The year 1943 went down in the history of partisan struggle as the year of massive strikes against the railway communications of the Nazi troops. The largest operation to disrupt enemy communications was prepared by the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement. On July 9, in a letter to I.V. Stalin, Chief of Staff P.K. Ponomarenko proposed that, in order to disrupt the enemy's railway traffic, an operation should be carried out simultaneously and everywhere to destroy the rails on the railway tracks (788). Having received the consent of the Stavka, the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement on July 14 set the task of partisan formations "simultaneously with other sabotage, to carry out systematic and widespread destruction of rails on the enemy's railways." To achieve surprise, it was planned to carry out the first raid at the same time on the signal of the TsSHPD. The commanders of partisan detachments and brigades were instructed to "monitor and report to the headquarters of the partisan movement about the accumulation of enemy echelons." It was planned to involve about 96 thousand partisans of Belarus, Kalinin, Leningrad, Oryol and Smolensk regions in the operation, which was conditionally called the "Rail War". They were to blow up more than 200,000 rails in the rear areas of Army Groups Center and North (789).
Approved on April 26, 1943 by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the operational plan of action for the partisans of Ukraine for the spring-summer period of 1943 provided for paralyzing the work of 26 major railway junctions in the rear of Army Group South, including Shepetovsky, Kovelsky, Zdolbunovsky, Korostensky , Sarnensky (790) . In the same month, to provide practical assistance to underground party organizations and partisan detachments, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) U D.S. chief General T. A. Strokach. Combat missions for partisan detachments and formations were clarified on the spot, and some of them (the formations of S. A. Kovpak, M. I. Naumov, S. F. Malikov, A. N. Saburov and others) were given new ones.
Specific tasks for the disorganization of the enemy rear from the representations of the Central and Ukrainian headquarters at the military councils of the fronts were given to partisan forces operating in the zones of these fronts.
The result of purposeful work was a sharp increase in the sabotage successfully carried out by the partisans on the railway tracks during the preparation by the Wehrmacht command of the offensive on the Kursk salient. From April to June alone, they blew up 1,700 German trains. At the same time, the partisans committed 84 percent of all sabotage on the roads of the southwestern and western strategic directions. On May 9, the head of the rear area of the Army Group Center, General Schenkendorf, reported to the commander of the Army Group Kluge that to protect 3300 km of railway and highway tracks from partisans, as well as a large number of military and industrial facilities, the 59 security and police battalions that were clearly not enough at his disposal ( 791) . The ensuing strengthening of the troops guarding the communications did not give any significant results: in June, combat actions of partisans and underground fighters were carried out on the territory of the rear area of Army Group Center significantly more than in the corresponding month of 1942 (792) . At the same time, according to the testimony of the former head of the transport service of this army group G. Teske, 44 railway bridges were disabled, 298 steam locomotives, 1223 wagons were damaged. Partisans 746 times interrupted traffic on sections of railways, including 588 times for up to 12 hours, 114 times for up to 24 hours, and 44 times for more than one day (793) .
The partisan struggle intensified in the rear of Army Group South. The report of the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht reported: "The partisan movement in Ukraine has become especially widespread, and this significantly worsens the supply of our army with food" (794) .
The capacity of the most important railway line Kovel - Sarny - Kyiv, along which military echelons moved to the regions of Kharkov and Belgorod, decreased 6 times, and the Kovel - Exactly more than 2 times. There was even more destruction on the railway transport during the defensive battle of the Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge. In July alone, the partisans committed more than 1,200 acts of sabotage on the enemy's railways. However, it was not possible to completely interrupt the movement in the rear areas of the Nazi army.
After the Soviet Army launched a counteroffensive and developed into a general strategic offensive, the enemy feverishly transferred reserves from one sector of the front to another. Under these conditions, the efficient operation of railway transport acquired particular importance for him. It was this moment that the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command chose to start the “Rail War”.
On the night of August 3, by order of the TsShPD, 167 partisan detachments numbering up to 100 thousand people dealt a powerful blow to enemy communications. The operation began simultaneously on a front of 1000 km and covered the entire rear of the Nazi troops from the front line to the western border of the USSR. The partisans seized pre-planned sections of roads, destroyed the railway track, track facilities, disrupted communications, destroyed rolling stock and the water supply system. According to the TsShPD plan, the first blow was to blow up 26,000 rails. The results have exceeded the plans. In one night, the partisans destroyed more than 42 thousand rails.
On August 6, the combat diary of the Wehrmacht's High Command noted: “In recent nights, the situation on the railways has changed significantly due to a series of explosions carried out at lightning speed that paralyzed all movement in the rear of Army Group Center (795) . In the following days, the power of the partisan strikes, as envisaged by the "Rail War" plan, was increasing. By August 31, more than 171 thousand rails had been blown up, and by September 15 - 214,705 (796). “The performance of all the partisans at once once again testifies to the presence of a firm military command, which sets ever larger tasks. In just one month, the number of explosions is 30 times greater than in a whole year ”(797),” the commander of the security forces corps of Army Group Center reported on August 31.
When the Soviet Army, developing the offensive, approached the Dnieper, on the orders of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, the second operation to destroy the lines began on the communications of the enemy, which received the code name "Concert". On September 19, the German railway directorate in Minsk reported with alarm: “The situation is very tense. The actions of the partisans are unbearably increasing... All the junction stations are overcrowded due to the impossibility of using the lines...” (798) . During the operation "Concert" (it lasted until the end of the year), the partisans destroyed 148557 rails, and as a result of two operations - 363262, which amounted to 2270 km of single-track railway (799). “The successive undermining of railways (by partisans. - Ed.) for the first time led to direct operational damage,” the diary of the military operations of the Wehrmacht Supreme High Command for October 3, 1943 (800) reported.
Trying to make up for the deficit in the rails, the Nazis changed double-track sections to single-track sections, welded broken rails and even imported them from Poland and Germany, thereby increasing the intensity of rail traffic.
Along with the destruction of the railway track, the fighters of the partisan detachments launched their combat activities even more widely, destroying the enemy garrisons, his military equipment, and vehicles. So, only Belarusian partisans during the “rail war” blew up 836 echelons, including 3 armored trains, disabled 6343 wagons and platforms, 18 water pumps, destroyed 184 railway bridges and 556 bridges on dirt and highway roads, destroyed 119 tanks and armored vehicles , 1429 vehicles, defeated 44 enemy garrisons (801). Ukrainian partisans widely used delayed-action mines. In the second half of 1943, they organized 3,188 echelon accidents, that is, 1.5 times more than in the previous two years of the war (802).
According to the summary of the command of Army Group Center dated September 15, 1943, in August 194: 3 alone, the partisans launched 781 attacks on railway junctions and stations, organized 217 large and 12717 small explosions, as well as mine explosions ZON. In 14 cases, railway facilities were fired upon with anti-tank guns and heavy mortars. Numerous acts of worker sabotage were noted in the depot workshops and other facilities. As a result, 74 locomotives and 214 wagons were damaged, 80 locomotives and 625 wagons were derailed, 150 km of railway tracks were dismantled (803).
The partisans also attacked the enemy's water communications. In Belarus, after the explosion of six locks, traffic along the Dnieper-Bug Canal (804) was stopped. On the Dnieper, Desna and Pripyat, Ukrainian partisans and underground workers sank and disabled 90 steamships, barges, boats and motor boats in 1943 (805).
The bourgeois falsifiers of history are trying to belittle the role of the partisan struggle in the rear of the Nazi troops. American bourgeois historian E. Howell in the book “Soviet partisan movement. 1941 - 1944" writes that the actions of the partisans in 1943 were not effective, since they "did not paralyze the railway lines", "the German retreat proceeded unhindered and almost according to plan, with a small percentage of losses in trains with troops" (806) . However, the facts completely refute these false claims. So, in connection with the intensified strikes on communications in August, the Wehrmacht headquarters demanded that Army Group Center "enlist all forces ... not directly employed at the front, including training, reserve formations and non-flying aviation" ( 807) . In September, an order was issued to the head of the troops for the fight against partisans in the East, SS Obergruppenführer Bach-Zelevsky, “to use subordinate troops primarily to divert enemy forces and means from the main railway lines,” bearing in mind “that economic and other issues should recede to the background" (808) .
Railway sidings and line stations began to be guarded by garrisons of up to 150 people, every 2-3 km of the way outposts were set up with a strength of up to a platoon, and every 200-300 m guard posts of 2-3 people. The sections between the outposts were patrolled by groups of soldiers on railcars armed with machine guns. In order to deprive the partisans of hidden approaches to the railway track, the Nazis everywhere burned and cut down forests and plantings along the railways, fenced the tracks with barbed wire, and mined the approaches to them. Despite this, the Soviet partisans, by the combined efforts of several detachments and even formations, liquidated many strongholds of the Nazis.
Taking advantage of the major defeats of the Nazi troops on the Soviet-German front, the partisans, under the leadership of underground party organs, expanded the areas of combat operations behind enemy lines. In Belarus, by the end of the year, they controlled a significant part of the territory of the republic. There were new liberated areas in Rivne, Volyn, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kamenetz-Podolsk and Kirovohrad regions of Ukraine. Even according to the enemy's admission, "in some places the actions of the partisans begin to develop into a popular uprising" (809) .
By the beginning of 1944, the population of the Leningrad region, which had rebelled against the fascist yoke, had liberated almost the entire central, northwestern, and southwestern parts of the region. In this territory there were about 350 thousand inhabitants living in 2 thousand settlements (810). The territory liberated by the Kalinin and Belorussian partisans on the border of Belarus with the Kalinin region extended from east to west for 100 km and from north to south up to 80-90 km (811) . In total, by the fall, Soviet partisans controlled over 200 thousand square meters. km.
In the liberated territories, the organs of Soviet power were restored, workshops and small industrial enterprises serving the population and partisans worked, reserves were formed and trained, and the sick and wounded were treated. Here, under the protection of the partisans, fleeing from arbitrariness and violence, the population flocked from the areas occupied by the Nazi invaders. Saving millions of Soviet people from inevitable death or deportation into Nazi slavery was a great merit of the Soviet partisans, their contribution to the victory over Nazi Germany.
Relying on the liberated areas, large partisan forces under the command of S. V. Grishin, S. A. Kovpak, Ya. I. Melnik, M. I. Naumov, V. E. Samutin, F. F. Taranenko, A. F. Fedorov and others in 1943, at the direction of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics and the Central Headquarters, carried out long raids in order to expand the zones of partisan operations and strike at the most important enemy targets. A large formation of Ukrainian partisans under the command of A.F. Fedorov from March to June was redeployed from Chernihiv to Volyn. The unit of S. A. Kovpak made a glorious Carpathian raid. Its participants marched along the rear of the enemy for about 2 thousand km, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy: more than 5 thousand soldiers and officers were killed, 12 echelons were derailed, 17 large enemy garrisons were defeated, 170 vehicles were destroyed. In the Carpathians, 32 oil towers, 2 oil refineries and a number of other enemy facilities were blown up. The raid contributed to the expansion of the guerrilla struggle in the western regions.
By decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belarus on November 23, 12 thousand Belarusian partisans (812) began to prepare for the exit to the Belostok, Brest, Pinsk, Vileika and Baranovichi regions. Most of them in the formations, destroying the rear of the enemy, went to these areas before the end of the year.
Acting actively, the partisans destroyed the enemy's manpower, disabled equipment, disrupted his economic and political measures, disrupted the planned replenishment of troops with people and ammunition. The Soviet Army used the areas liberated by the partisans for landing airborne assault forces (813), covert access to the flanks of the retreating enemy, increasing the pace of the offensive, etc. There were airfields in the partisan territories and zones, which played a large role in providing the partisans with weapons and ammunition. From them, prisoners of war, samples of new weapons, documents, etc., captured from the Nazis, were transported to the mainland.
The fascist command, seeking to suppress the growing activity of the partisans, undertook a series of punitive operations. Their conduct was authorized by the order of the Wehrmacht Headquarters of April 27, 1943. It contained instructions that “the fight against partisans should be considered as military operations at the front”, “to conduct it constantly”, with all “available reserves or specially created units” Responsibility for the development of punitive actions and their implementation was entrusted to the operational departments of army groups and field armies, which were to work closely with senior SS and police officials. The order demanded, when conducting punitive expeditions, to use merciless terror not only against the partisans, but also against the population providing assistance to them (814).
Fulfilling this order, the Nazis carried out major punitive operations from April to the end of the year (815). In the summer of 1943, the enemy was forced to keep in his rear more than 25 divisions and a large number of punitive units and subunits (816) in order to fight partisans and to protect military-economic facilities. Only against 20 thousand partisans operating in the Bryansk and Kletnyansky forests, in May - June, the Nazi command abandoned subunits and separate units from six infantry (102nd Hungarian, 6, 7, 98, 202, 707th German), four armored and motorized (4th, 5th, 10th, 18th) and two security divisions (817). A large number of police units were also involved in this task.
However, the enemy did not succeed in destroying the partisans and even in any way reducing their combat activity. On July 8, the headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht in a report on the actions of the partisans for April - June 1943 noted: “The activity of the partisans in the entire eastern space over the last quarter continued to intensify ... Our measures to combat the partisans, despite the introduction of large forces (for example, in the southern part of the Army Group Center region, by postponing Operation Citadel, we for the first time introduced significant forces to pacify the main area of \u200b\u200bpartisan activity in the Bryansk region), did not achieve the expected success ”(818) . This, in essence, was a recognition of the collapse of the fascist occupation policy. In connection with the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the pressure on the partisans weakened everywhere, and after the Soviet troops went over to the general offensive, the Nazi forces were even more tied up.
During the offensive, Soviet troops interacted with partisan formations. On the instructions of the military command, the partisans continuously conducted reconnaissance, committed sabotage on communications, disrupted transportation and evacuation, destroyed the enemy’s manpower and equipment, attacked headquarters and other government bodies, with the help of the population built crossings over water barriers, laid roads in wetlands, led mobile detachments of Soviet troops on the flanks and rear of the retreating enemy, assisted the troops in the liberation of settlements. Thus, the Military Council of the Central Front instructed the Oryol Headquarters of the partisan movement to paralyze traffic on railways and highways behind enemy lines. Fulfilling this task, from August 26 to September 5, the partisans actively counteracted the movement of the enemy along the railways and highways Bryansk - Lokot, Bryansk - Khutor-Mikhailovsky, Bryansk - Gomel, Krichev - Unecha, Unecha - Khutor-Mikhailovsky, Novozybkov - Novgorod-Seversky and put out of action the highway Suzemka - Trubchevsk (819). The Nazis were deprived of the opportunity to freely transfer reserves from one sector of the front to another.
The Bryansk partisans helped the troops in the liberation of the cities of Bryansk, Bezhitsa, Klintsy, the district centers of Dyatkovo, Trubchevsk, Kletny, Pochep, Navli and others. Before the start of the offensive, the headquarters of the Central and Bryansk fronts received accurate data on the location of firing points, minefields and anti-tank ditches created by the enemy along the western bank of the Desna, as well as a description of the fords on the rivers Navlya, Nerussa, Sev and Desna (820) . During the battle for the Dnieper, the partisans prepared and handed over to the formations of the Soviet Army 25 crossings across the Dnieper, Desna and Pripyat, which contributed to the crossing of these rivers by the troops of the Central, Voronezh and Steppe Fronts. During the liberation of Novorossiysk, a partisan detachment actively interacted with units of the 55th Guards Division of the 18th Army, led by the secretary of the Novorossiysk City Party Committee P. I. Vasev (821).
Soviet troops, after forcing the Dnieper north of Kyiv, reached the borders of the partisan region. Blocked by partisans in cities and district centers, enemy units were unable to restore a continuous front in the swampy wooded areas of Polesye. Breaks formed over several tens of kilometers. Parts of the Soviet troops penetrated behind enemy lines through them. On November 17, the partisan formation of A. N. Saburov in a stubborn 20-hour battle defeated the fascist garrison in the city of Ovruch, Zhytomyr region. For the next three days, until the approach of Soviet troops, it held this city and an important railway junction (822). Large partisan formations of A. N. Saburov, M. G. Salay and S. F. Malikov covered the open right flank of the 60th Army of General I. D. Chernyakhovsky during the period of repulsing the enemy counterattack near Zhitomir. Up to 3 thousand partisans, together with regular units, on December 9, 1943, drove the enemy out of the district center Znamenka.
After meeting with the Soviet troops, partisan detachments often joined them. So, in September - October 1943, 15,180 Oryol and Smolensk partisans, who were operationally subordinate to the Western Headquarters of the partisan movement, went to the Soviet rear. Of these, 13,533 people joined the units of the Soviet Army (823). By the decision of the Minsk regional party committee of December 10, 1943, more than 10 thousand fighters of partisan detachments and reserves (824) were sent to the 65th Army.
The partisans helped the Soviet Army by carrying out extensive intelligence work. Of great value was the information collected by the partisans about the regrouping of enemy troops, the construction of defensive lines, the location of operational reserves, supply bases, and airfields.
In the spring of 1943, when the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command outlined a plan of action for the summer and autumn, the requirements for intelligence of all kinds, and in particular for intelligence activities of partisans, sharply increased. Meanwhile, the partisans often limited it to a shallow depth, and their intelligence agencies did not always skillfully generalize the information they obtained. The People's Commissar of Defense demanded that these shortcomings be eliminated. According to the NPO order of April 19, 1943 "On the improvement of intelligence work in partisan detachments" (825), qualified specialists who had completed a course in the Soviet rear were appointed to the position of deputy commanders of partisan units and formations for intelligence. Responsibility for their work was assigned to the headquarters of the partisan movement, which were directly involved in the selection and appointment of people to these positions. Much attention was paid to the improvement of undercover intelligence. Since the bulk of the headquarters of the enemy troops were located in the cities, the order set the task of introducing partisan intelligence into all settlements without exception, and extending it to the entire occupied territory.
In connection with the growth of the partisan movement, the Abwehr, the Gestapo, and various special services sought to expand the sending of spies to partisan formations and detachments to collect information about the location, number, weapons of partisan formations, as well as for the physical destruction of command personnel.
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command entrusted the state security organs with the task of protecting partisan detachments and formations from the penetration of agents of the German special services into them. In some underground regional party committees, as well as in the partisan formations of V. A. Begma, S. A. Kovpak, A. N. Saburov, A. F. Fedorov and others, KGB operational groups were sent, which are in close contact with the command and party organizations conducted counterintelligence in partisan formations and in their zone of operations. In 1943, behind the front line, maintaining close ties with partisan detachments and formations, operational groups of state security agencies operated. They penetrated German reconnaissance and sabotage bodies and schools, opened subversive actions prepared by the Nazis against the USSR, revealed spies and saboteurs who were preparing to be sent or already abandoned in units and formations of the Soviet Army, rear areas of the country and in partisan detachments.
On May 15, 1943, one of the Soviet intelligence officers who penetrated the German intelligence agency Abwehrkommando-103 presented a German operational map to the Center. He also handed over an album with 247 photographs of fascist agents indicating their real names, nicknames and descriptions of fictitious documents with which they crossed the front line. Based on these materials, enemy agents were neutralized.
The scale of reconnaissance activity behind enemy lines is evidenced by the fact that from April to the end of the year, concentration sites for 165 divisions, 177 regiments and 135 separate battalions were established on the Soviet-German front; at the same time, in 66 cases their organization, staffing and names of the commanding staff were disclosed (826).
Partisan intelligence helped the army intelligence agencies to uncover the plans of the German High Command, the deployment of enemy units and formations. Some of the latest models of small arms and artillery weapons, tens of thousands of operational documents were seized from the enemy. As the former head of the third department (“Vostok”) of the intelligence and counterintelligence department of the OKB Schmalschleger noted after the war, the excellent results of Soviet intelligence were largely determined by the enormous role of the intelligence work of the partisans (827) .
The measures taken by the Communist Party in the spring and summer of 1943 to expand and strengthen the network of underground party committees and to improve the activities of small, well-hidden underground groups with clearly defined functional responsibilities gave underground work in cities and towns an unusually wide scope and stability. Relying on the help of partisans and the population, the underground carried out active sabotage activities on communications, blew up factories and mines, destroyed the Nazis and traitors to the Motherland, issued and distributed leaflets, appeals and newspapers.
So, on the night of July 30, a member of the Komsomol underground Fyodor Krylovich from the task force "Braves" committed a major sabotage at the Mogilev railway junction. At the Osipovichi station, he attached magnetic mines to the tanks of the echelon with fuel that arrived from Minsk. Next to the echelon with gasoline were 2 more echelons with ammunition and echelons with armored cars and tanks. At two o'clock in the morning there was an explosion. An echelon of gasoline caught fire. The flame quickly spread to the neighboring 3 echelons. As a result, 2 steam locomotives, 23 tanks of gasoline, 8 tanks of aviation oil, 30 wagons with shells, 33 wagons with bombs and mines, 15 wagons with food, 14 tanks, of which 11 were tiger tanks, 7 armored vehicles, etc., were destroyed. e. It was an extremely effective sabotage committed by one person.
The retaliation actions of the underground against the ranks of the Wehrmacht and the occupation apparatus had a huge political resonance. According to the verdict of the partisan court, the Minsk underground executed traitors to the Motherland: the responsible official of the SD service Akinchits, the editor of the fascist Belorusskaya Gazeta Kozlovsky, the burgomaster of Minsk Ivanovsky and others. The brave underground worker E. G. Mazanik, with the help of partisans N. P. Drozd, M. B. Osinova and N. V. Troyan, destroyed the executioner of the Belarusian people, the Reichskommissar of Belarus, Cuba. The famous Soviet intelligence officer N. I. Kuznetsov, with the help of the Rivne underground, liquidated the Deputy Reich Commissar of Ukraine G. Knut, the president of the fascist court of Ukraine Funk, the commander of the punitive troops in Ukraine, General Ilgen, the imperial adviser to finance G. Gel and others.
The activities of the underground became especially active with the approach of the Soviet Army. Soviet patriots during this period prevented the destruction and looting of many enterprises, factories, mines, administrative and residential buildings. During the battles for settlements, they collected and transmitted to the Soviet command information about the fortifications, the routes of movement of the enemy columns, by sudden shelling they introduced panic into the ranks of the enemy, and mined the ways of his retreat.
The sabotage of the economic and political measures of the invaders was carried out even more widely, in which millions of Soviet people took part. Despite the cruel measures, the workers left the enterprises, damaged equipment, committed minor acts of sabotage, leading to the production of substandard products.
Many enterprises as a result of sabotage did not come into operation. The metallurgical plants of the Donbass and the Dnieper region, which, according to the calculations of the invaders, should have produced 1 million tons of products in 1943, produced no more than 3-6 thousand tons per month (828). It was not possible to establish the production of shell casings at the Zaporizhstal plant. The products of the Zaporizhia plant "Ductile Iron" amounted to about 10 percent of the pre-war output. 80 percent of the pistons and cylinders produced by the Malleable Iron Plant No. 2 went to waste. From the report of the headquarters of the economic leadership "Vostok" dated September 30, 1944, it follows that the extraction of coal in the Donbass during the period of its occupation amounted to only about 4.1 million tons per year, while the pre-war annual production reached 90 million tons (829 ) . In order to cover the needs of the occupying authorities themselves and ensure the operation of the enterprises launched by them, the Nazis were forced to supply coal there from Upper Silesia during the entire period of occupation. Describing the situation in the occupied territory, the head of the police and security services wrote in those days: “The picture, which is a deterioration in the general mood of the population, has not changed to this day ... The workers ... sooner or later quit their jobs. The latter is observed in thousands of cases. The capture of runaway workers does not give any practical results ... There are not enough police forces to escort the fugitives under guard to their former place of work ”(830) .
Massive sabotage and sabotage prevented the occupiers not only from providing a wide production, but also from repairing military equipment.
The Soviet peasantry, under the leadership of the underground party organs, waged a broad struggle against the economic measures of the occupiers. It sabotaged the harvesting work, used the slightest opportunity to hide the harvest from the invaders. As a result, the regions of the Left-Bank Ukraine liberated by the Soviet troops in 1943 uninterruptedly provided for the needs of all Ukrainian and Belarusian fronts. In addition, the necessary stocks were created here, of which about 100 thousand tons of food were shipped to Leningrad and the troops of the Leningrad Front in 1943 (831).
Sabotage assumed wide scope throughout the occupied territory. It had not only economic, but also political significance, as it drew millions of patriots into the fight against the enemy.
In 1943, the heroic struggle of the Soviet people who found themselves in the occupied territory, directed by the Communist Party, reached great proportions. During 1943, partisans and underground workers organized almost 5 times more train bombings, destroyed 5 times more enemy garrisons, headquarters and other military installations, destroyed almost 4 times more enemy manpower than in the previous year. The period from April to December 1943 accounts for the largest share of enemy losses in the entire war: 36.7 percent of railway trains, 61.4 percent of steam locomotives, 56 percent of wagons, platforms and tanks, 31.2 percent of bridges, 33.7 percent of tanks and armored vehicles (832).
Partisan actions in 1943 had a pronounced offensive character. The partisans controlled vast territories. Since 1943, large groups of partisans often carried out military operations within the framework of the general plan of operations carried out by the Soviet troops. Hitler's General L. Rendulich admitted: “The centralized leadership of the partisan detachments was obvious, because when preparing and conducting any significant offensive by the German or Russian troops, the partisans in this area immediately intensified their actions ... These actions became a heavy burden for the army and represented no small danger. In no other theater of operations was there such close interaction between the partisans and the regular army as in the Russian ”(833) .
In 1943, a feature of the interaction of partisans with Soviet troops was pre-planned and provided with the necessary means of massive strikes by partisan forces against enemy communications, which unfolded during the two largest battles near Kursk and on the Dnieper.
The Communist Party and the Soviet government highly appreciated the contribution of partisans and underground fighters to the defeat of the Nazi army. From February to December 1943, 21,793 people were awarded the medal "Partisan of the Patriotic War" I and II degrees for courage and steadfastness in the fight against the enemy, many thousands were awarded orders, and 24 were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Among them were partisans and underground workers V. E. Lobanok, K. P. Orlovsky, N. N. Popudrenko, E. G. Mazanik, N. V. Troyan, M. B. Osipova and others.
During the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Armed Forces made a decisive contribution to the defeat of the Nazi invaders. At the same time, the combat and sabotage actions of partisans and underground fighters, as well as the massive resistance of the population to the economic, military and political measures of the occupiers, were an important military-political factor. By weakening the German war machine, the struggle behind enemy lines made a significant contribution to ensuring a radical change in the course of the war and driving the Nazi invaders from Soviet soil.
| Operation Rail War | |||
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| Main conflict: Great Patriotic War | |||
| the date | August 3 - September 15 | ||
| Place | Byelorussian SSR, Leningrad Oblast, Kalinin Oblast, Smolensk Oblast, Oryol Oblast, Ukrainian SSR | ||
| Outcome | Operation goals achieved | ||
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The purpose of the operation
Operation preparation
The central headquarters of the partisan movement attracted Belarusian, Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk, Oryol and part of the Ukrainian partisans (a total of 167 brigades and separate detachments) to carry out the operation.
The central headquarters of the partisan movement mistakenly assumed that the enemy was short of rails, although in reality the Germans had a surplus of rails.
On July 14, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the operation to be carried out. The local headquarters of the partisan movements and their representations at the fronts determined areas and objects of action for each partisan formation. The partisans were provided with explosives and mine-blasting equipment, demolition instructors were sent to them. In June 1943 alone, 150 tons of special-profile heavy bombs, 156,000 meters of igniter cord, 28,000 meters of hemp wick, 595,000 detonator caps, as well as weapons and ammunition were thrown into partisan bases. The exploration of railway communications was actively conducted.
Operation progress
During the first night of the operation, 42,000 rails were blown up. The actions, in which about 100 thousand partisans participated, unfolded in the rear areas of the Army Groups "Center" and "North" (the length along the front is about 1000 kilometers, to a depth of 750 kilometers). At the same time, Ukrainian partisans were actively fighting in the rear of Army Group South. The German command for some time could not organize opposition to the partisans.
Rail war - this name is usually understood as actions to destroy railway tracks in order to disrupt the operation of enemy transport.
Such actions were most widespread at a time when rail transport was the most massive and cheapest means of transportation and was actively used by the German conquerors.
The major railroad eradication operations were as follows:
- Operation "Rail War" - August - September 1943;
- Operation "Concert" - September - October 1943;
- - June - August 1944.
All these actions were carried out by Soviet partisans who wanted to help the Red Army in the fight against the invaders.
Operation Rail War
Leningrad, Kalinin, Belarusian and Ukrainian participated in this large-scale campaign. The Central Headquarters of the partisan movement prepared 167 units, for which it determined the objects and goals of the action. The detachments were supplied with subversive equipment, explosives, igniter cords and other necessary attributes.
During the first night alone, 42,000 rails were blown up, and their total number is estimated at 215,000. A huge number of Nazi trains were blown up: in Belarus alone, 3 armored trains and 836 echelons were destroyed.
The guerrillas' actions reduced enemy traffic by as much as 40 percent. The only thing the command made a mistake in was that it considered that the Germans had too few rails of their own. In fact, they were enough to restore the paths; new rails arrived from Germany and Poland, for which hundreds of locomotives were used.
The "rail war" thoroughly patted the enemy's forces:
- it took considerable time and human resources to restore the railways, additional detachments were involved in their protection;
- the Germans were forced to turn many double-track sections into single-track sections.
In the future, the operation made it difficult for the enemy to retreat. Despite the subversive equipment available to the partisans, it was not enough. Saboteurs had to get out, look for non-standard ways of fighting. Special wedges were used to destroy trains, the rails were often taken apart by hand.
WWII. Rail war guerrilla photo
Subsequently, the so-called "devil's kitchens" began to multiply, on which the partisans smelted tol. Mines were made from unexploded shells. Many partisans during the "Rail War" risked their own lives, performing the task assigned to them.
17-year-old Nikolai Goyshchik accomplished a real feat by throwing himself directly under an enemy train with a mine in his hands: reinforced security prevented the rails from being mined in advance. The news of the feat soon became known throughout Belarus. In addition to the partisans, the civilian population was also actively involved in the fight against enemy formations. And in addition to railways, highways and dirt roads were also attacked.
Various means were used: burning bridges, creating blockages, throwing thorns on the roads to damage the tires of enemy vehicles. It should be borne in mind that the roads in the Soviet Union were themselves in poor condition, especially in comparison with the German autobahns, and the subversive activities of the partisans made it even more difficult for the enemy to move across Soviet territory.
One of the most effective means of fighting the Soviet partisans against the German occupation forces during the Great Patriotic War was the Rail War. These actions implied a disruption in the functioning of the railway communication, which led to the difficulty of transporting military equipment and enemy soldiers. The apogee of such actions was the events carried out by the Soviet partisans in the period of 3.08. - 09/15/1943 received in history the name "Operation" Rail War". This operation was carried out in the occupied territory of modern Ukraine, Russia, Belarus.
The main objective of the operation was to assist the Soviet troops in the final defeat of the Nazi troops during the Battle of Kursk and further advance the offensive, by preventing the supply of material support to strengthen the defense capability of the German troops and the transfer of the main German forces to protect the railway.
Partisan formations of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia were involved in the operation "Rail War". P. Ponomarenko became one of the developers of the operation, the order to start the operation was given on 07/14/1943. Partisan formations were provided with explosives and demolition equipment and other ammunition. In total, more than one hundred thousand partisans were involved in the operation, who launched active activities in the rear of the German armies "South", "Center" and "North". Operation "Rail War" stretched along the front for a thousand kilometers and in depth for more than seven hundred and fifty kilometers. The operation itself was carefully designed, each detachment had a specific goal, all actions were scheduled to the minute. A kind of "rehearsal" of the operation was the massive undermining of the rails by the Oryol partisans on July 22, 1943.
From the first day of the operation, the partisans launched extensive subversive activities. At the same time, explosions thundered on many sections of the railway, and the Germans, who did not expect such large-scale actions, began to restore the railway only three days later. In the first day alone, more than forty thousand rails were destroyed. The success of the operation was colossal, so during the period of July-September 1943, the partisans managed to destroy 1529 railway echelons and 115 bridges. The partisans only in Belarus managed to blow up three enemy armored trains and destroy more than 810 echelons of the Germans. The partisans were able to reduce the capacity of the railway coverage by 71%. Some sections of the railway were completely destroyed, so now the occupiers could transport goods from Kovel to Berdichev only through Odessa. The guerrillas managed to paralyze the railway communication for a long time at such important junction stations as Kovel, Sarnensk, Shepetovka, Zdolbunovsk. In total, according to the plan of the operation, it was planned to destroy 230 thousand rails, that is, 1330 km of railway tracks in one track, the plan was almost 100% fulfilled.
The result of the operation was a sharp reduction in the supply of material support and manpower to the enemy. In order to at least partially restore the destroyed railway coverage, the German troops had to convert the double-track sections into single-track sections, and weld the undermined rails. Rails from Germany and Poland were urgently brought to the occupied territories, and this, in turn, increased the tension of transportation. To protect the roads, the Germans had to lay down additional forces, which made it difficult to regroup and supply the retreating troops.
A great contribution to the implementation of the operation "Rail War" was made by such Soviet partisans as S. Kovpak, A. Fedorov, F. Lysenko., V. Yaremchuk, and five more demolition men during the operation were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Autumn and spring downpours turned dirt roads into impenetrable mud swamps and made their exploitation impossible. The use of rivers as transport arteries was limited to a short period of navigation - in our climate this is a maximum of 5-7 months. The only all-season way to deliver goods was the railway network. Railways, like blood vessels, had to supply the army with everything they needed all year round. Of course, transport aviation also existed, but its low power did not allow transporting heavy loads or military equipment with its help.
Thus, the strategic importance of the railways was simply enormous, and their uninterrupted operation was a key factor for the successful conduct of hostilities.
In the summer of 1943, the Soviet command decided to strike at such an important component of the German military machine, and the role of the main executors of the plan of the Headquarters was assigned to partisan detachments.
It is important to note that from the very first days of the War, a people's liberation movement was born throughout the occupied territory. Formed from local residents and Red Army soldiers who escaped from encirclement or escaped from captivity, partisan detachments waged a continuous war in the enemy rear: undermining bridges, derailing enemy trains and destroying garrisons.
Having matured by the summer of 1943, the partisan movement was ready to conduct mass well-coordinated operations.
July 9, 1943 in a letter I.V. Stalin chief of staff P.K.Ponomarenko proposed, in order to disrupt the enemy's railway transportation, to conduct simultaneously and everywhere an operation to destroy the rails on the railway tracks. The central headquarters of the partisan movement adopted in June 1943 a resolution "On the destruction of the enemy's railway communications by the method of rail warfare."
So future operation has acquired the code name "Rail War".
The main goal of the campaign was to inflict maximum damage on the enemy's railway communications in the Orel-Kursk direction, to assist the Soviet Army in completing the defeat of the Nazi troops in the Battle of Kursk. The main objects of the future strike were to be railway bridges, junction stations, rolling stock and the railway tracks themselves.
As part of the preparation of the operation, hundreds of tons of explosives were transported to the front line, and the detachments were replenished with demolition men. In some partisan detachments, the production of improvised mines from unexploded shells was launched, and the tol necessary for the bombs was smelted in the so-called "devil's kitchens". Later, in the same kitchens, tol began to be smelted in forms prepared in advance for this, in which it solidified in the form "loaves" as the partisans called them. All members of the detachment, from the cook to the commander, were trained in the basic skills of subversive work.
The Germans also understood the exceptional importance of the railway infrastructure. As part of the prevention of sabotage actions, the German command took a number of countermeasures. Forests were cut down along the railroad tracks for 100 meters, towers, wire fences, and sometimes minefields were installed. Bunkers were installed and permanent garrisons were kept at especially important sections, hauls and junction stations.
Also The Germans carried out a number of operations against the partisans. Their goal was to capture lost territories, which could play an important role in the upcoming summer offensive.
But partisan intelligence was always on the alert and often punitive operations ended ingloriously for the invaders. One of these German units was heavily damaged by their own. The fact that the Nazis were planning an attack on their site, the partisans learned in advance and, having taken the most advantageous position, prepared to meet the enemy. Soon a German aircraft appeared, circled over the area for a while to mark targets for destruction, and then called in two bombers. After the first bombs were dropped, the enemy infantry went on the offensive. But when the partisans opened fire, the Nazis turned back. At this time, the German bombers made another call. Noticing the fugitives, the pilots mistook them for partisans and dropped the remaining bombs on them., and then, to be sure, they combed their infantry with machine-gun fire. The punitive operation failed.
German pilots bombed their infantry
5 / YIII-43, Morning issue of RFI sheet 4 VL
Active Army, 5 August. /Special Corr. TASS/. Partisan intelligence reported that the German punitive detachment was preparing an offensive. Having chosen the height that dominated the area and covering the flanks, the partisans prepared to meet the enemy. Soon a fascist spotter appeared. The plane searched for targets for a long time, then called in two bombers.
Enemy planes made a call and dropped a series of bombs. Immediately, the fascist infantry went on the offensive. The enemy counted on the fact that the combat formations of the partisans were demoralized. When no more than 50 meters were left to the first chain of Germans, the partisans opened fire from machine guns. The Nazis turned back. German bombers at that time were making another approach. The pilots, noticing the fleeing, decided that they were partisans, and began to drop bombs on them. The planes then descended and combed their infantry with machine-gun fire.
The German punitive detachment suffered heavy losses.
V. Medvedev
On July 22, 1943, the partisans of the Oryol region carried out a massive undermining of the rail- it was a kind of rehearsal before a future large-scale operation. By the end of July, preparations were completed. Operation "Rail War" was decided to begin on August 3.
The start time of the strike was not chosen by chance. Under the onslaught of the advancing Soviet troops, the German command continuously transferred mobile units from one sector of the front to another, trying to patch up holes in the defense. The load on the railway tracks was maximum, which means that the damage caused during the destruction would have been the greatest.
