The direct participants in the hostilities in distant Vietnam were servicemen of the Vietnamese People's Army (VNA), combat crews of a number of units and subunits of the Soviet Army, and servicemen of the US Army.
But in this war, in order to achieve the results and advantages of the warring parties, for a long period there was a hidden, but tangible confrontation between the scientific and human potential of the two superpowers of that period - the USA and the USSR.
In this war, far from Vietnam, there was a constant brain confrontation of hundreds of thousands, and maybe millions of people on the invisible fronts of the battles of scientists in research institutes and design bureaus, generals and officers in the offices of the General Staffs and headquarters of the branches of the US and USSR Armed Forces, combat crews at test sites.
The war in the skies of North Vietnam was the largest and most dramatic air clash since 1945. From both sides, aircraft of dozens of types participated in it. However, as in the Korean War of 1951-1953, the main burden of confrontation in the air "fell on the wings" of the two main types of combat vehicles, the outcome of the battles between which mainly determined the course of the struggle.
On the American side, the main fighter was McDonnell-Douglas F-4 Phantom II. This heavy two-seat twin-engine vehicle (normal takeoff weight over 20 tons), created in 1958, was originally intended to provide air defense for American aircraft carrier formations. By the early 1960s, the Phantom II, which had won a number of world speed records, was perhaps the most popular American combat aircraft. The undoubted advantages of the F-4 should include outstanding flight characteristics for its time (maximum speed 2260 km / h, practical ceiling 16600-17900 m, practical flight range without hanging tanks 2380 km), a powerful airborne surveillance and sighting radar (radar), and also a unique weapon system, including short-range air-to-air missiles AIM-9 "Sidewinder" (normal ammunition load - four units) and all-aspect all-weather missiles AIM-7 "Sparrow" of medium range (four missiles were placed on the nodes of the external pendants).
The Phantom's main rival, the MiG-21 front-line fighter, was also created in 1958. Unlike the American aircraft, the Soviet machine, designed to operate over the front line, at a small distance from the home airfield, belonged to a different "weight category" (the normal take-off weight of the modifications used in Vietnam is less than 8 tons) and had a significantly shorter range - about 1500 km. However, in terms of other flight characteristics (maximum speed 2175-2300 km / h, practical ceiling - 18,000-19,000 m), the MiG was not inferior to its American rival. The composition of the armament of the MiG-21 aircraft was much weaker than that of the "American" - two (later - four) R-Zs medium-range air-to-air missiles with infrared homing, as well as one gun caliber 23 or 30 mm.
By the beginning of February 1965, three strike aircraft carriers with 238 aircraft and 33 escort ships were concentrated off the coast of the DRV. On February 8, the transfer of the first air wing of the US Marine Corps, which included 15 F-4B fighters, began from the island of Okinawa to the South Vietnamese air base Danang. At the same time, the deployment of US Air Force squadrons equipped with F-100, F-105 and F-4C aircraft began at South Vietnamese and Taiwanese air bases. On March 2, the United States launched a large-scale air operation "Rolling Thunder", which lasted until October 31, 1968.
At the first stage of hostilities, the "Phantoms" of the air force were involved both in escorting fighters and in striking ground targets. Naval F-4Bs were mainly used to escort carrier-based attack aircraft - Skyraiders and Skyhawks - and protect the air defense of aircraft carrier formations from possible counterattacks by Vietnamese and Chinese aircraft.
In the initial period of the war, the Air Force and Air Defense Forces of North Vietnam had only 25 J-5 subsonic fighters (Chinese-made MiG-17F), several Soviet MiG-15 bis, and Il-28 bombers. These insignificant forces could not seriously oppose the Americans, flying in the skies of Vietnam, as at home. But with the help of Soviet and Chinese military specialists, the Vietnamese soon developed a tactic for using their fighters, which made it possible to inflict tangible blows even in the face of a multiple numerical superiority of the enemy. Small groups of MiGs patrolled at low altitude, out of sight of the enemy radar. When enemy planes appeared, the MiGs unexpectedly attacked his battle formations, firing from cannons heavily loaded with bombs percussion machines.
In Vietnam, we officially did not fight. They were military experts and instructors. Finding a normal Vietnamese is a problem. They are small, dead, do not hold overload. Our guys were holding normally up to 10g, but these guys were already losing consciousness at five. They were force-fed, they were handed over to the tribunal, if someone didn’t eat the meat they were supposed to eat, they were twisted on simulators - all to no avail. Lose consciousness and that's it. For a few seconds, but that's enough.
American pilots quickly realized that all Vietnamese aviation is divided into Russian pilots and Vietnamese. Shooting down Vietnam is an honorable, profitable business (they paid good money), and most importantly, it is safe.
The Vietnamese pilot was explained:
- There are three buttons in the MiG cockpit. You will press the first one if it will be bad in battle. Press the second - when it's really bad. And if it’s really, really bad, press the third one!
There is an air battle. The Vietnamese is overtaken by American planes. He pressed the first button - the MiG accelerated sharply. The Americans fired rockets. He pressed the second button - the MiG made an anti-missile maneuver. But here again! - from above, another link of Americans attacks him. He presses the third button and hears from behind:
- Come on, narrow-eyed, move away from the chair, we'll kill them ...
So the pilot Ha Van Tuk, who entered the battle with 36 enemy aircraft on his MiG-21, shot down the aircraft of the commander of the American fighter wing, Colonel D. Folin. True, the Ban Tam nho "nguoi nha troi" article on the Vietnam People's Army website cites Chang Han's testimony of how he dodged two American missiles.
Yes, things were much worse with the Russians at the American air pirates than with the frail Vietnamese. You kind of suddenly fall out on them from the sunny side, from the cloud, you seem to hit for sure, and he will make an anti-missile maneuver, spin the figure with an awesome overload, and you are already on your tail. To hell with them with money and fame, so it will bring you down! True, those who ejected were not finished off. And thanks to the Russian guys for that.
The Americans quickly figured out how to distinguish a Russian from a Vietnamese. There is a fight, as a rule, it is very transient. F-4 on the tail of the MiG. The MiG makes a maneuver, the overload is growing, five, six - hop! the wings trembled, for a second, barely noticeable - everything is clear, the Vietnamese. You can not be afraid. But if on 8g the MiG performs the maneuver just as confidently, then it’s definitely not Vietnamese, but Russian, and hell knows how it will all end. Therefore, the Americans openly went on the air with the phrase "Vanya! I'm gone!" got out of the fight.
The earliest mention of Soviet pilots on the MiG-17 who fought in Vietnam was found by Georgy Serdechny in the "Calendar of Memorable Dates of Russian Military History: People, Events, Facts" (2001). Further, the MiGs appeared in the Military Historical Archive magazine (2005, N 4), and soon got to the Military Historical Journal (2010, N 4).
The first aircraft of the US Navy (A-4 Skyhawk) was shot down by a MiG-17 on May 3, 1965 - this was the first case of a Vietnamese aircraft shooting down an American carrier-based aircraft "(V. Ilyin, M. Levin," Fighters ", 1997) .
It was evening. Crimson sky over the Red River. Here and there, the tops of trees, flooded by the flooded river, protruded from under the water. They were somewhat reminiscent of the swollen sails of fishing scows. The ferry overcame a fast current. And at that time, four MiG fighters flew over the heads of the Vietnamese peasants.
Every day, from morning until late evening, fighter-interceptors carried their air watch in the sky over Hanoi, guarding the capital from American air raids ... And now the Vietnamese were recalling the latest reports: -4"..."
... Three years have passed since the Vietnamese Aviation Regiment was created. During this time, pilots fought more than 60 battles, shot down 66 American aircraft, on May 12, 1967, during a massive raid on Hanoi, a young pilot, Lieutenant Hoang, shot down an F-4 aircraft piloted by Colonel Norman. Here is Norman's military ID number 26772. The American colonel managed to fly only three sorties to Vietnam. He was given the task of studying the tactics of air combat in the conditions of the DRV. Now his "ticket" is a trophy.
Every year the combat skills of the Vietnamese pilots grew stronger. And if in 1965 the pilots of the aviation regiment shot down only 3 American aircraft, then in 1966 - 31. And in six months of 1967 - already 32 aircraft. Moreover, in just one month - from April 19 to May 19 - 25 air pirates were destroyed.
Hero of the DRV Captain Nguyen Van Bai, Hero of the DRV Captain Lam Van Lit, Squadron Leader Captain Ho Van. Three bosom friends, three combat air captains.
All three captains are natives of South Vietnam. Ho Van is from Da Nang, where the largest US air base is located. Bai is from the city of Sadek, which is about a hundred kilometers from Saigon. Lit - from the province of Bac Lieu, Ca Mau County, the southernmost point of Vietnam ...
Different paths led them to aviation.
“In 1946,” Lit recalled, “as a little boy, I was a liaison officer in one of the partisan detachments in southern Vietnam. I did not dare to think about aviation. After all, then our entire detachment had several guns and a dozen grenades. That's all military "equipment". I saw only French planes. They flew over the villages. Then I learned to hate aviation. Did you think that the sky would be my home, the plane my closest friend...
Many years have passed since then. In August 1964, I took to the skies of Vietnam for the first time. Majestic pictures of my homeland were revealed under the wings of the plane. Smooth rectangles of rice fields, peasant huts with tiled roofs, smoking chimneys of factories in Haiphong, Hanoi, Hongai, Thaingyuen, Vietchi. Cities flooded with electric lights. But it was at that time that the American aggressors launched attacks on my Motherland. I will not hide, sometimes tears welled up when, under the planes of the plane, I saw ruined cities, smoking villages, ragged red circles of funnels in rice fields. And on the ground, people often, when they found out that I was a pilot, asked the most difficult question for me: “What are you, son?” What, really, am I?
What words needed to be found to answer people. Are words really needed...
-...Attention, Lit! To the left of the link at an altitude of 4500 meters, twelve American aircraft, the earth warned.
- Looked around. Dense clouds. He ordered the wingman to climb. In the headset I heard how the ground was correcting: “The enemy aircraft were divided into three groups. One of them is heading towards Hanoi.”
The main thing is to determine those planes that should bomb and attack them. Several seconds passed. Finally, I saw the four "F-4". I'm going to get closer. The American pilots, noticing our planes, made a series of maneuvers, trying to take the most convenient position for the attack. A moment, another moment... American and Vietnamese planes are flying literally parallel to each other. Even the faces of the pilots are different. A few seconds later, an American "phantom" is in sight. Opened fire. The MiG missile hit the enemy. In black puffs of smoke, he fell down. A blinding flash on the ground. Black cloud of smoke. At this time, my wingman shot down another phantom. With these volleys on July 7, 1965, we answered the question that tormented us so much: “What are you, son?” What are we? We beat the enemy!
In 1965, an air wing of the famous American F-104C Starfighter fighters was deployed to the Danang air base (South Vietnam) specifically to fight the MiGs. However, even without engaging in air combat, they quickly proved to be ineffective and were used exclusively for strikes against ground targets, and only in South Vietnam.
If in the first four months of 1966, eleven American aircraft of various types and nine North Vietnamese were shot down in air battles, then with the introduction of the MiG-21 into battle, the picture changed dramatically: from May to December, the United States lost forty-seven, and the DRV - only twelve aircraft - 4:1 ratio.
The very first air battles showed that due to the lower specific wing load than the F-4, the MiG-21 has better horizontal maneuverability, especially at high altitudes and low speeds. Based on this, the North Vietnamese pilots, without any fear, began to get involved in close combat. But most of the MiG-21s were armed with only two R-Zs missiles, which had a low value of permissible overload at the time of launch (only 1.4 units!). Otherwise, the rocket did not leave the guides - the blocking system worked. Because of this, with skillful maneuvering of the enemy, the use of R-3s missiles became difficult.
On June 4, 1965, a MiG-17F flight over the city of Wu-Ban attacked a trio of F-4Bs. One "Phantom" dodged the fight and, smoking engines, working at the "maximum", went to the east. Two other American planes were drawn into close combat on turns, where the more maneuverable MiGs had advantages, and the Vietnamese were not slow to take advantage of this. After a 180-degree turn, the leader of the Vietnamese link from a distance of 1000-1200 m opened fire on one of the American vehicles. Soon he approached the enemy at 700 m and opened fire again. The F-4B, ​​trying to get out of the shelling, energetically maneuvered in height and course. The second American fighter, following its leader, made a desperate attempt to help out the commander, trying from behind, from a distance of 400-500 m, to "get" the MiG (the task is completely impossible, since the minimum allowed launch range of AIM-9B "Sidewinder" missiles is much greater) . The guided MiG-17 opened barrage fire from cannons, and the second American fighter was forced to get out of the fire, performing a descent turn. It was immediately followed by the first F-4B, ​​which received several damages (according to the Vietnamese command, this Phantom failed to reach its airfield, and it crashed in Laos). The next air battle involving Phantoms took place on June 17 over the city of Ninh Binh. During it, four MiG-17Fs attacked the enemy from the rear hemisphere from a distance of 100-600 m. They managed to shoot down two F-4Bs, while the Americans did not show much activity and rather randomly left the battle. The Vietnamese suffered no losses, although their order of battle was also violated, and control of the link was lost. When returning to the airfield, two Vietnamese pilots were forced to eject due to full fuel consumption, and one MiG-17 made an emergency landing at the Haiphong airfield. (V. Ilyin, "MiG-21 vs. Phantom", website airwar.ru)
On September 20, 1965, a group of American aircraft appeared over the Kep railway station (north of Hanoi), which was detected by the Vietnamese P-35 radar. Part of the "Phantoms" with bomb weapons attacked the station. Their cover was provided by another pair of F-4Bs loitering at an altitude of 3000-4000 m. There was an on-duty unit of the Vietnamese in the air - four MiG-17Fs, which were aimed at the enemy by commands from the ground. The leader of the first Vietnamese pair dived from a height of 6000 m and attacked the F-4B, ​​which was performing a bombing approach at that time, when it visually detected the Americans. From a distance of 500 m, the Vietnamese pilot opened fire, after which the "Phantom" with a left turn with a decrease began to leave the shelling. The MiG continued to "sit on the tail" of the enemy and fired the second round from a distance of 400 m. The Phantom began to smoke, but continued to fly. With a third long burst from 200 m, he was finally shot down. The American pilots failed to eject. The second pair of MiGs started a fight at an altitude of 3000 m, when one of the American planes was coming out of a dive after the attack, and the second was just entering a dive for bombing. The Vietnamese flight commander attacked the first plane, opening fire somewhat prematurely from a distance of 1200 m. The American pilot, having found a MiG on his tail, turned on the afterburner, left the battle.
... A few kilometers from the Vietnamese capital, in the shade of giant trees and nanes, among hilly ridges, bamboo thickets, a small village scattered its buildings. Here, on its outskirts, there are two graves. One is under the yes tree - the tree of longevity, the other is under the nyan tree, which means "dragon's eye".
These graves are the tragic end of two lives: one, which has become an example for many, a life given to the people. And the other - the life of an American pilot who sowed death on Vietnamese soil.
- ... It happened on a hot summer morning in 1967, - said an elderly peasant Khoai.
- Air raid alert. A flight of American F-105 aircraft hung in the sky near Hanoi. One after another, the planes dived on a peaceful village, bombed peasant huts, rice fields, dams, roads. The ground trembled under the cracks. Wounded, but unconquered, embraced by greedy flames, the earth answered blows for blow. Anti-aircraft gunners and militias from self-defense units did not leave their combat positions. Suddenly, a bright orange bud of flame flared up in the sky, and a moment later an American plane fell out of it with a black plume of smoke. The pilot managed to eject.
Self-defense fighters, among whom was 18-year-old La Thi Ngoc, "Pearl", as her fellow villagers affectionately called her, went in search of a pilot. The American pilot landed in a thicket of zuoi bushes, unfastened his parachute, and hurriedly tried to burn maps and other military documents. Ngok was the first to spot the enemy. “Do not let, in no case do not let him burn the cards. Perhaps, as is often the case, objects of subsequent bombardments were inflicted on them, ”a thought flashed through. To warn people about an impending raid in time means saving dozens, and possibly hundreds of lives.
- Hands up! Ngoc commanded decisively. The muzzle of her carbine rested on the pilot's back. But at that moment, the girl saw that the flames of a small fire, lit by a pilot, were devouring the most valuable maps with inflicted bombing targets. Forgetting about the danger, not having time to disarm the enemy, the girl rushed to the fire. The imprudence was fatal. The pilot drew his M1911 and fired the entire clip into Ngok's back. "Pearl" is gone. But, dying, she managed to grab a card from the fire.
A few minutes later, militia fighters took the pilot prisoner. He did not manage to destroy the cards. By dying, Ngoc saved the lives of others. The girl was buried on the outskirts of the village. A farewell volley rumbled dully at the fresh grave of a fighter girl. And now, almost daily, people come here, to the small mound of Ngoc, to carefully place a bouquet of scarlet flowers.
The hot sun burned the green backs of the hills. After the raid on Hanoi, four American bombers were returning to the aircraft carriers of the Seventh Fleet. They flew high in the clear sky, apparently enjoying the impunity of their piratical activities. But unexpectedly they fell into the zone of heavy fire of the Vietnamese air defense. The missile hit one aircraft. Embraced in flames, he crashed into the ground near Ngoc's grave. The badly wounded pilot James Foster managed to eject. Having landed near the village, he began to transmit call signs to American aircraft with a portable radio set asking for help. Some time later, a new group of American aircraft flew into the area, apparently having received signals from it. A fierce bombardment of the entire area began.
Foster lay on the ground face to face with death. More than once he bombed Democratic Vietnam in the same way. More than once deadly fiery missiles of rockets fell off the planes of his plane, a bomb load fell. Just like it happened now. The pilot always sees the ground from the air. Now he followed the planes from the ground. Previously, bomb explosions were far from him, did not threaten his life. Black puffs of smoke, tornadoes of explosions, fragments of buildings, even human lives - for him only a struck object. Like a training ground.
Now Foster is experiencing the blows of his own aircraft - US aircraft. The pilot, shot down in the air, finds an end on the ground. But fear comes before death. Fear is irresistible. Fear dictates, makes Foster crawl. Minutes, hours... Seek shelter, look for people, even those whom only an hour ago he considered his enemies. Now he is ready to beg them for help. Live at any cost, but only live!
Foster crawled out of the bombardment zone and surrendered in the area of ​​the village. A Vietnamese doctor, Thu, provided medical assistance to him. Treated the wounds, bandaged. But the injury turned out to be fatal. When the militia carried Foster on a stretcher to the village, he asked Thu to call the pastor for confession. There was no priest in the village. The confession of a dying American pilot was received by a Vietnamese doctor.
Like a fantastic vision, New York appeared before Foster's eyes, childhood, father, mother ... It happens that consciousness wakes up in people before death. Dying, Foster shook hands with the Vietnamese doctor with the last of his strength, said: “Damn this war!”

In general, it should be noted that until the MiG-21s entered the scene and the massive use of S-75 anti-aircraft missile systems began, American aviation in the sky of Vietnam behaved rather carelessly, not considering the small number of MiG-17s as a serious threat. For example, "Phantoms", which served as an escort, were often loaded with bombs. The Vietnamese, on the other hand, sought to keep the MiGs at low altitude, where their small camouflaged aircraft were visually less noticeable and almost completely invisible to the American airborne radars. Suddenly attacking fighter-bombers, the Vietnamese pilots forced them to get rid of the bomb load and, approaching a short distance, shot them with cannons. The escort fighters that occupied a higher air corridor often simply did not have time to engage in combat with the MiGs. This forced the Americans to change tactics and reduce the cover groups to low altitudes (being at the same level or below the Vietnamese fighters, the Phantoms could "see" them using their radars or visually against the sky). Using a higher speed, the F-4 approached the enemy and hit him with missiles, after which they just as quickly left the battlefield. If the battle turned into a "carousel" on bends, then the advantage passed to the Vietnamese, who quickly approached the enemy at a distance of less than 1000 m, where the F-4s, which had only missile weapons, were practically helpless. However, the Americans soon improved their tactics again: several "Phantoms" took close combat, while one of the links allowed itself to be dragged into a fight on bends, and the other quickly gained altitude and attacked the MiGs with Sparrow missiles from a distance of several kilometers. Having lost six fighters in a similar situation, the Vietnamese switched to the previously proven tactics of sudden one-time "ambush" strikes, followed by a quick exit from the battle. At the end of 1966, on the recommendations of Soviet military experts, the aviation of the DRV advanced the line of interception directly to the borders of the country, where American aircraft followed in close combat formations, which prevented maneuvering combat. Another innovation was the practice of ambush on the ground, developed with the participation of the Chinese: MiG-17s took off from jump airfields and attacked the enemy following in close formation, after which they quickly descended and, camouflaged under the terrain, returned to the airfield.
Since February 1966, the main opponents of the F-4 have already become the supersonic MiG-21F-13 (some of them are Czechoslovak-made) and the MiG-21PF-V (an all-weather version, that is, equipped with a MiG-21PF radar sight in a "tropical" design), as well as American aircraft equipped with rocket weapons - UR R-Zs with TGS or blocks with 55-mm unguided aircraft missiles (NAR) S-5. The command of the Air Force and the US Navy continued to place great hopes on the F-4, believing that powerful weapons, advanced airborne radar, high speed and acceleration characteristics, combined with new tactics, would provide Phantoms with superiority over enemy aircraft. But in collisions with lighter MiG-21 F-4s, they began to suffer defeat after defeat. From May to December 1966, the United States lost 47 aircraft in air battles, while destroying only 12 enemy fighters. The large wing loading and somewhat lower (especially at medium altitudes) angular speeds of turns of American fighters affected (the Americans later admitted that the Phantom was generally inferior to the MiG in turns), operational overload restrictions (6.0 versus 8.0 for the MiG -21PF) and acceptable angles of attack, as well as the worst handling of the American car. The F-4 also did not have an advantage in terms of thrust-to-weight ratio: with a normal takeoff weight, it was 0.74 for the F-4B, ​​and for the MiG-21PF - 0.79. The disadvantages of the "Phantom" in the first place include unsatisfactory spin characteristics. There was a possibility of falling into a flat tailspin, from which a pilot of average skill practically could not get out. It was reported that only before 1971, 79 Phantoms were lost due to falling into a tailspin. The airborne radar of the American fighter, although it had a large detection and capture range, had relatively low noise immunity. The cockpits of the pilot and operator were oversaturated with numerous instruments and switches.
MiG-21s usually attacked the enemy at supersonic speeds, performing missile launches from the rear hemisphere and quickly breaking away from possible pursuit. It was difficult for the Americans to oppose anything to such tactics, which required high training of pilots and ground command post guidance officers. Joint actions of the "twenty-first" with the MiG-17 also began to be practiced, displacing the enemy from low altitudes to medium ones, where he was attacked by MiG-21s.
The lack of cannon armament and a small supply of missiles caused the loss of many MiG-21s - after all, after the launch of both missiles, the aircraft became unarmed! Although by that time in the Soviet Union, specifically for the MiG-21PF / PFM, a GP-9 suspended cannon container with a 23-mm GSh-23 gun was developed.
In 1967, the Americans managed to slightly improve the piloting and tactical training of their fighter pilots. The Air Force combat squadrons began to receive new F-4D aircraft, modernized taking into account military experience.
The qualitative strengthening of American fighter aviation led to the fact that in the first half of 1967, during the air battles of the aviation of the DRV, only 15 US aircraft were shot down. However, in the future, the Vietnamese fighters again increased their effectiveness (the acquired combat experience affected, as well as the transition to new and modernized types of vehicles - MiG-21PF and MiG-17F with R-3s guided missiles). In the first half of 1968, in 40 battles, the Vietnamese managed to destroy 25 enemy aircraft. In total, during the first stage of the air war, from April 1965 to November 1968, 268 air battles were carried out over Vietnam, during which 244 American and 85 Vietnamese aircraft were shot down.
From December 1968 to April 1972, there were only five air battles over the border regions of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and South Vietnam, including four battles in 1971 (one F-4 and MiG-17 fighters were shot down, as well as an American advanced air guidance aircraft OV -10A "Bronco"). The resulting pause was used by both sides to qualitatively strengthen the fighter groups. Since 1968, the US Air Force in Vietnam began to receive F-4E fighters with improved maneuverability, built-in cannon armament and a new radar. In 1970, the fighter wings of the 366th and 588th Air Force, located at the Danang airbase, were almost completely re-equipped with new aircraft. US Navy aircraft carriers participating in the fighting received advanced F-4J carrier-based fighters. The Soviet side handed over to the Vietnamese Air Force MiG-21PFM fighters with a GP-9 hanging cannon container, and a little later - MiG-2SHF and MiG-21MFL aircraft with a built-in GSh-23 cannon. In addition, China in 1968-1969 provided Vietnam with 44 J-6 fighters (a licensed version of the MiG-19 aircraft).
Convinced of the impossibility of gaining superiority over enemy fighters in a short time, the Americans concentrated their main efforts on improving the combat skills of their pilots. The US Air Force organized special retraining courses under the Red Flag program, during which they practiced dogfights with Aggressor squadrons equipped with Northrop F-5 fighters imitating MiG-21 aircraft. For naval aviation pilots, on the initiative of Captain Frank Ault, the "Navy Fighter Weapons School", known as the "Top Gun" school, was also organized in 1969.
The culmination of the struggle in the air in the spring of 1972 was May 10, when the aircraft of the DRV carried out 64 sorties, conducting 15 air battles, in which seven Phantoms were shot down. Those, in turn, managed to destroy two MiG-21s, two MiG-17s and one J-6.
During one of the battles on May 10, a MiG-17 link rose in alarm to release the neighboring airfield. MiGs covertly, at extremely low altitude, approached the target and shot down one Phantom from the first attack. The second flight pair got involved in a maneuverable dogfight with four F-4s, which ended with the loss of one MiG-17. However, the involvement of the "Phantoms" in the air "carousel" allowed the Vietnamese to lift two MiG-21s into the air from a blocked airfield, which attacked the same number of F-4s from a hill at a height of 2 km and shot down both "Phantoms" with just two R-3s missiles .
On May 11, two MiG-21s, which played the role of "bait", brought out four F-4s on two MiG-21s loitering at low altitude. The MiGs rapidly attacked the Phantoms and shot down two enemy planes with three missiles.
On June 13, a MiG-21 unit intercepted a group of Phantoms. Having penetrated into the battle formation of the Americans, two Vietnamese fighters caused panic in the enemy: the Phantoms broke the formation and began to maneuver randomly. At this time, the second pair of MiGs launched a missile attack and shot down two F-4s.
On May 18, Vietnamese aviation made 26 sorties and conducted eight air battles, which cost the Americans four Phantoms. Vietnamese fighters suffered no losses that day. During one of the battles, two MiG-21s intercepted a flight of Phantoms. The leader of the Vietnamese pair, captain Yigy, attacked and shot down the F-4 with one missile from a half-coup.
During the 12 days of Operation Linebacker-2 (December 18-29), seven American aircraft (including four Phantoms) and three Vietnamese MiG-21s were shot down during eight air battles. At the same time, the "twenty-first" tried not to get involved in fights on bends, and after intercepting on "supersonic" (regardless of the result), they quickly left the battlefield. However, forced in a number of cases to still be drawn into the "dog dump", the MiG-21 fighters retained an advantage over the upgraded F-4E and F-4J at medium altitudes, losing it only near the ground.
In total, 201 air battles took place between American and Vietnamese aircraft in 1972, resulting in the loss of 54 Vietnamese fighters (including 36 MiG-21s and one MiG-21US) and 90 American aircraft (including 74 F-4 and two reconnaissance RF-4C.Thus, the MiG-21 destroyed 67 enemy aircraft)
It should be recognized that the rivalry between the MiG-21 and the Phantom in the Vietnamese sky ended in the defeat of the American machine: F-4 fighters managed to shoot down only 54 MiG-21 aircraft during the entire period of hostilities from 1966 to 1972, during the same period "twenty the first" destroyed 103 "Phantoms". At the same time, it should be taken into account that the loss of one American aircraft, as a rule, led to the death or capture of two crew members. In addition, the Phantom cost American taxpayers several times the cost of one MiG-21 (when compared in comparable prices).
According to the terminology of the Vietnamese pilots, they most widely used such tactics as "deep penetration", "simultaneous strike", "continuous impact", "circle destruction", "attacks when the enemy is separated", "attacks when the enemy uses the "scissors" maneuver" etc. All air battles were carried out in conditions of visual visibility and at short distances.Rockets were the main weapon.
On December 23, 1972, a pair of Vietnamese pilots on MiG-21 aircraft in an air battle with an F-4 flight used the "attack when the enemy was separated" technique. Its essence was to leave the battle after the attack and prevent the enemy from taking a position advantageous for the attack. The fact is that, being in the position of the attacked, the F-4 link, as a rule, was divided into two pairs, of which one began to make a combat turn to the right with a climb, and the other - a downward spiral to the left. To ensure their success, the Vietnamese pair either separated or pursued the pair intended for attack - everything depended on the distance to the link (closing aircraft) F-4 at the moment it was divided into pairs. If the distance was less than 3000 m, the Vietnamese pair was divided and each of the pilots independently carried out the attack of "his" pair. If the distance was more than 3000 m, the Vietnamese pair continued their joint attack on the closing pair of F-4s. In all cases, the battle order of the pair was the right or left bearing. When pointing and searching (according to Vietnamese terminology, "passive mode"), the aircraft flew, keeping a distance of 400-600 m, an interval of 200-400 m and an excess of the wingman over the leader by 50-100 m. In air combat, the so-called. "active mode" - a more open battle formation (distance and interval increased to 800-1000 m).
In some cases, to improve the visibility of the rear hemisphere and protect the tail of the leading wingman of a pair of Vietnamese fighters, the "snake" maneuver was used. It was carried out relative to the leader's course with a maximum deviation from it of up to 1000 m and a turn of 45-50 degrees, with a bank angle of up to 60-65 degrees. On December 22, at 13.28, a pair of MiG-21 fighters was raised from the Noi Bai airfield to intercept a group of F-4 aircraft coming from Laos. Weather: cloudiness - 10 points, height of the lower edge - 400 m, upper - 1500 m, visibility - 8-10 km. Guidance was carried out from the command post of the regiment. Fulfilling the control command, the couple climbed 8000 m on a course of 220 degrees. After leaving the clouds, the leader of the pair on command from the control center began to turn to the left and immediately to the left at an angle of 90 degrees, at a distance of 6-8 km found a flight of F-4 aircraft flying at an altitude of 6000-8000 m. He decided to attack the second pair of F-4s and instructed the wingman to drop the external fuel tanks and turn on the afterburner. Since the extreme left pair was chosen as the object of attack, the leader went into a deeper turn with a 7-8-fold overload. At this point, the wingman lost the leader. At the time of its transition to a reverse roll, the aircraft was shot down. The pilot ejected and landed safely.
As it turned out during the analysis of the air battle, the first link at the same height was followed by the second link of F-4 aircraft, which attacked a pair of MiG-21 fighters. The lead F-4 of the second pair of the first flight was attacked by the lead pair of F-4s of the second flight, which fired six missiles at him. All missiles passed by. Seeing the numerical superiority of the enemy and having a limited supply of fuel, the leader in the limit mode for overload with a decrease left the battle. At an altitude of 30-50 m, he broke away from enemy aircraft and landed safely with the remaining fuel of 250-300 liters at the take-off airfield. The wingman's plane was shot down by a winged pair of the second flight F-4.
The reasons for the loss of the leader by the follower: weak group flocking as part of a pair and illiterate actions of the follower after the loss of the leader; tactically incorrect choice of the object of attack; lack of clear guidance from the IAP CP.
On December 23, at 13.41, a pair of MiG-21s was raised from the Noi Bai airfield to intercept a group of F-4 aircraft flying at an altitude of 7000-8000 m from Laos. Weather: cloudiness - 10 points, height of the lower edge - 400 m, upper - 1200 m, visibility 6-8 km. Guidance was carried out with KP IAP. After take-off and climbing 300 m, the steam flew under the clouds on a course of 160 degrees, then 1.5 minutes after take-off, on command from the CP, it lay down on a course of 260 degrees and began climbing the set altitude at maximum engine operating modes. At an altitude of 4000 m, the leader discovered on the right at an angle of 56-60 degrees a link of aircraft flying in a "wedge" formation at an altitude of 7000-8000 m. He decided to attack the driven pair of F-4s. Having dropped the external fuel tanks and turned on the afterburner, the pair began to approach the enemy aircraft with a right turn and with a climb. When a pair of MiG-21 aircraft entered the rear hemisphere of the F-4 link (at a distance of about 10 km), the latter discovered it and, dropping external fuel tanks and turning on the afterburner, tried to leave. However, a pair of MiG-21s, having an advantage in speed, quickly reduced the distance. Unable to break away, the F-4 link was divided into pairs: the leader began to perform a combat turn maneuver to the right, the slave - a downward spiral to the left. The lead pilot of the MiG-21 aircraft made a decision - to attack the driven pair of F-4s with both fighters. At a range of 1500-1800 m, he launched one R-ZS missile at the F-4 wingman and shot it down. The follower pilot of the MiG-21 aircraft, being in the left bearing, from a distance of 2500-3000 m also launched a rocket at the leading F-4 pair. But, since the launch was made on a turn with a 3-4-fold overload, the rocket missed the target. The MiG-21 fighters disengaged from the battle with a vigorous descent maneuver and landed safely at the landing airfield.
Thus, the correct construction of the air maneuver and the surprise of the attack contributed to the destruction of the F-4 aircraft. The failure of the second launch is explained by the fact that it was made from a long range and at an overload that exceeded the maximum allowable.
On December 27, at 13.34, a pair of MiG-21 fighters was raised from the Noi Bai airfield to intercept a group of F-4 aircraft coming from Laos. Weather: cloudiness - 6-7 points, lower edge - 500 m, upper - 1500 m, visibility - 10 km. Guidance was carried out with KP IAP. After takeoff, the pair climbed 300 m on a course of 80 degrees. In the area of ​​​​the Kep airfield, as instructed by the command post, the altitude was increased to 5000 m. After clarifying the altitude, it turned out that the command received by the leader was misunderstood.
It was necessary to increase the height only by 500 m. At the moment of descending to the set height, after passing the lower edge of the clouds and turning to the right, the wingman of the pair found a pair of F-4 aircraft to his right at a distance of 3 km. Having reported to the host about the target and received permission to attack, he launched the first R-ZS missile from a range of 1800-2000 m at a speed of 900-950 km / h and at a flight altitude of 200 m above the terrain. The rocket went to the ground. Increasing the speed to 1000-1200 km / h and reducing the distance to 1300 m, he launched a second rocket, which hit the target. The lead pair of F-4s was shot down, the pilot ejected.
The first unsuccessful attack testifies to the haste and non-compliance with the flight parameters before launching the rocket. An incorrectly accepted and executed command to climb by the pilot indicates poor control over the flight of his fighters by the IAP command post, which could lead to their loss in a difficult air situation and numerical superiority of enemy aircraft.
On December 27, at 14.07, one MiG-21 aircraft was raised from the Noi Bai airfield to intercept the F-4 group. Weather: cloudiness - 6-7 points, lower edge - 500 m, upper - 1200 m, visibility - 8-10 km. Management and guidance were carried out with the TsKP. To the northern outskirts of Hanoi, the pilot flew at an altitude of 150-200 m above the terrain, then, on command, turned on the afterburner, dropped the external fuel tank, gained a set altitude of 3500 m and lay down on a course of 195 degrees. Following this course, ahead of him at a distance of 8-10 km and somewhat higher, the pilot found a flight of F-4 aircraft flying in a "wedge" battle formation. Using the superiority in speed, he reduced the distance to the lead of the second pair to 1500-2000 m and launched the R-ZS missile (the target was chosen correctly, since the follower F-4 performed the "scissors" maneuver). The missile hit the target, the F-4 plane was shot down, the pilot ejected.
Turning off the afterburner, the MiG-21 pilot left the battle with a half-turn, returned to the airfield and landed. The tactically competent construction of the maneuver during the attack, the covert rendezvous with the target, and the exact observance of the aircraft's flight parameters during the missile launch ensured the successful completion of this air battle. On December 28, at 11.17, a pair of MiG-21 fighters was raised from the Noi Bai airfield to intercept a group of F-4 aircraft flying from Laos in the direction of Hanoi. Weather: cloudiness - 7-8 points, lower edge - 800 m, upper - 1800 m, visibility - 8-10 km. Guidance was carried out with KP IAP.
After taking off and climbing 300 m, the pair made a U-turn and laid down on a course in the direction of Hanoi. After 2 minutes 30 from the flight, a command was received from the command post of the regiment to drop the fuel tanks, turn on the afterburner and climb 5000 m. Being in the left bearing relative to the leader, he found on the right and slightly higher at a distance of 8 km a link of F-4 aircraft and, with the permission of the leader, attacked him. At this point, the leader discovered another link F-4, going the same course and at the same height as the first. To cover his wingman, the leader, with energetic maneuvers in the horizontal and vertical planes, tried to tie this link in battle. Then, with a fuel balance of 1000 liters, he left the battle and landed at the take-off airfield.
According to the reports of militia fighters, personnel of ZA, ZRV and RTV, it was possible to establish that the slave pilot shot down one F-4 and one RA-5C in an air battle, while he himself was shot down, ejected, but landed dead. It was not possible to establish the details of the battle, since the leader himself fought and could not observe the actions of the follower. It should be noted that in this air battle, tactical surprise, competent construction of a maneuver, combined with courage and courage, allowed the Vietnamese pilots to conduct air combat with a pair of MiG-21 aircraft with eight F-4 aircraft and achieve success in it.
Thanks to the ever-increasing assistance of China and the Soviet Union, the resistance of the North Vietnamese air defense system to the impudent aggressor was constantly growing. In July 1965, a new type of weapon was used for the first time, which made significant adjustments to the course of the air war - the Soviet S-75 anti-aircraft missile system.
On July 24, 1965, a division under the command of Major F. Ilinykh (guidance officer - Senior Lieutenant V. Konstantinov) shot down three F-4C fighter-bombers 30-40 km southeast of Hanoi with a rocket salvo.
The planes flew with a bomb load in close formation at an altitude of 2,000 meters.
To combat the air defense system, it was necessary to develop special weapons and tactics, the widespread use of false maneuvers and decoy aircraft that caused fire on themselves, which made it possible to establish the location of launcher missiles (more often, maneuverable Phantoms acted as such "decoys", but sometimes they were used and lightweight F-105s without bombs). In turn, the Vietnamese and Soviet missilemen practiced rapid redeployment - "wheel maneuver" (if 40 minutes after the launch of the rocket, the division did not leave its positions, then, as a rule, it was subjected to air strikes and destroyed). The camouflage of the starting positions was significantly developed: camouflaged green-brown rockets flew out of the jungle, scattering around them piles of branches and palm leaves, which were covered before the start.
Here is how A. Yakovlev, a participant in the Vietnam War, describes a missile battle with Phantoms: “... An F-105 glided over the valley - a reconnaissance and bait. The division was silent. A few tens of seconds later, a strike group fell out of the clouds - a pair of Phantoms. "Our ambush came to life. The leader was destroyed by the first missile. The wingman, turning sharply, attacked the positions of the division. Suddenly, an anti-aircraft missile went into the sky right in front of him. Deciding that this was the location of the division, the Phantom rushed in a dive to a false position, putting himself under fire from anti-aircraft artillery. A short volley of anti-aircraft guns was terrible: the plane fell apart in the air and crashed into the jungle in a heap of debris. "
Soviet veteran, retired lieutenant colonel Yuri Trushechkin, who took part in the Vietnam War, admitted that it was he who in 1967 shot down a plane carrying US presidential candidate John McCain. Trushechkin, 70, is convinced that he has nothing to hide, let alone be ashamed of. He said that he got to Vietnam as a 28-year-old captain, at a time when there were already mixed units with the Vietnamese. He served as a guidance officer in the missile crew. And when he left Vietnam, there were still about 70 officers, as well as soldiers, there were 365 captured Americans - like days in a year. The day that McCain's plane was shot down, the veteran remembers well. Captain Trushechkin, along with other military men, changed the position of the rocket launcher, which was supposed to cover the strategic bridge Ham Zhong from the Americans. The military was already leaving when they heard the air raid alert and saw two F-4s fly up.
The two remaining missiles were fired at the target - the other four were shot earlier. One of the remaining two missiles exploded in the jungle due to poor guidance, and the second one was shot down by a plane. "One plane was going around the hills, and the other went straight across the bridge. We were shooting at it," says Trushechkin. The pilot, who was John McCain, ejected and was taken prisoner by Vietnamese soldiers.
McCain was lucky - usually American pilots were beaten with hoes. “The most valuable trophies were considered to be a flight helmet and a ‘beggar’s flag’ — a patch with the inscription ‘I am an American citizen, in distress, please help me’ — in five languages,” says Yury Petrovich. It turned out to be a parachute book. I asked the translator to see what was written there. I remember the words: "John McCain". The parachute was assembled for him the day before ... "
As a trophy, Captain Trushechkin took home the pilot's documents and photographs that he managed to take underground in Vietnam - Soviet specialists were not allowed to take pictures. In total, McCain spent five and a half years in captivity - 1967 days - and was released on March 15, 1973 after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords between the United States and Vietnam.
The sharply increased number of combat losses and, above all, the psychological effect that the use of powerful medium-range anti-aircraft missiles in Vietnam produced, forced the American aviation command to abandon the previously worked out tactics. Since the C-75 confidently hit targets at medium and high altitudes, American aviation had to switch to flights at low and extremely low altitudes. With the skillful use of the terrain by aircraft, detection and tracking by radar stations became difficult. This reorientation immediately affected the conditions of air combat: North Vietnamese fighters now received reliable information from the guidance radar about enemy aircraft flying near the ground much less often.
But at the same time, American aircraft flying near the ground increased the likelihood of them being hit by cannon artillery and small arms fire. Therefore, by the end of 1965, the number of anti-aircraft guns in the air defense of the VNA was doubled and exceeded 2000. A significant number of them had radar fire control, for example, the Soviet 57-mm S-60 anti-aircraft artillery system. Subsequently, analyzing the results of the war, American experts came to the conclusion that more than half of the total number of downed fighter-bombers was hit by small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery fire, which was considered to have exhausted its capabilities long ago. Another disadvantage of the "low-altitude" tactics was a sharp weakening of the power of strikes inflicted by forcedly small groups of aircraft.
Taking into account the heavy losses incurred in attempts to destroy the air defense system, the American command relied on qualitatively new means of combating them - specially equipped aircraft of the Wild Weasel squadrons. These aircraft (originally the F-100F, somewhat later the F-105F, and even later - since 1972 - the F-4C and F-105G) were equipped with radar detection and suppression equipment and were armed with AGM-45 Shrike anti-radar missiles, and later and more advanced AGM-78 Standard-ARM.
Thanks to the active use of electronic warfare, the Americans were able to combine the actions of low-altitude groups of aircraft that broke through air defenses with massive strikes from medium altitudes. New means of overcoming air defense zones have appeared. Aerial reconnaissance of objects began to be carried out by effective, small-sized unmanned reconnaissance aircraft of the BQM-34 type. Bombs, unguided projectiles (NURS) and Shrike-type anti-location projectiles were widely used for fire suppression of SNR and reconnaissance and target designation means (SRTs). US aviation began to widely use low altitudes, anti-missile maneuver, fire suppression and other tactics.
Ball bombs were used to destroy manpower.
The effectiveness of the ZRV has declined sharply. A significant part of the aircraft broke through to the objects, destroyed on the positions of the air defense system.
To make up for losses, air defense systems and military equipment were promptly supplied from the USSR. Air defense systems with small and medium damage were restored with the help of SAF directly at the positions.
But these measures did not ensure the stability of anti-aircraft missile defense (SMD). Decisive measures were needed to improve the S-75 air defense system through their significant modernization. As a result of the measures taken, the effectiveness of these air defense systems in the face of radio countermeasures, the use of low altitudes by US aircraft, anti-missile maneuver, fire suppression and other tactical methods has significantly increased.
The main areas of modernization were: increasing noise immunity, improving the control loop in order to expand the affected area and the ability to combat targets using anti-missile maneuver, protection against anti-missile systems by using distracting radiation on positions and a number of organizational and technical measures. The combat characteristics of the missiles were significantly expanded. The process of improving the air defense system was continuous. For each new tactical method of AOS, means and ways were sought to reduce their effectiveness.
The ZRDN maneuver began to be widely used for the purpose of sudden live firing from an ambush.
It should be noted that along with effective directions for the modernization of air defense systems, there were also ill-conceived, unjustified ones. Someone suggested using an optical channel for firing in conditions of strong radio interference.
To do this, a small metal cabin was installed on the SNR receiving-transmitting cabin, in which a short-range optical tube was deployed. In the conditions of the Vietnamese heat and the small size of the cabin, it was impossible for the calculation number to work in it. The detection range was insufficient. Tracking accuracy is low. This additional optical channel has not found practical application. True, in the future it was significantly improved and turned into a television-optical channel.
EOS were especially effective in using radio countermeasures. At the initial stage of hostilities, radio interference directors for the SNR and SRTs practically paralyzed the work of these means. Combat firing was impossible or ineffective due to large errors in pointing the missiles at the target due to the distortion of the signal reflected from the target by the interference of the energy center.
The search for ways to combat the use of air defense systems in the conditions of radio countermeasures has become a major headache for the creators of the air defense system, for employees of research institutes and specialists of the main headquarters of the country's air defense forces.
A special group of specialists from design bureaus, research institutes, and air defense forces officers was formed to analyze combat firing of air defense systems in conditions of radio interference and prepare measures to improve their effectiveness.
This group worked for a long time in the combat groupings of the ZRV in Vietnam. On the basis of the materials of her work, a number of works were carried out to modernize the air defense system, introduced into the practice of organizational and technical measures, to improve the Instructions and Guidelines for the combat work of crews.
These measures made it possible to increase the effectiveness of combat firing of anti-aircraft missiles in the conditions of the use of active and passive radio interference by an air enemy. However, fundamental positive results were not achieved. In my opinion, one of the main reasons was the weak educational and material base for the training of combat crews of the air defense missile system in the conditions of radio countermeasures.
The USSR Air Force had an insufficient number of radio interference control aircraft to provide the necessary training for combat crews of anti-aircraft missiles at training grounds, in training centers and at places of permanent deployment. The ACKORD-type simulators required for the ZRV were developed and put into practice by the troops with a significant delay from the start of the massive use of radio interference by US air attack weapons.
However, it should be noted that the experience of the combat use of Soviet-made air defense systems in the DRV was successfully used to implement in a short time a qualitative leap in the effectiveness of anti-aircraft missile forces in the USSR and in other countries where our systems were supplied.
This work was carried out in the following main areas:
1. Modernization of air defense systems and SRTs (target reconnaissance station).
2. Implementation of new principles for building ZRV groupings.
3. Significant improvement of regulatory documents on the combat use of anti-aircraft missiles in the context of the use of modern methods of overcoming anti-aircraft missile defense by US aircraft and delivering strikes against administrative and industrial centers and troop positions.
4. The introduction of more modern methods and methods of combat training. Development and implementation of training and simulation equipment. Transition from individual combat training of crew numbers to comprehensive coordination of crews, batteries, divisions, units and formations of troops.
5. Mastering methods for restoring disabled air defense systems in combat positions and in repair organizations.
I will dwell on the main directions of development of the ZRV based on the results of the war. The experience of Vietnam showed that the formation of ZRV groupings according to the principles existing before the war did not ensure their effectiveness and survivability. The intervals between the air defense missile systems were too long and did not provide mutual fire cover for neighboring divisions. If the aircraft was in the kill zone of one division, then the neighboring ones did not have the opportunity to fire on this aircraft. Their affected areas did not overlap. The fire system was single layer. Along the route of the enemy aircraft, with such a system of fire, shelling could, as a rule, be carried out by only one division. The well-known principle of the concentration of fire could not be carried out.
Groupings of air defense systems in Vietnam were built on the basis of air defense systems of the same type, operating in the same frequency range with a small spacing of the operating frequencies of neighboring air defense missile systems. With this principle of construction, the noise immunity of ZRV groupings was low. One jammer could emit radio interference in the range of all or most divisions deployed on the defense of one object (usually 4 ZRDn).
To eliminate these main shortcomings of the anti-aircraft missiles, revealed as a result of the war in Vietnam, a new principle for building anti-aircraft missiles in our country was developed and implemented in a relatively short time. On the defense of large objects, instead of groupings of air defense systems of the same type, mixed groupings were created from different types of air defense systems of short, medium, long range in different frequency ranges at small intervals along the front and depth. Such groupings provided an equally strong all-round defense with a multi-layered fire system in a wide range of engagement heights. They have become immune to interference. Significantly increased their survivability when the enemy uses fire suppression of combat positions.
To reduce the heights of the combat use of air defense systems in the troops, a lot of work was carried out to relocate the air defense missile systems to new, more advantageous positions using the natural heights of the terrain to accommodate the receiving and transmitting cabins of the SNR. Sometimes such heights were artificially created at previously equipped positions. A titanic work was carried out in the air defense forces of the country to create groups of mixed composition. All this huge work was carried out, as a rule, in an economic way, i.e. forces and means of units and parts of the ZRV.
In the final period of the war, in 1972, the Vietnamese fired 2059 V-750 missiles at 1725 targets and shot down 421 enemy aircraft, a significant proportion of which were Phantoms.
The first sortie to intercept the B-52 was made on the MiG-21 aircraft on the evening of December 18, 1972. At 19.28, after taking off from the Noi-Bai airfield on a course of 220 degrees at maximum engine operation, the pilot climbed 5000 m and in front of him on the right at a distance of 10-15 km found the navigation lights of the B-52 strategic bomber. Having reported this to the TsKP and received an order to attack, the pilot turned on the afterburner, dropped the external fuel tanks and began to climb while simultaneously turning to the right. Having reached an altitude of 10,000 m, on a command from the TsKP (range to the target - 10 km), he turned on the RP-21 sight for radiation. After 3-5 seconds after that, the pilot noticed that the navigation lights of the B-52 aircraft went out, and the sight screen turned out to be completely illuminated by active noise interference, against which the target was not visible. The pilot reported the presence of interference and continued flying in the direction of the target. Some time later (30-40 seconds after the RP-21 was switched on for radiation), he saw six missile explosions near him, after which he disengaged from the attack with an energetic right turn with a decrease. While landing at the airfield, the plane hit a bomb crater and crashed. The pilot remained unharmed. The main reason for the unsuccessful battle is the lack of tactical surprise of the attack due to the illiterate approach to the target and the premature activation of the radar sight.
On December 27, 1972, at 22.02, a MiG-21 aircraft was raised from the En-Bai airfield to intercept a group of B-52 aircraft. Weather: cloudiness -10 points, height of the lower edge - 400 m, upper - 2000 m, visibility - 10 km.
Fulfilling the commands of the Central Control Center, the pilot climbed 5,000 m on a course of 200 degrees at the maximum engine operating mode. After that, the pilot dropped the external fuel tanks, turned on the afterburner and began to climb 10,000 m. navigation lights, and, observing the lights visually, continued to climb with a left turn (roll 35-40 degrees, speed 1200 km / h). Having reached an altitude of 10000 m and following a course of 70 degrees, the pilot continued approaching the target at a fighter speed of 1300 km / h and at a distance of 2000-2500 m aimed at the collimator sight and launched two missiles in one gulp. Both missiles hit the B-52 aircraft. The pilot completed the exit from the attack with a half-turn, switching to level flight at an altitude of 2500-3000 m, and safely landed at the take-off airfield.
Success in aerial combat was ensured by tactically competent use of the route during guidance and attack, surprise using B-52 unmasking signs (navigation lights) and precise maintenance of aircraft flight parameters when launching missiles.
On December 28, at 21.28, a MiG-21 fighter was raised from a field airfield located 12 km north of the Tho-Sop airfield to intercept the B-52. Weather: cloudiness - 5 points, lower edge - 800 m, upper - 1200-1500 m, visibility - 10 km. Guidance was carried out with PN. Up to an altitude of 4000 m, the flight was carried out at the maximum engine operating mode, after which the command was given to drop the outboard tanks, turn on the afterburner and climb 10,000 m on a course of 350 degrees.
At an altitude of about 7000 m, the pilot reported to the PN that he sees an aircraft ahead of him on the course, flying higher with navigation lights on. Presumably, from a range of 8-10 km at an altitude of 9000-9500 m, the MiG-21 fighter was detected by the tail protection radar of the B-52 bomber, the crew of which turned off the onboard navigation lights, about which the fighter pilot reported to the PN. This was the pilot's last report. According to the Vietnamese side, the MiG-21 fighter rammed the B-52 bomber.
An analysis of air battles between Vietnamese fighters and B-52 strategic bombers shows that a single aircraft was the main tactical unit in a night battle. The tactical surprise of his attack was ensured by the use of PKI for aiming and launching missiles. However, to complete the attack, it was necessary to enter the area of ​​​​a possible missile launch - the rear hemisphere of the B-52 bomber, strictly maintain the flight parameters before launch (exceeding the speed of 300-400 km / h, launch range 1800-2000 m) and launch R-ZS missiles in one gulp.
One of the reasons for the low effectiveness of the actions of the MiG-21 fighters against the B-52 aircraft is their failure to reach targets (six out of 10 guidance were disrupted due to strong interference from the guidance radar).
The Vietnam War seriously undermined the prestige of the United States and its political, military and economic positions in the world, stimulated the deepening of the moral, political and socio-economic crisis that shook the United States and the entire American society. As a result, a powerful anti-war movement arose, a radical, albeit temporary, change in the mentality of the American nation took place, which, in fact, can be called the “Vietnam syndrome” in the broadest sense of the term. Waging war for many years, suffering huge human and material losses, the United States was never able to realize the goals set for itself in Vietnam. The result was the realization by the nation, largely subject to chauvinist and great-power sentiments, of the fact that not everything in the world is decided by tight wallets and military force.
The "Vietnam Syndrome", which shook the foundations of American society, led to a certain adjustment in the US foreign policy, the value orientations of average Americans, and even domestic social policy. Responding to the mood in society, the American state machine as a whole managed to cope with this crisis, pragmatically taking into account mistakes and implementing a number of transformations, including in the army. Thus, the socio-political system of the United States was able to withstand the serious shocks associated with the "dirty" war in Vietnam and the defeat in it.
The weakening of the United States in the military sphere was also due to the fact that the United States finally lost such forward links in the entire "perimeter" of military bases as the military airfields of Tan Son Nyat, Pleiku, the military ports of Da Nang, Vung Tau, the entire area of ​​Cam Ranh Bay; a network of military bases in Laos and Kampuchea, as well as in Thailand. The aggressive military bloc SEATO, organized and supported by the United States in order to oppose the national liberation movement and socialism in Southeast Asia, itself announced its dissolution. With the disappearance of SEATO, the United States has lost one of the most important assets of global importance in this region of the world. Even in the aggressive NATO military bloc, which unites the largest imperialist countries, cracks grew as US defeats in Vietnam grew. And Washington had to “heal” this result of the Vietnam War for a number of years after 1975.
Thus, in connection with the Vietnam War, the myth of the invincibility of the American army was dispelled.
In the economic sphere, the strategic defeat of the United States in Vietnam was expressed in the economic weakening of the United States, in a number of financial and opportunistic phenomena of a crisis nature.
The costs of the United States in the Vietnam War are expressed in an amount that no one has yet fully calculated. However, if we take into account only the appropriations directly allocated for the conduct of military operations in Indochina, then they amounted to 352 billion dollars. Together with other costs, the cost of the war, the total amount, apparently, amounted to 700 billion dollars. In this war, as stated by the American magazine Fortune, the cost of killing one Vietnamese partisan was 52.5 thousand dollars.
The course of militarism pursued in connection with the Vietnam War led to such a significant strain on the state budget that the US government had to constantly increase taxes, the main burden of which fell on the working people. From the end of 1964 to November 1972, the amount of paper money in circulation in the United States increased from 39.6 billion dollars to 65 billion. By 1974, this figure had already reached 70 billion. Since 1975, the annual inflation rate has been ten%.
The Vietnam War threw the US economy into chaos. It was a huge factor that determined inflation - the most serious economic problem.

The main American sources used are the Red Baron Project, declassified in 2001 (a US Air Force study of air combat 1965-1967), and Chris Hobson's classic book "Vietnam Air Losses".
From the Vietnamese side, the main information was taken from the books of Istvan Topercher and the materials of the book about the Air Force of the DRV "Lich su dan duong Khong quan (1959-2004)". It should be noted that at present (as of 2013) there are no publicly available complete lists of victories and losses of North Vietnamese aviation in Russian and English. Interesting material is taken from Vladimir Ilyin's book "Phantom" F-4. - M .: Astrel, AST, 2001 and Ilyinsky M. M "Indochina: Ashes of four wars (1939-1979)". Moscow: Veche, 2000.

There were thousands of them - but officially there were none at all. The participation of the Soviet military in the Vietnam War was not advertised. "Voice of Russia" managed to interview one of those who defended the skies of Vietnam from US Air Force raids.

January 30 is another anniversary of the establishment of Soviet-Vietnamese diplomatic relations. One of the brightest pages in the relations between the two countries is military assistance to Vietnam during the war against American aggression. Voice of Russia was told about those days by a person who was directly involved in the events of the Vietnam War. Nikolai Kolesnik, chairman of the interregional public organization of Russian veterans of the Vietnam War, since 1965, participated in the battles waged against US aircraft by Soviet missilemen.

Kolesnik: Soviet military assistance was huge and comprehensive. In value terms, this amounted to about two million dollars daily during all the years of the war. A huge amount of equipment was delivered to Vietnam. It is enough to give just a few figures: 2,000 tanks, 7,000 guns and mortars, over 5,000 anti-aircraft guns and installations, 158 anti-aircraft missile systems, over 700 combat aircraft, 120 helicopters, over 100 warships. And all these deliveries were free of charge. The Vietnamese had to be taught to fight on all this equipment. For this, Soviet military specialists were sent to Vietnam. From July 1965 to the end of 1974, about 6.5 thousand officers and generals, as well as more than 4.5 thousand soldiers and sergeants of the Soviet Armed Forces, took part in the hostilities in Vietnam. In addition, the training of Vietnamese military personnel was started in military schools and academies of the USSR - more than 10 thousand people.

They say that the equipment sent from the USSR to Vietnam was outdated.

Kolesnik: At that time it was the most modern. For example, the MiG-21 jet fighters - it was on them that the Vietnamese pilots shot down both the F-105 and the B-52 "flying fortresses". During all the years of the war, fighter aircraft of the Vietnamese People's Army destroyed 350 enemy aircraft. Vietnamese aviation lost much less - 145 aircraft. The history of the VNA included the names of air aces, on whose account there were 7, 8 and 9 downed American aircraft. At the same time, de Beliva, the most successful US pilot, had only six air victories in Vietnam. The Soviet Dvina missile systems supplied during this war were capable of hitting air targets even at a 25-kilometer altitude. “These are the most deadly projectiles that have ever been fired from the ground on aircraft,” the American Military Technical Journal stated in those years.

The anti-aircraft missile forces of the DRV, created and trained by Soviet specialists, shot down about 1,300 American aircraft, including 54 B-52 strategic bombers. Each of them carried 25 tons of bombs, and each could destroy all living things and all buildings on an area equal to thirty football fields. The Americans regularly bombed both the "Ho Chi Minh trail" and the cities of North Vietnam, flying at an altitude inaccessible to anti-aircraft guns. After our first victories, they sharply lowered their altitude so as to be inaccessible to missiles, but fell under fire from anti-aircraft artillery. After the appearance of Soviet missiles, American military pilots began to refuse to fly to bomb the territory of North Vietnam. Their command had to take urgent measures, including increasing payments for each sortie, constantly replacing the flight crew of aircraft carriers. At first, Soviet officers conducted missile battles, the Vietnamese adopted their experience. For the first time, Soviet missiles showed themselves in the sky of Vietnam on July 24, 1965. 4 American "Phantoms" then went to Hanoi, at a height where they could not get the Vietnamese anti-aircraft guns. Soviet missiles were fired at them. 3 out of 4 aircraft were shot down. Since then, the date of this victory has been celebrated annually in Vietnam as the Day of the Missile Forces.

Do you remember when your first fight took place? Who is who then?

Kolesnik: August 11, 1965. During the day we occupied places on combat alert 18 times. And all - to no avail. And, finally, late at night, 4 enemy planes were shot down with three missiles. In total, the divisions of the First and Third Vietnamese anti-aircraft missile regiments shot down 15 enemy aircraft in the battles in which I participated.

The Americans must have hunted for your combat crews?

Wheeler: Yes. Places of deployment had to be changed after each battle. It was impossible otherwise - the Americans immediately launched rocket and bomb strikes on the identified positions of rocket launchers. The Americans did their best to prevent the use of our technology: they used interference, Shrike missiles. Our military designers also reacted and improved our anti-aircraft missile technology.

Have you personally seen captured American pilots?

Kolesnik: I have never seen it in person. Yes, our presence in Vietnam was not advertised. Suffice it to say that we spent the entire business trip in civilian clothes, without any personal and even without any documents. They were kept in our embassy.

And how did they announce to you that you were flying to Vietnam and what did you say at home?

Kolesnik: I served in an air defense regiment near Moscow. The regimental commander announced that we were invited to go on a business trip to a country with a "hot tropical climate." Almost everyone agreed, and those who for some reason did not want to go, as a result, did not go. I said the same at home.

What struck you the most as a young guy in the first place?

Kolesnik: Everything amazed me: the unusual nature, the people, the climate, and the first bombardment that I had to visit. After all, in Moscow we were guided by the fact that we would simply train and prepare Vietnamese calculations. And I had to train directly on combat positions, with daily incessant raids by American aircraft. The Vietnamese are very stubborn people, they learned very quickly. And I also mastered the basic commands and terms in Vietnamese.

What was the hardest thing?

Nikolai Kolesnik: Unbearable heat and high humidity. For example, after a 40-minute refueling of rockets with an oxidizer in a special rubberized suit, they lost almost a kilogram of weight.

What is the attitude of the current Vietnamese youth towards that war and your participation in it?

Nikolai Kolesnik: With great respect, the Vietnam veterans of that war. We remember our difficult military days and our common victories. And the younger, more pragmatic generation asked us with interest about those battles and details of that war unknown to them.

Now many in our country have a very ambiguous attitude towards the participation of the Soviet Union in conflicts outside its borders. What was participation in the Vietnam War for you?

N. Kolesnik: For me, those fights are still the brightest events in my life. I and my comrades-in-arms - both Soviet and Vietnamese - participated in historical events, forged victory, in the truest sense of the word. I am proud that I helped the Vietnamese people in the struggle for their independence and took part in the creation of Vietnam's anti-aircraft missile forces.

Armed conflict in the 60-70s. 20th century on the territory of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia with the participation of the United States and its allies. The war was one of the major conflicts of the Cold War.

Section of Vietnam.

After the defeat of France and the withdrawal of its troops under the Geneva Accords in the spring of 1954, Vietnam was temporarily divided into two parts by a demarcation line running along the 17th parallel: to the north, where the pro-communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) existed, and to the south, where in 1955 The Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed with its capital in Saigon. South Vietnam soon came under US control. The new government with Ngo Dinh Diem relied on the support of a narrow layer of citizens associated with Western countries, and received American financial assistance. In 1956, South Vietnam, with the tacit support of the United States, refused to hold a national referendum on the question of the reunification of the country. The adopted constitution included a provision according to which any act aimed at spreading communist ideas in the country was prosecuted. The persecution of political opponents of the regime began. The Catholic Church, along with the army, was the main pillar of the South Vietnamese regime.

At the same time, the communist regime led by Ho Chi Minh gained strength in the North of Vietnam, which was popular among the general population and sought to liberate and unite the entire country on an anti-colonial basis.

Vietcong.

The communists of the DRV arranged for the dispatch of weapons and "volunteers" to the south along the so-called "Ho Chi Minh trail" - roads laid in the jungle from North Vietnam through Laos and Cambodia. The authorities of these two countries were unable to resist the actions of the communists. In December 1960, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam was created, which led the guerrilla struggle against the South Vietnamese regime. The South Vietnamese government called these forces the Viet Cong (using this term to refer to all Vietnamese communists). Soon he already numbered 30 thousand fighters. Their struggle enjoyed the military support of North Vietnam.

Among the poor, the idea of ​​​​agrarian reform, carried out in North Vietnam, became extremely popular, which led to the transition of many South Vietnamese to the ranks of the partisans.

US intervention.

For the United States, the communist offensive in Indochina was a challenge, as it could lead to the West losing control over Southeast Asia. The concept of "dominoes" was popular in Washington at that time, according to which the fall of one pro-American regime would inevitably lead to a change in the political situation in the entire region. By the end of 1963, there were already 17,000 American military advisers in South Vietnam. From January 1964, the Saigon regime was headed by Nguyen Khanh, who came to power as a result of a military coup and proclaimed his goal to defeat the partisans and unite the entire territory of the country under his rule. But the popularity of the Viet Cong only increased, and dissatisfaction with the ruling regime, unable to cope with the situation inside the country, also grew. Many southerners shared intelligence information with the partisans. The situation was becoming threatening.

As a pretext for large-scale intervention, the United States used the shelling by the Vietnamese of the US Navy destroyer Maddox. On August 2, 1964, Maddox, patrolling the Gulf of Tonkin, approached the coast of North Vietnam and was allegedly attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. Two days later, another attack took place in international waters under unclear circumstances. At the initiative of US President L. Johnson, the US Congress adopted a resolution to protect the US in Indochina.

American bombing of Vietnam.

In February 1965 massive air and sea bombardments of the DRV began. Johnson sought to "bomb Vietnam into the Stone Age". For 1965-1968 more than 2.5 million bombs were dropped on Vietnam. By the end of 1965 alone, 700,000 inhabitants left the rural areas of South Vietnam and became refugees. In March, 3,500 US Marines landed in South Vietnam to protect the Da Nang airbase. Three years later, the number of troops reached 550 thousand people. The US military operation was also supported by contingents from South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. Germany, Great Britain and Japan allied themselves with the United States, but did not take a direct part in the war.

The Americans failed neither to suppress the morale of the enemy, nor to cut off the transfer of aid from the North to the South, nor to defeat the guerrilla forces in South Vietnam. To break the resistance, American troops undertook punitive operations, accompanied by the burning of civilian settlements and the mass extermination of residents. In March 1968, the company of Lieutenant W. Kelly killed almost all the inhabitants of the Vietnamese village of Song My, including women and children. This massacre caused an explosion of indignation in the United States. More and more Americans believed that their army was no better than the Nazis. Soon the Americans had to switch to the defense of their bases, limiting themselves to combing and bombing the jungle. American aviation watered the jungle with pesticides, which dried up the vegetation covering the partisans and made people sick. During the bombing, napalm was often used. American bombers attacked not only military facilities, but also industrial enterprises, various infrastructure facilities: power plants, railways, bridges, river communications and oil storage facilities. But the Vietnamese guerrillas opposed the "tunnel war" to the American "helicopter war" with unprecedented troop mobility. Their branching catacombs covered most of Vietnam - and under a single village, the length of the tunnels with warehouses, bedrooms and rooms for the wounded could exceed one and a half kilometers. But this ecological war did not help.

Vietcong counteroffensive.

In January-February 1968, the partisans attacked all the bases and roads of South Vietnam, captured the large city of Hue, the ancient imperial capital, and fought on the streets of Saigon. Dramatic events unfolded around the assault on the building of the American embassy: a stubborn battle lasted six hours before the US troops, with the help of reinforcements arrived in time, managed to push back the Viet Cong. It was this fact that had a shocking effect on American society, demonstrating the weakness of the Saigon regime, the American forces, and the determination of the Communists. At the cost of incredible efforts, American forces pushed back the enemy forces as a result of intensified bombing, but by the end of 1968, about two-thirds of the territory of South Vietnam was in the hands of the communists.

Help from the USSR and China.

The political, economic and military assistance from the Soviet Union played a major role in the current situation. Soviet supplies to North Vietnam were carried out through the port of Haiphong, from the bombing and mining of which the United States refrained, fearing the consequences of the destruction of Soviet ships. Beginning in 1965, the USSR supplied air defense equipment and ammunition, tanks and heavy weapons. Soviet specialists who trained the Viet Cong were widely involved.

China, in turn, sent troops of between 30,000 and 50,000 people to North Vietnam to restore roads and railways, and also supplied food, small arms, and trucks. At the same time, both of the most important allies of North Vietnam held different views on the strategy of the war. The Chinese, based on their own experience, advocated a "protracted war", for an emphasis on guerrilla actions carried out in the South mainly by the Viet Cong. The Soviet Union pushed Vietnam to negotiate and thus indirectly supported the idea of ​​large-scale military operations by the main forces of North Vietnam, capable of creating favorable conditions for reaching agreements.

Changing US strategy.

The Vietnam War was becoming increasingly unpopular in the US. Anti-war rallies took place all over the country, turning into clashes between students and the police. President L. Johnson was forced to set a course for negotiations with the DRV, but they were delayed because of the principled position of the DRV and the National Front, which demanded the evacuation of American troops and a change of government in Saigon. The failure of negotiations and the continuation of the war led President Johnson to withdraw his candidacy for another term.

Given the "lessons of Vietnam", the Republican government headed by R. Nixon in the late 60s. headed for the modification of the US Asian strategy. The proclamation of the "Guam Doctrine" or "Nixon Doctrine" reflected the intention of the new US leadership to maintain its predominant influence in Vietnam, while using methods appropriate to the changed conditions.

With regard to South Vietnam, the revision of the American strategy was expressed in the implementation of the strategy of the so-called "Vietnamization", associated with a phased reduction in the number of American forces involved in hostilities. The main burden of political and military responsibility in the struggle against the forces of revolutionary liberation was shifted to the Saigon rulers. At the same time, as Washington believed, the main goal was achieved - the preservation of American influence in Vietnam. The "Vietnamization" strategy was supposed to reduce the level of losses in the American troops and thereby protect the United States from criticism from American and international public opinion.

One of the most important components of this strategy was the "appeasement" of the South Vietnamese peasants, from whom the rebels drew their strength. The Americans tried to strike at the rear of the revolution and destroy the roots of the liberation struggle of the South Vietnamese population. To achieve these goals, the United States used on a larger scale almost the entire military arsenal, including B-52 bombers and pesticides. Under the guidance of American instructors, the army of South Vietnam, which was entrusted with the main burden of the war, was strengthened. At the same time, the Paris peace talks continued. To exert pressure, R. Nixon ordered in May 1972 to mine the North Vietnamese ports. By this, Washington hoped to completely prevent the delivery of Soviet military and economic aid to North Vietnam.

The bombing of the territory of the DRV was also intensified. In response, insurgent military operations against American and South Vietnamese troops intensified. On January 27, 1973, agreements were initialed in Paris to end the war and restore peace in Vietnam. Under the terms of the agreement, the US and the DRV were withdrawing their troops from South Vietnam. The DRV promised not to send weapons and "volunteers" to South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The demarcation between North and South Vietnam continued to run along the 17th parallel, while emphasizing its temporary nature. Free elections were to be held in these countries. But after the resignation of President Nixon in 1974, the US sharply reduced its aid to the allied regimes in Indochina, which caused the fall of the government of South Vietnam.

Decisive Viet Cong offensive.

In the spring of 1975, the local communists, who, contrary to the agreements, received a lot of help from the USSR, China and the DRV, launched a swift offensive in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. In Cambodia, the extremist communist group "Khemor Reds" came to power. In December, the Communist-led People's Democratic Republic of Laos was proclaimed. On April 30, the National Front forces captured Saigon. A year later, elections to the National Assembly were held throughout Vietnam, which proclaimed on July 2, 1976, the reunification of the North and South into a single Socialist Republic of Vietnam with its capital in Hanoi. The city of Saigon was soon renamed Ho Chi Minh, in memory of the founder and president of the DRV.

The US defeat in Vietnam was America's biggest setback during the Cold War. More than 50,000 American soldiers died in the war. The mass anti-war movement led to the emergence of the so-called. "Vietnamese Syndrome", i.e. dissemination of the idea of ​​renunciation of war as a means of resolving conflicts. Also in literature and cinematography, much attention was paid to the "syndrome" that pursued tens of thousands of soldiers and officers who had been in Vietnam and experienced psychological difficulties when returning to civilian life. For North Vietnam, military losses amounted to more than 1 million people, and for South Vietnam - about 250 thousand people.

The Vietnam War, organized by the communists (agents of Moscow), claimed more than 3 million lives. In this war, in fact, Moscow and communist Beijing were at war with the United States. As cannon fodder, the communists, as always, used the masses of Vietnam and China, who believed their demagogy, as well as the USSR. Moscow supplied (free of charge) weapons, officers, specialists, and China - weapons, officers, soldiers and food.

This is how the communists (on orders from Moscow) unleashed the Vietnam War:

For both the Soviet Union and China, Vietnam was an extremely important strategic area. For the USSR, it was the main channel for political penetration into Southeast Asia. Especially significant - in the context of deteriorating relations with China. With Vietnam as an ally, Moscow could achieve complete strategic isolation of Beijing and thus not find itself in a dependent position in the event of reconciliation between the latter and the United States. It was also important for the Chinese side to have Vietnam as an ally. The strategic dominance of the USSR in this region would close the encirclement around the PRC and weaken its position as the leader of the communist movement in Southeast Asia. In this situation, Hanoi tried to formally maintain a neutral position, which allowed it to receive operational assistance from both the USSR and the PRC. Looking ahead, we note that as Moscow and Hanoi drew closer, Beijing's relations with the latter began to noticeably decline and gradually reached their lowest point. Ultimately, the USSR filled the space left by the end of the war and the US withdrawal from Vietnam.

The main role in the development of the partisan movement in South Vietnam was played by the communists from the DRV. At the beginning of 1959, the final decision was made in Moscow to unleash a large-scale civil war. The North Vietnamese communists announced that they allegedly did not see peaceful ways to reunite the country after the failure of the terms of the Geneva Accords, and made a choice in favor of supporting the anti-Ziem underground. From the middle of the year, “military advisers” began to go south, having grown up in these places and ended up in the north after the division of the country. At first, the transfer of people and weapons was carried out through the demilitarized zone (DMZ), but after the military successes of the communist forces in Laos, transit began to be carried out through Lao territory. This is how the “Ho Chi Minh trail” arose, which ran through Laos, bypassing the DMZ and further south, entering the territory of Cambodia. The use of the "trail" was a violation of the neutral status of these two countries, established by the Geneva Accords.

In December 1960, all South Vietnamese groups that fought against the Diem regime were united into the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF), which became widely known in the West as the Viet Cong. From about 1959, the Viet Cong units began to be actively supported by the DRV. In September 1960, the North Vietnamese government officially acknowledged its support for the insurgency in the South. By this time, centers for training fighters were already operating in the territory of the DRV, "forging" cadres from among the inhabitants of the southern regions of Vietnam, who moved to the DRV in 1954. The instructors at these centers were mainly Chinese military specialists. In July 1959, the first large group of trained fighters numbering about 4,500 people began to seep into South Vietnam. Subsequently, they became the core of Viet Cong battalions and regiments. In the same year, the 559th transport group was formed as part of the Army of North Vietnam, designed to provide rear support for operations in South Vietnam through the "Laotian salient". Weapons and military equipment began to arrive in the southern regions of the country, which allowed the rebel detachments to win a number of significant victories. By the end of 1960, the Viet Cong already controlled the Mekong Delta, the Annam Central Plateau, and the coastal plains. At the same time, terrorist methods of struggle became widespread. So, in 1959, 239 South Vietnamese officials were killed, and in 1961 more than 1,400.

Viet Cong fighters began to use mainly Chinese-made Soviet 7.62-mm AK-47 assault rifles, machine guns of the same caliber, RPG-2 anti-tank grenade launchers, as well as 57-mm and 75-mm recoilless rifles. In this regard, it is interesting to quote the statement of US Secretary of Defense McNamara. In a memorandum dated March 16, 1964, he noted that “beginning on July 1, 1963, among the weapons captured from the Viet Cong, weapons that they had not seen before began to come across: Chinese 75-mm recoilless rifles, Chinese heavy machine guns, American 12.7 -mm heavy machine guns on Chinese-made machine guns. In addition, it is clear that the Viet Cong are using Chinese 90-mm rocket-propelled grenades and mortars. " According to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 1961-1965, 130 recoilless rifles and mortars, 1.4 thousand machine guns, 54.5 thousand small arms and ammunition for them (the main trophy, German production). At the same time, significant economic assistance was also provided to North Vietnam. In turn, during the period from 1955 to 1965, China provided the DRV with economic assistance in the amount of 511.8 million rubles, including 302.5 million rubles free of charge. In general, the amount of assistance to the PRC, according to Pentagon intelligence, was approximately 60% of the assistance to the USSR.

Thanks to the support of North Vietnam, the guerrillas acted more and more successfully. This forced the US to step up military aid to the Diem government. In the spring of 1961, the United States sent to South Vietnam about 500 specialists in counterguerrilla operations, officers and sergeants of the "special forces" ("green berets"), as well as two helicopter companies (33 H-21 helicopters). Soon, a special Advisory Group for the provision of military assistance to South Vietnam was set up in Washington, headed by General P. Harkins. By the end of 1961, there were already 3,200 American troops in the country. Soon, the "group of advisers" was transformed into the Command for the provision of military assistance to South Vietnam with a deployment in Saigon. It took upon itself the solution of many operational issues that had not previously been within the competence of the American advisers and the Advisory Group. At the end of 1962, the number of American military personnel was already 11,326 people. During this year, they, together with the South Vietnamese army, conducted about 20,000 military operations. Moreover, many of them, thanks to the use of helicopter support during attacks, turned out to be quite successful. In December 1961, the first regular units of the US Armed Forces were transferred to the country - two helicopter companies, designed to increase the mobility of the government army. There was a constant build-up of the Soviet corps in the country. American advisers trained South Vietnamese soldiers and participated in the planning of military operations. During this period, the events in South Vietnam did not yet attract much attention of the American public, but the John F. Kennedy administration was determined to repel "communist aggression" in Southeast Asia and demonstrate to Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev the US readiness to support its allies in the face of "national liberation movements ". "National liberation movements" - the terminology used by the USSR, denoting the process of exporting a revolution and Moscow's active interference in domestic political processes in other countries, including the organization of civil wars, partisan and terrorist actions, military coups and revolutions. On January 6, 1961, the Soviet leader N.S. Khrushchev publicly declared that "wars for national liberation" are just wars and therefore world communism will support them.

The growing conflict in Vietnam became one of the "hot" hotbeds of the Cold War. First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Nikita Khrushchev was afraid to enter into direct combat with the United States, which was fraught with the war in Vietnam, where American pilots and Soviet anti-aircraft gunners actually found themselves face to face. Moreover, Khrushchev's self-esteem was still too freshly wounded by the forced withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. He categorically did not want to conflict with the States again. Everything changed overnight. Leonid Brezhnev, who replaced Khrushchev in October 1964, decided to intervene. The flaring ideological conflict with China, strained relations with the radical Castrovian Cuba and the growing tension in the negotiations with the DRV threatened a serious split in the communist part of the world. Having strengthened his influence, Suslov, who became the main ideologist of the Soviet regime, demanded activity in Indochina, because he was afraid that Beijing would be able to strengthen its authority by acting as the only consistent defender of the Vietnamese people.

The competent tactics that the Vietnamese used at the talks in Moscow also played their role. The cunning Prime Minister of the DRV Pham Van Dong, who controlled the government for almost a quarter of a century, knowing that Brezhnev had been in charge of the military-industrial complex since the late fifties, made Leonid Ilyich an offer that he could not refuse: in exchange for helping Vietnam, the USSR could receive trophy samples of the latest American military equipment. The move was extremely effective - in May 1965, military advisers and anti-aircraft missile units fully manned by Soviet personnel went to Vietnam, which on August 5 opened the account of downed American aircraft. The wreckage was to be collected and studied by a special group of trophy workers, formed from employees of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense.

In January 1963, in the battle of Apbak, the partisans managed to defeat the government army for the first time. The situation of the Diem regime became even more precarious after the outbreak of the Buddhist crisis in May. Buddhists make up the bulk of the population of Vietnam, but Diem and almost all of his entourage were Catholic Christians. Buddhist unrest swept through a number of cities in the country, several monks committed self-immolation, which received a great response in Europe and the United States. In addition, it was already clear that Diem was incapable of organizing an effective fight against the NLF guerrillas. American representatives through secret channels contacted the South Vietnamese generals preparing the coup. On November 1, 1963, Ngo Dinh Diem was deprived of power and the next day he was killed along with his brother.

The military junta that replaced Diem proved politically unstable. Over the next year and a half, another coup took place in Saigon every few months. The South Vietnamese army was involved in a political struggle, which allowed the NLF guerrillas to expand the territories under their control.

The number of US troops in South Vietnam before the official deployment of troops:

1959 - 760
1960 - 900
1961 - 3205
1962 - 11300
1963 - 16300
1964 - 23300

Number of North Vietnamese troops transferred to South Vietnam during the first phase of the war:

1959 - 569
1960 - 876
1961 - 3400
1962 - 4601
1963 - 6997
1964 - 7970
In total, by the end of 1964, more than 24000 North Vietnamese military. Gradually, North Vietnam began to send there not just manpower, but entire military formations. In early 1965, the first three regular regiments of the Vietnam People's Army arrived in South Vietnam.

In March 1965, two battalions of the Marine Corps were sent to protect the strategically important Da Nang airfield in South Vietnam. Since then, the United States has become a participant in the civil war in Vietnam.

The Soviet leadership formally at the beginning of 1965, and in fact at the end of 1964, decided to provide the Democratic Republic of Vietnam with large-scale "military-technical assistance" and, in fact, direct participation in the war. According to A. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, aid to Vietnam during the war cost the Soviet Union 1.5 million rubles a day. Until the end of the war, the USSR supplied North Vietnam with 95 S-75 Dvina air defense systems and more than 7.5 thousand missiles for them. 2,000 tanks, 700 light and maneuverable MIG aircraft, 7,000 mortars and guns, more than a hundred helicopters, and much more were delivered to North Vietnam from the USSR free of charge. Almost the entire air defense system of the country was built at the expense of the USSR, by the forces of Soviet specialists. Despite the fact that the US authorities were well aware of the provision of military assistance by the USSR to North Vietnam, all Soviet specialists, including the military, were required to wear only civilian clothes, their documents were kept at the embassy, ​​and they learned about the final destination of their business trip at the last moment. Secrecy requirements were maintained until the withdrawal of the Soviet contingent from the country, and the exact numbers and names of the participants are not known to this day.

Over 10,000 Vietnamese were sent to the Soviet Union to receive military training and to learn how to use modern Soviet technology.

Soviet crews of anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) took a direct part in the hostilities. The first battle between anti-aircraft gunners of the USSR and American aircraft took place on July 24, 1965. There are claims that the Soviet Union was involved in the Vietnam War much deeper than is commonly believed. In particular, Mark Sternberg, an American journalist and former Soviet officer of the Turkestan military district, wrote about four USSR fighter air divisions that took part in battles with American aircraft. The Americans had every reason not to trust the assurances of the USSR about the exclusively advisory mission of military specialists. The fact is that the majority of the population of North Vietnam was illiterate. The vast majority were starving, people were exhausted, so ordinary fighters did not even have a minimum margin of endurance and strength. Young men could only endure ten minutes of combat with the enemy. There was no need to talk about mastery in the field of piloting on modern machines.

Communist China provided significant military and economic assistance to North Vietnam. On the territory of the DRV, Chinese ground forces were stationed, which included several units and formations of anti-aircraft (cannon) artillery. From the very beginning of the war, the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) had the task of involving its two largest allies, the USSR and China, in the war. As in the Korean War of 1950-1953. China was the only force capable of providing direct assistance to people in case of need. And the Chinese leadership, without hesitation, promised to help with manpower if American troops landed on the territory of the DRV. This verbal agreement was largely implemented by Beijing. As Ardalion Malgin, Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, informed the Central Committee of the CPSU in October 1968, two Chinese divisions and several other units provided cover for the northern regions of the DRV. Without Chinese food aid, the half-starved North Vietnam would have faced the prospect of mass starvation, since China supplied half of the food that came to the DRV through "fraternal aid."

The selection and study of captured samples of American military equipment, as well as acquaintance with the tactics of combat operations of the US armed forces in Vietnam, was carried out by a group of Soviet military scientific specialists in accordance with an agreement between the Minister of Defense of the USSR and the Minister of National Defense of the DRV. From May 1965 to January 1, 1967 alone, Soviet specialists selected and sent to the Soviet Union over 700 different samples of US military equipment and weapons (according to official Vietnamese data 417), including parts of aircraft, missiles, electronic, photographic reconnaissance and other weapons . In addition, Soviet specialists prepared dozens of information documents based on the results of studying both directly samples of equipment and weapons, and American technical documentation.

During the Vietnam War, the Soviet military-industrial complex received almost all the latest American technology. According to one of the leaders of those years, in the late 60s and early 70s, almost all the State and Lenin Prizes on "closed" topics were awarded for reproducing American models. This process had its downsides. Firstly, they copied American samples in the way that the technological level of Soviet industry allowed. Simplified options and worked in a simplified way. Secondly, sample documentation was usually non-existent, and an incredible amount of work was spent on figuring out why this or that block did not work or did not work as it should. As a result, a whole generation of specialists grew up in the USSR, whose intellectual potential was wasted on studying the behavior of American "black boxes". Having taken leadership positions, they could only demonstrate creative failure. The Soviet military-industrial complex as a whole received experience that was important for itself and detrimental to the country. Its leaders, unlike their American colleagues, did not receive super profits, but the conditions for the supply of "special equipment" to Vietnam created the most fertile ground for large-scale frauds. Since the weapons were handed over to friends free of charge, no transfer and acceptance certificates were drawn up. The Vietnamese might want to set up accounting, but this would complicate relations with Beijing. Until 1969, while a significant part of the supplies went by rail through China, quite a few echelons with weapons disappeared without a trace. Aleksey Vasiliev, who worked as a correspondent for Pravda in Hanoi, said that after several cases of loss, an experiment was carried out. The Vietnamese were informed about the departure of a non-existent train from the USSR. And after the allotted time, they confirmed its receipt.

The losses of the parties in the Vietnam War unleashed by the Communists and Moscow:

According to the official data of the Vietnamese government, released in 1995, during the entire war, 1.1 million soldiers of the North Vietnamese army and NLF (Viet Cong) guerrillas, as well as 2 million civilians in both parts of the country, were killed.

The losses of the military personnel of South Vietnam are approximately 250 thousand dead and 1 million wounded.

US losses - 58 thousand dead (combat losses - 47 thousand, non-combat - 11 thousand; out of the total number, as of 2008, more than 1,700 people are considered missing); wounded - 303 thousand (hospitalized - 153 thousand, minor injuries - 150 thousand).

In the myth about the “Slavic roots of Russians”, Russian scientists put a bold point: there is nothing from the Slavs in Russians. The western border, up to which true Russian genes are still preserved, coincides with the eastern border of Europe in the Middle Ages between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Russia with Muscovy. This boundary coincides with both the isotherm of the average winter temperature of -6 degrees Celsius and the western boundary of the 4th USDA hardiness zone.

There were thousands of them - but officially there were none at all. The participation of the Soviet military in the Vietnam War was not advertised. "Voice of Russia" managed to interview one of those who defended the skies of Vietnam from US Air Force raids.

January 30 is another anniversary of the establishment of Soviet-Vietnamese diplomatic relations. One of the brightest pages in the relations between the two countries is military assistance to Vietnam during the war against American aggression. Voice of Russia was told about those days by a person who was directly involved in the events of the Vietnam War. Nikolai Kolesnik, chairman of the interregional public organization of Russian veterans of the Vietnam War, since 1965, participated in the battles waged against US aircraft by Soviet missilemen.

Kolesnik: Soviet military assistance was huge and comprehensive. In value terms, this amounted to about two million dollars daily during all the years of the war. A huge amount of equipment was delivered to Vietnam. It is enough to give just a few figures: 2,000 tanks, 7,000 guns and mortars, over 5,000 anti-aircraft guns and installations, 158 anti-aircraft missile systems, over 700 combat aircraft, 120 helicopters, over 100 warships. And all these deliveries were free of charge. The Vietnamese had to be taught to fight on all this equipment. For this, Soviet military specialists were sent to Vietnam. From July 1965 to the end of 1974, about 6.5 thousand officers and generals, as well as more than 4.5 thousand soldiers and sergeants of the Soviet Armed Forces, took part in the hostilities in Vietnam. In addition, the training of Vietnamese military personnel was started in military schools and academies of the USSR - more than 10 thousand people.

They say that the equipment sent from the USSR to Vietnam was outdated.

Kolesnik: At that time it was the most modern. For example, the MiG-21 jet fighters - it was on them that the Vietnamese pilots shot down both the F-105 and the B-52 "flying fortresses". During all the years of the war, fighter aircraft of the Vietnamese People's Army destroyed 350 enemy aircraft. Vietnamese aviation lost much less - 145 aircraft. The history of the VNA included the names of air aces, on whose account there were 7, 8 and 9 downed American aircraft. At the same time, de Beliva, the most successful US pilot, had only six air victories in Vietnam. The Soviet Dvina missile systems supplied during this war were capable of hitting air targets even at a 25-kilometer altitude. “These are the most deadly projectiles that have ever been fired from the ground on aircraft,” the American Military Technical Journal stated in those years.

The anti-aircraft missile forces of the DRV, created and trained by Soviet specialists, shot down about 1,300 American aircraft, including 54 B-52 strategic bombers. Each of them carried 25 tons of bombs, and each could destroy all living things and all buildings on an area equal to thirty football fields. The Americans regularly bombed both the "Ho Chi Minh trail" and the cities of North Vietnam, flying at an altitude inaccessible to anti-aircraft guns. After our first victories, they sharply lowered their altitude so as to be inaccessible to missiles, but fell under fire from anti-aircraft artillery. After the appearance of Soviet missiles, American military pilots began to refuse to fly to bomb the territory of North Vietnam. Their command had to take urgent measures, including increasing payments for each sortie, constantly replacing the flight crew of aircraft carriers. At first, Soviet officers conducted missile battles, the Vietnamese adopted their experience. For the first time, Soviet missiles showed themselves in the sky of Vietnam on July 24, 1965. 4 American "Phantoms" then went to Hanoi, at a height where they could not get the Vietnamese anti-aircraft guns. Soviet missiles were fired at them. 3 out of 4 aircraft were shot down. Since then, the date of this victory has been celebrated annually in Vietnam as the Day of the Missile Forces.

Do you remember when your first fight took place? Who is who then?

Kolesnik: August 11, 1965. During the day we occupied places on combat alert 18 times. And all - to no avail. And, finally, late at night, 4 enemy planes were shot down with three missiles. In total, the divisions of the First and Third Vietnamese anti-aircraft missile regiments shot down 15 enemy aircraft in the battles in which I participated.

The Americans must have hunted for your combat crews?

Wheeler: Yes. Places of deployment had to be changed after each battle. It was impossible otherwise - the Americans immediately launched rocket and bomb strikes on the identified positions of rocket launchers. The Americans did their best to prevent the use of our technology: they used interference, Shrike missiles. Our military designers also reacted and improved our anti-aircraft missile technology.

Have you personally seen captured American pilots?

Kolesnik: I have never seen it in person. Yes, our presence in Vietnam was not advertised. Suffice it to say that we spent the entire business trip in civilian clothes, without any personal and even without any documents. They were kept in our embassy.

And how did they announce to you that you were flying to Vietnam and what did you say at home?

Kolesnik: I served in an air defense regiment near Moscow. The regimental commander announced that we were invited to go on a business trip to a country with a "hot tropical climate." Almost everyone agreed, and those who for some reason did not want to go, as a result, did not go. I said the same at home.

What struck you the most as a young guy in the first place?

Kolesnik: Everything amazed me: the unusual nature, the people, the climate, and the first bombardment that I had to visit. After all, in Moscow we were guided by the fact that we would simply train and prepare Vietnamese calculations. And I had to train directly on combat positions, with daily incessant raids by American aircraft. The Vietnamese are very stubborn people, they learned very quickly. And I also mastered the basic commands and terms in Vietnamese.

What was the hardest thing?

Nikolai Kolesnik: Unbearable heat and high humidity. For example, after a 40-minute refueling of rockets with an oxidizer in a special rubberized suit, they lost almost a kilogram of weight.

What is the attitude of the current Vietnamese youth towards that war and your participation in it?

Nikolai Kolesnik: With great respect, the Vietnam veterans of that war. We remember our difficult military days and our common victories. And the younger, more pragmatic generation asked us with interest about those battles and details of that war unknown to them.

Now many in our country have a very ambiguous attitude towards the participation of the Soviet Union in conflicts outside its borders. What was participation in the Vietnam War for you?

N. Kolesnik: For me, those fights are still the brightest events in my life. I and my comrades-in-arms - both Soviet and Vietnamese - participated in historical events, forged victory, in the truest sense of the word. I am proud that I helped the Vietnamese people in the struggle for their independence and took part in the creation of Vietnam's anti-aircraft missile forces.