Scientific revolution is a type of innovation in science, which differs from other types, not only in its characteristics and mechanisms of genesis, but in its significance and consequences for the development of science and culture. There are 2 main features of scientific revisions: 1. N. revisions are associated with the restructuring of the main scientific traditions. 2. N. revisions affect the worldview and methodological foundations of science, changing the style of thinking. Kuhn says that when a scientific revolution takes place, the view of the world changes. N. revolutions go beyond the region where they occurred and have an impact on changing the view of the world as a whole. N. revolutions differ in scale: 1. Global districts that form a completely new view of the world (Ptolemy-Copernicus; Newton-Einstein) 2. Revolutions in individual fundamental sciences that transform their foundations, but do not containing a global revolution of the world (discovery of the electromagnetic field) 3. Microrevolutions - the essence of which is the creation of new theories in scientific. region (psychology, behaviorism, modern humanist psychology). There are 3 types of roars, thanks to which what changes and what opens: 1 kind. construction of new fundamental theories (Copernicus, Newton, Einstein, Freud, etc.) features of this type are a) central to this group of theoretical concepts that determine the face of science in a given period. B) this revision concerns not only scientific ideas, but also changes thinking, touches on mental and methodological problems (Darwin's theory turned out to be applicable in biology, sociology, anthropology and even linguistics) 2 kind. The introduction of new methods of research, new methods lead to far-reaching consequences, changing problems, standards of scientific work, opening up new fields of knowledge (the appearance of a microscope, telescope, etc.) 3 kind. Discovery of new worlds (new subject areas) - the world of microorganisms and viruses; atoms and molecules; crystals; radioactivity; unconscious). Understanding what is happening re-tion does not happen immediately (for example, the teachings of Freud). The problem of commensurability of theories. N.rev-tions give rise to the question of the commensurability of old and new knowledge. In the cumulative theory, everything was clear, knowledge accumulates and does not disappear anywhere, they were considered valuable. Kuhn refuted the idea of ​​comparability of theories, the idea of ​​incommensurability of theories, saying that supporters of different paradigms see the world differently, therefore theories are incommensurable, and interpretations of facts cannot be brought to some common basis. Feyerabent also develops the idea of ​​incommensurability, saying that the same concepts have different meanings in different theories. In the modern world, the idea of ​​incommensurability is criticized, because there are cross-cutting problems in science, despite the change of paradigms. A new theory always grows out of old problems, out of its achievements and its failures. Succession of scientific theories are preserved in science at the level of the mathematical apparatus, at the level of concepts and facts. The history of science shows that often the old theory is related to the new one as a special case, but according to the principle of complementarity. does not have a universal solution, the relationship between the new and the old develops its own character. Speaking of succession, we can talk about traditions. Tradition - generally accepted models of production, organization of knowledge, traditions contribute to the rapid development of science. The succession of the traditions of noun. in 2 types: 1. in the form of texts 2. in the form of systemic scientific values ​​about the production of knowledge, its transfer (how to do science, how). Poloni said that the explicit and implicit knowledge, Traditions can exist in explicit knowledge and in implicit, that the transfer occurs during the live interaction of scientists. Scientific leaders are of tremendous value, being carriers of scientific knowledge and being carriers of techniques.

As we have seen, Euclid sets out operations on geometric quantities quite separately from operations on numbers, emphasizing that quantities and numbers are not the same thing. But could one still try to reduce geometry to arithmetic? This could be achieved if any segment were represented as a certain number of minimal, atomic elements, of which all segments would consist, as numbers - from one. A number of Greek, and even later, thinkers tried to somehow realize this "geometric atomism".

Perhaps the first of these were the Pythagoreans, who taught that at the basis of any thing there is a certain number. They thought of this number not just even as a set of units, but as a kind of structure, which was depicted as a figure made up of points (curly numbers). In particular, the Pythagoreans already called composite numbers - represented as a product of two factors m × n - "flat numbers" and depicted them as rectangles with sides m and n. Composite numbers, represented as a product of three factors, were called "solid numbers" and were depicted as parallelepipeds. Prime numbers that cannot be represented as products were called "linear numbers".

The Pythagoreans discovered many properties of numbers related to their divisibility and, in particular, built a theory of even and odd numbers - the theory of divisibility by 2. The main result of this theory was that the product of two numbers is even if and only if at least one of the factors is even. It follows from this that any number n is either odd itself or can be uniquely represented as a product of some odd number n 1 and some power of two: n = 2 k n 1 .

It was on the basis of this result that the Pythagoreans became convinced that “geometric atomism” was untenable: it turns out that there are incommensurable segments, that is, such segments that cannot be considered multiples of the same segment (there is no segment that fits an integer number of times as in one and the other of these segments). This fact turned out to be a turning point in the development of mathematics and became widely known not only among mathematicians, since, in general, it contradicted the usual idea. Thus, in the works of the philosophers Plato and Aristotle, issues related to incommensurability are often discussed. “For everyone who has not yet considered the cause, it is surprising if something cannot be measured by the smallest measure,” wrote Aristotle.

Specifically, the Pythagoreans found that the side of a square and its diagonal are incommensurable. The proof was as follows. Consider the square ABCD. Suppose there is a segment that fits m times on the diagonal AC and n times on the side AB . Then AC : AB = m : n . We assume that at least one of the numbers m and n is odd. If this is not the case and both are even, then let m = 2 l m 1 , and n = 2 k n 1 , where m 1 and n 1 are odd; divide m and n by the minimum of the numbers 2 l and 2 k , we get two numbers m ′ and n ′ such that AC : AB = m ′: n ′ and at least one of them is odd. In what follows, instead of m ′ and n ′ we will write m and n and assume that one of these numbers is odd. If we construct a square with side AC (say, ACEF), then the area of ​​this square will be related to the area of ​​square ABCD as m 2 to n 2:

By the Pythagorean theorem, the area of ​​a square with side AC is twice that of a square ABCD. Thus, m 2 \u003d 2n 2. So m is an even number. Let it be equal to 2N . Then m 2 = 4N 2 . Since 4N 2 = 2n 2, n 2 = 2N 2. So n is also even. This contradicts the assumption that one of the numbers m and n is odd.

We usually formulate the result about the incommensurability of the diagonal of a square and its side as follows: the number is irrational, that is, it is not expressed as a fraction m / n, where m and n are integers. The word "irrational" comes from the Latin. irrationalis - literally translated from Greek. the term “alogos” (“inexpressible [in words]”, “disproportionate”, “incomprehensible”, from the very ambiguous “logos”, which meant, in particular, “word”, “proportion”, “mind”, as well as “teaching” and etc., compare such terms as "geology" - the study of the Earth, "biology" - the study of life, etc.). The ancient Greeks did not speak about the " number", But about the ratio of the diagonal of the square to its side. If we take some unit of measurement, say, "cubit" (the Greeks had such a unit), and construct a square with side 1 (cubit), then the area of ​​the square built on the diagonal will be equal to 2. The proved result can then be formulated as follows : the side of a square whose area is 2 is incommensurable with a unit segment. At the same time, of course, the question arose, in which case the side of a square, the area of ​​which is expressed by a certain number, is commensurate with a unit segment, and in which case is it incommensurable? Pythagorean Theodore in the 5th century. BC e., having considered numbers from 3 to 17, he showed that the side of a square with an area equal to any number is commensurate with a unit segment only if this number is a complete square, and Theodore’s student Theaetetus extended this result to all numbers in general (proof , by and large, is the same as in case 2). So, if the root of any natural number is not itself a natural number, then it is irrational. Later, Theaetetus built a proof of incommensurability with a unit segment of the side of a cube of volume N (i.e., irrationality), unless N is a cube of any natural number, and also built a theory of irrationality of various types -

It is found in Euclid's Elements.

The discovery of incommensurable segments showed that geometric objects - lines, surfaces, bodies - cannot be identified with numbers and that therefore it is necessary to build their theory separately from the theory of numbers. Which, in general, Greek mathematicians began to do.

The most important characteristic of knowledge is its dynamics, i.e. its growth, change, development, etc. This idea, not so new, was already expressed in ancient philosophy, and Hegel formulated it in the position that "truth is a process" and not "a finished result." This problem was actively studied by the founders and representatives of dialectical-materialist philosophy, especially from the methodological positions of the materialist understanding of history and materialist dialectics, taking into account the socio-cultural conditioning of this process.

However, in Western philosophy and methodology of science of the XX century. in fact - especially during the years of the "triumphant march" of logical positivism (and it, indeed, had considerable success) - scientific knowledge was studied without taking into account its growth, change.

The fact is that logical positivism as a whole was characterized by a) absolutization of formal logical and linguistic problems; b) hypertrophy of artificially constructed formalized languages ​​(to the detriment of natural ones); c) concentration of research efforts on the structure of "ready" knowledge that has become knowledge without regard to its genesis and evolution; d) reduction of philosophy to particular scientific knowledge, and the latter to a formal analysis of the language of science; e) ignoring the socio-cultural context of knowledge analysis, etc.

The development of knowledge is a complex dialectical process that has certain qualitatively different stages. Thus, this process can be viewed as a movement from myth to logos, from logos to "pre-science", from "pre-science" to science, from classical science to non-classical and further to post-non-classical, etc., from ignorance to knowledge, from shallow incomplete to deeper and more perfect knowledge, etc.

In modern Western philosophy, the problem of the growth and development of knowledge is central to the philosophy of science, which is presented especially brightly in such currents as evolutionary (genetic) epistemology and postpositivism. Evolutionary epistemology is a direction in Western philosophical and epistemological thought, the main task of which is to identify the genesis and stages of the development of knowledge, its forms and mechanisms in an evolutionary key and, in particular, to build on this basis the theory of the evolution of science. Evolutionary epistemology seeks to create a generalized theory of the development of science, based on the principle of historicism.

One of the well-known and productive variants of the considered form of epistemology is the genetic epistemology of the Swiss psychologist and philosopher J. Piaget. It is based on the principle of increasing the invariance of knowledge under the influence of changes in the conditions of experience. Piaget, in particular, believed that epistemology is a theory of reliable knowledge, which is always a process, not a state. Piaget singled out four main stages in cognitive (intellectual) development, which is characterized by a strict sequence of formation: sensorimotor, intuitive (pre-operational), concrete-operational and formal-operational. One of the first rules of genetic epistemology is, according to Piaget, the "rule of cooperation". Studying how our knowledge grows (grows, increases), in each specific case it unites philosophers, psychologists, logicians, representatives of mathematics, cybernetics, synergetics and others, including social sciences and the humanities.

Especially actively the problem of growth (development, change) of knowledge was developed, starting from the 60s. XX century supporters of postpositivism - K. Popper, T. Kuhn, I. Lakatos, P. Feyerabend, St. Tulmin et al. Turning to history, the development of science, and not just to a formal analysis of its "frozen" structure, representatives of postpositivism began to build various models of this development, considering them as special cases of general evolutionary changes taking place in the world. They believed that there is a close analogy between the growth of knowledge and biological growth, i.e. evolution of plants and animals.

In postpositivism, there is a significant change in the problems of philosophical research: if logical positivism focused on the analysis of the structure of scientific knowledge, then postpositivism makes its main problem understanding the growth and development of knowledge. In this regard, representatives of postpositivism were forced to turn to the study of the history of the emergence, development and change of scientific ideas and theories.

The first such concept was the concept of knowledge growth by K. Popper.

Popper considers knowledge (in any of its forms) not only as a ready-made system that has become, but also as a changing, developing system. He presented this aspect of the analysis of science in the form of the concept of the growth of scientific knowledge. In his concept, Popper formulates three basic requirements for the growth of knowledge. First, the new theory must start from a simple, new, fruitful, and unifying idea. Second, it must be independently verifiable, i.e. lead to the presentation of phenomena that have not yet been observed. In other words, the new theory should be more fruitful as a research tool. Third, a good theory must withstand some new and rigorous tests.

In the 1950s, it became clear that the "revolution in philosophy" proclaimed by neo-positivism did not justify the hopes that had been placed in it. The classical problems that neopositivism promised to overcome and remove were reproduced in a new form in the course of its own evolution. The very concept of neo-positivism is increasingly being supplanted by the concept of "analytic philosophy". In the 60-70s in the West. philosophy of science develops a course of postpositivism. Post-positivists (Popper, Moon, Lakatos, Feirabenb, Polanyi) criticized the positivist ideal of fact, introducing a historical, sociological and cultural dimension into the analysis of science. The main thesis of postpositivism is that science is a historical phenomenon, science is developing. Not only its theories and knowledge are changing, but the criteria and principles and even the mechanisms of its functioning. Post-positivism is a general name used in the philosophy of science to refer to a variety of methodological concepts that have replaced those that were inherent in the methodology of logical positivism. His offensive was marked by the release in 1959 of the English. version of Popper's main methodological work - "The Logic of Scientific Discovery", as well as in 1963 Kuhn's book - "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions". A characteristic feature of the post-positivist stage is a significant variety of methodological concepts and their mutual criticism. These are Popper's falsificationism and Kuhn's concept of scientific revolutions, and the methodology of Lakatos' research programs, and Polanyi's concept of implicit knowledge. The authors and defenders of these concepts create very different images of science and its development. However, there are common features inherent in postpositivism:

1) Postpositivism moves away from the orientation towards symbolic logic and turns to the history of science. Those. we are talking about the correspondence of scientific constructions to real scientific knowledge and its history.

2) In postpositivism, there is a significant change in the problems of methodological research. In logical positivism, there is an analysis of the structure of scientific knowledge, in postpositivism - an understanding of the development of scientific knowledge.

3) Post-positivism is characterized by the rejection of rigid dividing lines, in contrast to positivism. Postpositivism speaks of the interpenetration of the empirical and the theoretical, of a smooth transition.

4) Post-positivism is gradually moving away from the ideology of demarcationism professed by logical positivism. The latter believed that it was possible and necessary to establish a clear demarcation line between science and non-science.

5) A common feature of post-positivist concepts is their desire to rely on the history of science.

6) Post-positivism recognized that significant, revolutionary transformations are inevitable in the history of science, when a significant part of previously recognized and substantiated knowledge is revised - not only theories, but also facts, methods, fundamental worldview ideas.

Among the most important problems considered by postpositivism, one can note: a) the problem of falsification (Popper) - a fact that contradicts a scientific theory, falsifies it and forces scientists to abandon it, but the process of falsification is not so simple; b) the problem of the plausibility of scientific theories (Popper); c) the problem of commensurability of scientific theories (Kuhn and Feyrabend) - the incommensurability of competing scientific theories; d) the problem of rationality - a narrow understanding of rationality was replaced by a more vague one; e) the problem of understanding; f) the problem of the sociology of knowledge.
Kuhn and Feyerabend put forward the thesis about the incommensurability of competing scientific theories, about the absence of common standards for comparison. This thesis caused a lot of controversy.

T. Kuhn, raising the question of supplementing the consensus model, believed that competing theories are radically incommensurable, hence the impossibility for those who represent them to communicate with each other. T. Kuhn, coming close to the problem of disagreement, essentially gave a description of the inter-paradigm disagreements that fill the ocean of the history of science. As an example, T. Kuhn takes the one set forth in his famous work "The Copernican Revolution". L. Laudan, analyzing T. Kuhn's view of the problem of scientific disagreements, sees the main postulates of Kuhn's point of view as follows: the period of the scientific revolution includes competing paradigms, but the latter are "chronically incomplete" (T. Kuhn's term), and this incompleteness is the result incommensurability of paradigms, although opponents sometimes use the same terminology. Any of the competing paradigms cannot be translated into another. The model proposed by T. Kuhn has two central ideas: the idea of ​​disagreement (incommensurability) and the idea of ​​maintaining agreement (normal science), although T. Kuhn tries to explain the transition from "normal" science to "crisis", the transition from agreement to disagreement. In his work “Perfect Tension”, T. Kuhn showed that this impossibility of translation is explained and conditioned by the fact that opponents in the debate honor different methodological standards, different cognitive values. On this basis, it is concluded that the knowledge used as an attribute of the theory for the enemy acts as an obstacle to the justification of his point of view, the content of theories, standards of comparison act as a prerequisite for dissensus. Moreover, T. Kuhn was able to show that the dialogue within different paradigms is incomplete due to adherence to different methodological standards, and therefore dissensus is a state of science that is difficult to translate into a consensus stage, dissensus is a constant characteristic of the life of the scientific community. The model proposed by T. Kuhn, however, is not able to resolve the question: how the stage of dissensus passes into the opposite stage, the stage of agreement, how scientists accept a single paradigm.

Underdetermination of the theory by empirical data. Scientific rules and evaluation criteria do not make it possible to unambiguously prefer one of the theories. In substantiation of this point of view, various arguments theses are put forward. Among the latter is the thesis of Duhem-Quine, the essence of which is that a theory cannot be accepted or rejected, focusing only on empirical evidence; the Wittgenstein-Goodman thesis, the meaning of which is that the rules of scientific inference (both inductive and deductive) are vague, they can be followed in different ways, often radically incompatible. The criteria for choosing a theory used by scientists are also vague, which prevents their use when choosing a theory, and, therefore, science is not a sphere that is governed by rules, norms, and standards.

A special place in the philosophy of science of the XX century. takes the concept of the American philosopher and historian of science Thomas Samuel Kuhn (1929-1996). In his famous book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn expressed a rather original idea of ​​the nature of science, the general patterns of its functioning and progress, noting that "his goal is to outline, at least schematically, a completely different concept of science, which emerges from the historical approach to the study of scientific activity itself.

In contrast to the positivist tradition, Kuhn comes to the conclusion that the path to creating a genuine theory of science lies through the study of the history of science, and its development itself does not proceed through the gradual accumulation of new knowledge on old ones, but through a radical transformation and change of leading ideas, i.e. through periodic scientific revolutions.

New in Kuhn's interpretation of the scientific revolution is the concept of a paradigm, which he defines as "generally recognized scientific achievements that, over time, provide the scientific community with a model for posing problems and solving them." In other words, a paradigm is a set of the most general ideas and methodological guidelines in science, recognized by the entire scientific community and guiding scientific research in a certain period of time. Examples of such theories are Aristotle's physics, Newton's mechanics and optics, Maxwell's electrodynamics, Einstein's theory of relativity, and a number of other theories.

Paradigm, according to Kuhn, or, as he proposed to call it in the future, the "disciplinary matrix" has a certain structure.

Firstly, the structure of the paradigm includes "symbolic generalizations" - those expressions that are used by members of the scientific group without doubts and disagreements and which can be put into a logical form, easily formalized or expressed in words, for example: "elements are combined in constant mass proportions" or "action equals reaction". These generalizations outwardly resemble the laws of nature (for example, the Joule-Lenz law or Ohm's law).

Secondly, in the structure of the disciplinary matrix, Kuhn includes "metaphysical parts of paradigms" - universally recognized prescriptions such as "heat is the kinetic energy of the parts that make up the body." They, in his opinion, "provide the scientific group with preferred and acceptable analogies and metaphors and help determine what should be accepted as a solution to the puzzle and as an explanation. And, conversely, they allow you to refine the list of unsolved puzzles, contributing to the assessment of the significance of each of them. ".

Thirdly, the structure of the paradigm includes values, "and, if possible, these values ​​should be simple, not self-contradictory and plausible, i.e. compatible with other, parallel and independently developed theories ... To a much greater extent than other types of components disciplinary matrix, values ​​can be shared by people who at the same time apply them in different ways.

Fourth, an element of the disciplinary matrix is ​​Kuhn's generally recognized "samples" - a set of generally accepted standards - schemes for solving certain specific problems. So, "all physicists start by studying the same samples: problems - an inclined plane, a conical pendulum, Keplerian orbits; instruments - a vernier, a calorimeter, a Wheatstone bridge." Mastering these classical models, the scientist comprehends the foundations of his science more deeply, learns to apply them in specific situations and masters the special technique of studying those phenomena that form the subject of this scientific discipline and become the basis of their activity in periods of "normal science".

Closely related to the concept of paradigm scientific community concept. In a sense, these concepts are synonymous. "A paradigm is what unites the members of the scientific community, and, conversely, the scientific community consists of people who accept the paradigm." Representatives of the scientific community, as a rule, have a certain scientific specialty, have received similar education and professional skills. Each scientific community has its own subject of study. Most research scientists, according to Kuhn, immediately decide whether they belong to one or another scientific community, all members of which adhere to a certain paradigm. If you don't share a belief in a paradigm, you are left out of the scientific community.

After the publication of Kuhn's book "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions", the concept of the scientific community became firmly established in all areas of science, and science itself began to be thought of not as a system of knowledge, but primarily as an activity of scientific communities. However, Kuhn notes some shortcomings in the activities of scientific communities, because "since the attention of various scientific communities is concentrated on various subjects of research, professional communications between separate scientific groups are sometimes difficult; the result is misunderstanding, and in the future it can lead to significant and unforeseen discrepancies" . Representatives of different scientific communities often speak "different languages" and do not understand each other.

Considering the history of the development of science, Kuhn identifies, first of all, the pre-paradigm period, which, in his opinion, is characteristic of the birth of any science before this science develops its first theory recognized by all, in other words, a paradigm. Pre-paradigm science is being replaced by mature science, which is characterized by the fact that at the moment there is no more than one paradigm in it. In its development, it goes through several successive stages - from "normal science" (when the paradigm accepted by the scientific community dominates) to the period of paradigm collapse, called the scientific revolution.

"Normal science", in Kuhn's view, "means research firmly based on one or more past scientific achievements, which for some time have been recognized by a certain scientific community as the basis for its further practical activity." Scientists whose scientific activity is based on the same paradigms rely on the same rules and standards of scientific practice. This commonality of attitudes, and the apparent coherence they provide, are the prerequisites for the genesis of "normal science."

Unlike popper, who believed that scientists constantly think about how to refute existing and recognized theories, and for this purpose strive to set up refuting experiments, Kuhn is convinced that "... scientists in the mainstream of normal science do not set themselves the goal of creating new theories, usually besides, they are intolerant of the creation of such theories by others. On the contrary, research in normal science is directed to the development of those phenomena and theories, the existence of which the paradigm obviously presupposes."

Thus, "normal science" practically does not focus on major discoveries. It provides only the continuity of the traditions of one direction or another, accumulating information, clarifying known facts. "Normal science" appears in Kuhn as "solving puzzles". There is a sample solution, there are rules of the game, it is known that the problem is solvable, and the scientist has the opportunity to try his personal ingenuity under given conditions. This explains the attraction of normal science to the scientist. As long as puzzle solving is successful, the paradigm is a reliable tool for learning. But it may well turn out that some puzzles, despite the best efforts of scientists, cannot be solved. Trust in the paradigm is declining. There comes a state that Kuhn calls a crisis. Under the growing crisis, he understands the constant inability of "normal science" to solve its puzzles to the extent that it should do it, and even more so the anomalies that arise in science, which gives rise to a pronounced professional uncertainty in the scientific community. Normal exploration freezes. Science essentially ceases to function.

The period of crisis ends only when one of the proposed hypotheses proves its ability to cope with existing problems, explain incomprehensible facts and, thanks to this, attracts the majority of scientists to its side. Kuhn calls this change of paradigms, the transition to a new paradigm, the scientific revolution. "The transition from a paradigm in crisis to a new paradigm, from which a new tradition of 'normal science' may be born, is a process far from cumulative and not one that could be brought about by a clearer development or extension of the old paradigm. This process is more like a reconstruction of the field on new grounds, a reconstruction that changes some of the most elementary theoretical generalizations in the field, as well as many of the methods and applications of the paradigm."

Each scientific revolution changes the existing picture of the world and opens up new patterns that cannot be understood within the framework of previous prescriptions. “Therefore,” notes Kuhn, “during a revolution, when the normal scientific tradition begins to change, the scientist must learn to re-perceive the world around him.” The scientific revolution significantly changes the historical perspective of research and affects the structure of scientific papers and textbooks. It affects the style of thinking and may, in its consequences, go beyond the area where it occurred.

Thus, the scientific revolution as a paradigm shift is not subject to a rational-logical explanation, because the essence of the matter is in the professional well-being of the scientific community: either the community has the means to solve the puzzle, or not, and then the community creates them. The scientific revolution leads to the rejection of everything that was obtained at the previous stage, the work of science begins, as it were, anew, from scratch.

Kuhn's book aroused interest in the problem of explaining the mechanism of changing ideas in science, that is, in essence, in the problem of the movement of scientific knowledge ... it has largely stimulated and continues to stimulate research in this direction.

Literature:

1) Buchilo N.F. Philosophy electronic textbook. M Knorus, 2009

2) Gaidenko P.P. History of Greek philosophy and its connection with science. Librocon 2009

3) Ilyin V.V. Philosophy and history of science MSU 2004

4) Kuhn T. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions AST 2004

5) Philosophy: Encyclopedic Dictionary. M.: Gardariki. Edited by A.A. Ivin. 2004.

N.F. Buchilo A.N. Chumakov, Philosophy Textbook. M., 2001

Buchilo N.F. Philosophy electronic textbook. M Knorus, 2009

Lenin V.I. Materialism and Empiriocriticism, vol. 18, ch. v.

Popper K. Logic and the growth of scientific knowledge. M., 1989.

Kuhn T. Structure of scientific revolutions. AST 2004

Science is in a state of constant development, it is mobile and open. In the course of scientific knowledge, the totality of actual problems changes, new facts are discovered and introduced into consideration, old theories are discarded and more perfect ones are created, sometimes of truly revolutionary significance. The course of knowledge shows us the eternal fermentation of the scientific spirit.

In the very philosophy and methodology of science, a significant increase in precisely dynamic problems is noticeable. If in the first half of the 20th century problems associated with the logical analysis of the scientific language, the structure of the theory, procedures of deductive and inductive inference prevailed, then from the second half of the 20th century a turn from logic to history becomes very noticeable. The dynamics of science, the laws and driving factors of its development, the problems of the relationship and commensurability of old and new theories, the relationship between conservatism and radicalism in science, the issues of rational overcoming of scientific disagreements and rational transition from one theoretical position to another - this is what becomes the object of primary interest of philosophers, leading sometimes heated discussions.

The purpose of the abstract is to consider the most important question: how exactly (revolutionary or revolutionary) is the development of science.

The purpose of this work is to consider various models of the development of science. In the history of science, there are four approaches to the analysis of the dynamics, development of scientific knowledge and the mechanisms of this development: cumulative and anti-cumulative (variants of which are Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions, Lakatos's theory of research programs), as well as uniqueism (case study theories) and Feyerabend's anarchism .

1 Cumulative

Cumulativism (from Latin Cumula - increase, accumulation) believes that the development of knowledge occurs by gradually adding new provisions to the accumulated amount of knowledge. Such an understanding absolutizes the quantitative moment of growth, changes in knowledge, the continuity of this process and excludes the possibility of qualitative changes, the moment of discontinuity in the development of science, scientific revolutions. Proponents of cumulative thinking represent the development of scientific knowledge as a simple gradual multiplication of the number of accumulated facts and an increase in the degree of generality of the laws established on this basis. So, G. Spencer conceived the mechanism for the development of knowledge by analogy with the biological mechanism of inheritance of acquired traits: the truths accumulated by the experience of scientists of previous generations become the property of textbooks, turn into a priori provisions to be memorized.

Consider the most developed example of an evolutionary model of the internal development of science - the concept of Stephen Toulmin. In opposition to neopositivist ideas about scientific thinking as strict adherence to logical norms, Toulmin brings to the fore another type of organization of scientific thinking, based on understanding. Understanding in science, according to Toulmin, is set, on the one hand, by compliance with the “matrices” (standards) of understanding adopted in the scientific community in a given historical period, on the other hand, by problem situations and precedents that serve as the basis for “improving understanding”. Analyzing conceptual points of view, the epistemologist must refer to the situation of understanding (or problem situation) that the scientist faces, and with respect to which he decides which intellectual means need to be introduced and updated in this situation.

Toulmin formulates a view of epistemology as a theory of the historical formation and functioning of "the standards of rationality and understanding that underlie scientific theories." According to Toulmin, the scientist considers understandable those events or phenomena that correspond to the standards adopted by him. That which does not fit into the “matrix of understanding is considered an anomaly, the elimination of which (i.e., the improvement of understanding) acts as a stimulus for the evolution of science.

According to this theory, the main features of the evolution of science are similar to the Darwinian scheme of biological evolution.

The mechanism of evolution of conceptual populations, according to Toulmin, consists in their interaction with a set of intra-scientific (intellectual) and extra-scientific factors. The decisive condition for the survival of certain concepts is the significance of their contribution to improving understanding. The evolution of theories depends on historically changing standards and strategies of rationality, which in turn are subject to feedback from evolving disciplines. In this sense, the internal (rationally reconstructed) and external (depending on non-scientific factors) history of science are complementary sides of the same process of adapting scientific concepts to the requirements of their "environment". Accordingly, the explanation of the "success" of certain intellectual initiatives involves consideration of the "ecology" of a particular cultural and historical situation. In any problem situation, disciplinary selection "recognizes" those competing innovations that are best adapted to the "requirements" of the local "intellectual environment". These "requirements" cover both the problems that each concept is intended to solve and other established concepts with which it must coexist. The relationship between the concepts of "environmental requirement" and "niche", "adaptability" and "success" are the subject of "intellectual ecology".

Sometimes the cumulative model is explained on the basis of the principle of generalization of facts and generalization of theories; then the evolution of scientific knowledge is interpreted as a movement towards ever greater generalizations, and the change of scientific theories is understood as a change from a less general theory to a more general one. Classical mechanics, on the one hand, and the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics, on the other, were usually cited as examples; arithmetic of natural numbers, on the one hand, and arithmetic of rational or real numbers, on the other, of Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries, etc.

2 Anticumulativeism

Anticumulativeism assumes that in the course of the development of knowledge there are no stable (continuous) and conserved components. The transition from one stage of the evolution of science to another is connected only with the revision of fundamental ideas and methods. The history of science is portrayed by representatives of anti-cumulativeism as an ongoing struggle and change of theories, methods, between which there is neither logical nor even meaningful continuity.

Consider, as an example, Thomas Kuhn's model of scientific revolutions.

The basic concept of this concept is a paradigm, i.e., the dominant theory that sets the norm, a model of scientific research in any field of science, a certain vision of the world by scientists. The paradigm is based on faith. Paradigm structure:

1. Symbolic generalizations such as Newton's second law, Ohm's law, Joule-Lenz's law, etc.

2. Conceptual models, examples of which are general statements of this type: "Heat is the kinetic energy of the parts that make up the body" or "All the phenomena we perceive exist due to the interaction in the void of qualitatively homogeneous atoms."

3. Value attitudes adopted in the scientific community and manifest themselves in the choice of research areas, in assessing the results obtained and the state of science in general.

4. Samples of solutions to specific problems and problems that, for example, a student inevitably encounters in the learning process.

The carrier, exponent and developer of the paradigm at any stage of the history of science is the scientific community. "A paradigm is what unites members of the scientific community, and conversely, the scientific community is made up of people who accept a paradigm." Important for Kuhn's concept is also the concept of the scientific community, consisting of practitioners working in a particular scientific field. Members of this community have a similar education and undergo the same process of initiation (introduction into the scientific community), after which they all accept the same specialized literature, extract from it similar knowledge on many points, and the boundaries of this standard literature usually mark the boundaries of a given scientific community. research area.

Kuhn introduces into the philosophy of science not the subject of knowledge of the classical theory of knowledge with the object of cognitive activity correlated with it, but the historically existing scientific community, with a developed view of the world, with a fairly clearly defined range of problems, the solution of which by acceptable methods is considered scientific. Everything that does not belong to generally accepted patterns and standards is considered unscientific. From this point of view, the paradigm is a rather conservative formation, its change is slow and not always painless. The development of science is presented by Kuhn as a process of emergence, evolutionary change and paradigm shift. This process can be described using four stages included in it.

The first stage can be called pre-paradigm, when there are different, perhaps even random, points of view, there are no fundamental concepts, the general problem at this stage is not expressed in any way, therefore there can be no common standards and criteria for evaluating and comparing randomly obtained results. This period, which actually refers to the genesis of science, is practically beyond the scope of consideration of the development model according to Kuhn, since the distinctive feature of developed science is precisely the presence of a paradigm in it.

The second stage in the development of science is of great importance, since it is associated with the creation and formation of a single paradigm. A fundamental concept arises and gradually becomes generally accepted, which raises many as yet unresolved problems. Fundamental ideas and theories can never be presented in their final form from the outset, they require significant refinement and improvement. The fundamental idea determines the main strategic direction of the movement of scientific thought. A scientific community is being created, the education process is being organized, specialized scientific personnel are being trained in various areas of fundamental science, covering theoretical, experimental and applied aspects of scientific activity. The basis of education has always been and remains a textbook, the content of which includes not only the theoretical achievements of the classics of the paradigm, but also the most important experiments and experiments. In the process of education, this material unwittingly contributes to the consolidation and standardization of the most successful patterns of problem solving. Through education, the paradigm contributes to the formation of the discipline of thinking.

The third stage in the development of science is called "normal science" by Kuhn. It corresponds to the evolutionary period in the development of science, when the paradigm has developed and new theories are no longer needed. All the efforts of scientists during this period are aimed at improving the fundamental concept, at the accumulation of facts confirming the main ideas, at solving unsolved problems. Kuhn calls such problems "puzzles", i.e., intellectual problems for which the solution exists but is not yet known. The state of knowledge accepted during this period does not allow any criticism and dissent. A person who disagrees with the fundamental principles of the paradigm or offers views that are completely incompatible with it is simply not included in the scientific community. No criticism is allowed during this period. If scientists encounter facts that cannot be explained in terms of the accepted paradigm, they simply ignore them. Such facts are called anomalies. Over time, the number of anomalies can be quite large. Some of the puzzles, left unsolved, can become anomalies, that is, the paradigm itself can generate anomalies within itself. The desire to improve the fundamental principles and theories in explaining the inconsistencies that arise leads to the complication of theories (note that with any number of inconsistencies between the theory and the facts, it is not discarded, as Popper suggested). Finally, the inability of the paradigm to explain the accumulated anomalies and inconsistencies with the facts leads to a crisis. The scientific community begins to discuss the paradigm.

The crisis and the related search for new fundamental ideas that can solve the accumulated anomalies constitute the fourth stage in the development of science, which ends with a scientific revolution, after which a new fundamental theory is established and a new paradigm is formed. The scientific revolution is a transitional period from the old paradigm to the new one, from the old fundamental theory to the new one, from the old picture of the world to the new one. Revolutions in science are the logical result of the accumulation of anomalies in the course of the functioning of normal science - some of them can lead not only to the need to modify the theory, but also to replace it. In this case, there is a choice between two theories or more.

According to Kuhn's concept, the new fundamental theory and its corresponding paradigm, emerging after the scientific revolution, are so different from the previous ones that they turn out to be incommensurable, in any case, in theoretical terms, there is no continuity. It would seem that the new paradigm is able to solve the puzzles and anomalies of the old theory and, in addition, puts forward and solves new problems, thereby increasing the stock of knowledge. But the whole point is that in the post-revolutionary period of the formation of a new paradigm, it is still so weak and imperfect that the old paradigm, at least in terms of the number of problems being solved, outwardly looks more attractive and authoritative. But still, the new paradigm wins in the end. This is usually explained by social factors. The incommensurability of paradigms leads to the conclusion that science develops discretely from one paradigm to another, within each of which development occurs in an evolutionary way. But if we are talking about progressive development, then we should answer questions related to the continuity, inheritance of scientific knowledge and the emergence of new knowledge. Here is what Kuhn writes about this: “Since the solved problem is the scale unit of scientific achievement, and since the group is well aware of what problems have already been solved, very few scientists will be inclined to easily accept a point of view that again calls into question many previously solved problems. Nature itself should be the first to undermine professional confidence by pointing out the vulnerable sides of previous achievements. Moreover, even when this happens and a new paradigm candidate is born, scientists will resist accepting it until they are convinced that two of the most important conditions are satisfied. First, the new candidate must apparently be solving some controversial and generally recognized problem that cannot be solved in any other way. Second, the new paradigm must promise to retain much of the real problem-solving ability that has been accumulated in science by previous paradigms. Novelty for the sake of novelty is not the goal of science, as is the case in many other creative fields. As a result, although new paradigms rarely or never have all the capabilities of their predecessors, they usually retain a huge amount of the most specific elements of past achievements and, in addition, always allow additional concrete solutions to problems.

3 Uniqueism

Case studies (case studies) - case studies. This direction began to come to the fore in the 70s. In works of this kind, first of all, the need to focus on a single event in the history of science, which occurred in a certain place and at a certain time, is emphasized. A case study is like a crossroads of all possible analyzes of science, focused at one point in order to outline, reconstruct one event from the history of science in its integrity, uniqueness and irreproducibility. The process of individualization of the historical events under study, which began with bringing to the fore as a subject of study the way of thinking of a certain era, which is radically transformed in the course of the global scientific revolution, ends with case studies, which are already a direct antipode of cumulative, linear models of the development of science. In the case study, the task is to understand the past event not as fitting into a single series of development, not as having some features common with other events, but as unique, unreproducible in other conditions. In historical works of the former type, the historian strove to study as many facts as possible in order to discover something in common in them and, on this basis, to deduce general patterns of development. Now the historian studies a fact as an event, an event of many features of the development of science, converging at one point in order to distinguish it from others.

Let us outline some methodologically significant features of the case studies, based on what has been said about these studies above.

First: processuality, these studies are focused not so much on some ready-made fact, the final result of a scientific discovery, but on the event itself, as complete and unique as possible. Such an event may, at first glance, appear very private and insignificant, but it bears some symptoms of turning points in the history of science. On the other hand, such events, whether the researchers themselves are aware of it or not, turn out to be a peculiar, easily visible and precisely defined crossroads of different areas of historical and scientific research, whether it be an analysis of the creative process, social conditions, the relationship between the general social and the scientific community itself, the structure of scientific knowledge, etc. .d. Case studies combine, which is very important, syntheticity, universality and locality, pinpointness, easily observable objectivity of the analyzed event.

Secondly: locality, for case studies it is important that an event of small size is taken as a holistic and unique one: this, as a rule, is not the culture of some long period of time in history, not the culture of a large region, no, localized events are studied, such as a separate text, a scientific debate, conference materials, a scientific discovery in a certain scientific team, etc.

Thirdly: significant, of particular importance for case studies, it becomes possible to characterize them as a kind of funnel into which both previous events and subsequent events are drawn, although the subject of study characterizes the present science, "now", even if it is "now" and refers chronologically to past centuries.

4 Anarchism

Paul Feyerabend was destined to complete the development of the logical-analytic direction in the philosophy of science, which was then only emerging within the walls of the University of Vienna.

Feyerabend called his concept epistemological anarchism. What does she represent? From the point of view of methodology, anarchism is a consequence of two principles:

1. The principle of proliferation (from the Latin proles - offspring, fero - I carry; literally: growth of the tissue of the body by decomposition of cells);

2. The principle of incommensurability.

According to the first one. It is required to invent (multiply) and develop theories and concepts that are not compatible with existing and recognized theories. This means that every scientist - generally speaking, every person - can (and should) invent his own concept and develop it. No matter how absurd and wild it may seem to others.

The principle of incommensurability, which says that theories cannot be compared with each other, protects any concept from external criticism from other concepts. So, if someone invented a completely fantastic concept and does not want to part with it, then nothing can be done about it: there are no facts that can be opposed to it, since it forms its own facts; indications of the incompatibility of this fantasy with the fundamental laws of natural science or with modern scientific theories do not work, since these laws and theories may seem simply meaningless to the author of this fantasy; it is impossible to reproach him even for violating the laws of logic, for he can use his own special logic.

The author of fantasy creates something similar to Kuhn's paradigm: this is a special world and everything that is not included in it has no meaning for the author. Thus, the methodological basis of anarchism is formed: everyone is free to invent his own concept; it cannot be compared with other concepts, for there is no basis for such a comparison; therefore, everything is permissible and everything is justified.

The history of science suggested to Feyerabend another argument in favor of anarchism: there is not a single methodological rule or norm that would not be violated at one time or another by one or another scientist. Moreover, history shows that scientists often acted and were forced to act in direct contradiction to existing methodological rules. From this it follows that instead of the existing and recognized methodological rules, we can adopt directly opposite ones. But neither the first nor the second will be universal. Therefore, the philosophy of science should not at all seek to establish any rules for scientific research.

Feyerabend separates his epistemological (cognitive-theoretic) anarchism from political anarchism, although there is a certain connection between them. The political anarchist has a political program, he seeks to eliminate certain forms of organization of society. As for the epistemological anarchist, he can sometimes defend these norms, because he does not harbor any permanent hostility, nor permanent loyalty to anything - to any social organization and to any form of ideology. He does not have any rigid program, and he is generally against all programs. He chooses his goals under the influence of some kind of reasoning, mood, boredom, out of a desire to impress someone, etc. To achieve his chosen goal, he acts alone, but he can also join a group if it will be to his advantage. In doing so, he uses reason and emotion, irony and active seriousness - in a word, all the means that human ingenuity can come up with. There is no concept - no matter how "absurd" or "immoral" it may seem - that he refuses to consider or use, and there is no method that he considers unacceptable. The only things he opposes openly and unconditionally are universal standards, universal laws, universal ideas such as "Truth," "Reason," "Justice," "Love," eaten by them ... ".

Analyzing the activities of the founders of modern science, Feyerabend comes to the conclusion that science is not at all rational, as most philosophers believe. But then the question arises: if, in the light of modern methodological requirements, science turns out to be essentially irrational and can develop only by constantly violating the laws of logic and reason, then how does it differ from myth, from religion? In essence, nothing, replies Feyerabend.

Indeed, what is the difference between science and myth? The characteristic features of the myth usually include the fact that its main ideas are declared sacred; any attempt to attack them runs into a taboo; facts and events that do not agree with the central ideas of the myth are discarded or brought into line with them by means of auxiliary ideas; no ideas that are alternative to the main ideas of the myth are allowed, and if they do arise, they are ruthlessly eradicated (sometimes together with the carriers of these ideas). Extreme dogmatism, cruelest monism, fanaticism and intolerance of criticism - these are the hallmarks of myth. In science, on the other hand, tolerance and criticism are widespread. There is a pluralism of ideas and explanations, a constant readiness for discussion, attention to facts and a desire to revise and improve accepted theories and principles.

Feyerabend disagrees with this portrayal of science. All scientists know, and Kuhn expressed it with great force and clarity, that dogmatism and intolerance rage in real science, and not invented by philosophers. Fundamental ideas and laws are jealously guarded. Everything that diverges from accepted theories is discarded. The authority of great scientists presses on their followers with the same blind and ruthless force as the authority of the creators and priests of myth on believers. The absolute domination of the paradigm over the soul and body of scientific slaves - that's the truth about science. But what then is the advantage of science over myth, asks Feyerabend, why should we respect science and despise myth?

It is necessary to separate science from the state, as it has already been done with respect to religion, calls Feyerabend. Then scientific ideas and theories will no longer be imposed on every member of society by the powerful propaganda apparatus of the modern state. The main goal of education and training should be the comprehensive preparation of a person so that, having reached maturity, he can consciously and therefore freely make a choice between various forms of ideology and activity. Let some choose science and scientific activity, others join one of the religious sects, others will be guided by myth, etc. Only such freedom of choice, Feyerabend believes, is compatible with humanism, and only it can ensure full disclosure abilities of each person. No restrictions in the field of spiritual activity, no obligatory for all rules, laws, complete freedom of creativity - this is the slogan of epistemological anarchism.

Conclusion

The current state of the analytical philosophy of science can be characterized, using Kuhn's terminology, as a crisis. The paradigm created by logical positivism has been destroyed, many alternative methodological concepts have been put forward, but none of them can solve the problems. There is not a single principle, not a single methodological norm that would not be questioned. In the person of Feyerabend, the analytical philosophy of science has gone so far as to oppose science itself and to justify the most extreme forms of irrationalism. However, if any line between science and religion, between science and myth disappears, then the philosophy of science as a theory of scientific knowledge must also disappear. Over the past few decades, in fact, not a single new original concept has appeared in the philosophy of science, and the sphere of interest of most researchers is gradually shifting to the field of hermeneutics, the sociology of science, and the ethics of science.

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2. Gryaznov B.S. Logics. Rationality, creativity. Moscow: Nauka, 1982

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4. Electronic resource - "Electronic Encyclopedia"