Peninsula.

From this analysis of the situation it is clear that the original intention, as early as the autumn of 1941, to undertake operations against the British in the Middle East and withdraw troops from the Russian front proved to be unrealistic.

Directive No. 32 and the draft plans of 4 July 1941 provide for three enveloping operations against the Middle East for the post-Barbarossa period. Of all these plans, only the plan of an offensive operation through the Caucasus in the direction of Iran now remains in force.

The reorganization and rearmament of the ground forces scheduled for the fall had to be postponed indefinitely, the operations planned for the period after Barbarossa were also pushed back, since after the supposed end of the eastern campaign, the army would need time to replenish with people and equipment. Thus, Hitler signed for the fact that his plan of "blitzkrieg" failed. In search of the culprits, he sharply criticized the OKH about the further conduct of operations and behaved towards him defiantly and even insultingly. How offensive Hitler's reproaches were is shown by Halder's proposal to Brauchitsch to submit a resignation letter. Brauchitsch, however, turned down the offer. Hitler and the military leadership were forced to admit at the end of August that they had miscalculated in their plans for Russia. And among the population, sad voices began to be heard about the fact that the war had dragged on for too long and that the army had suffered huge losses.

Casualties on the Eastern Front amounted to a total of 585,122 by the end of August, about three times the casualties of the entire campaign in France.

During the same time, the German troops lost 1478 tanks and assault guns, that is, approximately 43% of the available tanks and assault guns by the beginning of the war with Russia.

A security report dated 4 August 1941 stated:
“The opinion is often expressed that the campaign is not developing as one might expect based on the reports published at the beginning of the operation ... Now one gets the impression that the Russians have a huge amount of weapons and equipment and that their resistance is intensifying.”

In a report dated September 4, 1941, it was noted that “many citizens of the Reich express dissatisfaction with the fact that hostilities on the Eastern Front have dragged on too long. Increasingly, one can hear statements that the offensive in the East is developing very slowly. In order to eliminate these sentiments and restore faith in the regime among the population, it was necessary to quickly end the war in Russia and end it with victory.

Military-economic issues.

In August, I had to conclude that the plans for the production of weapons and military equipment outlined on July 14, 1941 were also not fully implemented. The planned output for the newly formed tank and motorized divisions was already reduced by 16% on August 8. Of the originally planned 36 three-regiment tank divisions, now only 30 two-regiment divisions were to be formed, and of the 18 motorized divisions, only 15 two-regiment divisions.

At extended meetings in the OKW department of military economy and armaments, which lasted from August 14 to 16, 1941, it was decided, due to the lack of labor and raw materials, to reduce the program for the production of tanks from 900 to 650 units per month. In addition, it was decided, along with a partial reduction in production for the needs of the ground forces, to limit the production of anti-aircraft installations, completely stop production associated with preparations for the Zeelowe (Sea Lion) landing operation, and coordinate the extensive production program for the Air Force with the existing capabilities .

The Imperial Minister for Armaments and Ammunition, Fritz Todt, who took part in the meeting, stated that the plan for the production of tanks and the expanded program for the production of weapons for the Air Force arose at a time when they hoped to release 1 million soldiers from the army for the needs of the economy with the end of the war on the Eastern Front. Human. Now the situation has changed. Even if the figure of 1 million people was 100% too high, it still became obvious that the main obstacle to the implementation of plans for the production of weapons was, first of all, the lack of labor.

The chief of staff of the OKH, in his memorandum on the possibilities of reorganizing the ground forces in the fall of 1941, referring to the need to provide effective assistance to the economy with people after the end of operations in the fall of 1941, came to the conclusion that after the end of operations on the Eastern Front, from the armed forces could be allocated for the needs of industry are a maximum of 500 thousand people, of which 200 thousand will be participants in the world war dismissed from the army and 300 thousand will be specialists who are urgently needed in industry. All plans for the military industry proceeded from the fact that after the end of the eastern campaign, in the course of the reorganization of the ground forces, most of the specialist workers would be sent to enterprises. At the same time, it was supposed to disband 49 infantry divisions, as a result of which about 500 thousand people would be released for the military industry. Initially, it was planned to disband even 60 infantry divisions, but by August this figure had decreased to 49. In July, the need for manpower amounted to 1.5 million people, and thus they could only be met by one third, and in specialists even only one fifth.

The tense situation at the front made it clear to the leadership of the relevant departments that the use of the released soldiers in the military industry in the near future was out of the question. Therefore, the existing contradiction between the growing demand and the available reserves of labor for the military industry continued to deepen. Of the 9.9 million unconscripted conscripts belonging to the contingents of 1897-1923, after being called up for active service, the selection of persons subject to armor, and also unsuitable for military service, only 72 thousand people remained by the beginning of August. This meant that it was impossible to make up for losses in personnel, nor to satisfy the need to increase the number of troops at the front, since the annual natural increase in the contingent of those liable for military service (350 thousand people) turned out to be exceeded. This problem could be solved only by laying bare other areas of the economy or by calling people of younger ages into active service. But the opportunities for this were limited, and mainly because the need for workers for the war industry increased. Although the civilian branches of industry were able to release about 30,000 people for military production every month through various types of internal transfers, this was still not enough.

The way out of this situation, found by the German leadership, was very simple: to use in the military industry about 500 thousand French prisoners of war, previously employed in Germany's agriculture. Their place in agriculture could be taken by Russian prisoners of war. The first attempts by the Wehrmacht High Command and the Imperial Ministry of Labor to put this plan into practice date back to mid-July, although it had already become clear then that the use of Russian prisoners of war for work in Germany in accordance with the directives previously issued by higher authorities was impossible.

In August, the situation cleared up a little after the Wehrmacht's supreme command, and mainly Goering, as the general commissioner for the implementation of the four-year plan, demanded that the French prisoners of war be replaced by Russians. On August 2, the Wehrmacht Supreme High Command requested the use of Russian prisoners of war in Germany. This measure was seen as a "necessary evil". However, Goering managed to get 100,000 French and only 120,000 Russian prisoners of war for the military industry, and primarily for the implementation of the aircraft production program, since Hitler categorically prohibited the use of more Russians on the territory of the empire. Thus, assistance was provided to the military industry, but not to the extent required.

Due to the fact that most French prisoners of war needed training for work in the military industry, their efficiency was still low. Moreover, this number of prisoners of war was completely insufficient. Only to fulfill the most urgent and most important military orders required: the navy - 30 thousand people, the ground forces - 51 thousand people, the air force until the end of 1941 - 316 thousand people, to implement the Krauch program (fuel , aluminum, artificial rubber) - 133,700 people, that is, a total of 530,700 people. The only way to solve the labor problem - and this became quite obvious in August - was to use Russian manpower in the future.

On August 16, 1941, the participants in the meeting in the department of the war economy and armaments came to the conclusion that even the most important production programs should be reduced due to the lack of raw materials. The commander of the reserve army, Colonel-General Fromm, demanded that the leadership of the Wehrmacht "finally descend from sky-high heights to the sinful earth." Real conditions dictated either a sharp reduction in production programs, or the capture of new resource bases. The missing reserves of raw materials had to be replenished from the rich bowels of the European part of the Soviet Union, and this was one of the main reasons that prompted Hitler to attack the USSR. In his notes on the military and economic significance of the operation in the East, the head of the department of military economy and armaments indicated that Germany would be relieved with raw materials if it was possible to prevent the enemy by decisive actions from eliminating stocks of raw materials, to capture the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus intact and intact, and solve the transportation problem.

For the exploitation of Russian industry and natural resources, it was planned to create a special organization, and the issue of this was previously discussed as early as November 1940. Initially, this organization was placed under the command of Lieutenant-General Schubert and was called the "working headquarters of Russia." On March 19, 1941, it was renamed the "Economic Special Purpose Headquarters Oldenburg" and subordinated directly to Goering. The organization was supposed to deal with issues not only of the military, but of the entire economy as a whole, that is, to put the industry and raw materials of the USSR at the service of Germany's interests.

The leadership of the War Economy and Armaments Administration was of the opinion that Germany should not only use Russia's raw materials to continue the war, but also further restore Russian industry and agriculture. Goering, on the contrary, was in favor of the unrestrained plunder of the Soviet Union and did everything possible to carry it out. In June 1941, the organization was renamed the "military-economic headquarters Ost". It had "economic inspectorates" in the rear areas of the army groups, one in each army group, one or more "economic teams" in security divisions, and one "economic group" in each army. All these "economic" organizations were at the disposal of the relevant command authorities of the Wehrmacht and carried out the tasks of supplying the troops.

But their main purpose was to do everything necessary for the fastest and most effective use of the occupied regions in the interests of Germany, that is, in plundering the wealth of the Soviet Union. On August 25, 1941, Hitler, in a conversation with Mussolini, noted that the economic occupation and exploitation of the Soviet Union had successfully begun. He even claimed that the captured booty was much larger than that which the German army was counting on. However, Hitler concealed the fact that the seized sources of raw materials, due to the severe destruction and damage to the mining enterprises, can only be used for the German military industry to a limited extent and that, due to the lack of transport, the transfer of agricultural products from the Soviet Union cannot be fully ensured. Nevertheless, in this field, as well as in the field of raw materials, there was hope that in the future it would be possible to overcome all the growing, now becoming obvious difficulties, if things were better organized and if the German troops successfully advanced to the East.

The issue of raw materials played a decisive role in why Hitler, having disagreed with the OKH on the further plan of operations, decided in late August to strike the main blow in the south, and not on the front of Army Group Center. The Führer believed that the destruction or capture of vital raw material bases was of much greater importance than the capture or destruction of industrial enterprises for the processing of raw materials.

The need to capture the Donets Basin and provide cover for the Romanian oil-bearing regions prompted Hitler to use the operationally advantageous starting position on the inner flanks of Army Groups "South" and "Center" to launch an offensive in order to destroy the Russian armies in the Kyiv region and open the way to the Soviet bases of raw materials. By this time, coal production in Germany was about 18 million tons per month (June 1941), iron ore - 5.5 million tons per year, oil - 4.8 million tons per year.

After the successful completion of the first stage of the operation to encircle Kyiv, Hitler decided that both main objectives of the campaign had almost been completed - to seize the Crimea and the industrial coal-mining region of Donetsk and cut off the Russian oil routes from the Caucasus, as well as to cut off Leningrad in the north and connect with the Finns. However, by the beginning of September, the German military command understood that the “Russian colossus” was not only not crushed, but also concentrated most of the forces near Moscow, which must be destroyed if you want to achieve a final victory over Russia. By the beginning of September, the Red Army had concentrated near Moscow in well-equipped positions about 40% of the personnel of the ground forces and artillery, 35% of tanks, 35% of the air force. Since the Russian command believed that the western direction would be the decisive direction, it also pulled in a large number of manpower reserves and equipment there.

Political situation. Germany's foreign policy situation was such that she needed air to win over the Soviet Union as soon as possible. In their plans for the period after Barbarossa, the German command counted on the support, and perhaps even the entry into the war of Turkey, Spain and Vichy France on the side of the "Great German Empire". Already in March 1941, the German ambassador to Turkey, Franz von Papen, reported that Turkey would take the side of the Axis countries only if favorable conditions developed for them. Spain took a similar position. Hopes of reaching an agreement with Vichy France, mainly on the question of her North African possessions, were dashed in early September, as France realized that, as a result of the weakening of Germany in the war with Russia, she could again advance to the ranks of the great powers in the not too distant future. . But these were hopes that could be realized only when victory over Russia would become obvious, and the countries named above would risk entering the war in connection with this.

In addition, after the US occupation of Iceland, Hitler feared, and not without reason, that the US would enter the war and then he would be able to wage war only if the economic potential of Russia was in his hands. Fear of US entry into the war while the campaign in Russia was still pending forced Hitler to do everything possible to prevent America from declaring war on Germany. He hoped that after the victory over Russia, the United States would not dare to oppose Germany and would remain neutral, especially since American forces would be pinned down in the Pacific by an axis partner, Japan.

In a conversation with the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, Hitler again emphasized his decision to do everything possible to prevent the United States from entering the war in the near future. A request for permission for German submarines to attack American ships was categorically rejected by Hitler.

Hitler, in contrast to Joachim von Ribbentrop, approved of Japan's performance in Southeast Asia and its reserved stance towards the Soviet Union, since this delayed part of the British forces from Europe and North Africa and kept the United States from entering the war.

Ribbentrop, who disagreed with Hitler on foreign policy issues, sought from the very beginning of the Russian campaign to persuade Japan to start hostilities against the Soviet Union as soon as possible. All his attempts, however, failed, running into the notorious "selfish considerations" and the realistic assessment of the situation by the Japanese.

Hitler considered Japan's attack on Russia impossible. However, he made the answer to the question whether such an attack is beneficial for Germany dependent on the evolving military situation. In any case, at the beginning of September, he believed that he could alone, without the help of Japan, bring Russia to its knees. The Axis partners, however, by this time were no longer so sure of the victorious outcome of the German campaign against the Soviet Union. The Italian General Staff and Mussolini, starting from the second half of July, believed that Germany had overestimated its strength and that Russia would be able to hold out until winter. The Japanese, impressed by the strength of the Russian resistance near Smolensk and remembering the lessons of the battles with the Red Army at Khalkhin Gol (66), decided to seek a political settlement of relations with the Soviet Union. Back in 1941, they did not hide their doubts about the victorious outcome of the eastern campaign for Germany.

Hitler, who had reached a stalemate in early September, saw the only way out of the current situation in concentrating all his efforts on the Eastern Front in order to secure a strategic advantage for himself as early as 1941 and create favorable conditions for the development of operations in the period after Barbarossa in 1942. But for this, Hitler needed to finally defeat the Red Army and achieve operational freedom of action on the European territory of Russia, which was possible only if the Russian troops were defeated near Moscow. Therefore, from Hitler's point of view, it was logical to listen to the arguments of the OKH, which he had hitherto rejected as untenable, and stake everything on the trump card, whose name was "Moscow", in order to end the war in the East in this way. The victorious outcome of the offensive in the autumn of 1941 was supposed to help resolve the ever-growing difficulties in the military, economic and political fields.

1098 days ago

The art of war is a science in which nothing succeeds except what has been calculated and thought out.

Napoleon

The Barbarossa plan is a plan for Germany's attack on the USSR, based on the principle of lightning war, blitzkrieg. The plan began to be developed in the summer of 1940, and on December 18, 1940, Hitler approved a plan according to which the war was to be ended by November 1941 at the latest.

Plan Barbarossa was named after Frederick Barbarossa, a 12th century emperor who became famous for his conquests. This traced elements of symbolism, to which Hitler himself and his entourage paid so much attention. The plan received its name on January 31, 1941.

Number of troops to implement the plan

Germany prepared 190 divisions for war and 24 divisions as a reserve. For the war, 19 tank and 14 motorized divisions were allocated. The total number of the contingent that Germany sent to the USSR, according to various estimates, ranges from 5 to 5.5 million people.

The apparent superiority in the technology of the USSR should not be taken into account, since by the beginning of the wars, German technical tanks and aircraft were superior to Soviet ones, and the army itself was much more trained. Suffice it to recall the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, where the Red Army demonstrated weakness in literally everything.

Direction of the main attack

The Barbarossa plan defined 3 main directions for the strike:

• Army Group South. A blow to Moldova, Ukraine, Crimea and access to the Caucasus. Further movement to the line Astrakhan - Stalingrad (Volgograd).
• Army Group Center. Line "Minsk - Smolensk - Moscow". Advance to Nizhny Novgorod, leveling the line "Wave - Northern Dvina".
• Army Group North. Attack on the Baltic states, Leningrad and further advance towards Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. At the same time, the army "Norway" was to fight in the north together with the Finnish army.

Table - offensive goals according to the Barbarossa plan

	SOUTH	CENTRE	NORTH
Target	Ukraine, Crimea, access to the Caucasus	Minsk, Smolensk, Moscow	Baltic States, Leningrad, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk
population	57 divisions and 13 brigades	50 divisions and 2 brigades	29 division + army "Norway"
Commanding	Field Marshal von Rundstedt	Field Marshal von Bock	Field Marshal von Leeb
common goal	Get on line: Arkhangelsk - Volga - Astrakhan (Northern Dvina)

Approximately by the end of October 1941, the German command planned to reach the Volga-Northern Dvina line, thereby capturing the entire European part of the USSR. This was the plan of the blitzkrieg. After the blitzkrieg, the lands beyond the Urals should have remained, which, without the support of the center, would quickly surrender to the winner.

Until about mid-August 1941, the Germans believed that the war was going according to plan, but in September there were already entries in the diaries of officers that the Barbarossa plan had failed and the war would be lost. The best proof that Germany in August 1941 believed that only a few weeks were left before the end of the war with the USSR is the speech of Goebbels. The Minister of Propaganda suggested that the Germans additionally collect warm clothes for the needs of the army. The government decided that this step was not necessary, since there would be no war in the winter.

Implementation of the plan

The first three weeks of the war assured Hitler that everything was going according to plan. The army advanced rapidly, winning victories, the Soviet army suffered huge losses:

• 28 divisions out of 170 disabled.
• 70 divisions lost about 50% of their personnel.
• 72 divisions remained combat-ready (43% of those available at the start of the war).

During the same 3 weeks, the average rate of advance of German troops inland was 30 km per day.

By July 11, the army group "North" occupied almost the entire territory of the Baltic states, providing access to Leningrad, the army group "Center" reached Smolensk, the army group "South" went to Kyiv. These were the last achievements that fully corresponded to the plan of the German command. After that, failures began (still local, but already indicative). Nevertheless, the initiative in the war until the end of 1941 was on the side of Germany.

German failures in the North

The army "North" occupied the Baltic states without problems, especially since there was practically no partisan movement there. The next strategic point to be captured was Leningrad. It turned out that the Wehrmacht was not capable of this task. The city did not capitulate to the enemy, and until the end of the war, despite all efforts, Germany failed to capture it.

Failures of the Army Center

The "Center" army reached Smolensk without any problems, but got stuck under the city until September 10. Smolensk resisted for almost a month. The German command demanded a decisive victory and the advance of the troops, since such a delay under the city, which was planned to be taken without heavy losses, was unacceptable and cast doubt on the implementation of the Barbarossa plan. As a result, the Germans took Smolensk, but their troops were pretty battered.

Historians today evaluate the battle for Smolensk as a tactical victory for Germany, but a strategic victory for Russia, as they managed to stop the advance of troops on Moscow, which allowed the capital to prepare for defense.

Complicated the advance of the German army deep into the country partisan movement of Belarus.

Failures of the Army of the South

The "South" army reached Kyiv in 3.5 weeks and, like the "Center" army near Smolensk, got stuck in battles. In the end, it was possible to take the city in view of the clear superiority of the army, but Kyiv held out almost until the end of September, which also made it difficult for the German army to advance, and made a significant contribution to the disruption of the Barbarossa plan.

Map of the advance plan of the German troops

Above is a map showing the plan of the German command for the offensive. The map shows: in green - the borders of the USSR, in red - the border to which Germany planned to reach, in blue - the deployment and the plan to advance the German forces.

General state of affairs

• In the North, it was not possible to capture Leningrad and Murmansk. The advance of the troops stopped.
• In the Center, with great difficulty, we managed to get to Moscow. At the time the German army entered the Soviet capital, it was clear that no blitzkrieg had happened.
• In the South, they failed to take Odessa and capture the Caucasus. By the end of September, the Nazi troops had only captured Kyiv and launched an offensive against Kharkov and the Donbass.

Why did the blitzkrieg fail in Germany?

Germany failed the blitzkrieg because the Wehrmacht was preparing the Barbarossa plan, as it later turned out, on false intelligence. Hitler admitted this by the end of 1941, saying that if he had known the real state of affairs in the USSR, he would not have started the war on June 22.

The lightning war tactics were based on the fact that the country has one line of defense on the western border, all large army units are located on the western border, and aviation is located on the border. Since Hitler was sure that all Soviet troops were located on the border, this formed the basis of the blitzkrieg - to destroy the enemy army in the first weeks of the war, and then rapidly move inland without encountering serious resistance.

In fact, there were several lines of defense, the army was not located with all its forces on the western border, there were reserves. Germany did not expect this, and by August 1941 it became clear that the lightning war had failed, and Germany could not win the war. The fact that World War II lasted until 1945 only proves that the Germans fought very organized and brave. Due to the fact that they had the economy of the whole of Europe behind them (speaking of the war between Germany and the USSR, many for some reason forget that the German army included units from almost all European countries) they managed to fight successfully.

Did Barbarossa's plan fail?

I propose to evaluate the Barbarossa plan according to 2 criteria: global and local. Global(landmark - the Great Patriotic War) - the plan was thwarted, because the lightning war did not work, the German troops were bogged down in battles. Local(landmark - intelligence data) - the plan was implemented. The German command drew up the Barbarossa plan on the basis that the USSR had 170 divisions on the country's border, there were no additional defense echelons. There are no reserves and reinforcements. The army was preparing for this. In 3 weeks, 28 Soviet divisions were completely destroyed, and in 70, approximately 50% of the personnel and equipment were disabled. At this stage, the blitzkrieg worked and, in the absence of reinforcements from the USSR, gave the desired results. But it turned out that the Soviet command has reserves, not all troops are located on the border, mobilization brings quality soldiers into the army, there are additional lines of defense, the “charm” of which Germany felt near Smolensk and Kyiv.

Therefore, the disruption of the Barbarossa plan must be regarded as a huge strategic mistake of German intelligence, led by Wilhelm Canaris. Today, some historians associate this person with the agents of England, but there is no evidence for this. But if we assume that this is indeed the case, then it becomes clear why Canaris slipped Hitler an absolute “linden” that the USSR was not ready for war and that all troops were located on the border.

Even before the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939, Stalin began to prepare the Red Army to conquer Europe.

Stalin was preparing not for a defensive, but for an offensive aggressive war. On February 14, 1938, Stalin wrote in the Pravda newspaper: "The final victory of socialism in the sense of a complete guarantee against the restoration of bourgeois relations is possible only on an international scale." In the Directive of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army of May 15, 1941, it was written: “Leninism teaches that the country of socialism, using the favorable international situation, must and will be obliged to take the initiative in offensive military operations against the capitalist encirclement in order to expand the front of socialism” .

On December 14, 1939, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations for attacking Finland. Of the 40 member states of the League of Nations, 28 states voted in favor of the draft resolution of the Assembly, 9 abstained, 3 were absent, including the USSR. The Council of the League of Nations got acquainted with the resolution adopted by the Assembly and passed a resolution on the exclusion of the Soviet Union from this international organization.

Stalin's operational plans for preparing an attack on Germany have not yet been declassified, but are partially set out in a memorandum to Stalin from the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army "On the Fundamentals of the Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the West and in the East", compiled no later than August 16, 1940 of the year. These plans of the Soviet General Staff were declassified and published only in the first half of the 1990s.

In mid-May 1941, the next version of the "Considerations on the Strategic Deployment Plan" appeared - the fifth (since August 1940) version of the war plan against Germany. On the map attached to the text document, the hand of the First Deputy Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff - Vasilevsky clearly marked the date “15.5.41″

Hitler's plans to attack the USSR were outlined in the Barbarossa plan, signed on December 18, 1940. Hitler began to develop this plan shortly after the surrender of France on July 1, 1940.

On June 22, 1941, hundreds of thousands of officers and commanders of the Red Army did not have maps for the defense of the territory of the USSR. 550 million copies of maps of the territory not of the USSR, but of Germany, Poland, Romania were printed ... In December 1939, the Chief of the General Staff Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov, on the working map of Mark Karpovich Kudryavtsev, who for many years headed the topographic service, marked with a blue pencil the lines on which he was supposed to create a stock of topographic maps. And the lines were:
- In the depths of our troops, these were Murmansk, Petrozavodsk, Leningrad, Minsk, Kyiv, Moldova.
- And to the west it was Berlin, Prague, Budapest, Bucharest.
The USSR was preparing for a victorious offensive right up to Berlin ... East of Minsk and Kyiv, there were no maps in the fighting units of the army. Minsk was taken by the Germans on the 7th day of the war. Further, the Red Army retreated "blindly". In sufficient quantities, maps appeared only near Moscow.

Historian M. Meltyukhov pointed out that the plan for the war with Germany was approved on October 14, 1940, and its further clarification in the documents dated March 11 and May 15, 1941, essentially did not change anything. “The most important thing,” he stressed, “both in Germany and in the USSR, these plans did not remain on paper, but began to be implemented. A comparative analysis of the preparation of the parties for the war is another direction for further research on the eve of the war. But even on the basis of the materials known today, it can be argued that this process went on in parallel and from the beginning of 1941 entered the final stage both in Germany and in the USSR, which, by the way, once again confirms the inevitability of the outbreak of war precisely in 1941, who no matter who initiated it."

Original taken from igor_mikhaylin in 1940-41 From Marx to Paulus. Creation of a shock group

writes http://maxpark.com/community/14/content/3134170 Aizen Taicho

There is one little-known detail in the history of the Patriotic War.

The fact is that the Barbaros operational plan was by no means the first operational plan developed for an attack on the USSR, and the attack itself was planned in the fall of 1940.
Hitler believed that the British would quickly conclude a truce (or peace), he would turn to the USSR and quickly end the war in the east.
But England persisted and the plan eventually fell through. That's what it was.

INTENTION
On July 21, Hitler categorically stated: “The Russian problem will be solved by an offensive.

Following the ground forces of Germany, Brauchitsch received an order to prepare a plan of war against the USSR, given that the attack would be undertaken 4-6 weeks after the end of the concentration of troops.
»
It was at this meeting on a national scale that the decision to attack the Soviet country was approved.
For the first time, the question of a war with the USSR was put on the basis of operational calculations.
Here is the commander-in-chief of 0 divisions.
Herman Goth, who commanded the 3rd Panzer Group during the attack on the USSR, notes in his memoirs "Tank Operations" that on July 29, 1940, the chief of staff of the 18th Army (this post was previously held by Lieutenant General Marx - the author of the very first plan attack on the USSR) was called to Berlin, "where he was given the task of developing a plan of operation against Russia."
Goth wrote:
“At this time, Hitler, who was about to launch an offensive against Russia in the autumn (autumn of 1940), was informed that the concentration and deployment of troops along the eastern border would take from four to six weeks ...
On July 31, Hitler made his intentions more specific and stated that he would most willingly launch an offensive against Russia this year.
But this cannot be done, since hostilities will take over the winter, and a pause is dangerous; the operation makes sense only if we defeat the Russian state with one blow.

Herman Goth
About the same General Tippelskirch:
“The beginning of military preparations can be traced back to the summer of 1940. At the end of July, before the order was given for an air attack on England, Jodl informed one of his closest collaborators that Hitler had decided to prepare for war against the Soviet Union.
This war had to start under all circumstances, and then it would be better to fight it within the framework of a war already being waged; in any case, it is necessary to prepare for it.
At first, even the possibility of starting a new war in the upcoming autumn (ie, in 1940) was discussed. However, this would have to face insurmountable difficulties associated with strategic concentration, and such an idea had to be abandoned soon ”
Only time constraints - the Germans did not have time to make a strategic concentration for aggression against the USSR - kept them from attacking the Soviet Union in 1940.
Simply put, the decision to attack the USSR was made in the summer of 1940. Everything else was technical developments.
CREATING A STRIKING GROUP
In the summer and autumn of 1940, the high command of the German Wehrmacht began to intensively transfer to Poland, closer to the Soviet borders; their troops. Against the USSR, Hitler planned to throw 120 divisions, leaving 60 divisions in the West, in France and Belgium, as well as in Norway.

To this end, the railway network in Poland was improved, old tracks were repaired and new tracks were laid, communication lines were established.
Immediately after the defeat of France, three Nazi armies of the von Bock group - 4, 12 and 18 - numbering up to 30 divisions were sent to the East, to the Poznan region.
Of the 24 formations that were part of the 16th and 9th armies of group "A", intended to attack England according to the "Sea Lion" plan, 17 were transferred to the East
The headquarters of the 18th Army was deployed in Poland, uniting all German troops in the East. Only during the period from July 16 to August 14, more than 20 Nazi divisions were redeployed, making marches along a mysterious curve.

They went from Central France to the English Channel and Pas de Calais, and then through Belgium and Holland to Germany and on to Poland, to the borders of the Soviet Union. However, everything will become extremely clear if we consider that the Nazi command, which carried out these mysterious marches, pursued a single goal: to cover Germany's preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union.

According to German data, by September 20, 1940, about 30 divisions were transferred from France to the borders of the USSR, to East Prussia, Poland, Upper Silesia
To wage war against the USSR, the German command formed new infantry, tank, motorized divisions.
Since for Germany since the autumn of 1940 the preparation of a war against the Soviet Union had become a decisive task, on October 12, 1940, an order was given to stop all preparations for the Sea Lion plan until the spring of 1941.
Tank, mechanized and infantry divisions, including the division of selected thugs "Dead Head", as well as Himmler's terrorist apparatus, which were intended for landing in England, were loaded into wagons at the end of the summer and autumn of 1940 and moved to the borders of the Soviet Union.

Preparations for the attack on the USSR were carried out with German punctuality. Operational-strategic plans were developed very carefully and comprehensively. Tens of thousands of pages were written, thousands of maps and diagrams were drawn. The most experienced field marshals, generals, and officers of the General Staff methodically developed an aggressive plan for a treacherous attack on a socialist state that was engaged in peaceful, creative work.

The slowness and thoughtfulness of this preparation testify to the fact that fascist Germany was not afraid of an attack from the USSR, and the legends of German politicians, generals, "historians" about Germany's "preventive war" against the USSR are simply falsification and lies.
After a meeting with Hitler at the Berghof, on August 1, 1940, E. Marx presented Halder with the first version of the plan for the war against the USSR. It was based on the idea of ​​"blitzkrieg". Marx proposed the formation of two shock groups, which were to advance to the line Rostov-on-Don - Gorky - Arkhangelsk, and further to the Urals. The decisive importance was given to the capture of Moscow, which would lead, Marx pointed out, to the "termination of Soviet resistance"

Only 9-17 weeks were allotted for the implementation of the plan to defeat the USSR.
After Keitel's report about the insufficient engineering preparation of the bridgehead for an attack on the USSR, Jodl on August 9 gave the top secret order "Aufbau ost". It outlined the following preparatory measures: repair and construction of railways and highways, barracks, hospitals, airfields, training grounds, warehouses, communication lines; provided for the formation and combat training of new formations
By the end of August 1940, a preliminary version of the plan for the war of fascist Germany against the USSR was drawn up, which received the code name of the plan "Barbarossa
Marx's plan was discussed at operational meetings with the participation of Hitler, Keitel, Brauchitsch, Halder and other generals. A new option was also put forward - an invasion of the USSR by forces of 130-140 divisions; the final development of it was entrusted to the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Paulus. The purpose of the invasion was to encircle and defeat the Soviet units in the western part of the USSR, access to the line Astrakhan - Arkhangelsk

Paulus considered it necessary to create three army groups: "North" - to attack Leningrad, "Center" - to Minsk - Smolensk, "South" - in order to reach the Dnieper near Kyiv. Started in August 1940, the development of the preliminary plan "Barbarossa", according to General Paulus, ended with two war games.

In late November and early December 1940, these large operational games were held at the General Staff of the Ground Forces in Zossen under the leadership of Paulus.
They were attended by Colonel General Halder, the Chief of Operations of the General Staff, Colonel Heusinger, and specially invited senior staff officers from the OKH.
Field Marshal Paulus at the Nuremberg Tribunal testified
“The result of the games, taken as the basis for the development of directives for the strategic deployment of the Barbarossa forces, showed that the envisaged disposition on the Astrakhan-Arkhangelsk line - the distant goal of the OKW - was supposed to lead to the complete defeat of the Soviet state, which, in fact, the OKW achieved in its aggression and what, finally, was the goal of this war: to turn Russia into a colonial country"
At the end of the military games, in December, a secret meeting was held with the chief of the general staff of the ground forces, who used the theoretical results of the games with the involvement of individual headquarters of army groups and armies responsible for unleashing aggression against the USSR.
It discussed issues that were not resolved during the military games.

At the end of the meeting, Colonel Kindel, Head of the Vostok Department of Foreign Armies, delivered a special report. He gave a detailed economic and geographical characterization of the Soviet Union, as well as the Red Army, although he could not realistically assess its true strength.
Paulus testified:
“The speaker’s conclusions are a noteworthy adversary that there was no information about special military preparations and that the military industry, including the newly created one east of the Volga, was highly developed”
As Tippelskirch notes, this was essentially the first step towards the strategic deployment of the German armed forces against the Soviet Union. In July, the direct development of plans for an attack on the USSR begins.
Interesting is the following remark by Tippelskirch, referring to the beginning of the development of the German plans for the eastern campaign:
“The hitherto known grouping of enemy forces, as well as general considerations independent of this, made it possible to assume that the Russians would withdraw no further than the Dnieper and the Western Dvina, because with a further retreat they would no longer be able to protect their industrial regions.
Based on this, it was planned to prevent the Russians from creating a continuous front of defense to the west of the indicated rivers with the strikes of tank wedges.
Those. the information about the Soviet group that the Germans had at the time they began to develop plans for a war against the USSR did not at all cause them fears that they might be subjected to a military strike from the east.
On the contrary, they assume that the Russians will retreat, and they are thinking about how to prevent the Red Army from retreating too far - to defeat it in border battles. General Marks
The very first draft of the Ost operation plan, developed by the chief of staff of the 18th Army, Major General Marx, who, according to Hoth, enjoyed "special authority" with Hitler, says the same thing.
MARX PLAN
On August 5, 1940, General Marx presented his project. Now this document was declassified in the 90s by the international fund "Democracy", "Documents", v. 1, pp. 232-233;
In the very first lines it stated:
"The goal of the campaign is to defeat the Russian armed forces and make Russia unable to act as an enemy to Germany in the foreseeable future." And not a word about the fact that there is a threat of a Soviet attack and that the campaign is designed to prevent it. Vice versa! The document says in black and white: "The Russians will not do us a favor by attacking us."
But the Russians will not render such a service, it’s not scary - the Germans will attack themselves.
How will the enemy (i.e. Soviet troops) behave in response to the German attack? General Marx stated his considerations: “We must count on the fact that the Russian ground forces will resort to defense, while only aviation and naval forces, namely the submarine fleet, will act offensively.
Therefore, the conduct of the war on the part of Soviet Russia will consist in its joining the blockade (of Germany).

To this end, a Russian invasion of Romania is likely to take oil from us. Therefore, one should count on at least strong Russian air raids on the Romanian oil regions.
On the other hand, the Russian will not be able, as in 1812, to evade any decision on the battlefield. The modern armed forces, numbering 100 divisions, cannot give up the sources of their strength. It should be assumed that the Russian ground forces will take up a defensive position to fight in order to protect Great Russia and Eastern Ukraine.
After the frank indication of General Marx that “the Russians will not render us a service by their attack on us” (i.e., the Germans initially proceeded from the fact that they would be the aggressors, and the Soviet Union was assigned the role of a victim of aggression), it is quite obvious: any forecasts of German strategists about the possible actions of the Red Army - these are reflections on retaliatory, defensive actions on the Soviet side.

General Marks
And, of course, quite legal and natural for a country that has been attacked by an aggressor.
This is to the fact that Rezun quite often exaggerates the topic of the “Soviet threat to the Romanian oil fields” - they say, poor and unfortunate Hitler, who depended on fuel supplies from Romania, was afraid that the USSR would cut these supplies.
But we see - from the reflections of the German strategists themselves, under what circumstances could something like this happen - "a Russian invasion of Romania in order to take oil from us (Germans.)" - only in the case (and under the condition) of a German attack on the USSR.
The fact that the Germans were not at all afraid of any strike from the USSR - even a preemptive one (!), even in a situation where the aggressive intentions of Germany were unraveled in Moscow, is also evidenced by the indisputable fact that the German troops concentrating near the Soviet border were not even put tasks in case the Red Army strikes first.
German strategists, in principle, did not consider such an option and completely ruled it out!
And this despite the fact that the concentration of Soviet troops, the Germans noted and perceived this fact as a response, defensive nature, measures of the USSR.
For example, the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Bock, on March 27, 1941, writes in his diary:
“A meeting was held at the headquarters of the OKW on the issue of speaking out against Russia ... No decision was made on issuing the necessary instructions in case of an unexpected Russian offensive on the border in the sector of the army group.
Although such a development of events seems unlikely, we must be prepared for any surprises, since any attempt to attack in the direction of the German border threatens the huge stocks of ammunition, food and weapons concentrated there, intended to support our planned operation.
As you can see, von Bock, although he considers any unexpected offensive by the Red Army "unlikely", would still consider it necessary to play it safe - one must, they say, be prepared "for any surprises."
Which, in general, is logical. But even for reinsurance purposes, the OKW does not give any appropriate (to cover the border in the event of a Soviet attack) instructions to the German troops - get ready calmly for the implementation of the Barbarossa plan, do not be distracted by "unlikely" scenarios (and the OKW, apparently, had reason consider the Soviet offensive to be completely unbelievable), do not fill your head with unnecessary problems.

So all rezunism can be sent to a landfill ...

DEVELOPMENT OF OKW
All Soviet border districts (in the west of the country) received orders from their command to provide cover for the border in the event of a German attack; German army groups did not set similar tasks.
As they say, feel the difference! So the Germans were "afraid" of the Soviet attack.
The most curious document Strategic development of the operational department of the OKW for the preparation and conduct of a campaign against the USSR.
The head of the operations department of the OKW was Alfred Jodl, who was also Hitler's chief military adviser on operational-strategic issues.
The document is dated September 15, 1940.
Among the goals of the campaign against the USSR, we again do not find a hint of the "threat of a Soviet invasion" that should have been prevented. In general, not a single word that the Soviet Union is plotting something against Germany.
“The goal of the campaign against Soviet Russia,” the document said, “is: by swift action, destroy the mass of ground forces located in western Russia, prevent the withdrawal of combat-ready forces into the depths of Russian space, and then, cutting off the western part of Russia from the seas, break through to such a boundary, which, on the one hand, would secure the most important regions of Russia for us, and on the other hand, could serve as a convenient barrier from its Asian part.
A map was attached to this strategic development of the operational department of the OKW, which schematically showed "the grouping of forces of the Russian ground forces according to the data at the end of August 1940."
Perhaps in the grouping of Soviet troops "at the end of August 1940" was something threatening for Germany?
No. The Soviet grouping - at the moment when the Germans were no longer even making a decision (this happened back in July 1940), but were developing their plans for the upcoming attack on the USSR - did not represent any threats to Germany.
What worries German military strategists?

And they are worried that in the USSR they can unravel the aggressive German plans and regroup their forces in such a way that it will not be possible to realize the above plan: "to destroy the mass of ground forces located in western Russia, to prevent the withdrawal of combat-ready forces into the depths of Russian space." This alone worries the Germans.

The document of Jodl's department (later hanged by the verdict of the Nuremberg Tribunal) stated:
“It should, however, be taken into account that it is in Russia that it is difficult to obtain more or less reliable information about our future enemy. Even less reliable will be this data on the distribution of Russian forces by the time our aggressive intentions are discovered on the other side of the border. At the moment, the distribution of Russian forces may still bear traces of previous events in Finland, the Limitrophes and Bessarabia.
As you can see, in their documents for internal use, the Germans already in 1940 did not hesitate to call themselves aggressors.
So, in the operational department of the OKW, it was assumed that the "aggressive intentions" of the Germans would be noticed in the USSR. And these are quite reasonable assumptions: to completely hide the preparations for an event of such gigantic proportions as an attack on the Soviet Union is a matter of science fiction.
At the very least, one must be prepared for the fact that aggressive German plans will be revealed in the USSR. And in this case, Jodl's department compiled 3 options for possible actions of the USSR:
"I. The Russians will want to pre-empt us and, to this end, will deliver a preemptive strike against the German troops that are beginning to concentrate near the border.
II. The Russian armies will take upon themselves the blow of the German armed forces, deploying near the border in order to hold in their hands the new positions they have captured on both flanks (the Baltic and Black Seas).
III. The Russians use a method that has already justified itself in 1812, i.e. they will retreat into the depths of their space in order to impose on the advancing armies the difficulties of extended communications and the difficulties of supply associated with them, and then, only in the further course of the campaign, will they launch a counterattack.
And then the views of the German strategists were expressed on each of the possible options for the response of the USSR.

THREE OPTIONS
These three options are worth talking about, they are very important.
“Option I. It seems incredible that the Russians would decide on an offensive on a large scale, for example, an invasion of East Prussia and the northern part of the General Government, until the bulk of the German army was shackled for a long time by hostilities on another front.
Apparently, neither the command nor the troops will be able to do this. Smaller operations are more likely. They can be directed either against Finland or against Romania ... "
Those. in Germany, not only were they not afraid of a Soviet attack, but it seemed “incredible” to the Germans that the Soviet Union would decide on a preemptive strike even when it realized that it was facing German aggression.
And this forecast of the operational department of the OKW came true. When the Soviet military begins to assert the opinion that Germany is systematically concentrating its forces against the USSR, they will have the idea of ​​delivering a preventive (preemptive) strike.
But what did the Germans consider more probable?

The Germans thought it most likely that the USSR would act according to option "II", i.e. when the Red Army will take "on itself the blow of the German armed forces, deploying near the border." Those. stubborn defense will hold the new border (with the annexed Baltic States, Western Belarus and Ukraine, Bessarabia). "
This decision, the OKW document said, “appears to be the most probable, since it cannot be assumed that such a strong military power as Russia will cede its richest, including the recently conquered areas, without a fight.”

And in the discussion about this option, it was said:
“If the Russians stop at option II, then the disposition of their forces will apparently have a certain resemblance to the present. At the same time, even larger forces are likely to be concentrated on the territory of Russian Poland, and the main reserves will remain in the Moscow area, which is already due to at least the structure of the Russian railway network.
“For us, such a decision, in which the enemy will take the battle with large forces at an early stage, would be favorable because after the defeats in the border battles, the Russian command is unlikely to be able to ensure an organized withdrawal of the entire army,” added the German strategists.

This document - compiled by no means by Soviet propagandists and not by Soviet historians, but by the Germans themselves - also contains a direct answer to Rezunov's numerous "perplexities" about "why such a large concentration of Soviet troops on the border?"

The Germans perfectly understood why and why.
Because (I answer with the words of the German strategists) “the Russian armies will take the blow of the German armed forces, turning around near the border in order to hold in their hands the new positions they have captured on both flanks (the Baltic and Black Seas).”

The Germans quite well calculated the train of thought of the Soviet military-political leadership. And they planned their attack based on this forecast, which turned out to be accurate (according to the second option for the possible actions of the Red Army, which seemed to them "the most likely").
Finally, option III - if the Red Army will act on the model of the Russian army of 1812 - was characterized by the Germans as extremely unfavorable for them (which is understandable: it meant a protracted war). But at the same time, how unlikely.
The OKW noted:
“If the Russians build their war plan in advance on first accepting the attack of the German troops with small forces, and concentrating their main grouping in the deep rear, then the boundary of the latter’s location north of the Pripyat marshes can most likely be a powerful water barrier formed by the Dvina rivers ( Daugava) and Dnieper. This barrier has a gap only about 70 m wide - in the area south of Vitebsk. Such an unfavorable decision for us should also be taken into account as a possible one. On the other hand, it is absolutely unbelievable that, south of the Pripyat swamps, the Russians will leave the regions of Ukraine, almost indispensable for them, without a fight.
So, we emphasize once again: neither at the moment when the Germans made the decision to attack the USSR, nor when planning for a future aggressive war against the Soviet Union was already in full swing in Germany, such a motive as protection from Soviet aggression was completely absent.
Completely absent and all.

July 31, 1940 Franz Halder again takes notes on the results of the next meeting with Hitler, who has already decided how to "force England to go to peace" (as Hitler put it at the aforementioned meeting in the Berghof on July 13, 1940) - defeat Russia and establish complete German hegemony in Europe.
“England's hope is Russia and America,” Hitler explained to his military leaders.
But, he added, if hope in Russia falls away, then the British will not have to hope in America either - "for the fall of Russia will in an unpleasant way increase the importance of Japan in East Asia, Russia is the East Asian sword of England and America against Japan." Hitler loved these analogies with the "sword".
Russia, Hitler stressed, is the factor on which England puts the most. However, if Russia is defeated, then "England's last hope will fade." And then the prospects are much more tempting: "Then Germany will become the ruler of Europe and the Balkans." Well, stubborn England will have to put up with it.

Hence the conclusion:
“Russia must be finished off,” and “the sooner Russia is defeated, the better.” Hitler also sets a target date: spring 1941

DECISION IS MADE
On October 15, 1940, Franz Halder records in a military diary Hitler's thoughts expressed during a meeting in Brenner, a high-mountainous place on the Austro-Italian border, after the Anschluss of Austria - German-Italian.
In Brenner, Hitler often held business meetings (for example, with Mussolini) and conferences.

This meeting took place two weeks after the signing of the Berlin Pact (also known as the 1940 Three Power Pact, or the Tripartite Pact).
"On September 27, 1940, in Berlin, Germany, Italy and Japan signed an agreement for a period of 10 years, containing obligations regarding mutual assistance between these powers, in addition, zones of influence between the Axis countries were delimited when establishing a" new order "in the world. Germany and Italy were intended leading role in Europe and Japan in Asia.
The Fuhrer expresses confidence that the war is "won", and bringing it to complete victory is "only a matter of time." The reason for England's resilience, says Hitler, is a double hope: on the USA and the USSR. But America, he says, by the fact of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact "has been given a warning," the United States is confronted "with the prospect of waging a war on two fronts." Accordingly, American aid to England will be limited.
The hope of England in the Soviet Union, continues Hitler, is also not justified. At the same time, he notes, “it is unbelievable that Russia itself would start a conflict with us.”

Which, however, does not stop the Fuhrer from developing plans for an attack on the Soviet Union.
On December 5, 1940, Halder writes:
“Notes on a meeting with Hitler on December 5, 1940… If England is forced to sue for peace, she will try to use Russia as a ‘sword’ on the Continent…
The question of hegemony in Europe will be decided in the struggle against Russia.
Again, no "Soviet threat". The USSR is seen as a factor that (according to Hitler) will play a role in making peace with England.

If the USSR is present as a player on the continent, peace with England will be less profitable.
If the USSR is taken out of the game, England will have no choice but to recognize German hegemony in Europe.
December 13, 1940 - a meeting with the chiefs of staff of army groups and armies.
“In the morning,” writes Halder, “discussion under the leadership of Paulus of the problems of the operation in the East.”
Thus, the plan of war against the Soviet Union is being discussed at full speed. Perhaps the exacerbation of the military-political situation on the Soviet-German border, the growing threat from the east, obliges us to do so?
Not at all. Even vice versa.

Halder writes:
"Military-political situation: Our assessments are based on the statements of the Fuhrer." What are these ratings? For example: “Russia, on which they pin (meaning in London.) hopes that it will not tolerate the sole domination of Germany on the continent.
So far, no result in this sense." Those. there are no threats to Germany from the USSR. However…
However, "Russia is a complicating factor." What is this factor "difficulty"? All the same: “The solution to the question of hegemony in Europe rests on the struggle against Russia”
Those. the presence of Russia in itself (regardless of its intentions) is a problem and an "embarrassing factor". And that's enough.
Therefore, although Hitler “still” has no reason to fear from the East, after 5 days he signs the well-known directive No. 21, the Barbarossa plan (Weisung Nr.21. Fall Barbarossa).

On January 8-9, 1941, in the Berghof, Hitler holds a large meeting with the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces in the presence of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces, the Chief of Staff of the Operational Command of the OKW, the Chief of the Operations Department of the General Staff of the Ground Forces and the 1st Chief Quartermaster (i.e. First Deputy Chief of the General Staff), Chief of the Operations Department of the High Command of the Naval Forces and Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force.

January 16, 1941 Halder writes in his diary:
“About the Führer's report 8-9.1 at the Berghof ... Separate points: The purpose of England in the war? England aspires to dominance on the Continent. Consequently, she will try to defeat us on the continent. So I [Hitler] must be so strong on the continent that this goal can never be achieved. England's Hope: America and Russia...
We will not be able to finally defeat England only by landing troops (aviation, navy). Therefore, in 1941, we must strengthen our positions on the continent to such an extent that in the future we will be able to wage war with England (and America) ...
Russia:
Stalin is smart and cunning. He will increase his demands all the time. From the point of view of Russian ideology, the victory of Germany is unacceptable. Therefore, the solution is to defeat Russia as soon as possible. In two years England will have 40 divisions. This may encourage Russia to move closer to it.”
And again we do not see such a motive as the "threat of a Soviet attack." Hitler does not like that the "smart and cunning" Stalin is trying to use the circumstances prevailing at that time in the interests of the USSR.
But more remarkable is Hitler's indication of the date when, in his opinion, an Anglo-Soviet alliance dangerous for Germany could take shape: "in two years." It is not difficult to calculate when this (and at that time purely hypothetical) situation could have developed: at the beginning of 1943.

Those. Hitler actually admitted that before 1943 there was no threat from the east.

CONCLUSION
The German command developed a plan and strategy for an attack on the USSR in the summer of 1940 and at the same time began to create a strike group of troops on the border with the USSR.
The Germans were not at all afraid of the USSR, they were only concerned with the question of how the USSR would respond to the attack.
They themselves made a decision long before the aggression itself ..