PLAN" BARBAROSSA ". In the evening December 18, 1940. Hitler signed a directive on the deployment of military operations against the USSR, which received the serial number 21 and the code name option " Barbarossa"(Fall" barbarossa"). It was made only in nine copies, three of which were handed over to the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the armed forces (ground forces, air force and navy), and six were closed in OKW safes.

It stated only the general plan and initial instructions for waging war against the USSR and did not represent a complete war plan. The war plan against the USSR is a whole complex of political, economic and strategic measures of the Hitlerite leadership. In addition to directive N21, the plan included directives and orders from the supreme command and the main commands of the branches of the armed forces on strategic concentration and deployment, logistics, preparation of the theater of operations, camouflage, disinformation and other documents.. Among these documents, the directive on the strategic concentration and deployment of ground forces was especially important. dated January 31, 1941. It concretized and specified the tasks and methods of action of the armed forces set out in Directive N21.
plan" Barbarossa"the defeat of the Soviet Union was envisaged in the course of one short-term campaign even before the war against England was over. Leningrad, Moscow, the Central Industrial Region and the Donets Basin were recognized as the main strategic objects. A special place in the plan was given to Moscow. It was assumed that its capture would be decisive for the victorious outcome of the entire war. " The end goal of the operation, - stated in directive N21, - is the creation of a protective barrier against Asiatic Russia along the Volga-Arkhangelsk common line. Thus, if necessary, the last industrial region left by the Russians in the Urals can be paralyzed with the help of aviation". To defeat the Soviet Union, it was planned to use all the ground forces of Germany, excluding only the formations and units necessary for the occupation service in the enslaved countries. The German Air Force was tasked with "release such forces to support the ground forces during the eastern campaign, so that you can count on the rapid completion of ground operations and at the same time limit to a minimum the destruction of the eastern regions of Germany by enemy aircraft. "For combat operations at sea against the three Soviet fleets of the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea, it was planned to allocate a significant part of the warships of the German Navy and the naval forces of Finland and Romania .according to plan" Barbarossa"152 divisions (including 19 tank and 14 motorized) and two brigades were allocated to attack the USSR. Germany's allies fielded 29 infantry divisions and 16 brigades. Thus, if we take two brigades for one division, a total of 190 divisions were allocated. In addition , two-thirds of the air force available in Germany and significant fleet forces were involved in the war against the USSR. The ground forces intended to attack the Soviet Union were reduced to three army groups: " South"- 11th, 17th and 6th field armies and 1st tank group;" Centre"- 4th and 9th field armies, 2nd and 3rd tank groups;" North"- the 16th and 18th and 4th tank groups. The 2nd separate field army remained in the OKH reserve, the army" Norway"received the task of acting independently in the Murmansk and Kandalash directions.
Plan" Barbarossa"contained a somewhat refined assessment of the Armed Forces of the USSR. According to German data, by the beginning of the German invasion (June 20, 1941), the Soviet Armed Forces had 170 rifle, 33.5 cavalry divisions and 46 mechanized and tank brigades. Of these, as stated by the Nazi command, 118 rifle, 20 cavalry divisions and 40 brigades were deployed in the western border districts, 27 rifle, 5.5 cavalry divisions and 1 brigade in the rest of the European part of the USSR, and 33 divisions and 5 brigades in the Far East. It was assumed that Soviet aviation had 8,000 combat aircraft (including about 1,100 modern ones), of which 6,000 were in the European part of the USSR. The Nazi command assumed that the Soviet troops deployed in the west, using field fortifications on the new and old state borders for defense, as well as numerous water barriers, would enter the battle in large formations west of the Dnieper and Zapadnaya Dvina rivers. At the same time, the Soviet command will strive to keep air and naval bases in the Baltic states, and rely on the Black Sea coast with the southern wing of the front. " With an unfavorable development of operations south and north of the Pripyat swamps, - noted in the plan " Barbarossa ", - the Russians will try to stop the German offensive on the line of the Dnieper, Western Dvina rivers. When trying to eliminate German breakthroughs, as well as in case of possible attempts to withdraw threatened troops beyond the Dnieper line, Western Dvina, one should take into account the possibility of offensive actions from large Russian formations with using tanks".






According to sir" Barbarossa"Large tank and motorized forces, using aviation support, were supposed to deliver a swift strike to a great depth north and south of the Pripyat marshes, break through the defenses of the main forces of the Soviet Army, presumably concentrated in the western part of the USSR, and destroy the scattered groupings of Soviet troops. North of the Pripyat marshes was planned offensive of two army groups: " Centre F. Bock) and " North"(Commander Field Marshal W. Leeb) . Army Group" Centre"delivered the main blow and had to, concentrating the main efforts on the flanks, where the 2nd and 3rd tank groups were deployed, to carry out a deep breakthrough by these formations north and south of Minsk, to reach the Smolensk area, scheduled for the connection of tank groups. It was assumed that with the release of tank formations in the Smolensk region, prerequisites will be created for the destruction of the field armies of the Soviet troops remaining between Bialystok and Minsk. Subsequently, upon reaching the Roslavl, Smolensk, Vitebsk line by the main forces, the army group " Centre"We had to act depending on the situation developing on its left wing. If the neighbor on the left did not succeed in quickly defeating the troops defending in front of him, the army group was supposed to turn tank formations to the north, and the field armies would lead the offensive in an easterly direction towards Moscow. If the group armies" North"will be able to carry out the defeat of the Soviet Army in its offensive zone, army group" Center"It was necessary to immediately strike at Moscow. Army Group" North"received the task, advancing from East Prussia, to deliver the main blow in the direction of Daugavpils, Leningrad, to destroy the troops of the Soviet Army defending in the Baltic States and, having captured the ports on the Baltic Sea, including Leningrad and Kronstadt, to deprive the Soviet Baltic Fleet of its bases. If this army group the defeat of the grouping of Soviet troops in the Baltic states would be beyond its power, the mobile troops of the army group should have come to its aid " Centre", the Finnish army and the formations transferred from Norway. Thus strengthened by the army group" North"It was necessary to achieve the destruction of the Soviet troops opposing it. According to the plan of the German command, the operation of a reinforced army group" North"provided to the army group" Centre"freedom of maneuver to capture Moscow and the solution of operational and strategic tasks in cooperation with the army group" South".
South of the Pripyat swamps army group planned to attack South"(Commander General Field Marshal G. Rundstedt ) . She delivered one strong blow from the Lublin region in the general direction to Kyiv and further south along the bend of the Dnieper. As a result of the strike, in which powerful tank formations were to play the main role, it was supposed to cut off the Soviet troops stationed in Western Ukraine from their communications on the Dnieper, capture the crossings across the Dnieper in the Kyiv region and south of it. In this way, it provided freedom of maneuver for developing an offensive in an easterly direction in cooperation with troops advancing north, or for an attack on the south of the Soviet Union in order to capture important economic regions. Troops of the right wing of the army group " South"(11th Army) were supposed, creating a false impression of the deployment of large forces on the territory of Romania, to pin down the opposing troops of the Soviet Army, and later, as the offensive developed on the Soviet-German front, to prevent the organized withdrawal of Soviet formations beyond the Dniester.
In terms of " Barbarossa"it was planned to use the principles of military operations that had justified themselves in the Polish and Western European campaigns. However, it was emphasized that unlike operations in the West, an offensive against Soviet troops must be carried out simultaneously on the entire front: both in the direction of the main attacks and in secondary sectors. "Only this way, - stated in the directive of January 31, 1941, - it will be possible to prevent the timely withdrawal of enemy combat-ready forces and destroy them to the west of the Dnieper-Dvina line".






Plan" Barbarossa"Take into account the possibility of active opposition of Soviet aviation to the offensive of the German ground forces. From the very beginning of hostilities, the German Air Force was tasked with suppressing the Soviet Air Force and supporting the offensive of the ground forces in the directions of the main strikes. To solve these problems at the first stage of the war, it was planned to use almost all of the German aviation allocated for operations against the Soviet Union. Attacks on the rear industrial centers of the USSR were planned to begin only after the troops of the Soviet Army were defeated in Belarus, the Baltic states and Ukraine. The offensive of the army group " Centre"it was planned to support the 2nd air fleet," South"- 4th Air Fleet," North- 1st Air Fleet.
The navy of fascist Germany was supposed to defend its coast and prevent the breakthrough of the ships of the Soviet Navy from the Baltic Sea. At the same time, it was envisaged to avoid major naval operations until the land forces captured Leningrad as the last naval base of the Soviet Baltic Fleet. In the future, the naval forces of Nazi Germany were tasked with ensuring freedom of navigation in the Baltic Sea and supplying the troops of the northern wing of the ground forces. The attack on the USSR was planned to be carried out on May 15, 1941.
So according to the plan Barbarossa" nearest The strategic goal of the Nazis in the war against the USSR was to defeat the troops of the Soviet Army in the Baltic States, Belarus and the Right-Bank Ukraine. The subsequent goal was to capture Leningrad in the north, in the center - the Central Industrial Region and the capital of the Soviet Union, in the south - to capture all of Ukraine and the Donets Basin as quickly as possible. The ultimate goal of the eastern campaign was the exit of the Nazi troops to the Volga and the Northern Dvina..
February 3, 1941. meeting in Berchtesgaden Hitler in the presence Keitel and Jodl heard a detailed report Brauchitsch and Hyder about the plan of war against the USSR. The Führer approved the report and assured the generals that the plan would be carried out successfully: " When the implementation of the Barbarossa plan begins, the world will hold its breath and freeze". The armed forces of Romania, Hungary and Finland - allies of Nazi Germany - were to receive specific tasks immediately before the start of the war. The use of the Romanian troops was determined by the plan " Munich", developed by the command of the German troops in Romania. In mid-June, this plan was brought to the attention of the Romanian leadership. June 20, Romanian dictator Antonescu gave on its basis an order to the armed forces of Romania, which outlined the tasks of the Romanian troops. Before the outbreak of hostilities, the Romanian ground forces were supposed to cover the concentration and deployment of German troops in Romania, and with the outbreak of the war, to tie down the grouping of Soviet troops located on the border with Romania. With the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the line of the Prut River, which, as was believed, would follow as a result of the offensive of the German army group " South", the Romanian troops had to move on to energetic pursuit of the units of the Soviet Army. If the Soviet troops managed to hold their positions along the Prut River, the Romanian formations had to break through the Soviet defenses in the Tsutsora, Novy Bedrazh sector. The tasks of the Finnish and German troops deployed in the North and Central Finland, were identified OKW directive of April 7, 1941. and announced by the operational directives of the Finnish General Staff, as well as the directive of the army commander " Norway"dated April 20. The OKW directive provided that the armed forces of Finland before the offensive of the Nazi troops were to cover the deployment of German formations in Finland, and with the transition of the Wehrmacht to the offensive, the Soviet groups in the Karelian and Petrozavodsk directions should be attacked. With the release of the army group " North"on the line of the Luga River, the Finnish troops had to go on a decisive offensive on the Karelian Isthmus, as well as between the Onega and Ladoga lakes, in order to connect with the German armies on the Svir River and in the Leningrad region. The German troops deployed on the territory of Finland, according to the directive of the army commander "Norway" was given the task of advancing in two groups (each consisted of a reinforced corps): one - to Murmansk, the other - to Kandalaksha.The southern group, breaking through the defenses, was supposed to go to the White Sea in the Kandalakshiya region, then advance along the Murmansk railway to the north, in order, in cooperation with the northern grouping, to destroy the Soviet troops stationed on the Kola Peninsula and capture Murmansk and Polyarnoye Air support for the Finnish and German troops advancing from Finland was assigned to the 5th German Air Fleet and the Finnish Air Force.
At the end of April, the political and military leadership of fascist Germany finally set the date for the attack on the USSR: Sunday, June 22, 1941. The postponement from May to June was caused by the need to redeploy to the borders of the USSR the forces involved in the aggression against Yugoslavia and Greece.
In preparing for a war against the USSR, the Hitlerite leadership outlined major measures for the restructuring of its armed forces. They concerned primarily the ground forces. It was planned to bring the number of divisions of the active army to 180 and increase the reserve army. By the beginning of the war against the USSR, the Wehrmacht, including the reserve army and the SS troops, was supposed to have about 250 fully equipped divisions. Particular attention was paid to the strengthening of mobile troops. It was planned to deploy 20 tank divisions instead of the existing 10 and to increase the level of infantry motorization. To this end, it was planned to additionally allocate 130 thousand tons of steel for the production of military trucks, all-terrain vehicles and armored vehicles at the expense of the fleet and aviation. Big changes were planned in the production of weapons. According to the planned program, the most important task was the production of the latest models of tanks and anti-tank artillery. A significant increase in the production of aircraft of those designs that withstood the test during the fighting in the West was also envisaged. Great importance was attached to the preparation of the theater of operations. Directive of 9 August 1940, which received the code name " Aufbau Ost" ("Construction in the East"), it was planned to transfer supply bases from west to east, build new railways and highways, training grounds, barracks, etc. in the eastern regions, expand and improve airfields, and communications networks.
In preparations for aggression against the USSR, the Hitlerite leadership assigned the most important place to ensuring the surprise of the attack and the secrecy of carrying out each preparatory measure, whether it concerned the restructuring of the economy, strategic planning, the preparation of a theater of military operations or the deployment of armed forces, etc. All documents related to the planning of the war in the East were prepared with the utmost secrecy. An extremely narrow circle of people was allowed to develop them. The concentration and operational deployment of troops was planned to be carried out in compliance with all camouflage measures. However, the Nazi leadership understood that it was impossible to completely hide the concentration and deployment of a multi-million army with a huge amount of military equipment near the Soviet borders. Therefore, it resorted to a widely conceived political and operational-strategic camouflage of the impending aggression, recognizing the number one task of misleading the government of the Soviet Union and the command of the Soviet Army about the plan, scale and time of the start of aggression.


Both the operational-strategic leadership bodies and the Abwehr (intelligence and counterintelligence) took part in the development of measures to disguise the concentration of Wehrmacht troops in the east. The Abwehr developed a directive signed on September 6, 1940 by Jodl, which specifically outlined the goals and objectives of disinformation. Directive N21 - version " Barbarossa". But perhaps most fully the perfidious tactics of the Nazis are revealed by the directive on disinformation of the enemy, issued by the OKW on February 15, 1941." The purpose of disinformation is, - indicated in the directive, -h to hide preparations for Operation Barbarossa". This main goal should form the basis of all measures to disinform the enemy.". Camouflage measures were planned to be carried out in two stages. First stage- until about mid-April 1941 - included the camouflage of general military preparations not related to the mass regrouping of troops. Second- from April to June 1941 - masking the concentration and operational deployment of troops near the borders of the USSR. At the first stage, it was planned to create a false idea about the true intentions of the German command, using various kinds of preparations for the invasion of England, as well as for the operation " Marita" (against Greece) and " Sonnenblume"(in North Africa). The initial deployment of troops to attack the USSR was planned to be carried out under the guise of the usual movements for the army. At the same time, the tasks were to create the impression that the center of concentration of armed forces was located in southern Poland, in Czechoslovakia and Austria and that the concentration of troops in the north At the second stage, when, as noted in the directive, it would no longer be possible to hide the preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union, it was planned to present the concentration and deployment of forces for the eastern campaign in the form of false measures, allegedly carried out with the aim of diverting attention from the planned invasion of England This distracting maneuver was presented by the Hitlerite command as “the greatest in the history of wars.” At the same time, work was carried out aimed at preserving the impression among the personnel of the German armed forces that preparations for the landing in England were continuing, but in a different form - allocated for this purpose troops are withdrawn to the rear until a certain point . " Necessary, - the directive said, - to keep as long as possible in error about the real plans even those troops intended to operate directly in the east". Importance was attached, in particular, to the dissemination of misinformation about non-existent airborne corps, allegedly intended to invade England. The forthcoming landing on the British Isles should have been evidenced by such facts as the seconding of translators from English to military units, the release of new English topographical maps, reference books, etc. Among the officers of the army group " South"Rumors spread that German troops would allegedly be transferred to Iran to wage a war to seize the British colonies. The OKW directive on disinformation of the enemy indicated that the more forces were concentrated in the east, the more efforts must be made to keep public opinion astray regarding In the instructions of the Chief of Staff of the OKW of March 9, it was recommended to present the deployment of the Wehrmacht in the east and as defensive measures to ensure the rear of Germany during the landings in England and operations in the Balkans.


The Hitler leadership was so confident in the successful implementation of the plan " Barbarossa", which, approximately from the spring of 1941, began the detailed development of further plans for the conquest of world domination. In the official diary of the Supreme High Command of the Nazi armed forces for February 17, 1941, Hitler's demand was stated that "after the end of the eastern campaign, it is necessary to provide for the capture of Afghanistan and the organization of an offensive against India"Based on these instructions, the OKW headquarters began planning Wehrmacht operations for the future. These operations were scheduled to be carried out in the late autumn of 1941 and in the winter of 1941/42. Their concept was set out in the draft directives N32 "Preparing for the post-Barbarossa period", sent to the ground forces, air force and navy on June 11, 1941. The project provided that after the defeat of the Soviet Armed Forces, the Wehrmacht would have to seize British colonial possessions and some independent countries in the Mediterranean basin, Africa, the Near and Middle East, the invasion of the British Isles, the deployment of military operations against America. G As early as the autumn of 1941, Hitler's strategists expected to begin conquering Iran, Iraq, Egypt, the Suez Canal region, and then India, where it was planned to join the Japanese troops. The fascist German leadership hoped, by annexing Spain and Portugal to Germany, to quickly accept the siege of the islands.. The development of directive N32 and other documents indicates that after the defeat of the USSR and the decision " English problem"the Nazis intended to ally with Japan" eliminate the influence of the Anglo-Saxons in North America". Capture of Canada and the United States of America It was supposed to be carried out by landing large amphibious assaults from bases in Greenland, Iceland, the Azores and Brazil - on the east coast of North America and from the Aleutian and Hawaiian Islands - on the west. In April-June 1941, these questions were repeatedly discussed at the highest headquarters of the German armed forces. Thus, even before the aggression against the USSR, the German fascist leadership outlined far-reaching plans for the conquest of world domination. The key position for their implementation, as it seemed to the Nazi command, was given by a campaign against the USSR.
In contrast to the preparation of campaigns against Poland, France and the Balkan states, the war against the USSR was prepared by the Hitlerite command with special care and over a longer period of time. Aggression against the USSR according to the plan " Barbarossa"was planned as a fleeting campaign, the ultimate goal of which - the defeat of the Soviet Armed Forces and the destruction of the Soviet Union - was supposed to be achieved in the fall of 1941 .
The fighting of the armed forces was supposed to be carried out in the form of a blitzkrieg. At the same time, the offensive of the main strategic groupings was presented in the form of a continuous offensive at a fast pace. Short pauses were allowed only for the regrouping of troops and pulling up the lagging rear. The possibility of stopping the offensive due to the resistance of the Soviet Army was ruled out. Excessive confidence in the infallibility of their intentions and plans " hypnotized"fascist generals. Hitler's machine was gaining momentum to win victory, which seemed so easy and close to the leaders of the" Third Reich ".

Due to the critical situation on the outskirts of the capital, on October 20, Moscow was declared under a state of siege. The defense of the frontiers in 100-120 kilometers was assigned to the commander of the Western Front, Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, and on its near approaches, to the head of the Moscow garrison P.A. Artemyev.

Due to the critical situation on the outskirts of the capital, on October 20, Moscow was declared under a state of siege. The defense of the frontiers in 100-120 kilometers was assigned to the commander of the Western Front, Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, and on its near approaches, to the head of the Moscow garrison P.A. Artemyev. It was pointed out that it was necessary to strengthen the rear and to intensify the fight against the subversive actions of enemy agents.

The population of Moscow was actively involved in the construction of defensive structures around the capital and inside the city. In the shortest possible time, the city was surrounded by anti-tank ditches, hedgehogs, and forest blockages. Anti-tank guns were installed on dangerous areas. Muscovites were formed into divisions of the people's militia, tank destroyer battalions, combat squads, which, together with units of the regular army, participated in battles and in maintaining order in the city.

Enemy air raids on Moscow were successfully repelled. By the beginning of the battle near Moscow, the air defense of the capital had a coherent system based on the principle of all-round defense, taking into account the most dangerous directions - western and southwestern, as well as on the maximum use of the combat capabilities of fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons, which closely interacted with each other.

Fighter aircraft fought against the air enemy on the distant approaches. Its airfields were located within a radius of 150-200 kilometers from Moscow, but as the Germans approached the capital, they moved closer and closer. In the daytime, the fighters operated throughout the entire depth of the defense, and at night - within the light searchlight fields.

On the immediate approaches to Moscow, German aircraft were fired upon and destroyed by anti-aircraft artillery, mostly of medium caliber. Its fire was controlled by sectors, each of which had one anti-aircraft artillery regiment. The regiments built battle formations in three lines, which had considerable depth. Parts and subunits of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery and anti-aircraft machine guns were used to cover important objects inside the city from the air (the Kremlin, railway stations, power plants).

Retreating, the German bombers threw off their deadly cargo anywhere.

In October, the enemy made 31 raids on Moscow, 2018 aircraft participated in them, of which 278 were shot down. The air defense forces of Moscow waged a tense struggle with the air enemy and defended the capital from destruction.

The control of the forces and means of the air defense of Moscow was carried out centrally from the command post of the 1st air defense corps. The commander of the Moscow air defense zone was General M. S. Gromadin.

In October, fascist aviation carried out 31 raids on Moscow. About 2 thousand aircraft took part in them, but only 72 1 were able to break through to the bombing targets. When repelling raids in air battles and anti-aircraft artillery fire, 278 German aircraft 2 were shot down.

In the second half of October, it was possible to delay the advance of the Nazi troops in the zone of the Bryansk Front. This allowed the 3rd and 13th armies, which had been fighting hard behind enemy lines for almost three weeks, to break out of the encirclement on October 23 and, by order of the Headquarters, withdraw to the line east of Dubna, Plavsk, Verkhovye, Livny.

The actions of the front troops pinned down the 2nd Panzer Army in the Tula direction. She was able to resume attacks only at the end of October, when the offensive of the 4th Army of Army Group Center had already bogged down. By October 29, the enemy tank divisions advanced from Mtsensk to Tula, but were stopped here. “An attempt to capture the city on the move,” wrote Guderian after the war, “came up against a strong anti-tank and air defense and ended in failure, and we suffered significant losses in tanks and officers.” For three days, the Nazis fiercely attacked Tula, but the troops of the 50th Army and the Tula combat area, together with the militias, selflessly defended. Communists and Komsomol members of the city and region joined the ranks of the defenders. Their courage was amazing. Tulyaks turned their city into an impregnable fortress and did not surrender it to the enemy. An important role in organizing the struggle for Tula was played by the city defense committee, headed by the first secretary of the regional party committee, V. G. Zhavoronkov, who in those days was a member of the Military Council of the 50th Army.

The defense of Tula ensured the stability of the left wing of the Western Front on the far southern approaches to the capital. It also contributed to the stabilization of the situation on the Bryansk front.

Thus, the October offensive of the Nazi troops on Moscow failed. The enemy was forced to go on the defensive on the lines of Selizharovo, Kalinin, Tula, Novosil.

The most important condition for disrupting the enemy's intentions was the creation of reserves in a short time, most of which were brought into battle in the Western Front at the turn of the Mozhaisk line of defense.

A huge role in repelling the fierce onslaught of the Nazis, along with the ground forces, was played by the Soviet Air Force. Only in the first nine days of the enemy attack on Moscow, aviation of the Western Front, the 6th Air Defense Aviation Corps and units of the Air Defense Forces carried out 3,500 sorties, destroying a significant number of enemy aircraft, tanks and manpower. In total, from September 30 to October 31, the Air Force made 26,000 sorties, of which up to 80 percent were to support and cover troops.

The enemy also experienced the force of powerful blows from Soviet tanks and artillery. Tank brigades blocked the path of the fascist troops in especially dangerous directions.

To disrupt the enemy offensive, anti-tank areas and strongholds, various engineering barriers were equipped.

Warriors of all branches of the military in the battles on the outskirts of Moscow showed examples of the performance of military duty and the invincible strength of morale, showed mass heroism. In these battles, units of rifle divisions distinguished themselves: 316th General I.V. Panfilov, 78th Colonel A.P. Beloborodov, 32nd Colonel V.I. Polosukhin, 50th General N.F. Lebedenko, 53rd 1st Colonel A.F. Naumov, 239th Colonel G.O. Martirosyan, as well as the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division Colonel A.I. Lizyukov, the cavalry group of General L.M. Dovator, tank brigades led by M.E. Katukov, P. A. Rotmistrov, I. F. Kirichenko, M. T. Sakhno, and many other compounds.

The results of the October offensive did not please the Nazis. The main goals of Operation Typhoon - the destruction of the Soviet Army and the capture of Moscow - were not achieved. The outcome of the bloody battles was unexpected not only for the soldiers, but also for the generals of the Wehrmacht.

The stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops was the main reason for the hesitation that appeared among the command of the Wehrmacht, the divergence of opinions in determining the ways of further waging war against the Soviet Union. At the beginning of November, Franz Halder, then Chief of the German General Staff, wrote in his diary: “We must, by analyzing the current situation, accurately determine our capabilities for conducting subsequent operations. There are two extreme points of view on this issue: some consider it necessary to gain a foothold on the achieved lines, others demand to actively continue the offensive.

But in fact, the Nazis had no choice. Winter was approaching, and the goals of the Barbarossa plan remained unfulfilled. The enemy was in a hurry, striving at all costs to capture the capital of the Soviet Union before the onset of winter.

The plan of the fascist German command to continue the offensive in November contained the same idea as in October: simultaneously inflict crushing blows on the flanks of the Western Front with two mobile groupings and, rapidly bypassing Moscow from the north and south, close the encirclement east of the capital.

In the first half of November, the fascist German command regrouped its troops: from near Kalinin to the Volokolamsko-Klinskoye direction, it transferred the 3rd tank group, and replenished the 2nd tank army with more than a hundred tanks, concentrating its main forces on the right flank to bypass Tula .

By November 15, 1941, Army Group Center included three field, one tank armies and two tank groups, numbering 73 divisions (47 infantry, 1 cavalry, 14 tank, 8 motorized, 3 security) and 4 brigades.

The task of covering Moscow from the north (Operation Volga Reservoir) was assigned to the 3rd and 4th German tank groups, consisting of seven tank, three motorized and four infantry divisions, and from the south - to the 2nd tank army, consisting of four tank, three motorized and five infantry divisions. The 4th Army was to conduct a frontal offensive, pin down the main forces of the Western Front, and then destroy them west of Moscow. The 9th and 2nd armies, pinned down by the troops of the Kalinin and Southwestern fronts, were actually deprived of the opportunity to take part in the November offensive. In total, the fascist German command allocated 51 divisions directly for the capture of Moscow, including 13 tank and 7 motorized.

Assessing the current situation, the Soviet command clearly understood that the relative relaxation of tension on the front near Moscow was temporary, that although the enemy had suffered serious losses, he had not yet lost his offensive capabilities, retained the initiative and superiority in forces and means, and would persistently strive to capture Moscow. Therefore, all measures were taken to repel the expected offensive. At the same time, new armies were formed and deployed at the line of Vytegra, Rybinsk, Gorky, Saratov, Stalingrad, Astrakhan as strategic reserves.

The rate, having determined the intentions and capabilities of the enemy, decided

First of all, strengthen the most dangerous areas. She demanded

from the Western Front, in cooperation with the troops of the Kalinin and the right wing of the Southwestern Fronts, to prevent bypassing Moscow from the north

west and south. His armies were reinforced by anti-tank artillery and

guards mortar units. On Volokolamsk and Serpukhov

in the directions the reserves of the Headquarters were concentrated; 16th Army were

given three cavalry divisions; the 2nd cavalry corps (two divisions) arrived in the Podolsk, Mikhnevo region from the Southwestern Front, part

which additionally included infantry and tank divisions. For the first

half of November, the Western Front received a total of 100 thousand soldiers.

Kalinin Front - 30th Army.

The shock German groups were opposed by the 30th, 16th and partially 5th armies on the right and the 50th and 49th armies on the left wing of the Western Front.

The command of the Western Front, reinforcing the troops operating northwest and southwest of Moscow, organized counterattacks in the 16th Army zone on Volokolamsk and in the Skirmanovo area, as well as in the 49th Army zone in the Serpukhov direction. According to the recognition of the fascist command, the counterattack in the zone of the 49th Army did not allow the 4th German Army to go on the offensive here in the second half of November.

In total, the troops of the Western Front (including the 30th Army) by mid-November had 35 rifle, 3 motorized rifle, 3 tank, 12 cavalry divisions, 14 tank brigades .. As before, in terms of numbers, Soviet divisions were significantly inferior to German ones. Despite the strengthening of the troops of the Western Front, the fascist German armies in November continued to maintain their overall numerical superiority in men and military equipment near Moscow, especially in the directions of the main attacks. So, in the Klin direction, against 56 tanks and 210 guns and mortars, which the 30th Army had, the enemy had up to 300 tanks and 910 guns and mortars.

By concentrating about 1000 aircraft near Moscow (although there were many obsolete types among them), the Soviet command created a quantitative superiority in aviation over the enemy. In order to gain air supremacy, the Headquarters ordered the commander of the Air Force of the Soviet Army to carry out an operation from November 5 to 8 to destroy German aircraft at airfields. The air forces of the Kalinin, Western, Bryansk fronts, the 81st division of the DBA and aviation of the Moscow defense zone were involved in it. 28 enemy airfields were hit, and on November 12 and 15 another 19, where 88 aircraft were destroyed.

Much attention was paid to the engineering equipment of the area. The troops improved their positions, created zones of operational barriers. The intensive construction of defensive lines continued. Only on the outer boundary of the Moscow zone, by November 25, 1428 bunkers, 165 km of anti-tank ditches, 110 km of wire fences in three rows and other obstacles were built.

The air defense of the capital continued to be strengthened and improved. By decision of the State Defense Committee of November 9, 1941, the air defense zones of the country were removed from the subordination of the military councils of the districts and fronts and subordinated to the deputy people's commissar of defense for air defense, who actually became the commander of the country's air defense forces as an independent branch of the Armed Forces of the USSR. At the same time, all air defense zones in the European part of the Soviet Union were transformed into divisional and corps air defense areas. The Moscow Air Defense Zone became the Moscow Air Defense Corps District.

In those difficult days, the Soviet people celebrated the 24th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The ceremonial meeting of the Moscow Council of Working People's Deputies on November 6, the parade of troops on Red Square on November 7 and the speeches of the Chairman of the State Defense Committee I. V. Stalin played an important role in strengthening the confidence of the people and the army that the enemy near Moscow would be stopped, that here, at the walls of the capital, the defeat of the Nazi invaders will begin.

Addressing the soldiers who were leaving Red Square for the front, I. V. Stalin said on behalf of the party and the people: “The whole world is looking at you as a force capable of destroying the predatory hordes of German invaders. The enslaved peoples of Europe, who fell under the yoke of the German invaders, are looking at you as their liberators.”

After a two-week pause, Army Group Center resumed its offensive against the Soviet capital. On the morning of November 15, powerful artillery and air preparation began, and then the 3rd Panzer Group dealt a strong blow to the 30th Army of General D. D. Lelyushenko. Part of the troops of this army, located north of the Volga reservoir, by order of the command on November 16, retreated to the northeastern bank of the Volga.

Stubborn resistance to the enemy was provided by formations defending south of the reservoir. Only in the second half of November 16, the enemy was able to force the Lama River, while losing up to 60 tanks and armored vehicles. By the end of November 17, he managed to reach the Novozavidovsky area. The situation at the junction of the Kalinin and Western fronts became extremely complicated. To eliminate the threat of an enemy breakthrough to Klin, the front command reinforced the 30th Army with two divisions and organized several air strikes against the advancing enemy troops in its zone.

On November 16, in the Volokolamsk direction, the German 4th Panzer Group (at least 400 tanks) went on the offensive against the 16th Army with massive air support. Its main blow fell at the junction of the 316th Infantry Division of General I.V. Panfilov and the group of troops of General L.M. Dovator. In decisive battles with the Nazis, the Panfilov heroes immortalized their names. In the area of ​​​​the Dubosekovo junction, 28 Panfilov soldiers, having destroyed 18 tanks and dozens of fascists in four hours of an unequal battle, did not let the enemy through.

And on the same day, part of the forces of the 16th Army, with the support of aviation, launched a powerful counterattack on the enemy. The defenders of Moscow fought steadfastly in other sectors of the front as well. In the Istra direction, the 78th Rifle Division was especially stubbornly defending.

Events at the front from November 16 to 21 showed that the main forces of the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups, which had the task of making quick operational breakthroughs and a swift bypass of Moscow, were drawn into protracted battles. The pace of the enemy offensive was continuously decreasing and did not exceed even for mobile troops 3-5 km per day. The Nazis had to overcome staunch defenses, while repelling counterattacks by infantry, tank and cavalry formations. Enemy attempts to encircle any division, as a rule, did not bring success. To master each subsequent line, he was forced to organize the offensive again.

Kalininsky actively helped the Western Front, whose troops firmly fettered the 9th German field army, preventing it from transferring a single division to the Moscow direction.

On November 19, the command of Army Group Center, having reinforced the 3rd Panzer Group with tank and motorized divisions, demanded that it capture Klin and Solnechnogorsk as soon as possible. To avoid encirclement, on November 23, Soviet troops left these cities after stubborn street fighting.

The onslaught of the enemy did not weaken in other sectors of the defense either. Particularly stubborn battles were waged by the troops of the 16th and partly of the 5th armies at the turn of the Istra River. The Soviet divisions held back the fierce attacks of the Nazis here for three days and inflicted heavy damage on them. However, on November 27, the 16th Army had to leave the city of Istra.

Despite significant losses, the enemy continued to rush towards Moscow, spending the last reserves. But he failed to cut the front of the defense of the Soviet troops.

The Soviet command assessed the resulting situation as very dangerous, but not in the least hopeless. It saw that the troops were determined to prevent the enemy from reaching Moscow and were fighting steadfastly and selflessly. Every day it became more obvious that the enemy's capabilities were not unlimited, and as his reserves were spent, his onslaught would inevitably weaken.

The assessment of the current situation given in those days by the leadership of the Wehrmacht can be judged by Halder's entry in his official diary: “Field Marshal von Bock personally directs the course of the battle near Moscow from his advanced command post. His ... energy drives the troops forward ... The troops are completely exhausted and incapable of an offensive ... Von Bock compares the current situation with the situation in the battle of the Marne, indicating that a situation has arisen when the last battalion thrown into battle can decide the outcome battles." However, the calculations of the Nazis for each "last" battalion were not justified. The enemy suffered heavy losses, but could not break through to Moscow.

After the capture of Klin and Solnechnogorsk, the enemy made an attempt to develop his strike northwest of Moscow. On the night of November 28, he managed to cross with small forces to the eastern bank of the Moscow-Volga Canal in the Yakhroma area north of Iksha.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the command of the Western Front took urgent measures to eliminate the danger that had arisen. Reserve formations and troops from neighboring sectors were transferred to the Kryukovo, Khlebnikovo, and Yakhroma regions. An important role in changing the situation north of Moscow was played by the timely advance from the reserve to the line of the Moscow-Volga Canal between Dmitrov and Iksha of the 1st Shock Army under the command of General V. I. Kuznetsov. Its advanced units pushed the enemy back to the western bank of the canal.

In late November and early December, the 1st shock and the newly formed 20th armies, with the active support of the aviation group of General I.F. Petrov, launched a series of counterattacks on the Nazi troops and, together with the 30th and 16th armies, finally stopped them further promotion. The enemy was forced to go on the defensive. The threat of a breakthrough to Moscow from the northwest and north was eliminated.

Events on the left wing of the Western Front unfolded exceptionally sharply and tensely. Here the 2nd German Panzer Army was able to resume the offensive only on November 18th. After unsuccessful attempts to capture Tula from the south and northwest, the command of Army Group Center decided to launch an offensive in a northerly direction, bypassing the city from the east.

The strike force - the 2nd Tank Army, consisting of four tank, three motorized, five infantry divisions, supported by aviation, broke through the defenses of the 50th Army and, developing the offensive, captured Stalinogorsk (Novomoskovsk) on November 22. Her units rushed to Venev, Kashira. Fierce fighting broke out.

The front commander demanded that the 50th Army "under no circumstances allow the enemy to penetrate into the Venev area." This city and the approaches to it were defended by a combat group consisting of a regiment of the 173rd rifle division, the 11th and 32nd tank brigades (30 light tanks), a tank destroyer battalion formed from the local population. Without breaking the resistance of the group with frontal attacks, the 17th German Panzer Division bypassed the city from the east. On November 25, its advanced units were 10-15 km from Kashira.

Two other divisions of the 2nd Panzer Army were advancing on Mikhailov and Serebryanye Prudy. The Nazis sought to take Kashira as soon as possible and capture the crossings on the Oka.

In order to stop the advance of the enemy's southern strike force, the command of the Western Front on November 27 conducted a counterattack in the Kashira area with formations reinforced with tanks and rocket artillery of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps. As a result of the counterattack, the corps, with the support of the aviation of the front and parts of the Moscow air defense, inflicted a heavy defeat on the 17th tank division of the enemy and by November 30 threw it back to the Mordves region.

Thus, the stubborn defense of Tula, the staunch resistance of the Soviet troops in the areas of Stalinogorsk and Venev thwarted the plans of the enemy. The 2nd Panzer Army was unable to capture the crossings across the Oka.

After this failure, the Nazis made desperate attempts to take control of Tula with a blow from the east and northeast. They believed that in the current situation it was impossible "to carry out further operations to the north or east ... without first mastering this important communications junction and the airfield."

On December 3, the enemy managed to cut the railway and highway north of Tula. At the same time, he increased pressure on the city from the west at the junction of the 49th and 50th armies. The fight has reached its peak. To eliminate the breakthrough north of Tula, the 50th Army of General I.V. Boldin launched a counterattack on the enemy in the area of ​​​​Kostrovo, Revyakino, where it surrounded part of the forces of the 4th German Panzer Division.

The active operations of the troops of the left wing of the Western Front in early December forced the 2nd German Panzer Army to begin a retreat. At the critical moment of the battle in the areas of Kashira and Tula, she could not get help from her neighbor on the right - the 2nd field army, whose main forces were involved in protracted battles with the troops of the 3rd and 13th armies of the Southwestern Front in the Yelets direction.

The enemy, having failed north and south of Moscow. December 1 tried to break through to the city in the center of the Western Front. He delivered strong blows in the Naro-Fominsk region and pushed the defending divisions back. The front command immediately responded to this with a counterattack, using the reserve of the 33rd and neighboring armies. The enemy was driven back across the Nara River with heavy losses. Thus, his last attempt to save Operation Typhoon failed. The Nazis also failed to carry out the plan for the destruction of Moscow by air strikes. Strengthening air defense has yielded results. In November, only a few planes broke through to the city. In total, during the period July - December 1941, the Moscow Air Defense Forces repelled 122 air raids, in which 7146 aircraft participated. Only 229 aircraft, or a little over 3 percent, were able to break through to the city.

The attempts of the Nazis to carry out extensive reconnaissance and sabotage, terrorist and other subversive activities were also unsuccessful. The state security organs neutralized about 200 fascist agents in the capital and its suburbs. In addition, over 75 spies and saboteurs were detained by the border units for the protection of the rear in the combat area of ​​the Western Front, and several enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups were liquidated. In the Moscow direction, the enemy failed to commit a single sabotage in the rear of the Soviet troops, disrupt the work of industrial enterprises, transport, disrupt the supply of the army in the field. Using captured enemy agents who turned themselves in, the Soviet counterintelligence officers, together with the military command, misinformed the enemy intelligence about the location and redeployment of formations and associations of troops, their command posts, and about the work of the Moscow road junction. As a result, the Nazi command did not have reliable data on the advancement of reserves to the Moscow region.

The end of November - the beginning of December was a period of crisis of the Nazi offensive against Moscow. The plan to encircle and capture the Soviet capital was a complete failure. “The attack on Moscow failed. All the sacrifices and efforts of our valiant troops were in vain. We suffered a serious defeat,” Guderian wrote after the war. The enemy was finally exhausted, his reserves were exhausted. “The information that we had said that all the reserves that von Bock had were used and drawn into the battle,” said Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky. The failure of Operation Typhoon was a fait accompli.

In those difficult, decisive days of the battle for the capital, Pravda wrote: “We must by all means frustrate Hitler’s predatory plan ... This is what our whole country is waiting for ... The rout of the enemy must begin near Moscow!”.

Echelons with weapons and ammunition were going to the front in a continuous stream. Fresh reserves of the Headquarters were concentrated in the areas northeast and southeast of the capital. Moscow and Tula became the front-line arsenals of the fighting troops.

An important measure in disrupting the new onslaught of the enemy near Moscow was the counteroffensive organized by the Headquarters in mid-November near Tikhvin and Rostov-on-Don. The fascist German army groups "North" and "South", repelling the offensive of the Soviet troops, were deprived of the opportunity to provide assistance to the Army Group "Center" on decisive days. These were the first serious harbingers of great changes on the entire Soviet-German front.

So, the offensive of the Nazi troops on Moscow in November also ended in complete failure.

Army Group Center failed to achieve the goals of Operation Typhoon. Her troops were drained of blood and lost their offensive capabilities. During the fighting from November 16 to December 5, the Wehrmacht lost 155 thousand soldiers and officers, 777 tanks, hundreds of guns and mortars near Moscow. By means of aviation of the fronts and Moscow air defense, many aircraft were shot down in air battles and destroyed at airfields. During two months of defensive battles, the Soviet Air Force made more than 51,000 sorties, of which 14 percent were for the air cover of the capital. Here, in the Moscow direction, by December 1941, for the first time, they won operational air supremacy. The aviation guard was born in the sky near Moscow. The rank of guards received the 29th, 129th, 155th, 526th fighter, 215th assault and 31st bomber aviation regiments.

On December 4-5, 1941, the defensive period of the battle near Moscow ended. The Soviet Armed Forces defended the capital, stopping the advance of the fascist hordes.

In order to restore their prestige, to eliminate the confusion that had begun in the camp of their allies, the fascist rulers needed a major victory, and they did everything to achieve it at any cost. However, the Wehrmacht by that time was able to advance only in one strategic direction.

In order to overcome the military-political crisis, the rulers of Nazi Germany decided to carry out a total mobilization in the country and speed up the development of the military industry, a significant growth of which was provided at the expense of the resources of the occupied European countries. All these measures, which began in January 1943, gave definite results. The production of tanks, guns, and mortars in Nazi Germany more than doubled compared to the previous year, and combat aircraft, 1.7 times. Taking advantage of the absence of a second front in the West, the government of fascist Germany was able to direct a large share of industrial resources, as well as newly mobilized human contingents, to strengthen the Eastern Front. By the summer of 1943, it not only made up for the losses suffered, but also supplied the existing ones with new, more advanced models of military equipment.

During 1943, the enemy was able to bring the total number of his armed forces to 10,300 thousand people, that is, almost to that. level, which was the summer of the city, when this number was greatest. Although after the defeat at Stalingrad, Hitler at a meeting at the headquarters of the Wehrmacht on February 1, 1943, was forced to declare that “the possibility of ending the war in the east through an offensive no longer exists”, nevertheless, the inevitability of the collapse pushed him to another adventure.

The main forces of the Wehrmacht were still concentrated on the Soviet-German front. By the beginning of the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, there were 196 German divisions here, as well as 32 divisions and 8 brigades of German satellites.

The Kursk direction was chosen to conduct a major offensive operation, which received the code name "Citadel". Far advanced to the west, our Kursk ledge created, in the opinion of the German command, favorable prerequisites for the encirclement and subsequent defeat of the Soviet troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts occupying it. After that, it was supposed to strike at the rear of the Southwestern Front - to carry out the "Panther". Under Kursk, Hitler concentrated up to 50 of his best divisions, including 16 tank and motorized. He pinned great hopes on new military equipment: Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand self-propelled guns, Heinkel-129, Focke-Wulf-190A aircraft.

When planning this offensive, the German command wanted to achieve a decisive military victory here at any cost. Keitel, Chief of Staff of the German Armed Forces, spoke frankly about this: "We must attack for political reasons."

The plan for the upcoming offensive of the Nazi troops near Kursk is described in sufficient detail in Order No. 6, signed by Hitler on April 15, 1943.

Already in the spring of 1943, the Soviet Supreme High Command had information about the impending summer offensive of the Nazi troops in the area of ​​the Kursk salient. Intelligence data came with exceptional speed and accuracy. The direction of the enemy's main attack was also accurately determined. It was in connection with this that the Stavka concentrated large strategic reserves in the rear of the Soviet troops east of the Kursk ledge at the line of Tula, Yelets, Stary Oskol, Rossosh. Formations and formations that participated in the battle of Stalingrad, in the battles near Leningrad, as well as in other sectors of the Soviet-German front, were withdrawn to these areas. At first, all these troops were united in the Reserve Front, which from April 15, 1943 became known as the Steppe Military District, and from July 10, 1943 - the Steppe Front, which I was entrusted with command.

The members of the Military Council were at first Lieutenant General Mekhlis, and then (from July 9, 1943) Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces I.Z. Susaykov and Major General I.S. Grushetsky, Lieutenant General M.V. became the chief of staff. Zakharov.

It should be noted that in the history of wars there was almost no case when such powerful strategic reserves would be created, united by a single front command.

In the course of the war before the Battle of Kursk, it happened that in the process of defensive and offensive operations, strategic reserves of considerable strength were brought into battle - several armies that were in the reserve of the Headquarters, but they were transferred to strengthen front-line formations. Their introduction, as a rule, was carried out one by one, dispersed in time and space. True, in the first period of the war in the western direction there was at one time a Reserve, but it was weaker than the Steppe Front in composition, and a significant part of its forces was on the defensive in contact with the enemy. In the Battle of Kursk, several armies and separate tank corps were united by the front command, which gave the strategic reserve a completely different quality.

I remember well how, before leaving for a new destination, I was called to Headquarters. Supreme Commander I.V. Stalin, in the presence of the marshal and members of the State Defense Committee, said:

The steppe front must play an important role in the counteroffensive. And, turning to me, he continued:

Do you understand, Comrade Konev, what assignment you are receiving in connection with the situation that is developing in the southern direction? The enemy will apparently create very strong groupings in order to cut off the Kursk salient. Your front, located behind the Central and Voronezh fronts, should be ready if the enemy breaks through, repel his blows and prevent the development of a breakthrough in the eastern direction, both in the Orel and in the Belgorod direction. Therefore, the strip occupied by the front must be well prepared defensively, and in the rear, along the Voronezh and Don rivers, the state line of defense must be prepared.

As you know, in the Battle of Kursk, Soviet troops created a powerful, deeply echeloned, well-organized defense with an advantageous balance of forces for us, since we were preparing for a deliberate defense. Nevertheless, the enemy managed to penetrate our defenses to a depth of 35 km in the Oboyan direction. And only thanks to the introduction into battle of two armies of the Steppe Front - the 5th Guards Tank Army P.A. Rotmistrov and the 5th Guards Army A.S. Zhadov - the enemy was finally stopped.

The creation of the Steppe Front played an equally important role in the rapid transition of the Soviet troops from defensive actions to a decisive offensive. The front formation, which was in the reserve of the Headquarters, by its entry into the line of active fronts, sharply changed the situation in favor of the most important south-western direction in the summer campaign of 1943.

Thus, the Soviet Supreme High Command adopted a fundamentally new decision to organize the consolidation of strategic reserves. The creation of the Steppe Front, which united the reserves of the Headquarters in the southwestern direction, is, of course, an achievement of Soviet military art.

By the beginning of the Nazi offensive, the troops of the front were in full combat readiness for the offensive and represented a large strike force capable of operating both in the Orel and in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction.

As you know, in the Battle of Kursk, Soviet troops created a powerful, deeply echeloned, well-organized defense with an advantageous balance of forces for us, since we were preparing for a deliberate defense. Nevertheless, the enemy managed to penetrate our defenses to a depth of 35 km in the Oboyan direction. And only thanks to the introduction into battle of two armies of the Steppe Front - the 5th Guards Tank Army P.A. Rotmistrov and the 5th Guards Army A.S. Zhadov - the enemy offensive was finally stopped.

Thus, the presence in the rear behind the defending fronts of large strategic reserves deployed in advance made it possible in a very short time to thwart the carefully prepared strategic offensive of the German army, on which the Nazi command had placed all its hopes.

The creation of the Steppe Front played an equally important role in the rapid transition of the Soviet troops from defensive actions to a decisive offensive. The front formation, which was in the reserve of the Headquarters, by its entry into the line of active fronts, dramatically changed the situation in favor of the Red Army in the most important south-western direction in the summer campaign of 1943.

Based on the tasks and purpose of the Steppe Front, the selection of command personnel was carried out very carefully. At the direction of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, officers and generals were appointed to the positions of army commanders, as well as commanders of corps and divisions, who had not only extensive war experience, but also experience in combat training and formation of troops. This was due to the fact that the troops, being part of the Steppe Front, had to represent strong, combat-ready formations and formations, and undergo enhanced combat training.

The long operational pause established on the fronts from April to July favored the successful and high-quality completion of combat and political training according to a program specially developed by the front. At the same time, much attention was paid to mastering the experience gained by the troops in the battles near Moscow and Stalingrad.

Preparing for the upcoming offensive battles, the troops of the front also improved their preparation for defense. Far in the rear from the front, the state line was being intensively prepared.

A close connection at that time was established with local party and Soviet bodies. I want to express my deep gratitude to them and to the population of the regions, which at that time rendered great assistance in preparing this milestone. Thousands of people, mostly women and teenagers, tore trenches, built anti-tank barriers, roads, bridges, which could play a very important role in the event of a breakthrough by German troops.

Did the enemy know about the organization of a strong defense in the rear of our fronts? Knew. And it played a positive role. The enemy believed that we were only preparing for a defensive battle. Having a huge number of tanks and self-propelled guns of the latest models, the Nazis hoped that it would be impossible to keep them.

So, the enemy was preparing, and so were we. The main thing was to hide not the very fact of preparation, but the forces and means, the plan of the battle, the time of the transition to the offensive, the nature of our defense. Perhaps this is the only unprecedented case in military history when the strong side, which had all the possibilities for the offensive, went on the defensive. The further course of events confirmed that in this case the most correct decision was made.

The Stavka instructed the Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. to coordinate the preparation and action of the fronts in the Battle of Kursk. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.

From spring until the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the troops carried out intensified preparations for the upcoming battle. Units and formations were staffed, replenished with military equipment, accumulated ammunition, fuel, engineering equipment, and combat training was underway.

On July 10, 1943, the Steppe Military District was renamed the Steppe Front. Its composition was defined by the following directive:

To the Commander of the Steppe Military District.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

2. Include the 5th Guards in the Steppe Front. 27th Army with 4th Guards. tank corps, the 53rd army with the 1st mech. corps, the 47th army with the 3rd guards. fur. Corps, 4th Guards. army with the 3rd Guards. Tank Corps, 52nd Army, 5th Guards Tank Army, 3rd, 5th, 7th Guards Cavalry Corps, 5th Air Army, all reinforcement units and rear units and institutions of the Steppe Military District.

3. Deploy the armies of the front according to oral instructions given by the General Staff.

4. Move troops only at night.

6. Report the progress of the regrouping daily in cipher.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command

I. Stalin.

A. Antonov.

As can be seen from the above directive, there were a lot of troops in the front. But basically these associations and formations came from other fronts. The troops were poorly equipped with personnel and equipment, did not have stocks of materiel, and were tired in the battles. In a very short time it was necessary to replenish and strengthen them, equipping them with everything necessary for military operations, to put together a good combat-ready organism.

In those hot days, commanders and political workers, headquarters, political agencies and the economic apparatus worked with great effort to make the Steppe Front ready for offensive operations.

The preparation of the troops of the front for the upcoming battle consisted of a huge list of measures and required great physical exertion of all the soldiers - from the private to the general. The infantrymen improved their "fortresses" - trenches and shelters, put weapons and equipment on alert, learned to conduct an offensive battle, go on a counterattack.

The tankers carried out firing on the move and the combat cohesion of units. Artillerymen occupied the most advantageous firing positions, perfected gun trenches and observation posts, worked out interaction with infantry and tanks. The sappers did a great job, turning the multi-lane defense into a system of strong lines impregnable for enemy tanks. Work was also in full swing among signalmen, without whom it is impossible for a commander to control troops in modern warfare; all the rear services worked hard, and especially the supply artillerymen. They delivered more advanced military equipment to the troops, which we received in large quantities, and helped the commanders to master this equipment.

There was no such area of ​​the combat life of the troops that would remain out of sight of the commanders and political workers. Their diversified and ebullient activity gave the troops high combat capability and moral cohesion. Political workers of the political department of the front, headed by General A.N. Tevchenkov, and the staff officers of the front, at my request, were constantly in units and subunits.

The victories won by the Red Army in the winter campaign of 1942/43 and the significant strengthening of units and formations with new military equipment and weapons instilled confidence in the fighters and commanders, helped maintain high morale and an offensive impulse. All the soldiers were eager to go on the offensive as soon as possible and defeat the enemy.

For three months, our troops were intensively preparing to give a worthy rebuff to the enemy. The intensity of the work did not weaken day or night. By the beginning of the fighting, all units, including those in reserve, were buried in the ground, and military equipment was also buried in the ground. According to all the rules of military art, which was developed during the war, groupings of troops were created and fire systems were organized, especially anti-tank, all-round defense of villages, towns and cities, defensive lines were well prepared.

By the beginning of the defensive battle, the Central and Voronezh Fronts had up to 20,000 guns and mortars, up to 3,600 tanks and self-propelled artillery, and 2,370 aircraft. Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy in men by 1.4 times, in guns and mortars - by 2 times, in tanks and self-propelled guns - by 1.3 times. Thus, the grouping of our troops, concentrated in the Kursk direction, really made it possible to solve not only defensive, but also offensive tasks.

During the preparation of the battle, as already mentioned, our intelligence provided the command with all the necessary information about the impending enemy offensive and about the steps that the German command was taking.

Konev I.S. Notes of the front commander;

Test on the topic: "The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945"

1. Which of the listed persons was the Chairman of the State Defense Committee during the Great Patriotic War?

1) M.N. Tukhachevsky

2) L.D. Trotsky

3)K.K. Rokossovsky

4) I.V. Stalin

2. Read an excerpt from the memoirs of a military leader and indicate the battle, the preparation of the enemy for which we are talking.

“The plan for the upcoming offensive of the Nazi troops is described in sufficient detail in Order No. 6, signed by Hitler on April 15, 1943. According to this order, the objective of the offensive was to destroy the Soviet troops by means of a “concentric offensive” in order to encircle the Soviet fronts. One blow was planned to be delivered from the area south of Orel by the main forces of Army Group Center and the other from the area north of Kharkov by the main forces of Army Group South.

1) Battle of Stalingrad

2) Battle of Kursk

3) the battle for the Dnieper

4) the battle for the Caucasus

3. Outstanding commanders of the Great Patriotic War were

1) G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky

2) M.N. Tukhachevsky, M.V. Frunze

3) V.I. Chapaev, S.S. Kamenev

4) A.A. Brusilov, F.E. Dzerzhinsky

4. Consider the scheme of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War and answer the question.

What number indicates the Brest Fortress, famous for the heroism of its defenders, on the diagram?

5. Which of the following was the beginning of a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War?

1) complete lifting of the blockade of Leningrad

2) the battle for the Dnieper

3) Battle of Stalingrad

4) Moscow battle

6. Read an excerpt from the memoirs of Marshal V.I. Chuikov and name the city in question.

“Nevertheless, despite the colossal losses, Paulus did not give up the idea of ​​​​taking the city completely. Fresh infantry units and tanks appeared, which, despite the losses, were rushing forward towards the Volga. It seemed that Hitler was ready to destroy all of Germany for this one city.

7. Read an excerpt from the memoirs and indicate the year to which the events described relate.

“The situation at that time remained very difficult for our country. Under the heel of the fascist invaders were the Baltic States and Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, the western and southern regions of the Russian Federation. The enemy continued blockade of Leningrad, kept large forces of troops not far from Moscow. The strategic reserves accumulated with great tension were used up ... The situation was aggravated by the unsuccessful outcome of hostilities for our troops near Leningrad, Kharkov and in the Crimea.

8. .What operation of the Red Army began shortly after the opening of the Second Front in Europe?

1) Oryol offensive operation

2) an operation to encircle and defeat the Nazi troops in Stalingrad

3) operation to liberate Belarus

4) Rzhev-Vyazemskaya strategic offensive operation

9. Read an excerpt from the memoirs of a military leader and indicate the year when the campaign in question was planned.

“What did the Stavka proceed from when developing the plan for the summer campaign? The enemy was driven back from Moscow, but still continued to threaten her. Moreover, the largest grouping of German troops (more than 70 divisions) was located in the Moscow direction. This gave the Headquarters and the General Staff reason to believe that with the beginning of the summer period, the enemy would try to deliver a decisive blow to us precisely in the Central direction. This opinion, as I well know, was shared by the command of most fronts.

Supreme Commander I.V. Stalin, not considering it possible to launch large offensive operations at the beginning of the summer, was also in favor of active strategic defense. But along

with her, he considered it expedient to conduct private offensive operations in the Crimea, in the Kharkov region, in the Lvov-Kursk and Smolensk directions, as well as in the regions of Leningrad and Demyansk.

10. Consider the scheme of one of the periods of the Great Patriotic War and complete the task.

Indicate the number that Belgorod is indicated on the diagram.

11. During the Vistula-Oder offensive operation, Soviet troops liberated most of

2) Hungary

3) Romania

4) Austria

12. What is the conditional name of the plan of attack of fascist Germany on the USSR?

1) "Typhoon"

2) "Citadel"

3) "Barbarossa"

13. Review the diagram and complete the task.

Indicate the name of the operation, as a result of which the city, indicated by the number "1", was liberated.

1) "Kutuzov"

2) "Rumyantsev"

3) "Suvorov"

4) "Bagration"

14. During the counteroffensive of the Red Army near Moscow

1) Smolensk was liberated

2) Klin and Volokolamsk were liberated

4) the largest tank battle took place near Prokhorovka

15. During the Battle of Kursk, the city was liberated by Soviet troops

1) Volokolamsk

2) Belgorod

3) Rostov-on-Don

16. Which of the following commanders took part in the Great Patriotic War? Find two military leaders in the list below and write down the numbers under which they are indicated.

1) K.K. Rokossovsky

2) M.D. Skobelev

3) A.A. Brusilov

4) G.K. Zhukov

5) I.V. Gurko

17. Read an excerpt from the notes of a military journalist and indicate the name of the soldier missing in the text.

“The battle started early in the morning. The battalion's path to Chernushki was suddenly blocked by an enemy bunker. From its embrasure jets of fire hotly beat and smoke was carried out. The chain of fighters lay down. No attempts to destroy the forest enemy fortress were successful. Then he crawled up to the bunker and, instantly jumping up, closed his embrasure with his chest. Fascist machine gun stalled. And the battalion with a Russian battle cry rushed forward - to the village of Chernushki.

1) N.F. Gastello

2) V.V. Talalikhin

3) A.M. Sailors

4) V.G. Klochkov

18. The commanders of large partisan formations during the Great Patriotic War were

1) I.V. Panfilov and L.M. Dovator

2) A.N. Saburov and S.A. Kovpak

3) N.F. Vatutin and I.D. Chernyakhovsky

4) V.I. Chuikov and M.S. Shumilov

19. Read an excerpt from the memoirs of Marshal G.K. Zhukov and indicate when the event in question took place.

“Grateful descendants should never forget the labor heroic deeds of the Soviet people and the feats of arms not only of individual soldiers, but of entire formations in this most difficult period for our country.

Expressing my deep gratitude to all the survivors of the battle for Moscow, I bow my head to the blessed memory of those who stood to the death, who did not let the enemy into the heart of our Motherland, its capital, the hero city of Moscow. We are all indebted to them!”

1) in 1941–1942

2) in 1942–1943

3) in 1943–1944

4) in 1944–1945

20. Read an excerpt from the document and indicate the battle of the Great Patriotic War in question.

“The most important prerequisites for the defeat of the German troops in the operations Uranus, Little Saturn and Ring were the skillful organization of operational-tactical surprise, the correct choice of the direction of the main attacks, the precise determination of weak points in the enemy’s defense ... The victory of our troops marked the beginning of a radical change in the war in favor of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the mass expulsion of enemy troops from our territory.

1) Smolensk

2) Vistula - Oderskaya

3) Stalingradskaya

4) Moscow

21. A radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War was achieved as a result of the defeat of the fascist troops

1) near Moscow

2) near Stalingrad and on the Kursk Bulge

3) in East Prussia

4) in Belarus

22. The central event of the first period of the Great Patriotic War was the heroic battle for Moscow - an example of the courage and bravery of Soviet soldiers and officers.

Name three outcomes of the Moscow battle.

Indicate two names of the commanders of the fronts of the Red Army in this battle.

23. On June 22, 1941, the Nazi troops launched an offensive on the territory of the USSR. Despite heroic resistance, the Red Army retreated, suffering huge losses.

Name at least two reasons for the retreat of the Red Army in the initial period of the war.

24. A historical event during the Great Patriotic War was the execution on August 9, 1942 in the besieged besieged Leningrad
in the Great Hall of the symphony of D. D. Shostakovich. The performance was broadcast on the radio and received worldwide recognition as a symbol of the unbending will of the Soviet people, their invincibility. The theme of war and patriotism was also widely developed in Soviet literature.

Name three any names of writers and poets whose main theme of creativity was the events of the Great Patriotic War.

Name at least three literary works dedicated to the events of the Great Patriotic War.

25. During the Battle of Stalingrad

1) the largest tank battle took place near Prokhorovka

2) The Red Army fought heavy battles on the Seelow Heights

3) Orel and Belgorod were liberated

4) the defense of Pavlov's House took place