Colonel Kassad has a post about intelligence officer Leonov, in which, among other things, he signs how several people under his command captured coastal batteries at Cape Krestovoy, which ensured the capture of the port of Liinakhamari. Moreover, there were two batteries.
http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/3411391.html
Perhaps Kassad is just a victim of the Soviet-era pear, or maybe he really doesn’t care how it really was. That the combined detachment of intelligence officers of the SOR and the headquarters of the Federation Council was not commanded at all by Leonov, but by Barchenko-Emelyanov, that there were 195 of them, and not several dozen. They managed to capture only the anti-aircraft battery on Krestovoy, and failed to capture the coastal 15.5-cm battery. However, Leonov is a hero, because after the war he intensively created his image, and Barchenko is forgotten because he did not promote himself.

Alexander Antoshin: It was necessary to storm the batteries - not needed, useful / not useful The question is not unambiguous in my opinion, the fact that it was dark was of course good ... But do not forget even in pitch darkness with smoke curtains set up by Russian boats and under the chirping of PPSh in the port , the Germans, confused, nevertheless opened fire from Cape Lodeyny and inflicted serious damage on the 1st boat from a distance of about 1 km. And what would have happened if it weren’t for that mess on the Krestovy m, which our scouts made? The Germans would have shot from the rear the landing forces and ships advancing on the supporters, the concentration-landing zone at the berths, at least.

Even if 4 -155 coastal guns could not respond quickly due to the caliber, poor lighting conditions in the water area and the surprise factor. But at least 2-88 mm also look at the throat of the bay (the sector of fire is narrow, but there is). 75 mm Fri gun at the water's edge looked directly at Cape Devkin. And 3 more 20 mm machine guns at Cape Krestovy, 2 of them could cover our boats for sure, even the same Cape Lodeyny with 4-20 mm ... Another 3 20 mm above the 4th berth. The sector and angle made it possible to hit targets at the turn at Cape Devkin with at least 1 gun.

I think that some confusion of the Germans played a role in their inability to knock ours down from the approaches to the batteries on the Krestovy metro station. Plus, obviously the German infantry "stumbled" in the port. Instead of pressing into the trenches and putting out all the available machine guns and peering into the darkness, they were waiting for something somewhere in the personnel quarters or sleeping. Well, I have such a picture at least (otherwise there is no way to explain such a "puncture") And at the time of the landing in the port, neither the courtyards of the 88-mm battery nor the 155 mm were occupied by the detachment of Barchenko Yemelyanov, although they were shot through.

igor_ktb: That the assault on Cape Krestovy was needed is understandable. Ours did not know anything exactly about the batteries - about their ability to fire in the dark, the condition of the guns. It is quite clear that it was necessary to try to capture the cape.

The issue is that the story about Leonov is constructed in such a way that it was only thanks to him that the landing took place with a handful of fighters.

Original taken from igor_ktb to Barchenko-Emelyanov

I read his memoirs. Actually, I don't read memoirs, but sometimes I make exceptions. I read Kabanov - pretty good, by the way, turned out to be.
Here I was bribed again by the northern theme, and the volume was small.
But now there is an answer to the question why, in general, little is known about the subject. Yunevich, Leonov, as it were, are more famous people, but this one actually appeared only in October 1944. Now everything is clear - for the entire war he participated, not counting October 1944, in only one more or less successful operation, and he was not the main one there. The rest: the exercises, the front line on Musta-Tunturi, unsuccessful raids (you can even count them on the fingers). Not the most eventful combat career. And his brother turns out to have served in the 2nd SCAP, died on a Hurricane.

Original taken from rostislavddd in Legend of the Soviet Navy

A reconnaissance officer of the 181st separate reconnaissance detachment of the reconnaissance department of the headquarters of the Northern Fleet is standing with the SVT, foreman of the 2nd article Viktor Nikolayevich Leonov
Future Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, captain of the second rank. He also remained in the history of the Russian Navy as one of the creators of the modern special intelligence of the Navy (the reconnaissance detachments of the fleets were disbanded after the war, the special forces of the Navy in the 50s were created from scratch).
R.I.P. 1916-2003. Photo taken in 1942.

BABIKOV Makar Andreevich Published April 24, 2012. Interview and literary processing. A. Drabkin, N. Anichkin

I was born in the North, in the Pechora, at that time it was still the Arkhangelsk province. He grew up and studied there. I managed to work for a year as an elementary school teacher, then in the district committee of the Komsomol, and in 1940 I was drafted into the army and ended up in the Northern Fleet, at the Polyarnaya base, in an anti-aircraft battery.

The war began for us not on June 22, but on June 18. We had general naval communications exercises, and during the exercises a German aircraft flew over the main base of the fleet. The commander asks: "Why didn't they shoot?" Everyone throws up their hands.

“You have a duty gun on every ship. Each battery has a duty gun. They are obliged to shoot without any order. Since it is a duty weapon.

All commanders and political workers shrug.

"From now on, if it appears, open fire."

Four hours later he reappeared, Junkers, not only from the duty gun, but from all that was, they took up arms. It immediately soared up and flew, and the fleet was put on alert, and we didn’t leave the battery anywhere, food was delivered directly to combat points. Thus the war began for us.

It must be said that in 1940, when the Germans occupied Norway, a significant part of the population of Northern Norway on their fishing boats, boats, with all their families, went to the USSR with their belongings. They were given a place in the state farm, and as soon as the war began, they immediately joined in combat activities, not all of them, of course, but men, young men, youth, they immediately joined.

In the North, there was such a feature - the front went along the coast, capturing a little Finland and Norway, and now, according to an agreement with our allies, a dividing line was drawn along the city of Tromso, we did not have the right to walk south of Tromso, so as not to beat our own, or rather allies, and north of Tromsa they were not allowed to walk.

After the war began, I was taken to the political department. The political department was formed from reserve commanders who came on mobilization, and most of them did not have a decent education, and before the army I had already worked as a teacher, so the head of the political department dictated a report to me. Then, in the fall, 4 political workers with academic education came.

From the political department, “under patronage”, I went to the reconnaissance detachment, in the training detachment I had a platoon commander who treated me well, after the start of the war he got into this reconnaissance detachment, and then one political worker came from our division to the same detachment, so they gave me protection, so I got into intelligence.

The name of his detachment sometimes changed, but there was always the word "special". Special reconnaissance detachment, special purpose detachment. But the special has always been present.

The detachment reported directly to the commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Golovko, he even spoke about us - this is my personal guard. The detachment was under special care, they did not experience any shortages. Nikolaev, a member of the Military Council of the Fleet, sometimes came to us and said: “I came with you to drink 100 grams.” And then one day there was an unpleasant incident - several people from the detachment got into a fight with civilians, and Nikolaev came to sort it out. He immediately wanted to expel the two offenders, but I got up, I say, in the detachment, after all, the problems are not for this reason. They began to supply us worse. The squad needs help. Cowhide boots appeared immediately, good solid boots. Everything that was needed, everything appeared.

We can say we are lucky. The commander of the fleet and a member of the military council kept the detachment under their control and supervision. This fault is the rarest case.

In the detachment there was a large group of foreign communist employees of the Comintern, this was very important for us, and very useful, because they knew the situation, the language.

The entire coast from Troms to the front at Murmansk was under intelligence control. This was a very difficult service. The reconnaissance points were located right along the coast, in bare rocks, it was impossible to build dugouts there, and they sat at these points for 3-4, or even 6 months. Products were thrown there either from submarines or with parachutes. A special detachment group of 150 people served at these points. They were not allowed to surrender.

In general, there was order in the detachment - not to surrender. We did not have any documents, the uniform was not strictly military, but semi-civilian, semi-sports. In case of danger, it was necessary to shoot. Fight to the last, blow yourself up with grenades, shoot yourself. I remember we were going into operation, it was necessary to urgently break through to the German positions and seize a bridgehead for the landing of the main landing force, but immediately after the landing one sailor was wounded in the legs, and there was no time to drag him back. He asked to leave the gun. We retreated about 100 meters and he fired a bullet at himself. All!

During the war, participants in the partisan movement were awarded Soviet government awards: five people with the Order of the Red Star, one person with the medal "For Courage". In addition, another 16 Norwegian citizens were awarded Soviet orders and medals for helping Soviet prisoners of war. Among the Norwegians awarded Soviet orders, Trigve Friksen, who was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of War and the Order of the Red Star in Moscow, cannot be ignored.

In the summer of 1943, in Cyborg, during Operation Midday Sun, German counterintelligence uncovered a number of reconnaissance groups. Some of them died, a number of Norwegian intelligence assistants were executed. Their portraits are on the wall of the museum. There is also a permanent exhibition dedicated to the Norwegian partisans and Soviet intelligence officers.

There was another case - a Norwegian young man, about 20 years old, approximately, a radio operator, in general, at first there were only Soviet radio operators in the detachment, but then they began to be missed, so I had to resort to Norwegian ones. He was part of a group of three, all Norwegians, they were sent behind the front line and they were ambushed. The group leader escaped and left. To cover his tracks, he first went west, the other would immediately go to his base, and he made such a turn. In general, he escaped from the ambush, but the Germans nevertheless overtook him near the former border, and he died. His second-in-command fought until he died. And the radio operator was taken prisoner. The guy turned out to be unstable and he was immediately pressed, as it should, and turned over.

As a result, he sent a signal that he needed help and a group of two people, a Norwegian and our radio operator, were dropped to him. They met him and went to the shore, where our submarine was supposed to pick them up, but as soon as the submarine approached to help take off these guys, the Germans opened fire in the hope of capturing it. The commander of the boat ordered an urgent dive, while he himself remained afloat. He was captured wounded, but the boat with the rest of the crew was able to escape.

Then this guy spent some time in Norway, and then the Germans threw him on one island, in the North, approximately on the route of the allied convoys. He sat there for a while, and then went out on a boat into the sea and drowned. Threw himself into the sea.

In 1942, our detachment carried out a very difficult operation.

We were supposed to escort two companies of marines to the German stronghold, but one company got lost in the dark, and while this company was being searched for, the other was inactive. The commander decided to conduct the operation only with the forces of the detachment.

The battle began early in the morning and lasted all day. We lay under fire all day. People are dying, but you can’t help anything, you have to somehow escape. Yura Mikheev was wounded, but managed to throw a grenade at the German. He himself died, but gave us the opportunity to break through.

Lieutenant Shalavin, our commander, was wounded, both of his legs were shot, so he handed over command to Leonov, he was a submariner before the war, and after the start of the war he got into the detachment. At first he was an ordinary scout, and by 1942 he became a squad leader. Here Shalavin told him: “Victor, you command. I'm not a walker."

We went to the coast, just the snow fell, all wet, tired, lay in this snow all day. Pasha Poroshev was cramped all over. Everyone says I'll be like Quazemoda. Strip him to the goal, rubbed everything with vodka. He says, now pour it into your mouth. Well, we think, since it has come to this, then everything ...! As they say, the guy became a walker. He was very humorous, unsightly in appearance, his face was quite simple, he always said - then I was big and handsome.

The name of the scout Pavel was not Poroshev, but Baryshev. Baryshev Pavel Sergeevich, born in 1920.

We broke away, but we still need to lie out in the snow for another day until our boats arrive. We lie in the snow, I look, on a hillock a man walks and shoots. It turned out to be Pushlakhta, he is from the Arkhangelsk region, from the village of Pushlakht, that's what his name was Pushlakhta. He was wounded when he saw us, he said: “I see that there is no one of you, I think, I’ll get to the Germans now and shoot them, and that’s it.”

We still waited for the boats. We returned to the base, and Shalavin was carried out.

After this operation, journalists immediately began to hunt for us, Leonov was given an officer rank and appointed deputy commander of the detachment, and a year later he was appointed commander.

In 1944, our detachment participated in the liberation of Northern Norway. We were given an important and responsible task - to capture two German batteries that covered the fjord. Until you capture them, you can’t meddle in the fjord, they will drown.

We landed 120 people and for two days, along the rocks, we walked to the batteries. About 150 meters before the batteries, they lay down, waiting for darkness, and then got up and went forward, but immediately stumbled upon a German patrol. Immediately a fight, six scouts died in the first 2-3 minutes of the battle. But the rest managed to break through. They jumped out to the sawn-off shotgun, and the servant managed to jump out to two guns and opened fire.

We managed to capture these guns and held out until the morning, despite the fact that we had many wounded. And in the morning the personnel of this battery surrendered, and the next morning the long-range battery capitulated.

The fleet commander congratulated us later: “Yes, well done! Clean work". And the commander of the detachment, Leonov, announced: "You are a Hero of the Soviet Union"!

On this, in fact, our combat activities in the Northern Fleet ended.

On the evening of May 8, 1945, I was invited to the Political Directorate, and they said that Germany had capitulated and on May 9 there would be a rally dedicated to the Victory at the main base. At this meeting, I spoke on behalf of the Red Navy and the foremen, and on May 10 we were told that the detachment was being transferred to the Far East. A few days to pack and spin the wheels. Somewhere on May 20, we left, those who were older or wounded were left, and the rest went to the Far East.

At that time, many troops from the west were transferred to the Far East, including the Karelian Front. Part of the front remained in the West, the 14th Army, and the other half went to the Far East. Meretskov, the former commander of the Karelian Front, became the commander of the 1st Far Eastern Front, on which our detachment was.

They arrived in Vladivostok, replenished with recruits, all the guys are young, 18-19 years old, absolutely not shot. We had to have time to prepare them, train them, and for us the area is completely unusual, we fought in the polar rocks, and here is the taiga.

On August 9, we were at the exercises and suddenly received an encryption, urgently return to the base. We returned to the base, and there the boats were already waiting for us. The war has begun.

On August 11, we left for Korea. We landed in the city during the day, the entire local population hid, as if it were not there. Late in the evening, the lead detachment of the army approached.

Met with the army. We agreed, we take the next city, Mejen - whoever takes it first, he manages. We came by sea before they did. The situation in this city is already different - ours have thoroughly bombed it, everything is on fire. We stayed in this city until the evening. Then the marines came up, we surrendered the city to them and went to Vladivostok.

During the transition, we ran into a mine. Moreover, the lead boat passed, and the mine exploded behind it. A column of water hit the driven boat, several of our guys were washed overboard, the boat was damaged, but we, nevertheless, reached Vladivostok closer to midnight.

We returned to the base. We fell down exhausted, I was right on the pier, and at 5 o'clock I got up on alarm - 2 hours to get ready, get new weapons, ammunition, food. And again in battle.

At 7 o'clock we went on three boats to Chongjin. There we were already met by artillery fire, still on the way. We captured the pier with a fight and immediately rushed forward to cut the railway. Nikandrov's platoon captured the bridges, and my platoon went to cut the highway.

The Japanese tried to escape to the south, and here it came to the point that several sailors jumped into the back of the car and grabbed the Japanese and fought with the Japanese.

In my platoon, one squad went around with cameras, their task was to record everything. And so the commander of this department, Maximov, when there was a hand-to-hand fight, was so carried away by photographing that a bullet hit him in a man's device.

In this fight, the Japanese shot at me almost point-blank, but a miracle happened, the bullet went through my temple, but did not touch the bones. Now everything is overgrown, but before it was noticeable.

We held out in the city for another day, but the landing party that was supposed to go there did not appear. They could not enter the bay and landed near the city, and the Japanese did not let it go further.

The Japanese realized that there was a small group in the city and tried to knock us out. We have entrenched ourselves in the port, the rain is pouring like a bucket, the Japanese are firing at us, we are shooting back. So the night lasted, and in the morning two of our frigates came and the Japanese immediately ran.

Then they returned to Vladivostok. We were given a respite of 3 or 4 days, and then the radio reported that the Japanese emperor had declared surrender, and the detachment was given the task of landing in Wonsan, and there the Japanese garrison of 7 thousand, the airfield, and so we had to force this garrison to surrender, and capture the airfield .

It was easy with the airfield - Leonov held minute negotiations there so that the planes would not take off, but it was more difficult with the garrison, the negotiations went on for two days - on one side of the street we were with weapons, on the other side of the same street the Japanese were also with weapons at the ready.

Two days later, the garrison capitulated. And so we had to bring these 7 thousand into columns, take away their weapons, collect them in one place. Such a mission fell to us in the last operation in the Far East.

That war was fleeting. The emperor announced his surrender. You know that the Americans dropped two atomic bombs, this also had its significance, the war ended there.

I was one of the first from the detachment to demobilize and go to Moscow, my wife is a Muscovite. In the autumn of 1941, she dug trenches near Mozhaisk, and then went to the navy. She graduated from the school of the training detachment near Moscow, and asked to go to the North. It turned out not even in Polyarny, the main base, on Rybachy, moreover, Rybachy was then cut off, communication was only by sea. There we met her, and when the fighting in the North ended, we arrived in Moscow, registered on December 30, and played a modest wedding on December 31. So I returned to Moscow from the Far East, and have been living here ever since. My wife and I graduated from institutes, raised children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren.

- Thank you, Makar Andreevich. A few more questions. How were you selected for the squad?

The selection was very strict. As soon as the war began - immediately a shaft of reports, with a request to be sent to the front. Then the flagship physical instructor of the fleet was invited to the intelligence department. They say that here is a bunch of reports of people who are rushing to the front. Look. You know all the athletes. You have training before your eyes, all sorts of exercises. Take away. He selects: here some, others there. You can rely on these guys. These are dubious. They say to him: “You will now command these guys that you have chosen.” Thus, he turned out to be the commander of the reconnaissance detachment.

- During the war, there were losses, how was a replacement selected?

report. And also selection. Mistakes also happened. I know 2-3 cases when the guys were disgraced. Somewhere got drunk, quarreled.

There was another such case - the personal belongings of the sailors began to disappear in the detachment. The sailors reacted to this very painfully. They found out who. They say, either we will finish you in battle, or voluntarily leave here yourself. This guy immediately packed his backpack and left somewhere. But these are isolated cases. And only on the shore, in battle, there was nothing like that.

- How did you train?

In the summer - forced marches in full combat, training on ladders, with a weapon and a backpack, run along the ladder so as not to fall and fall into the water, this also needs to be acquired. They fought with each other, especially since I'm not rich in build, most of the guys are taller and heavier than me, but somehow I had to hold on. And in winter, skiing, the ability to go down from the mountains.

- What weapon did you take with you?

The first time of the war SVT, Tokarev rifle, semi-automatic. In 1941, the chief, the deputy head of the intelligence department, had one machine gun. All. But already in 1942, especially in 1943, everyone had automatic weapons, an indispensable knife or dagger. A machine gun for each squad.

They used mainly our weapons, but they also studied German.

- Did you yourself land in observation groups that watched the movement on the Norwegian coast?

No, I was not on long-term assignments, only went to the rear for a few days.

These groups, as a rule, were isolated from each other, and did not have the right to communicate, only radio communication with the headquarters. In 1942, 5 groups perished, in 1943 another 5 groups. In one group there was such a case - one fighter lost his nerve, went crazy on a mission. They were forced to shoot him.

- What was the size of the group going on the mission?

Depending on the task. If the detachment commander himself goes on a mission, then most of the detachment participates in this operation.

In May 1942 there was a major operation. The detachment had to break forward, divert attention to itself, so that they would pile on the detachment, and at that time the army was supposed to go into a free breakthrough. The detachment completed the task, and then the frost hit. No one could have foreseen that God would arrange such ice. Many were injured, frozen, the operation failed.

- More often on what they threw on boats, submarines?

Differently. At first, in 1941, on former fishing boats. Then on sea hunters, torpedo boats. Distant casting - submarines.

- Who gave you the task? Golovko himself?

Fleet headquarters. More specifically, the intelligence department. We were like a unit of the intelligence department. At first, we were even in the same house - a residential building, two entrances, a detachment in one entrance, an intelligence department in the other. But in 1942, somewhere in the early summer, a bomb hit the part of the building where the intelligence department was, some of the employees died immediately. We were on a mission, returned, and we only have the wreckage of the house.

- So you were based in Polyarny?

Yes, and the maneuvering base has always been on Rybachy. At first it was a former mine depot. Then after a while there was a fire, this room burned down, we were settled in former Finnish houses. They lived in these houses until the end of the war.

- Did the detachment bear heavy losses?

The detachment twice suffered heavy losses. But one of the most difficult operations is 1942, September. There, due to a misunderstanding, we were thrown in the wrong place, it was already at dawn. According to the plan of the operation, we were supposed to return, but instead the commander abandoned it. Lost excellent scouts. Abramov, such a walker, a Leningrader. The route was chosen according to the map. Vasya Kashutin is a great person, for some reason he preferred an army uniform, she sat on it - you will admire it! He came under fire on the slope, further down the slope there was a small hillock half the height of a man, I was so offended that Vasya was lying there, screaming. I crawled towards him. He crawled up, and he was already cold, that's all. He had a dagger behind his bootleg. Dagger took off, went down. There we had a running expression, a fly swatter. Fly slayer, where did you go? But I'm already back. I gave the dagger to the commander. So he had him later. They are right in front of my eyes right now. Met Vasya's sister. Corresponded. Now she is dead.

Was Leonov a good commander?

Leonov, as a commander, grew up in the detachment. From operation to operation, his skill grew. And already in 1942, when we went on this operation, he was a group commander, 7 people, a control group. Leonov picked up the skill, became an officer, and, relatively speaking, the commander gave him his place, because he stopped going on missions

- Equipment for each task was selected, or always standard?

They were dressed differently in winter and summer. Although there both winter and summer are relative concepts - there is snow or no snow, cold water or not. People are used to dressing themselves. There were no strict regulations on what to wear in the detachment; in this sense, we were free Cossacks.

- Are winter clothes short fur coats?

We never had shorts. Sweatshirt, wadded pants. In 1943, Canadian suits. They are quite light, dry well, not so blown.

- How often did you have to go on assignments?

It depended most often on what the command required. Sometimes you don’t go out for a month, and sometimes you go out 3 or 4 times a month.

Once, in 1941, when the situation at the front was unstable, the command decided to give the detachment a break, and Konstantin Simonov came to our detachment.

He then came again and again, even went with us to one operation. The Finns were there. On the eve of the Finns left, we destroyed the dugouts, burned and left.

I remember that we once sat, talked and asked: "Konstantin Mikhailovich, read something from the front." He sat silently for a while, and then he himself read the famous song "Wait for me." I read it. The guys listened. And then from the elderly, family Alyosha Chemodanov says: “Konstantin Mikhailovich, we are family people here, we have children, wives, what to read the words: having changed yesterday, there is such a phrase. It is very hard for sailors to listen to what changed yesterday.” And Simonov changed it to "forgetting yesterday."

And there was also such a photojournalist Khaldei, very famous, he also visited the detachment a lot, and at the same time as Simonov.

- How did you spend your free time between operations?

The most favorite thing was to go to the Fleet House, to the Club. There you can watch movies, dance, listen to music. And we were given good passes. In essence, we had free access, the detachment was in a privileged position in this respect.

- Were the Germans mainly the enemy or the Finns too?

In the North, the Finns did not fight against us. The German mountain rangers fought against us. Strong opponent, trained. They knew the mountains well and fought decently, very decently, but only until the autumn of 1944, when the threat of encirclement overtook them, then they abandoned everything, just to have time to escape.

- How were they treated as enemies, as an adversary?

There was no bitterness. We knew that if you are not his, then he is you. You still need to defend yourself. But sometimes there was such a situation when they involuntarily surrendered, then the prisoners are prisoners, the weapons were taken away and that's it. It cannot be said that there was anger against them, hatred. It wasn't. As they say, do not cut it.

Did you use a weapon with a silencer?

There were no silencers in our squad, but there were in the detachment. They were used by the guys who sat in the position as a sniper so as not to find themselves.

- In addition to awards, were there any other rewards?

Came from a good operation. So, the usual feast. We took one flask of vodka with us to the department, you never know, suddenly someone gets into the water, or is wounded. And so the vodka remained in the base. When they returned, then it was already possible to mark this event accordingly.

- Radio stations always took?

Yes, a radio operator is a must. There are 24/7 radio operators on duty at the base.

- Is there one radio station per group, or per platoon?

Usually the detachment goes and one radio station. If a small group, 2-3 people, then they must have a radio operator.

Most of them are old people and did not have pensions. Previously, they could travel by minibus directly to the large village of Khanzhonkovo, but this became unprofitable for the carrier and now the route has been divided into four parts. That is, a pensioner needs to transfer to four different routes in order to get to the nearest center, where he can receive humanitarian assistance or get basic medical advice. In this village, not only is there no hospital - because of the war, the only pharmacy in it was closed and sometimes people died from the lack of the cheapest, simplest medicines in case of an elementary heart attack.

In such cases, volunteer groups, like ours, come to the village, find out what the situation is there. Then we indicate this point in the report to our partners and international organizations - help is needed there. That is, we are like an advanced reconnaissance detachment.

People there are used to traveling to larger cities, now the situation is gradually leveling off. As for Russian humanitarian aid, it has been plundered on the ground for quite a long time. Despite the volume, its impact was, unfortunately, negligible. But now the situation has improved, at least in Donetsk, hospitals are well supplied precisely due to this humanitarian aid.

Do I understand correctly that your group is engaged in distributing humanitarian aid from all sources where it does not reach well?

We have a self-organized volunteer group, I am one of its four founders. The structure is flat, we have neither superiors nor subordinates. Now there are more than 20 people in the group who are constantly engaged in work. We have two directions.

The first is systemic support provided through official contracts with organizations such as the Czech "People in Need", "Doctors Without Borders", the Rinat Akhmetov Foundation. We work with them, supplying, for example, places of residence for migrants. And there was a big project to support people living in bomb shelters in those areas that are called “red zones”.

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The second direction is targeted assistance. We collect contributions. We have a Facebook group where we post videos, texts about our activities, photos. People send us money on cards - these are private donations, through which we can help people whose needs are atypical. For example, the rules of most international organizations do not allow the provision of medical assistance. The Red Cross only helps people directly affected by the fighting. People with chronic diseases such as diabetes, asthma, hypertension, and these are common among old people who have no money, no one helps. Therefore, we have a hotline, thanks to which we collect applications and help each person individually. This direction covers from three hundred to five hundred people a month, and since the beginning of our activity, we have already helped more than 20,000 people. And we support some families all the time.

After all, many have never been in this situation before, but got into it. I remember well one case - a family with four children, two of whom are disabled. Before the war, the husband and wife were small business owners, that is, they were middle class who relied on themselves. During the war, the business collapsed, because no one needs legal services now. They lost their income, there were no large savings, and they, too, suddenly found themselves in the category of socially unprotected. These are the people we provide system support.

A reconnaissance detachment in the mountains can be sent out under various conditions of combat activity of troops: on the march and in a meeting engagement, during an offensive engagement, in pursuit, in defense in the absence of direct contact with the enemy, and also during the withdrawal of troops.
The reconnaissance detachment can perform the following tasks.
On the march- to detect the approach of enemy troops and the availability of means of using nuclear weapons, as well as to determine its forces and deployment lines for combat; establish the patency of roads, the presence and nature of barriers and obstacles.
During the offensive- establish pockets of enemy resistance, locations of fire weapons, especially means of using nuclear weapons; identify the presence of areas of radiation and chemical contamination; determine the nature of the obstacles that have arisen as a result of nuclear explosions, the state of the routes and their suitability for the movement of all branches of the military; establish the approach of enemy reserves, their forces and deployment lines for counterattacks; establish the beginning and direction of the enemy's withdrawal.
When chasing an enemy- to establish the forces and composition of the covering parts of the enemy; detect the approach of reserves and their use; establish the preparation of the enemy for the use of nuclear weapons; determine the nature of barriers and obstacles.
On the defensive in the absence of direct contact with the enemy- timely determine the forces, composition and direction of actions of the reconnaissance and forward units of the enemy, the approach of the main forces, the areas of concentration and the initial position for the offensive; identify whether the enemy has the means to use nuclear weapons and the procedure for using them; during a defensive battle - to conduct reconnaissance of the flanks and joints.
The following features influence the organization and nature of the actions of a reconnaissance detachment in the mountains:

• an insignificant number of paths for the movement of the detachment, especially for wheeled and tracked vehicles;
• the steepness and sinuosity of ascents and descents, which greatly reduce the speed of the reconnaissance detachment;
• icing in winter ups and downs, which makes it difficult for wheeled vehicles to move even on relatively small ups and downs;
• the nature of the mountainous terrain, which contributes to the widespread use by the enemy of ambushes, the construction of blockages in narrow passages, the explosion of bridges, crossings and individual sections of roads;
• a large number of dead spaces and hidden approaches that limit the observation of the enemy and the conduct of actual fire.

A reconnaissance detachment operating in the mountains, as a rule, will be tied to the roads. If he receives a reconnaissance strip that includes several directions, then he will have to send patrols to each of these directions. However, due to the disunity of these areas, communication between the patrols and their control will be very difficult or not feasible at all, and the patrols will thus turn into scattered independent reconnaissance bodies that have no connection with the main forces of the reconnaissance detachment. It follows from this that a reconnaissance detachment operating in the mountains must be assigned not a strip, but the direction of reconnaissance.
The composition of the reconnaissance detachment for operations in the mountains is more often a reinforced rifle company on armored personnel carriers or a tank company, however, in some cases, the composition of the reconnaissance detachment may be mixed (motorized rifle units, tanks, armored personnel carriers, motorcycles), and when operating in particularly difficult areas, the reconnaissance detachment may be completely on foot. Everything will depend on the conditions of the mountainous terrain, but in all cases, the reconnaissance detachment must necessarily include motorized infantry.
The order of battle of a reconnaissance detachment operating in mountainous terrain is different from that on flat terrain. The distance of reconnaissance patrols from the main forces of the detachment should not exceed 1.5-2 km, while in plain conditions this distance will be 10-15 km or more.
The number of reconnaissance patrols sent out from a reconnaissance detachment is determined by the detachment commander, based on the conditions of the situation, the nature of the terrain and the availability of roads. If the enemy is at a considerable distance, it is enough to have one reconnaissance patrol ahead; as we approach the area of ​​a probable meeting with the enemy, the number of patrols in the mountainous area can be increased to three or four, or even five.
When operating in difficult mountainous terrain, the patrols are quickly exhausted, so the commander of the reconnaissance detachment must provide additional patrols in advance formed and prepared for action in the main body column to replace them.
To inspect the area away from the main route of movement, as a rule, foot patrols from well physically trained and dexterous scouts are sent to a distance of no more than 300-500 m from the main forces of the reconnaissance detachment. After the main body of the detachment has passed, the foot patrols join the reconnaissance detachment, and other sentinels must be trained in the main forces of the detachment to be sent to new directions.
During the years of the last war, reconnaissance detachments operating in the mountains used the following battle formations. A head patrol moved ahead of the main forces of the reconnaissance detachment at a distance of 1-2 km. The rear patrol moved 500 meters from the main forces of the detachment. In cases where the terrain did not allow the use of wheeled or tracked vehicles, foot patrols were sent out. For example, reconnaissance detachments operating in the Carpathians conducted reconnaissance in the battle formation shown in Fig. 35.

Rice. 35. Order of battle of a reconnaissance detachment in the Carpathians (1944)

When drawing up a plan of action in the mountains, the commander of a reconnaissance detachment, depending on the nature of the terrain, must provide for places that ensure the highest speed of movement and maneuverability of the patrols and the main forces of the detachment. He must also calculate the movement on the route, taking into account the steepness of the ascents and descents, and determine the speed of the detachment on various sections of the route. The steeper the climb, the slower the movement should be and the more frequent the stops. The movement of the detachment before contact with the enemy must occur at maximum speed. When the detachment is in immediate proximity to the advanced units of the enemy, it must move in leaps from one turn of the road to another; all paths and roads that cut the main route of the detachment must be carefully inspected by sentinels, additionally sent from the main forces of the reconnaissance detachment, since from these directions in the mountains a sudden attack by the enemy on the flank and rear of the main forces of the reconnaissance detachment is possible.
Passing through the gorges along a narrow and difficult to turn road and having met in front and above such places where the enemy can be, it is necessary to leave several camouflaged armored personnel carriers (tanks) behind so that they are ready to open fire on the enemy and cover the attack or withdrawal of the reconnaissance detachment .
In addition, when driving along such roads, it is necessary to take into account a possible raid by enemy aircraft, for which it is necessary to increase the distance between the subunits of the main forces of the reconnaissance detachment. During an air raid, reconnaissance units moving at the head of the detachment must make a forward throw.
An enemy on the move is best scouted in valleys and narrow places. Therefore, it is sometimes advantageous to wait for the enemy columns to enter the valley, or to speed up your movement, shoot down the enemy covering units and take up a position that provides a good view. Let's confirm this with an example.
In the area of ​​metro station Pereginsko in 1944, the enemy retreated along the valley of the Lomnica River to the northwest. direction. The commander of the reconnaissance detachment, Captain Levchenko, was tasked with throwing around the retreating enemy column, determining its composition and cutting off its escape routes (Fig. 36).
The composition of the reconnaissance detachment was as follows: a rifle battalion in vehicles, 10 self-propelled guns with a landing of submachine gunners and an artillery battery.
At 6:00 am on July 28, 1944, the reconnaissance detachment set out from the Maidan region to complete the task. With the beginning of the movement, a head patrol was sent. The detachment moved along the same road along which the enemy retreated, since there were no detours before reaching the valley in the Pereginyoko region.

Rice. 36. Actions of the reconnaissance detachment in the area of ​​​​m. Pereginsko in 1944

At 0800, the head patrol commander reported that he had reached Nebyłów and that the retreating enemy units were moving along the valley of the Lomnica River in the direction of Olchówka. In addition, he reported that in the Nebylów area there were roads along which it was possible to overtake the enemy convoy.
Having received such data, the commander of the reconnaissance detachment decided to defeat the enemy column in the Olhuvka area. The plan was as follows: self-propelled guns with a landing party to overtake the column in the Olhuvka area, cut the road along which it was moving, and defeat it with a simultaneous blow from the rear and from the front.
By 9.30 am, self-propelled guns with an infantry landing in a detour, unnoticed by the enemy, were ahead of him and occupied the only road along which he was moving. Self-propelled guns were located along the road and began to wait for the enemy. As soon as the head of the column approached, fire was opened. The enemy, who did not expect a sudden raid by scouts, threw down his weapons in a panic and, without offering organized resistance, surrendered. In total, in the Olhuvka area, scouts captured 560 soldiers and officers and many different equipment.
As combat experience shows, in the process of performing tasks, a reconnaissance detachment often has to conduct reconnaissance in force. In mountainous terrain, conducting reconnaissance in force has some peculiarities. The reconnaissance detachment, with the fire of small forces, diverts the attention of the enemy from the front, while with the main forces it undertakes envelopment or a deep detour in order to reach the flank or rear of the enemy, and then destroy him.
If enemy defensive lines are discovered in the reconnaissance detachment's direction of action, the commander of the reconnaissance detachment must organize reconnaissance with the task of establishing the enemy's forces, the front of his defense, the nature of the defensive structures, gaps and flanks. Particular attention should be paid to reconnaissance of enemy nuclear attack weapons.
In order to receive reconnaissance data transmitted from aboard reconnaissance aircraft, the commander of the reconnaissance detachment, at the direction of the commander who sent the reconnaissance detachment, allocates a radio receiver.
When a reconnaissance detachment meets with reconnaissance or guarding the enemy, it is necessary to take all measures to ensure that, without revealing oneself, using rugged mountainous terrain, bypass the enemy and reach his main forces. This is the basic requirement that a reconnaissance detachment must strive to fulfill. However, the situation may develop in such a way that the reconnaissance detachment will not be able to bypass the advanced enemy units and will be forced to collide with them. In this case, the detachment suddenly attacks them, captures prisoners, documents, and after that, using hidden approaches, goes to its main forces with the task of establishing their composition and direction of movement.
The main obstacle to the use of motorized reconnaissance detachments in the mountains is the lack of roads, and in those directions where there are even roads, the steepness of the ascents and descents, as well as the narrowness, frequent bends and winding roads and paths, usually winding along the rocky spurs of mountain ranges.
Combat vehicles in reconnaissance can be used in areas with slopes up to 45 °, free from scree and large stones. The experience of military operations and post-war exercises, however, show that, despite the difficulties of using tanks and armored personnel carriers in reconnaissance, they will find use in the mountains with their proper equipment, good traffic organization, and excellent driver training. The use of tanks and armored personnel carriers is especially expedient when reconnaissance needs to capture individual points, fashion shows, cover the actions of rifle subunits, and overcome areas (areas) where nuclear explosions were carried out.
Considering the actions of the reconnaissance detachment, special mention should be made of the reconnaissance of the terrain in the mountains, since the success of our troops will largely depend on the solution of this task. Reconnaissance of the terrain is carried out in order to establish the nature and features of the relief, natural obstacles and local objects, the condition of the soil, roads, to determine the degree of influence of the terrain on the location and actions of friendly troops, the enemy, and especially on the use of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction and protection against them.

Peculiarities of visiting the area in the mountains
intelligence units

Inspection of gorges (gorges, hollows). Sudden actions from the enemy should be expected in gorges, narrow mountain passes, on roads and paths. It is in these places that the enemy will most often set up ambushes and raids. Therefore, gorges, gorges and hollows must be carefully examined. At the same time, special attention must be paid to examining the heights located on the sides of the gorge, for which the sentinels must climb the slopes of the heights on both sides of the gorge and carefully examine it from above.
The reconnaissance group can move along the gorge if the sentinels inform the commander about the absence of the enemy. The main forces of the reconnaissance group move along the bottom of the gorge (gorge) in such a way that the sentinels walking along the slope or ridge are ahead of the group in relation to the ledge, i.e., so that they have the opportunity to warn the reconnaissance group in time about the presence of the enemy.
If along the way you encounter gorges (gorges) that diverge from the main route, the commander of the reconnaissance group is obliged to send additional patrol vehicles or foot patrols to inspect them, and only after receiving information from the patrol about the absence of the enemy in these places, the reconnaissance group can continue movement along a given route.
Altitude Inspection the reconnaissance group produces by moving along its slopes or by moving around its soles. Inspection of the height can be carried out by passing through its crest, but for this the commander of the reconnaissance group sends foot patrols or, if the terrain permits, a patrol car to inspect the reverse slopes. The patrol car (sentinels) advances covertly to the ridge in order to observe the terrain ahead. If the enemy is not detected, then this is reported to the group commander, after which the reconnaissance group overcomes the height.
If there are several heights on the way of the reconnaissance group, then you need to inspect them sequentially one after another.
Hollows, ravines, groves, bushes, blocks of stones, etc., on the heights, must be examined with particular care, since in such places the enemy most often sets up ambushes.
O review of settlements. Settlements and individual buildings in the mountains are most often located at the foot of the mountain, on the slopes of the mountains, at the entrances to the gorges. It should be remembered that in mountainous wooded areas, the enemy will usually not occupy settlements, but will be located on heights.
The enemy will build the defense of a settlement located in a lowland (in a gorge) not along its outskirts, but on the heights surrounding the settlement. Inspection of a settlement in the mountains should be made from the slopes of the mountains.
The sentinels should enter the settlement secretly, from the side of vegetable gardens, orchards, vineyards and the rear of residential buildings. In the future, the sentinels inspect the buildings on the outskirts, and if there are local residents, then they are necessarily interrogated on such questions: is there an enemy or not and which one; when was the enemy, what strength and when and where did he leave.
The sentinel must move along the street and along the outskirts of the settlement, especially suspicious buildings should be inspected, observing all precautions. You can not touch things that come across, as they can be mined; it is also forbidden to use the products left by the enemy.
When the patrol vehicle (sentinels) reaches the opposite outskirts, it is necessary to carefully examine the area ahead. If there is no enemy, then the signal "There is no enemy" is given and the patrol vehicle (sentinels) continues to perform the task.
The main forces of the reconnaissance group should be hidden outside the settlement until the sentinels have completed their inspection; only after that the group can continue to move.
Inspection of the forest the reconnaissance party begins by observing its edge from a well-hidden spot. Observing the edge and the forest, one must strive to establish the presence of the enemy by various signs.
Signs of the presence of the enemy in the forest may be the following: tracks of tanks and vehicles leading into or out of the forest; alarming flight of birds; broken branches and peeled bark on trees; fire smoke; shine of glasses of optical instruments, etc.
If no signs of the presence of the enemy in the forest are found, a patrol car (patrolmen on foot) is sent to inspect the forest, and the main forces of the reconnaissance group remain in cover, watching the patrol car.
If there is no enemy at the edge of the forest, the patrol car (patrolmen on foot) gives a signal to the group commander; having received permission from him, he begins to conduct reconnaissance in the depths of the forest.
In mountainous areas, the inspection of forest areas will more often be carried out by reconnaissance groups on foot, since the actions of reconnaissance groups on tanks and armored personnel carriers are very difficult due to especially difficult road conditions.
Inspecting the forest, bushes and groves, the sentinels pay special attention to finding minefields, contaminated areas and other barriers prepared by the enemy. While conducting reconnaissance in the forest, edges, tree tops, dense thickets, ravines, pits, rubble, piles of stones and other places convenient for enemy ambushes are subjected to a thorough inspection.
If the forest is small, then the sentinels comb it at a distance of visual communication, and the main forces of the reconnaissance group go around a small forest or grove.
While the lookouts are inspecting the edge of the forest, the reconnaissance party is in cover, ready to support them. The commander of the reconnaissance group personally monitors the actions of the sentinels and, when he is convinced that the sentinels have entered the forest, he leads the reconnaissance group to the forest.
When moving through the forest, the main forces advance behind the sentinels at a reduced distance, while the movement is made non-stop at the highest possible speed. Surveillance at this time is carried out very carefully on both sides, and fire weapons are in readiness for the immediate opening of fire. Before leaving the forest, the sentinels make a short stop at the edge of the forest and inspect the area ahead.
Having not found the enemy or signs of his presence and having informed the commander of the reconnaissance group about this, the sentinels continue to carry out the assigned task, and the main forces of the group follow them out of the forest.
View of the mountain river. Mountain streams and rivers present serious obstacles to movement, although more fords can be found in mountain rivers than in rivers of flat terrain.
When examining the river, the following is established: the width of the river and the speed of the current; river bottom soil; the presence of rapids and whirlpools on the river; the nature of the coasts (precipitous, steep, forested); whether there are crossings and their nature; patency; from where and what roads or paths approach the river in the exploration area; the availability of improvised material for the device of the crossing and overcoming the river; the presence of barriers at the bottom of the river, arranged by the enemy.
When reconnaissance of a ford, it is necessary to determine the depth of the ford, the speed of the current, the length and width, the hidden approaches to the ford, the steepness of the slopes to it and exits from the river, the passability of the ford for each type of troops.
The reconnaissance group should begin its inspection of the river with reconnaissance of the approaches to it. Not finding the enemy on the outskirts of the river, the commander of the reconnaissance group sends sentinels (patrol vehicle) to directly inspect the river.
Patrolmen (patrol car), using hidden approaches, advance as close as possible to the river and organize observation of their shore.
While observing, they determine the speed of the water flow, the nature of the banks and the place of a possible crossing, the places for launching amphibious assault vehicles, the presence of mine-explosive barriers, the presence of explosive barriers in the water (established by trawling with the help of "cats" thrown into the water due to shelters).
After that, if the task is set to reconnoiter the opposite shore, the sentinels, under the cover of the main forces of the reconnaissance group, ford or on improvised means, cross to the opposite shore and take up a convenient place for observation. If the opposite coast is jammed by the opponents, the commander of the reconnaissance group reports this to the commander who sent the group, and organizes observation of the enemy from his own coast.
If there is a bridge or some other crossing on the river, then the reconnaissance group must inspect the area adjacent to the crossing and determine hidden approaches. Patrolmen under cover of the group, using sharply rough terrain, advance as close as possible to the crossing, establish the presence of the enemy at the crossing and the nature of the bridgeheads, and also determine by eye the carrying capacity, the width of the roadway and the length of the bridge.
This is basically the order of inspection by the reconnaissance group of the terrain and various local objects in the mountains.