The most vivid personality and state practice of Alexander I

were revealed in his confrontation with Napoleon, a confrontation that

led the French emperor to Saint Helena, and Alexander

broken and devastated so much that he apparently could not recover from this

till the end of one's days.

Russia met the beginning of the century with the settlement of its relations with

European powers. Friendly relations were restored with

England, diplomatic relations with the Austrian Empire resumed.

Alexander I declared that he refuses to interfere in internal affairs

foreign states and recognizes in them the political system that

supported by the "general consent" of the peoples of these countries. Saved with France

former friendly relations, but Alexander every month

imbued with increasing distrust of the first consul of France. At the heart of this

mistrust lay not only politics, the ever-increasing expansion of France on

European continent, about which much has been written by our historians, but also

Alexander's attitude to the domestic political problems of France, which is not

attention was paid.

Being a fan of the ideas of the French Revolution, the Republic,

constitutional system and ardently condemning the dictatorship and terror of the Jacobins, the young

The Russian monarch closely followed the developments in France. Already in

1801, reflecting on Napoleon's desire to raise his power in

France, over his international claims, which were actively promoted

Foreign Minister Talleyrand, Alexander remarked: "What swindlers!" And in

1802, when Napoleon declared himself consul for life, Alexander wrote

La Harpe: "I have completely changed, just like you, my dear, my opinion about

first consul. Since the establishment of his consulate for life,

the veil fell: since then things have been going from bad to worse. He started by being

deprived himself of the greatest glory that can befall a man.

The only thing left for him was to prove that he acted without any

personal gain, only for the happiness and glory of their homeland, and to remain faithful

Constitution, to which he himself swore to transfer his power in ten years.

Instead, he preferred to copy the customs of the royal

yards, thereby violating the Constitution of their country. Now it is one of the most

great tyrants that history has ever produced." As you can see, care

Alexandra is concerned about the constitutional order of France. And not at all

professed precisely these views, and the letter was purely personal, closed

character. In addition, Alexander quite correctly caught the sovereign claims

"little corporal".

Since 1803, the expansion of France has been increasing. Bonaparte organizes Boulogne

camp for preparing troops for the invasion of the British Isles, occupies

Hanover and the Kingdom of Naples. The Russian ambassador in Paris begins

demonstrate their rejection of Napoleon's policies, which causes rage

first consul. The execution by Napoleon of the Duke of Enghien, the offspring of the Bourbons

and a relative of the St. Petersburg court, caused a shock in the Russian capital.

The Russian government protested. It stated, in particular,

that Napoleon violated the neutrality of another state (the duke was captured in

Baden) and human rights. After the proclamation of Napoleon as emperor, Russia

went on an active rapprochement with Prussia, and then with England. The matter went to

European war. So by the force of circumstances, rather by the force of one's own

humanistic aspirations, rejection of cynical trampling by Napoleon

laws of their own country, as well as the principles of legitimism, well-established in

Europe of the system, Alexander was forced to abandon his position

non-intervention in European affairs, although the confrontation with France on this

stage was not caused by the interests of Russia. But already at this time the desire

to make Russia happy through the beginning reforms, more and more

coexist in Alexander's soul with the desire to "save" Europe from the French

Tirana. And there is no need to underestimate this desire or replace it with the concept

"salvation of the reactionary regimes of Europe" and so on, since it lay in

the general course of the attitude of Alexander I at that time.

For Russia, the military confrontation with France was objectively

undesirable, since already at that time there was a natural desire

parties through political combinations to achieve the desired results for themselves.

Russia sought to develop the successes of the Russian-Turkish wars and claimed

the straits and Poland, the annexation of Moldavia and Wallachia; in the sphere of interests of Russia

included Finland. Napoleon sought to ensure freedom in the fight against

England and wanted to extend his power to southern and central Europe. On the

compromises were acceptable along this path, but war was also possible. Subsequent

The development of events showed the regularity of both. And yet it should

talk about the two main trends that dictated the behavior of Alexander.

The first is, of course, the policy of Russia as a great European power,

capable of dividing Europe with Bonaparte, and the growing autocratic ambitions

Russian emperor. The second is his liberal complexes, which overflowed

from domestic politics to the international arena. It was at this time that

Alexander, an idea is born, later expressed in the organization of the Holy

union, about the possibility of organizing the European world on the basis of humanism,

cooperation, justice, respect for the rights of nations, observance of the rights

person. The lessons of La Harpe were not in vain. So, directing in 1804

Novosiltsev to England for negotiations, he gave him instructions in which

outlined the idea of ​​concluding a general peace treaty between the peoples and the creation

league of peoples. Here is what he wrote in this document: "Of course, here we are talking

not about the realization of the dream of eternal peace, but still one could

approach the benefits expected from such a world, if in the treaty

in determining the conditions for a general war, it was possible to establish on clear and precise

principles of international law. Why not include in such

agreement on the positive definition of the rights of nationalities, does not provide

the benefits of neutrality and establish obligations never to start

war without first exhausting all the means provided by the arbitration

mediation, which makes it possible to clarify mutual misunderstandings and

try to eliminate them? Under such conditions, it would be possible to start

implementation of this general pacification and create an alliance, decrees

which would form, so to speak, a new code of international law".

A remarkable document, although very premature for that time. However

less Alexander was perhaps the first statesman of Europe,

who put forward the idea of ​​legal regulation of international relations than

long anticipated real steps in this direction already in the second half of

And yet the reasoning of that time remained a chimera. Reality

turned out to be more prosaic. England sought an alliance with Russia to crush

Napoleon. A new anti-French coalition appeared within England,

Russia, Austria, Prussia. At the same time, Russian claims to Turkey and Poland were

satisfied. Russian troops moved to Europe. The goal of the great

absolutist power outweighed the good fantasies of a young liberal

person. But these fantasies remained in his mind, and they will reappear as

only for this there will be suitable circumstances.

The defeat of the allies was complete. Crashed into dust and illusions of Alexander. He

led the troops, determined their disposition, was sure of victory ... When

the troops fled and the catastrophe became apparent, he burst into tears. Alexander in that

day barely escaped captivity, having lost contact with the headquarters, with the troops. He took refuge in

hut of a Moravian peasant, then galloped for several hours among the running

troops, was tired, dirty, did not change sweaty linen for two days, lost

baggage. The Cossacks got him wine, and he got a little warm, fell asleep in the shed on

straw. But he was not broken, but only realized that to fight with such an opponent,

like Napoleon, it is necessary to be fully armed with physical and spiritual strength and all strength

empire. From now on, for him, extremely proud, claiming the role

benefactor of Russia and Europe, Napoleon became a mortal enemy, and from 1805

he purposefully and stubbornly went to its destruction. But on the way there were

more new defeats on the fields of Prussia, Tilsit, Erfurt, 1812, fire

Moscow, the European campaign of the Russian army, new defeats from Napoleon.

Contemporaries noted that after Austerlitz, Alexander in many ways

changed. L.N. Engelhardt, who closely observed the king at that time, wrote:

"The battle of Austerlitz made a great influence on the character of Alexander, and

it may be called an epoch in his reign. Before that, he was meek, trusting,

affectionate, and then he became suspicious, strict to the point of immensity, impregnable and

could no longer bear for anyone to tell him the truth."

From that time on, Arakcheev became a more prominent figure under him, and

The activities of the Secret Committee are gradually fading away. And although reformist

the efforts of the king continue - still slowly and carefully - but time

former hobbies and revelations are already passing: life, the system takes its toll. By

In essence, the very first clash with Napoleon taught Alexander a cruel

a life lesson that he learned very thoroughly.

This manifested itself already during the negotiations in Tilsit, where the emperors

we talked face to face in a house on a raft in the middle of the Neman.

7. Crash

At that moment, when it seemed that Alexander would finally decide on

practical implementation of their liberal undertakings, were shelved

constitutional ideas for Russia were laid down; serf liberation projects

peasants, already approved by Alexander, also disappeared into the recesses of his

office. Only verbal liberal outbursts remained on the surface and

the sad eyes of Alexander himself. At the turn of the second and third

decades of his reign, that turn in his actions began, in

affections and in his soul, who struck contemporaries, set riddles

before his future biographers, a turn that, apparently, led him to

premature death.

This turn did not begin suddenly and, according to his biographers, took more than one

year, but was clearly marked just at the time when Alexander I was on

the height of his glory, after the crushing of Napoleon and the development of plans

post-war structure of Europe. It was the time when, according to

adjutant wing of Alexander I Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, the tsar, having thrown

former indecision and timidity (however, often feigned), became

"amateur, firm and enterprising and did not allow anyone to take over him

top", he showed military prowess, diplomatic skill, became

the true leader of the country and almost Europe.

This turn was based on a whole complex of reasons, social

shocks, personal dramas of Alexander.

I must say about the deep disappointment of Alexander in his former

allies, their direct collusion against Russia and betrayal. Austria and England

slowly but surely moved Russia away from decisive influence on European

affairs. Increasingly, the most fundamental decisions of the post-war

devices of Europe were accepted in European capitals. Almost all threads

European policy was held in his hands by the all-powerful Austrian minister

Foreign Affairs Metternich. And this is after the great troubles that

Russia, those sacrifices that she brought on the altar of Europe, the fire of Moscow,

after his, Alexander's, army took over in the hardest war, and he

he entered Paris victoriously.

After the second crushing of Napoleon, the congress to develop a common

peace treaty resumed its work. Controversy between the winners

were eliminated, although Russia achieved recognition of its claims to Poland,

Finland.

At the same time, the idea arose in Alexander's mind of creating a Holy Union

European powers, which would regulate from the position of legal and

religious and moral relations between states. This idea of ​​commonwealth

of all the Christian peoples of Europe arose from the king long ago. She was expressed

even in the instructions to Novosiltsev at the talks in London. Now the king is back

came back to this idea. The main provisions of the Treaty of the Holy Alliance,

written personally by Alexander I, contained the following articles:

Allies pledged to maintain the bonds of fraternal friendship, to render each other

help, govern their subjects in the spirit of the same brotherhood, truth and peace,

to join the Union of all peoples. In international and domestic affairs

sovereigns were obliged to be guided by the commandments of the Gospel. Majority

European countries signed the Act of Union, among them Russia, Austria, France,

The existence of the Union has received conflicting assessments in history. His

was evaluated both as a form of Russian leadership in international affairs, and as a conspiracy

rulers against nations, and as a mixture of politics and mysticism. Some

regarded the Union as a prototype of a European confederation based on the desire

solve all matters through cooperation and good will. This cannot be underestimated

virtuous and moral side of the Union. In any case, Alexander

creating it, he sacredly believed in those principles of goodness that he laid in his

basis. It is natural that at the first congresses of the Union he raised the question of

simultaneous reduction of the armed forces of the European powers, on mutual

guarantees of the inviolability of the territory, on the adoption of international status

persons of Jewish nationality, on the creation of an inter-allied headquarters,

anticipating many subsequent humanist international initiatives. And

therefore, it was especially discouraging for him that the Holy Alliance

was used, primarily by Austria, as a means of suppressing popular

movements in the 20s. In the future, the formidable revolutionary reality

destroyed all the evangelical illusions of Alexander. Ruined hopes that

The Union will ensure internal order in the countries of Europe, stand in the way of unrest and

turmoil, put an end to revolutions and riots. Spain, Portugal, Piedmont,

Naples marked on the map of Europe places of powerful popular uprisings,

crushed by Allied forces. And it is no coincidence that during the Congress of the Union in

Troppau (1820) Metternich noticed a striking change in Alexander. That

in frank conversations with him, he said that he regretted his liberal

hobbies.

More and more came to a standstill and internal affairs. constitutional reforms,

plans for the liberation of the peasants, although developed in deep secrecy, but

became known in society, aroused the fierce resistance of the majority

nobility. It created a familiar fear in my heart. Strike from the side

high-ranking conspirators could be expected at any moment.

Under the influence of this fear, responsibility for the murder of the father is increasingly and

more often stirred Alexander's thoughts, did not give rest. redemption by the good

intentions and good deeds for Russia did not come, but this did

life is hopeless, meaningless.

At times the routine of the state gripped him; in these last years

his life was more setbacks, disappointments than bright moments. brainchild

his dreams - military settlements - instead of alleviating the situation of the peasants

turned by the power of the system into one of its darkest symbols, and cruel

the suppression of the discontent of the military settlers colored in brightly reactionary

the tone of the entire post-war domestic policy of Alexander.

Rebelled, there was information about the actions of secret societies

in Russia. Against the Russian governor in Warsaw - Konstantin Pavlovich -

discontent grew in the army and society, terrible

news of the outbreak of European revolutions. In many European countries, people

young officers took up arms in order to establish order by force, on

who did not dare the authorities. All this was connected in consciousness into a single and

continuous chain of events. As a result, it was at the congress of the Holy Alliance

in Troppau, Alexander, together with the Prussian and Austrian monarchs, signed

protocol on armed intervention in the affairs of other states for the purpose of combating

with the revolution.

In the early 1920s, Alexander for the first time on a scale not only in Russia, but

and Europe suddenly realized with absolute clarity what an abyss lies between his

liberal dreams, cautious constitutional moves, and a storm of popular

revolution or military mutiny. The rumors that reached him about those hopes

which aroused among the people, especially among the serfs,

hatched in the palace, even very limited projects of public

reconstruction, could not help but horrify him. Is it not in these revolutionary

shocks in Europe and the growing crisis of power in Russia, we must see more

one of the reasons for Alexander's retreat from his liberal undertakings:

crowned freedom lover, a cautious reformer suddenly felt the real

the breath of freedom that came from the masses. And that was enough

enough to reflect grimly on their own liberal

movements.

The danger from the “right” threatened personal death, while the danger from the “left” put

called into question the whole system that nurtured Alexander and to which he faithfully

served all his life, wishing only to bring her to at least some

in line with rapidly changing times.

I think that only this can explain the appearance in the early 20s. row

decrees, which again unleashed the arbitrariness of the landlords in relation to the peasants,

allowed to exile them "for presumptuous deeds" to Siberia, forbade them

complain about landlords. At the same time, censorship and persecution of the press intensified.

Moreover, those press organs that tried to

promote the constitutional projects of Alexander I himself.

Petersburg and Kazan educational districts, Runich and Magnitsky committed atrocities,

the spirit of Arakcheev gloomily hung over Russia.

Having not produced anything worthwhile, Alexander had to

nobility and fear of personal death, under fear of popular uprisings quickly

curtail their liberal programs. All this he saw with bitterness, understood

and could not help feeling deeply disappointed. "When I think how little more

done within the state, then this thought falls on my heart, like

ten-pound weight; I'm tired of this," he said to one of his

interlocutors in 1624, a year before his death.

Crisis phenomena were growing in all public spheres of Russia: in

economy, finance, management. What he wrote truthfully and sharply

N.M. Karamzin in his Note on Ancient and New Russia back in 1811 and that

became the cause of Alexander's dissatisfaction with the historian, now, in the early 20s,

exposed with terrifying clarity.

One of the senators, having received in 1825 the news of the death of Alexander,

wrote in his diary the following words, which, as it were, summarized

existing state of affairs: "Having traced all the events of this reign, that

we see? Complete breakdown of internal control, Russia's loss of its

influence in the field of international relations ... St. Isaac's Church in its

in its present ruined state* represents the exact likeness of a government:

it was destroyed, intending to erect a new temple on the old foundation from

masses of new material ... it required huge costs, but the construction

had to stop when they felt how dangerous it was to erect a building,

without a well-defined plan. The same goes for state affairs:

there is no definite plan, everything is done in the form of experience, on trial, everyone wanders

in the dark."

* St. Isaac's Cathedral began at that time to be built on the site of the former

destroyed St. Isaac's Church.

Along with the general troubles and dead ends in public life, Alexander

faced personal upheaval and drama. After the war he

repeatedly admitted that the invasion of the French and the fire of Moscow shocked

his imagination, put before him the inner question: are these not

horrors of punishment by the Almighty for the sin that lay on his conscience in connection with

father's death?

Alexander begins a gradual turn to religiosity, later to

mysticism, an envelope with prayers appears, which he constantly wears with

yourself. Alexander increasingly spends time in conversations with European and Russian

"prophets" and "prophetresses", takes the Russian

The Bible Society, is approaching its chairman, Prince A.N. Golitsyn,

whom he subsequently puts at the head of the Ministry of Spiritual Affairs and

public education, obediently listens to soul-saving conversations

religious fanatic archimandrite Photius of the Novgorod Yuryevsky monastery.

In this retreat into religion, Alexander seeks solace from that spiritual

discord, which is growing in his soul, both in connection with public

shocks and dead ends, and in connection with the growing voice of conscience,

condemning him for parricide. Characteristic of his confession, made in 1816

Countess S.I. Sologub: "Invoking religion to my aid, I acquired

calmness, that peace of mind, which I will not exchange for any bliss

of this world!"

In December 1818, after a cold and erysipelas, she died in

at a very young age, the beloved sister of Alexander I and his close friend

Queen of Württemberg Ekaterina Pavlovna. Her death literally shocked

emperor. Then, one after another, at short intervals, a terrible

fire in his Tsarskoye Selo palace and the infamous November, 1824

year, a flood in St. Petersburg, which took place in severe frost and carried away

many lives.

And shortly before that, Alexander experienced another personal blow: at the age

at the age of sixteen, his beloved daughter died quite unexpectedly from

favorites M.A. Naryshkina Sofya, his only survivor

child. Truly fate pursued Alexander as a statesman,

and as a person.

And then there was a rumor that not everything was clean with the history of birth

his father Paul I, that he himself was almost replaced almost in the cradle, or

was a twin and his blood brother was taken away in childhood to the unknown

region and is now found in Siberia in the guise of a certain Afanasy Petrovich,

who pretended to be the king's uncle. This case in Petersburg was conducted by himself

Arakcheev. There is evidence that in 1822-1823. for night interrogations

some old man was brought to the tsar from the Peter and Paul Fortress. All this also

could not but seal the general condition of Alexander.

In recent years, he has become increasingly gloomy, more and more secluded,

more often he tried to go abroad, then to the distant lands of Russia, as if he had fled

from himself. Perhaps in these long journeys he made himself known and

fear of a possible attempt, especially since information about the creation of secret

societies with the intention of killing the king and exterminating the royal family periodically

settled in the emperor's office. Perhaps Alexander experienced an unaccountable

guilt before the people, who never received from him the desired freedom,

hence his desire to reach during his travels around the country to everyone

layer of society, to see firsthand how peasants, Cossacks, military

settlers, steppe dwellers, mine workers, and even prisoners.

8. Mysterious envelope

For the first time, Alexander, as we remember, spoke about the unwillingness to take the throne

long before the death of both Catherine and Paul. But we will assume that then they

led by fear of his father, whom Catherine was going to dethrone in

favor of the grandson of Alexander.

However, for Alexander this question was not settled. The idea of ​​abandoning

power, abdicate haunted him all his life, but especially since

the time when, having risen to the throne over the corpse of his father, he fully tasted,

what is power, what kind of sacrifices does it require from a person, what cruel

makes demands on him - and of course, not in the sense of fulfilling his

duty to the people, the fatherland, as any government is obliged to declare,

but in that very secret, secret understanding, which is the meaning of its

existence: protecting the interests of one's class, class, clan, ability

cohort of supporters, to subordinate the interests of the public to the interests of personal and

make it look quite the opposite, the art is subtle

maneuver and cynically deceive, pretend and cruelly punish, possess

many other qualities of this power, which allow a person of power

year after year to taste her sweet and such terrible writing.

I have already said that from a young age in the character of Alexander there were

features that put him in a special position in relation to power. And

although her dope successfully enveloped him for many years, and associated with

her rights and obligations for a long time distracted him from ordinary human thoughts

about the ephemeral meaning of this power, he returned again and again to this

a question posed at a young age.

subtle camouflage in order to deceive opponents, arouse sympathy

friends, as many domestic historians write about it, but when these

conversations are conducted at very critical, turning point moments in life, then

one has to think about the fact that Alexander in this sense was inherent in

some real and quite deep experiences, doubts and hesitations.

His second impulse followed in 1796, when during the coronation of Paul I

he asked A. Czartoryski to prepare a draft manifesto on the occasion of his

possible future accession to the throne, because it was he who was now

direct heir to the throne. This never published document

it was said that Alexander, when he became emperor, would grant the people

freedom and justice, and then, "having fulfilled this sacred

duty", renounce the crown "in order to be recognized by the most

worthy to wear it could strengthen and improve the cause, the foundations

which he (Alexander, - A.S.) laid down. "In the same year, he wrote to V.P.

Kochubey: "... I realize that I was not born for the dignity that I now wear, and

still less for the future destined for me, from which I swore an oath to myself

refuse in one way or another..." In a letter to La Harpe in 1797, he

suggests that when his time to reign comes, first to give Russia

constitution, and only then retire from power. Historians have counted twelve

Alexander's statements, made in different years, about his intention to renounce

throne. This thought turned into a fixed idea for him.

Events of the first years of the XIX century. for a long time distracted Alexander from his

thoughts unconventional for the autocracy, but at the end of the second decade

his reign, when the era of the Napoleonic wars died down, and the crisis

public and his personal acquired more and more visible outlines, he is increasingly

and often returns to this idea.

In September 1817, at dinner in Kyiv, according to his adjutant wing

A.I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Alexander uttered the words, which then

became the leitmotif of his conversation with the brothers Konstantin and Nikolai: "When

someone has the honor to be at the head of such a people as ours, - said

emperor, - he must, in a moment of danger, be the first to meet her. He

must remain at his post only as long as his physical strength

he is allowed to do so. After this period, he must retire. " Under these

notes, an expressive smile appeared on the lips of the sovereign, and he continued:

"As for me, I feel good so far, but in 10 or 15 years,

when I'm 50 years old..." As you know, Alexander passed away in two years

before the earliest time they have set.

A month later, at the laying of the temple on Sparrow Hills, he mentioned

architect K.L. Vitberg that he does not hope to "see anything with him."

In 1818, during the congress of the Holy Alliance in Aachen, Alexander

expressed the same thought in a conversation with the Prussian king Friedrich Wilhelm: "I

ceased to be deceived about the gratitude and devotion of people, and therefore

turned all my thoughts to God."

Significant is the conversation with brother Nikolai Pavlovich after watching

Krasnoye Selo of the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Guards Infantry Division, which

commanded by the Grand Duke.

Having dined in Nikolai's tent, Alexander started with him in his presence

wife, Grand Duchess Alexandra Feodorovna, a conversation about

succession to the throne. This conversation was subsequently recorded by Nikolai's wife. "Your

diligence and your conscientiousness, dear Nikolai, - said the emperor, -

please me, all the more so that you will later be entrusted with much

more important duties and responsibilities than you yourself expect. "He further

emphasized that the sovereign, in order to fulfill his duties

what is needed "beyond other qualities" is also excellent health and physical strength.

"And I feel their gradual weakening and foresee that soon I will not be in

able to fulfill these duties as he always understood them, why

I consider it a duty and irrevocably decided to renounce the throne, as soon as

I will notice by the decline of my strength that the time has come by that time.

Alexander mentioned that Constantine, like himself, had no

male offspring, while Nicholas recently had a son. "So you

should know, - Alexander finished, - what awaits you in the future

imperial rank."

Seeing the confusion of the spouses, he reassured them: "A minute has not yet

has come: perhaps several years will pass before it (in the diary of Nicholas I,

recalling this conversation, ten years were mentioned. - A. S). I wanted

only to accustom you in advance to the thought of the immutable and inevitable

the future that awaits you."

And in the future, Alexander repeatedly talked on this topic with Nikolai

Pavlovich.

So in 1819, Nikolai, the third son of Pavel, who never thought, according to him

to his own diary confession, about the throne, he suddenly saw in front of him

brilliant perspective. But it could come true only if

either abdication or death of Emperor Alexander.

From that day on, it was not Konstantin who stood in line for Alexander, but namely

Nikolay - cold, prudent, incredibly ambitious, vengeful, like

post-December period.

Objectively, from this very day, Nikolai, with all the power of the laws of power, must

was to be opposed to Alexander, and this

awakened by him in his younger brother, but apparently deeply hidden desire

become the first person of the state. To this side of the relationship of the royal brothers

somehow ignored by historians, lulled by formal loyalty

Nicholas in relation to his older brother, constantly showing him a feeling

love and respect for the "angel" Alexander, as he called him in his letters.

Meanwhile, events developed.

In the same 1819 Alexander visited Warsaw, and Konstantin

once confirmed his intention to renounce the rights to the Russian throne.

The Tsarevich told his brother about his intention to marry Countess Joanna

Georgian, which deprived their offspring of the right to the Russian throne.

As the crown prince himself later told, the emperor told him literally

the following: "I want to abdicate (that is, abdicate the throne. - A.S.); I

tired and unable to bear the burden of the government, I warn you, for

so that you think what you will need to do in this case ... When

when it's time to abdicate, then I'll let you know and you write my thoughts to

mother".

Shortly thereafter, Alexander issued a manifesto. It said: "If

which person from the imperial family will enter into a marriage union with a person who is not

having a corresponding dignity, that is, not belonging to any

reigning or possessing house, in which case the person of the imperial

surnames cannot communicate to another the rights belonging to members of the imperial

surnames, and children born from such a union do not have the right to inherit

throne". Of course, this meant the new marriage of Constantine with the beautiful

This manifesto thus further strengthened the potential rights

Nikolai Pavlovich, who by that time already had a son, Alexander, the future

Alexander II.

While the relationship between the brothers remained a mystery to others, but

no secret, if it affects the interests of many people, can

stay that way for a long time.

According to eyewitnesses, already in October 1820, Nikolai Pavlovich and

his wife was greeted during a trip to Berlin with exclamations: "Long live

Grand Duke, Russian heir!" And in Warsaw, where Nikolai later arrived

Pavlovich, Konstantin gave him such honors that did not correspond to

his rank and led Nicholas into confusion.

letter of renunciation of the rights to the Russian throne. Among other things, he wrote that

does not feel in himself "neither those talents, nor those forces, nor that spirit" that would

corresponded to that dignity, "to which, by birth, I can have

Two weeks later, Alexander, after some hesitation, answered his brother,

that, after consulting with his mother, he satisfies the request of Constantine: "We

it remains for both, respecting the reasons you have explained, to give you complete freedom

follow your unshakable decision, asking the almighty God that he

blessed the consequences of such pure intentions."

It is believed that Nikolai did not know about this correspondence of the elder brothers, but

such a claim would be dubious given that their mother, Maria

Feodorovna, was aware of the affairs of the throne and that the relationship between

her from power, were uneasy.

In any case, the abdication of Constantine further increased the chances

Nicholas, on the path of which now only the life of Alexander remained.

The year 1823, as it were, summed up all these vicissitudes with the succession to the throne:

Alexander finally officially decided to make Nicholas his heir. He

instructed Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow to prepare on this occasion

manifest project. Soon the document was written and approved by the king. In him

it was said about the renunciation of the power of Constantine: "As a result, on the exact

on the basis of the act of succession to the throne, the second brother to be the heir

our Grand Duke Nikolai Pavlovich." It was further said that this

the manifesto will be made public "in due time". After that, the text of the manifest

in deep secrecy was placed in the vault of the Moscow Assumption Cathedral, and

copies from it were sent to the Council of State, the Synod and the Senate. Keep

the original was supposed to be "on my demand", as he wrote with his own hand on

envelope Alexander. In the event of the death of the emperor, the envelopes were to be opened

"above all other action."

Three people, three close and trusted persons of the emperor knew about

Considering the question why Alexander did not dare to publish

manifesto, N.K. Schilder believed that Alexander still intended to abdicate

from the throne, which is why he wrote on the envelope: "Keep until my demand."

S.V. Mironenko suggests that in an environment where all dreams collapsed

Alexander about the transformation of Russia, when he had a difficult mental

crisis, the publication of this document without any conditions would mean

recognition by Alexander of the complete collapse of all his undertakings. "This is at the same time

abdication". These assumptions are quite logical, but Alexander, moreover, could not

not to understand that by making the manifesto public, it thereby directly

would point to his heir - full of strength, ambitious, tough

Nikolai Pavlovich. Probably, Alexander, this most intelligent "heart specialist", knew

his brother better than anyone else, and could not unreasonably believe that

that in the context of the brewing social crisis in the country, the name of Nicholas could

be used by various circles in the struggle for power.

And Alexander's hesitation regarding a possible renunciation of the throne

continued. By 1825 they had acquired a kind of manic character from him.

In January 1824, in a conversation with Prince Vasilchikov, Alexander said: "I

I would not be dissatisfied with throwing off the burden of the crown, which is terribly burdening me.

In the spring of 1825 in St. Petersburg, in a conversation with the Prince of Orange, he again expressed

his thought to retire from the throne and begin a private life. The prince tried it

to dissuade, but Alexander stood his ground.

A number of historians have paid attention to the nature of Alexander's departure to

Taganrog, where he soon died.

Alexander visited his mother in Pavlovsk, took a walk in the garden and went into the Rozy

pavilion, where he was once solemnly honored after returning from

victory from Paris. The next night he visited the Alexander Nevsky Lavra

near the graves of his daughters and from there, without an escort, in one carriage he left

Petersburg. Near the outpost, he ordered the carriage to be stopped and, turning around,

I looked long and thoughtfully at the city.

Already in the Crimea, he again returned to his thoughts about leaving for

private life. So, having familiarized himself with Oreanda, Alexander noticed that he wanted

to live here permanently. Addressing P.M. Volkonsky, he said: "I will soon

I will move to Crimea and live as a private person. I served 25 years and

the soldier is retired at this time."

It is impossible not to recall the words written later by the wife of Nicholas I,

1826: "Probably, when I see the people, I will think about how the deceased

the emperor, speaking to us once about his renunciation, said: "How will I

rejoice when I see you passing by me, and I, lost in the crowd,

I will shout "Hurray!" to you.

Dying and already partaking of the holy mysteries, Alexander did not give any instructions

regarding the succession. N.K. Schilder noticed that he was dying

not as a sovereign, but as a private individual.

Immediately after the death of the emperor, all the threads of governing the country turned out to be

in the hands of Nicholas, although not to him, but to Konstantin in Warsaw, he wrote about his illness

Alexander asked me to inform his mother about this.

Nikolai wrote to P.M. Volkonsky to Taganrog in connection with the organization

funeral cortege in Russia: "... I take it upon myself to ask you to enter into relations

with all local authorities, with commanders in chief and with other places, with

with which it will be necessary, being content to report directly to me about the measures already taken,

allowing in advance everything that you find decent ... all the same intercourse necessary with

in places located here, I ask you to do it directly through me.

So, officially knowing nothing about the concealment of the manifesto in the Assumption Cathedral,

allegedly not knowing about the correspondence of the brothers in connection with the abdication of Constantine,

Nikolai assumes full power.

pointed out the true ambitious claims of Nicholas, which, apparently, could not

not beware of Alexander, although he understood the need to streamline

dynastic issue.

A few days after the death of the emperor, Nicholas was already officially and

reliably learned about the abdication of Constantine, and about the transition to his throne.

But when he presented his claims to the throne, the military governor of St. Petersburg

Count Miloradovich and a group of senior guard officers opposed this.

Miloradovich stated that if Alexander wanted to leave the throne to Nicholas, then

would have published a manifesto during his lifetime, the abdication of Constantine also remained

unpublished, and in general "the laws of the empire do not allow

throne by testament". In essence, the military governor took power in his

Until two o'clock in the morning, the generals talked with Nikolai. Grand Duke

proved his rights to the throne, but Miloradovich stood his ground. As a result

Nicholas was forced to swear allegiance to Constantine. He later said this

elder brother like this: "In the circumstances in which I was placed, I

it was impossible to do otherwise." Miloradovich had a guard in his hands, and for

he, apparently, was surrounded by circles, among which the candidacy of Nikolai was

unpopular and unacceptable.

The role played by the pet during the dynastic crisis is curious.

Tsar A.A. Arakcheev.

Having fallen ill in Taganrog, Alexander called Arakcheev to him several times,

who was then in his estate Gruzino, but he stubbornly refused

come, referring to the grave morale in connection with the murder

palace people of his housekeeper and concubine; he even folded himself with

himself the authority of the commander of military settlements, which inexpressibly surprised

the highest ranks of Russia.

However, having received the news of the death of Alexander, Arakcheev immediately again

took command of the military settlements and came to the disposal

Nicholas. Note that even in 1801, in response to Paul’s call to come to St. Petersburg, he did not

appeared there on time and thereby untied the hands of the conspirators. Isn't that what we are

must see one of the reasons for the great attachment of Alexander I to

Arakcheev, who at one time betrayed Paul, and now could betray his

the current emperor, feeling the invincibility of Nicholas's coming to power?

The initiator of the next "palace coup" against Nicholas in favor of

Konstantin Miloradovich, as you know, was killed on Senate Square during

rebels, to which Nicholas sent him.

Finishing his work on Alexander I, H. K. Schilder wrote: "If

fantastic conjectures and careless legends could be based on

positive data and transferred to real soil, then established by this

way, reality would leave behind the most daring poetic

fiction; in any case, such a life could serve as a canvas for

inimitable drama with a stunning epilogue, the main motive of which was

would be redemption. In this new image, created by folk art,

Emperor Alexander Pavlovich, this "sphinx, unsolved to the grave", without

doubt, would present himself as the most tragic face of Russian history, and his

the thorny path of life would be crowned with an unprecedented afterlife apotheosis,

overshadowed by the rays of holiness."

9. Death or departure

N.K. Schilder, like some other historians, did not escape the temptation

to admit that Alexander I, perhaps, ended his life in a completely different way than

throughout the 19th century, and in official historiography. Words written by N.K.

Schilder, show that the point here is not just some kind of coquetry, empty

idle ranting or sensationalism. All creativity

venerable historian shows that he was very far from this kind

motives. It's hard to give up the idea that this record belongs to a person,

who was worried about something unrevealed and serious in the history of life and death

Alexander I. This "something", I think, worries any researcher,

in contact with the biography of Alexander I.

It is believed that the personality of Alexander I "does not provide any basis for the

posing this question," as N. Knoring once wrote. And this author,

like other historians before him - Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, Melgunov,

Kizevetter, Kudryashov, believed that Alexander was a whole, strong-willed nature, and

the main thing - power-hungry, and it was not in his nature to refuse the throne,

for which he fought with such intelligence, perseverance, cunning and grace

practically all my life. It is believed that all this talk of his burdens

crown, about weariness from her burden, about the desire to withdraw into private life no more

than his usual posture, political camouflage.

This is where the basis for a negative answer to the question of

his possible resignation from power.

Of course, such an approach to the personality of Alexander I is more preferable,

rather than strange arguments about his passivity, lethargy, spinelessness,

the ability to go with the flow. A clever and cunning man, in his terrible time and in

terrible, cruel environment, he managed to deceive not only his

approximate, but also subsequent historians.

However, even those who more realistically and far-sightedly evaluate the character and

activities of Alexander I, nevertheless bypass one of the most important dominants of his

life - the question of the murder of his father and the terrible torment associated with it

conscience, and panic fear for their own fate, which

haunted him throughout his life. Remorse, constant fear

the uprising of the Semyonovsky regiment, a conspiracy in the army, plans for regicide, finally,

Sherwood's report on a vast conspiratorial society in Russia,

Only in this connection should we, apparently, understand his repeated

statements about the desire to abdicate: on the one hand, it was

a certain moral outlet that calmed, created the illusion

atonement for a grave sin, on the other hand, these conversations were a kind of

lightning rod; they deceived public opinion, reassured him,

disoriented the dissatisfied - if the sovereign himself wishes to renounce

throne, then why should efforts be spent on removing him from power.

But there is also a third aspect: constant, from year to year,

repetition of the same thought, and not a trifling one, but one that,

if it came true, it could in many ways change the fate of the country and the fate of

Alexander himself; this thought really tormented the emperor, constantly

splashed out, introducing into bewilderment and fear people close to him.

Therefore, on this main point it is difficult to agree with the opponents of the legend.

After all, everything, in fact, depended on the extent to which his

intention to throw off the burden of power. Today no one has measured this degree

will not be able to determine exactly, as no one can authoritatively enough and

deny the seriousness of such intentions, given the entire history

ascension to the throne of Alexander and his subsequent life.

Against the legend, it seems, quite definitely say such

objective facts, like the illness of the emperor in Taganrog, the act of his death,

autopsy report, multiple, largely repeating each other

diary entries about the course of Alexander's illness and his last minutes, reports

on the transfer of the body from Taganrog to St. Petersburg, the funeral in Petropavlovsk

Against the identification of Alexander I with the elder Fyodor Kuzmich

also testifies to the analysis of their handwriting, made at the direction of the biographer

Alexander I, Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich at the beginning of the 20th century.

The dissimilarity on the deathbed of the external appearance of the deceased Alexander

contemporaries explained the poor conditions of embalming in Taganrog,

shaking on the way, the effect of the heat that stood at that time in the south.

The researchers also paid attention to the fact that Fedor Kuzmich in his

conversations, conversations often used South Russian and Little Russian words

like "punk", which was completely unusual for Alexander I.

These are all very important arguments against the existence

legends. However, they do not remove all existing issues.

And again I must turn to the events that took place in Taganrog, and to

to what was the elder Fyodor Kuzmich, who died at the age

87 years from the year of birth of Fyodor Kuzmich, we get the year of birth of Alexander

I - 1777.

returning from a trip to the Crimea. But for the first time he felt bad

much earlier, back in Bakhchisarai, where he had a fever.

accompanying him constantly on all trips, Adjutant General Peter

Mikhailovich Volkonsky, his close friend and attorney, in his daily

journal began to record the progress of the disease.

Surprisingly, on the same day, they opened their diary entries on the progress of

illness and pastime of Alexander two more persons: his wife,

Empress Elizaveta Alekseevna, and life physician Baronet Willie, a former personal

doctor of Alexander I. These days were also described by doctor Tarasov,

who used the patient together with the life physician Stofregen, personal physician

empresses.

the day of the death of Alexander I. The diary of Elizabeth Alekseevna ends at 11

to the emperor by people, records that, in essence, reflected the course

three correspondents took up their pen, it was impossible to imagine that

the disease, which had barely shaken Alexander's always excellent health, would take

such a tragic turn. This is the riddle that researchers face

they didn’t even put it, but psychologically it can reveal a lot. Even

the unconditional opponent of the legend about the departure of Alexander I from power, the Grand Duke

Nikolai Mikhailovich wrote in one of his articles: "The disappearance of the emperor

may be permissible "in practice, with the unconditional protection of the secrets of accomplices

such a drama. "As for the replacement of the body of the emperor, which, by the way, insisted

a staunch supporter of the legend V.V. Baryatinsky in his book "Royal

mystic", then Nikolai Mikhailovich calls this version simply "fabulous

fairy tale".

Beginning of diary entries on the same day by three people close to Alexander I

people may, of course, indicate great concern on the part of all

three with the emperor's health. But since there is no danger to health at that

day was not observed, then one has to explain such unanimity either

inexplicable, or it can only be explained by the desire to create a single version

the course of the disease, which both Alexander and these three of his close people need.

V.V. Baryatinsky and other supporters of the legend see

the artificiality of the situation in the discrepancy between the information contained in the diaries

records of all three on the same occasion. But I think this

artificiality is visible in a completely different way - in the creation of these diaries, although in

they were not needed at the time.

The act of the death of the emperor was signed by the same Volkonsky, the same Willie, and

also Adjutant General Baron Dibich, who immediately became a confidant under

Nicholas I and who made a brilliant career with him, and the doctor of the Empress

Stofregen. The autopsy protocol was signed by doctors Willie, Stofregen, Tarasov, and

also local Aesculapius; affixed this protocol with his signature

Adjutant General Chernyshov, who was also very close for many years

a man to Alexander I. The presence of this one signature of Chernyshov on the most important

document surprised even Schilder, but Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich in

in his article against the legend, he considered this "a mere accident" and wrote,

that the protocol is a pure formality.

I think that in ordinary cases such a document is valid in

appears to be very formal. But in other, special cases, it is the protocol

autopsy, pathoanatomical analysis is sometimes the key to serious

historical conclusions. And this was exactly what subsequent events showed,

the very special case that has not been adequately reflected in

document on the causes of death of Alexander I.

It is no coincidence that later attempts to study the causes and

the course of Alexander's illness encountered insurmountable difficulties and

contradictions and, in essence, led the matter to a dead end on the main issue - about

identification of the body of Alexander I with the human body, which became the object

this protocol.

Thus, a rather narrow circle of persons is determined who could be

involved in all the ups and downs of the last days of the reign of Alexander I. This

Empress Elizaveta Alekseevna, Volkonsky, Willie, Chernyshov, Dibich,

Stofregen and Tarasov. Even Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich admits that

if desired, such a composition of "accomplices" could well organize

"disappearance" of Alexander I. As for the substitution, this is a special issue and

so scrupulous that it is practically impossible to discuss it, as, say,

possible substitution of Catherine's son - Paul I, as discussed above, or substitution

in many other cases, which became dynastic secrets of European,

and not only European ruling houses, secrets taken to their grave

creators.

Attention should be paid to some more details, past which

for some reason, the researchers of this rather strange problem have passed. In all

diary entries say that in the last days near the bed

dying Alexander were and Willie, and Volkonsky, and Tarasov, and

empress. However, there is another version, different from this diary

"hora". In the library of the Romanov House, copies of two letters about the last

days of Alexander, an unknown person from the Shakhmatov family, in whose house

the empress moved immediately after the death of her husband. Correspondent,

referring to his mother and brother, in particular, writes about the behavior in those days

Elizabeth Alekseevna. The Empress was asked to move to the Shakhmatovs' house during

during the sovereign's illness, but she replied: "I ask you not to separate me

with him as long as there is a possibility, "- after which no one dared her

ask, and she remained all day alone in her rooms, and went

constantly to the body without witnesses (italics mine. - A.S.); and when he

died, she herself tied a handkerchief around his cheeks, closed her eyes,

crossed herself, kissed her, wept, then got up, looked at the icon and

said: "Lord, forgive my sin, You were pleased to deprive me of it."

All this happened already in the presence of doctors and Volkonsky.

A similar discrepancy between the diary evidence and the information in this letter

needs an explanation.

Noteworthy is the fact that the records of the Empress are cut off

Volkonsky that it was on this day in the morning that the emperor ordered to call

himself Elizaveta Alekseevna, and she remained with him until dinner. About what

the couple talked for several hours, why the visit was so long

Elizabeth Alekseevna to the sovereign - this remains a secret. One more thing

a remarkable event occurred on this day: Alexander received information about

denunciation of non-commissioned officer Sherwood, from which it was clear that in Russia

there is a vast anti-government conspiracy based on army

unit, one of the goals of which is the forcible removal of the ruling

dynasty and the introduction of republican rule in Russia.

It is not at all possible to exclude the connection of these events - the news of Sherwood's denunciation and

a long conversation with the empress, which could be followed by the adoption

some solution.

Require an explanation and such seemingly insignificant details as a fact

the absence of the Empress at the memorial service for the deceased sovereign in Taganrog

cathedral, and most importantly, neither she nor Alexander's closest friend and associate

Prince Pyotr Mikhailovich Volkonsky did not accompany the funeral procession in

Moscow, and then to Petersburg. If the absence of the empress could be

explained by the state of her health, then the absence of Volkonsky in the composition

She died alone, without witnesses.

the empress, among other things, wrote the following: "All earthly ties are broken between

us! Those that are formed in eternity will already be different, of course, still

more pleasant, but while I still wear this sad, mortal shell, it hurts

tell myself that he will no longer be involved in my life here,

on the ground. Friends since childhood, we walked together for thirty-two years. We

we have gone through all the epochs of life together. Often alienated from each other, we are one way or another

converged again in another way; finally finding ourselves on the true path, we

experienced only one sweetness of our union. At that time she was taken away

from me! Of course I deserved it, I was not sufficiently conscious of the beneficence

Boga, perhaps, still too much felt the little roughness. Finally,

be that as it may, it was so pleasing to God. May he please allow

so that I do not lose the fruits of this mournful cross - it was sent down to me not

without a purpose. When I think about my fate, then in all its course I recognize the hand

It is remarkable that throughout the quoted text, Elizabeth

Alekseevna never mentioned the death of her husband.

All these details, compared with those that have already become the object of attention

researchers - like the mysterious night visit by the emperor before

departure to Taganrog of the Alexander Nevsky Lavra, its all-consuming melancholy,

increased talk of abdication, - can only emphasize

the extraordinary nature of the events in question.

As for the elder Fyodor Kuzmich, his fate has already been written

a lot, and there is no need to repeat his entire life path from the first

A special section of his book entitled "Elder Kuzmich" devoted

Siberian hermit G. Vasilich in the book "Emperor Alexander I and the Elder

Fyodor Kuzmich (according to the memoirs of contemporaries and documents). "Since in

this book contains indeed many noteworthy testimonies

regarding the life of Fyodor Kuzmich, I intend to turn to them further, in

features to those that, in my opinion, were still not enough

researched.

The first thing to be said is that both supporters and

opponents of the identity of Alexander I and Fyodor Kuzmich recognize the existence

unsolved mystery. Attempts to unravel this mystery, undertaken by K.V.

Kudryashov, N. Knoring and Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, and

left her behind seven seals. Their assumptions are nothing more than hypotheses.

Based on information about the starets brilliant education, excellent knowledge of them

life of the highest Petersburg society at the beginning of the century, great awareness of

events of the Patriotic War of 1812, including the entry of Russian troops into

Paris, K.V. Kudryashov, and then N. Knoring suggested that under

the mask of an old man was hiding who disappeared from St. Petersburg in the late 1920s. at

under unclear circumstances, a brilliant cavalry guard, hero of military campaigns

against Napoleon Fedor Alexandrovich Uvarov II. Grand Duke Nicholas

Mikhailovich, referring to the same data, as well as to some external

similarity of Fyodor Kuzmich with Alexander I, suggested that in Siberia from

the eye of light hid the illegitimate son of Paul I from Sofia Stepanovna Ushakova,

daughters of first Novgorod, and then St. Petersburg governor S.F.

Ushakov, a certain Simeon the Great. However, these are all just hypotheses.

On behalf of Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich to Siberia, to Tomsk

the province where the elder lived and died, the official for special assignments N.A.

Lashkov, the results of whose trip Nikolai Mikhailovich summarized in a short

reference: "The elder appeared in Siberia in 1837, lived in various places, leading

hermit life everywhere, enjoying the universal respect of the surrounding

population (see Dashkov’s detailed report) and not revealing to anyone his

personality. He was visited more than once by clerics, local bishops and random

travelers, especially after his final relocation to Tomsk. BUT

namely, in 1859, at the invitation of the Tomsk merchant Semyon Feofanovich

Khromov, the elder Fyodor Kuzmich moved to live with him, having

old age. Khromov's eldest daughter, Anna Semyonovna Okonishnikova, who lives in

Tomsk and the favorite of the elder Fyodor, told Lashkov the following: "Once

in the summer (we lived in Tomsk, and the old man was in our zaimka, four versts from

city) my mother (Khromova) and I went to Fyodor Kuzmich's estate; was

sunny wonderful day. Arriving at the zaimka, we saw Fyodor Kuzmich

walking across the field in a military way hands back and marching. When we are with him

greeted us, he told us: "Ladies, it was such a beautiful sunny

the day I fell behind society. Where was and who was, and found himself on your

clearing." Anna Semyonovna also spoke of this case:

"When Fyodor Kuzmich lived in the village of Korobeinikov, then my father (Khromov) and I

came to visit him. The elder came to us on the porch and said: "Wait

me here, I have guests." We moved a little away from the cell and waited

at the forest About two hours passed; finally from the cell, to

accompanied by Fyodor Kuzmich, a young lady and an officer in a hussar

shape, tall, very handsome and like the deceased heir

Nicholas Alexandrovich. The elder accompanied them quite a distance, and when they

said goodbye, it seemed to me that the hussar kissed his hand, which he did not

allowed. Until they disappeared from each other's sight, they always each other

bowed. After seeing off the guests, Fyodor Kuzmich returned to us with a beaming face and

said to my father: "Grandfathers how they knew me, fathers how they knew me, children how

knew, but the grandchildren and great-grandchildren see how they see it." Anna Semyonovna's words can

trust, because she was almost always with Fyodor Kuzmich, in the year of death

whom (1864) she had already 25 years of age.

According to other sources, it is known that A.F. Khromov, on whose estate

Fyodor Kuzmich lived in the last years of his life, visited St. Petersburg twice

under Alexander II and Alexander III and handed over some papers to the palace,

left over from Fyodor Kuzmich.

Everyone who interacted with the elder was struck by his appearance: tall,

clean, remarkably white face, curly gray beard, gray curly

hair that bordered a bald head, always clean and tidy clothes, bright,

correct, figurative speech.

We will leave aside all the described and disputed cases of recognition in

Elder Alexander I. They are given in the work of G. Vasilich. Let's pay attention

on details, and here eluded the researchers.

Leaving the village of Zertsaly for a new place of residence, Fyodor Kuzmich,

according to eyewitnesses, placed in the local chapel behind the icon of the Mother of God

painted monogram depicting the letter "A" with a crown above it and flying

Description of the modest dwelling of Fyodor Kuzmich in the same place, in Zertsaly, includes

and information that in the corner of his cell above the head of the bed next to

icons hung a small icon with the image of Alexander Nevsky.

It is known that Alexander Nevsky was a saint of Emperor Alexander I,

who was named after his great ancestor. And once again the mention of

Alexander Nevsky in connection with the personality of the elder is found in testimonies

eyewitnesses. Here is how the historian G. Vasilich writes about this: "On major holidays,

after mass, Fyodor Kuzmich usually went to see two old women, Anna and

Martha, and drank tea with them. These old women used to live near the Pechersk Monastery

Novgorod province, between Izborsk and Pskov, engaged in gardening.

Exiled to Siberia by their masters (it is not known who exactly) for some

fault, came with the elder in the same party. On the day of Alexander Nevsky

pies and other country dishes were prepared for him in this house. Elder

spent all afternoons with them, and in general, according to reports from those who knew

him, all that day was unusually cheerful, he remembered Petersburg, and in

these reminiscences peeped through something dear and sincere to him. "What kind

celebrations were on this day in St. Petersburg! he said. - fired from

cannons, hung carpets, in the evening there was lighting throughout the city, and the general

joy filled the hearts of men...

Other testimonies note the elder's extensive knowledge, possession

foreign languages; there is information about his active correspondence and that he

received various kinds of information about the state of affairs in Russia. Among his

correspondents was listed as Baron D.E. Osten-Saken, who lived in Kremenchug. Letters

the old man to Osten-Saken for a long time were kept in his estate in Priluki

(Kyiv province). However, they could not be found: it turned out that they

disappeared from the box where they lay for many years. By the way, the baron was famous

Freemason, and Fyodor Kuzmich's contacts with him indicate a Masonic orientation

old man. Note that at one time Alexander I was also involved in the Masonic

bed. It is impossible not to notice that many of Fyodor Kuzmich's statements about life, about

people are close to the views of Alexander in the last years of his life. However, they

close to any other enlightened person. His words are known: "And the kings,

both commanders and bishops are the same people as you, only God was pleased

to endow some with great power, while others were destined to live under their

constant patronage.

According to the general opinion, the elder was distinguished by great kindness, responsiveness,

willingly went to help people, that is, he was distinguished by the same features that

when Alexander I was also singled out. The elder gladly taught children

literacy, conquered adults with his conversations, stories, especially about military

events of 1812, about the life of St. Petersburg, but it was noticed that he never

mentioned at the same time the name of Emperor Paul I and avoided giving characteristics

Emperor Alexander. South Russian and Little Russian inclusions in his speech

quite explicable by a long life in the south, in particular, in Little Russia, as

this is evidenced by his connections with the southern monasteries, the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra,

with the seat of Osten-Sacken.

And two more small details, not noticed before, could be noted

in relation to the characteristics of the old man. First, he experienced a touching

tenderness for children, especially girls: for example, living in the village of Korobeiniki, on

apiary of the peasant Latyshev, he idolized his little daughter Feoktista, and

later, having moved to the Red River, he patronized an orphan

Alexandra, who met the elder when she was only 12 years old, and

remained his devoted friend for many years. Remember the tragic loss

Alexandra: first two young daughters, and then her beloved

sixteen-year-old daughter from Naryshkina. These coincidences can be

accidental, but they are capable, under certain conditions, of shedding light on the mystery

personality of Fyodor Kuzmich.

Secondly, one day, remembering the day he retired from society, he

I noticed that in those days it was a beautiful sunny day. Studying notes

empress about the November days in Taganrog, I involuntarily drew attention to her

phrase in which Elizaveta Alekseevna noted unusually warm for that

time weather. It was 15 degrees Celsius here.

I would like to introduce into wide circulation other facts, details that

aggregates can bring us closer to the mystery of Elder Fyodor Kuzmich. So,

it is known that in the families of Dr. Tarasov and Count Osten-Sacken, memorial services for

the deceased Alexander I was not served since 1825. The first memorial service for Alexander

in these families it was served only in 1864, that is, after the death of the elder

Fedor Kuzmich. Many eyewitnesses testified that some close to

king people, including V.P. Kochubey, refused to recognize the deceased

Alexander I. His mother, Maria Fedorovna, was also embarrassed. Special Commission

under the chairmanship of Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich established that

Nicholas I and Fyodor Kuzmich were in constant correspondence. She was in cipher

the key to which was discovered in the Romanov family vault. This fact was

reported to Nicholas II.

Data on the comparison of the handwriting of the emperor and the elder are also contradictory.

Contrary to the opinion of Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, the identity of handwriting

acknowledged the well-known lawyer A.F. horses as well

General Dubrovin, who knew well the handwriting of Alexander I. Moreover, A.F. Koni was

the same person." It is curious that Nicholas I later destroyed

diary of Elizaveta Alekseevna, the correspondence of Fyodor Kuzmich with

Osten-Saken.

Noteworthy is the publication of a document by Baron N.N. Wrangel,

writer and publicist, who presented the testimony of the son of a famous

psychiatrist I.M. Balinsky - I.I. Balinsky. This is a note in which I.I.

Balinsky conveys the story of the porter Yegor Lavrentiev, who served in the clinic

his father. Prior to this, Lavrentiev had been at the tomb of the Romanovs for many years.

in the Peter and Paul Cathedral. It was he who told how one night in 1864 in

the presence of Alexander II, Minister of the Court Count Adalberg was opened

the tomb of Alexander I, which turned out to be empty, and a coffin was placed in it, in

where the long-bearded old man lay. To all those present at this ceremony

was ordered to keep secret. The servants were generously rewarded, and

then they were sent to different parts of Russia. By the way, this version coming from

the Balinsky family, was well known in Russian émigré circles.

At the same time, there is news that during subsequent openings of the tomb

Alexander I already in the XX century it was found that it was empty.

According to Adjutant General Prince L.A. Baryatinsky, Alexander II,

being the heir to the throne, he met with the elder. Nicholas II, as

heir to the throne, visited the grave of the elder, as, indeed, other

Grand Dukes who visited Siberia. Known interest in this issue

Alexander III.

According to L.D. Lyubimov, Grand Duke Dmitry Pavlovich (who

was close to the biographer of Alexander I, Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich)

admitted with great excitement that, on the basis of accurate data, he had come to the conclusion

about the identity of the emperor and the elder. Lyubimov also said that at one time

Dmitry Pavlovich asked the opinion of Nicholas II on this matter, and

the emperor did not deny the reality of the existing legend.

Undoubtedly, all these details can in no way be considered

as decisive arguments in determining the personality of Elder Fedor

Kuzmich. However, solving this kind of mystery does not pretend to be quick.

and unambiguity of answers, every little thing is important here, every, albeit controversial,

new observation, and I think that this little digression will be useful

for those who will return to this dark but exciting page of history

Russian ruling dynasty.

The conventions of the assumption made by N.K. Schilder, and after him

and some other historians, we may, of course, not accept, but undoubtedly

one thing: the life and death of Alexander I is a truly dramatic page

Russian history; to an even greater extent, it is the drama of a living human

personality, forced to combine, it seems, such incompatible principles,

as "power" and "humanity"

An integral feature of the characteristics of any personality is how a person conducts a policy of friendship. Two great contemporaries, Napoleon Bonaparte and Alexander 1. Enemies involuntarily, friends in spite of.

A detailed examination of the meetings of the two autocrats will help us to reveal more deeply the character traits of the Russian Emperor.

The meeting on the Neman River is the first meeting between Alexander and Napoleon. The Russian Emperor, having heard about the French invader, reverent for his military prowess and secretly wishing to be like him, is finally given the opportunity to get to know Napoleon live. By order of Napoleon, a passionate lover of theatrical effects, a raft is set up in two boats in the middle of the river, on which two magnificent pavilions covered with white linen are being built. The larger of them, intended for the meeting of two sovereigns, is decorated with green-painted monograms: a huge letter "A" on the pediment facing the Russian side, the same size with the letter "N" on the pediment facing Tilsit. mysticism heir apparent king

From the very beginning of the conversation, Alexander is convinced that his assumptions were correct: Napoleon sincerely wants peace in order to strengthen his power in Europe and finally crush England. He exposes Russia's allies, admires the bravery and resilience of the Russians in battle, and proposes dividing the world between two empires. Listening to his speeches, Alexander guesses in him a harsh, courageous, practical mind and faith in his lucky star. In his presence, in contrast, Alexander himself seems too soft, delicate, evasive. Yes, he, the prince, born at the steps of the throne, raised under the wing of Catherine the Great, has nothing in common with this plebeian and, however, is unable to resist the charms that his interlocutor experiences on him, pacing up and down the tent with quick steps. After spending two hours in friendly conversation, the emperors go out hand in hand. Alexander accompanies Napoleon to the boat.

To continue negotiations, Napoleon offers to move to Tilsit, declaring it a neutral city. On the day of Alexander's arrival, Napoleon gives the password "Alexander, Russia, Greatness". The next day, Alexander chooses the password, these are the words: "Napoleon, France, Courage." Isn't it a rather sly exchange of pleasantries? While work is underway on the text of the peace treaty, Alexander is trying to get to know and understand better the one who now calls him his friend. He characterizes him as follows to Czartoryski: “This man, in the midst of the strongest shocks, retains a calm and cold head: all his outbursts of anger are pre-calculated and intended to intimidate his interlocutors. He likes to repeat that you can find an approach to any business and there are no such difficulties that to overcome." And here we note for ourselves another trait of Alexander's character - caution, which helps him "test the ground."

Alexander's insight surprises, and acting skills make Napoleon himself believe in the sincerity of the king. Observation allows Alexander to create his own image of Napoleon - without the colors of the public and the praise of others.

The political friendship of the two emperors seems to us to be a magnificent game. And here it is worth noting another feature of Alexander - vindictiveness. After all, he does not forgive Talleyrand for a letter written at the direction of the First Consul in response to the protest of Russia after the execution of the Duke of Enghien, a letter in which the tsar was unambiguously accused of patricide. And he assures General Savary: “I did not feel such prejudice towards anyone as towards him, but after a conversation that lasted three quarters of an hour, it dissipated like a dream. And I will never remember this feeling, everything that touched me so deeply he told me". Another time, speaking of Napoleon, he exclaims: "It is a pity that I did not see him earlier! .. The veil has been torn, and the time for delusions has passed." But he reveals his true feelings in letters to his beloved sister Catherine: “God kept us: instead of victims, we come out of the struggle not without brilliance. But what can you say about these events? I spend whole days with Bonaparte, whole hours alone with him!” And mothers: "Fortunately, Bonaparte, with all his genius, has a weak point - vanity, and I decided to sacrifice my pride in the name of saving the empire." He goes further and writes to the King of Prussia: "Be patient. We will regain what we have lost. He will break his neck. Despite all my signs of friendship and my outward actions, deep down I am your friend, and I hope to prove it to you in practice." ". A cunning game, dangerous and complex, however, lulls Napoleon's vigilance. Here he is, the real Alexander - an actor of the highest quality!

Do not bypass the stage in the theater, which can be called "theater in the theater." The best actors of the French comedy perform on stage in front of the "parterre of kings and princes. On October 4, 1808, playing in Voltaire's Oedipus, Talma utters a remark with special feeling: "The friendship of a great man is a blessing of the Gods." At these words, Alexander stands up and shakes hands Napoleon, sitting next to him in the box. The audience gives the emperors an ovation. The emperors bow. So on which side of the ramp are the performers of the main roles in this theatrical performance? Alexander writes to his sister Catherine: "Bonaparte takes me for a fool. But he laughs best who laughs last. And I trust in God."

It would seem that after the fall of Napoleon, after losing the Patriotic War and the First World War, Alexander 1 should have lost interest in this person. But, despite this, it was Alexander who initiated Bonaparte's exile to Fr. St. Helena, thereby providing a huge service to Napoleon. This is how strongly La Harpe's humanist ideas were influenced. Alexander tries to be humane to his enemy even after his collapse. And for the study we take out another important feature of the Emperor - nobility. After all, only having it, you can treat the defeated enemy with the respect of a true friend.

The Age of the Two Emperors

Napoleon and Alexander I

Material on the topic "Patriotic War of 1812".
8th grade.

The course of world history in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. largely determined by the events that took place on the European continent. This important time period of a quarter of a century is usually called differently: the era of the Napoleonic wars or the Napoleonic era; the era of coalitions; the era of the Patriotic War of 1812; congress era. Without any doubt, due to the significance of the events and due to the spread of new social ideas, this was a turning point in the history of mankind, since it was during this period of global conflicts between the great European states that the fate of the future world order was determined. It was decided both on the battlefields and in the course of behind-the-scenes diplomatic negotiations.

A number of outstanding personalities appeared on the forefront of political history - role models in the spirit of romanticism. Then a real cult of "heroes" reigned: in the minds of contemporaries and descendants, this epic struggle of European titans was strongly associated with the names of people who led and determined the course of world events. At the center of the historical drama of the early 19th century were two people whose names personified this turbulent era - the French emperor and commander Napoleon Bonaparte and the Russian monarch Alexander I, who received the title of "Blessed" after the end of seemingly endless bloody wars. It was they who turned out to be the pillars of European and world politics at the beginning of the 19th century.

Both Napoleon and Alexander I stood at the head of the great powers, dictating and determining the rhythm of epoch-making events. The fate of the peoples of the world largely depended on the personal will and actions of these two rulers, although both of them, like no other, knew how to subordinate their personal ambitions to political expediency and state interests. Each of them at one time played the role of "Agamemnon of Europe" - "the king of kings." In 1805-1807. they were irreconcilable rivals and competitors in European political life, striving to prove their imperial superiority in the international arena by force of arms; from 1807 to 1811 - allies and "brothers" (according to the then accepted among the monarchs to address each other), who almost became related to each other; and later - sworn enemies, who alternately made "visits" to the capitals of the enemy states at the head of their armed subjects.
Contemporaries and descendants, with all the polarity of opinions, highly appreciated the scale of their personalities. In fairness, it should be noted that the bar for Napoleon's assessments in the public mind has always been higher: "the greatest military leader in world history", "administrative and state genius." With respect to Alexander I, skepticism and doubts are noticeable. The emphasis was usually placed on the mystery and inconsistency of his nature, and for characterization, the statement of P.A. Vyazemsky, which sounded relevant at all times, was cited: “The Sphinx, not unraveled to the grave, is now arguing about it again.” But in the historical context of their era, they were antipodes. Each of the emperors represented two opposite principles, which was largely due to both the difference in origin and upbringing, and the different way of coming to power. The personalities of Napoleon and Alexander I can also be viewed from this point of view: as a projection of certain social circumstances. You can, of course, find a number of similar moments that united both.

During their youth, the spirit of change was in the air. As individuals, both were formed under the influence of the ideas of the European Enlightenment, which influenced their worldview, but later, under the pressure of life circumstances, the views of both changed. If we consider the way of thinking of the young Napoleon, then, undoubtedly, one can notice that he began as an extreme radical. Then he traveled a path very characteristic of post-revolutionary France - from an ardent and staunch Jacobin he turned into the emperor of all the French, concerned only with the preservation and strengthening of his unlimited power, since it was not consecrated by the old feudal traditions and was hostilely perceived by his opponents. Alexander I, who received in his youth from his educators the theoretical baggage of advanced and even republican ideas, without any doubt, was considered a liberal in his younger years, but by the end of his life, after a collision with reality, his liberalism began to decline. Most of his biographers believed that in the last period of his reign, he was in the camp of reaction.
As contemporaries noted, both emperors, each in their own way, possessed the magnetic power of influencing those around them: Napoleon, in addition to the ability to instantly subdue any, the most desperate and brave military leader, could ignite and rouse the masses of soldiers into battle with his appearance during the battle. Even the famous opponent of the French emperor, the English commander A.U. Wellington remarked that "his presence on the battlefield created a superiority of 40,000 men." Alexander I also had a rare gift (he inherited from his grandmother, Catherine II) of seducing people from his environment (“a real deceiver”), especially women. According to the historian M.A. Korf, he was "extremely able to conquer his own minds and penetrate the souls of others." Without any doubt, both had outstanding acting abilities, and the Russian Tsar in this art, apparently, was head and shoulders above his partner in politics: what was his famous ability to shed a tear at the right moment. No wonder Napoleon, realizing that the game on the political stage with him was played by the highest master, once called Alexander I "northern Talma". In general, both skillfully used the arsenal of means (innate or acquired) that was extremely necessary for any crowned ruler and had the advantages and disadvantages inherent in most statesmen.

In addition to common and bringing together moments, there were striking differences even in outwardly seemingly similar circumstances. For example, both almost simultaneously received the supreme power in their hands, in fact, as a result of state conspiracies. But in France and in Russia, the causes and course of events differed sharply from each other. In these conspiracies, the roles that fell to the lot of General Napoleon Bonaparte and the heir to the Russian throne, Grand Duke Alexander Pavlovich, as well as the degree of their participation in what was happening, turned out to be different.
Napoleon, the child and heir of the French Revolution, owed everything to her: both temporary hardships and a phenomenally successful career. He came to power thanks to public fatigue from the horrors of revolutionary terror and military upheavals, disappointment in the proclaimed ideals. All French society longed for order and tranquility. The young general successfully used the current favorable situation and, acting decisively, as a result of a well-thought-out and bloodless coup d'état, took power into his own hands in 1799.
In Russia, in 1801, events developed according to a different scenario. Alexander I ascended the throne and put on the imperial crown as a result of the extreme dissatisfaction of the Russian officer corps and bureaucracy with the despotic rule of his father, Emperor Paul I, who was quick to both anger and forgiveness. The role of the heir in this classically executed palace coup was passive, he only gave his consent to a handful of conspirators for actions that were supposed to force his father to abdicate. But the tragedy that occurred - the assassination of Paul I - then, according to many contemporaries, led to constant torment of conscience in the Russian "crowned Hamlet" (A.I. Herzen) until the end of his reign.
If Alexander I was constantly weighed down by the burden of moral responsibility, then Napoleon hardly thought about the moral nature of power. He very quickly, alternately announcing plebiscites, went from First Consul to Emperor and believed that his power was legitimate, since it was based on the results of the will of the French nation. But feudal Europe, in the person of its monarchs, was in no hurry to accept the newly-made emperor into its ranks. Most of them were forced to recognize the imperial title of Napoleon only thanks to the force of arms and the brilliant military victories of the French army.
The Russian emperor remained "a republican only in words and an autocrat in deeds." Napoleon, "born of the chaos of the revolution, ordered this chaos." He, unlike Alexander I, who inherited the power structure that had been established for centuries, created his own empire himself. Using the basic postulates of the ideology of the Enlightenment and destroying the remnants of feudalism, Napoleon constructed an effective state system of government in France and clothed the developing bourgeois relations in clear legal norms. The famous Civil Code of Napoleon became not only a famous monument of legal thought, but is still the current code of laws in many countries of the world. But the Russian emperor, who formally had unlimited (autocratic) power, was a hostage to feudal traditions and could not act without looking back at the Russian nobility, realizing his real dependence on this estate. It was precisely because of these circumstances that he was often forced to yield to the conservative majority, whose representatives occupied dominant positions among the highest bureaucracy.
Napoleon Bonaparte made his way through life on his own. Even as a young officer, who was teased by the fair sex as a “puss in boots” for his small stature, the native of Corsica knew exactly what he wanted; he always strove to be the first and asserted his superiority in every way. Constant self-affirmation became his life credo. Thanks to a successful military career and acquired fame, he reached the highest level of power in France and intended to go further and further - to dominate Europe. The Russian monarch did not have such aspiration and target setting. Behind the shoulders of young Alexander I was only the school of sophisticated court maneuvering he had completed in his youth between the salon of his grandmother, the power-hungry Catherine II, and the Gatchina barracks of his father, the always suspicious Paul I. and father. According to V.O. Klyuchevsky, he had to live for a long time "on two minds, keep two front faces." To a large extent, it was precisely for this reason that traits such as diversity appeared early in his character and were further developed - the ability to find the right demeanor in the most unexpected circumstances and put on a “mask” appropriate for the case, flexibility in doing business, which often manifested itself in the exaltation of people not only personally unpleasant to him, but, from his point of view, absolutely unworthy of respect, and a number of other qualities that are extremely important for survival in an atmosphere of constant intrigues of the Russian imperial court. Therefore, in Alexander I, liberal rules were very simply combined with such hereditary vices of the Holstein-Gottorps (received from Peter III and Paul I) as paradomania and martinetism, while noble dreams of the liberation of the peasants, constitutional projects on "reasonable autocracy", plans for broad transformations were calmly coexisted with the serf way of life and military settlements arranged according to personal imperial instructions. According to the definition of the same V.O. Klyuchevsky, the tsar always wavered "between constitutional ideals and absolutist habits."

Dissimilar in life and in politics, Napoleon and Alexander had their own scope of unique abilities. There is no need to convince anyone that in his time on the battlefields, Napoleon had no equal. He went down in history, first of all, as one of the world's greatest generals. Undoubtedly, he possessed the most versatile qualities of a leader and was an example of a military leader endowed with incredible abilities. His talents were fully manifested in that historical period when the art of war was at a crossroads. And, without any doubt, the Napoleonic campaigns had a tremendous impact on the further development of military theory and military art. They still amaze those who study them. Unlike Napoleon, the talents of Alexander I as a statesman did not receive universal recognition. Only recently have researchers begun to give credit to what one of the most educated and intelligent Russian emperors did. Summing up all his personal qualities, it should be noted that he was a born diplomat and had an extraordinary foreign policy thinking. True, from his youth, Alexander I dreamed of military glory, he loved to engage in the army, but he valued only the external (front) side of military affairs. And very soon he had a sobering up. In 1805, he was the first of the Russian monarchs after Peter I went to the theater of operations - and witnessed the defeat of the Russian troops at Austerlitz, and at the same time Napoleon's military triumph. Having fully drunk the bitterness of military failures, he concluded for himself that the first commander in Europe on the battlefields would always be his successful opponent. Therefore, Alexander Pavlovich chose another field of activity for the confrontation with the French commander, and from that moment he directed all his forces to the area of ​​​​high politics. As a diplomat, he demonstrated a broad vision of the prospects of international politics, ways of managing it, showed himself to be a subtle master of political calculation, in which many contemporaries gave him credit. “This is a true Byzantine,” Napoleon said about him, “subtle, feigned, cunning.”
Europe at the beginning of the 19th century was a military camp, and Napoleonic France was a constant troublemaker. For the French commander, who wore the imperial mantle, the first goal was always power, and war became the most reliable and more than once tested means of strengthening and expanding the boundaries of his despotic influence. Once Napoleon himself dropped a prophetic phrase: "My power will end on the day when they will no longer be afraid of me." It is no coincidence that many contemporaries called the French emperor the military despot of Europe. In essence, he tried to put into practice the model of continental integration by force of bayonets.
Since the war, with the growth of the power of the aggressively unceremonious French empire, turned into a pan-European phenomenon, Russia (and, consequently, Alexander I) could not stay away from the raging military fire for a long time. But what could then be opposed to the Napoleonic dictatorial manners and the resounding victories of the perfectly well-oiled military machine of France? To counter Napoleonic expansion, feudal Europe, in the old fashioned way, tried to use only military means and consistently created one coalition after another. The core of these coalitions was most often Russia as the most powerful land power in Europe, while England, which paid part of the Allied military expenses, assumed the functions of the main banker. But in the camp of the allies traditionally there were contradictions, friction and dissatisfaction with each other. Napoleon, in the fight against coalitions of European states, always took this factor into account and successfully used his repeatedly tested and effective strategy. Achieving military victories, he consistently removed one enemy after another from the allies, and in this way he managed to successfully destroy several coalitions.
After the three military campaigns of 1805-1807, which were generally unsuccessful for the Russian army, when almost all of continental Europe was under French control, Alexander I took a bold and unexpected step. During the famous personal Tilsit meeting with Napoleon in 1807, he not only signed peace with France, but also concluded a military-political alliance.
The course towards rapprochement with France caused a negative reaction in Russian society, but then few people understood the true reasons and the real background of the events. Many contemporaries condemned the Russian emperor, weighing only the benefits received by Napoleon on the scales. But Alexander I calculated well the possible options for the further development of events: the main thing was that Russia received a five-year respite to prepare for a new and inevitable military clash with France.
Alexander I himself always (even as an ally) considered Napoleon as his personal enemy, and also as an enemy of the entire Russian state. The Russian Tsar became one of the first European monarchs who understood the need to use political means to fight post-revolutionary France. He began to adopt the methods by which the French achieved impressive victories. Appreciating the brilliance of glory and realizing the importance of public opinion, Alexander I saw in propaganda not only the most important element of politics, but also a sharp weapon to fight his opponent. In 1812, the Russian press and journalism (in Russian and foreign languages), with the blessing of the emperor, began to actively use liberal phraseology and anti-French emancipatory rhetoric as opposed to Napoleonic propaganda. The desecrated patriotism of the European peoples was skillfully fed, and nationalism, which was gaining strength during this period, was stimulated in various ways. In 1813, the spearhead of propaganda efforts turned out to be directed at Germany, and in 1814 - at France, whose territory became the scene of hostilities. The national-patriotic upsurge of the German people was largely caused by the offensive nature of Russian journalism. In 1814, Alexander I put forward a very important thesis and then widely disseminated among the French population that the Allies were fighting not against France and its people, but personally against Napoleon and his conquest ambitions. In general, in the "war of feathers" and in the struggle for public opinion in Europe, the advantage turned out to be on the side of Alexander I. To a large extent, thanks to this circumstance, he achieved the final political defeat of his crowned rival.
The Russian emperor also won in the pre-war "battle of wits" that unfolded before 1812. Beginning in 1810, the two gigantic empires, realizing the inevitability of war, began to actively prepare for it. Napoleon, as usual, concentrated powerful human and material resources and hoped for a fleeting campaign. The French commander planned, by multiplying "mass by speed" (his expression), to achieve a quick victory in a general battle in the border provinces. After Russia was brought to its knees, he hoped to sign with her "on the drum" a peace favorable to the French empire. This strategic concept turned out to be fundamentally vicious and erroneous. The initial miscalculation led to other mistakes, which ultimately led the great commander to the grandiose catastrophe of the Russian campaign.
Even in the pre-war period, Alexander I managed to carry out partial reforms of the state administration system according to French models and, most importantly, prepare the army for a decisive military battle. In addition, together with the Minister of War M.B. Barclay de Tolly, the Russian emperor, thanks to the brilliantly acting military intelligence, was able to develop a three-year strategic plan for the war with Napoleon. The first period (1812) is the prolongation of the war in time and luring the enemy deep into Russian territory, and then (1813-1814) the transfer of hostilities to Western Europe, in the hope of an uprising in Germany against the Napoleonic yoke. The Russian strategic plan was based on ideas that were completely opposite to Napoleonic plans and turned out to be disastrous for the French ruler. Subsequent events, which developed according to the strategic scenario conceived in St. Petersburg by Alexander I, only proved the correctness of the Russian emperor's predictions.
Often in the historical literature it was argued that, unlike Napoleon, who made global miscalculations in the Russian campaign, the Russian monarch in 1812 played a passive role and only from a distance observed the events that were fateful for all of Europe. It is hardly possible to agree with such an opinion. Yes, Alexander I, of course, experienced the unpleasant fact for him personally of his departure from the army at the beginning of the war. He was convinced of the expediency of such a step by those close to him, although it was another and very painful blow to the emperor's pride. But in 1812, the Russian tsar, in spite of everything, was the autocratic leader of the state, and all the most important strategic and military-political decisions depended on his will. For example, he took a very firm and unshakable position: not to enter into any peace negotiations with Napoleon as long as at least one enemy soldier remained on Russian territory. He repeatedly stated this decision both before the start of the war and during it, which was recorded by many contemporaries. It was Alexander I who initiated the creation of the militia, he also appointed M.I. Golenishchev-Kutuzov to the post of commander-in-chief, no matter what they write about, although he had his own, generally negative, judgment about his personal qualities. He also drew up a plan for the conduct of hostilities for the second period of the war of 1812, which guided all Russian troops in the expulsion of the enemy from Russian borders. In general, the Patriotic War and the subsequent course of military events in Europe completely refute the prevailing opinions about the weakness, indecision, compliance of Alexander I and his susceptibility to foreign influence. In an extreme situation of an unprecedented enemy invasion of his country, the Russian emperor showed firmness and uncompromisingness in upholding clearly defined goals and in bringing the matter to a victorious end.
Alexander I played an outstanding role during the foreign campaigns of the Russian army in 1813-1814. Despite the proposals made in the Russian camp at the end of the campaign of 1812 not to conduct active operations abroad and to make peace with Napoleon, the Russian tsar insisted on continuing offensive operations in Europe. He also became the inspirer, ideologist, organizer and, in fact, the military-political leader of the new anti-Napoleonic coalition. During periods of temporary setbacks, he made titanic efforts to prevent collapse and keep all allies in the ranks of the alliance that had formed. But Alexander I not only settled the friction, he developed a unified military and foreign policy strategy of the allies and proposed the right tactical solutions. In 1813, at critical moments, such as during the Battle of Leipzig, he actively intervened in events: despite the objections of the Austrians, he insisted on the need for decisive action by the strength of his authority. In 1814, contrary to the opinion and opposition of the same Austrians, Alexander I initiated the movement of the Allied forces to Paris, which led to the final fall of Napoleon and his abdication. Most contemporaries also noted the special generosity and loyalty shown by the Russian monarch, in contrast to other allies, in relation to the defeated France.
1814 became the "finest hour" of Russia's international politics, the highest point of Alexander I's glory, after which a new diplomatic career opened up for him. The final denouement in the fate of Napoleon has not yet arrived. The following year, he attempted one last return to the European political scene. The famous "hundred days" added to him a few minutes of fame in his lifetime and a little popularity after his death. But the ensuing exile to the island of St. Helena meant not only public oblivion and the slow extinction of the disgraced emperor. For such an active nature as Napoleon, she marked political death. Although his figure until the time of his death was perceived by opponents who had not forgotten anything as the main symbol of evil (“monster” and “enemy of mankind”), politically he ceased to be dangerous. Only the name remained significant - Napoleon. It symbolized the revolutionary and post-revolutionary era, the period of cardinal changes and resounding victories. The bearer of this name himself, who was in forced inaction as a state prisoner of all European monarchs, had only one thing left to do - write memoirs, on the basis of which the "Napoleonic legend" was subsequently born.
For Alexander I, after leaving the stage of his main opponent, the time came for stormy international activity, when his moral authority increased immensely and in the "concert" of the winners he rightfully got the first violin. Concerned about the fate of post-war Europe, the Russian emperor demonstrated unconventional thinking and innovative approaches to international politics. Being one of the main creators of the Vienna system, which fixed the redistribution of borders and a new alignment of forces in Europe, he personally developed and proposed a scheme for peaceful existence and collective security, which provided for the preservation of the existing balance of power, the inviolability of the form of government and established borders. It was based on a wide range of ideas, primarily on the moral precepts of Christianity, which gave many people a reason to call Alexander I an "idealist politician" and a "romantic emperor." These principles were laid down in the Act of the Holy Alliance of 1815, drawn up in the gospel style. Behind the vague and religious-mystical postulates of the Act, the original version of which was written by the hand of the Russian monarch, a new interpretation of the “European idea” was read.

At one time, Napoleon also tried to unite under his scepter all the peoples of the continent into a single whole on a confederate basis. But he wanted to realize his plan through military violence, while simultaneously imposing his famous Civil Code on the entire European territory, which, in his opinion, would allow uniting peoples and "forming a single and united nation." In opposition to the Napoleonic idea of ​​forced unification of Europe under the auspices of French cultural, legal and economic hegemony, Alexander I proposed a voluntary union of monarchs for the sake of peace, collective security and stability. In addition to the aforementioned Act (which provided for the “indissoluble brotherhood” of monarchs), which was signed by almost all European sovereigns (except for the Pope and King George III of England), the Paris Treaty of 1815 was drawn up by four heads of European powers in addition to it. He formalized the so-called quadruple alliance (Russia, England, Austria Prussia), which actually solved the main European problems. The mechanism for the functioning of the Holy Union was also envisaged. It was based on constant mutual contacts, for which international congresses were convened as needed. Diplomacy thus acquired a new dimension: in addition to the traditionally bilateral diplomacy, it also became a conference one. The congresses convened then essentially became the forerunners of the modern European Parliament - a club, or assembly, of all monarchs. In the conditions of feudal Europe it was impossible to offer anything else. But as a precedent, this was of great importance for the future European world order. We can especially note one confidential proposal made by Alexander I to the English government in 1816 - on the simultaneous proportional disarmament of European states. An amazing initiative for the most powerful and most authoritative power at that moment! But England did not support this proposal, and the bold initiative remained unclaimed. The world returned to the realization of this prematurely formulated idea much later.
Historians of various trends and views at one time, being under the influence of certain worldview and ideological clichés, wrote a lot about the reactionary nature and protective orientation of the activities of the Holy Alliance (“the conspiracy of monarchs against the peoples”), about the struggle against the revolutionary movement, in which Russia (“ gendarme of Europe") played an important role. Others filled their characteristics with an exclusively negative meaning, often replacing and narrowing the scope of the term "Vienna system" to the concept of "Holy Alliance". Some authors emphasized that the foreign policy of Alexander I of this period did not meet national interests and tied Russia's hands in the international arena by observing the principles of the Holy Alliance (the impossibility of fundamentally resolving the "Eastern question"), and being busy with European affairs distracted the tsar from solving internal problems. In addition, a noticeable increase in the influence and prestige of Russia caused counteraction from the major Western powers. Many scientists were not entirely right when, pointing to the motives that guided the Russian emperor, they characterized them as illusory, while clearly exaggerating the foreign policy altruism of Alexander I.
Without any doubt, any researcher cannot but notice in the actions of the Russian emperor in the last decade of his reign elements of mysticism, his faith in his messianic destiny. At the same time, modern historians also wrote about the purely practical nature of the royal mystic, because the Vienna system, created largely thanks to his efforts, did not fail for half a century and turned out to be extremely stable. Despite the existing contradictions between the great powers, it was aimed at peace, not war, and the European consensus was achieved through collective efforts through the negotiation process and compromises.
Of course, at the beginning of the 19th century, the ideas of European integration by peaceful means were clearly ahead of their time, since they were not stimulated by the economic interest of states and peoples in such an association. The motivating reason was only the frank fear of the European monarchs of a repetition of the bloody events of the Napoleonic wars and any revolutionary upheavals. But even the first, perhaps not entirely successful attempt led to the fact that Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century. did not know major wars. Of course, the question immediately arises about the price of progress, to which mankind has not yet given an unambiguous answer: what is better - stable and peaceful development or an era of rapid change? Graduality and evolution - or upheavals and rapid revolutionary changes?
How many people - so many opinions. Development does not always proceed in straight lines, and it is impossible to issue a correct recipe for infallible decisions. Historical experience will help to develop the correct answer. In this regard, the epoch of two great emperors, two historical antipodes provides a lot of food for thought. Both for the first time in practice tried to implement one global idea. But they approached its implementation in different ways and offered completely opposite methods - military and diplomatic. And both, each in their own way, ended up failing.

Summing up the life path of two historical characters who represented one generation of great politicians at the turn of the 18th-19th centuries, it is necessary to recognize their outstanding role, first of all, in the national history of their states. Both France and Russia during their reign reached the peak of their military glory. It is unlikely that someday French regiments will march in the Kremlin, and Russian soldiers will bivouac on the Champs Elysees. In the historical consciousness of the descendants, these events associated with the names of emperors left a noticeable mark.
The role of both in the formation of state institutions and management structures is also great: in France and in Russia they have survived in a modified form to this day. It was under Napoleon and Alexander I that the main paths and main trends in the development of the French and Russian peoples were determined. In France at that time, bourgeois relations were firmly established, which even the restoration of the Bourbons could not prevent. In Russia, however, the timid constitutional dreams and the first transformations of Alexander I laid the foundation for the gradual movement of Russian society towards the abolition of serfdom and bourgeois reforms. The legacy of the two emperors in world diplomacy is great - each offered his own way of solving the most complex international problems.
More than 500 thousand works have been written about this era and its main figures - Napoleon and Alexander I, about the military, political, economic, social, moral aspects of their deeds. Probably, no historical period has attracted such close attention of scientific minds. But despite the seeming study, the phenomenon of this era itself remains unrevealed to the end. Previously unknown sources continue to be introduced into scientific circulation, new and original points of view appear, the vision of world history at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries is constantly changing. The state activity of Napoleon and Alexander I, their behavior both as allies and as opponents in the military confrontation of multidirectional forces - this invaluable historical experience is inexhaustible. His study and comprehension, no doubt, will be continued by the new forces of historians.

Victor BEZOTOSNY,
Candidate of Historical Sciences

Napoleon Bonaparte and Alexander I 3

Foreign policy and their friendship. 5

The reasons for the termination of friendship, their common interests and contradictions. fifteen

In the west, Russia actively participated in European affairs. In the first decade and a half of the nineteenth century the implementation of the western direction was associated with the struggle against the aggression of Napoleon. After 1815, the main task of Russia's foreign policy in Europe became the maintenance of the old monarchical regimes and the struggle against the revolutionary movement. Alexander I and Nicholas I relied on the most conservative forces and most often relied on alliances with Austria and Prussia. In 1848, Nicholas helped the Austrian emperor suppress the revolution that broke out in Hungary, and strangled the revolutionary uprisings in the Danubian principalities.

At the very beginning of the XIX century. Russia adhered to neutrality in European affairs. However, the aggressive plans of Napoleon, since 1804 the French emperor, forced Alexander I to oppose him. In 1805, a third coalition was formed against France: Russia, Austria and England. The outbreak of the war was extremely unsuccessful for the allies. In November 1805, their troops were defeated near Austerlipem. Austria withdrew from the war, the coalition collapsed.

Russia, continuing to fight alone, tried to create a new alliance against France. In 1806, the 4th coalition was formed: Russia, Prussia, England and Sweden. However, the French army forced Prussia to capitulate within just a few weeks. Once again, Russia found itself alone in the face of a formidable and powerful enemy. In June 1807, she lost the battle near Friedland (the territory of East Prussia, now the Kaliningrad region of Russia). This forced Alexander I to enter into peace negotiations with Napoleon.

In the summer of 1807, in Tilsit, Russia and France signed a peace treaty, and then an alliance treaty. According to its terms, the Duchy of Warsaw was created from the Polish lands torn away from Prussia under the protectorate of Napoleon. This territory in the future became a springboard for an attack on Russia. The Treaty of Tilsit obliged Russia to join the continental blockade of Great Britain and break off political relations with it. The rupture of traditional trade ties with England caused significant damage to the Russian economy, undermining its finances. The nobles, whose material well-being largely depended on the sale of Russian agricultural products to England, showed particular dissatisfaction with this condition and Alexander I personally. The peace of Tilsit was unfavorable for Russia. At the same time, he gave her a temporary respite in Europe, allowing her to intensify her policy in the eastern and northwestern directions.

Napoleon, sensing the serious political significance of the Bailen catastrophe. Although he pretended to be calm, emphasizing that the Baylen loss was a complete trifle compared to the resources owned by his empire, he understood perfectly well how this event should affect Austria, which began to arm itself with redoubled energy.

Austria saw that Napoleon suddenly had not one front, but two, and that this new southern Spanish front would from now on greatly weaken him on the Danube. To keep Austria out of the war, it was necessary to make her understand that Alexander I would invade Austrian possessions from the east, while Napoleon, his ally, would march on Vienna from the west. For this purpose, the Erfurt demonstration of friendship between the two emperors was mainly started.

Alexander I experienced a difficult time after Tilsit. The alliance with Napoleon and the inevitable consequences of this alliance - a break with England - severely hurt the economic interests of both the nobility and the merchant class. Friedland and Tilsit were considered not only a misfortune, but also a disgrace.

Alexander hoped, believing Napoleon's promises, that by acquiring a part of Turkey thanks to the Franco-Russian alliance, he would calm the court, guards, general noble opposition. But time passed, and no steps were taken by Napoleon in this direction; moreover, rumors began to reach St. Petersburg that Napoleon was inciting the Turks to further resistance in the war they were waging at that time against Russia. In Erfurt, both participants in the Franco-Russian alliance hoped to take a closer look at the good quality of the cards with which each of them plays his diplomatic game. Both allies deceived each other, both knew it, although not yet completely, both did not trust each other in anything, and both needed each other. Alexander considered Napoleon a man of the greatest mind; Napoleon recognized the diplomatic subtlety and cunning of Alexander. “This is a real Byzantine,” said the French emperor about the Russian tsar. Therefore, at the first meeting in Erfurt on September 27, 1808, they passionately embraced and kissed each other in public and did not stop doing this for two weeks in a row, daily and inseparably appearing at reviews, parades, melons, feasts, in the theater, on hunting, on horseback rides. Publicity was the most important thing in these hugs and kisses: for Napoleon, these kisses would have lost all their sweetness if the Austrians had not known about them, and for Alexander if the Turks had not known about them.

During the year that passed between Tilsit and Erfurt, Alexander made sure that Napoleon only beckoned him with a promise to give him the "East" and take the "West" for himself; it was clear that not only would he not allow the tsar to occupy Constantinople, but that even Moldavia and Wallachia Napoleon would prefer to leave in the hands of the Turks. On the other hand, the tsar saw that Napoleon, for a whole year after Tilsit, did not bother to remove his troops even from that part of Prussia, which he returned to the Prussian king. As for Napoleon, for him the most important thing was to keep Austria from speaking out against France, while he was. Napoleon will not be able to put an end to the guerrilla war that has flared up in Spain. And for this, Alexander had to undertake to actively act against Austria if Austria decided to speak out. And Alexander did not want to give or fulfill this direct obligation. Napoleon agreed to give in advance for this Russian military assistance to Alexander Galicia and even more possessions near the Carpathians. Subsequently, the most prominent representatives of both the Slavophile and the national-patriotic schools of Russian historiography bitterly reproached Alexander for not accepting these proposals of Napoleon and for missing an opportunity that would never happen again. But Alexander submitted after feeble attempts to resist that strong current in the Russian nobility, which saw in an alliance with Napoleon, who twice defeated the Russian army (in 1805 and 1807), not only a disgrace (it would still go anywhere), but also ruin. Anonymous letters reminding Alexander of the end of Paul, his father, who also entered into friendship with Napoleon, were convincing enough. And yet, Alexander was afraid of Napoleon and did not want to break with him for anything. At the direction and invitation of Napoleon, who wanted to punish Sweden for her alliance with England, Alexander had been waging war with Sweden since February 1808, which ended with the rejection of all Finland from Sweden to the Torneo River and its annexation to Russia. Alexander knew that even by this he did not calm the irritation and anxiety of the Russian landlords, for whom the interests of their own pocket were infinitely higher than any territorial state expansions in the barren north. In any case, the acquisition of Finland was for Alexander also an argument in favor of the fact that breaking with Napoleon now is both dangerous and unprofitable.

In Erfurt, Talleyrand betrayed Napoleon for the first time by entering into secret relations with Alexander, whom he advised to resist Napoleonic hegemony. Talleyrand subsequently motivated his behavior as if by concern for France, which Napoleon's insane love of power led to death. “The Russian sovereign is civilized, but the Russian people are not civilized, the French sovereign is not civilized, but the French people are civilized. It is necessary that the Russian sovereign and the French people enter into an alliance with each other, ”the old intriguer began his secret negotiations with the tsar with such a flattering phrase.

It was said of Talleyrand that throughout his life he "sold those who bought him." At one time he sold the Directory to Napoleon, now in Erfurt he sold Napoleon to Alexander. He subsequently sold Alexander to the British. He only did not sell the English to anyone, because only they did not buy him (although he offered himself to them several times at the most reasonable price).

Here it is inappropriate to delve into the motives of Talleyrand (who later received money from Alexander, although not in such a large amount as he expected). It is important for us to note two features here: firstly, Talleyrand saw more clearly than others already in 1808 what, more or less vaguely, began to disturb, as already mentioned, many marshals and dignitaries; secondly, Alexander realized that the Napoleonic empire was not as strong and indestructible as it might seem. He began to oppose Napoleonic harassment on the issue of Russia's military action against Austria in the event of a new Franco-Austrian war. During one of these disputes, Napoleon threw his hat on the ground and began to trample it furiously with his feet. Alexander, in response to this trick, said: “You are sharp, but I am stubborn ... We will talk, we will argue, otherwise I will leave.” The union remained formally in force, but from now on Napoleon could not count on it.

People in Russia waited with great anxiety to see whether the meeting in Erfurt would end well: whether Napoleon would arrest Alexander, as he had done just four months earlier with the Spanish Bourbons, luring them to Bayonne. “No one hoped that he would let you go, Your Majesty,” one old Prussian general let out frankly (and to Alexander's great annoyance) when Alexander was returning from Erfurt. From the outside, everything was excellent: during the entire Erfurt meeting, the vassal kings and other monarchs who made up Napoleon's retinue did not cease to be touched by the heartfelt mutual love of Napoleon and the tsar. But Napoleon himself, seeing Alexander off, was gloomy. He knew that the vassal kings did not believe in the strength of this alliance, and that Austria did not believe either. It was necessary to finish the Spanish affairs as soon as possible.

Napoleon had 100,000 men in Spain. He ordered another 150,000 to hastily invade Spain. The peasant uprising flared up every month. The Spanish word guerilla, "little war," misunderstood the meaning of what was happening. This war with peasants and artisans, with shepherds of sheep and mule drivers worried the emperor much more than other great campaigns.

After the slavishly resigned Prussia, the Spanish furious resistance seemed especially strange and unexpected. And yet Napoleon did not even suspect what this Spanish fire would come to. This could have had a somewhat sobering effect on General Bonaparte, but on the Emperor Napoleon, the winner of Europe, the "riot of ragged beggars" could not have affected.

Unsure of Alexander's help and almost convinced that Austria would turn against him. Napoleon in the late autumn of 1808 rushed to Spain.

France and Russia share a remarkably complicated history of political and cultural relations. The war with Napoleon was the main event in Russian history in the 19th century. But she had a strange result. In Russia, the cult of Napoleon intensified, and the traditional love for French culture increased immeasurably. The Empire style with its Russian version dominated everywhere. The Russian emperor ordered a large painting “Parade of the Old Guard” for his office, and a unit was created as part of the Russian guard, wearing a uniform that deliberately repeated the form of Napoleonic soldiers.

Republican ideas that inspired the Russian nobles to the Decembrist uprising were also brought from Imperial France.

Internal sympathy existed, despite the objective political and social contradictions.

The Empire style of art would have meant "Napoleon style" if it had not become international and transcended the era. The ideology of the Napoleonic Empire created a kind of artificial Renaissance, which revived not the ancient spirit, but the symbols and signs of the Roman militarized world - eagles, armor, lictor bundles, sacrificial tripods - and the solemn severity inherent in Roman aesthetics. This style, created "under Napoleon", became an important contribution to the history of culture, no less important than military campaigns with their bright victories and gloomy defeats. The style survived Napoleon and took root in many countries of the world, but especially and very beautifully in another empire - in Russia. What is called Russian Empire is part of an international phenomenon. However, in Russia, the "imperial" style not only changed its form, but also found new historical sources and key symbols - the past of Russia with its helmets and chain mail, with the image-ideal of a medieval knight.

The works of French and Russian applied art of the early 19th century shown next to each other confirm the global nature of the style created by France, which turned the Republic back into a monarchy, focusing on the ideals and style of the Ancient World. Russia imported brilliant monuments of French craftsmanship. French artists created sketches for Russian factories. The original works of Russian workshops were not inferior to imported ones and were saturated with their own ideological program. All this can be shown by Russia and its museum - the Hermitage. But he also shows objects with a stronger French accent. Thanks to a combination of circumstances, personal sympathies and dynastic marriages, many Napoleonic things that were kept in the Beauharnais family ended up in Russia: from the saber that was with Napoleon at Marengo to the service.

However, behind the story about art lies a theme very close to Russian history. Gilded heroes of French and Russian production stand side by side like brothers, like Alexander Pavlovich and Napoleon on a raft in Tilsit. The theme "Alexander and Napoleon" is loved not only by historians, but also by everyone who in Russia reflects on Russian history. A dramatic break with France after the assassination of Paul, a humiliating defeat at Austerlitz, a reconciliation that delighted everyone, skillfully used for Russia's political purposes. A treacherous preventive attack, the loss of Moscow and the terrible humiliation of the all-European victors, which ended with the capture of Paris by the Russian troops, which was struck by the nobility of the victorious emperor. This is a beautiful saga.

For the Hermitage, there is another aspect of this story. His name is Vivant Denon. A remarkable artist, one of the organizers of the scientific Egyptian expedition of Napoleon, the creator of the Louvre, the father of "Egyptomania", a freemason and mystic, who served in his youth at the Russian Court. The Egyptian papyrus donated by him and a luxurious book of his oriental engravings are kept in Russia. They say that during the period of friendship between Alexander and Napoleon, he helped to buy paintings for the Hermitage, including, supposedly, Caravaggio's The Lute Player. Alexander awarded him the Order of St. Anne in gratitude for the art objects sent to St. Petersburg. As director of the Louvre, he unsuccessfully tried to buy from the Empress Josephine part of her art collection. Josephine's daughter sold paintings and sculptures to Alexander, to the Hermitage. The Russian emperor, in turn, defended the right of France to preserve the treasures collected by Denon throughout Europe.

Our cultural interactions are full of fascinating episodes, many of which visibly and invisibly stand behind amazingly beautiful things united "under the sign of two eagles" - Russian and French.

The Bucharest peace treaty was of great importance. It was concluded a month before Napoleon's attack on Russia and upset his hopes of helping the Turkish army. The treaty allowed the Russian command to concentrate all its forces on repelling the Napoleonic aggression. The successes of Russian weapons and the conclusion of the Treaty of Bucharest led to the weakening of the political, economic and religious yoke of the Ottoman Empire over the Christian peoples of the Balkan Peninsula.

Reasons for the termination of friendship, their common interests and contradictions

After Erfurt, Alexander returned to St. Petersburg with the intention of maintaining the Franco-Russian alliance and not getting out of the wake of Napoleonic policy, at least in the near future. When a scientific and detailed socio-economic and political history of Russia at the beginning of the 19th century is written, then, probably, the future researcher will devote a lot of attention and devote a lot of pages to these curious years from Erfurt to the invasion of Napoleon in 1812. In these four years, we see a complex the struggle of hostile social forces and currents that determined the historical pattern of both the appearance of the figure of Speransky and his downfall.

Apparently, the question of introducing some reforms in the administration of the Russian Empire was put forward rather persistently by the conditions of that time. There were enough shocks that contributed to the creation of the need for reform: Austerlitz, Friedland, Tilsit. But, on the other hand, the terrible defeats in the two big wars that were waged by Russia in 1805-1807. against Napoleon, ended, no matter what was said about the Tilsit disgrace, in a comparatively advantageous alliance with a world conqueror and then, in a short time, the acquisition of vast Finland. This means that the Russian tsar did not see any reasons for very deep, fundamental reforms, even for those that were outlined for Prussia after the Jena defeat. It was here that Speransky came in unusually handy to the court. A smart, dexterous and cautious raznochinets returned from Erfurt, where he traveled in Alexander's retinue, completely delighted with Napoleon. Speransky did not touch serfdom in any way, even remotely - on the contrary, he convincingly argued that it was not slavery at all. He also did not touch the Orthodox Church in any way - on the contrary, he said many compliments to her at every opportunity. Not only did he not encroach on any restriction of autocracy, but, on the contrary, he saw in tsarist absolutism the main lever of the transformations he had initiated. And these transformations were precisely intended to turn the loose semi-Eastern despotism, the patrimony of the Holstein-Gottorp family, who appropriated the boyar surname of the extinct Romanovs, into a modern European state with a properly functioning bureaucracy, with a system of formal legality, with organized control over finances and administration, educated and businesslike personnel of the bureaucracy, with the transformation of governors from satraps into prefects, in a word, he wanted to plant on Russian soil the same orders that, in his opinion, turned France into the first country in the world. In itself, this program did not contradict the thoughts, feelings, desires of Alexander, and the king supported his favorite for several years in a row. But both Alexander and Speransky paid off without a host. The well-born nobility and the middle-noble stratum led by it sensed the enemy, no matter how much he covered himself with moderation and good intentions. They understood instinctively that Speransky was striving to make the feudal-absolutist state bourgeois-absolutist and create forms that were essentially incompatible with the feudal-serf system that existed in Russia and the nobility of political and social life.

They went as a united phalanx against Speransky. Not by chance, but organically, Speransky's reform work was associated in their eyes with the commitment of the leading minister to the Franco-Russian alliance, to friendship with the military dictator of France and Europe; not by chance, but organically, in the minds of the Russian nobility, the popovich was associated, who introduces exams for officials and wants to oust the nobility from the state machine in order to transfer this machine to raznochintsy, rabble-rousers and merchants, and the French conqueror, who ruins the same Russian nobility with a continental blockade and to whom the king went to the Erfurt Horde to bow with his favorite. What was the firm line of the court and noble opposition in St. Petersburg and Moscow in 1808-1812, and this opposition was directed equally sharply both against the domestic and against the foreign policy of the tsar and his minister.

Already this circumstance deprived the Franco-Russian alliance of due strength. In Russian aristocratic salons, the taking of Finland from Sweden was condemned, because it was done at the request of Napoleon, and they did not even want to get Galicia, if this required helping the hated Bonaparte against Austria in 1809. They tried in every possible way to show coldness to the French ambassador in St. Petersburg, Caulaincourt, and the more affectionate and cordial the tsar was with him, the more demonstratively the aristocratic circles, both of new Petersburg and especially of old Moscow, showed their hostility.

But from the end of 1810, Alexander ceased to oppose this victorious current. Firstly, Napoleon's Tilsit speeches about the spread of Russian influence in the East, in Turkey, turned out to be only words, and this disappointed Alexander; Secondly. Napoleon still did not withdraw his troops from Prussia and, most importantly, played some kind of game with the Poles, not abandoning the idea of ​​restoring Poland, which threatened the integrity of the Russian borders and the rejection of Lithuania; thirdly, Napoleon's protests and displeasure at the failure to comply exactly with the conditions of the continental blockade took on very insulting forms; fourthly, the arbitrary annexations with a stroke of the pen of entire states, practiced by Napoleon so willingly in 1810-1811, disturbed and annoyed Alexander. The exorbitant power of Napoleon itself hung an eternal threat over his vassals, and after Tilsit, Alexander was looked upon (and he knew it) as a simple vassal of Napoleon. They were ironic about the small handouts that Napoleon gave Alexander both in 1807, giving him the Prussian Bialystok, and in 1809, giving the king one Austrian district on the eastern (Galician) border; they said that Napoleon treats Alexander in the same way as the former Russian tsars treated their serfs, granting them so many souls as a reward for their service.

When Napoleon's marriage to Grand Duchess Anna Pavlovna failed, for the first time in all of Europe they began to talk about the approaching sharp quarrel between the two emperors. The marriage of Napoleon to the daughter of the Austrian emperor was interpreted as replacing the Franco-Russian alliance with the Franco-Austrian one.

There are precise indications that for the first time not only thinking aloud about the war with Russia, but also seriously studying this issue, Napoleon began in January 1811, when he got acquainted with the new Russian customs tariff. This tariff greatly increased duties on the importation into Russia of wines, silk and velvet fabrics, and other luxury items, i.e., just those goods that were the main items of French imports to Russia. Napoleon protested against this tariff; he was told that the deplorable state of Russian finances compels such a measure. The rate remains. Complaints about the too easy passage of colonial goods to Russia on pseudo-neutral, but in fact English courts, became more and more frequent. Napoleon was sure that the Russians were secretly releasing English goods and that from Russia these goods were widely distributed in Germany, Austria, Poland, and thus the blockade of England was reduced to zero.

Alexander also thought about the inevitability of war, looked for allies, negotiated with Bernadotte, formerly a Napoleonic marshal, now the Crown Prince of Sweden and an enemy of Napoleon. On August 15, 1811, at a solemn reception of the diplomatic corps, who arrived to congratulate Napoleon on his birthday, the emperor, stopping near the Russian ambassador, Prince Kurakin, turned to him with an angry speech that had a threatening meaning. He accused Alexander of infidelity to the union, of hostile actions. What does your sovereign hope for? he asked menacingly. Napoleon then suggested that Kurakin immediately sign an agreement that would settle all misunderstandings between Russia and the French Empire. Kurakin, timid and agitated, declared that he had no authority for such an act. No authority? - Napoleon shouted. - So demand your authority! .. I don’t want war, I don’t want to restore Poland, but you yourself want the Duchy of Warsaw and Danzig to join Russia ... Until the secret intentions of your court become open, I will not stop increasing the army, standing in Germany! The emperor did not listen to excuses and explanations of Kurakin, who rejected all these accusations, but spoke and repeated his thoughts in every way.

After this scene, no one in Europe doubted the imminent war. Napoleon gradually turned the whole of vassal Germany into a vast springboard for a future invasion. At the same time, he decided to force both Prussia and Austria into a military alliance with him - two powers on the continent that were still considered independent, although in fact Prussia was in complete political slavery to Napoleon. This military alliance was to immediately precede the attack on Russia.

Prussia experienced very difficult times in the years when the Napoleonic yoke weighed on it, but still, even in the first moments after Tilsit, in 1807-1808, there was no such chronic panic as after Wagram and the Austrian marriage of Napoleon. In the early years, under the influence of Stein and the Reform Party in Prussia, if not completely abolished serfdom, then almost all of its legal foundations were very significantly broken. Some other reforms were also carried out.

But then the fiery patriot Stein, who too openly admired the Spanish uprising, attracted the attention of the Napoleonic police: one of his letters was intercepted, which seemed to Napoleon unintentional, and the emperor ordered King Frederick William III to immediately expel Stein from Prussia. The king, as a sign of zeal, not only immediately carried out the order, but also confiscated the property of the disgraced statesman.

The cause of reform in Prussia slowed down, but did not stop. Scharnhorst, the Minister of War, Gneisenau and their assistants worked as far as possible to reorganize the army. At the request of Napoleon, Prussia could not have an army of more than 42 thousand people, but by various clever measures the Prussian government managed, calling for a short time, to give military training to a large mass. Thus, slavishly fulfilling the will of Napoleon, submissive, flattering, humiliating, Prussia nevertheless quietly prepared for the distant future and did not lose hope of a way out of that desperate impossible situation in which the terrible defeat of 1806 and the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 had placed her.

When Napoleon's war with Austria broke out in 1809, there was one desperate, convulsive, made at individual risk and fear attempt on the Prussian side to free themselves from oppression: Major Schill with part of the hussar regiment, which he commanded, began a partisan war. He was defeated and killed, his comrades, by order of Napoleon, were tried by a Prussian military court and shot. The king was beside himself with fear and rage against Schill, but for the time being Napoleon was content with these executions and the humiliated assurances of Friedrich Wilhelm. After the new defeat of Austria at Wagram, after the Treaty of Schönbrunn and the marriage of Napoleon to Marie-Louise, the last hopes for the salvation of Prussia disappeared: Austria, it seemed, completely and irrevocably entered the orbit of Napoleonic politics. Who could help, what to hope for? At the beginning of the quarrel between Napoleon and Russia? But this quarrel developed very slowly, and now, after Austerlitz and Friedland, former hopes were no longer placed on the strength of Russia.

From the very beginning of 1810, there were ominous rumors that Napoleon intended, without war, by a simple decree, to destroy Prussia, either by dividing it into parts (between the French Empire, the Westphalian kingdom of Jerome Bonaparte and Saxony, which was in vassal dependence on Napoleon), or by expelling from there the Hohenzollern dynasty and replacing it with one of their relatives or marshals. When, on June 9, 1810, by a simple decree, Napoleon annexed Holland and then turned it into nine new departments of the French Empire, when Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck, the Lauenburg duchies of Oldenburg, Salm-Salm, Arenberg and a number of others were annexed to France in the same easy way possessions, when, having occupied the entire northern coast of Germany, from Holland to Holstein, Marshal Davout, as the only consolation for those who were joining, declared in an official appeal to them: Your independence was only imaginary, then the Prussian king began to expect the last hour of his reign. His independence, after all, was also only imaginary, and he knew that back in Tilsit, Napoleon had categorically declared that he had not erased Prussia from the map of Europe only out of courtesy to the Russian Tsar. And now, in 1810-1811, Napoleon's relations with the tsar quickly deteriorated and there was no talk of any kindness. At the end of 1810, Napoleon, for no reason at all, in the midst of complete peace, did not hesitate to drive the Duke of Oldenburg out of his possessions and annex Oldenburg to his state, although the son and heir of this duke was married to Alexander's sister, Ekaterina Pavlovna.

Prussia in 1810-1811 was waiting for death. It was not only King Frederick William III, who had never distinguished himself for courage, who was afraid, but those liberal-patriotic associations, like the Tugendbund, which at that time reflected the desire of a part of the young German bourgeoisie to get rid of the foreign oppressor and then create a new, free Germany, were also silenced. The Tugendbund was not the only, but only the most conspicuous of these illegal associations; he, too, fell silent and despondent in 1810, and especially in 1811 and early 1812. The situation seemed very hopeless. Minister Hardenberg, who once stood for resistance and for this, at the request of Napoleon, removed from the Prussian court, now formally repented and in writing brought to the attention of the French ambassador Saint-Marsan about a complete change in his convictions. Our salvation depends only on Napoleon, - wrote Hardenberg to General Scharnhorst. Hardenberg himself in May 1810 turned to the French ambassador with the following humiliated request: Let his imperial majesty deign to speak out about the participation that I could take in business. This will provide substantial proof of the return of the emperor's trust and favors to the king.

Napoleon relented and allowed Friedrich Wilhelm to appoint Hardenberg as state chancellor. This happened on June 5, and already on June 7, 1810. the new Prussian Chancellor wrote to Napoleon: Deeply convinced that Prussia can be reborn and ensure its integrity and its future happiness only by honestly following your system, sovereign ... I consider it my highest glory to earn the approval and high confidence of your imperial majesty. I remain with the deepest respect, sir, the most humble and obedient servant of Your Imperial Majesty. Baron von Hardenberg, State Chancellor of the King of Prussia.

On March 14, 1812, a Franco-Austrian treaty was signed in Paris, according to which Austria was obliged to send 30,000 soldiers to help Napoleon. Napoleon guaranteed the seizure of Moldavia and Wallachia from Russia, which were then occupied by Russian troops. In addition, the Austrians were guaranteed the possession of Galicia or other territorial compensation corresponding in value.

These two alliances, with Prussia and Austria, were needed by Napoleon not so much to replenish the great army, but to divert part of the Russian forces north and south of that direct road Kovno - Vilna - Vitebsk - Smolensk - Moscow, along which he was to be sent offensive.

Prussia undertook to put 20 thousand people at the disposal of Napoleon for the upcoming war, Austria - 30 thousand people. Moreover, Prussia pledged to provide Napoleon for his army (to pay off part of its unpaid debts to the French emperor, from which Prussia could not get out) 20 million kilograms of rye, 40 million kilograms of wheat, more than 40 thousand bulls, 70 million bottles of alcoholic beverages.

Diplomatic preparations for the war were already completed in early spring. There is information that a bad harvest in 1811 led to famine in some parts of France at the end of winter and in the spring of 1812, that in some places in the countryside there were disturbances on this basis, and in some places they were expected, and there are indications that this delayed Napoleon's campaign for one and a half to two months. Buying and speculating in grain increased anxiety and irritation in the countryside, and this uneasy situation also slowed down Napoleon's advance.

Napoleon was forced to organize special flying detachments, which were supposed to hunt through the forests for those who were evading and forcibly bring them to military units. As a result of repressive measures, recruiting before the war of 1812, in general, gave everything that Napoleon counted on.

By the end of the spring of 1812, Napoleon's military and diplomatic preparations were basically and partly completed in detail. All vassal Europe was dutifully ready to oppose Russia.

Literature

1. Aksenova M., Ismailova S. World History - T.I, - M .: Avanta +, 1993 -618 p.

2. Volgin I.L., Narinsky M.M. ... Dialogue about Dostoevsky, Napoleon and the Napoleonic myth // Metamorphoses of Europe. M., 1993, p. 127-164

3. Tarle E. V. Napoleon. - M.: Gosizdat, 1941. - 562 p.

4. Chandler D. Napoleon's military campaigns. M.: Tsentropoligraf, 1999.

Volgin I.L., Narinsky M.M.… Dialogue about Dostoevsky, Napoleon and the Napoleonic myth // Metamorphoses of Europe. M., 1993, p. 127-164

Tarle E. V. Napoleon. - M.: Gosizdat, 1941. - S. 432.

Tarle E. V. Napoleon. - M.: Gosizdat, 1941. - S. 401.

Tarle E. V. Napoleon. - M.: Gosizdat, 1941. - S. 368.

Chandler D. Napoleon's military campaigns. M.: Tsentropoligraf, 1999.

Aksenova M., Ismailova S. World History - T.I, - M .: Avanta +, 1993 - P 222.

NAPOLEON I (Napoleon) (Napoleon Bonaparte) (1769-1821), French emperor in 1804-14 and in March - June 1815. A native of Corsica. He began serving in the army in 1785 with the rank of junior lieutenant of artillery; advanced during the French Revolution (reaching the rank of brigadier general) and under the Directory (army commander). In November 1799 he carried out a coup d'état (Brumaire 18), as a result of which he became the first consul, who in the course of time effectively concentrated all power in his hands; in 1804 he was proclaimed emperor. Established a dictatorial regime. He carried out a number of reforms (the adoption of the civil code, 1804, the foundation of the French bank, 1800, etc.). Thanks to victorious wars, he significantly expanded the territory of the empire, made most of the Western states dependent on France. and Center. Europe. The defeat of Napoleon's troops in the war of 1812 against Russia marked the beginning of the collapse of the empire of Napoleon I. The entry of troops of the anti-French coalition into Paris in 1814 forced Napoleon I to abdicate. Was exiled to Fr. Elbe. He again occupied the French throne in March 1815 (see "One Hundred Days"). After the defeat at Waterloo, he abdicated a second time (June 22, 1815). He spent the last years of his life on about. St. Helena a prisoner of the British.

Alexander I (Blessed), Alexander Pavlovich (December 12 (23), 1777, St. Petersburg - November 19 (December 1), 1825, Taganrog) - Emperor of the Russian Empire from March 11 (23), 1801 to November 19 (December 1), 1825 ), the eldest son of Emperor Paul I and Maria Feodorovna. At the beginning of his reign, he carried out moderately liberal reforms developed by the Private Committee and M.M. Speransky. In foreign policy, he maneuvered between Great Britain and France. In 1805-07 he participated in anti-French coalitions. In 1807-12 he temporarily became close to France. He waged successful wars with Turkey (1806-12) and Sweden (1808-09). Under Alexander I, the territories of Eastern Georgia (1801), Finland (1809), Bessarabia (1812), Azerbaijan (1813), and the former Duchy of Warsaw (1815) were annexed to Russia. After the Patriotic War of 1812, in 1813-14 he headed the anti-French coalition of European powers. He was one of the leaders of the Vienna Congress of 1814-15 and the organizers of the Holy Alliance. In the last years of his life, he often spoke of his intention to abdicate and "withdraw from the world," which, after his unexpected death from typhoid fever in Taganrog, gave rise to the legend of "Elder Fyodor Kuzmich." According to this legend, it was not Alexander who died and was then buried in Taganrog, but his double, while the tsar lived for a long time as an old hermit in Siberia and died in 1864.

Foreign policy and their friendship

Russia and France were bound by a common destiny, which determined many things not only in their lives. The two empires turned out to be both parallel to each other and very different. Historians talk about it in long sentences. Art clearly shows this without words. The cultural affinity established by the Age of Enlightenment proved to be more than just stronger than political enmity. It included this enmity (and its variant, the touching alliance) within itself, made it a concrete version of cultural history, more enduring and more important for posterity than political history. Monuments tell us about the same situation of love and hate that politicians have felt and are feeling.

In the west, Russia actively participated in European affairs. In the first decade and a half of the nineteenth century the implementation of the western direction was associated with the struggle against the aggression of Napoleon. After 1815, the main task of Russia's foreign policy in Europe became the maintenance of the old monarchical regimes and the struggle against the revolutionary movement. Alexander I and Nicholas I relied on the most conservative forces and most often relied on alliances with Austria and Prussia. In 1848, Nicholas helped the Austrian emperor suppress the revolution that broke out in Hungary, and strangled the revolutionary uprisings in the Danubian principalities.

At the very beginning of the XIX century. Russia adhered to neutrality in European affairs. However, the aggressive plans of Napoleon, since 1804 the French emperor, forced Alexander I to oppose him. In 1805, a third coalition was formed against France: Russia, Austria and England. The outbreak of the war was extremely unsuccessful for the allies. In November 1805, their troops were defeated near Austerlipem. Austria withdrew from the war, the coalition collapsed.

Russia, continuing to fight alone, tried to create a new alliance against France. In 1806, the 4th coalition was formed: Russia, Prussia, England and Sweden. However, the French army forced Prussia to capitulate within just a few weeks. Once again, Russia found itself alone in the face of a formidable and powerful enemy. In June 1807, she lost the battle near Friedland (the territory of East Prussia, now the Kaliningrad region of Russia). This forced Alexander I to enter into peace negotiations with Napoleon.

In the summer of 1807, in Tilsit, Russia and France signed a peace treaty, and then an alliance treaty. According to its terms, the Duchy of Warsaw was created from the Polish lands torn away from Prussia under the protectorate of Napoleon. This territory in the future became a springboard for an attack on Russia. The Treaty of Tilsit obliged Russia to join the continental blockade of Great Britain and break off political relations with it. The rupture of traditional trade ties with England caused significant damage to the Russian economy, undermining its finances. The nobles, whose material well-being largely depended on the sale of Russian agricultural products to England, showed particular dissatisfaction with this condition and Alexander I personally. The peace of Tilsit was unfavorable for Russia. At the same time, he gave her a temporary respite in Europe, allowing her to intensify her policy in the eastern and northwestern directions.

Napoleon, sensing the serious political significance of the Bailen catastrophe. Although he pretended to be calm, emphasizing that the Baylen loss was a complete trifle compared to the resources owned by his empire, he understood perfectly well how this event should affect Austria, which began to arm itself with redoubled energy.

Austria saw that Napoleon suddenly had not one front, but two, and that this new southern Spanish front would from now on greatly weaken him on the Danube. To keep Austria out of the war, it was necessary to make her understand that Alexander I would invade Austrian possessions from the east, while Napoleon, his ally, would march on Vienna from the west. For this purpose, the Erfurt demonstration of friendship between the two emperors was mainly started.

Alexander I experienced a difficult time after Tilsit. The alliance with Napoleon and the inevitable consequences of this alliance - a break with England - severely hurt the economic interests of both the nobility and the merchant class. Friedland and Tilsit were considered not only a misfortune, but also a disgrace.

Alexander hoped, believing Napoleon's promises, that by acquiring a part of Turkey thanks to the Franco-Russian alliance, he would calm the court, guards, general noble opposition. But time passed, and no steps were taken by Napoleon in this direction; moreover, rumors began to reach St. Petersburg that Napoleon was inciting the Turks to further resistance in the war they were waging at that time against Russia. In Erfurt, both participants in the Franco-Russian alliance hoped to take a closer look at the good quality of the cards with which each of them plays his diplomatic game. Both allies deceived each other, both knew it, although not yet completely, both did not trust each other in anything, and both needed each other. Alexander considered Napoleon a man of the greatest mind; Napoleon recognized the diplomatic subtlety and cunning of Alexander. "This is a real Byzantine," the French emperor said about the Russian Tsar. Therefore, at the first meeting in Erfurt on September 27, 1808, they passionately embraced and kissed each other in public and did not stop doing this for two weeks in a row, daily and inseparably appearing at reviews, parades, melons, feasts, in the theater, on hunting, on horseback rides. Publicity was the most important thing in these hugs and kisses: for Napoleon, these kisses would have lost all their sweetness if the Austrians had not known about them, and for Alexander if the Turks had not known about them.

During the year that passed between Tilsit and Erfurt, Alexander made sure that Napoleon only beckoned him with a promise to give him the "East" and take the "West" for himself; it was clear that not only would he not allow the tsar to occupy Constantinople, but that even Moldavia and Wallachia Napoleon would prefer to leave in the hands of the Turks. On the other hand, the tsar saw that Napoleon, for a whole year after Tilsit, did not bother to remove his troops even from that part of Prussia, which he returned to the Prussian king. As for Napoleon, for him the most important thing was to keep Austria from speaking out against France, while he was. Napoleon will not be able to put an end to the guerrilla war that has flared up in Spain. And for this, Alexander had to undertake to actively act against Austria if Austria decided to speak out. And Alexander did not want to give or fulfill this direct obligation. Napoleon agreed to give in advance for this Russian military assistance to Alexander Galicia and even more possessions near the Carpathians. Subsequently, the most prominent representatives of both the Slavophile and the national-patriotic schools of Russian historiography bitterly reproached Alexander for not accepting these proposals of Napoleon and for missing an opportunity that would never happen again. But Alexander submitted after feeble attempts to resist that strong current in the Russian nobility, which saw in an alliance with Napoleon, who twice defeated the Russian army (in 1805 and 1807), not only a disgrace (it would still go anywhere), but also ruin. Anonymous letters reminding Alexander of the end of Paul, his father, who also entered into friendship with Napoleon, were convincing enough. And yet, Alexander was afraid of Napoleon and did not want to break with him for anything. At the direction and invitation of Napoleon, who wanted to punish Sweden for her alliance with England, Alexander had been waging war with Sweden since February 1808, which ended with the rejection of all Finland from Sweden to the Torneo River and its annexation to Russia. Alexander knew that even by this he did not calm the irritation and anxiety of the Russian landlords, for whom the interests of their own pocket were infinitely higher than any territorial state expansions in the barren north. In any case, the acquisition of Finland was for Alexander also an argument in favor of the fact that breaking with Napoleon now is both dangerous and unprofitable.

In Erfurt, Talleyrand betrayed Napoleon for the first time by entering into secret relations with Alexander, whom he advised to resist Napoleonic hegemony. Talleyrand subsequently motivated his behavior as if by concern for France, which Napoleon's insane love of power led to death. "The Russian sovereign is civilized, but the Russian people are not civilized, the French sovereign is not civilized, but the French people are civilized. It is necessary that the Russian sovereign and the French people enter into an alliance with each other," with such a flattering phrase, the old intriguer began his secret negotiations with the tsar.

It was said about Talleyrand that throughout his life he "sold those who bought him." At one time he sold the Directory to Napoleon, now in Erfurt he sold Napoleon to Alexander. He subsequently sold Alexander to the British. He only did not sell the English to anyone, because only they did not buy him (although he offered himself to them several times at the most reasonable price).

Here it is inappropriate to delve into the motives of Talleyrand (who later received money from Alexander, although not in such a large amount as he expected). It is important for us to note two features here: firstly, Talleyrand saw more clearly than others already in 1808 what, more or less vaguely, began to disturb, as already mentioned, many marshals and dignitaries; secondly, Alexander realized that the Napoleonic empire was not as strong and indestructible as it might seem. He began to oppose Napoleonic harassment on the issue of Russia's military action against Austria in the event of a new Franco-Austrian war. During one of these disputes, Napoleon threw his hat on the ground and began to trample it furiously with his feet. Alexander, in response to this trick, said: “You are sharp, but I am stubborn ... We will talk, we will argue, otherwise I will leave.” The union remained formally in force, but from now on Napoleon could not count on it.

People in Russia waited with great anxiety to see whether the meeting in Erfurt would end well: whether Napoleon would arrest Alexander, as he had done just four months earlier with the Spanish Bourbons, luring them to Bayonne. "No one hoped that he would let you go, Your Majesty," one old Prussian general blurted out frankly (and to Alexander's great annoyance) when Alexander was returning from Erfurt. From the outside, everything was excellent: during the entire Erfurt meeting, the vassal kings and other monarchs who made up Napoleon's retinue did not cease to be touched by the heartfelt mutual love of Napoleon and the tsar. But Napoleon himself, seeing Alexander off, was gloomy. He knew that the vassal kings did not believe in the strength of this alliance, and that Austria did not believe either. It was necessary to finish the Spanish affairs as soon as possible.

Napoleon had 100,000 men in Spain. He ordered another 150,000 to hastily invade Spain. The peasant uprising flared up every month. The Spanish word guerilla, "little war," misunderstood the meaning of what was happening. This war with peasants and artisans, with shepherds of sheep and mule drivers worried the emperor much more than other great campaigns.

After the slavishly resigned Prussia, the Spanish furious resistance seemed especially strange and unexpected. And yet Napoleon did not even suspect what this Spanish fire would come to. This could have had a somewhat sobering effect on General Bonaparte, but the “riot of the poor ragamuffins” could not have affected the Emperor Napoleon, the winner of Europe.

Unsure of Alexander's help and almost convinced that Austria would turn against him. Napoleon in the late autumn of 1808 rushed to Spain.

France and Russia share a remarkably complicated history of political and cultural relations. The war with Napoleon was the main event in Russian history in the 19th century. But she had a strange result. In Russia, the cult of Napoleon intensified, and the traditional love for French culture increased immeasurably. The Empire style with its Russian version dominated everywhere. The Russian emperor ordered a large painting “Parade of the Old Guard” for his office, and a unit was created as part of the Russian guard, wearing a uniform that deliberately repeated the form of Napoleonic soldiers.

Republican ideas that inspired the Russian nobles to the Decembrist uprising were also brought from Imperial France.

Internal sympathy existed, despite the objective political and social contradictions.

The Empire style of art would have meant "Napoleon style" if it had not become international and transcended the era. The ideology of the Napoleonic Empire created a kind of artificial Renaissance, which revived not the ancient spirit, but the symbols and signs of the Roman militarized world - eagles, armor, lictor bundles, sacrificial tripods - and the solemn severity inherent in Roman aesthetics. This style, created "under Napoleon", became an important contribution to the history of culture, no less important than military campaigns with their bright victories and gloomy defeats. The style survived Napoleon and took root in many countries of the world, but especially and very beautifully in another empire - in Russia. What is called Russian Empire is part of an international phenomenon. However, in Russia, the "imperial" style not only changed its form, but also found new historical sources and key symbols - the past of Russia with its helmets and chain mail, with the image-ideal of a medieval knight.

The works of French and Russian applied art of the early 19th century shown next to each other confirm the global nature of the style created by France, which turned the Republic back into a monarchy, focusing on the ideals and style of the Ancient World. Russia imported brilliant monuments of French craftsmanship. French artists created sketches for Russian factories. The original works of Russian workshops were not inferior to imported ones and were saturated with their own ideological program. All this can be shown by Russia and its museum - the Hermitage. But he also shows objects with a stronger French accent. Thanks to a combination of circumstances, personal sympathies and dynastic marriages, many Napoleonic things that were kept in the Beauharnais family ended up in Russia: from the saber that was with Napoleon at Marengo to the service.

However, behind the story about art lies a theme very close to Russian history. Gilded heroes of French and Russian production stand side by side like brothers, like Alexander Pavlovich and Napoleon on a raft in Tilsit. The theme "Alexander and Napoleon" is loved not only by historians, but also by everyone who in Russia reflects on Russian history. A dramatic break with France after the assassination of Paul, a humiliating defeat at Austerlitz, a reconciliation that delighted everyone, skillfully used for Russia's political purposes. A treacherous preventive attack, the loss of Moscow and the terrible humiliation of the all-European victors, which ended with the capture of Paris by the Russian troops, which was struck by the nobility of the victorious emperor. This is a beautiful saga.

For the Hermitage, there is another aspect of this story. His name is Vivant Denon. A remarkable artist, one of the organizers of the scientific Egyptian expedition of Napoleon, the creator of the Louvre, the father of "Egyptomania", a freemason and mystic, who served in his youth at the Russian Court. The Egyptian papyrus donated by him and a luxurious book of his oriental engravings are kept in Russia. They say that during the period of friendship between Alexander and Napoleon, he helped to buy paintings for the Hermitage, including, supposedly, Caravaggio's The Lute Player. Alexander awarded him the Order of St. Anne in gratitude for the art objects sent to St. Petersburg. As director of the Louvre, he unsuccessfully tried to buy from the Empress Josephine part of her art collection. Josephine's daughter sold paintings and sculptures to Alexander, to the Hermitage. The Russian emperor, in turn, defended the right of France to preserve the treasures collected by Denon throughout Europe.

Our cultural interactions are full of fascinating episodes, many of which visibly and invisibly stand behind amazingly beautiful things united "under the sign of two eagles" - Russian and French.

The Bucharest peace treaty was of great importance. It was concluded a month before Napoleon's attack on Russia and upset his hopes of helping the Turkish army. The treaty allowed the Russian command to concentrate all its forces on repelling the Napoleonic aggression. The successes of Russian weapons and the conclusion of the Treaty of Bucharest led to the weakening of the political, economic and religious yoke of the Ottoman Empire over the Christian peoples of the Balkan Peninsula.

Reasons for the termination of friendship, their common interests and contradictions

After Erfurt, Alexander returned to St. Petersburg with the intention of maintaining the Franco-Russian alliance and not getting out of the wake of Napoleonic policy, at least in the near future. When a scientific and detailed socio-economic and political history of Russia at the beginning of the 19th century is written, then, probably, the future researcher will devote a lot of attention and devote a lot of pages to these curious years from Erfurt to the invasion of Napoleon in 1812. In these four years, we see a complex the struggle of hostile social forces and currents that determined the historical pattern of both the appearance of the figure of Speransky and his downfall.

Apparently, the question of introducing some reforms in the administration of the Russian Empire was put forward rather persistently by the conditions of that time. There were enough shocks that contributed to the creation of the need for reform: Austerlitz, Friedland, Tilsit. But, on the other hand, the terrible defeats in the two big wars that were waged by Russia in 1805-1807. against Napoleon, ended, no matter what was said about the Tilsit disgrace, in a comparatively advantageous alliance with a world conqueror and then, in a short time, the acquisition of vast Finland. This means that the Russian tsar did not see any reasons for very deep, fundamental reforms, even for those that were outlined for Prussia after the Jena defeat. It was here that Speransky came in unusually handy to the court. A smart, dexterous and cautious raznochinets returned from Erfurt, where he traveled in Alexander's retinue, completely delighted with Napoleon. Speransky did not touch serfdom in any way, even remotely - on the contrary, he convincingly argued that it was not slavery at all. He also did not touch the Orthodox Church in any way - on the contrary, he said many compliments to her at every opportunity. Not only did he not encroach on any restriction of autocracy, but, on the contrary, he saw in tsarist absolutism the main lever of the transformations he had initiated. And these transformations were precisely intended to turn the loose semi-Eastern despotism, the patrimony of the Holstein-Gottorp family, who appropriated the boyar surname of the extinct Romanovs, into a modern European state with a properly functioning bureaucracy, with a system of formal legality, with organized control over finances and administration, educated and businesslike personnel of the bureaucracy, with the transformation of governors from satraps into prefects, in a word, he wanted to plant on Russian soil the same orders that, in his opinion, turned France into the first country in the world. In itself, this program did not contradict the thoughts, feelings, desires of Alexander, and the king supported his favorite for several years in a row. But both Alexander and Speransky paid off without a host. The well-born nobility and the middle-noble stratum led by it sensed the enemy, no matter how much he covered himself with moderation and good intentions. They understood instinctively that Speransky was striving to make the feudal-absolutist state bourgeois-absolutist and create forms that were essentially incompatible with the feudal-serf system that existed in Russia and the nobility of political and social life.

They went as a united phalanx against Speransky. Not by chance, but organically, Speransky's reform work was associated in their eyes with the commitment of the leading minister to the Franco-Russian alliance, to friendship with the military dictator of France and Europe; not by chance, but organically, in the minds of the Russian nobility, the popovich was associated, who introduces exams for officials and wants to oust the nobility from the state machine in order to transfer this machine to raznochintsy, rabble-rousers and merchants, and the French conqueror, who ruins the same Russian nobility with a continental blockade and to whom the king went to the Erfurt Horde to bow with his favorite. What was the firm line of the court and noble opposition in St. Petersburg and Moscow in 1808-1812, and this opposition was directed equally sharply both against the domestic and against the foreign policy of the tsar and his minister.

Already this circumstance deprived the Franco-Russian alliance of due strength. In Russian aristocratic salons, the taking of Finland from Sweden was condemned, because it was done at the request of Napoleon, and they did not even want to get Galicia, if this required helping the hated Bonaparte against Austria in 1809. They tried in every possible way to show coldness to the French ambassador in St. Petersburg, Caulaincourt, and the more affectionate and cordial the tsar was with him, the more demonstratively the aristocratic circles, both of new Petersburg and especially of old Moscow, showed their hostility.

But from the end of 1810, Alexander ceased to oppose this victorious current. Firstly, Napoleon's Tilsit speeches about the spread of Russian influence in the East, in Turkey, turned out to be only words, and this disappointed Alexander; Secondly. Napoleon still did not withdraw his troops from Prussia and, most importantly, played some kind of game with the Poles, not abandoning the idea of ​​restoring Poland, which threatened the integrity of the Russian borders and the rejection of Lithuania; thirdly, Napoleon's protests and displeasure at the failure to comply exactly with the conditions of the continental blockade took on very insulting forms; fourthly, the arbitrary annexations with a stroke of the pen of entire states, practiced by Napoleon so willingly in 1810-1811, disturbed and annoyed Alexander. The exorbitant power of Napoleon itself hung an eternal threat over his vassals, and after Tilsit, Alexander was looked upon (and he knew it) as a simple vassal of Napoleon. They were ironic about the small handouts that Napoleon gave Alexander both in 1807, giving him the Prussian Bialystok, and in 1809, giving the king one Austrian district on the eastern (Galician) border; they said that Napoleon treats Alexander in the same way as the former Russian tsars treated their serfs, granting them so many souls as a reward for their service.

When Napoleon's marriage to Grand Duchess Anna Pavlovna failed, for the first time in all of Europe they began to talk about the approaching sharp quarrel between the two emperors. The marriage of Napoleon to the daughter of the Austrian emperor was interpreted as replacing the Franco-Russian alliance with the Franco-Austrian one.

There are precise indications that for the first time not only thinking aloud about the war with Russia, but also seriously studying this issue, Napoleon began in January 1811, when he got acquainted with the new Russian customs tariff. This tariff greatly increased duties on the importation into Russia of wines, silk and velvet fabrics, and other luxury items, i.e., just those goods that were the main items of French imports to Russia. Napoleon protested against this tariff; he was told that the deplorable state of Russian finances compels such a measure. The rate remains. Complaints about the too easy passage of colonial goods to Russia on pseudo-neutral, but in fact English courts, became more and more frequent. Napoleon was sure that the Russians were secretly releasing English goods and that from Russia these goods were widely distributed in Germany, Austria, Poland, and thus the blockade of England was reduced to zero.

Alexander also thought about the inevitability of war, looked for allies, negotiated with Bernadotte, formerly a Napoleonic marshal, now the Crown Prince of Sweden and an enemy of Napoleon. On August 15, 1811, at a solemn reception of the diplomatic corps, who arrived to congratulate Napoleon on his birthday, the emperor, stopping near the Russian ambassador, Prince Kurakin, turned to him with an angry speech that had a threatening meaning. He accused Alexander of infidelity to the union, of hostile actions. What does your sovereign hope for? he asked menacingly. Napoleon then suggested that Kurakin immediately sign an agreement that would settle all misunderstandings between Russia and the French Empire. Kurakin, timid and agitated, declared that he had no authority for such an act. No authority? - Napoleon shouted. - So demand your powers! .. I don’t want war, I don’t want to restore Poland, but you yourself want the duchies of Warsaw and Danzig to be annexed to Russia ... Until the secret intentions of your court become open, I will not stop increasing army stationed in Germany! The emperor did not listen to excuses and explanations of Kurakin, who rejected all these accusations, but spoke and repeated his thoughts in every way.

After this scene, no one in Europe doubted the imminent war. Napoleon gradually turned the whole of vassal Germany into a vast springboard for a future invasion. At the same time, he decided to force both Prussia and Austria into a military alliance with him - two powers on the continent that were still considered independent, although in fact Prussia was in complete political slavery to Napoleon. This military alliance was to immediately precede the attack on Russia.

Prussia experienced very difficult times in the years when the Napoleonic yoke weighed on it, but still, even in the first moments after Tilsit, in 1807-1808, there was no such chronic panic as after Wagram and the Austrian marriage of Napoleon. In the early years, under the influence of Stein and the Reform Party in Prussia, if not completely abolished serfdom, then almost all of its legal foundations were very significantly broken. Some other reforms were also carried out.

But then the fiery patriot Stein, who too openly admired the Spanish uprising, attracted the attention of the Napoleonic police: one of his letters was intercepted, which seemed to Napoleon unintentional, and the emperor ordered King Frederick William III to immediately expel Stein from Prussia. The king, as a sign of zeal, not only immediately carried out the order, but also confiscated the property of the disgraced statesman.

The cause of reform in Prussia slowed down, but did not stop. Scharnhorst, the Minister of War, Gneisenau and their assistants worked as far as possible to reorganize the army. At the request of Napoleon, Prussia could not have an army of more than 42 thousand people, but by various clever measures the Prussian government managed, calling for a short time, to give military training to a large mass. Thus, slavishly fulfilling the will of Napoleon, submissive, flattering, humiliating, Prussia nevertheless quietly prepared for the distant future and did not lose hope of a way out of that desperate impossible situation in which the terrible defeat of 1806 and the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 had placed her.

When Napoleon's war with Austria broke out in 1809, there was one desperate, convulsive, made at individual risk and fear attempt on the Prussian side to free themselves from oppression: Major Schill with part of the hussar regiment, which he commanded, began a partisan war. He was defeated and killed, his comrades, by order of Napoleon, were tried by a Prussian military court and shot. The king was beside himself with fear and rage against Schill, but for the time being Napoleon was content with these executions and the humiliated assurances of Friedrich Wilhelm. After the new defeat of Austria at Wagram, after the Treaty of Schönbrunn and the marriage of Napoleon to Marie-Louise, the last hopes for the salvation of Prussia disappeared: Austria, it seemed, completely and irrevocably entered the orbit of Napoleonic politics. Who could help, what to hope for? At the beginning of the quarrel between Napoleon and Russia? But this quarrel developed very slowly, and now, after Austerlitz and Friedland, former hopes were no longer placed on the strength of Russia.

From the very beginning of 1810, there were ominous rumors that Napoleon intended, without war, by a simple decree, to destroy Prussia, either by dividing it into parts (between the French Empire, the Westphalian kingdom of Jerome Bonaparte and Saxony, which was in vassal dependence on Napoleon), or by expelling from there the Hohenzollern dynasty and replacing it with one of their relatives or marshals. When, on June 9, 1810, by a simple decree, Napoleon annexed Holland and then turned it into nine new departments of the French Empire, when Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck, the Lauenburg duchies of Oldenburg, Salm-Salm, Arenberg and a number of others were annexed to France in the same easy way possessions, when, having occupied the entire northern coast of Germany, from Holland to Holstein, Marshal Davout, as the only consolation for those who were joining, declared in an official appeal to them: Your independence was only imaginary, then the Prussian king began to expect the last hour of his reign. His independence, after all, was also only imaginary, and he knew that back in Tilsit, Napoleon had categorically declared that he had not erased Prussia from the map of Europe only out of courtesy to the Russian Tsar. And now, in 1810-1811, Napoleon's relations with the tsar quickly deteriorated and there was no talk of any kindness. At the end of 1810, Napoleon, for no reason at all, in the midst of complete peace, did not hesitate to drive the Duke of Oldenburg out of his possessions and annex Oldenburg to his state, although the son and heir of this duke was married to Alexander's sister, Ekaterina Pavlovna.

Prussia in 1810-1811 was waiting for death. It was not only King Frederick William III, who had never distinguished himself for courage, who was afraid, but those liberal-patriotic associations, like the Tugendbund, which at that time reflected the desire of a part of the young German bourgeoisie to get rid of the foreign oppressor and then create a new, free Germany, were also silenced. The Tugendbund was not the only, but only the most conspicuous of these illegal associations; he, too, fell silent and despondent in 1810, and especially in 1811 and early 1812. The situation seemed very hopeless. Minister Hardenberg, who once stood for resistance and for this, at the request of Napoleon, removed from the Prussian court, now formally repented and in writing brought to the attention of the French ambassador Saint-Marsan about a complete change in his convictions. Our salvation depends only on Napoleon, - wrote Hardenberg to General Scharnhorst. Hardenberg himself in May 1810 turned to the French ambassador with the following humiliated request: Let his imperial majesty deign to speak out about the participation that I could take in business. This will provide substantial proof of the return of the emperor's trust and favors to the king.

Napoleon relented and allowed Friedrich Wilhelm to appoint Hardenberg as state chancellor. This happened on June 5, and already on June 7, 1810. the new Prussian chancellor wrote to Napoleon: Deeply convinced that Prussia can be reborn and ensure its integrity and its future happiness only by honestly following your system, sovereign ... I consider it my highest glory to earn the approval and high confidence of your imperial majesty. I remain with the deepest respect, sir, the most humble and obedient servant of Your Imperial Majesty. Baron von Hardenberg, State Chancellor of the King of Prussia.

On March 14, 1812, a Franco-Austrian treaty was signed in Paris, according to which Austria was obliged to send 30,000 soldiers to help Napoleon. Napoleon guaranteed the seizure of Moldavia and Wallachia from Russia, which were then occupied by Russian troops. In addition, the Austrians were guaranteed the possession of Galicia or other territorial compensation corresponding in value.

These two alliances, with Prussia and Austria, were needed by Napoleon not so much to replenish the great army, but to divert part of the Russian forces north and south of that direct road Kovno - Vilna - Vitebsk - Smolensk - Moscow, along which he was to be sent offensive.

Prussia undertook to put 20 thousand people at the disposal of Napoleon for the upcoming war, Austria - 30 thousand people. Moreover, Prussia pledged to provide Napoleon for his army (to pay off part of its unpaid debts to the French emperor, from which Prussia could not get out) 20 million kilograms of rye, 40 million kilograms of wheat, more than 40 thousand bulls, 70 million bottles of alcoholic beverages.

Diplomatic preparations for the war were already completed in early spring. There is information that a bad harvest in 1811 led to famine in some parts of France at the end of winter and in the spring of 1812, that in some places in the countryside there were disturbances on this basis, and in some places they were expected, and there are indications that this delayed Napoleon's campaign for one and a half to two months. Buying and speculating in grain increased anxiety and irritation in the countryside, and this uneasy situation also slowed down Napoleon's advance.

Napoleon was forced to organize special flying detachments, which were supposed to hunt through the forests for those who were evading and forcibly bring them to military units. As a result of repressive measures, recruiting before the war of 1812, in general, gave everything that Napoleon counted on.

By the end of the spring of 1812, Napoleon's military and diplomatic preparations were basically and partly completed in detail. All vassal Europe was dutifully ready to oppose Russia.

Literature

1. Aksenova M., Ismailova S. World History - T.I, - M .: Avanta +, 1993 -618 p.

2. Volgin I.L., Narinsky M.M.. Dialogue about Dostoevsky, Napoleon and the Napoleonic myth // Metamorphoses of Europe. M., 1993, p. 127-164

3. Tarle E. V. Napoleon. - M.: Gosizdat, 1941. - 562 p.

4. Chandler D. Napoleon's military campaigns. M.: Tsentropoligraf, 1999.

Volgin I.L., Narinsky M.M.. Dialogue about Dostoevsky, Napoleon and the Napoleonic myth // Metamorphoses of Europe. M., 1993, p. 127-164

Tarle E. V. Napoleon. - M.: Gosizdat, 1941. - S. 432.

Tarle E. V. Napoleon. - M.: Gosizdat, 1941. - S. 401.

Tarle E. V. Napoleon. - M.: Gosizdat, 1941. - S. 368.

Chandler D. Napoleon's military campaigns. M.: Tsentropoligraf, 1999.

Aksenova M., Ismailova S. World History - T.I, - M .: Avanta +, 1993 - P 222.