1939-1940

For a special period, a plan of action of the Red Army was provided.

In the conditions of the war of the USSR only against Finland, for the convenience of control and material support of the troops, two fronts are created:

• Northern front - for operations on the coast of the Barents Sea and in the directions of Rovaniemi, Kemi and Uleaborg;
• Northwestern Front for action on the directions of Kuopio, Mikeenli and Helsingfors. Command Northwestern Front assigned to the Command and Staff of the Leningrad Military District.

I order to start developing a plan for the operational deployment of troops Northwestern Front, guided by the following guidelines:

• I. Taking into account the composition and deployment of the Finnish army at the present time, as well as the preparation of the theater for war by Finland, build a plan for the deployment of our troops based on the following assumptions:
  • 1. In the event of war in the coming years, Finland will be able to field 16-18 infantry divisions using all of them against the USSR.
  • 2. The indicated divisions are expected to be deployed:
    • In the Petsamo area - up to one infantry division.
    • In the area of ​​Kemijärvi, Kuusamo, to cover the direction to Kemi - up to two infantry divisions.
    • In the Uleaborg direction - up to two infantry divisions.
    • In the directions of Kuopio, Savonminna, Nurmes - up to five infantry divisions.
    • In the region of Savonminna, Lappeenranta, the coast of the Gulf of Finland, Lahti - up to six infantry divisions.
    • In the area of ​​Helsingfors, Abo - one - two infantry divisions.
  • 3. The final deployment of all divisions is expected on the 15-20th day of mobilization.
  • 4. The possibility of strengthening the armed forces of Finland with the troops of its possible allies (Sweden, Norway, Germany) is not ruled out.
  • 5. With the general probable plan of defensive actions of the Finnish army, the possibility of its active actions in the first days of the war with the aim of creating a threat to Leningrad by accessing Lake Ladoga and capturing Vyborg is not ruled out.
• II. Main tasks Northwestern Front I put: The defeat of the armed forces of Finland, the capture of its territory within the boundaries and access to the Gulf of Bothnia on the 45th day of the operation, for which:
  • 1. During the period of concentration of troops, firmly cover the Vyborg and Kexholm directions, under all circumstances keep Vyborg behind you and prevent the enemy from reaching Lake Ladoga.
  • 2. After concentrating troops, be ready on the 35th day of mobilization on special instructions to go on the general offensive, deliver the main blow in the general direction to Lappeenranta, Heinola, Hämeenlinna and auxiliary blows in the directions of Korniselkä, Kuopio and Savonminna, Mikkeli, defeat the main forces of the Finnish army in the area of ​​Mikkeli, Heinola, Hamina, on the 25th day of the operation, capture Helsingfors and reach the front of Kuopio, Jyväskylä, Hämeenlinna, Helsingfors.
• III. On the right, the Northern Front (Kandalaksha headquarters) on the 40th day of mobilization goes on the offensive and on the 30th day of the operation captures the Kemi, Uleaborg area.

His left-flank 20th division. the rifle corps advances in the direction of Suomusalmi, Puolanka and on the day of the operation takes possession of the Puolankayu Shtakor-Ukhta area.

Border with him: Art. Maselskaya, Pieliisjärvi, Insalmi, Pyhäjärvi. Everything for Northwestern Front exclusively.

• IV. To perform these tasks in the composition of the troops Northwestern Front turn on:
  • four directorates of field armies;
  • nine departments of rifle corps;
  • one control mech. corps;
  • twenty-nine rifle divisions;
  • two armored divisions;
  • one motorized rifle division;
  • five tank brigades;
  • four motorized brigades;
  • twelve artillery regiments of the RGK;
  • six pontoon battalions;
  • seven engineer battalions;
  • fifty-five regiments.

In the reserve of the main command in the Tikhvin area: Volkhovstroy, Chudovo have three rifle divisions.

Specified troops Northwestern Front expand.

Front headquarters - Leningrad.

• 7th Army consisting of:
  • six rifle divisions;
  • one ski team;
  • two pontoon battalions;
  • one tank brigade;
  • a network of air regiments;
  • two artillery regiments of the RGK;
  • two engineering battalions.
  • Army Headquarters - Suojärvi.

Dealing the main blow with the forces of at least four rifle divisions in the direction of Korniselkä, Kuopio, defeat the opposing units of the Finnish army and capture: on the 15th day of the operation - the Ioensu region; on the 30th day of the operation - the Kuopio area, covering the main enemy grouping from the north.

In the future, keep in mind the attack on Jyväskylä.

Border left: Art. Kuokkantsemi, Savonranta, ref. Virtasalmi, claim. Leyvonmäki.

• 22 army (from URVO) consisting of:
  • one control of the rifle corps;
  • five rifle divisions;
  • one tank brigade;
  • one motorized brigade;
  • three artillery regiments of the RGK;
  • one pontoon battalion;
  • two engineer battalions;
  • seven air regiments.
  • Army Headquarters - Kexholm.

During the period of cover, firmly covering the state border, to prevent the enemy from reaching Lake Ladoga.

After concentrating, delivering the main blow with the forces of four rifle divisions in the direction of Virmuntioki, Yuva, surround and destroy the opposing enemy and on the 15th day of the operation reach the front: Savonranta, Yuva, Kampila.

In the future, depending on the circumstances, keep in mind actions either jointly with the 23rd Army on Heinoll, or in cooperation with the 7th Army on Jyväskylä and further on Talter. On the 30th day of the operation, go to the front: Kangamiemi, Leyvonmyaki, Lake. Iloma, Kalkkinen.

Border on the left: Vuoksela, Antrea, Imatra, claim. Ristiina, claim. Kalkkinen.

• 23 Army (allocated from the LVO Directorate) consisting of:
  • two directorates of rifle corps;
  • six rifle divisions;
  • two tank brigades;
  • one motorized brigade;
  • six artillery regiments of the RGK;
  • two artillery divisions of the RGK;
  • two pontoon battalions;
  • three engineering battalions;
  • eleven air regiments.
  • Army Headquarters - Karisalmi.

Dealing the main blow with at least four rifle divisions in the direction of Lappeenranta, Lahti, Riihimiyaki, destroy the opposing enemy and on the 15th day of the operation reach the Savitaipela, Valkolaimyaki front, st. Taavetti.

In the future, bypassing the most developed fortifications from the north in cooperation with the 20th Army, destroy the enemy in the Helsing direction and, on the 30th day of the operation, reach the front of Kalkkinen, Karkelya, Mäntsälä, meaning by reaching the Savitaipela front, st. Taavetti, bring the mechanized corps into the breach.

Border on the left: Perkervi, st. Tali, Luumaki, Kouvola, suit. Myantsya.

• 20 army (from ORVO) consisting of:
  • two directorates of rifle corps;
  • six rifle divisions;
  • two tank brigades;
  • one motorized brigade;
  • five artillery regiments of the RGK;
  • two pontoon battalions;
  • two engineer battalions;
  • nine air regiments.
  • Army Headquarters - Vyborg.

Objective: Break through the fortified front of the enemy, destroy its opposing units and take possession: on the 15th day of the operation, reach the front of st. Taavetti, Khaliena, on the 30th day of the operation - Mäntsälä, Parvar. In the future, in cooperation with the 23rd army and 1 MK. on the 35th day of the operation by the Helsingfors region.

In addition to the above forces, at the disposal of the command Northwestern Front have:

• • 1) On the northwestern coast of the Estonian SSR in the region of Tallinn, Baltiysky Port, one management. sk (65sk), two rifle divisions (11p 126 sd from PriBOVO), of which one should be assigned for transportation to the Hanko (Gange) peninsula for action on Helsingfors and the second - either for transportation also to the Khanko peninsula, or for landing on the Aland Islands , and one separate shooting brigade.
  • 2) Front reserve: three rifle divisions in the area of ​​st. Petijärvi, st. Heinioki, Valk-Jarvi; one rifle division - in the Leningrad region.
  • 3) mechanized corps in the area of ​​Vyborg, Heinioki, st. Antrea.
• 4) the second air defense corps (Leningrad);
  • 5) twenty-one air regiments;
  • 6) one airborne brigade.
• V. Army and Front Air Forces to set the following tasks:
  • 1. Assist ground troops by acting against enemy ground troops in his battle formations and large groupings.
  • 2. Destroy enemy aircraft.
  • 3. Prohibit military transportation on land and at sea.
  • 4. Together with naval aviation and fleet, destroy the enemy's naval fleet.
  • 5. Together with the fleet, interrupt the sea supply to Finland through the Gulf of Bothnia and from the Baltic Sea.
  • 6. Cover the transfer and landing of troops on the Hanko Peninsula with the involvement of PriBOVO aviation for this purpose.
• VI. Red Banner Baltic Fleet, operationally subordinate to the Military Council Northwestern Front set the following tasks:
  • 1. Together with aviation, destroy the combat fleet of Finland and Sweden (in the event of the latter's intervention).
  • 2. Assist the ground forces operating on the coast of the Gulf of Finland and from the Hanko Peninsula, providing their flanks and destroying the coastal defenses of the Finns.
  • 3. To ensure the transfer of two rifle divisions in the very first days of the war from the northern coast of the Estonian SSR to the Hanko Peninsula, as well as the transfer and landing of a large landing force on the Aland Islands.
  • 4. By cruising operations of submarines and aviation, interrupt the maritime communications of Finland and Sweden (in the event of her opposing the USSR) in the Gulf of Bothnia and the Baltic Sea.
• VII. Develop a cover for mobilization, concentration and deployment along the entire border with Finland within the LVO, ensuring the fulfillment of the following tasks:
  • 1. Cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of our troops from the ground and air enemy, preventing the enemy from invading our territory and flying over the state border with his aircraft.
  • 2. Prevent enemy raids on Leningrad and other industrial centers.
  • 3. Prevent the enemy from breaking through to Lake Ladoga and keep Vyborg behind him.
  • 4. To prevent disruption of the work of railways on the territory of the front.
  • 5. Air and ground reconnaissance to determine the concentration, deployment, forces and grouping of enemy troops. The first crossing and flight of the state border is allowed only with the permission of the main command.
• VIII. General instructions:
  • 1. Give this deployment plan the code name “S. 3-20". The plan is put into effect upon receipt of an encrypted telegram for mine and the Chief of the General Staff K. A. with the following signatures: "Proceed to the implementation of" S. 3-20 ".
  • 2. By February 15, 1941, the Military Council and the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District should develop in the General Staff of the Red Army:
• a) Plan for the concentration and deployment of front troops.
• b) Cover plan.
• c) Plan for the execution of the first operation.
• d) Air Action Plan.
• e) A plan for organizing the rear and material support, sanitary and veterinary evacuation for the first month of the war.
• f) Plan for the restoration and construction of railways and dirt roads.
• g) Plan for the communication device for the period of cover, concentration and deployment and for the period of the first operation.
• h) Engineering plan.
• i) Air defense plan.
  • 3. The following are allowed to develop the plan:
• a) In full: the commander of the troops, a member of the Military Council, the chief of staff and the head of the operational department of the district.
• b) In terms of developing an action plan for the Air Force - the commander of the Air Force of the LVO.
• c) In terms of developing a plan for organizing the rear - the deputy head of the district for rear.
• d) In terms of developing a plan for military communications - the head of the Military Communications of the LVO.

It was assumed that the Germans would start the invasion with part of the forces, but this did not happen.

With a favorable development of events for the troops of the Baltic, the action plan of the Red Army was quite ambitious.

• 8th Army - deployed on the Polangen, Yurburg front, consisting of:
  • 10 shooters. divisions, including 2 of the Latvian SSR;
  • 1 motorized division;
  • mechanized corps from LVO
• 11th Army - deployed on the front Yurburg (suit.), Druskininkai, consisting of:
  • 11 rifle divisions, of which 2 of the Lithuanian SSR;
  • 2 tank divisions;
  • 1 motorized division;
  • 1 tank brigade.

The Front Command has at its disposal:

• on the territory of the Latvian SSR - 1 division on the protection of the coast in the Libava region and 2 divisions from the Estonian SSR in reserve in the Mitava region;
• in the area of ​​​​Shavli, Ponevezh - 6 lines of divisions, from among the divisions with a readiness period of 15 - 30 days.

Total in the composition Northwestern Front have:

• 31 division lines, of which 4 national and 6 with terms of readiness for 15 - 30 days;
• 2 motorized divisions;
• 4 tank divisions;
• 3 sec. tank brigades;
• 20 aviation regiments, and a total of about 1,200 aircraft.

  V. Fundamentals of strategic deployment, Note of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the National Guard of the Red Army in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov on the fundamentals of the strategic deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in the West and in the East in 1940 and 1941, TsAMO of Russia, F. 16, Op. 2951, D. 239, Ll. 1 - 37

Front Composition

Representatives of the Headquarters

Troop commanders

fighting

To the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Top secret 26.6.41 20.35

I report the position of the troops Northwestern Front. 1. The enemy continues to encircle Libau.

2. 8th Army - 12th Mechanized Corps and 5th Panzer Division behind enemy lines without fuel. The commander of the 3rd mechanized corps reported openly on 25.6.41: "Help, surrounded." Rifle formations on the front Plateliai, Krazhai, Kelme, Siaulienai, Sheduva. On the night of June 27, the withdrawal of the river will begin. Lielupe and further to the northern coast of the West. Dvina to Jekabpils. The formations of the army suffered losses and need their immediate replenishment, which began to arrive after mobilization, but cannot be dressed, since the uniforms of two rifle divisions remained in the former deployment points.

The formations lost part of their weapons, which is being specified.

11th Army - the headquarters and the Military Council of the army, according to a number of data, was captured or died. The Germans captured the cipher document. The 5th, 33rd, 188th, 128th rifle divisions are unknown in what condition and where they are. Many stragglers and runaways were detained in the direction of Dvinsk. Many weapons were thrown. The 11th Army is not an organized combat force.

In the Vilnius direction, it is necessary to deploy a new army group immediately. Due to the replenishment of apparently dead divisions, I ask you to allow the formation of four new rifle divisions.

I ask you to reinforce the front with ten artillery regiments to count the dead. The 11th Rifle Division is fresh, but its howitzer artillery regiment has been defeated by aircraft.

The air forces of the front suffered heavy losses of a small number of airfields. This time is not capable of effectively supporting, covering ground troops and attacking the enemy.

Crews saved 75%. Loss of the material part of 80%.

I ask you to strengthen the front with three mixed air divisions. To replenish the units of the air forces of the front with materiel in the first place and flight crews.

I ask for the release of 200 thousand sets of uniforms and equipment to provide weapons for the mobilized and for the new four rifle divisions. The 22nd and 24th Rifle Corps are being mobilized in winter quarters. The 29th Rifle Corps withdrew east of Vilnius. I am clarifying the position. Dvin direction. Dvinsk was occupied by enemy tanks. He demanded to restore the situation. In view of the bombing of communications centers by the enemy and their destruction by elements hostile to us, communications are poor.

On June 26, 1941, I ask you to put at my disposal three bomber and two fighter divisions to reinforce the air force.

I ask you to include six new rifle divisions in the front instead of the former territorial ones, which are being redeployed for retraining.

F. Kuznetsov Dibrova P. Klenov

Report of the commander of the troops of the North-Western Front dated June 26, 1941 to the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on the situation at the front by 20:35 on June 26, 1941, F. 221, op. 2467ss, d. 39, ll. 346-348.

In September, the troops of the North-Western Front carried the defense in the Demyansk direction against the troops of the Army Group "North".

The idea of ​​a counter-offensive of the North-Western Front near Demyansk appeared even before the start of the battle for Moscow. On September 22, 1941, the commander of the troops of the North-Western Front, Kurochkin, submitted a plan for the encirclement of enemy troops between the lakes Ilmen and Seliger for consideration by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Then the plan provided for the defeat of only two German infantry divisions - the 30th and 32nd. The plan was approved by the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 002265. The start of the offensive was scheduled for September 24th. Before the Typhoon began, the North-Western Front managed to go on the offensive, to face the first difficulties. However, the aggravation of the situation in the Moscow direction made it necessary to remove formations from the troops of the front for the defense of the capital. In particular, the 8th Tank Brigade of P. A. Rotmistrov, which took part in the battles for Kalinin, was withdrawn from the 11th Army. The 312th Staraya Russa on the eastern bank of the Lovat River ended in complete failure. In August 1943, the front once again unsuccessfully tried to liberate Staraya Russa. On November 20, 1943, the North-Western Front was disbanded, and its administration was transferred to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Demyansk operations of the North-Western Front:

Demyansk offensive operation January 7 - March 19, 1942 (the first offensive began on January 7, 1942, the second offensive on January 29, 1942; on February 20, 1942, the enemy was surrounded).

Demyansk defensive operation March 20 - the end of April 1942 (April 21, 1942, the encircled group was released).

Demyansk offensive operation in late May early June 1942

Demyansk offensive operation December 23-30, 1942 (or December 23, 1942 - January 13, 1943)

From February to December 1942, the enemy lost more than 90 thousand people in the Demyansk operations.

After the withdrawal of German troops from Demyansk, the North-Western Front carried out an unsuccessful Staraya Russian operation on March 4–18, 1943. In August 1943, it carried out another unsuccessful Staraya Russian operation. (Another Starorusskaya operation is mentioned in connection with the offensive near Demyansk on January 7 - May 20, 1942, but no dates are indicated).

Northwestern front. Distribution of forces.

The North-Western Front - the formation (operational association) of the Red Army (RKKA), during the Great Patriotic War (formed on June 22, 1941 on the basis of the troops of the Baltic Special Military District).

Front Command

1. Commander of the Front in 1941: F. I. Kuznetsov (June 22, 1941 - July 3, 1941), Colonel General.

Born on September 17 (29), 1898 in the village of Balbechino, Chaussky district, Mogilev province (now the Goretsky district of the Mogilev region of Belarus) in a peasant family. Member of the 1st World War (ensign) and the Civil War (regiment commander). In the Red Army since 1918. Graduated from the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze (1926) and advanced training courses for senior officers (1930). In 1935-1938 - head of the faculty and head of the department at the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze. Member of the CPSU (b) since 1938. Since July 1938 - Deputy Commander of the Belarusian Special District. Participated in the Soviet-Finnish war. From August 1940 - Commander of the North Caucasian, then the Baltic Special Military District. From June 22 to July 3, 1941, commander of the North-Western Front. Removed from his post for inept command and control of troops. Later he held various command positions. From everywhere expelled for prof. unsuitability.

2. Chief of Staff of the Front: P. S. Klenov (June 22, 1941 - July 1, 1941), Lieutenant General.

July 1, 1941 removed from office for inactivity. Arrested on July 11, 1941. On February 13, 1942, by the decision of the OSO, he was sentenced to capital punishment. Shot on February 23, 1942.

3. Front Air Force Commander: A.P. Ionov, Major General of Aviation.

Russian. Candidate member of the CPSU(b) since January 1932.

Born in February 1894 in the village of Zuevskaya, Poshekhonsky district, Yaroslavl province, into a peasant family

In September 1914, he voluntarily joined the army, enrolling in the Gatchina military aviation school. The last rank and position in the old army was ensign, commander of an aviation detachment.

In the Red Army on mobilization since October 1918 - pilot of the 1st detachment of the Yaroslavl air group. From November 1923 in the ranks of the Red Army. In 1923-1926. - Instructor pilot of the training squadron of the Red Army, pilot of a separate reconnaissance air squadron "Ultimatum", commander of the flight and detachment of the same squadron.

In 1928-1932. - commander of the training squadron, head of the training department, commander of the flight training squadron of the 2nd military school of pilots (Borisoglebsk).

Since May 1932 - assistant commander of a heavy bomber air brigade for combat training in the Leningrad Military District. Since January 1933 - commander of the 200th light bomber air brigade.

Since December 1933 - a student of the operational faculty of the Air Force Academy named after prof. N. E. Zhukovsky, after graduating from which in 1934 he was appointed commander of the air brigade of the same academy. Then (until August 1938) he commanded the 107th air brigade.

Since August 1938 - Chairman of the Central Commission for the Study and Prevention of Accidents of the Red Army Air Force. On the eve of the Great Patriotic War - Commander of the Air Force of the Baltic Special Military District. Since the beginning of the war - the commander of the Air Force of the North-Western Front.

Arrested on July 1, 1941. On February 13, 1942, by a special meeting of the NKVD of the USSR, he was sentenced to death by firing squad. The sentence was carried out on February 23, 1942.

	connections
	rifle	tank
	10 sc (10, 90 sd)	12 mk (23 td, 28 td, 202 md)
	11 sc (48, 125 sd)
	22 MSD NKVD
	16 sc (5, 33, 188 sd)	3 microns (2 td, 5 td, 84 ppm)
	29 sc (179, 184 sd)
	23 sd, 126 sd, 128 sd
	22 sc (180, 182 sd)
	24 sc (181, 183 sd)
	16 sd, 67 sd, 13 sbr
Total: armies 3	sc-6; sd-20; sbr-1	Mk-2; td-4; md-2

By June 22, 1941, there were 25 divisions in the district, including 4 tank and 2 motorized divisions (see table). Rifle formations were kept according to peacetime states, while tank and motorized units did not complete their formation. On June 1, 1941, the average staffing of PribOVO divisions was 8,710 people, while the number of infantry divisions of the Nazi troops was brought to wartime states (16,850 people).

On June 23, the 22nd motorized rifle division of the NKVD was formed from parts of the NKVD of the district, from July 1 it became part of the 8th Army.

The balance of forces and means of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht

Forces and means			balance of power
Personnel
Guns and mortars
Tanks (all types)
Aircraft (combat)

To deliver a surprise attack on the troops in the zone of the Baltic Special Military District, the Wehrmacht command concentrated large forces in East Prussia. Here, on a front stretching 230 km (from the Baltic Sea to Goldap), Army Group North was deployed (18th and 16th field armies and 4th tank group). Her actions were supported by the 1st Air Fleet. To the south, from Goldap to Suwalki, the 3rd Panzer Group and part of the forces of the 9th Army, which were part of Army Group Center, concentrated on the 70-km front.

In total, the Nazi group consisted of 41 divisions, including 7 tank and 6 motorized. The average operational density of the enemy was 7-8 km per division, while that of the Soviet troops was about 50 km, and only per division of the first line.

The Nazis concentrated the most powerful forces in two main directions: Tilsit - Siauliai and Suwalki - Vilnius.

Direction of impact - Tilsit-Siauliai

The composition of the troops of the 1st echelon

Wehrmacht troops - 1st, 6th, 8th tank, 269th and 290th field divisions,

offensive front - 50 km;

The composition of the Red Army troops in the offensive zone - 125 rifle division and regiment 90 rifle division

Direction of impact - Suwalki - Vilnius

The composition of the troops of the 1st echelon

Wehrmacht troops - 7th, 12th, 20th tank, 5th, 6th, 26th and 35th field divisions,

offensive front - 70 km;

The composition of the Red Army troops in the offensive zone - 11 battalions

The grouping of troops on the Northwestern Front that had taken shape by the beginning of the war did not ensure the repulsion of the massive attacks of the aggressor. The formations of the 8th Army were in the best position, occupying defensive zones in accordance with the cover plan. The main forces of the 11th army were only moving forward to their positions. Divisions of the 27th Army remained in camps or places of permanent deployment. The rifle divisions of the first echelon of the covering armies, stretched out on a wide front, could not resist for a long time.

The reserves advanced from the depths did not have time to support them, as they were late with their arrival in the designated areas by 3-5 days. Considering the conditions created, it was not advisable to pull up the reserves to the state border, but they should have been concentrated on the borders of the Neman and the Western Dvina.

The North-Western Front is an operational association of the Soviet armed forces during the Great Patriotic War, operated in 1941-1943, created on June 22, 1941 on the basis of the Baltic Military District. Initially, the North-Western Front included the 8th, 11th, 27th armies, later also the 1st shock, 3rd shock, 4th shock armies, 22nd, 34th, 48th , 53rd, 68th armies, 1st tank army, 6th air army. The command of the North-Western Front was taken by Colonel-General F.I. Kuznetsov, Corps Commissar V.N. became a member of the military council. Bogatkin (since December 1942 - lieutenant general), chief of staff - lieutenant general N.F. Vatutin.

In the border battle in the summer of 1941, the troops of the North-Western Front opposed the German Army Group North and part of the forces of the Army Group Center. Under pressure from the enemy, by June 29, Soviet troops withdrew to the Western Dvina. Cut off from the main forces, the 8th Army retreated to the Estonian border and was included in the Northern Front. The 11th and 27th armies fought with the enemy advancing on Staraya Russa and Kholm. On July 3, 1941, Major General P. P. Sobennikov became commander of the North-Western Front, and on August 24, Lieutenant General P. A. Kurochkin. By the autumn of 1941, the troops of the North-Western Front had entrenched themselves on the Demyansk defensive line.

During the counter-offensive near Moscow, the troops of the North-Western Front in January 1942 carried out the Toropetsko-Kholmskaya operation, as a result of which, by the end of February 1942, the Staraya Russian and Demyansk enemy groups were separated, and six German divisions in the Demyansk area were surrounded. By the spring of 1942, the troops of the North-Western Front reached the line of the Lovat River. In May 1942, Major General I.T. Shlemin, in August of the same year he was replaced by Lieutenant General M.N. Sharokhin. Throughout 1942, the North-Western Front tried to eliminate the Germans' Demyansk cauldron, but was not successful. In October 1942, there was a change of command of the North-Western Front, Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, chief of staff - Lieutenant General V.M. Zlobin.

The Demyansk bridgehead of the Germans was liquidated only in February 1943. An attempt by the Northwestern Front to go on the offensive against Staraya Russa was unsuccessful. In March 1943, the leadership of the front was again replaced, Colonel General I.S. Konev, and the chief of staff - Lieutenant General A.N. Bogolyubov. In May, Lieutenant-General E.F. became a new member of the military council of the front. Bokov. In the summer of 1943, I.S. Konev was sent to the Kursk Bulge, and Colonel-General P. A. Kurochkin became the commander of the North-Western Front. In August 1943, the front made another unsuccessful attempt to launch an offensive against Staraya Russa. On November 20, the North-Western Front was disbanded, and the First Baltic Front was created on its basis.

8th Army

12th mechanized corps - 23rd and 28th TD, 202nd MD;

3rd mechanized corps - 2nd and 5th TD, 84th MD;

10th Rifle Corps - 10th and 11th Rifle Divisions;

11th Rifle Corps - 48th and 125th Rifle Divisions;

Directorate of the 65th Rifle Corps;

22nd Infantry Division of the NKVD.

11th Army

1st mechanized corps - 3rd TD, 163rd MD, 5th MCP;

16th Rifle Corps - 5th, 33rd and 188th Rifle Divisions;

Thus, the front commander suggested urgently beginning the transfer to the Pskov and Ostrov region of the 22nd Latvian and 24th Estonian territorial corps, which had not yet been put into battle because of their unreliability. Here, the 1st mechanized and 41st rifle corps transferred to the front were supposed to take up defense along the line of the old fortified areas. Under their cover, it was supposed to deploy troops withdrawn from the Dvina line. At the same time, Kuznetsov proposed to begin the evacuation of the Moonsund Islands and the withdrawal of the troops of the 8th Army from Riga to a new line of defense along the southern border of Estonia.

“You did not understand the order of Headquarters 0096. The current situation requires, over the next three to four days, to detain the enemy at the line of the West. Dvina. The headquarters requires the execution of order 0096. Take all measures to prevent the spread of the enemy on the northern coast of the West. Dvina. Use all aircraft for systematic bombardment, day and night, of enemy crossings and crossing units. Report on performance.

As we can see, the retreat of the troops of the front from the line of the Western Dvina was not prohibited at all - but it should have been more organized, while simultaneously holding the defensive line along the river by the covering forces. After all, it is no secret that it is the retreat that is the most difficult type of combat operations, where it is important to maintain both the controllability of the troops and the morale of the fighters and commanders. While the enemy's tank and motorized divisions were pinned down by counterattacks near Dvinsk and Krustpils, the Northwestern Front had time to create a new line of defense at the turn of the old fortified areas and along the lines of the Velikaya and Cherekha rivers.

However, there was another reason why it was impossible to retreat from the Dvina. On the southern bank of the river there was still a large number of scattered Soviet units, randomly retreating to the river. They had no connection with the command, and, apparently, Kuznetsov simply counted them as already dead - so in a report to the People's Commissar of Defense dated June 28, he reported: “The 2nd Panzer Division, apparently, perished. The 11th Army does not exist as a formation. I don’t know the provisions of the 5th, 33rd, 188th, 128th, 23rd and 126th rifle divisions, the 5th tank division and the 84th motorized division”. Meanwhile, all these troops retreated to the Dvina, trying to cross it; to leave the line of the river meant to doom them to death.

And the situation at the front was not as catastrophic as it seemed to Kuznetsov's headquarters. In addition to Dvinsk, the enemy never managed to capture serviceable bridges across the Dvina anywhere. True, on June 28-29, the Germans managed to cross it in three more places, but such attempts were repulsed on most of the front. Note that in late September and early October 1943, the Soviet troops that reached the Dnieper captured up to a dozen bridgeheads only in the zone of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts, however, only three of them were “opened” - one in October and two in november.

The Germans advanced furthest from the bridgehead near Livany - as we saw above, on July 30, the units of the Guryev group defending here retreated to Lake Luban. However, in fact, the troops of the 6th Panzer Division did not advance to such a depth, by evening it reached only the village of Rudzety, 20 km from the river. The division advanced almost parallel to the Dvinsk-Pskov highway, 30 km west of it. On July 1, the forward detachments of the division traveled another 25 km and reached Varaklyany (10 km west of Vilyana).

The forces of the 11th Rifle Corps (48th and 125th Rifle Divisions) and the 12th Mechanized Corps were deployed against the bridgeheads formed on both sides of Jekabpils. On June 30, his 28th Panzer Division with the 10th Motorcycle Regiment took up defense in the area from Koaknese to Plavinas, the 202nd Motorized Rifle Division between Plavinasam and Krustpils. The 23rd Panzer Division concentrated in the Ergli region (30 km north of Plavinas) with the task of preparing a counterattack on Plavinas.

During the night of June 30, the enemy tried to cross the river eight times, but all his attempts were repulsed. At 18:00, the headquarters of the corps sent a reconnaissance group consisting of three tanks and a motorized infantry platoon to the Lyegrade region (towards Krustils) with the task of reconnoitering the enemy’s crossing across the Aiviekste River.

By this time, the mechanized corps had about 9 thousand personnel, 50 tanks and 47 guns. As we will see below, in the 11th Rifle Corps on June 4, that is, after a difficult retreat, there were still 8,769 people - that is, on the 1st, the corps numbered at least 10-12 thousand. The 181st division of the 24th Latvian territorial corps was also advanced here from Gulbene. Due to the absence of the headquarters of the 12th mechanized corps, its troops were subordinated to the headquarters of the 65th rifle corps, which did not have its own troops. Even if the forces available here were not enough to throw units of three German divisions that had managed to cross over into the river, they were quite enough to blockade the bridgeheads.

On the morning of April 30, the enemy managed to capture the bridges in Riga - but a few hours later they were repulsed by a counterattack of units of the 10th Rifle Corps of the 8th Army and blown up only late in the evening, after crossing the remnants of the 90th Rifle Division and our other troops from the south coast.

By June 30, Soviet troops basically continued to hold the defense on the right bank of the Western Dvina. None of the new bridgeheads gave the enemy the opportunity to quickly concentrate troops and go on the offensive - even part of the rear of the 41st Reinhard motorized corps later had to be transported across the bridges in Dvinsk. On June 1, a counterattack against Krustpils was planned by the forces of the 202nd motorized and 181st rifle divisions.

Manstein, according to his post-war statements, rushed forward - but the command of the army group considered it best to hold the 56th motorized corps until Reinhard could launch an offensive from the bridgeheads at Krustpils.

In such a situation, at 20:45 on June 30, the command of the North-Western Front, not yet having time to receive Zhukov's prohibition directive, ordered his subordinate formations to withdraw from the line of the Western Dvina.

First. The enemy continues the offensive in the Krustpils-Pskov and Dvina-Pskov directions. Large columns of motorized troops and infantry were found moving from the Kaunas region in the directions: Panevezys, Jekabpils; Utena, Daugavpils. The enemy, apparently, is trying to break the front at the junction of the 8th and 27th armies and prevent the withdrawal of the 8th army to the east with the simultaneous capture of fortified areas before the withdrawal of our troops.

Second. The tasks of the troops of the North-Western Front are: to prevent a breakthrough of the occupied front from the direction of Krustpils and Daugavpils to the northeast, to firmly consolidate and hold the Pskov, Ostrov and Sebezh fortified regions with all their forces and prevent the enemy from breaking through to the northeast and east.

Third. 8th Army on the night of 30.6. on 1.7.41, start a withdrawal to a fortified line. Intermediate milestones:

a) by the end of 1.7.41 - Cesis. lake Alauksto, Madona, Buzany, southwestern shore of the lake. Luban;

b) by the end of 2.7.41 - Dzeni, Gulbene, Yaunkanchi (northern shore of Lake Luban).

In the future, make a withdrawal to the Pskov and Ostrovsky fortified areas.

Include in your composition parts of the 12th mechanized corps in the Madona area. When withdrawing, have the main grouping on your left flank, paying special attention to communication with a neighbor on the left.

The border on the left is Jekabpils, (claim.) Lake. Lubana, (claim.) Island.

Fourth. The 27th Army continued to stubbornly hold the enemy at the line they occupied. The withdrawal to the fortified line should be started only with the beginning of the withdrawal of the 8th Army from the Dzeni, Gulbene, Yaunkanchi line. By the end of 1.7.41, get in touch with the 8th Army about the area of ​​Lake. Luban.

The border on the left is Kraslava, Dagda, (suit.) Opochka.

Fifth. The 41st Rifle Corps should concentrate and occupy Pskov, Ostrov, Vystavka for defense on 1 July 1941, continuing to improve the fortifications, build fortified areas, anti-tank guns and field positions. The task is to prevent the enemy through the fortified areas to the east and northeast. Upon occupation of the fortified areas, enter into submission to the commander of the 8th Army.

Sixth. The 24th Rifle Corps (11th, 181st and 183rd Rifle Divisions) on the night of 1.7.41, start moving to the area (claim.) Ostrov, (claim.) Opochka, Novorzhev, where to replenish, reorganize and take over for defense the strip (suit.) Ostrov, Opochka ... After concentrating and occupying the defense strip, go to the disposal of the commander of the 27th Army.

Seventh. The 1st mechanized corps, arriving from the Leningrad Military District, is to concentrate in the Podlozhye region (40 km northeast of Pskov), (suit.) Porkhov, Borovichi (20 km north of Porkhov). The task is optional.

Eighth. The commander of the 22nd Rifle Corps, by the end of 1.7.41, go to the front of Podseva, Gorki, (suit.) Porkhov. To make parts of the hull for stubborn defense with a front to the southwest and south. Prepare passages in the zone of their defense for the 1st mechanized corps in the direction of Opochka ...

The exact time of the cancellation of this order is unknown - according to some reports, it arrived at the army headquarters only on the morning of June 2. In any case, at 7 am on June 1, the troops of the 11th Rifle Corps of the 8th Army, which were defending against the German bridgehead at Plavinas, began to withdraw to the north. Parts of the 48th Infantry Division retreated in the direction of Snyteri, Dukuri Manor, Skuene Manor, Krusta-Krogs, the 125th Division - to Madliena, Rantsiemi Manor, Ramuli Manor, Amata River. By this time, according to the report of its commander, about 700 bayonets remained in the 125th division.

The command of the 12th mechanized corps was not informed about this - apparently, the command of the 11th rifle corps and its divisions decided that since everyone received the order to withdraw, there was no need to warn the neighbor about this. As a result, the enemy struck at the flank of the 202nd Motorized Division, which was defending to the left at the Krustpils-Plyavinas line.

The 28th Panzer Division, located near Plavinas, also found itself in danger of being outflanked after the enemy, advancing from the direction of Krustpils, crossed the Aiviekste River with forces near the infantry regiment with artillery. An attempt to push the Germans back behind Aiviekste was unsuccessful; in addition, around noon, an order was received from the commander of the 8th Army to withdraw in the direction of Madona.

As a result, on the evening of June 1, formations of the 12th mechanized corps, which had previously successfully repulsed all enemy attempts to force the river, were also forced to begin a retreat, covering it with counterattacks from the 23rd Panzer Division.

Already in the afternoon of June 1, counter-orders went to the troops. The 8th Army was ordered to attack the enemy troops on the flank, which were spreading from the bridgehead at Krustpils and had already reached Madon. The 27th Army was ordered to take up a strong defense and prevent the German bridgehead near Dvinsk from being "opened". At 17:10, the commander of the 181st rifle division was ordered to leave one rifle regiment with an artillery battalion and two anti-tank batteries in the Madona area, transferring it to the command of the commander of the 202nd motorized division, and the rest of the forced march to move to the Island.

The next day, these orders were confirmed by a new order.

"First. The enemy crossed to the northern bank of the river. Zap. Dvina with the strength of up to one infantry division with tanks in the Dvinsk region and an unexplained number of motorized infantry with tanks in the Jakobshtadt and Friedrichstadt regions, with the aim of separating the North-Western Front in the direction of Madona.

Second. The armies of the North-Western Front during 2 and 3.7.41 destroy enemy units that broke through to the north of the river. Zap. Dvina, go out on the entire front to the river. Zap. Dvina and firmly hold this line ...

Fourth. The 8th Army with the 181st Rifle Division, holding the occupied front along the river. Zap. Dvina, with their own forces, from the morning of 2.7.41, destroy the enemy who crossed over in the Friedrichstadt area and prevent it from spreading to the north and northeast, for which purpose to have a strong reserve in the Madona area consisting of the 181st Infantry Division and the 12th th mechanized corps.

In the future, destroy the Jacobstadt group and reach the river on the entire front. Zap. Dvina and firmly defend it.

The border on the left is Jekabpils, Ostrov.

Fifth. The 27th Army with the 163rd Motorized Division, in cooperation with the 12th Infantry Division of the 22nd Army, pinning the enemy in the center along the Rezekne-Daugavpils highway, strike with the flanks of the army, cover the Daugavpils region from the west and east, surround and destroy the enemy in the Daugavpils region and north-east" .

But the loss of at least two days made this order impossible. "Order - counterorder - disorder". Despite the fact that below Plavinas the right bank of the river was still entirely in our hands, the battle for the Dvina was already lost.

The commander of the 4th Panzer Group, E. Gepner, planned to launch a general offensive at dawn on July 2. In fact, it started a day earlier than planned. On the morning of July 1, the 1st Panzer and 36th Motorized Divisions of the 41st Motorized Corps began to advance after the retreating troops of the 11th Rifle and 12th Mechanized Corps. At the same time, units of the 10th Rifle Corps of the 8th Army left Riga.

But the 6th Panzer Division and the 56th Motorized Corps were unable to launch an offensive even on July 2nd. Routh explains this very dully: by the poor condition of the roads south of Lake Lubana and the onset of heavy rain. Apparently, the division experienced a shortage of heavy equipment, which still could not be transported across the Dvina. By evening, the division had only reached the line of Zoblev and the Stock Exchange. There was practically no resistance from the Soviet troops in front of her front, but from the east her flank was constantly attacked by the remnants of the 10th airborne brigade.

Manstein at the appropriate place in his memoirs becomes very verbose, but also very vague.

“Finally, on July 2, we were able to speak again after the third mechanized formation arrived in the corps - the SS division “Dead Head”, and to our left the 41st Panzer Corps crossed the Dvina near Jacobstadt ...

However, after a sudden raid on Dvinsk, 6 days have already passed. The enemy had the opportunity to overcome the shock that he received when German troops appeared on the eastern bank of the Dvina ...

Whether it would be possible to preempt the enemy to the same extent again was, at least, doubtful ... This would be possible only if the tank group managed to direct all its forces to carry out one task. Just this, as will be shown, did not happen, although the enemy did not have enough strength to stop the advance of the tank group. .

In any case, Manstein managed to break through the defenses of the 27th Army far from immediately. On the morning of June 1, the commander of the 27th Army, N. E. Berzarin (the future commandant of Berlin), received an order from the front command (given at 4:55) - to hold out at the occupied lines until July 5 at any cost. For this purpose, the 163rd motorized division of the 1st mechanized corps, transferred from the Northern Front, was transferred to the army. The division advanced to the Jaunlatgale, Karsava region with the task of covering the gap between the 8th and 27th armies and organizing anti-tank defense along the eastern banks of the Pededze and Aiviekste rivers on the front from Sita station to Lake Lubana, on the probable path of enemy tanks. Thus, even without intelligence data, the Soviet command correctly determined the route of the 1st and 6th German tank divisions.

By the evening of July 1, the forward detachments of the 1st Panzer Division had already reached Madon, 50 km from the Dvina. By order of Kuznetsov, one of the regiments of the 181st division of the 24th rifle corps was urgently sent here by the front. Reinforced by an artillery battalion and two anti-tank defense batteries, the regiment was to come under the command of the commander of the 202nd motorized division with the task of preventing the enemy from breaking through from Krustpils to Madona and further to the northeast. The rest of the division was ordered to move in a forced march to the Ostrov area, where to take up defense. At the same time, another order of the 8th Army prescribed “holding the front of Riga, Jekabpils, with our own forces to eliminate the enemy units that have broken through at Friedrichstadt, ensuring our left flank in the direction of Madona from the enemy’s attack and preventing it from spreading in the northern and northwestern directions ... be ready with a short strong blow from the area of ​​​​st. Luksty in the direction of Plavinas, in cooperation with the 27th Army, to eliminate the enemy units that had broken through from the direction of Jekabpils to Madona " .

For a counterattack towards Madona, it was proposed to use the remnants of the 12th mechanized corps, concentrated in the area of ​​Luksty station; at this point only 35 tanks remained in the corps.

At 0:25 on July 2, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe headquarters of the 12th mechanized corps, a pennant was dropped with an order from the army command to stop the withdrawal and restore the situation along the right bank of the Western Dvina. That is, the army headquarters had no other connection with the corps at that moment. Having tried to fulfill this order, the corps command at 02:50 ordered the 28th Panzer Division to take the former line along the Western Dvina bank in the area of ​​​​Koaknese, Plyavinas by 0700, the 202nd Motorized Rifle Division to hold the occupied line of Madona, Meyrany, and the 23rd Panzer divisions from the Medzula, Lyezere area to attack enemy units on the northern bank of Aiviekste in the Lyegrade area. By 2 pm on July 2, parts of the corps were even able to take their starting position for the attack - however, the attack did not take place, since the 181st and 48th rifle divisions, having not received an order to stop the withdrawal, had already retreated to the northeast.

Already during the retreat in the Gulbene area, the vanguard of the 645th motorized rifle regiment of the 202nd motorized division attacked an enemy motorized detachment, capturing two serviceable cars and 7 motorcycles. Documents of the 8th Panzer Division of the 56th Motorized Corps (?!) were seized in one of the vehicles, as well as an extract from the notorious directive of May 13 “On special jurisdiction in the Barbarossa zone” - the very one that Manstein allegedly refused to send to the troops...

Meanwhile, the 27th Army was threatened by a detour from the Madona region, so on the evening of July 1, N.E. Berzarin ordered his troops to withdraw to a new line - from Lake Luban to Lake Rezna, bending his right flank to the east. Despite the multiple superiority of the enemy, the retreat of the 27th Army was carried out systematically. By 17:00 on July 1, the army units, according to the operational report of the front headquarters No. 09 / op dated 11:45 on July 2, occupied the following position:

“a) The 10th airborne brigade during the day, fighting with small groups of the enemy, holds the line of Garvatsaynieki, Dekshorn, Prizhevo. Headquarters - Vilani. The 76-mm battery of the 9th anti-tank defense artillery brigade joined the brigade.

Losses: killed - 3 people, wounded - 4 people.

b) Parts of the Akimov group on 1.7.41 continued to hold and strengthen the line of Gashish, Bashki, Leitani, Bieshen. Headquarters - Lubana.

c) Parts of the Lelyushenko group during the day of 1.7.41 put themselves in order at the turn: 185th Infantry Division - Bieshen, Kovalev; 42nd Panzer Division - (suit.) Kovaleva, Kolei, Unguri.

In front of the front of the group, the 46th motorcycle regiment and the 44th tank battalion of the enemy were installed in battle. The enemy suffered significant losses. The entire headquarters of the tank battalion was destroyed. The 280th Infantry Regiment of the 185th Infantry Division, which lost many guns, suffered the greatest losses. .

At the same time, new corps arrived at the front, deploying at the turn of the old fortified areas:

“a) the 41st Rifle Corps - continues to concentrate in the Pskov, Ostrov area;

b) the 1st mechanized corps, consisting of one tank division and a motorized division, concentrated in the Pskov region;

c) the 22nd Rifle Corps - concentrated in the area of ​​Porkhov, Podseva, Gory;

d) 24th Rifle Corps - concentrated in the area (claim.) Ostrov, (claim.) Opochka, Novorzhev " .

In the operational report of the headquarters of the front No. 10 / op for July 2, the position of the arriving units looked as follows:

“a) the 1st mechanized corps (without the 1st tank and 163rd motorized divisions) - in the forests and the area of ​​​​st. Toroshino, Podborovye (18–20 km northeast of Pskov).

b) 41st Rifle Corps (118th, 111th and 235th Rifle Divisions) 1.7.41 began to unload at the station. Pskov, st. Cherskaya. Until 18:00 on July 2, 1941, 11 echelons of the 111th Rifle Division, 13 echelons of the 118th Rifle Division and 3 echelons on the way and 6 control echelons of the 41st Rifle Corps arrived. Transportation is very late.

Upon completion of the concentration, the corps has the task of defending the Pskov, Ostrov, Vystavka sector.

c) 22nd Rifle Corps: 180th Rifle Division concentrated in the Porkhov area, 182nd Rifle Division from 1.7.41 on the move from the Petseri area to Porkhov.

d) 24th Rifle Corps: 181st Rifle Division - from 1.7.41 on the move from the Gulbene area to the Ostrov area, 183rd Rifle Division - on the move from the Tsesisvraion Ostrov area " .

At that moment, the 1st mechanized corps (3rd tank, 163rd motorized divisions and 5th motorcycle regiment) had 371 tanks - 26 medium three-tower T-28,225 light BTs and 120 flamethrower T-26s, as well as 135 armored vehicles. The corps was staffed close to the staff, that is, it had 20-25 thousand people. However, even earlier, one tank battalion, an anti-aircraft division and a certain amount of vehicles were withdrawn from the corps.

On the afternoon of June 1, the headquarters of the North-Western Front received a directive from the Stavka, signed by G.K. Zhukov, which required “conduct an active operation to eliminate the crossed to the northern bank of the river. Zap. Dvina of the enemy in order to firmly gain a foothold in the future on its northern coast ". For the operation, it was allowed to use the 112th Infantry Division of the 22nd Army of the Western Front, as well as the 163rd Motorized Division of the 1st Mechanized Corps, arriving in the North-Western Front.

In pursuance of this directive, at 0:17 on July 2, the front commander gave N.E. Berzarin a new order:

“The 27th Army with the 163rd Motorized Division, in cooperation with the 12th Infantry Division of the 22nd Army, pinning down the enemy in the center along the Rezekne-Daugavpils highway, strike with the flanks of the army, cover the Daugavpils region from the west and east, surround and destroy enemy in the area of ​​Daugavpils and northeast. By the end of 2.7.41, capture Daugavpils with moving parts and go out. Zap. Dvina .

The corresponding order of the commander of the 27th Army was sent to the troops only at about 8 o'clock in the morning and arrived there by 10 o'clock. The formations of the front holding the defense were extremely few in number; it is unlikely that they had the opportunity to launch a serious counteroffensive. Moreover, the Stavka, contrary to the belief of some modern historians, did not require this - remember that Zhukov's directive of June 30 ordered Kuznetsov only to detain the enemy for 3-4 days and prevent him from spreading along the northern bank of the Dvina.

Moreover, at 2 a.m., even before the arrival of the order from the front headquarters, the commander of the 27th Army ordered the systematic withdrawal of his troops from Dvinsk:

"…4. 27th Army rear guard in parts to firmly hold the enemy on the occupied line and begin to withdraw sequentially, along the lines, only under pressure from a superior enemy, preventing the defeat of the battle formation in parts.

5. Intermediate defensive lines of retreat: the first - Lake. Lubana, r. Malta, r. Rezekne to st. Kazraji, Tiskadi, Malta, lake. Rezna-ezers, oz. Osha-ezers;

the second - r. Iga to Martuzani, Stiglov, Degl-va, Mozuli, Miroeda;

the third - Nosova, Augshpils, Krasny, Opochka.

6. Sequence of withdrawal: to line No. 1 - by the end of 2.7.41; to line No. 2 - by the end of 3.7.41; to line No. 3 - by the end of 4.7.41

7. Guryev's group to retreat in its lane, providing a junction with units of the 8th Army. The concentration area after the withdrawal of Marshavitsa, Soshihino, passing into the subordination of Akimov.

The border on the left - Larks, Augshpils, Bashki, Driceni, (suit.) Preili.

8. Akimov's group, retreating in its lane, cover the highway from a breakthrough of motorized units to the north. The concentration area is Marshavitsy, Soshihino.

The border on the left is (claimed) Maromohi, (claimed) Red, Ludza, Oguretska, Bikernieki.

9. Lelyushenko's group to depart in the indicated lane along the lines; after retreating beyond the UR, concentrate in the area of ​​​​st. Vereshchagin, Vysotskoye…”

This order turned out to be very timely: at 11 o'clock on July 2, Manstein himself launched an offensive. All day long, army formations repulsed the attacks of enemy tanks and infantry in the area of ​​Vilana, Preili and at the line of Aglona station, Leitani, Lake Sivera.

At 8:09, having finally received an order from the front headquarters, the commander of the 27th Army, by combat order No. 014, again ordered the troops to advance on Dvinsk. Fortunately, it was already too late - by the time the German offensive began, this order could not get into the troops.

By the end of the day on July 2, the army continued to hold the front from Lake Luban through Vilany, Prizhevo, Preili, the Aglona station, Leitani to Lake Siver. In front of the army front, the non-existent 226th and 18th Infantry Divisions were installed, as well as the very real 3rd Motorized Division. In addition to it, in reality, the 8th Panzer and units of the 290th and 121st Infantry Divisions, as well as the motorized division of the SS "Dead Head" operated here. The reconnaissance detachment of this division, numbering about 200 people, broke through our guard along the highway, moved to Sebezh and broke into the city of Dagda around noon. To the west of the city was the command post of the 42nd Panzer Division and the reserve of the 21st Mechanized Corps - tank and motorcycle battalions. Urgently sent to Dagda, they defeated the German detachment in a short battle; 126 serviceable motorcycles and 34 SS prisoners were captured, including two officers.

The SS men turned out to be extremely talkative - it turned out that the advance detachment of the division was following the reconnaissance detachment to Dagda. The commander of the 42nd Panzer Division, Colonel Voeikov, organized an ambush, as a result of which the reconnaissance battalion of the "Dead Head" was almost completely destroyed, consisting of 10 tanks, 15 armored personnel carriers, 18 guns and 200 vehicles.

German sources are very muffled about this defeat. Manstein complains that the SS, despite their courage and excellent equipment, did not have enough experience and suffered too high losses. In popular books on the history of the SS troops and the Totenkopf Division, it is mentioned in passing that the 1st Motorized Regiment of the Totenkopf lost about a hundred people in the battle near Dagda. On the contrary, V. Haupt writes that during these battles, the "Dead Head" lost two-thirds of its (apparently combat) composition and was reduced to one regiment.

As a result, despite a significant superiority in strength, during the day of fighting on July 2, Manstein managed to advance only 7-10 km. So far, there has been no talk of any breakthrough in the Soviet defense.

By the end of the day, the units of the 27th Army had 3,200 bayonets, 95 guns and 80–90 tanks. Akimov's group defended on the outskirts of Rezekne, the 163rd motorized division of the 1st mechanized corps (529th and 759th motorized rifle regiments) advanced to the Rezekne area, with its participation and with the support of the left-flank 112th rifle division of the 22nd army, the front command still intended to launch a counterattack in the direction of Dvinsk on the morning of July 3.

During the day, the columns of the 163rd motorized division were repeatedly attacked by enemy aircraft. The losses were insignificant, but the division's advance was delayed. Only by 20 o'clock the advanced units of the division reached the northern outskirts of Rezekne. Unfortunately, the 25th tank regiment of the division (without the 3rd battalion) was sent from Pskov by rail and, due to the untimely delivery of the train, began to arrive at Rezekne station only by 11 o’clock on July 3, when the main forces of the division were already drawn into a fierce battle south of the city.

On the morning of July 3, the position of the troops of the front was as follows. Parts of the 8th Army occupied the Sigulda line, Luksty station, Madona. On the Pskov direction, the remnants of the 12th mechanized corps retreated through Madona and to the east of it on Gulbene, on the morning of July 3, they defended along the line of Sakstagala, Malta, Luni, Lake Siver. To cover Rezekne, in addition to units of the 163rd motorized division, a front headquarters security battalion was thrown from the west, which repelled enemy attacks and held the Sakstagala area until the morning of July 3.

The left flank and the center of the 27th Army have so far managed to hold their positions, but the right flank was exposed due to the withdrawal of the 12th Mechanized Corps. As early as June 2, after a fierce battle in the Vilyana region, units of the 10th Airborne Brigade, having suffered losses, were dispersed by the motorized infantry of the 6th Panzer Division, operating with the support of a company of tanks. On the evening of July 2, Akimov's group, under the onslaught of tanks and motorized infantry of the 8th Panzer Division, withdrew to the Malta region (12 km southwest of Rezekne) and since then there has been no news from it. The road to Rezekne was open.

By this time, the command of the North-Western Front had finally abandoned plans for a counteroffensive. A combat order dated 02:00 on July 3 ordered the 27th Army to “holding back the enemy and destroying his columns that have gone too far with short counterattacks, preserving manpower and equipment, continue the defense of the direction”. The 163rd motorized division was now planned to be used for a counterattack against the forces of the 41st motorized corps and to restore contact with Akimov's group south of Rezekne.

Meanwhile, on the morning of July 3, troops of the 41st Motorized Corps reached Lake Lubana, units of the 6th Panzer Division bypassed it from the east, and the 1st Panzer Division from the west. The remnants of our 202nd motorized division, after an unsuccessful counterattack in the Madona area, withdrew to the Dzelzava manor area. In total, the combat composition of the 12th mechanized corps by this time remained:

“23rd Panzer Division - 10 tanks, 150 infantry, no shells;

28th Panzer Division - 22 tanks, a motorized rifle regiment almost at full strength;

202nd motorized division - about 600 people; motorcycle regiment does not exist" .

At 3 pm on July 3, units of the 1st Panzer Division of the 41st Motorized Corps occupied Gulbene, pushing back the remnants of the 202nd Motorized Division defending here. By the evening of the same day, tanks of the 8th Panzer Division of the 56th Motorized Corps broke into Rezekne, where the headquarters of the 27th Army had recently been located. Two regiments of the 163rd Motorized Division and half of the 25th Tank Regiment, which arrived too late, could not hold back the enemy, although they seriously halted his advance.

Worst of all, on the evening of July 3, the forward detachments of the 6th Panzer Division, bypassing the defenses of the units of the 163rd Motorized Rifle Division near Karsava along country roads, broke from the west into the town of Gauri on the Dvinsk-Pskov highway, 55 km from Rezekne and in 20 km north of Karsava. At 16:20, a German reconnaissance detachment of 5-6 tanks was discovered on the highway in the Vilaka (Vyshgorodok) area, just 45 km from Ostrov.

As a result, Soviet troops were thrown off the highway with a side impact. The 163rd Motorized Division had to retreat eastward to Krasny Ostrov and the Lzha River. The path was open to the enemy along the highway towards Ostrov and Pskov - but, again, there was no merit of the 56th motorized corps in this ...

By evening, the Soviet command identified two main directions of the enemy's offensive: Krustpils - Madonna - Gulbene and Dvinsk - Rezekne. However, it still had no idea that the Germans were "castling" their motorized corps. The 41st, taking advantage of the open flank of the 27th Army and the absence of organized Soviet troops to its right, went to the Pskov highway, while the 56th went east - to Pushkinskiye Gory, Sebezh and Opochka.

The 21st Mechanized Corps, which formed the center and left flank of the 27th Army, was thrown back east of the Dvinsk-Pskov highway and could no longer impede the enemy's advance towards Ostrov. By the end of the day, the 46th Panzer and 185th Motorized Divisions were defending in the Brodaizhe area east and southeast of Rezekne with their front to the west. The 42nd Panzer Division still held Dagda and the area south of Lake Yesha; to the left of it to the Western Dvina and along the line of the river to the city of Drissa, the 122nd rifle division held the front.

On July 4, the enemy's 3rd motorized division, advancing towards Opochka, occupied Ludza. Moving to the right along the highway Kraslava - Sebezh, the SS division "Dead Head" finally captured Dagda and went east of Lake Yesha, finally disconnecting the corps. It was followed by the 121st Infantry Division.

And here the Germans were again unlucky. The withdrawal of the 42nd Panzer Division was covered by its 42nd motorized rifle regiment, Colonel A. M. Goryainov. Feeling the weakness of the German infantry, Colonel Goryainov launched a counterattack - and hit the headquarters of the 121st Infantry Division directly. During a short battle, the headquarters was defeated, the division commander, Major General Otto Lanzelle, died.

By the end of July 5, the 42nd tank and 185th motorized rifle divisions of the 21st mechanized corps retreated beyond the old border line to the Sebezh region and were withdrawn to the front reserve; The 46th Panzer Division continued to operate at Opochka.

By this time, the 24th Latvian Territorial Rifle Corps, which had finally arrived here, had finally been transferred to the army, in fact, before that it had not taken part in the battles. On the afternoon of July 6, the commander of the 27th Army, Major General N. E. Berzarin, reported to the Military Council of the front on the state of his troops:

“The existing corps and divisions bear only this name, but in fact it looks like this:

a) The 24th Rifle Corps - completely unprepared units that do not have our equipment, armed with all weapon systems - all brands of the world. It is impossible to supply them with ammunition and spare parts.

There are no headquarters, no means of communication, the staffing of the commanding staff is up to 12-15%, the shortage is up to 90%.

Now in this corps (181st plus 128th rifle divisions) there are no more than 8 thousand.

b) The 21st mechanized corps has endured heavy fighting, its special units are dropping out, and in fact the corps is being eaten by the enemy.

c) The 163rd motorized division after heavy fighting is completely unfit for combat, having lost people (up to 60%), losing artillery (up to 70%), losing tanks (up to 50%). All these data are only approximate - they are currently being collected and counted. A division cannot be thrown into battle.

d) The 235th Rifle Division (arrived as one 806th Rifle Regiment) - I don’t know where it is and when it will be at our front.

In short, a rather difficult situation has arisen that can only be rectified by a cardinal decision - to create a strong defensive zone in the depths with fresh units, and to withdraw the entire listed composition behind some kind of barrier and form it for new actions. It must be borne in mind that the army in its composition has thousands of examples of courage and heroism of all and many people. But the trouble is that we do not have a well-established command and control, we do not have aviation, and the enemy, using our weak points, persistently uses them ... aviation literally terrorizes our units, being unpunished.

Lieutenant General Comrade Akimov, whom I am sending to you as having already completed his tasks, can report in detail on the state of affairs.

I and all of us have enough determination to fight and fight by any means, but for the common good of the country, I would like to orient you with this short note. .

Thus, the front of the 27th Army was broken through only on July 3. It should be noted that this happened as a result of bypassing it from the west and the defeat of the right flank by the forces of the 41st motorized corps, which broke through from the Krustpils area to the junction of two Soviet armies. We have already analyzed the reasons for this breakthrough.

It can be stated that the bridgehead at Dvinsk did not play a decisive role in the success of the German offensive. The Soviet defense was broken through by the blow of the 41st motorized corps from the bridgehead at Krustpils - and this success of the Germans, in turn, was due to the untimely withdrawal of two divisions of the 11th rifle corps.

The enemy did not count on success at Krustpils, where he did not have a permanent bridge at his disposal, and made the main bet on the bridgehead in the Dvinsk region. However, during the week Manstein was unable to crush the defenses of the opposing units of the 27th Army, which were significantly inferior in size and capabilities to his 56th Motorized Corps. And only the mistake of the commander of the North-Western Front, combined with the delay in orders caused by poor communications, led to disastrous results.

On June 3, F.I. Kuznetsov was removed from his post and a week later he was appointed commander of the 21st Army. The next day, the former commander of the 8th Army, Lieutenant-General P.P. Sobennikov, took his place, and Corps Commissar V.N. Bogatkin became a member of the military council. Even earlier (July 1), Lieutenant-General N.F. Vatutin, the former Deputy Chief of the General Staff, assumed the post of chief of staff of the front.

P. P. Sobennikov recalled:

“On July 3, 1941, already on the retreat from the city of Riga, which was occupied by small units of the Germans, I received an order from the front commander, Colonel General Kuznetsov, to assume the post of commander of the North-Western Front. I received this prescription from a motorcyclist. On July 3, I met, having arrived in Pskov, at my reserve command post, General Ivanov, appointed in my place, oriented him on the move in the situation known to me and, having arrived at the headquarters of the front near the city of Pskov, took command of the troops of the front of the same date " .

From that moment on, the fate of the North-Western Front depended on whether the unfired troops of the 41st, 24th, and 1st Mechanized Corps would manage to take defensive lines along the old border line and the Velikaya River in time, and on the number of front forces that could be withdrawn to these lines.

According to the report of the headquarters of the North-Western Front to the General Staff of the Red Army dated July 4, 1941, in total there were:

8th Army:

10th Rifle Division: officers - 52, junior officers - 81, privates - 429. Total - 562. Horses - 10. Ordinary rifles - 257, automatic - 76, light machine guns - 5, easel - 3, DP - 6, cars - 9, carts - 3, kitchens - 1.

11th rifle division: personnel -1450; easel machine guns - 6, 45-mm guns - 1, 122-mm - 3, armored vehicles - 1.

48th Rifle Division: officers - 336, junior officers - 348, privates - 1365. Total - 2049. Horses - 765. Ordinary rifles - 1445, automatic - 198, light machine guns - 45, easel - 26, large-caliber - 3 , anti-aircraft guns - 6, DP - 89, guns 45 mm - 15, 76 mm - 12, 76 mm anti-aircraft guns - 3.122 mm - 23.152 mm - 1, motor vehicles - 91, radium - 14, tractors - 15.

67th Rifle Division - no information.

The 125th Rifle Division, together with the corps units of the 11th Rifle Corps: officers - 681, junior officers - 550, privates - 5489. Total - 6720. Horses - 501. Ordinary rifles - 6496, automatic - 35, light machine guns - 80, easel - 25, anti-aircraft guns - 23, DP - 35, guns 45 mm - 5, 76 mm - 12, 122 mm - 10, 152 mm - 46, cars - 292, motorcycles - 1, tractors - 87.

10th rifle corps with corps units: officers - 170, junior officers - 246, privates - 1439. Total - 1855. Ordinary rifles - 850, light machine guns - 63, easel -11, anti-aircraft guns - 2, walkie-talkies - 5, guns 45 mm - 1, 76 mm -2, 76 mm anti-aircraft guns -26.122 mm - 26, 152 mm - 9, vehicles - 61, tractors - 42.

12th Mechanized Corps:

Management and corps: personnel - 1550, tanks - 32.

23rd Panzer Division: officers - 384, junior officers - 347, privates - 2467. Total - 3198. Rifles - 2008, light machine guns - 42, 37-mm guns - 12, 45-mm - 10, 122- mm - 7, tanks - 11, armored vehicles - 2, vehicles - 167.

28th Panzer Division: officers - 464, junior officers - 578, privates - 2692. Total - 3734. Ordinary rifles - 2276, automatic - 2, mortars -2, light machine guns - 59, anti-aircraft guns - 2, DP - 41 , guns 45 mm - 0.37 mm - 6, 76 mm - 1.122 mm -2.152 mm - 1, tanks - 3 , cars - 384.

9th anti-tank defense artillery brigade: officers - 226, junior officers - 356, privates - 1549. Total 2131. Ordinary rifles - 1686, automatic - 6, light machine guns - 27, DP - 3, 76-mm guns - 13.85 mm - 7, cars - 64, radios - 12, motorcycles - 3, tractors - 3.

Directorate of the 65th Rifle Corps: officers - 63, junior officers - 245, privates - 245. Total - 553. Ordinary rifles - 286, manual - 3, vehicles - 30, radios - 3.

No information was received on the 2nd Panzer Division, the motorcycle regiment of the 3rd Mechanized Corps.

202nd motorized division: officers - 114, junior officers - 46, privates - 875. Total - 1035. Rifles - 306, light machine guns - 22, DP - 2, 76-mm guns - 2, 122-mm - 6 , tanks T-26 - 5, T-38 - 1.

27th Army:

Army Directorate, 5th Airborne Corps, 112th tank and 163rd motorized divisions of the 1st mechanized corps: commanders - 3715, junior officers - 6088, privates - 22181. Total - 31,984. Horses - 94. Rifles - 16971, automatic rifles - 1016, mortars -243 , light machine guns - 660, easel - 151, large-caliber - 36, anti-aircraft - 23, DP -1747, 37-mm guns - 20, 45-mm - 95, 76-mm - 48, 76-mm anti-aircraft guns - 4, 122- mm - 12, 152-mm - 12, tanks - 360, armored vehicles - 73, vehicles - 3632, radios - 7.

Management of the 22nd Rifle Corps and corps units: officers - 400, junior officers - 340, privates - 1432. Total - 2172. Guns 107-mm - 53, 152-mm - 9.

180th Rifle Division: officers - 1030, junior officers - 1160, privates - 9132. Total - 11 322. Horses - 3039. Rifles - 11 645, mortars - 35, light machine guns - 535, easel - 212, large-caliber - 3, anti-aircraft - 24, DP - 5, walkie-talkies - 0, 37-mm guns - 31, 45-mm - 58, 76-mm - 74, 76-mm anti-aircraft - 4, 122-mm - 14, 152-mm - 12, armored vehicles - 6, vehicles - 72.

182nd Rifle Division - no information received.

(From) 24th Rifle Corps, 181st and 183rd Rifle Divisions, 41st Rifle Corps, 111.48 and 235th Rifle Divisions no information was received.

Management and body parts1st Mechanized Corps: officers - 216, junior officers - 250, privates - 1255. Total - 1721. Rifles - 193, automatic - 1, mortars - 24, light machine guns - 162.

3-tank division: officers - 1096, junior officers - 1652, privates - 6455. Total - 9203. Ordinary rifles - 4847, automatic - 946; mortars -39, light machine guns - 161, easel - 35, guns 45 mm - 5, 76 mm - 4.152 mm - 12.203 mm - 12, tanks T-26 - 16, T-38 - 27, BT-7 - 121, others - 36, armored vehicles - 81, motor vehicles - ... 10 .

17th Communications Regiment: officers - 92, junior officers - 205, privates - 468. Total 765. Rifles - 516, light machine guns - 7.

25th Engineer Regiment: officers - 14, junior officers - 29, privates - 187. Total - 230. Vehicles - 2.

402nd howitzer artillery regiment: officers - 155, junior officers - 266, privates - 885. Total - 1306. Rifles - 1962, automatic - 4, light machine guns - 5, 122-mm guns - 2, 203-mm - 24, armored vehicles - 0, cars - 112, motorcycles - 12, tractors - 104.

110th howitzer artillery regiment: officers - 143, junior officers - 190, privates - 1205. Total - 1538. Rifles - 1862, guns of the 203rd - 22, vehicles - 112.

10th air defense brigade: officers - 176, junior officers - 272, privates - 1774. Total - 2222. 85-mm guns - 24, 76-mm - 37, 40-mm - 16.37-mm - 16 , heavy machine guns - 2, quad installations - 16, cars - 95, motorcycles - 8, tractors - 27, radio stations - 9.

12th air defense brigade: officers - 114, junior officers - 85, privates - 479. Total - 678. No guns, quad installations - 1, vehicles - 30.

14th air defense brigade: officers - 81, junior officers - 37, privates - 252. Total - 370. 85-mm - 4.37-mm guns - 3, heavy machine guns - 3, quad installations - 7, cars - 34.

306th separate anti-aircraft artillery battalion: officers - 22, junior officers - 39, privates - 256, 85-mm guns - 8, quadruple installations - 3, vehicles - 13.

362nd separate anti-aircraft artillery battalion: officers - 38, junior officers - 57, privates - 329. Total - 424. 76-mm guns - 7, quad installations - 8, vehicles - 33, tractors - 3.

Air Force:

6th mixed aviation division: officers - 577, junior officers - 1345, privates - 1378. Total - 3300. Rifles - 2723, aircraft - 69.

7th mixed aviation division: officers - 536, junior officers - 1422, privates - 1260. Total - 3218. Rifles - no data. Aircraft I-16 - 2; I-15bis - 19; I-153 - 2; Sat - 3. Total - 26.

8th mixed aviation division: officers - 804, junior officers - 678, privates - 846. Total - 2328. MiG-3 aircraft - 14, I-153 - 8, I-16 - 1, I-15bis - 6 Total - 29.

57th mixed aviation division: officers - 781, junior officers - 667, privates - 693. Total - 2141. I-16 aircraft - 6, I-153 - 18, SB - 5. Total - 22.

By 11th Army (16th rifle corps, 29th rifle corps, 179th and 184th rifle divisions, 5.33, 128, 188,126,23rd rifle divisions, 84th motorized division, 5th tank division, 10 -I anti-tank defense artillery brigade, 429th howitzer artillery regiment, 4th and 30th pontoon regiments) no information .

I specifically decided to wait until the annual parade dust around May 9 settles a little. Below you can see several dozen pictures taken in May of this year in one of the bloodiest "squares" of the "Demyansky Cauldron". I have been going there for far from the first year, I try to communicate as much as possible with the few participants in the events there and eyewitnesses, since there are still such people. I didn’t write about my impressions, it’s too violently there you can feel everything described. But I’ll say one thing - now a kind of animal fear sometimes rolls over there, especially when you try to imagine what exactly those who fought there experienced.

From January 7 to May 20, 1942, the troops of the North-Western Front (P.A. Kurochkin) carried out the Demyansk offensive operation. In the course of it, by the end of February, Soviet troops separated the old Russian and Demyansk enemy groups, and surrounded the latter, consisting of six divisions of the 16th Army. However, the liquidation of the encircled group was delayed, and by April 23 the enemy managed to unite with the encircled troops, forming the so-called Ramushevsky corridor 4 km wide. Further offensive actions of the Soviet troops in order to eliminate the Demyansk group were not successful. The struggle of the parties unfolded in the zone of the formed corridor, which by the end of April was expanded by the enemy to 6-8 km.

Map of military operations

Map of military operations

Not far from the mouth of the corridor, in the winter of 1941-1942, truly tragic events unfolded. Attempts to advance the Red Army only on a small sector of the front turned into bloody losses: about 18,000 soldiers and officers and more than 80 tanks. Soldiers of the SS division "Totenkopf" and the Danish SS corps also fought against the Red Army. The Germans staunchly defended themselves, turning the forests adjacent to settlements into deeply echeloned fortified areas. Blockages, barbed wire and continuous minefields awaited the attackers in addition to cold, non-freezing swamps, machine-gun and artillery fire.

There are a lot of such funnels filled with water in the forest. Quite often they are found dropped after the battle killed.

There are a lot of such funnels filled with water in the forest. Quite often they are found dropped after the battle killed.

Scattered everywhere helmets with the most intricate holes are collected in heaps, and those of them that are not too rusty and mutilated are used to build simple home-made monuments

Scattered everywhere helmets with the most intricate holes are collected in heaps, and those of them that are not too rusty and mutilated are used to build simple home-made monuments

The forest in our offensive zone is crammed with rusty, mutilated iron. And of course people...

The forest in our offensive zone is crammed with rusty, mutilated iron. And of course people...

British smoke mine

British smoke mine

german newspaper

german newspaper

Asterisks from fraternal mogi, where their comrades were buried namelessly in 1941-1942

Asterisks from fraternal mogi, where their comrades were buried namelessly in 1941-1942

About unknown soldiers

Several units of medallions for several hundred found Red Army soldiers are a common thing. As a rule, the dead lie quite shallow, right under the turf. They do not have weapons with them or it was damaged in battle. Well, if a person is wearing a helmet, there is a chance to find him with a metal detector. We just found such a "mounted" fighter.

Of his personal belongings, he had only two coins of 20 kopecks, a bottle of cologne and a spoon with the brand of the city of Kirov. The spoon lay in a felt boot. There were no inscriptions or signs that could help identify the deceased ...

Sailors in the "cauldron"

Sailors also fought in the Demyansk "cauldron". As part of the naval infantry brigades. Naval rifle brigades began to be formed according to GKO Decree No. 810 of 10/18/41 on the formation of 25 rifle brigades and Order of the NPO of the USSR No. 00110 of 10/18/41 on the same (from number 61 to number 85). The recently adopted state of cadet rifle brigades was taken as a basis, in which there was one rifle regiment until the end of October. From the beginning of November, the brigades were transferred to the state of a separate rifle brigade with three rifle battalions. The name "marine rifle brigades" was given by the Order of NPO No. 0512 dated 12/27/41. Nothing other than the presence of 20 to 80% of sailors in l / s and the assignment of a different number of undergraduate cadets of military schools and district courses to them did not differ from ordinary rifle brigades. After the "October" brigades, according to the Decree of the State Defense Committee No. 935 of 11/22/41, 116, 138, 142 Omorsbr brigade were also formed according to the state of separate rifle brigades. In December 1941 - January 1942, the 154th Omorsbr brigade was formed (according to a separate NPO Directive).

It was formed on January 2, 1942 in Moscow as a result of the renaming of the 166th Marine Brigade, which, in turn, was renamed on December 28, 1941 from the 1st Moscow separate detachment of sailors withdrawn from the front to the capital. On January 19, the brigade was sent to the 3rd Shock Army of the Northwestern Front. Not a single brigade retained the word "cadet" in its name. Omorsbr of the formation of 1942 also did not have "cadet" in the name. The expression "cadet marine brigades" appeared, as it seems, by mixing heterogeneous facts into one. During the formation and in everyday life, the fighters of the omorsbr could call themselves the marines, the command too, but "marine rifle brigades" remained in history. As in the Order of the NPO.

The Order of Alexander Nevsky was awarded to commanders of the Red Army who showed personal courage, courage and courage in the battles for the Motherland and ensured the successful actions of their units with skillful command, for the initiative shown in choosing the right moment for a sudden bold and successful attack on the enemy and inflicting a major defeat on him with small losses for their troops.

The order was awarded to the commanders of regiments, battalions, companies, platoons. According to the Decree of the PVS of the USSR of November 10, 1942, the award of the order was extended to the commanders of divisions and brigades.

The first awarding of the order took place by the Decree of the PVS of the USSR of November 5, 1942. Badge No. 1 was received by the commander of the marine battalion of the 154th marine rifle brigade, senior lieutenant (later - lieutenant colonel) I.N. Ruban. .

The sailors really fought famously. Suddenly, boldly and courageously. In black pea coats, to the hoarse "Polunra!" they threw the Germans out of the small village and prepared for the next attack. And the Germans were also preparing. Reconnaissance, especially aerial reconnaissance, was excellent. And therefore, when the sailors fearlessly attacked again, the Germans met them with dagger fire from machine guns and self-propelled guns. They killed or wounded almost all the attackers, several dozen sailors were captured. Later, the Germans gathered all the dead and threw them into a deep adit in a sand pit. And bombarded with an explosion. Demyansk search engines have been looking for this adit for many years. Found.

Every day, a careful accounting of the found fighters is carried out. In total, over 300 fighters of the Red Army were found during the entire spring Watch

Every day, a careful accounting of the found fighters is carried out. In total, over 300 fighters of the Red Army were found during the entire spring Watch

About monuments

The Demyansk detachment has a commander. His will and hands created the vast majority of monuments and burials in those places. His detachment found and buried almost 9,000 dead soldiers - more than a DIVISION!

About beavers

Beavers have become the scourge of this year. The beavers skillfully dammed a small stream through which our troops advanced in the autumn and winter of 1941-1942.

Undermined

Undermined

Previously, it was possible to jump over the rivulet, but now we had to seriously overcome it by boat.

Previously, it was possible to jump over the rivulet, but now we had to seriously overcome it by boat.

About life