The battle for Stalingrad in terms of the duration and fierceness of the fighting, in terms of the number of people and military equipment participating, surpassed at that time all the battles of world history.
At certain stages, more than 2 million people, up to 2 thousand tanks, more than 2 thousand aircraft, up to 26 thousand guns participated in it on both sides. The fascist German troops lost more than 800 thousand soldiers and officers, as well as a large number of military equipment, weapons and equipment, killed, wounded, captured.
Defense of Stalingrad (now Volgograd)
In accordance with the plan of the summer offensive campaign of 1942, the German command, having concentrated large forces in the southwestern direction, expected to defeat the Soviet troops, go to the big bend of the Don, seize Stalingrad on the move and capture the Caucasus, and then resume the offensive in the Moscow direction.
For the attack on Stalingrad, the 6th Army (commander - Colonel General F. von Paulus) was allocated from Army Group B. By July 17, it included 13 divisions, in which there were about 270 thousand people, 3 thousand guns and mortars and about 500 tanks. They were supported by aviation of the 4th air fleet - up to 1200 combat aircraft.
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command moved the 62nd, 63rd and 64th armies from its reserve to the Stalingrad direction. On July 12, on the basis of the field administration of the troops of the Southwestern Front, the Stalingrad Front was created under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko. On July 23, Lieutenant General V.N. Gordov was appointed commander of the front. The front also included the 21st, 28th, 38th, 57th combined arms and 8th air armies of the former Southwestern Front, and from July 30 - the 51st Army of the North Caucasian Front. At the same time, the 57th, as well as the 38th and 28th armies, on the basis of which the 1st and 4th tank armies were formed, were in reserve. The Volga military flotilla was subordinated to the front commander.
The newly created front began to fulfill the task, having only 12 divisions, in which there were 160 thousand soldiers and commanders, 2.2 thousand guns and mortars and about 400 tanks, the 8th Air Army had 454 aircraft.
In addition, 150-200 long-range bombers and 60 air defense fighters were involved. In the initial period of defensive actions near Stalingrad, the enemy outnumbered the Soviet troops by 1.7 times in personnel, by 1.3 times in artillery and tanks, and by more than 2 times in the number of aircraft.
On July 14, 1942, Stalingrad was declared under martial law. Four defensive bypasses were built on the outskirts of the city: outer, middle, inner and city. The entire population, including children, was mobilized for the construction of defensive structures. The factories of Stalingrad completely switched to the production of military products. Militia units, self-defense work units were created at factories and enterprises. Civilians, equipment of individual enterprises and material values were evacuated to the left bank of the Volga.
Defensive battles began on the distant approaches to Stalingrad. The main efforts of the troops of the Stalingrad Front were concentrated in the large bend of the Don, where they occupied the defenses of the 62nd and 64th armies in order to prevent the enemy from forcing the river and breaking through it by the shortest route to Stalingrad. From July 17, the forward detachments of these armies fought defensive battles for 6 days at the turn of the Chir and Tsimla rivers. This allowed us to gain time to strengthen the defense at the main line. Despite the steadfastness, courage and perseverance shown by the troops, the armies of the Stalingrad Front failed to defeat the enemy groupings that had penetrated, and they had to retreat to the near approaches to the city.
On July 23-29, the 6th German Army made an attempt to encircle them with sweeping attacks on the flanks of the Soviet troops in the large bend of the Don, go to the Kalach region and break through to Stalingrad from the west. As a result of the stubborn defense of the 62nd and 64th armies and the counterattack of the formations of the 1st and 4th tank armies, the enemy's plan was thwarted.
Defense of Stalingrad. Photo: www.globallookpress.com
July 31, the German command turned the 4th Panzer Army Colonel General G. Goth from the Caucasus to the Stalingrad direction. On August 2, its advanced units reached Kotelnikovsky, creating a threat of a breakthrough to the city. Fighting began on the southwestern approaches to Stalingrad.
To facilitate the command and control of troops stretched out in a strip of 500 km, on August 7, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command formed a new one from several armies of the Stalingrad Front - the South-Eastern Front, the command of which was entrusted to Colonel General A. I. Eremenko. The main efforts of the Stalingrad Front were directed to the fight against the German 6th Army, which was advancing on Stalingrad from the west and northwest, and the South-Eastern Front was directed to the defense of the southwestern direction. On August 9-10, the troops of the South-Eastern Front launched a counterattack on the 4th Panzer Army and forced it to stop.
On August 21, the infantry of the 6th German Army crossed the Don and built bridges, after which the tank divisions moved to Stalingrad. At the same time, Gotha's tanks launched an offensive from the south and southwest. 23 August 4th Air Army von Richthofen subjected the city to a massive bombardment, dropping more than 1000 tons of bombs on the city.
Tank formations of the 6th Army moved towards the city, encountering almost no resistance, however, in the Gumrak area, they had to overcome the positions of anti-aircraft gun crews that had been put forward to fight the tanks until the evening. Nevertheless, on August 23, the 14th Panzer Corps of the 6th Army managed to break through to the Volga north of Stalingrad near the village of Latoshynka. The enemy wanted to break into the city on the move through its northern outskirts, however, along with the army units, self-defense units, the Stalingrad police, the 10th division of the NKVD troops, sailors of the Volga military flotilla, cadets of military schools stood up to defend the city.
The enemy's breakthrough to the Volga further complicated and worsened the position of the units defending the city. The Soviet command took measures to destroy the enemy grouping that had broken through to the Volga. Until September 10, the troops of the Stalingrad Front and the reserves of the Headquarters transferred to its structure launched continuous counterattacks from the north-west on the left flank of the 6th German Army. It was not possible to push the enemy back from the Volga, but the enemy offensive on the northwestern approaches to Stalingrad was suspended. The 62nd Army was cut off from the rest of the troops of the Stalingrad Front and was transferred to the South-Eastern Front.
Since September 12, the defense of Stalingrad was entrusted to the 62nd Army, commanded by General V. I. Chuikov, and troops of the 64th Army General M.S. Shumilov. On the same day, after another bombardment, German troops launched an attack on the city from all directions. In the north, the main target was Mamaev Kurgan, from the height of which the crossing over the Volga was clearly visible, in the center the German infantry made its way to the railway station, in the south, Goth's tanks, with the support of the infantry, gradually moved towards the elevator.
On September 13, the Soviet command decided to transfer the 13th Guards Rifle Division to the city. Having crossed the Volga for two nights, the guards threw back the German troops from the area of the central crossing over the Volga, cleared many streets and quarters of them. On September 16, the troops of the 62nd Army, with the support of aviation, stormed the Mamaev Kurgan. Fierce battles for the southern and central parts of the city continued until the end of the month.
On September 21, on the front from Mamaev Kurgan to the Zatsaritsyno part of the city, the Germans launched a new offensive with the forces of five divisions. A day later, on September 22, the 62nd Army was cut into two parts: the Germans reached the central crossing north of the Tsaritsa River. From here they had the opportunity to view almost the entire rear of the army and conduct an offensive along the coast, cutting off the Soviet units from the river.
By September 26, the Germans managed to come close to the Volga in almost all areas. Nevertheless, Soviet troops continued to hold a narrow strip of the coast, and in some places even separate buildings at some distance from the embankment. Many objects changed hands many times.
The fighting in the city took on a protracted character. The troops of Paulus lacked the strength to finally throw the defenders of the city into the Volga, and the Soviet ones - to dislodge the Germans from their positions.
The struggle was for each building, and sometimes for part of the building, floor or basement. Snipers were active. The use of aviation and artillery, due to the proximity of enemy formations, became almost impossible.
From September 27 to October 4, active hostilities were fought on the northern outskirts for the villages of the Krasny Oktyabr and Barrikady factories, and from October 4 - for these factories themselves.
At the same time, the Germans were attacking in the center on Mamaev Kurgan and on the extreme right flank of the 62nd Army in the Orlovka area. By the evening of September 27, Mamaev Kurgan fell. An extremely difficult situation developed in the area of the mouth of the Tsaritsa River, from where the Soviet units, experiencing an acute shortage of ammunition and food and losing control, began to cross over to the left bank of the Volga. The 62nd Army responded with counterattacks of the newly arriving reserves.
They were rapidly melting, however, the losses of the 6th Army took on catastrophic proportions.
It included almost all the armies of the Stalingrad Front, except for the 62nd. Commander was appointed General K. K. Rokossovsky. From the composition of the South-Eastern Front, whose troops fought in the city and to the south, the Stalingrad Front was formed under the command General A. I. Eremenko. Each front was directly subordinated to the Stavka.
Commander of the Don Front Konstantin Rokossovsky and General Pavel Batov (right) in a trench near Stalingrad. Photo reproduction. Photo: RIA Novosti
By the end of the first decade of October, enemy attacks began to weaken, but in the middle of the month Paulus launched a new assault. On October 14, the German troops, after powerful aviation and artillery preparation, again went on the attack.
Several divisions advanced on a sector of about 5 km. This offensive of the enemy, which lasted almost three weeks, led to the most fierce battle in the city.
On October 15, the Germans managed to capture the Stalingrad Tractor Plant and break through to the Volga, cutting the 62nd Army in half. After that, they launched an offensive along the banks of the Volga to the south. On October 17, the 138th division arrived in the army to support Chuikov's weakened formations. Fresh forces repelled enemy attacks, and from October 18, Paulus' ram began to noticeably lose its strength.
To alleviate the position of the 62nd Army, on October 19, troops from the Don Front went on the offensive from the area north of the city. The territorial success of the flank counterattacks was insignificant, but they delayed the regrouping undertaken by Paulus.
By the end of October, the offensive operations of the 6th Army slowed down, although in the area between the Barrikady and Krasny Oktyabr factories, no more than 400 m remained to go to the Volga. Nevertheless, the tension of the fighting weakened, and the Germans basically consolidated the captured positions.
November 11 was made the last attempt to capture the city. This time the offensive was carried out by the forces of five infantry and two tank divisions, reinforced by fresh engineer battalions. The Germans managed to capture another section of the coast with a length of 500-600 m in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Barricades plant, but this was the last success of the 6th Army.
In other sectors, Chuikov's troops held their positions.
The offensive of the German troops in the Stalingrad direction was finally stopped.
By the end of the defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad, the 62nd Army held the area north of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the Barrikady plant, and the northeastern quarters of the city center. The 64th Army defended the approaches.
During the period of defensive battles for Stalingrad, the Wehrmacht, according to Soviet data, lost in July - November up to 700 thousand soldiers and officers killed and wounded, more than 1000 tanks, over 2000 guns and mortars, more than 1400 aircraft. The total losses of the Red Army in the Stalingrad defensive operation amounted to 643,842 people, 1,426 tanks, 12,137 guns and mortars, and 2,063 aircraft.
Soviet troops exhausted and bled the enemy grouping operating near Stalingrad, which created favorable conditions for a counteroffensive.
Stalingrad offensive operation
By the autumn of 1942, the technical re-equipment of the Red Army had been basically completed. At the factories located in the deep rear and evacuated, mass production of new military equipment was launched, which not only was not inferior, but often surpassed the equipment and weapons of the Wehrmacht. During the past battles, Soviet troops gained combat experience. The moment had come when it was necessary to wrest the initiative from the enemy and begin mass expulsion of him from the borders of the Soviet Union.
With the participation of the military councils of the fronts at Headquarters, a plan for the Stalingrad offensive operation was developed.
The Soviet troops were to launch a decisive counter-offensive on a front of 400 km, encircle and destroy the enemy strike force concentrated in the Stalingrad area. This task was assigned to the troops of three fronts - the South-Western ( Commander General N. F. Vatutin), Donskoy ( Commander General K. K. Rokossovsky) and Stalingrad ( Commander General A. I. Eremenko).
The forces of the parties were approximately equal, although in tanks, artillery and aviation, the Soviet troops already had a slight superiority over the enemy. Under such conditions, in order to successfully complete the operation, it was necessary to create a significant superiority in forces in the directions of the main attacks, which was achieved with great skill. The success was ensured primarily due to the fact that special attention was paid to operational camouflage. The troops moved to the assigned positions only at night, while the radio stations of the units remained in the same places, continuing to work, so that the enemy had the impression that the units remained in their previous positions. All correspondence was forbidden, and orders were given only orally, and only to direct executors.
The Soviet command concentrated more than a million people on the direction of the main attack in a 60 km sector, supported by 900 T-34 tanks that had just rolled off the assembly line. Such a concentration of military equipment at the front has never happened before.
One of the centers of fighting in Stalingrad is an elevator. Photo: www.globallookpress.com
The German command did not show due attention to the position of its Army Group "B", because. was waiting for the offensive of the Soviet troops against the Army Group "Center".
Group B Commander General Weichs did not agree with this opinion. He was worried about the bridgehead prepared by the enemy on the right bank of the Don opposite his formations. According to his insistent demands, by the end of October, several newly formed Luftwaffe field units were transferred to the Don in order to strengthen the defensive positions of the Italian, Hungarian and Romanian formations.
Weichs' predictions were confirmed in early November when aerial reconnaissance photographs showed the presence of several new crossings in the area. Two days later, Hitler ordered the transfer of the 6th Panzer and two infantry divisions from the English Channel to Army Group B as reserve reinforcements for the 8th Italian and 3rd Romanian armies. It took about five weeks for their preparation and transfer to Russia. Hitler, however, did not expect any significant action from the enemy until early December, so he calculated that reinforcements should have arrived in time.
By the second week of November, with the appearance of Soviet tank units on the bridgehead, Weichs no longer doubted that a major offensive was being prepared in the zone of the 3rd Romanian army, which, possibly, would also be directed against the German 4th tank army. Since all of his reserves were at Stalingrad, Weichs decided to form a new grouping as part of the 48th Panzer Corps, which he placed behind the 3rd Romanian Army. He also transferred the 3rd Romanian armored division to this corps and was about to transfer the 29th motorized division of the 4th tank army there, but changed his mind, because he also expected an offensive in the area where the Gota formations were located. However, all the efforts made by Weichs turned out to be clearly insufficient, and the High Command was more interested in building up the power of the 6th Army for the decisive battle for Stalingrad than in strengthening the weak flanks of General Weichs's formations.
On November 19, at 0850, after a powerful, almost one and a half hour artillery preparation, despite the fog and heavy snowfall, the troops of the Southwestern and Don fronts, located northwest of Stalingrad, went on the offensive. The 5th Panzer, 1st Guards and 21st Armies acted against the 3rd Romanian.
Only one 5th tank army in its composition consisted of six rifle divisions, two tank corps, one cavalry corps and several artillery, aviation and anti-aircraft missile regiments. Due to a sharp deterioration in weather conditions, aviation was inactive.
It also turned out that during the artillery preparation, the enemy’s firepower was not completely suppressed, which is why the offensive of the Soviet troops at some point slowed down. After assessing the situation, the commander of the Southwestern Front, Lieutenant-General N.F. Vatutin, decided to bring tank corps into battle, which made it possible to finally crack the Romanian defense and develop the offensive.
On the Don Front, especially fierce battles unfolded in the offensive zone of the right-flank formations of the 65th Army. The first two lines of enemy trenches, passing along the coastal hills, were captured on the move. However, decisive battles unfolded behind the third line, which took place along the chalk heights. They were a powerful defense center. The location of the heights made it possible to fire at all the approaches to them with crossfire. All the hollows and steep slopes of the heights were mined and covered with barbed wire, and the approaches to them crossed deep and winding ravines. The Soviet infantry that reached this line was forced to lie down under heavy fire from the dismounted units of the Romanian cavalry division, reinforced by German units.
The enemy carried out violent counterattacks, trying to push the attackers back to their original position. At that moment it was not possible to get around the heights, and after a powerful artillery raid, the soldiers of the 304th Infantry Division stormed the enemy fortifications. Despite the hurricane of machine-gun and automatic fire, by 4 p.m. the enemy's stubborn resistance had been broken.
As a result of the first day of the offensive, the troops of the Southwestern Front achieved the greatest success. They broke through the defenses in two areas: southwest of the city of Serafimovich and in the Kletskaya area. A gap up to 16 km wide was formed in the enemy defenses.
On November 20, south of Stalingrad, the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. This came as a complete surprise to the Germans. The offensive of the Stalingrad Front also began in adverse weather conditions.
It was decided to begin artillery preparation in each army as soon as the necessary conditions for this were created. It was necessary to abandon its simultaneous conduct on the scale of the front, however, as well as from aviation training. Due to limited visibility, it was necessary to fire at unobservable targets, with the exception of those guns that were launched for direct fire. Despite this, the enemy's fire system was largely disrupted.
Soviet soldiers are fighting in the streets. Photo: www.globallookpress.com
After the artillery preparation, which lasted 40-75 minutes, the formations of the 51st and 57th armies went on the offensive.
Having broken through the defenses of the 4th Romanian army and repelled numerous counterattacks, they began to develop success in the western direction. By the middle of the day, conditions were created for the introduction of army mobile groups into the breakthrough.
The rifle formations of the armies advanced after the mobile groups, consolidating the success achieved.
To close the gap, the command of the 4th Romanian army had to bring into battle its last reserve - two regiments of the 8th cavalry division. But even this could not save the situation. The front collapsed, and the remnants of the Romanian troops fled.
The incoming reports painted a bleak picture: the front was cut, the Romanians were fleeing the battlefield, the counterattack of the 48th Panzer Corps was thwarted.
The Red Army went on the offensive south of Stalingrad, and the 4th Romanian Army, which was defending there, was defeated.
The Luftwaffe command reported that due to bad weather, aviation could not support ground troops. On the operational maps, the prospect of encirclement of the 6th Wehrmacht Army clearly loomed. The red arrows of the blows of the Soviet troops hung dangerously over its flanks and were about to close in the area between the Volga and the Don. In the course of almost continuous meetings at Hitler's headquarters, there was a feverish search for a way out of the situation. It was necessary to urgently make a decision about the fate of the 6th Army. Hitler himself, as well as Keitel and Jodl, considered it necessary to hold positions in the Stalingrad region and confine themselves to a regrouping of forces. The leadership of the OKH and the command of Army Group "B" found the only way to avoid disaster in withdrawing the troops of the 6th Army beyond the Don. However, Hitler's position was categorical. As a result, it was decided to transfer two tank divisions from the North Caucasus to Stalingrad.
The Wehrmacht command still hoped to stop the offensive of the Soviet troops with counterattacks by tank formations. The 6th Army was ordered to remain where it was. Hitler assured her command that he would not allow the encirclement of the army, and if it did happen, he would take all measures to unblock it.
While the German command was looking for ways to prevent the impending catastrophe, the Soviet troops developed the success achieved. A subdivision of the 26th Panzer Corps, during a daring night operation, managed to capture the only surviving crossing over the Don near the town of Kalach. The capture of this bridge was of great operational importance. The rapid overcoming of this large water barrier by the Soviet troops ensured the successful completion of the operation to encircle the enemy troops near Stalingrad.
By the end of November 22, the troops of the Stalingrad and Southwestern fronts were separated by only 20-25 km. On the evening of November 22, Stalin ordered the commander of the Stalingrad Front, Yeryomenko, to join tomorrow with the advanced troops of the Southwestern Front, which had reached Kalach, and close the encirclement.
Anticipating such a development of events and in order to prevent the complete encirclement of the 6th field army, the German command urgently transferred the 14th tank corps to the area east of Kalach. Throughout the night of November 23 and the first half of the next day, units of the Soviet 4th mechanized corps held back the onslaught of enemy tank units rushing south and did not let them through.
The commander of the 6th Army already at 18 o'clock on November 22 radioed to the headquarters of Army Group "B" that the army was surrounded, the situation with ammunition was critical, fuel supplies were running out, and food was enough for only 12 days. Since the command of the Wehrmacht on the Don did not have any forces that could release the encircled army, Paulus turned to the Headquarters with a request for an independent breakthrough from the encirclement. However, his request went unanswered.
Red Army soldier with a banner. Photo: www.globallookpress.com
Instead, he was ordered to immediately go to the boiler, where to organize an all-round defense and wait for help from outside.
On November 23, the troops of all three fronts continued the offensive. On this day, the operation reached its climax.
Two brigades of the 26th Panzer Corps crossed the Don and launched an offensive against Kalach in the morning. A stubborn battle ensued. The enemy fiercely resisted, realizing the importance of holding this city. Nevertheless, by 2 p.m., he was driven out of Kalach, which housed the main supply base for the entire Stalingrad group. All the numerous warehouses with fuel, ammunition, food and other military equipment located there were either destroyed by the Germans themselves or captured by Soviet troops.
At about 4 p.m. on November 23, the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts met in the Sovetsky area, thus completing the encirclement of the enemy's Stalingrad grouping. Despite the fact that instead of the planned two or three days, the operation took five days, the success was achieved.
An oppressive atmosphere reigned at Hitler's headquarters after the news of the encirclement of the 6th Army was received. Despite the obviously disastrous situation of the 6th Army, Hitler did not even want to hear about the abandonment of Stalingrad, because. in this case, all the successes of the summer offensive in the south would have been nullified, and with them all hopes for conquering the Caucasus would have disappeared. In addition, it was believed that the battle with the superior forces of Soviet troops in the open field, in harsh winter conditions, with limited means of transportation, fuel and ammunition supplies, had too little chance of a favorable outcome. Therefore, it is better to gain a foothold in the positions occupied and strive to unblock the grouping. This point of view was supported by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Reichsmarschall G. Goering, who assured the Führer that his aircraft would supply the encircled group by air. On the morning of November 24, the 6th Army was ordered to take up an all-round defense and wait for a deblocking offensive from the outside.
Violent passions also flared up at the headquarters of the 6th Army on November 23. The encirclement ring around the 6th Army had just closed, and a decision had to be made urgently. There was still no response to Paulus's radiogram, in which he requested "freedom of action". But Paulus hesitated to take responsibility for the breakthrough. By his order, the corps commanders gathered for a meeting at the army headquarters in order to work out a plan for further actions.
Commander of the 51st Army Corps General W. Seidlitz-Kurzbach called for an immediate breakthrough. He was supported by the commander of the 14th Panzer Corps General G. Hube.
But most of the corps commanders, led by the chief of staff of the army General A. Schmidt spoke out against. Things got to the point that in the course of a heated dispute, the infuriated commander of the 8th Army Corps General W. Gates threatened to personally shoot Seydlitz if he insisted on disobeying the Fuhrer. In the end, everyone agreed that Hitler should be approached for permission to break through. At 23:45, such a radiogram was sent. The answer came the next morning. In it, the troops of the 6th Army, surrounded in Stalingrad, were called "troops of the fortress of Stalingrad", and the breakthrough was denied. Paulus again gathered the corps commanders and brought them the order of the Fuhrer.
Some of the generals tried to express their counterarguments, but the army commander rejected all objections.
An urgent transfer of troops from Stalingrad began to the western sector of the front. In a short time, the enemy managed to create a grouping of six divisions. In order to pin down his forces in Stalingrad itself, on November 23, the 62nd Army of General V.I. Chuikov went on the offensive. Its troops attacked the Germans on the Mamayev Kurgan and in the area of the Krasny Oktyabr plant, but met with fierce resistance. The depth of their advancement during the day did not exceed 100-200 m.
By November 24, the encirclement was thin, an attempt to break through it could bring success, it was only necessary to remove troops from the Volga front. But Paulus was a too cautious and indecisive person, a general who was used to obeying and accurately weighing his actions. He obeyed the order. Subsequently, he confessed to the officers of his headquarters: “It is possible that the daredevil Reichenau after November 19, he would have made his way to the west with the 6th Army and then told Hitler: "Now you can judge me." But, you know, unfortunately, I'm not Reichenau."
On November 27, the Fuhrer ordered Field Marshal von Manstein prepare the deblockade of the 6th field army. Hitler relied on new heavy tanks - "Tigers", hoping that they would be able to break through the encirclement from the outside. Despite the fact that these machines had not yet been tested in combat and no one knew how they would behave in the conditions of the Russian winter, he believed that even one battalion of "Tigers" could radically change the situation near Stalingrad.
While Manstein received reinforcements from the Caucasus and prepared the operation, Soviet troops expanded the outer ring and fortified it. When on December 12 Panzer Group Gotha made a breakthrough, it was able to break through the positions of the Soviet troops, and its advanced units were separated from Paulus by less than 50 km. But Hitler forbade Friedrich Paulus to expose the Volga Front and, leaving Stalingrad, to make his way towards the “tigers” of Goth, which finally decided the fate of the 6th Army.
By January 1943, the enemy was driven back from the Stalingrad "cauldron" by 170-250 km. The death of the encircled troops became inevitable. Almost the entire territory occupied by them was shot through by Soviet artillery fire. Despite Goering's promise, in practice, the average daily aviation capacity in supplying the 6th Army could not exceed 100 tons instead of the required 500. In addition, the delivery of goods to the encircled groups in Stalingrad and other "boilers" caused huge losses in German aviation.
The ruins of the fountain "Barmaley" - which has become one of the symbols of Stalingrad. Photo: www.globallookpress.com
On January 10, 1943, Colonel General Paulus, despite the hopeless situation of his army, refused to capitulate, trying to tie down the Soviet troops surrounding him as much as possible. On the same day, the Red Army launched an operation to destroy the 6th field army of the Wehrmacht. In the last days of January, Soviet troops pushed the remnants of Paulus's army into a small area of the completely destroyed city and dismembered the Wehrmacht units that continued to defend. On January 24, 1943, General Paulus sent one of the last radiograms to Hitler, in which he reported that the group was on the verge of destruction and offered to evacuate valuable specialists. Hitler again forbade the remnants of the 6th Army to break through to his own and refused to take out of the "cauldron" anyone except the wounded.
On the night of January 31, the 38th motorized rifle brigade and the 329th sapper battalion blocked the area of the department store where Paulus' headquarters was located. The last radiogram received by the commander of the 6th Army was an order for his promotion to field marshal, which the headquarters regarded as an invitation to suicide. Early in the morning, two Soviet parliamentarians made their way into the basement of a dilapidated building and handed over an ultimatum to the field marshal. In the afternoon, Paulus rose to the surface and went to the headquarters of the Don Front, where Rokossovsky was waiting for him with the text of surrender. However, despite the fact that the field marshal surrendered and signed the capitulation, in the northern part of Stalingrad the German garrison under the command of Colonel General Stecker refused to accept the terms of surrender and was destroyed by concentrated heavy artillery fire. At 16.00 on February 2, 1943, the terms of surrender of the 6th field army of the Wehrmacht came into force.
The Hitlerite government declared mourning in the country.
For three days, the funeral ringing of church bells sounded over German cities and villages.
Since the Great Patriotic War, Soviet historical literature has claimed that a 330,000-strong enemy grouping was surrounded in the Stalingrad area, although this figure is not confirmed by any documentary data.
The point of view of the German side on this issue is ambiguous. However, with all the scatter of opinions, the figure of 250-280 thousand people is most often called. This value is consistent with the total number of evacuees (25,000 people), captured (91,000 people), and enemy soldiers killed and buried in the battle area (about 160,000). The vast majority of those who surrendered also died from hypothermia and typhus, and after almost 12 years in Soviet camps, only 6,000 people returned to their homeland.
Kotelnikovskaya operation Having completed the encirclement of a large group of German troops near Stalingrad, the troops of the 51st Army of the Stalingrad Front (commander - Colonel-General A. I. Eremenko) in November 1942 came from the north to the approaches to the village of Kotelnikovsky, where they entrenched themselves and went on the defensive.
The German command made every effort to break through the corridor to the 6th Army surrounded by Soviet troops. For this purpose, in early December, in the area of the village. Kotelnikovsky, an attack group was created consisting of 13 divisions (including 3 tank and 1 motorized) and a number of reinforcement units under the command of Colonel-General G. Goth - the Goth army group. The group included a battalion of heavy Tiger tanks, which were first used on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. In the direction of the main attack, which was inflicted along the Kotelnikovsky-Stalingrad railway, the enemy managed to create a temporary advantage over the defending troops of the 51st Army in men and artillery by 2 times, and in terms of the number of tanks - more than 6 times.
They broke through the defenses of the Soviet troops and on the second day they reached the area of the village of Verkhnekumsky. In order to divert part of the forces of the strike force, on December 14, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Nizhnechirskaya, the 5th Shock Army of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. She broke through the German defenses and captured the village, but the position of the 51st Army remained difficult. The enemy continued the offensive, while the army and the front no longer had any reserves left. The Soviet Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, in an effort to prevent the enemy from breaking through and releasing the encircled German troops, allocated the 2nd Guards Army and the mechanized corps from its reserve to reinforce the Stalingrad Front, setting them the task of defeating the enemy strike force.
On December 19, having suffered significant losses, the Goth group reached the Myshkova River. 35-40 km remained before the encircled grouping, however, Paulus' troops were ordered to remain in their positions and not strike a counterattack, and Goth could no longer move further.
On December 24, having jointly created approximately double superiority over the enemy, the 2nd Guards and 51st Armies, with the assistance of part of the forces of the 5th Shock Army, went on the offensive. The 2nd Guards Army delivered the main blow towards the Kotelnikov group with fresh forces. The 51st Army was advancing on Kotelnikovsky from the east, while enveloping the Gotha group from the south with tank and mechanized corps. On the first day of the offensive, the troops of the 2nd Guards Army broke through the enemy's battle formations and captured the crossings across the Myshkova River. Mobile formations were introduced into the breakthrough, which began to rapidly move towards Kotelnikovsky.
On December 27, the 7th Panzer Corps came out to Kotelnikovsky from the west, and the 6th Mechanized Corps bypassed Kotelnikovsky from the southeast. At the same time, the tank and mechanized corps of the 51st Army cut off the enemy grouping's escape route to the southwest. Continuous strikes against the retreating enemy troops were carried out by aircraft of the 8th Air Army. On December 29, Kotelnikovsky was released and the threat of an enemy breakthrough was finally eliminated.
As a result of the Soviet counter-offensive, the enemy's attempt to release the 6th Army encircled near Stalingrad was thwarted, and the German troops were thrown back from the outer front of the encirclement by 200-250 km.
Stalingrad Front
It was formed on July 12, 1942 to organize defense in the Stalingrad direction as part of the 62nd, 63rd and 64th armies from the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the 21st army and the 8th air army from the abolished South-Western Front. The administration was formed on the basis of the administration of the Southwestern Front. Subsequently, at various times, the Stalingrad Front included the 28th, 38th, 57th, 51st, 66th, 24th, 1st and 2nd Guards, 5th Shock combined arms armies, 1st and 4th tank armies, 16th air army. The Volga military flotilla and the Stalingrad air defense corps area were operationally subordinate to him. By July 17, the front took up defensive positions in a strip of more than 500 kilometers at the turn of the middle reaches of the Don and in its large bend from Kletskaya to Verkhnekurmoyarskaya. After the breakthrough by the Nazi troops of the Soviet front in the southwestern direction, the troops of the Stalingrad Front took the blow of a strong enemy grouping (the Battle of Stalingrad 1942-43). Due to the increased width of the defense zone (about 800 km), the Stalingrad Front was divided on August 7 into the Stalingrad (63rd, 21st and 62nd Armies, 4th Tank Army, 16th Air Army) and the South-Eastern front. In the defensive battle near Stalingrad, the troops of the Stalingrad Front, in cooperation with the troops of the South-Eastern and Don Fronts, exhausted the enemy, held the city and created the prerequisites for the Soviet troops to go on the offensive. By the decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of September 28, the Stalingrad Front was renamed the Don Front, and the South-Eastern Front - the Stalingrad as part of the 28th, 51st, 57th, 62nd, 64th combined arms armies and the 8th air army. Since December, it included the 5th Shock and 2nd Guards armies. On November 20, the troops of the Stalingrad Front launched a counteroffensive and on November 23, in cooperation with the troops of the Southwestern Front, they surrounded the 330,000-strong group of Nazi troops near Stalingrad. From December 12 to 30, they carried out the Kotelnikovskaya operation of 1942, as a result of which they repelled the enemy’s attempt to release the German fascist troops surrounded near Stalingrad and defeated his Kotelnikovskaya group. On January 1, 1943, the Stalingrad Front was transformed into the Southern Front.Commanders:
S. K. Timoshenko (July), Marshal of the Soviet Union;
V. N. Gordov (July - August), lieutenant general;
A. I. Eremenko (August - December), Colonel General.
Member of the Military Council:
N. S. Khrushchev.
Chiefs of Staff:
P. I. Bodin (July), lieutenant general;
D. N. Nikishev (July - September), major general;
K. A. Kovalenko (September), major general;
G. F. Zakharov (September - October), major general;
I. S. Varennikov (October - December), October - December.
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Taking into account the tasks to be solved, the peculiarities of the conduct of hostilities by the parties, the spatial and temporal scale, as well as the results, the Battle of Stalingrad includes two periods: defensive - from July 17 to November 18, 1942; offensive - from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943
The strategic defensive operation in the Stalingrad direction lasted 125 days and nights and included two stages. The first stage is the conduct of defensive combat operations by the troops of the fronts on the distant approaches to Stalingrad (July 17 - September 12). The second stage is the conduct of defensive operations to hold Stalingrad (September 13 - November 18, 1942).
The German command delivered the main blow with the forces of the 6th Army in the direction of Stalingrad along the shortest path through the large bend of the Don from the west and southwest, just in the defense zones of the 62nd (commander - major general, from August 3 - lieutenant general , from September 6 - major general, from September 10 - lieutenant general) and the 64th (commander - lieutenant general V.I. Chuikov, from August 4 - lieutenant general) armies. The operational initiative was in the hands of the German command with almost double superiority in forces and means.
Defensive combat operations by the troops of the fronts on the distant approaches to Stalingrad (July 17 - September 12)
The first stage of the operation began on July 17, 1942, in a large bend of the Don, with combat contact between units of the 62nd Army and the forward detachments of German troops. Fierce battles ensued. The enemy had to deploy five divisions out of fourteen and spend six days to approach the main line of defense of the troops of the Stalingrad Front. However, under the onslaught of superior enemy forces, Soviet troops were forced to retreat to new, poorly equipped or even unequipped lines. But even under these conditions, they inflicted significant losses on the enemy.
By the end of July, the situation in the Stalingrad direction continued to be very tense. German troops deeply covered both flanks of the 62nd Army, reached the Don in the Nizhne-Chirskaya area, where the 64th Army held the defense, and created the threat of a breakthrough to Stalingrad from the southwest.
Due to the increased width of the defense zone (about 700 km), by the decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the Stalingrad Front, commanded by Lieutenant General from July 23, was divided on August 5 into the Stalingrad and South-Eastern Fronts. In order to achieve closer interaction between the troops of both fronts, from August 9, the leadership of the defense of Stalingrad was united in one hand, in connection with which the Stalingrad Front was subordinated to the commander of the troops of the South-Eastern Front, Colonel General.
By mid-November, the advance of the German troops was stopped on the entire front. The enemy was forced to finally go on the defensive. This was the end of the strategic defensive operation of the Battle of Stalingrad. The troops of the Stalingrad, South-Eastern and Don fronts fulfilled their tasks, holding back the powerful offensive of the enemy in the Stalingrad direction, creating the prerequisites for a counteroffensive.
During the defensive battles, the Wehrmacht suffered huge losses. In the struggle for Stalingrad, the enemy lost about 700,000 killed and wounded, over 2,000 guns and mortars, over 1,000 tanks and assault guns, and over 1,400 combat and transport aircraft. Instead of a non-stop advance to the Volga, the enemy troops were drawn into protracted, exhausting battles in the Stalingrad region. The plan of the German command for the summer of 1942 was frustrated. At the same time, the Soviet troops also suffered heavy losses in personnel - 644 thousand people, of which 324 thousand people were irretrievable, and 320 thousand were sanitary people. The losses of weapons amounted to: about 1400 tanks, more than 12 thousand guns and mortars and more than 2 thousand aircraft.
Soviet troops continued to advance
STALINGRAD FRONT, formed on July 12, 1942 to organize defense against Stalingrad. in the direction of the 62nd, 63rd and 64th A from the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, 21st A and 8th VA from the abolished on July 12 Yugo Zap. fr. Management is formed on the basis of management ... ... Great Patriotic War 1941-1945: Encyclopedia
Front (military), 1) the highest operational association of the armed forces in the continental theater of operations. Designed to perform operational and operational strategic tasks at one of the strategic or several operating ... ...
I (German Front, French front, from Latin frons, genitive frontis forehead, front side) 1) association of political parties, trade unions and other organizations to fight for common goals. 2) A place, a site where at the same time ... ... Great Soviet Encyclopedia
From the first days of the Great Patriotic War, on the basis of the military districts of the western part of the Soviet Union, the deployment of fronts began, as an operational strategic association of units and formations of the Red Army. By June 25, 1941, 5 was formed ... ... Wikipedia
Anti-aircraft guidance group ... Wikipedia
This page is proposed to be renamed Front (military association). Explanation of reasons and discussion on the Wikipedia page: To rename / March 28, 2012. Perhaps its current name does not comply with the norms of modern Russian ... ... Wikipedia
This term has other meanings, see Front. The front is the highest operational-strategic association of troops (forces), designed to conduct strategic operations to destroy large enemy groupings or defenses ... ... Wikipedia
This term has other meanings, see South Eastern Front. South Eastern Front Years of existence August 5, 1942 September 28, 1942 Country ... Wikipedia
Books
- Stalingrad. There is no land for us beyond the Volga (Second edition, supplemented and revised), Isaev A.V. In the book of Alexei Isaev, this battle appears in all its grandiose scale - here ...
- Victory Parade, Valentin Varennikov. The author of the book "Victory Parade", Army General Valentin Ivanovich Varennikov, Hero of the Soviet Union, an outstanding military leader, laureate of the Lenin Prize, in 1942 was appointed to ...
By August 10-11, an exceptionally difficult situation had developed on the left wing of the Stalingrad Front. The 62nd Army of Lieutenant General A.I. Lopatin fought west of Kalach on the western bank of the Don. Part of its forces (up to three divisions), inflicting a counterattack, inflicted significant losses on the enemy, but it itself was squeezed from three sides and fought hard battles on the way out of the semi-encirclement. By August 14, the main forces of the army reached the eastern bank of the Don, where they took up defensive positions on the outer contour. The further advance of the enemy was halted here by organized fire and stubborn resistance of the troops, but the situation still remained critical, since, having increased their forces, the Nazis intended to deliver an even more powerful blow here just at the time when the grouping of the troops of the front did not correspond to the prevailing situation. In connection with a certain withdrawal of forces to the north, we had no reserves in the direction of the main enemy attack.
I had to report this to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Her decision was somewhat unexpected.
On August 13, late in the evening, an order from the Headquarters was received from Bodo, which stated that the commander of the South-Eastern Front was also appointed commander of the Stalingrad Front (concurrently), and Comrade Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev was appointed a member of the Military Council of both fronts. In connection with this appointment, naturally, the range of duties and scope of work of the command increased, so Comrade F. I. Golikov was appointed deputy commander for the South-Eastern Front, and Major General K. S. Moskalenko became commander of the 1st Guards Army. At the same time, the commander of the 10th division, Colonel A. A. Saraev, who was directly subordinate to the command of the South-Eastern Front, was appointed head of the garrison of the city of Stalingrad, Lieutenant General Gordov was appointed deputy commander for the Stalingrad Front.
On the night of August 14, I went to the headquarters of the Stalingrad Front in order to get acquainted in detail with the position of the troops, and first of all with the grouping of forces and means. The main means of reinforcing the Stalingrad Front were concentrated on the right wing, in the sector of the 21st Army across the Don River, east of Serafimovich. There were two artillery regiments of the reserve of the High Command, two separate tank battalions, each of which was equal to a tank brigade, mortar guards regiments and several anti-tank regiments, that is, the main means of fighting against tanks. The enemy pressed on the 62nd Army and was preparing to strike at the units of General V. D. Kryuchenko (4th Panzer Army), in order to reach the Don River, in the easternmost part of its bend. Moreover, the enemy's transition to the offensive from the sector where he concentrated was likely already tomorrow, that is, on August 15th. There was almost nothing to keep him here. Nikita Sergeevich and I immediately reported to Stavka about the real state of affairs. At the same time, they issued an order for a hasty regrouping of troops, which began immediately. The regrouping required a minimum of 30-40 hours of time. But will the enemy give us this watch? Since a strike could follow immediately, an order was given to withdraw several formations from the South-Eastern Front in order to strengthen the composition of our troops in the threatened sector. The enemy really did not give us even 12 hours of time, starting his offensive at dawn on August 15 against the troops of the 4th Panzer Army, and struck in the direction of Trekhostrovskaya.
Units that were transferred from the right wing of the Stalingrad Front to new areas immediately entered the battle and repelled enemy attacks. Most of them, even with incredible tension, did not manage to arrive on time. The units released from the South-Eastern Front also could not fully arrive.
The enemy had a huge superiority in tanks, artillery and aircraft. The latter did not leave the battlefield for a minute and continuously bombed our battle formations. This allowed the Nazis by the end of the day on August 15 to reach the Don in a large area - from Trekhostrovskaya to Bolshenabatovsky. Thus, they solved their immediate task, which, as it now became completely clear, was to take up a starting position for forcing the Don River. In order to save the situation here, in order to localize the success of the enemy, who was constantly accumulating his forces, five anti-tank regiments, three rifle divisions, two brigades and one hundred tanks had to be taken from the South-Eastern Front.
As a result of the fighting from August 15 to 17, the troops of the 4th Panzer Army with their left flank retreated to the Don line on the outer defensive bypass. To the right of the tank army, three divisions of the 1st Guards Army under the command of Major General K. S. Moskalenko, which had previously been transferred from the Stavka reserve to the South-Eastern Front, entered the battle. The troops of the 1st Guards Army and other units advanced here from the South-Eastern Front stopped the enemy advance in their sector, retaining a foothold on the right bank of the Don.
K. S. Moskalenko, who led the 1st Tank Army, and then the 1st Guards Army, successfully led the troops in the extremely difficult conditions of the first stages of the battle, when the troops of the armies, not having time to complete the concentration, were forced to engage in unequal fierce battles with the enemy. Commander's will, decisiveness, personal heroism of the commander have more than once played an important role in the accomplishment of the combat missions assigned to the troops.
The leadership of the two fronts, especially in the initial period, required an enormous effort, since the amount of work was very large. An extraordinary situation has arisen in command and control of the troops. With one commander and one member of the Military Council, there were two equivalent headquarters, two very large front-line departments. This greatly complicated the entire system of command and control of troops.
If the command of a direction or a group of fronts was usually carried out through a relatively small headquarters, which was an operational group of qualified general staff officers, then under the circumstances it was necessary to lead through two parallel headquarters. Not to mention anything else, even technically, the implementation of the functions of leading the troops required twice as much time.
Orders, directives, orders, as a rule, were issued in two versions (for one and the other front), being prepared by two different headquarters. I had to hear two chiefs of staff, two heads of intelligence departments, two artillerymen, two tankers, two air force commanders, two engineers, two deputies for logistics. Only deputies on two fronts were recruited up to twelve people. But we needed not only to listen to everyone, but also to give instructions, to control their implementation. It is clear that all these orders, instructions could be exhaustive only if they were based on accurate knowledge at any moment of all the data about each unit, from the morale of its personnel to the availability and condition of equipment, weapons, ammunition and etc., accurate knowledge of enemy data. The desire to always be aware of all questions concerning both fronts forced Nikita Sergeevich and me to exert all our energy and, regardless of anything, not for a minute lose contact with the troops. With all this, it was impossible to allow our personal work to in any way hinder or slow down the implementation of the decisions taken and the preparation of new measures. Under those conditions, it was extremely necessary that the activities of a member of the Military Council and the commander should activate subordinates, awaken their initiative, and not give them the opportunity to calm down.
Now it is difficult to imagine the entire amount of work that had to be done daily at that time. Of course, this was an exceptional case; in the past, this situation had no precedent. It is undoubtedly easier to manage eight or ten armies united in one front than seven armies divided between two fronts.
We - the "Military Council of the Two Fronts" - at the beginning of the command, an invaluable service in command and control was rendered by the fact that Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, being near Stalingrad from the beginning of the battle, knew the troops and command and political staff best of all. It must be added to this that Nikita Sergeevich's seething energy, his ability to work with people and correctly note the positive aspects and shortcomings in work, his high partisanship in business and in everything, were a good example for all of us.
The main function of directing the troops of the front was supplemented by the work caused by the subordination of the fronts of the former Stalingrad military district and the imposition on us of responsibility for the defense of Astrakhan and the Astrakhan direction. Despite all this, the centralization of command and control of the troops of the two fronts was expedient in that situation and facilitated the solution of the most important task of organizing the interaction of forces and means in general, and especially at the junction of them, on the flanks.
The unification of the command of the fronts made it possible to more flexibly interact and maneuver forces and means on the scale of the two fronts, in essence, in the strategic direction, which played a very significant role in the fulfillment by the troops of both fronts of the task of holding the city, crushing the enemy's strike groups and preparing the conditions for a counteroffensive. Coordination in the implementation of operational decisions, the organization of reconnaissance, and the material support of the troops (which presented particular difficulty in the conditions of Stalingrad due to the fact that the rear was beyond the Volga) was also of great positive significance.
The command of the two fronts paid the most serious attention to the political education of the troops. At the most critical moments of the battle, orders were given, appeals of a political nature were distributed in such a way that around them it was possible to deploy extensive explanatory and agitation-mass work, so that as a result of it, as they say, it would reach the heart of every Stalingrad soldier. The Council of Fronts considered one of its decisive tasks to be in close contact with the troops, constantly probing their combat pulse.
Thus, the fact that the command of the two fronts was united, in general, should be considered positive.
The need for a complete separation of the fronts arose much later, in preparation for the counteroffensive, around the end of September 1942, when the former Stalingrad Front was to closely cooperate with the newly created Southwestern Front. Later, on September 30, 1942, the front, located north of Stalingrad, was renamed the Donskoy and transferred to the subordination of the new commander, and the South-Eastern Front, which had defended Stalingrad all the time, received the name Stalingrad and remained under my subordination.
During the struggle for Stalingrad, a lot of time had to be devoted to the organization of intelligence. I heard daily reports on newly received data on the enemy. With these reports, the head of intelligence of the front and the commander of the Air Force or his chief of staff came to me. Since things were not going well with intelligence, it was necessary, starting from mid-August, to pay close attention to intelligence issues.
The fact is that the commanders of regiments, divisions and headquarters, and sometimes the heads of intelligence departments and departments, paid insufficient attention to this most important type of combat support for the activities of the troops and unsatisfactorily led intelligence.
And we needed to intensify reconnaissance in such a way that, as they say, it would not let the enemy breathe, penetrate into all the cracks, disorganize his command, communications, battle formations, rear, exhaust the enemy, give him no peace day or night. For this, intelligence had to be organized and managed. It was necessary to awaken in our scouts the remarkable qualities inherent in our Russian people: courage, endurance, initiative, cunning and resourcefulness; it was necessary to start as soon as possible on both fronts systematic, continuous, organized reconnaissance of the enemy by all types and methods: observation, ambushes, searches, scouts, raids, combat, sending divisional and army agents behind enemy lines, etc. so that in each division in its sector there are daily prisoners, trophies and documents.
All types and types of troops and services were involved in conducting reconnaissance at the front. For example, we successfully began to use mortars to support scouts.
Here are excerpts from the message of the company commander, Senior Lieutenant Yeltsov, who personally reported to me on the successful completion of the assigned task by his unit. On my orders, Yeltsov's story was published in a front-line newspaper. Here is an excerpt from that story:
“We were given the task of carrying out reconnaissance in force and obtaining a “language”. To accomplish this task, a mortar platoon of junior lieutenant Veretennikov was attached to help the scouts. Before going on reconnaissance, the political instructor of the company Novinsky made his way to the area of action of the scouts, examined the area, outlined the paths of approach and withdrawal of the mortars, and determined where it would be possible to take convenient firing positions.
Late at night, the scouts, and with them the mortars, set off. Having reached the planned milestone, the calculations took up positions near the wall of a long collective farm barn.
A group of sappers went ahead. At the barbed wire, the Nazis found her and opened fire from two machine guns. With well-aimed fire, the mortars silenced them, but immediately, to the right, another machine gun started talking. While the fascists were exchanging fire with our mortars, a group of scouts penetrated a wire fence in a ravine on the left and there, at a well-trodden path that ran along a hollow, set up an ambush. Soon the scouts noticed that a German soldier was walking along the path. For a moment, and he was captured.
Having completed their first task, the mortars quickly changed their firing position. It was impossible to stay on the old one, because the enemy had established where the fire was coming from, and, undoubtedly, had to fire at the positions. And so it turned out.
Having completed the task, the scouts began to retreat. At the wire fence, they again came under enemy fire. Suddenly a rocket went off. This was a signal from our scouts about where to send mortar fire to cover the withdrawal. A great commotion was made in the camp of the enemy.
The task was completed successfully. The scouts took the "language" and established the location of the enemy's firepower in this sector of his defense.
This seemingly special case showed that the mortar is an indispensable weapon in reconnaissance, easily applicable in its difficult conditions both to divert the attention of the enemy and to quickly suppress firing points that interfere with the scouts.
In questions of the organization of reconnaissance, the commanders of all levels were always in great tension. Controlling, it was necessary to be demanding of subordinates in matters of intelligence (as, indeed, in all others) and to exact severely for non-fulfillment or slow execution of orders. At the heart of this exactingness was the need to constantly educate subordinate soldiers, to instill a taste for intelligence in big and small bosses. The results were telling. Soon, a broad initiative began to appear in this matter.
Often our officers, sergeants and soldiers, who did not directly have the direct task of conducting reconnaissance, taking prisoners, and monitoring enemy actions, did this on their own initiative, as it should be. In intelligence reports, reports began to appear more and more often about a broad initiative in reconnaissance of the enemy. Separate examples were published in front-line newspapers. I remember Senior Lieutenant Timofeev, who captured a German officer and delivered him to headquarters, although he did not have the task of taking V "language". I remember one tank crew (unfortunately, I forgot the name of its commander), which delivered to the front headquarters in good condition a radio station that had just been adopted by the enemy. This incident is also described in a diary captured later by our scouts from the enemy. In it, Lieutenant of the 7th APD Laurent writes: “...Here is another incident. Our officer was driving with a brand new radio station (in a car with a radio station mounted on it. - A. E.) to the front. An unexpected shell explosion in front of the radiator forced him and two radio operators to jump out of the car and take cover in a nearby trench. At this time, a Russian tank appeared. He slowly drove up to the radio and stopped near it. The hatch opened, a man comes out of the tank with the end of the cable in his hands and ties this new beautiful machine to his tank, then comes back; and now the tank unhurriedly turns around and slowly leaves home, giving another shot at the ill-fated radio operators, who, with bulging eyes, look at all this and do nothing, as if stunned. They lost everything, even shaving brushes and socks were left in the stolen car. But the worst thing is that now you have to go on foot, look for the boss to whom the radio station was intended, and report to him about what happened. A crazy trick on the part of the Russians, but what can you do! .. V "
The results of the improvement in the work of our intelligence were not long in coming. We began to have very valuable information about the enemy: about the number, weapons, movements of his troops, changes in the composition of formations, about the political and moral state and mood of enemy soldiers and officers, about the plans of the enemy command, as well as about the enemy’s assessment of the merits and demerits of our weapons , our tactics, the combat effectiveness of our individual units.
From the testimonies of prisoners, trophy letters and diaries, we were convinced that the morale of the majority of German soldiers and non-commissioned officers at that time was still very high. So, a soldier of the 276th Infantry Regiment of the 94th Infantry Division, Hans Parman, who was taken prisoner at that time, showed that the morale of the unit is not bad, the soldiers do not feel tired, there are no defeatist moods among the soldiers and officers; on the contrary, there is confidence in the victory of Germany, the hope that the current year will not bring such disappointments as the last one (meaning the winter offensive of the Soviet Army in 1941/42 - A. E.).
From the testimony of Chief Corporal of the 71st Infantry Regiment of the 29th Mechanized Division Schneider, who was taken prisoner in one of the night searches in mid-August, it turned out that the personnel of his unit was heterogeneous: older soldiers believe that the war should be ended as soon as possible, with it does not matter with what outcome, as they are tired and strive to return to their families as soon as possible; young soldiers are quite cheerful and want to fight to the bitter end.
Captured at the same time, non-commissioned officer of the 129th Panzer Division of the 29th Mechanized Division, Willi Zeidler, said that the fighting mood of the German soldiers was maintained by the strictest discipline and a system of cruel punishments for every misconduct, as well as espionage by the SS. A slightly different position in this regard is occupied by young German soldiers who, under the influence of Nazi propaganda, still continued to believe in the victory of the Fuhrer. This was evidenced by a number of testimonies of prisoners. So, a soldier of the 2nd Tank Destroyer Company of the 94th Infantry Division, Joachim Broehlich, during interrogation stated:
“I think that Germany will win the war because we have already captured a lot from the Russians, our reserves are incalculable, we have wonderful food, we will have winter uniforms. I heard Hitler's speech on the radio in May. He said that in general, at the end of this year, the Russians would be finished. Then he said that the German army would soon receive such new weapons that would be able to defeat any Russian city with just a few shots. True, these guns are not yet available, but, as the officers said, they should arrive one of these days along with new divisions from Germany and France. As soon as these divisions arrive, the last big offensive will begin. Stalingrad will be taken, then Moscow and Leningrad will fall, and the war with Russia will be over.
The same point of view, however, with justifications of an “ideological” nature, is set forth in the letters and diary of the lieutenant of the 6th company of the 578th infantry regiment of the 305th infantry division G. Hannes - a representative of the “thinking” in the Hitlerite stratum of the German officers . He wrote: “... we have a war. Let's leave a question why and what for it has begun. The war has begun, and now everyone fighting in the East knows that we must fight it. The question stands thus: to be or not to be the German people. Therefore, every soldier is ready to make a sacrifice. War requires sacrifice... It is becoming ever clearer that the German soldier in the East is placed in conditions in which there are no longer any rules for waging war. The soldier is well aware of this cruel necessity. There is no line between life and death. This is even more important to know in the rear. The troops must be prepared militarily, physically strong, but in many respects the war depends on the spiritual state. In today's confused world, a lot depends on how much they know what they are fighting for.
However, behind these grandiloquent phrases about the "higher ideological" motives for the war, allegedly caused by the need to fight for the very existence of the German nation, there are very prosaic goals. They were already practically carried out by the German occupiers: robbery, robbery, the export of Soviet national property to Germany, the establishment of German landowner settlements, the export of Russian citizens to Germany, etc. To illustrate this situation, it is enough to cite a very short but expressive excerpt from a letter from a sister to a soldier Fritz Billing (field mail 39006) July 28, 1942: “...fight well, my little Fritz, and you will get land and Russian slaves. Your loving sister.
Characteristic is also the testimony of a soldier of the headquarters company of the 15th Infantry Regiment of the 29th Mechanized Division, Robert Downe:
“German soldiers are told that the war between the USSR and Germany is not just a struggle for territories, but a war between worldviews. Many of the soldiers do not yet place the blame for the hardships they experience in the war on Hitler and his regime. There are many who believe that the Hitler regime is the most suitable for Germany. They say that during his time in power, Hitler created a strong, unified empire capable of withstanding any attack from outside. They also believe that the defeat of Hitlerism and its destruction is tantamount to the destruction of Germany itself. If Hitler is overthrown, Germany will be divided into a number of small states and cease to exist as an independent state. She will fall under the complete subjugation of England. The fear of this is, among other things, one of the reasons that contribute to the stubborn struggle of many German soldiers, especially young people.
Representatives of other nationalities that were part of the Nazi army were somewhat different. Thus, the Austrians, as a result of the dismissive attitude towards them on the part of German soldiers and especially officers, expressed dull dissatisfaction with the Nazi regime.
The morale of the Romanian troops was low. The majority of Romanian soldiers understood that they were forced to risk their lives for interests alien to them. Here is an excerpt from a letter from a soldier Albu-Sika to his relatives (Bucharest, Prest st., v - 12).
“I report that I am alive, but I live in poverty. Recently they were heavily attacked and again lost many soldiers and officers. I don't know when this will all end! I'm so tired of it that I can no longer endure the torment. Of all the soldiers serving the gun, only two of us survived. God saved me too. Now we are near Stalingrad, where the Russians are fighting to the last. So I live very badly in every way; If it continues like this, I'll just go crazy. I don't know what they are going to do with us. They probably want to kill us all...
From the Donets to these places where we are now, we walked all the way, 700 kilometers. Both feet are blistered. I don't know if the day will come when we will be replaced from our positions.
I asked you to do something so that I could come home, but you write that nothing can be done. Our soldiers receive holidays under patronage from the country. It is especially easy for you to do this now, when our General Chalyk has gone to Bucharest. This can be done on the recommendation of Popescu (he knows the general). I beg you to go wherever possible and make sure to get me out of here as soon as possible, because these dogs want to destroy us all. Already killed more than half of the regiment. We are not sorry at all.
The Russians have a lot of weapons. How much weapons we have already taken and how much the Germans have taken, but there is no end in sight! The Russians shoot without pity and kill our people every day. All this does not bother our big bosses, since they are tens of kilometers behind the lines and do not know what we are experiencing in the trenches of the first line, 100 meters from the enemy. Those of our people who could still live are also dying: the wounded are not looked after, they are not given help, and they die.
Once again I ask you, do what you can and where you can, but pull me out of this damned trench, because the Russians use a lot of different types of fire to destroy us ... B "
A soldier of the 2nd Battalion of the 91st Infantry Regiment of the 20th Romanian Infantry Division Spiroi Romulis testified: “The morale in the regiment is not very good. The soldiers do not want to fight for the Germans. The officers promised that the division would soon return home. But the soldiers have now ceased to believe. This was only possible for the priest, who ran away home after the first fight.
In the testimonies of prisoners, in the letters of soldiers and officers to their homeland, which fell into the hands of our scouts before they were sent, in diaries and other similar documents, a more or less objective assessment of our tactics, the actions of our artillery, mortars, aviation, combat capability was often given. some of our parts.
Corporal of the 4th Panzer Regiment of the 6th Panzer Division Max Becker said: “Non-commissioned officers and even lieutenants explained to the soldiers that the task of the division near Stalingrad was very difficult due to the superiority of the enemy infantry, that the Soviet troops were allegedly equipped with artillery to a lesser extent, in In particular, there are allegedly no “Stalinist organs” (rocket mortars) on this front. We had to see for ourselves the absurdity of these assumptions and experience the influence of this music; we heard her, and she made an exceptionally strong impression.
The commander of the battalion of the 571st Infantry Regiment of the 305th Infantry Division Friedrich Giese testified: "The Red Army is strong in defense, the infantry is especially strong, the Katyushas drive you crazy." On the actions of our aviation, he responded: “Your bombers operate only at night. Only once they beat us hard during the day, it was near the Oskol River.
Non-commissioned officer of the 297th artillery regiment of the 297th infantry division Alois Heimesser in his diary notes more than once the crushing actions of our artillery and aviation:
In "19.8.42. Artillery shelling the area; the first message comes that the other batteries of our regiment again have heavy losses; artillery is very good landing here.
20.8. Two mines hit directly on the OP. The heavy battery of Russians shoots unpleasantly long and close to us.
23.8. Russian volley gun fired three times at our site. There are many destroyed vehicles of the 14th Panzer Division and the 29th Motorized Division in this place.
26.8. At 11.30, the Russians, after artillery preparation, went on the attack. Russian mines and artillery shells lie very close to our NP.
30.8. Air raid by 20 Russian bombers. General Pfefer and the regimental commander also lie on their stomachs. You can see at least 50 searchlights in front of Stalingrad. Heavy bombing during the night. The "Stalin Organ" is also here.
31.8. At 3 o'clock ... an attack by Russian assault aircraft. There was heavy bombing at the firing positions, an attack by ground attack aircraft. At 2 p.m., another attack by Russian aircraft.
1.9. The "Stalin organ" fired through us; as we learned later, the firing position and our battle formations were fired upon. 4 people and 10 horses were killed. 26 horses were killed in the 9th battery. At 9 o'clock a strong attack by dive-bombers was ahead of us, followed by bombing and a raid by Russian ground attack aircraft.
3.9. We have never seen so many “Stalinist bodies” at the same time.
4.9. The Russian artillery is shelling us very hard. Everywhere it becomes completely impossible: at an observation post you are under fire from machine guns and mortars, at a firing position you are under artillery fire.
15.9. When I fell asleep at 24 o'clock, the falling bombs suddenly thundered terribly.
The senior corporal of the 71st motorized regiment of the 29th motorized division, V. Schneider, who was taken prisoner in the area of \u200b\u200bjunction B "74 km", showed that he had a very high opinion of the combat capability of the Red Army, which has recently been equipped with aircraft, tanks and equipment increased unusually; Soviet artillery destroys concentrations of German troops and materiel with daily powerful raids; Soviet pilots also work excellently, flying 4-5 times a day on concentrations of German troops, they successfully bomb them.
From these sources, as well as from the observations of intelligence officers, from their conversations with the civilian population, from the reports of the partisans, we received a rather versatile idea of the state of the enemy troops, as well as the situation of the local population in fascist captivity, about life in Germany itself, etc. , and most importantly, they had the opportunity to get acquainted with the actions of the enemy and his calculations both for the previous weeks and for the near future.
The reader is well aware of the barbaric actions of the Nazis, their robbery of our property, the deportation of our people into slavery in Germany, the destruction of entire villages and villages, the inhabitants of which were suspected of having links with the partisans, and other atrocities of the Nazis. I will give here just one document - a letter from Semyon Tikhonovich Semykin to his sons (Semykin, with the help of our scouts, managed to cross the front line).
I have lived in the world for 80 years. I experienced in my lifetime the oppression of tsarism, and hard forced labor in the corvee, and the kulak whip, and the severity of two wars ... But what I experienced during the three days of being under the rule of the Germans eclipsed everything experienced over three quarters of a century. I can’t tell everything: so great is the grief caused to us.
We had a native, good village. Now he is gone. There were ruins and burnt chimneys. Our peaceful village was burned by the Nazis. There are no hundreds of our women, old people and children - the Germans burned some of them, shot some of them, and drove many of them away to their place in Germany.
In the cellar, in the courtyard of my son, the children of my sons Peter, Alexei, Leonid, who serve in the Red Army, hid. Eleven of my grandchildren were there. When a fascist approached the house and, dousing it with kerosene, set it on fire, the women rushed from the cellar to the hut to save their property. The scoundrel drove them back with his butt, locked the cellar and set fire to the fire. Smoke and fire seeped in. The cries of women and children were heard for a long time around the yard.
Everyone in the cellar suffocated and burned down. Eleven of my grandchildren died in it. Their mothers also died.
Listen, my sons, Petro, Alexei, Lenya! To you and your friends in arms I appeal:
“You have no more wives, you have no more beloved daughters and sons, my grandchildren. The enemy took them. There is no your village, there are no your houses: the invaders burned everything. I know it hurts you to hear this, but it's true. Take revenge on the bloody enemy! B»
It is worth citing a few facts characterizing life in Germany itself, where, despite the boasting of the Hitlerite bosses, the situation became more and more tense. Here is a letter from relatives to the soldier Oskar Winkler from Siegesdorf:
In "Dear Oscar! We think a lot about you and can understand your situation. During the day under mortar fire, and at night we dig, and for a long time without rest. Of course, you can lose both life and health. You probably sometimes get the idea why some should be on the front lines, while others should sit in the rear. The sons of rich peasants sit in the rear or serve in the artillery, and many have a lot of special reasons for taking vacations.
Here is another excerpt from a letter to Corporal Franz Kreiner (field mail 21958) dated August 13, 1942; his mother writes:
“Your brother Rudy hasn't been home for 18 months either. He has been in France for the last three months, and now he has a leave of absence. However, he again needs to leave, even 8 days before the end of his vacation: he signed up as a volunteer in Africa so as not to be sent to the East.
It is clearly seen here that the Nazis were afraid of the Eastern Front like fire and, in comparison with it, Africa was considered a paradise. This, better than any arguments and arguments, refutes the falsification of the Second World War by bourgeois historians, including Churchill, who are trying to convince the reader that the turning point in the war allegedly came as a result of the victories of the Western allies in Africa over Rommel.
Here is another document that very unambiguously shows the horror that the Eastern Front instilled in enemy soldiers.
B“...Now I turn to the most terrible; I can't believe you have to go East. This is too strong for me. I just can't imagine it. I begin to think: I feel as if I am suffocating, as if the house is collapsing on my head. After all, I always had the hope that you would stay in the West ... Now I would already wish that your illness would return - and you would again return to your homeland, to the infirmary ... You are in danger that can strike any day ".
However, what did we learn about the main thing, about the plans of the enemy for the near future? The summary data obtained from the numerous pieces of information obtained by intelligence have revealed to us a number of important points on this issue. It is necessary, however, to make the reservation that, no matter how well intelligence is organized, comprehensive data cannot be demanded of it: its information can always contain ambiguities, and sometimes even contradictions; facts deliberately manipulated or falsified by the enemy may leak into intelligence data along with the truth. Therefore, only careful processing and in-depth analysis of intelligence data guarantee truly objective and correct conclusions.
We learned that in connection with the failure of the strike of the 4th enemy tank army in the Abganerovo area (our counterattack in the area of the 74 kmV siding siding), the enemy was forced to seriously regroup his forces; He didn't have many spares. By order of Hitler's headquarters, the 6th Army, which was fighting in the big bend of the Don, on August 12 handed over to the 4th Tank Army two of its full-blooded divisions (297th Infantry and 24th Tank).
With these reinforcements, after regrouping (withdrawing the battered divisions back and replacing them with fresh ones), the 4th Panzer Army was to continue its offensive; however, now the direction of the main blow was shifted to the right, although the target of this blow, as before, remained the elevated Volga coast in the region of Krasnoarmeysk. The implementation of this intention was entrusted to the 48th tank corps, which received the task of moving west of the line Lake Tsatsa, Krasnoarmeysk, the 6th Romanian army corps, which was obliged to advance west of the railway station Abganerovo - station Tundutovo, and the 4th German army corps, aimed at offensive to the east of this railway.
The fact that we had information about this, firstly, showed what a service we rendered to the Stalingrad Front with a counterattack near Abganerovo, which diverted the two most combat-ready divisions from its sector, and secondly (and this is the most important thing!), Confirmed our fear of a serious threat, hanging over the South-Eastern Front, Stalingrad, and, perhaps, over all the troops of the southern wing of our front.
To confirm this, I will cite here the very convincing and fully consistent with the real state of affairs, the arguments of General Dörr, which he sets out in his book.
“When the 4th Panzer Army went on the defensive at the Tundutovo station on August 20, it was in close proximity to an important piece of terrain, possibly of decisive importance for the entire operational area of Stalingrad - the Volga uplands between Krasnoarmeysk and Beketovka.
At Krasnoarmeysk, a high bank rising 150 m above the level of the Volga departs from the river and turns further south, passing into Ergeni. Here, if you look downstream of the river, is the last hill near the shore. It dominates the entire bend of the Volga with Sarpinsky Island. If at all it was possible to crack the defenses of Stalingrad, then the blow should have been delivered from here.
Krasnoarmeysk was the southern cornerstone of the defense of Stalingrad and at the same time the final point of the only communication linking the western bank of the Volga with Astrakhan by land. At no other point was the appearance of German troops so unfavorable to the Russians as here.
In addition, any kind of battle that the German troops fought outside the city, whether offensive or defensive, was from the very beginning associated with great difficulties, while Krasnoarmeysk and Beketovka remained in Russian hands, since this elevated area dominated the Volga, provided excellent opportunities for monitoring the Kalmyk steppes, could be used as a place of concentration and as a springboard for a Russian counterattack on the southern flank of the troops advancing on Stalingrad or occupying defenses there.
To this description of the area Krasnoarmeisk, Beketovka, given by Dörr, who is a well-trained general staff officer in operational terms, perhaps nothing can be added.
That is why the strengthening of this section began without delay, as soon as the South-Eastern Front was created. The measures taken were very successful. Already on August 13, troops withdrawn from the line of the Aksai River to the outer bypass in the Demkin, Tebektenerovo sector, significantly strengthened the defense here. In the zone between the Aksai and Myshkova rivers, where mining was widely used, a forefield was formed, defended by the forward detachments of the 64th Army. In the rear, we had concentrated general and especially anti-tank reserves (one rifle division, one anti-tank brigade and two anti-tank regiments).
If the same opportunity (to fortify the sector north of Stalingrad) had presented itself in the region of the Stalingrad Front, the enemy would never have seen the Volga.
Preliminary countermeasures and further persistent actions by the 64th Army frustrated Hitler's plan to take Stalingrad in the "pincers". The fact is that one of the sides of these gigantic "pincers" was supposed to, moving along the road (east) Salsk - Stalingrad, go to the Volga in the Krasnoarmeisky district of Stalingrad. The entire movement of the 4th Panzer Army from the bridgehead in the Tsimlyanskaya, Konstantinovskaya area to the Abganerovo area and further to the east was directed towards this main goal.
Let's see how events developed in the future.
Let us dwell in somewhat more detail on the situation that has developed in our sector in the sectors of the 62nd and 4th tank armies.
The 62nd Army by this time was in a difficult position. By August 9, the enemy again managed to surround one of its divisions, which, nevertheless, continued fighting, trying to break out of the enemy ring. By August 14, separate units of this division managed to break out of the encirclement and unite with the army troops operating outside the encirclement. Three divisions of this army were withdrawn to the eastern bank of the Don and took up defensive positions in the Vertyachiy, Lyapichev sector, as mentioned above.
On August 15, the troops of the 4th Panzer Army, holding the Melo-Kletsky and Bolshenabatovsky fronts, were attacked by the enemy. The result of this was the breakthrough of the front in the center and the division of the formation forces into two groups. The units that were part of the right group withdrew to the northeast and joined the 1st Guards Army, the advanced units of which had recently arrived in the Frolovo area from the Headquarters reserve. Taking into account the current situation, this army received the task of defending the front along the line of the Don in the Kremenskaya, Sirotinokaya sector, the mouth of the Ilovlya River. The left group of the 4th Panzer Army, pushed back by the enemy to the left bank of the Don, took up defensive positions in the area from the mouth of the Ilovlya River to Nizhne-Gnilovskaya.
Against the 4th Panzer Army, the enemy threw large masses of tanks and aircraft. Parts of the army heroically resisted the advancing enemy, inflicting heavy losses on him, but they could not resist in an unequal battle, in front of significantly superior enemy forces. By the end of August 15, the enemy managed to break through to the Don in the Trekhostrovskaya, Akimovsky, Bolshenabatovsky sector. In this way, the enemy solved his immediate task: he took up the starting position for forcing the Don and preparing a new attack on Stalingrad (which was already mentioned earlier). This success cost the Nazi troops very dearly. The shock wings of the enemy grouping in battles were significantly "plucked". However, having hastily reinforced its troops with new divisions and regrouped, the fascist German command decided to build on its tactical success.
At the same time, serious battles took place in the sectors of the 64th and 57th armies. Here, in the period from August 17 to 20, the enemy launched a series of successive strikes in order to find weak points and disorientate us in relation to the direction of the main attack (Beketovka, Krasnoarmeysk). By the way, he didn't succeed.
On August 17, the enemy's 371st infantry division, reinforced with tanks, attacked our units in the Abganerovo area, broke through to the Yurkin state farm and captured it (schemes 1, 7 and 8). However, the very next day, the 29th Infantry Division with a swift counterattack drove the Nazis out of the state farm and threw them back to the southern outskirts of the Abganerovo station. On August 19, the enemy attack on the state farm was repeated simultaneously from two directions: by the 371st Infantry Division from the Abganerovo region and the 94th Infantry Division along the railway; in addition, the 29th motorized division from the Plodovitoe area struck in the direction of the B “74 kmV” siding. On August 20, a group of 150 tanks (14th Panzer Division) attacked our positions in the Semkin area. As a result of these attacks, the enemy only slightly penetrated our defenses, capturing the Abganerovo station. Its further advance was suspended by the introduction of reserves, as already mentioned.
At the same time, the enemy was preparing the main attack with the forces of three infantry (97th, 371st and 297th), two tank (14th and 24th) divisions and one motorized division (29th) from the Plodovitoe area to the Krasnoarmeysk, Beketovka area. As you can see, the 297th Infantry and 24th Panzer Divisions were transferred from the 6th Army. On August 21, this group launched an offensive. By the end of the day, up to 150 tanks reached the Oak Ravine area, the Morozovskaya gully. In the future, the enemy sought to deepen the breakthrough and reach the Stalingrad area. However, here he was met by our anti-tank regiments, under the blows of which the enemy's tank fist lost its striking power. The stability of the defense was also facilitated by minefields reinforced with Fog installations. The enemy's furious attacks choked, and the calculations of the Nazi strategists to capture the Krasnoarmeysk region, which they considered, not without reason, to be the cornerstone "point" from which it was possible to "turn over" the whole of Stalingrad, failed.
True, the enemy here strongly hung over the left flank of the 64th Army. This forced us to have additional forces in this sector.
Regarding these battles, the front command reported to Headquarters:
In "From 12.8 to 19.8 the enemy under the cover of massive aviation on the front of Tebektenerovo, Abganerovo, temporary storage. Privolzhsky, with the strength of two infantry, one tank and one motorized division, daily attacked the battle formations of our troops, conducting 6-8 massive attacks by tanks and infantry per day. All enemy attempts to break through our defenses were defeated, which forced him to reinforce his troops with a fresh 24th Panzer Division, weakening other sectors of the front.
On August 20, the enemy managed to break through our line of defense on the right flank of the 57th Army in the area of the temporary storage warehouse. Privolzhsky, where, despite heavy losses (up to 60 tanks were destroyed), enemy tanks numbering up to 90 pieces managed to reach the southern outskirts of the Dubovy Ovrag, elev. 84.5, 118.0, Morozov, creating the threat of a flank attack on the 64th Army. Attempts to further advance to Krasnoarmeysk and break through to the north-west into the flank and rear of the 64th Army during August 20-29 were unsuccessful, since by this time, due to the maneuver with internal resources to the area, the Tundutovo station, the siding at the elev. 105, Peschanaya beam, the 133rd tank brigade, the 20th anti-tank artillery brigade and the 55th tank brigade were concentrated.
With a counterattack of these formations to the east and southeast, the enemy was driven back to the line: high. 120, Morozovskaya beam. During the last days, the enemy carried out daily uninterrupted attacks, 4-6 per day; at the same time he is regrouping to the west in search of weak spots in the defense; all attacks and attempts to break through remain fruitless for the enemy.
It was at this time that Goebbels yelled about the difficulties of advancing the German army in the east, explaining them by the strength of the Soviet fortifications. He declared Stalingrad the largest fortress, allegedly superior in impregnability to the famous Verdun, and yet he "predicted" the imminent fall of Stalingrad.
These days, the world press was already attentively listening to the sounds of the battle of Stalingrad, reports began to appear in the press that the Germans had been stopped at Stalingrad.
Summing up the battles until the end of the second stage, it should be said that during this time, the Soviet troops, by stubborn defensive actions, inflicted serious losses on the enemy and frustrated his plan to capture Stalingrad on the move. However, in the course of these battles, the troops of the Stalingrad and South-Eastern fronts were forced to retreat to the outer defensive bypass, suspending the enemy offensive there for a while. In disrupting the plans of the German command for the sudden capture of Stalingrad, along with the stubbornness of the troops of the South-Eastern and Stalingrad fronts, selflessly fulfilling their duty to the Motherland, the labor exploits of the civilian population of Stalingrad and the region played a significant role. Tens of thousands of Stalingraders built defensive lines and erected barricades under enemy air strikes and artillery fire. The workers of Stalingrad, under the most difficult conditions, produced weapons for the front.
The German fascist headquarters, and especially "the commander-in-chief" himself, were extremely irritated and dissatisfied with the actions of the commander of the 6th Army, General Paulus, and the commander of the 4th Panzer Army, General Hoth. The two deadlines for the capture of Stalingrad, appointed by Hitler, had passed, and Paulus and Goth were still far from the goal. Valuable time was gone. The fate of the plans for the entire summer campaign was being decided. The Fuhrer was worried and demanded more and more efforts from the troops, ordered to break the resistance, crack the defenses and take the city before the onset of autumn.
Now, after the enemy had failed to break through to Stalingrad by inflicting strikes at different times from the west and southwest, the fascist German command decided to take possession of the city and reach the Volga, inflicting two simultaneous strikes in converging directions by the forces of the 6th Army - from the area Trekhostrovskaya and the main forces of the 4th Panzer Army - from the Abganerovo area to the north (Scheme 8). To provide a link between the 6th and 4th tank armies, it was planned to strike from the Kalach region to the east and break into Stalingrad from the south.
In accordance with this decision, a regrouping was carried out and new forces were brought up. Thus, the 6th Army, having transferred the sector from Pavlovsk to the mouth of the Khoper River to the 8th Italian Army, freed up all its forces for an attack on Stalingrad, creating a strike force consisting of nine divisions (six infantry, two motorized and one tank).
In total, up to 20 divisions took part in this offensive against Stalingrad.
A hasty strengthening of the Stalingrad grouping of German troops began. If in the first days of the struggle 17 to 18 divisions of the first line operated directly in the Stalingrad direction, now the composition of these troops has been further increased, and their combat means have been strengthened. This period includes the arrival near Stalingrad of one of the most stubborn fascist fanatics, Colonel-General von Richthofen, with the 4th Air Fleet led by him.
Thus, having failed in an attempt to capture Stalingrad on the move with strikes from the 6th Army from the west and from the 4th Panzer Army from the southwest (by taking it into the “KleshiV”), the Nazi command drew up the aforementioned new plan for a concentric attack on Stalingrad, along which both groups advancing on Stalingrad had to direct the points of their attacks to a common center, approximately at the junction between the two fronts or somewhat to the north. At the same time, the 6th Army struck from the region of the small bend of the Don, and the 4th Panzer Army from the region of Abganerovo, Plodovitoe.
I will quote here the order of the 6th Army, which outlines this plan.
In "Army High Command 6.
ARMY ORDER ON THE ATTACK ON STALINGRAD
Card 1: 100000
1. The Russians will stubbornly defend the area of Stalingrad. They occupied the heights on the eastern bank of the Don, west of Stalingrad, and set up positions here to a great depth.
Therefore, when advancing through the Don to Stalingrad, the troops may encounter resistance from the front and strong counterattacks towards our northern flank.
It is possible that, as a result of the crushing blows of recent weeks, the Russians will no longer have the strength to put up a determined resistance.
2. The 6th Army has the task of capturing the isthmus between the Volga and the Don north of the Kalach-Stalingrad railway and being ready to repel enemy attacks from the east and north.
To do this, the army crosses the Don between Peskovatka and Trekhostrovskaya, the main forces on both sides of Vertyachiy. Protecting itself from attacks from the north, it strikes with its main forces through a chain of hills between the river. Rossoshka and the sources of the river. B. Korennaya (10 km east of Samofalovka) to the area immediately north of Stalingrad, to the Volga. At the same time part of the forces break into the city from the northwest and capture it.
This blow is accompanied on the southern flank by the advance of part of the forces across the river. Rossoshka in its middle course, which, southwest of Stalingrad, should connect with the mobile formations of the neighboring army advancing from the south. To ensure the flank of the troops in the area between the lower reaches of the Rossoshka and Karpovka rivers and the river. Don above Kalach from the northeast, so far only weak forces are advancing. With the approach of the forces of the neighboring army from the south (meaning the 4th Panzer Army. — A. E.) to Karpovka, troops are being withdrawn from this area.
With the transfer of the offensive to the eastern bank of the river. Don on its western bank below the Small remain only small forces. Subsequently, they strike across the Don on both sides of Kalach and participate in the destruction of those located there (in Kalach. - A. E.) enemy forces.
3. Tasks:
24th Panzer Corps to defend the river. Don from the right dividing line of the army to Luchenskaya (suit); 71st Infantry Division, leaving weak barriers on the river. Don, seize the bridgehead on both sides of Kalach and then advance in an easterly direction. Prepare for a new task.
51st Army Corps to seize the second bridgehead on the river. Don on both sides of Vertyachiy. To do this, he is temporarily given artillery, engineering units, traffic control groups, anti-tank units and the necessary means of communication from the 14th Panzer Corps. With the passage of the bridgehead by the 14th Tank Corps, the 51st Army Corps should secure its southern flank. To do this, the corps will cross between Novo-Alekseevsky and Bol. Rossoshka across the river. Rossoshka, occupy the hilly area west of Stalingrad and, moving southeast, connect with the mobile formations of the neighboring army advancing from the south on the right.
Then the corps to seize the central and southern parts of Stalingrad ...
The 14th Panzer Corps, after occupying the bridgehead by the 51st Army Corps, strike from it to the east through a chain of hills north of Mal. Rossoshka, Konnaya station, and go to the Volga north of Stalingrad, cut the Volga and interrupt the railway communication north of the city. Part of the corps forces to strike from the north-west, break into the northern part of Stalingrad and capture it. At the same time, do not use tanks ... At the same time, maintain close cooperation with the 8th Army Corps approaching from the west.
8th Army Corps to cover the northern flank of 14th Tank Corps. To do this, strike from the bridgeheads captured between N. Gerasimov and Trekhostrovskaya to the southeast and, gradually turning to the north, reach the line (if possible inaccessible to enemy tanks) between Kuzmichi and Kachalinskaya. Maintain close cooperation with the 14th Tank Corps.
11th and 17th Army Corps to secure the northern flank of the army.
11th Army Corps - at the turn of the river. Don from Melov to Kletokai (claim.) And further to the left dividing line of the army ... in the near future, send the 22nd Panzer Division to the area of \u200b\u200bDaliy-Perekovsky, Orekhovsky, Selivanov at the disposal of the army command ....
The 8th Aviation Corps will primarily support the actions of the 51st Army Corps, then the 14th Tank Corps with the main forces ... "
Although the best assessment of any plan is the real results achieved in its implementation, nevertheless, let us briefly analyze this document, because, firstly, it was important for the further development of events at Stalingrad, and secondly, because in the bourgeois military literature, the catastrophe of the Nazi troops at Stalingrad is partly associated with the fallacy of this plan. So, General Doerr, already familiar to us, in his book “The March on Stalingrad” tries to convince his readers that the reason for the failure of the German army at Stalingrad was a bad plan, and not at all that it was inferior in its morale to the Soviet Army.
He analyzes this plan in great detail and rather "self-critically" for a former Hitlerite General Staff officer. However, this "self-criticism" is, in essence, nothing more than a desire to belittle the strength of the resistance of our army, to belittle our military art. True, at the beginning of his reasoning, he throws a casual compliment to the defenders of Stalingrad, thereby trying to show his alleged objectivity. Now, after all, there are no people in the world who would not know about the heroism of the Stalingraders, so even the beaten Nazi generals are reluctantly forced to write about it.
Here is Dörr's reasoning on this plan, which we will quote in full:
“I want to make a few remarks here about the attack on the city, since the failure of the actions of the advancing troops in this operation cannot be explained only by the lack of forces of the attacker and the outstanding courage and skillful actions of the defender, - it should also be attributed to errors in grouping of forces of the 6th Army at the beginning of the offensive.
From the detailed order of the 6th Army dated August 19, 1942, “On the offensive against Stalingrad,” it is not clear how the troops were to capture the huge city. Perhaps the command of the 6th Army at that moment did not yet clearly imagine the geographical position of the city and its features? One may wonder whether it was expedient and correct, being still to the west of the Don, to launch an offensive against a large city located at a distance of 60 km to the east of the river.
The immediate task was to force the Don, the line of which was defended by the enemy, who had deeply echeloned his positions and prepared for defense. After forcing the Don, the main task of the 6th Army was to be the offensive of the 14th Panzer Corps to the Volga; only after the success of this offensive, as a result of which all communications connecting Stalingrad with the north would have been cut, could it be possible to proceed with the assault on the city.
Whether the army would have to regroup again or the corps, continuing to move forward, would break into Stalingrad, depended on whether the enemy would defend the city even if the Germans went to the Volga and cut off all communications leading to the city from the north.
In the “Order on the offensive against Stalingrad”, which, by the way, only says about the plan of the command of the 6th Army in relation to the capture of the city: “... part of the forces simultaneously break into the city from the north-west and capture it”, you can it was interpreted only in such a way that the corps should use every opportunity to break into the city if the situation, thanks to the surprise of actions, would allow hope for success.
It can be argued that the command of the 6th Army, in a certain respect, incorrectly assessed the situation. This is evidenced by the following circumstances:
1) The experience of fighting with the Russians gave reason to believe that they would defend Stalingrad even in a hopeless situation to the last bullet. However, judging by the order, the command of the 6th Army believed that "the Russians would stubbornly defend the Stalingrad region" and that "they would concentrate forces for a counterattack in the Stalingrad region, including tank brigades".
2) The army command, obviously, did not take into account the extremely difficult terrain conditions.
3) As a result of the entry of our troops to the Volga north of Stalingrad, the supply of the city was difficult, but communications were not cut.
4) At that time, obviously, they still did not imagine to what extent it would be possible to overcome the resistance of the enemy, who has numerical and operational superiority, if the defender fights to the last bullet and cannot be starved out.
5) If it was known or expected that the enemy would defend the entire region of Stalingrad, then a concentric strike or an offensive on a wide front from distant approaches was not advisable. As a result of such actions, it was possible to press the enemy, but it was impossible to disrupt his tactical formation as long as he still had contact with the rear. It was necessary to dismember the troops defending the city and cut off their supply routes. Therefore, first of all, it was necessary to drive a wedge into the disposition of troops in Stalingrad in such a way that the bank of the Volga with a ferry crossing opposite Krasnaya Sloboda would fall into our hands. Along with the offensive of the 14th Panzer Corps, this was the most important task. One should even consider the question whether it was not more important at the moment when it was believed that we would meet only weak resistance in Stalingrad, to carry out this task than to carry out our attack in the direction of the Market.
6) The "Great Stalingrad" area was divided by the 6th Army into lanes for advancing formations, and not into main objects, this eventually led to the fact that its geographical features had an effect when the attackers came into such close contact with the enemy, and the defenders created such a skillful defense that the regrouping of the 6th Army and the shift in the direction of its main attack could no longer force the Russians to perform new tasks; the moment of surprise was lost.
In this "self-criticism" of Dörr there are undoubtedly correct provisions. First of all, the petty pedantry of the authors of the plan did not allow them, as they say, to consider the elephant, that is, the very object of their desires - the giant city of Stalingrad, stretching for 60 kilometers along the Volga. Hitler's strategists planned to capture it in the usual way - by assault on the move. In this regard, Doerr's doubts about the appropriateness of a concentric strike for capturing Stalingrad, with the help of which it was impossible to actually overcome our defenses, are understandable. Not unreasonable, of course, is the deaf recognition of the underestimation of the moral stamina of the city's defenders. Other provisions of Dörrr are also significant, for example, the idea of a strike against our troops defending a section of the Volga coast against Krasnaya Sloboda.
However, Dörr is wrong on the decisive point. He deliberately does not take into account the real situation of the moment when this plan arose. The fact is that then, in August, the situation with the defense of the city was significantly different from the situation that arose in September. Therefore, the decision to strike in the north is not devoid of operational meaning. Moreover, if the Nazis had persisted in carrying out their original plan, the outcome of the Stalingrad events would have come for them much earlier.
Let me explain this idea. If the enemy really continued to strike, as he was originally aimed, from the south at Krasnoarmeysk, Beketovka, along Lake Sarpa with the task of reaching here, as in the north, on the Volga, then he would exhaust the forces of his strike force in overcoming well organized nodes of resistance, strongholds, minefields. The strength of our defense in this area would naturally have been effectively used and would undoubtedly have caused enormous damage to the enemy.
At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the troops defending this sector (artillery and machine-gun battalions) were non-maneuverable units. Being on the defensive, in the absence of an enemy offensive on their sector, they were inactive in combat. With the new German plan (by order of Paulus), their role became passive. It is clear that if the enemy had attacked where we prepared to repulse him, he would have had less success than in the sector where his attack was, if not sudden, in the full sense of the word, then at least forestalling our countermeasures.
At the same time, the new plan, on the orders of Paulus, brought the southern and northern strike groups closer together, which not only improved interaction, but also increased their striking power. A powerful maneuverable tank fist was formed.
Thus, the plan itself, which apparently was the result of the joint work of General Paulus and his chief of staff, General Schmidt (to both, by the way, Doerr does not have much sympathy), is not as bad as some would now like to present it. bourgeois military historians. It is quite characteristic that Dörr, at the beginning of his discussion of the plan, names three reasons for the failure of the German offensive on Stalingrad: a) the lack of attacking forces; b) outstanding courage and tactical skill of the defenders; c) errors in the use of the forces of the 6th Army, i.e. errors in the plan. In the following, Dörr focuses all his attention only on the errors of the plan. Why is he doing this? Regarding the lack of attacking forces, he, in essence, can not say anything, since this is clearly a fictitious reason. In fact, at that time the superiority of the attackers was overwhelming, especially in the directions of the main attacks. For the second reason, Dörr also, for very understandable reasons, does not consider it necessary to expand. But he seeks to “crush” the plan of the 6th Army to the ground. At the same time, he is not embarrassed by the fact that, having found the real errors and miscalculations of the plan, he did not notice in it what was positive for the Nazis. Doerr even turns out that one of the decisive reasons for the failures of the attackers was the premature issuance of the order to attack the city, but this is nothing more than a desire to speak in paradoxes. It is clear to everyone that belated setting of tasks harms success, and advance usually contributes to success. Setting the task of capturing the city in such an operation as Stalingrad, at a time when the troops were at a distance of 50-60 kilometers from the city, is quite normal. This is the usual task depth in such an operation. In short, the immediate task was set for the troops - forcing the Don - and the subsequent - capturing the city. When the Nazis reached the Volga north of Stalingrad, in the Rynok area, they had time to issue new orders, since it immediately became clear that the city could not be taken on the move. Such orders, specifying the further actions of the troops and prescribing the necessary regroupings, of course, were issued more than once.
We have to dwell on all this in detail also because, unfortunately, in our country people still sometimes mistake the objectivism of bourgeois military writers for real objectivity. In this regard, many are confused by the so-called "multilateralism" in assessing events. What this notorious “multilateralism” is worth is clearly shown by the given example. The juggling and distortion of facts is obvious. There were mistakes in the plans of the 6th Army, and quite significant ones, but by no means did they play the main role in the defeat of the Nazis at Stalingrad. It is clear to any unprejudiced person that Stalingrad was not taken thanks to the unsurpassed moral qualities of the Soviet soldiers and the entire Soviet people, thanks to the high skill of our commanding cadres, and ultimately thanks to the socialist system of our state. And no objectivist intricacies can refute this.
It must be emphasized that the implementation of any combat plan is connected with the manifestation of initiative and the ability to find real ways and methods of its implementation, depending on the situation, which often changes, especially in the course of the practical implementation of the plan itself.
Military plans (plans of combat operations) differ significantly from economic plans. If the implementation of the economic plan is to a large extent connected with taking into account an objective more or less constant factor (for example, the availability of the necessary reserves of minerals for the creation of a new industrial region, the availability of hydroresources for a power plant, etc.), then it looks completely different. objectB" in military terms: it is an adversary; this, in essence, is also a “subject”, actively acting, opposing us with its will, its plans and calculations. Unfortunately, it is not always possible to take into account, from the very beginning, when drawing up a plan, the strength of the enemy's resistance and possible countermeasures. When implementing an operational and even tactical plan, not to mention a strategic one, it is usually necessary to show maximum initiative and combat skill, great ability to quickly respond to enemy countermeasures, changing certain details of the plan in time in order to achieve its main goal with the least expenditure of forces.
In the past, in our military-historical literature, a ossified formulation of approximately the following content was in circulation: "Hitler's adventurist plan was timely revealed and our brilliant plan was opposed to it." Further, it was usually said that the military events developed successfully, everything "went like clockwork". At the same time, they say, the enemy sought to carry out his vicious plan with incredible persistence, and we, acting strictly in accordance with our plan, easily dealt with the stubborn but stupid enemy. This is a harmful scheme. The adventurism of the Nazis, like other militarists of the past and present, lies in the fact that they are not able to objectively assess our forces, but this does not mean that in every limited period of time any enemy plan is obviously vicious and adventuristic in its basis.
While recognizing the political adventurism of the militarists, one cannot, however, assume that all their plans are not based on a more or less correct operational or tactical calculation. Attaching the label of adventurism and depravity to any military-operational or tactical plan of the enemy lulls the vigilance of our commanding cadres, causes philistine complacency and the idea that, due to its adventurism and depravity, the enemy’s plan will fail by itself.
By saying this, we in no way diminish the importance of tactical, operational or strategic planning, but, on the contrary, we strive to emphasize how serious and important planning issues are for the success of a battle, operation, campaign, war as a whole. Only having a plan appropriate to the situation can one oppose one's will to the enemy in order to change the situation in one's favor, and not trail behind the developing military events.
In this connection, the falsity and harm of Moltke's well-known maxim should be emphasized once again: “Not a single operational plan remains in its original form after the first collision of one's own forces with the main forces of the enemy. Only a layman can think of some preconceived and carefully thought-out idea, the consistent implementation of which can supposedly be traced throughout the entire course of the war.
This position, it must be emphasized, has now been brought to light again by the beaten Nazi generals, in particular Kurt Tippelskirch in his article "Operational decisions of the command at critical moments in the main land theaters of the Second World War".
In the first section of his article on lightning wars, Tippelskirch notes that, due to the enormous superiority of the Germans and their skillful use of the then new means of struggle, they managed, as it were, to refute this "eternal principle" of warfare and achieve the full and precise implementation of all their plans; he further argues that in the period after 1941, when the forces of the parties were more or less equal, and the opponents of Nazi Germany learned to use new types of weapons and equipment, the Moltke law again triumphed and, so to speak, severely repaid Hitler for what he tried to ignore him. We will not talk here about the fact that Tippelskirch acts as an inveterate metaphysician and idealist. This is so clear. A mere glance at the course of events of the past war is enough to understand that these theorizings are not worth a damn, since in them Tippelskirch has in mind only the German fascist army and does not at all take into account what applies to its opponents.
In fact, for fascist Germany, after her treacherous attack on our country, dark days came. Most of the operational plans of the German General Staff in the clash between the Nazi army and the Soviet Armed Forces turned out to be unrealistic, but this is not at all because such is the eternal law of war, but simply because these plans themselves did not take into account the real state of affairs. Another thing is the plans of the Soviet command, which, although they were subject to adjustments, were carried out in the main, since they were in line with the real development of events on the war fronts; our clear idea - the complete defeat of the Nazi Wehrmacht - can be easily traced throughout the Great Patriotic War.
Already on the day Paulus signed the order referred to above, i.e., on August 19, with massive air support, the enemy launched attacks aimed at forcing the Don. A new stage of the defense of the city began - fighting on the outer and middle Stalingrad contours.
At first, the enemy tried to force the Don in the Nizhne-Akatov, Nizhne-Gerasimov sector, but did not achieve success here. The advanced units of the Nazis, who crossed to our shore, were destroyed. Then the attacks were transferred to the sector Vertyachiy, Peskovatka, where the enemy managed to achieve a huge superiority in forces on a narrow sector of the front; the three infantry divisions concentrated here were advancing with the support of all the firepower of two motorized divisions and one tank division, prepared to develop an attack on Stalingrad; with a fire shield from tank and field artillery, the enemy covered the area for crossing the river; on the side of the crossing enemy units there was a tactical advantage of the terrain - the dominant bank of the Don.
The 98th Rifle Division, first under the command of Colonel Iosif Fedorovich Barinov, and then Colonel Ivan Fedorovich Sergeev, and three battalions of the 54th fortified area (commandant Colonel M.T. Karnachev), fought heroically against the superior forces of the enemy, occupying defense on a wide front. On August 20, the enemy managed to push back our troops and seize a bridgehead on the left bank (that is, to force the river in separate sections). Feeling this pressure, we immediately transferred the 87th Infantry Division under the command of Colonel Kazartsev, two anti-tank artillery regiments and other units to help the defenders. The enemy, however, continued strong pressure and by the end of August 20 he had transferred two divisions to the left bank.
Despite the fierce battles waged by our troops in order to prevent the further concentration of enemy forces on the left bank, two more divisions crossed over the following days. The crossing divisions included one infantry, one tank and two motorized divisions. The transfer of troops across the river was provided by six crossings.
The battles from 15 to 21 August clearly showed the intentions of the enemy and revealed his operational plan to capture Stalingrad. The enemy attacked Stalingrad from two directions and wanted to capture the city by means of a concentric attack from the northwest by the 6th Army of Paulus and from the southwest by the 4th Panzer Army of Hoth. On the main axes of these attacks, the enemy had a great superiority in forces and combat means, while our units were very few in number. A very difficult operational situation was created for the Stalingrad defense.
Which of the directions we considered then the most dangerous? Of course, both were dangerous, but still, if the enemy had first captured the southern part of Stalingrad with the famous heights, which General Dörr very correctly assessed, then it would have been very difficult for us to defend Stalingrad. We uncovered the enemy's plan in time, correctly assessed the operational significance of these heights, and took a number of additional measures to prevent the enemy from entering this area.
After the report of Lieutenant General F. I. Golikov and the Chief of Staff of the South-Eastern Front, Major General G. F. Zakharov and an assessment of the situation, which was done every day by the end of the day, on the morning of August 22, the following order was given:
IN 1. The enemy, having suffered heavy losses in previous battles, threw up fresh reserves - the 24th tank and 29th infantry divisions. With a strike in the zone between the railway and the Sarpa lakes, Tsatsa is trying to destroy our defenses and capture the city of Stalingrad from the south.
2. 64th Army - to firmly hold the occupied line. Destroy enemy tanks and infantry groups that have penetrated the area of st. Tinguta and northeast, and continue to deplete the enemy's forces.
Create an intermediate line of defense along the line: height with horizontal 180 8 km south of Zeta, Kosh, 3 km northwest of the junction B "74 kmV", Kosh - 4 km northwest of st. Tinguta, farm in „- 2, state farm named after. Yurkina (sheep breeding), height 122.2, height 115.8.
Take the line: the 154th naval brigade and two army machine-gun battalions, which cover the army from the right flank in the Ivanovka and Gavrilovka regions.
The tanks of the 13th Panzer Corps should be dug in at this line in the direction of the railway in readiness to repulse enemy tanks from a place and counterattacks.
Vinnitsa infantry school to subdue. The 133rd tank brigade and the 30th fighter brigade should be in the main direction in the area of height. 115.8, h. 120.2, intercepting the direction to Ivanovka. Reinforce this direction with two destroyer-anti-tank artillery regiments in readiness to counterattack to the south, southeast and southwest.
Dividing line on the left: Prolific, high. 185.8, (claim) Tundutovo, (claim) Staraya Otrada.
3. The 57th Army to destroy the group of enemy tanks and infantry that broke into the defense zone, preventing it from reaching the bypass of the V "KV".
To create a strong defense in the army zone, by 03.00 23.8.42, carry out the following measures:
a) Create an intermediate defense line with the front edge along the line of the Morozovskaya beam, its northern slopes, Morozov, mark 17.8, mark 43.3, the southern outskirts of the Dubovy Ovrag and in depth to the line mark 115.8; 187.4; 118, northeastern outskirts of Duboviy Ovrag. The troops occupying this height should be reinforced with at least one anti-tank artillery regiment.
b) Create a second intermediate line along the line: Kom. Budyonny, Bolshie Chapurniki, elev. 13.4, elev. 11.8, elev. 14.5.
At the turn of Com. Budyonny, Bolshie Chapurniki to position the 56th tank brigade, to bury the tanks, having them ready for maneuver.
At the turn of elev. 13.4, elev. On 11.8, 14.5, deploy one army machine-gun battalion (17th) of the 118th fortified area, which arrived at your disposal on 21.8.42 in the Ivanovka, Gavrilovka area. The army machine-gun battalion is to be subordinated to the control of the 76th fortified area.
c) Reserves: 504th, 502nd, 499th and 1188th anti-tank regiments should be located at the turn of the V "KV" bypass, subordinating them to those commanders of rifle divisions in whose sector they operate (take positions). Have at least one anti-tank regiment on the line west of Ivanovka.
4. Equip intermediate lines with full profile trenches and reinforce anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers.
The main purpose of intermediate lines is to prevent the enemy from spreading rapidly into the depths of defense, by joint strikes of reserves and troops occupying lines, to destroy the enemy without a trace, while completely holding the main forward edge.
This event played a very important role in the defense of Stalingrad; the enemy, striving with all his might to capture the heights, never reached them and could not reach the southern outskirts of Stalingrad.
Thus, in the period from August 15 to 22, we carried out a number of measures to strengthen the troops and strengthen the defense on the axes of the main enemy attacks in the area of the heights south of Stalingrad and on the ax of the strike of Paulus's 6th Army, as was mentioned above.
A few words should be said here about Generals Golikov and Zakharov.
F. I. Golikov did significant work during his stay in Stalingrad. Carrying out the tasks of implementing the orders of the command, being in the troops of the armies of the South-Eastern Front and at auxiliary command posts in Stalingrad and at the Gornaya Polyana state farm, he proved himself to be a major military leader with great energy and organizational talent.
G. F. Zakharov - Chief of Staff of the South-Eastern Front - was an experienced strong-willed general with organizational skills, good operational training and extensive experience in commanding troops. He was distinguished by high efficiency, exactingness, but sometimes he was unnecessarily harsh.
By this time, the troops of the Stalingrad Front were on the defensive along the outer contour of the Stalingrad fortifications. Bridgeheads on the right bank of the Don in the areas of Serafimovich, Kletskaya and Novo-Grigorievskaya remained in the hands of our troops. The troops of the 4th Panzer Army covered the Stalingrad-Povorino railway with their front. The 62nd Army defended the shortest routes to Stalingrad from the west. The armies of the Southeastern Front covered the Stalingrad direction from the southwest and south. Unfortunately, most of the divisions of our armies were at a very large understrength. Despite this, the troops in those days significantly intensified their activities. Strained all the forces and the civilian population of the city, especially the workers who worked tirelessly to strengthen the defense. The production of artillery and tank weapons, which was given by the Stalingrad factories, made it possible to daily form an anti-tank artillery regiment (20 guns) and a tank company consisting of 10 combat vehicles.
