The Soviet leadership failed to take advantage of Khrushchev's removal to normalize relations with China. On the contrary, under Brezhnev they worsened even more. The blame for this falls on both sides - from the second half of 1966, the Chinese leadership, headed by Mao Zedong, organized a number of provocations on transport and the Soviet-Chinese border. Claiming that this border had been forcibly established by the Russian tsarist government, it laid claim to several thousand square kilometers of Soviet territory. Particularly acute was the situation on the river border along the Amur and Ussuri, where a hundred years after the signing of the border treaty, the fairway of the river changed, some islands disappeared, others approached the opposite bank.
The bloody events took place in March 1969 on Damansky Island on the river. Ussuri, where the Chinese fired on the Soviet border detachment, killing several people. Large Chinese forces landed on the island, well prepared for combat. Attempts to restore the situation with the help of Soviet motorized rifle units were not successful. Then the Soviet command used the Grad multiple launch rocket system. The Chinese were virtually annihilated on this small island (about 1700 m long and 500 m wide). Their losses numbered in the thousands. On this active hostilities actually stopped.
But from May to September 1969, Soviet border guards opened fire on violators in the Damansky area more than 300 times. In the battles for the island from March 2 to March 16, 1969, 58 Soviet soldiers were killed, 94 were seriously injured. For their heroism, four servicemen received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The battle for Damansky became the first serious clash between the Armed Forces of the USSR and the regular units of another major power since the Second World War. Moscow, despite its local victory, decided not to aggravate the conflict and give Damansky Island to the People's Republic of China. The Chinese side subsequently filled up the channel separating the island from their coast, and since then it has become part of China.
On September 11, 1969, at the Soviet initiative, a meeting of the heads of government of the USSR (A.N. Kosygin) and the PRC (Zhou Enlai) took place, after which protracted negotiations on border issues began in Beijing. After 40 meetings in June 1972 they were adjourned. The Chinese government preferred to improve relations with the US, Western European countries and Japan. In 1982-85. Soviet-Chinese political consultations were held alternately in Moscow and Beijing at the level of government representatives with the rank of deputy foreign ministers. There were no results for a long time. Soviet-Chinese relations were settled only by the end of the 1980s.
ALIVE MATROSOV!
Our special correspondents V. Ignatenko and L. Kuznetsov are reporting from the area of Damansky Island
Here, on the front line, as soon as the smoke of the last battle cleared, we were told about the exceptional courage of the Far Eastern border guard sailors. Not on distant oceanic meridians, not in campaigns on super cruisers and submarines, sailors distinguished themselves these days. In the mortal battle with the Maoist provocateurs on March 2 and 15, guys in pea jackets stood shoulder to shoulder with the officers and soldiers of the outposts.
It is not difficult to recognize them among the military people of the border region: only the sailors wear black sheepskin coats, and hats and caps with anchors are pulled down somehow in a special way, sort of casually, but within the framework of the charter.
Fortunately, the sailors got out of the fire without loss. Shells and lead bursts lay side by side, spread over their heads. But, alive and unharmed, the guys rose to height, shook off the hot, smoking earth and rushed to the counterattack ... We saw these young Komsomol guys, in whose veins the blood of fathers, defenders of the legendary Malaya Zemlya, flows.
We want to talk about one sailor in particular. Long before dawn, on March 15, when there were all signs of preparing a new provocation near Damansky, Captain Vladimir Matrosov took up an observation post on a spit a few meters from the gently sloping coast of the island. He could see the provocateurs fidgeting fussily on the Chinese coast in the predawn twilight. From time to time, the hoarse sounds of motors were heard: it must have been brought up to the firing lines of the gun. Then silence again, viscous, cold.
A few hours later, the first round hit from the Chinese side, then the second, the first shells exploded ... The Maoists rushed in chains at Damansky. Our fire weapons began to speak, the vanguard of the Soviet border guards moved to the island.
I am Break! I am Break! How do you hear? The enemy is in the southern part of the island, - Matrosov shouted into the radiotelephone. This was the turn of his combat mission. - How did you understand?
I am Burav. You are understood!
A minute later, our fire became more accurate, the Chinese faltered.
I am Break! I am Break! The enemy moved to the northeast. - The sailors did not have time to finish: a mine struck nearby. He fell into the snow. It's gone! And the phone is intact.
I am Break! I am Break! Volodya continued. - How did you understand me?
And the earth shook again. Again the elastic wave pushed the sailor. And again, I just had to shake off the ground.
Then Matrosov got used to it. True, he did not get over the unpleasant feeling that someone invisible from the other side was watching him, as if he knew how much now depended on his, Volodina, adjustment of the fire. But again, the callsigns "Cliff" flew on the air ...
He saw our border guards fighting on the island. And if suddenly one of ours stumbled and fell, he knew: it was the Mao Zedong lead that threw the soldier to the ground. This was the second fight in the life of Matrosov ...
Captain Matrosov kept in touch with the command post for several hours. And all this time he was the epicenter of a barrage of fire.
Vladimir, one might say, is a border guard from the cradle. His father, Stepan Mikhailovich, only recently retired with the rank of colonel of the border troops, and the younger Matrosov, as far as he can remember, lived all the time on the edges of his native land, at outposts. From childhood, he knew the anxieties of the cutting edge, and this region planted good seeds of masculinity and kindness in his soul, and over time, having strengthened, these seeds began to grow. When the time came for Vladimir to choose his fate, there was no doubt: he chose the path of his father. Studied and became an officer. Now he is 31 years old. He is a communist. Frontier hardening before being assigned to this area was in the Kuril Islands. Probably not one of the eleven sailors who participated in the battle on Damansky is now dreaming of getting Matrosov's party recommendation. After all, Vladimir became a communist at their age, and they went through their first baptism of fire together: a communist and Komsomol members.
In the division, senior officers told us: “You noticed how similar our Matrosov is ...” And we, without listening to the end, agreed: “Yes, he is very similar to that legendary Alexander Matrosov.” Everything seems to happen on purpose. It seems that the journalistic move is naked to the limit. But no, this amazing external similarity is not more important. A hundred times brighter is the kinship of their characters - heroic, truly Russian. More important is the identity of their lofty spirit, the fieryness of their hearts in a difficult hour.
Historians of the Great Patriotic War find new evidence of many exploits of privates, sergeants, officers who repeated the feat of Matrosov. They died gloriously, and they became immortal, because in the Russian warrior there is this "sailor's" vein, this attitude to victory even at the cost of one's life.
Vladimir Matrosov is alive!
May he live happily to a ripe old age. May there be peace and harmony in his house, where his daughters are growing up: the second-grader Sveta and the five-year-old Katya. May they always have a dad...
N-sky division of maritime border guards
Red Banner Pacific
border district, March 20
YURI VASILIEVICH BABANSKY
Babansky Yuri Vasilievich - commander of the Nizhne-Mikhailovskaya border outpost department of the Ussuri Order of the Red Banner of Labor of the border detachment of the Pacific border district, junior sergeant. Born on December 20, 1948 in the village of Krasny Yar, Kemerovo Region. After graduating from an eight-year school, he graduated from a vocational school, worked in production, and then was drafted into the border troops. He served on the Soviet-Chinese border in the Pacific border district.
The commander of the department of the border outpost of Nizhne-Mikhailovskaya (Damansky Island) of the Ussuri Order of the Red Banner of Labor of the border detachment, junior sergeant Babansky Yu.V. showed heroism and courage during the border conflict on March 2 - 15, 1969. Then, for the first time in the history of the border troops, after June 22, 1941, the border guards of the detachment took battle with units of the regular army of the neighboring state. On that day, March 2, 1969, Chinese provocateurs who invaded Soviet territory shot from an ambush a group of border guards who had come out to meet them, led by the head of the outpost, Senior Lieutenant Strelnikov I.I.
Junior Sergeant Yuri Babansky took command of the group of border guards who remained at the outpost and boldly led them into the attack. The Maoists unleashed heavy machine gun and grenade launcher fire, mortars and artillery fire on the brave handful. Throughout the battle, Junior Sergeant Babansky skillfully led his subordinates, shot accurately, and assisted the wounded. When the enemy was knocked out of Soviet territory, Babansky went on reconnaissance to the island more than 10 times. It was Yuri Babansky with a search group who found the group of I.I. Strelnikov, and under the muzzles of machine guns and machine guns of the enemy organized their evacuation, it was he and his group on the night of March 15-16 who discovered the body of the heroically deceased head of the border detachment, Colonel D.V. Leonov and carried him off the island...
By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of March 21, 1969, Junior Sergeant Yu.V. Babansky was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (Gold Star medal No. 10717).
After graduating from the military-political school, Babansky Yu.V. continued to serve in the border troops of the KGB of the USSR in various officer positions, including during the period of hostilities in Afghanistan. In the 1990s, he was deputy head of the troops of the Western Border District, was a member of the Central Committee of the Komsomol, was elected a deputy of the Supreme Council of Ukraine.
Currently, reserve lieutenant general Yu.V. Babansky is a military pensioner, engaged in social activities. He is the chairman of the all-Russian organizing committee for the action "Argunskaya outpost" and at the same time is the chairman of the public organization "Union of Heroes", an honorary citizen of the Kemerovo region. Lives in Moscow.
THE COUNTRY DID NOT KNOW YET
... They loved fire training at the outpost. They often went out to shoot. And the time in recent months for study has become less and less. The Red Guards did not give rest.
From childhood, Yuri Babansky was taught to consider the Chinese as brothers. But when he first saw the angry hooting mob brandishing clubs and weapons, shouting anti-Soviet slogans, he could not understand what was happening. He did not immediately learn to understand that faith in the holy bonds of brotherhood was trampled by the Maoists, that people deceived by Mao's clique are capable of any crime. The Chinese staged demonstrations with the slogans of the "great helmsman." Then they attacked the Soviet border guards with their fists. “This is how they were fooled,” Babansky thought. “But the fathers of our children fought for the liberation of China and died for People’s China.” There was a strict order: not to succumb to provocations. Machine guns in the back. And only the courage and endurance of the Soviet border guards did not allow the incidents to turn into a bloody conflict.
The Maoists were getting bolder. Almost daily in the morning they went out on the Ussuri ice, behaved cheekily. provocative.
On March 2, 1969, the border guards, as usual, had to expel the raging Maoists who had crossed the border back home. As always, the head of the outpost, Ivan Ivanovich Strelnikov, came out to meet them. Silence. You can only hear how the snow creaks under the boots. These were the last moments of silence. Babansky ran up the hillock and looked around. From the cover group, only Kuznetsov and Kozus fled after him. "I got away from the guys." Ahead, slightly to the right, stood the first group of border guards - the one that followed Strelnikov. The head of the outpost protested to the Chinese, demanding to leave Soviet territory.
And suddenly the dry frosty silence of the island was torn open by two shots. Behind them - frequent automatic bursts. Babansky did not believe. Didn't want to believe. But the bullets were already burning the snow, and he saw how one by one the border guards from Strelnikov's group fell. Babansky jerked a machine gun from behind his back, joined the store:
Get down! Fire! - he commanded and in short bursts began to mow down those who had just shot his comrades point-blank. Bullets whistled nearby, and he fired and fired. In the excitement of the battle, he did not notice how he had used up all the cartridges.
Kuznetsov, - he called the border guard, - give me a store!
They'll give you a ride. Enough for everyone. Be on the left, and I'm up to the tree.
He knelt down, threw up his machine gun and fired aimed fire from behind a tree. Cold-blooded, prudent. There is! One, second, third...
There is an invisible connection between the shooter and the target, as if you are sending a bullet not from a machine gun, but from your own heart, and it hits the enemy. He was so carried away that Sergeant Kozushu had to shout several times:
Yurka! Who is it in camouflage, ours or the Chinese?
Kozus was firing to the right of Babansky, a large group of Maoists was moving towards him, having taken refuge on the island in the evening. They walked straight ahead. The distance was shrinking every minute. Kozu fired several bursts and just had time to think that there weren’t enough cartridges, when he heard Babansky’s command: “Save cartridges!” and moved the lever to single fire.
Goat! Be careful not to go around to the right!
Like Babansky, he did not stay in place, changed positions and fired aimed. The ammo ran out.
Kuznetsov! And Kuznetsov! - he called and looked to where the border guard had just fired. Kuznetsov sat bent over, his head in his hands. The face is bloodless, the lower lip is slightly bitten. Lifeless eyes. A spasm clenched her throat, but there was no time to grieve. I took the rest of the cartridges from Kuznetsov. And then right in front of him, about thirty meters away, he saw a Chinese machine gun. Babansky fired, hit the machine gunner. Now we need to help Kozushu. Babansky acted swiftly and precisely. He shot through the channel and fired at the advancing enemy on the right. The Chinese machine gun again had a soldier. Yuri fired again. He was glad that the machine gun never fired a single burst.
Goat! Cover up! - Babansky ordered hoarsely and crawled to his group, which lay in the lowland. He crawled along the pitted island, blackened by fire and iron. Howled, mines whistled, explosions roared. In my head flashed: “How are the guys? Are you alive? How much longer can they hold out? The main thing is ammunition ... ”The guys were lying in a lowland, pressed by fire. Babansky did not have time to feel fear - there was only rage in him. I wanted to shoot, to destroy the killers. He ordered the border guards:
Swing to the tree! Observe! Bikuzin! Fire towards the parapet!
The border guards lay down in a semicircle, six meters apart. The cartridges were divided equally. Five or six per brother. Shells and mines exploded. It seemed to get off the ground - and you are gone. One bullet whistled over Babansky's ear. “Sniper,” flashed through my head. “You have to be careful.” But Kozus, who was covering him, had already removed the Chinese shooter. Suddenly, the fire died down. Preparing for a new attack, the Chinese regrouped. Babansky decided to take advantage of this:
One at a time, the distance is eight - ten meters, dashes to the leading signs! Yezhov - to the armored personnel carrier! Let support!
Babansky did not yet know that the riverbed was under fire. He did not know whether Eremin, who had been sent by him to the outlet, had time (“Let them send cartridges!”) To inform the outpost of the order of the commander. The Maoists pressed on. Five Soviet border guards led by junior sergeant Yuri Babansky against an enemy battalion. The border guards took a more advantageous position - at the leading signs. The Chinese are no more than a hundred meters away. They opened heavy fire. This fire was supported from the shore by a mortar battery. For the first time for twenty-year-old guys, armed combat has become a reality: life is next to death, humanity is next to treachery. You are against the enemy. And you must defend justice, you must defend your native land.
Guys, help is coming! Bubenin should come up. We must stand, because our land!
And Bubenin came to their aid. On his armored personnel carrier, he invaded the rear of the Chinese, introduced panic into their ranks and essentially decided the outcome of the battle. Babansky did not see the armored personnel carrier, he only heard the rumble of its motors on the river, right in front of them, and understood why the enemy faltered, receded back.
Running after me! - Yuriy ordered and led the fighters to the northern part of the island, where the bells came to the rescue. "Five machine guns is also a force!" Babansky fell, froze, then crawled. Bullets whistled from all sides. The body tensed. If only there was some pothole, a funnel - no, a snow-covered meadow spread like a tablecloth. Apparently, Yuri Babansky was not destined to die, apparently, "he was born in a vest." And this time the shells and mines spared him. He reached the bushes, looked around: the guys were crawling after him. I saw: help was coming from the Soviet coast in an extended chain. Baban sighed in relief. I wanted to smoke. It didn't take long for someone to find two cigarettes. He smoked them one by one. The tension of the battle has not subsided yet. He still lived with the excitement of the struggle: he picked up the wounded, searched for the dead, carried them out of the battlefield. It seemed to him that he was numb, unable to feel. But tears came to his eyes when he saw the face of Kolya Dergach, a fellow countryman and friend, mutilated by the Chinese. Late in the evening, completely tired, he turned on the radio at the outpost. Music was on the air. It seemed unthinkable, impossible, unnatural. And then, suddenly, the meaning of the border service was revealed in a new way: for the sake of children sleeping peacefully, for the sake of this music, for the sake of life, happiness, justice, there are guys in green caps at the border. They stand to death. The country did not yet know about what happened on Damansky ...
In the early spring of 1969, a conflict began on the Soviet-Chinese border. During the clashes, 58 Soviet soldiers and officers were killed. However, at the cost of their lives, they managed to stop a big war.
0.74 square km
The two most powerful socialist powers at that time, the USSR and the PRC, almost started a full-scale war over a piece of land called Damansky Island. Its area is only 0.74 square kilometers. In addition, during the flood on the Ussuri River, he was completely hidden under water.
There is a version that Damansky became an island only in 1915, when the current eroded part of the spit on the Chinese coast. Be that as it may, the island, which in Chinese was called Zhenbao, was located closer to the coast of the PRC. According to the international position adopted at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the borders between states should run along the middle of the main fairway of the river. This agreement provided for exceptions: if the border had historically developed along one of the banks, with the consent of the parties, it could be left unchanged. In order not to aggravate relations with a neighbor gaining international influence, the leadership of the USSR allowed the transfer of a number of islands on the Soviet-Chinese border. On this occasion, 5 years before the conflict on Damansky Island, negotiations were held, which, however, ended in nothing, both because of the political ambitions of the leader of the PRC, Mao Zedong, and because of the inconsistency of the USSR Secretary General Nikita Khrushchev.
Five thousand provocations
For the USSR, which, by and large, has not yet recovered either demographically or economically after a series of wars and revolutions in the first half of the 20th century and especially after World War II, an armed conflict, and even more so full-scale military operations with a nuclear power, in which, moreover, at that time, every fifth inhabitant of the planet lived, were unnecessary and extremely dangerous. Only this can explain the amazing patience with which the Soviet border guards endured constant provocations from the "Chinese comrades" in the border areas.
In 1962 alone, there were more than 5 thousand (!) Various violations of the border regime by Chinese citizens.
Native Chinese territories
Gradually, Mao Zedong convinced himself and the entire population of the Celestial Empire that the USSR illegally owns vast territories of 1.5 million square kilometers, which supposedly should belong to China. Such sentiments were actively inflated in the Western press - the capitalist world, during the period of the Soviet-Chinese friendship, was strongly frightened by the red-yellow threat, now rubbed its hands in anticipation of the clash of two socialist "monsters".
In such a situation, only a pretext was needed to unleash hostilities. And such an occasion was the disputed island on the Ussuri River.
"Put as many of them as possible..."
The fact that the conflict on Damansky was carefully planned is indirectly recognized even by Chinese historians themselves. For example, Li Danhui notes that in response to "Soviet provocations" it was decided to conduct a military operation with the forces of three companies. There is a version that the leadership of the USSR was aware in advance through Marshal Lin Biao of the upcoming action of the Chinese.
On the night of March 2, about 300 Chinese soldiers crossed the ice to the island. Due to the fact that it was snowing, they managed to go unnoticed until 10 am. When the Chinese were discovered, the Soviet border guards did not have an adequate idea of their numbers for several hours. According to a report received at the 2nd outpost "Nizhne-Mikhailovka" of the 57th Iman border detachment, the number of armed Chinese was 30 people. 32 Soviet border guards left for the scene. Near the island, they split into two groups. The first group, under the command of Senior Lieutenant Ivan Strelnikov, headed straight for the Chinese, who were standing on the ice southwest of the island.
The second group, under the command of Sergeant Vladimir Rabovich, was supposed to cover Strelnikov's group from the southern coast of the island. As soon as Strelnikov's detachment approached the Chinese, a hurricane of fire was opened on him. Rabovich's group was also ambushed. Almost all border guards were killed on the spot. Corporal Pavel Akulov was captured in an unconscious state. His body with signs of torture was later handed over to the Soviet side. The squad of junior sergeant Yuri Babansky entered the battle, which was somewhat delayed, advancing from the outpost, and therefore the Chinese could not destroy it using the surprise factor. It was this unit, together with the help of 24 border guards who came to the rescue from the neighboring Kulebyakiny Sopki outpost, in a fierce battle, showed the Chinese how high the morale of their opponents was. “Of course, it was still possible to withdraw, return to the outpost, wait for reinforcements from the detachment. But we were seized with such fierce anger at these bastards that in those moments we wanted only one thing - to put as many of them as possible. For the guys, for ourselves, for this span of land that no one needs, but still our land, ”recalled Yuri Babansky, who was later awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for his heroism.
As a result of the battle, which lasted about 5 hours, 31 Soviet border guards were killed. The irretrievable losses of the Chinese, according to the Soviet side, amounted to 248 people.
The surviving Chinese were forced to withdraw. But in the border area, the 24th Chinese Infantry Regiment, numbering 5,000 people, was already preparing for combat operations. The Soviet side pulled up the 135th motorized rifle division to Damanskoye, which was given installations of the then secret Grad multiple launch rocket systems.
Preventive "Grad"
If the officers and soldiers of the Soviet army demonstrated determination and heroism, then the same cannot be said about the top leadership of the USSR. In the following days of the conflict, the border guards received very conflicting orders. For example, at 15-00 on March 14 they were ordered to leave Damansky. But after the island was immediately occupied by the Chinese, 8 of our armored personnel carriers advanced in battle order from the side of the Soviet frontier post. The Chinese retreated, and the Soviet border guards at 20-00 of the same day were ordered to return to Damansky.
On March 15, about 500 Chinese attacked the island again. They were supported by 30 to 60 artillery pieces and mortars. From our side, about 60 border guards on 4 armored personnel carriers entered the battle. At the decisive moment of the battle, they were supported by 4 T-62 tanks. However, after a few hours of battle, it became clear that the forces were too unequal. The Soviet border guards, having shot all the ammunition, were forced to retreat to their own shore.
The situation was critical - the Chinese could launch an attack already on the frontier post, and according to the instructions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in no case could Soviet troops be brought into the conflict. That is, the border guards were left face to face with the many times superior units of the Chinese army. And then the commander of the troops of the Far Eastern Military District, Colonel-General Oleg Losik, at his own peril and risk, gives an order that greatly sobered up the militancy of the Chinese, and, perhaps, forced them to abandon full-scale armed aggression against the USSR. Multiple launch rocket systems "Grad" were introduced into the battle. Their fire practically swept away all the Chinese units concentrated in the Damansky area. Already 10 minutes after the shelling of the Grad, organized Chinese resistance was out of the question. Those who survived began to retreat from Damansky. True, two hours later, the approaching Chinese units unsuccessfully tried to attack the island again. However, the "Chinese comrades" learned the lesson they learned. After March 15, they no longer made serious attempts to seize Damansky.
Surrendered without a fight
In the battles for Damansky, 58 Soviet border guards were killed and, according to various sources, from 500 to 3,000 Chinese troops (this information is still kept secret by the Chinese side). However, as happened more than once in Russian history, diplomats surrendered what they managed to keep by force of arms. Already in the autumn of 1969, negotiations were held, as a result of which it was decided that the Chinese and Soviet border guards would remain on the banks of the Ussuri, without going to Damansky. In fact, this meant the transfer of the island to China. The island was legally transferred to China in 1991.
Content:
The beginning and development of the border confrontation between the USSR-PRC in 1949-1969.
By the time the People's Republic of China was formed, the issue of the border line between the USSR and China was not raised at the official level. In accordance with the Treaty of Friendship, Union, Mutual Assistance (1950), the Soviet-Chinese border, before the revision of bilateral relations, was a border of good neighborliness, where active ties were maintained between the population of the border regions, lively trade was conducted, and cultural exchange was established. Agreements on cooperation were concluded in a number of border areas, including the "Agreement on the procedure for navigation along the border rivers Amur, Ussuri, Argun, Sungach, and Lake Khanka and on the establishment of a navigable situation on these waterways" (1951), on forestry , on the joint fight against forest fires in the border areas, etc. Within the framework of these agreements, the de facto protected border line was not questioned.
In the early 50s. The USSR handed over to the PRC topographic maps with the designation of the entire border line. There were no comments from the Chinese side regarding the line of the border. In the years when Soviet-Chinese relations were on the rise, and the economic development and security of China depended to a large extent on the USSR, border issues were not raised at the official level.
But since the second half of the 50s. Difficulties began to appear in relations between the USSR and the PRC. In 1957 Under the motto of the Maoist campaign "Let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools compete," there was dissatisfaction with the USSR's policy towards China, including in the form of claims for certain areas under the jurisdiction of the USSR. An interesting fact is that, in general, the positions of circles whose opinion was at odds with the official policy of the CPC were subjected to significant criticism, but their vision of the territorial-border problem was not affected.
Another indication of the existence of differences in the border issue was the so-called "cartographic aggression" carried out already in the 50s. In maps, textbooks and atlases, China's borders include territories under the actual jurisdiction of the USSR and other countries. In the "Atlas of the PRC Provinces", which was published in Beijing in 1953, a section in the Pamirs and several regions in the eastern section, including two islands near Khabarovsk, were designated as Chinese territories.
In 1956-1959. cases of border violations by Chinese citizens are becoming more frequent, but then these issues were successfully resolved at the level of local authorities. The general tone of bilateral relations remained benevolent.
In the mid 50s. The USSR offered China to settle border issues. However, due to the events in Poland and Hungary, this initiative was not developed.
Until 1960, the issue of the border was no longer raised at the interstate level. However, at the moment when the issue of the Soviet-Chinese border was again on the agenda, relations between the two countries were no longer so smooth. Late 50s, early 60s. there are a number of prerequisites for the deterioration of relations between the USSR and China.
China's unilateral military-political actions, carried out without consultation with the USSR, placed the Soviet Union, as an ally of the PRC, in a very difficult position. These actions include, first of all, the provocation against India (1959) and the incident in the Taiwan Strait (1958). During the same period, China's desire to gain a leading position in the international communist and workers' movement, as well as to get rid of the tutelage of the CPSU, intensifies.
In addition, starting from the 20th Congress of the CPSU (1956), ideological differences began to grow between the two countries. Later, on their basis, the CPC accused the CPSU of revisionism and the restoration of capitalist relations. The condemnation of Stalin's personality cult was perceived negatively by the Chinese leadership. Personal enmity between Khrushchev N.S. and Mao Zedong also played a role in the deterioration of bilateral relations.
Some foreign authors note the Chinese leadership's dissatisfaction with Soviet influence in Manchuria and especially in Xinjiang.
Recall that one of the first results of the flaring conflict between the CPSU and the CCP was the unexpected withdrawal of Soviet specialists from China in 1960. Almost simultaneously, the first episode on the border occurred, which showed the existence of disagreements between the USSR and China on the issue of the border line and the ownership of those or other areas. We are talking about an incident in 1960, when Chinese pastoralists were grazing cattle in the territory under Soviet jurisdiction, in the area of the Buz-Aigyr Pass in Kyrgyzstan. When the Soviet border guards arrived, the shepherds declared that they were on the territory of the People's Republic of China. Later it turned out that they acted on the directive of the authorities of their province.
On this occasion, the ministries of foreign affairs of China and the USSR sent several notes to each other and made oral statements in which, for the first time since the formation of the PRC, at the official, diplomatic level, a different understanding of the border line with the Soviet Union was revealed. The parties never came to an agreement, but in 1960, at a press conference in Kathmandu, Zhou Enlai, when asked about the presence of unidentified sections on the Soviet-Chinese border, answered the following: "There are minor discrepancies on the maps ... peacefully it is very easy to resolve."
Nevertheless, since the autumn of 1960, systematic exits of Chinese citizens to the islands on the border rivers of the Far East, which are under Soviet control, began in order to conduct economic activities (mowing grass, collecting brushwood). They told the Soviet border guards that they were on Chinese territory. The reaction of Soviet border guards to incidents has changed. If earlier they ignored the crafts of Chinese peasants in a number of territories under Soviet jurisdiction, then, starting from 1960, they tried to suppress violations. It should be noted that during the demarcation of the border in the 80-90s. most of these islands, including about. Damansky, legally passed to the PRC.
In this situation, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU decided to create an interdepartmental commission of specialists from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the KGB and the Ministry of Defense, whose task was to select and study treaty acts on the border with the PRC. The commission identified 13 sites where there were discrepancies on the maps of the parties and 12 where the distribution of the islands was not carried out.
The border line itself did not have a clear designation on the ground, because. Of the 141 border markers, 40 were preserved in their original form, 77 were in a destroyed state, and 24 were absent altogether. It was also noted that the description of the border in treaty acts is often of a general nature, and many treaty maps are drawn up on a small scale at a primitive level. In general, according to the conclusion of the commission, it was noted that the entire border line with the PRC, except for the section in the Pamirs south of the Uz-Bel pass, was determined by agreements. In the case of border negotiations, the commission proposed to draw the border not along the banks of the rivers, but along the line of the middle of the main fairway on navigable rivers and along the line of the middle of the river on non-navigable rivers, and not as it was indicated by the red line on the map attached to the Beijing Treaty, according to which the border ran along the Chinese coast. Divination by Tarot cards, available online at gadanieonlinetaro.ru, will help you find out your fate.
The systematic violations by Chinese citizens of the guarded border line in the 1960s and the demonstrative conduct of economic activities were probably intended to consolidate the so-called "existing situation" in practice. Moreover, the statistics of violations showed that from 1960 to 1964 their number grew rapidly, and in the second half of the 60s the incidents became more acute.
Thus, in 1960 the number of violations was about 100, in 1962 it was already about 5,000. In 1963, more than 100,000 Chinese civilians and military men took part in the illegal crossing of the Soviet-Chinese border.
As the situation on the Soviet-Chinese border deteriorated, the exchange of notes and oral statements, in which the parties constantly accused each other, did not stop. The Soviet side expressed its dissatisfaction with the violation of the border by Chinese citizens, in Chinese documents, as a rule, it was said that the Soviet border guards did not allow economic activity, where it was carried out earlier or declared that this or that site belongs to the territory of the PRC. Despite the increase in the number of incidents at the borders, the case was not brought to wide publicity. So far, relations between the Soviet Union and China have also not moved from polemics to open confrontation. This is evidenced by reviews of the Chinese and Soviet central press for 1962-1963.
In 1963, the parties agreed to hold consultations to clarify the boundary line. They began on February 25, 1964. Negotiations were held at the level of deputy foreign ministers. At the head of the Soviet delegation was Colonel-General Zyryanov P.I., commander of the country's border troops. The Chinese delegation was headed by acting. Zeng Yongquan, Head of the Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. Negotiations continued until August 22 of the same year. During the meeting, different approaches of the parties to the problem of border settlement were revealed.
The Chinese position in the negotiations was reduced to three points, on which the Chinese side invariably insisted:
- Only treaties should serve as the basis for negotiations.
- The negotiations should consider the entire border, and not just its individual sections.
- As a result of negotiations, a new treaty should be concluded with reference to existing treaties, which should be qualified as unequal.
It should be noted that this wording had a certain subtext. The fact is that, despite the results of the work of the interdepartmental commission, which spoke about the possibility of transferring individual sections to the PRC, there remained very extensive sections (Pamir), not included in the agreements, but developed by the Soviet Union and under the jurisdiction of the USSR for a long time. The transition of these sections to the PRC would be very sensitive for the Soviet Union in political terms and could receive undesirable local resonance. Therefore, in the words of Zyryanov P.I. the emphasis was on the fact that "the border has developed historically and is fixed by life itself."
Soviet border guards are preparing to oust Chinese violators. January 1969
The Chinese reacted rather sharply to tactics of this kind. They expressed bewilderment about how the historical border line was determined: "What do you mean by the historically established border line? Do you mean the line that developed in the 11th or 1111th century, or the line that took shape a minute before your speech?". The head of the Chinese delegation, Zeng Yongquan, commented on it as follows: "In those areas where you did not cross the boundary line defined by the treaties, you apparently will not mind acting in accordance with the treaties, but in those areas where you crossed the boundary line defined by the treaties, border line, you will insist that the issue be resolved in accordance with the “actually guarded line.” According to him, the “actually guarded, historically established border line” appeared when there were not many more than 200 Chinese border guards on the border between China and the USSR and the Soviet side sent troops wherever it pleased.
At the same time, the Chinese side emphasized that, abandoning the "big registry", it should return back what was "captured" by Russia and the Soviet Union in addition to it. It sounded like this: “You should know that we do not require you to give up 1,540 thousand square kilometers of Chinese territory, torn away by tsarist Russia. We have shown maximum generosity and goodwill. take over an inch of Chinese territory."
The Chinese side, moreover, insisted on recognizing the Russian-Chinese treaties that defined the border as unequal. It was pointed out that these agreements were concluded during a period of China's weakness and, as a result, more than 1,500 thousand square meters were rejected. km. Chinese territory in favor of Russia, including 1 million square meters. km. in Primorye and the Amur region and 0.5 million square meters. km. in Central Asia. So, according to the Aigun Treaty, 600 thousand square meters were transferred to Russia. km., in Beijing 400 thousand square meters. km., in Chuguchaksky more than 440 thousand square meters. km., in St. Petersburg more than 70 thousand square meters. km. The Chinese side also insisted that in the 1920s. Soviet Russia renounced all unequal treaties, and since the border treaties with Russia were considered in the PRC precisely as unequal, the Chinese delegation has repeatedly stated that it has the right to recognize their nullity.
At the same time, it was stipulated that the recognition of treaties as unequal would not lead to new territorial claims. However, Soviet experts saw a trap in such a proposal. The Chinese have repeatedly emphasized that although the treaties are unequal in nature, but given the nature of relations between the socialist states, China will not demand the return of these lands, but only seeks recognition of the "unequal rights" of Russian-Chinese treaties. The problem was that China could in the future declare the Soviet Union a non-socialist state, which happened after a while, and therefore recognize the agreements as null and void and, thus, raise the issue of ownership of 1,500 thousand square meters. km.
On the question of the "unequal rights" of the Russian-Chinese treaties, both delegations were repeatedly drawn into unjustified polemics, which took up a lot of time and did not bring practical results. It is natural that in the end the Soviet side rejected this point.
Nevertheless, the Chinese were ready to recognize the Russian-Chinese treaties of the 19th century as the basis for negotiations. But at the same time, they argued that the Soviet Union did not comply with these treaties and was "biting" into Chinese territory.
The Chinese side insisted that the Soviet Union recognize the disputed areas, and demanded, according to their designation, to withdraw troops from there, including border troops. The total area of "disputed areas" was approximately 40 thousand square meters. km., incl. 28 thousand sq. km. in the Pamirs. The total length of the "disputed" sections of the border line exceeded half the length of the border between the USSR and the PRC and mainly passed along the Amur and Ussuri rivers. Representatives of the USSR argued that it could only be about clarifying the line of passage of the border (demarcation) in some areas and did not recognize the existence of "disputed areas."
During the negotiations, it was possible to reach a certain compromise on the eastern section of the border, 4200 km long, but with the exception of the issue of two islands (Bolshoi Ussuriysky and Tarabarov). In April 1964, the parties exchanged topographic maps indicating their understanding of the border line and created a working group, after which they proceeded directly to the consideration of the border line. As a result of studying Chinese maps and comparing them with Soviet ones, it was found that there are discrepancies in drawing the border line on these maps in 22 sections, of which 17 are located on the western part of the Soviet-Chinese border (now the Central Asian republics of the former USSR) and 5 sections - on eastern part of the border. These sections roughly coincided with the sections indicated in their note by the interdepartmental commission of 1960. On the Chinese maps, 3 more sections were indicated that did not appear in the materials of the commission, including a rather large section in the area of the Bedel Pass (Kyrgyzstan), as well as the islands near Khabarovsk. The greatest discrepancies were identified for the Pamir section.
Based on the results of the examination of the maps in Moscow, it was concluded that it was possible to conduct negotiations not on individual sections, as previously assumed, but on the entire border, as the Chinese delegation insisted. This approach became possible because for the most part of the border line there were no vital divergences. According to the longest line, which required clarification - the river border in the Far East, the parties had the same understanding that the border should have passed along the main fairway. In this regard, the delegation was given an additional instruction to confirm the line of the border in areas where the parties understand it in the same way. As part of this approach, the parties were able to come to an understanding along the entire eastern section of the border, with the exception of the issue of the Kazakevicheva channel.
When the Soviet delegation proposed to record the results of clarifying the border in the eastern sector, leaving the issue of the Kazakevicheva channel for later, the Chinese side agreed to this option. However, the Soviet leadership showed integrity in this matter. General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU N.S. Khrushchev, insisted on the position "either all or nothing."
Mao's statement, which was made during negotiations in the open press on a territorial register of 1.5 million square meters, did not contribute to reaching an agreement. km.
As a result of the consultations, no agreements were reached. After they ended, which did not continue, border incidents resumed. From October 1964 to March 1965 the Soviet-Chinese border was violated 36 times with the participation of 150 Chinese civilians and military personnel, and in 15 days of April 1965. the border was violated 12 times by more than 500 Chinese civilians and military personnel. The number of violations of the Soviet-Chinese border in 1967. it was noted about 2 thousand times. At the height of the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1969, Chinese border guards and Red Guard detachments rammed Soviet patrol vessels, tried to seize patrols, and fought with Soviet border guards.
According to some Chinese data, from October 15, 1964 to March 15, 1969, the number of border conflicts was 4189 cases. At the same time, border violations by the Chinese side were, as a rule, provocative and well-organized. Chinese leaders openly declared the possibility of military action. The Chinese press continued to criticize the Soviet leadership. The entire domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union, which was defined as the policy of revisionism, hegemonism and social-imperialism, was put under attack, put on a par with American imperialism. Any actions of the USSR in the international arena, covered in the Chinese press, were subjected to a series of harsh attacks, and were viewed as hostile to the PRC.
Tensions also intensified because a number of islands on the Ussuri River, located on the Chinese side of the main channel, were under the actual control of the Soviet border troops, and the Chinese side, claiming their belonging to the PRC, indicated its presence on them by demonstrative conduct of economic activities and the presence of its own troops there. border patrols. The Soviet side quite often motivated its presence on the Chinese side of the fairway by the presence of a "red line" on the map of the Beijing border treaties of 1860, where it marked the line of the border and on river sections and walked along the Chinese coast. In addition, until an official agreement was reached and delimitation was not made, the USSR continued to extend its jurisdiction to the "historically established and actually protected" border line
In general, with the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, relations between the two states acquired a character that had rarely been seen before in the practice of international relations. Provocations against the USSR happened not only on the border. There were illegal detentions of Soviet courts of civilian courts "Svirsk" and "Komsomolets Ukrainy", provocations of Chinese citizens on Red Square and at the American embassy in Moscow, as well as at the Soviet embassy in Beijing.
In comparison with the 50s, two significant features of the situation on the border in the 60s. steel, firstly, military construction, and secondly, incessant incidents.
The peak of the confrontation was 1969. Starting from March 2, clashes between Soviet border guards and Chinese military personnel took place on the Ussuri River on Damansky Island (Zhenbaodao). Prior to this, clashes between Soviet and Chinese border guards also took place, however, they rarely went beyond hand-to-hand combat and did not lead to casualties. But during the fighting on March 2, 31 Soviet border guards were killed and 14 people were injured. Approximately 300 people took part in this action from the Chinese side. There was the use of artillery and mortars, as well as heavy machine guns and anti-tank guns. The Chinese armed forces also suffered heavy losses. The fighting continued on March 14-15. Only after the use by the Soviet side of the Grad volley fire systems, which covered Chinese territory for 20 square meters. km. in depth and inflicted serious losses on the Chinese armed forces clashes on about. Damansky stopped. To the notes of protest and the Statement of the Soviet government, the leadership of the PRC replied in the usual style that the USSR must recognize the unequal nature of the treaties defining the border between the USSR and the PRC and called the USSR an aggressor "encroached" on Chinese territory. Participants in the battles from the Chinese side at home were regarded as heroes.
It should be noted that formally the Chinese side had good reason to lay claim to Fr. Damansky (Zhenbaodao) and a number of other islands, because they were located on the Chinese side of the main fairway, which, according to international law, is taken as the border line on border rivers. However, the Chinese side knew that this and other islands had been under the jurisdiction of the USSR for many years. The Chinese side also knew that the Soviet Union, in principle, did not object to the transfer of these islands to China. As further negotiations showed, the issue of ownership of the islands was resolved, and in the face of confrontation, the actions of the PRC in relation to these islands were aimed at aggravating the situation and can be considered provocative, which indicates that the Chinese side was the initiator of the bloodshed.
Regarding the events on about. Damansky, there is a version that they were deliberately provoked by the Chinese armed forces on the orders of Lin Biao in order to strengthen his position at the 10th Congress and increase the role of the PLA in Chinese politics.
On March 29, the Soviet government made a statement in a harsh tone, in which it proposed to resume negotiations begun in 1964. In this document, the PRC leadership was asked to refrain from actions on the border that could cause complications, and to resolve the differences that arose in a calm atmosphere. In conclusion, it was noted that "attempts to talk with the Soviet Union, with the Soviet people in the language of weapons, will meet with a firm rebuff." At the 9th Congress of the CPC, Marshal Lin Biao said in his speech that the proposals of the Soviet government of March 29 would be considered and answered. At the same time, it was said that "Our party and government (CCP) have always advocated and continue to advocate the resolution of these issues through diplomatic channels through negotiations in order to resolve them on a fair and rational basis." On April 11, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs again sent a note to the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which it was proposed to resume consultations between the plenipotentiaries of the governments of the PRC and the USSR "in ... the very near future." The reply was received in May 1969. It again contained allegations that Fr. Damansky (Zhenbao Dao) is Chinese territory, and the Ussuri incidents were deliberately provoked by the Soviet side. At the same time, it was confirmed that the PRC opposed the use of military force, and it was proposed to agree on the place and date of negotiations through diplomatic channels. These Soviet and Chinese statements indicated that both sides were trying to portray themselves as victims of aggression and to absolve themselves of responsibility for the bloodshed.
With a formal readiness to resume the negotiation process and reduce the level of tension, incidents at the borders did not stop until the end of the summer of 1969, and speeches at party meetings and in the press of both countries sounded more and more harsh. In July and the first half of August, there were more than 488 cases of border violations and armed incidents involving 2,500 Chinese citizens. On July 8, Chinese border guards attacked Soviet rivermen on about. Goldinsky. On August 13, in the Kazakh SSR in the Semipalatinsk region, in the area of Lake Zhalanashkol, the largest armed incident after the March events took place, with casualties on both sides. Only after that the parties managed to agree on a meeting at a fairly high level.
On September 11, 1969, the head of the Soviet government A.N. Kosygin visited the People's Republic of China, having met with the Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Zhou Enlai. The result of the "meeting at the airport" was an agreement on the further conduct of negotiations on the border, starting from October 19, 1969, as well as on the implementation of a number of measures in order to normalize the situation on the border. During the conversation, which lasted 3.5 hours, they also discussed the exchange of ambassadors (instead of chargé d'affaires), the intensification of trade relations and the normalization of interstate relations.
The heads of government also agreed that during the negotiations any threat of the use of force should be excluded.
As a result, the Soviet border guards were instructed to guard the borders on the rivers up to the middle of the fairway. They were also charged with maintaining normal relations with the border troops and the PRC authorities; consider all border issues through consultations in a spirit of goodwill and taking into account the mutual interests of the population of the border regions of both countries in the field of economic activity.
Despite the fact that the situation on the border has stabilized, no significant progress has been achieved in relations between the two states, and the issues of border settlement have remained open.
Americans, recalling the Cuban Missile Crisis, call it the most dangerous moment in the Cold War, when the world stood on the brink of catastrophe. Despite some tense moments, Washington and Moscow managed to resolve this crisis, but only after the death of US Air Force pilot Major Rudolph Anderson Jr. (Rudolph Anderson Jr.).
Seven years later, in March 1969, a unit of soldiers from the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) attacked a Soviet border outpost on Damansky Island, killing dozens and injuring more border guards. Because of this incident, Russia and China were on the brink of war, which could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. But after two weeks of clashes, the conflict subsided.
What if the brief 1969 conflict between China and the Soviet Union escalated into a war?
History
The incident on Damansky Island, where the ambush was set up and the main fighting took place, became the lowest point in Soviet-Chinese relations. Even ten years earlier, Beijing and Moscow stood shoulder to shoulder as the main stronghold of the communist world. But the struggle over issues of ideology, leadership and resources led to a sharp rift between the allies, and this had global consequences. The split intensified territorial disputes that had existed since tsarist times. There were many gray areas along the long, loosely marked border that both China and the USSR claimed possession of.
Context
It's time for Americans to understand: China is not the USSR
Qiushi 05/10/2012Why won't China become the next USSR?
U.S. News & World Report 22.06.2014If China collapses like the USSR
Xinhua 08/14/2013After a few minor incidents, the skirmishes on Damansky escalated the tension to a maximum. The Soviets launched a counter-offensive but suffered heavy losses, as they did during the August incident in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The parties have become stronger in the opinion that the Chinese leadership was preparing for these clashes and led them. Why would the Chinese provoke their much stronger neighbor? And what if the Soviets had reacted more aggressively to Chinese provocations?
Immediately after this conflict, the USSR and China began preparations for war. The Red Army transferred its forces and assets to the Far East, and the PLA conducted a full mobilization. In 1969, the Soviets had a huge technical advantage over China. But Beijing created the largest army in the world, and a significant part of it was concentrated near the Soviet-Chinese border. In contrast, the Red Army concentrated the bulk of its forces and resources in Eastern Europe, where they could prepare for a conflict with NATO. Consequently, at the moment of the clash, the Chinese may well have had superior conventional forces along much of the frontier.
However, Chinese superiority in manpower did not mean that the PLA would be able to carry out a long-term invasion of the USSR. The Chinese did not have the logistics and air force to capture and hold large swathes of Soviet territory. Moreover, the long Sino-Soviet border gave the Soviets plenty of room to respond. Since a NATO offensive was unlikely, the Soviets could move significant forces and equipment from Europe to the east to attack Xinjiang and other border territories.
The most important direction of a possible strike was Manchuria, where the Red Army at the end of World War II carried out a crushing and lightning offensive. Despite the large numerical superiority, the PLA in 1969 had no more hope of stopping such an offensive than the Kwantung Army had in 1945. And the loss of Manchuria would be a colossal blow to China's economic power and political legitimacy. In any case, Soviet aviation would very quickly disable the Chinese Air Force and subject cities, communication centers and military bases on Chinese territory to powerful air strikes.
After seizing Manchuria in 1945, the Soviets plundered Japanese industry and withdrew. They could play the same scenario in 1969, but only if the Chinese leadership looked reality in the eye. With the excesses of the Cultural Revolution now a thing of the past and rival factions still competing in ideological radicalism, it would be difficult for Moscow to find a constructive partner for peace talks. The Soviet offensive, if it developed, would have been very similar to the offensive of the Japanese troops in 1937, however, without the superiority at sea, which the Imperial Japanese Navy enjoyed. In anticipation of such strikes, the PLA could withdraw into the hinterland, leaving scorched earth in its wake.
Nuclear weapon?
China tested its first nuclear weapon in 1964, theoretically giving Beijing a nuclear deterrent. However, the systems for delivering such charges to the target left much to be desired. Liquid fuel rockets did not inspire much confidence in terms of reliability, they took several hours to prepare, and they could be on the launch pad for a strictly limited time. Moreover, at that time, Chinese missiles did not have enough launch range to strike at key Soviet targets located in the European part of Russia. Chinese bomber aircraft, represented by a few Tu-4s (a Soviet copy of the American B-29) and H-6 (a copy of the Soviet Tu-16), did not have much chance of overcoming the modern air defense system of the Soviet Union.
The Soviets, for their part, were close to achieving nuclear parity with the US. The USSR had a modern and advanced arsenal of operational-tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, capable of easily destroying the Chinese nuclear deterrence forces, military formations and large cities. Sensitively listening to world public opinion, the Soviet leadership would not have dared to launch a full-scale nuclear attack on China (in this case, American and Chinese propaganda would have frolic with might and main). But limited strikes against Chinese nuclear facilities, as well as strikes with tactical weapons against deployed Chinese military formations, could seem quite reasonable and expedient. Much would depend on how the Chinese react to defeats on the battlefield. If the Chinese leadership had decided to act on the principle of "make or break" and use their nuclear forces in order to forestall the decisive and victorious actions of the Soviets, they could well receive a preemptive strike from the Soviets. And since Moscow considered China to be completely insane, it could well decide to destroy Chinese nuclear forces before they create problems for it.
US reaction
The United States has responded to these clashes with caution and apprehension. The border conflict convinced Washington that the Sino-Soviet split remained in place. However, officials differed in assessing the likelihood of a larger conflict and its consequences. The Soviets, through various official and unofficial channels, tried to find out the attitude of the United States towards China. Allegedly, the United States reacted negatively in 1969 to Soviet soundings in an attempt to propose joint strikes against Chinese nuclear facilities. But even if Washington did not want to burn China in a nuclear fire, it would hardly take any serious steps to protect Beijing from Moscow's wrath.
Ten years earlier, Dwight Eisenhower laid out the biggest obstacles in the Soviet Union's war against China: what to do after victory. The Soviets had neither the capacity nor the desire to rule another territory the size of a continent, especially when mass resistance from a disaffected population could arise there. And the United States, courting the "legitimate" government in Formosa (Taiwan), would gladly support the various forces of resistance to the Soviet occupation. If Beijing had survived the war, the United States could well have "unleashed Chiang Kai-shek" in an attempt to take part of its territories from mainland China and place them under Western rule.
The most likely outcome of such a war would be a short-term success for China, after which the USSR would strike at it quickly and crushingly in retaliation. Beijing would then fall into an even stronger embrace of the United States, and perhaps for this reason the Soviets decided not to risk it.
Robert Farley is a frequent contributor to The National Interest. He is the author of The Battleship Book. Farley teaches at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. His areas of specialization include military doctrine, national security and maritime affairs.
The rapid rapprochement between Russia and China involuntarily recalls the events of 45 years ago on Damansky Island: in 15 days of armed confrontation, 58 Soviet border guards, including 4 officers, were killed due to a piece of land measuring 1 km2 on the Ussuri River separating the two countries. Then, in March 1969, only a madman could dream of a “pivot to the East” and “contracts of the century” with the Chinese.
The song “Red Guards walk and roam near the city of Beijing” Vladimir Vysotsky - talent is always perspicacious! - wrote in 1966. “... We sat for a while, And now we’re going to play hooligans - It’s really quiet, - Mao and Liao Bian thought, - How else can you counter the World atmosphere: Here we’ll show a big fiddle to the USA and the USSR!” In addition to the verb “counter-trap”, which has become an integral part of the vocabulary of our first person, this couplet is also notable for the mention of a certain “Liao Bian”, who, of course, is none other than Marshal Lin Biao, at that time the Minister of Defense of the PRC and the right hand Chairman Mao. By 1969, the big "Maoist fiddle" for the Soviet Union had finally matured.
"Special Weapon Number 1"
However, there is a version that Lin Biao was the only person in the PRC synclite who opposed the secret directive of the CPC Central Committee of January 25, 1969 on military operations by three companies near Damansky Island "in response to Soviet provocations." By “provocations,” Chinese propaganda meant the reluctance of Soviet border guards to let Chinese Red Guards into Soviet territory, which at that time was this tiny island in the Ussuri and which China considered its own. It was strictly forbidden to use weapons, violators were restrained with the help of "special weapons number 1", a horn on a long handle, and "belly tactics" - they closed the line and pressed with their whole body on fanatics with Mao's quotes and portraits of the leader in their hands, pushing them back a meter where they came from. There were other methods, which one of the participants in those events speaks about in the most interesting documentary film by Elena Masyuk “The Hieroglyph of Friendship”: they took off their pants, turned their bare ass towards the portraits of Mao - and the Red Guards retreated in horror ... During January-February, both on Damansky and on Kirkinsky - this is another island on the Ussuri - Soviet and Chinese border guards more than once met in hand-to-hand combat, however, there were no casualties. But then things took a more serious turn.
On the night of March 1-2, a company of Chinese soldiers in full combat gear crossed to Damansky and entrenched on its western bank. On an alarm signal, 32 Soviet border guards left for the scene, including the head of the 2nd Nizhne-Mikhailovskaya frontier post of the 57th Iman border detachment, senior lieutenant Ivan Strelnikov. He protested to the Chinese and was shot point-blank along with 6 of his comrades. Having accepted an unequal battle, almost completely - 11 people out of 12 - the border group covering Strelnikov, led by Sergeant Rabovich, also died. In total, during the fighting with the Chinese on March 2, 31 Soviet border guards were killed, 14 were injured. In an unconscious state, the Chinese captured, and then brutally tortured Corporal Pavel Akulov. In 2001, photographs of Soviet soldiers who died on Damansky from the archives of the KGB of the USSR were declassified - the pictures testified to the abuse of the dead by the Chinese.
Everything was decided by "Grad"
The question that often arose among contemporaries of those events, and later: why at the decisive moment Damansky, despite the aggressive attitude of the Chinese, was guarded in the usual regular mode (there is a version that not only our intelligence warned about the inevitability of a conflict on the Kremlin Island through secret channels , but also Lin Biao personally, which, allegedly, Mao later found out about); why reinforcements arrived in time after the first losses, and finally, why even on March 15, when fresh units of the Chinese army (24th Infantry Regiment, 2 thousand soldiers) entered the battle on Damansky after massive shelling of Soviet positions, when in a supernova Soviet tank knocked out by the Chinese T-62, the head of the Imansky border detachment, Colonel Leonov, died - why was the ban of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on bringing troops of the Far Eastern Military District into the Damansky region not lifted then?
When the commander of the district, Colonel-General Oleg Losik, on the 15th gave the command to deploy the 135th motorized rifle division in the battle area and iron the Chinese positions from the then-secret BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket systems, he actually acted at his own peril and risk. The "hail" that fell on the heads of the Chinese - and the main part of the material and technical resources and manpower of the enemy was destroyed in one gulp - discouraged them from continuing the war for Damansky: Beijing did not yet have such weapons. According to Russian data, the final Chinese losses ranged from 300 to 700 people killed, while Chinese sources still do not give exact figures.
By the way, in August 1969, the Chinese again decided to test the strength of the Soviet borders: in the area of Lake Zhalanashkol in Kazakhstan, they landed 80 of their special forces. But here they were already met fully armed: as a result of a 65-minute battle, the group lost 21 people and was forced to retreat. But this episode, undoubtedly victorious for the USSR, remained almost unnoticed. Whereas Damansky, as the personification of the readiness of our army to repulse Maoist China, was talked about in the USSR for a long time, although the question of why, in fact, our soldiers shed blood there, arose very soon.
What did they fight for...
On September 11, 1969, the premier of the USSR Alexei Kosygin and the head of the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai, at the talks at the Beijing airport - Kosygin was returning from the funeral of Ho Chi Minh - discussed the situation around Damansky and agreed: the parties, in order to avoid an escalation of the conflict and to maintain a truce, should remain busy for this moment positions. Most likely, Beijing knew in advance about Moscow's readiness for such a compromise - before the start of negotiations, Chinese soldiers landed on Damansky. And so they remained in their “occupied positions” ...
In 1991, as a result of the signing of the Soviet-Chinese agreement on the demarcation of the border, Damansky was officially ceded to China. Today, there is no island with that name on the map - there is Zheng-Bao-Dao ("Precious Island" - translated from Chinese), on which Chinese border guards take the oath at the brand new obelisk to their fallen heroes. But the lessons of those events are not only in the name change. And not even in the fact that Russia, to please China, has elevated a purely recommendatory principle of international law into an absolute one: taking into account the fact that the border, allegedly, must necessarily pass through the middle of the fairway of the border rivers, hundreds of hectares of land have already been transferred to China, including cedar forests in Primorsky and Khabarovsk Territory. The border, "island" dossier perfectly illustrates how patient, persistent and resourceful the Chinese dragon is in pursuing its own interests.
Yes, since 1969, too much water has flowed in the Ussuri and Amur. Yes, China and Russia have changed a lot since then. Yes, Putin and Xi Jinping sit side by side at the May 9 Victory Day parade and will most likely sit side by side at a similar parade in Beijing in September. But the fact is that both "Pu" and Xi with their large-scale intentions are mere mortals. And the dragon, according to legend, lives a very long time. He is practically immortal.
21-05-2015, 20:05
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