Sudan 1983. Sudan People's Liberation Army

The second civil war in Sudan is the war of the Arabs of Sudan against the non-Arab peoples of the South, which lasted 22 years (1983-2005) and was accompanied by acts of genocide, massacres and expulsions of the civilian population. According to a 2001 estimate, by this time about 2 million people had died, and 4 million were refugees. Civilian casualties were among the highest among post-World War II military conflicts. Military operations and the killing of citizens also caused famine and epidemic diseases, accompanied by death.
The war was fought between the Arab government of Sudan, based in the north, and the armed group SPLA (People's Liberation Army of Sudan, SPLA), representing non-Arab southerners. The cause of the war was the Islamization policy launched by the Sudanese government led by Jafar Nimeiri in 1983. The impetus for the start of the war was the tension in the country's armed forces, caused by the sending to the North of units consisting of non-Arab residents of the South. The fighting went on with varying success. A peace process began in 2002, culminating in January 2005 with the signing of the Naivasha Peace Agreement.

background

Causes and nature of the war

The civil war in Sudan is often characterized as a struggle between the central government and the peoples on the country's periphery. In addition, the conflict is also called inter-ethnic, since the north of the country was Arab, and in the south, mostly Negroid-Nilotic people lived. Also, the war can be called inter-religious, the north was Islamic, and the south was predominantly Christian and pagan.
One of the causes of the war was the struggle for natural resources. There are significant oil fields in South Sudan that the government wanted to fully control, and the southerners tried to keep control of the resources for themselves. 70% of Sudan's exports were oil sales. In addition, the soil in the Nile Valley in the south is much more fertile than in the north.

Before the war

At the time when Sudan was a colony of the British Empire, the north and south of Sudan were administratively divided and had practically no common features. However, in 1946 the British abolished this division. Arabic became the official language throughout Sudan. The infringement of the rights of the Negroid English-speaking population caused discontent in the south. After decolonization and declaration of independence, the interests of the southerners were not taken into account. The leading position in the country was taken by the northern Arab elite, after which riots broke out in the south of the country.
In 1962, the situation in Sudan escalated, the Islamic government banned the entry of Christian missionaries into the country and announced the closure of Christian schools. This led to clashes in the south of the country between government troops and disgruntled southerners. Gradually, these skirmishes escalated into a full-scale civil war. The first civil war ended in 1972 with the signing of the peace agreement in Addis Ababa. The treaty provided for broad religious and cultural autonomy for the South.
The internal policy of the Sudanese government (unsuccessful agrarian policy) led to the start of large-scale clashes throughout Sudan. The civil war between the government and the rebels in the south of the country took place in parallel with other conflicts - the Darfur conflict, clashes in the north of the country and the war between the Dinka and Nuer peoples.

Civil War

The beginning of the war

Violation of the Addis Ababa Agreement

The provisions of the Addis Ababa Agreement were incorporated into the Sudanese Constitution. As a result, the violation of these provisions by the government led to the outbreak of the second civil war. Sudanese President Jaafar Nimeiri tried to take control of the oil fields in the south of the country. In 1978, oil was discovered in Bantio, in southern Kordofan and in the Upper Blue Nile in 1979. In 1981, the Adar field was discovered, and in 1982, oil was found in Heglig. Access to oil fields gave a significant economic benefit to those who controlled them.
Islamic fundamentalists in the north of the country were unhappy with the provisions of the Addis Ababa agreement, which provided religious freedom in the south of the country to Christians and pagans. The positions of the Islamists gradually strengthened and in 1983 the President of Sudan announced that Sudan was becoming an Islamic republic and introduced Sharia throughout the country.

Sudan People's Liberation Army

The Sudan People's Liberation Army was founded in 1983 by a group of rebels to fight the government of Sudan in order to restore the autonomy of South Sudan. The group positioned itself as a defender of all the oppressed citizens of Sudan and stood for a united Sudan. NAOS leader John Garang criticized the government for its policies, which led to the disintegration of the country.
In September 1984, President Nimeiri announced the end of the state of emergency and the liquidation of the emergency courts, but soon promulgated a new judicial act that continued the practice of the emergency courts. Despite Nimeiri's public assurances that the rights of non-Muslims would be respected, these claims were viewed with extreme suspicion by southerners and other non-Muslims.

1985—1991

At the beginning of 1985, there was an acute shortage of fuel and food in Khartoum, drought, famine and the escalation of the conflict in the south of the country led to a difficult internal political situation in Sudan. On April 6, 1985, General Abdel al-Rahman Swar al-Dagab, with a group of senior officers, carried out a coup d'état. They did not approve of attempts to total Islamization of Sudan. The 1983 constitution was repealed, the ruling Sudanese Socialist Union party was dissolved, former President Nimeiri went into exile, but Sharia law was not repealed. After that, a transitional military council was created, headed by Sivar ad-Daghab. After that, an interim civilian government was formed, headed by Al-Jazuli Duffallah. In April 1986, elections were held in the country, after which a new government was formed, headed by Sadiq al-Mahdi from the Umma Party. The government consisted of a coalition of the Umma Party, the Democratic Union, Hassan Turabi's National Islamic Front. This coalition was dissolved and changed several times over the course of several years. Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and his party played a central role in Sudan during this time.

Negotiations and escalation

In May 1986, Sadiq al-Mahdi's government began peace talks with the SPNA, led by John Garang. During the year, Sudanese and NAOS representatives met in Ethiopia and agreed on the early abolition of Sharia law and the holding of a constitutional conference. In 1988, the SPNA and the Sudan Democratic Union agreed on a draft peace plan, including the abolition of military agreements with Egypt and Libya, the abolition of Sharia, the end of the state of emergency, and a ceasefire.
However, due to the aggravation of the situation in the country and the difficult economic situation in November 1988, Prime Minister al-Mahdi refused to approve the peace plan. After that, the Sudan Democratic Union withdrew from the government, after which representatives of Islamic fundamentalists remained in the government.
In February 1989, under pressure from the army, al-Mahdi formed a new government, calling for members of the Democratic Union, and adopted a peace plan. A constitutional conference was scheduled for September 1989.

National Salvation Revolutionary Command Council

On June 30, 1989, a military coup took place in Sudan led by Colonel Omar al-Bashir. After that, the "Council of the Revolutionary Command of National Salvation" was created, which was headed by al-Bashir. He also became Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces. Omar al-Bashir dissolved the government, banned political parties, trade unions and other "non-religious" institutions, and eliminated the free press. After that, the policy of Islamization of the country began again in Sudan.

Criminal Law 1991

In March 1991, the Sudan penal law was promulgated, which provided for punishments under Sharia law, including amputation of hands. Initially, these measures were largely ignored in the south of the country, but in 1993 the government began replacing non-Muslim judges in southern Sudan. In addition, a public order police was created to monitor compliance with Sharia norms, which monitored the rule of law.

the height of the war

Under the control of the People's Army for the Liberation of Sudan were part of the equatorial territories, Bahr el-Ghazal, Upper Nile. Also, rebel units were active in the southern part of Darfur, Kordofan and the Blue Nile. Under the control of government forces were large cities in the south: Juba, Wau and Malakal.
In October 1989, after a ceasefire, hostilities resumed. In July 1992, government forces in a large-scale offensive took control of southern Sudan and captured the headquarters of the SPNA in Torit
Under the pretext of fighting the insurgency, the Sudanese government has deployed significant army and police forces in the southern regions of the country. Often, however, these forces attacked and raided villages in order to obtain slaves and livestock. During these hostilities, according to various estimates, about 200,000 South Sudanese women and children were captured and enslaved by the Sudanese armed forces and irregular pro-government groups (People's Defense Army).

Disagreements in the NAOS

In August 1991, internal strife and a struggle for power began in the NAOS. Part of the rebels separated from the Sudan Liberation Army. An attempt was made to overthrow the leader of the NAOS, John Garang, from his post as leader. All this led to the emergence in September 1992 of the second faction of the rebels (led by William Bani), and in February 1993 the third (led by Cherubino Boli). April 5, 1993 in Nairobi (Kenya), the leaders of the breakaway rebel factions announced the formation of a coalition.

Towards a peaceful settlement

In 1990-1991, Sudan supported Saddam Hussein's regime in the Persian Gulf War. This changed the US attitude towards official Khartoum. The Bill Clinton administration banned American investment in the country and placed Sudan on the list of rogue states. Since 1993, the leaders of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya have held conferences to try for a peace settlement in Sudan under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Development Organization. In 1994, a declaration was drafted that aimed to identify the essential elements needed to achieve a just and comprehensive peace settlement and the south's right to self-determination. After 1997, the Sudanese government was forced to sign this declaration.
In 1995, the opposition in the north of the country united with political forces in the south and created a coalition of opposition parties called the National Democratic Alliance. It included the SPNA, the Sudan Democratic Union, the Umma Party and a number of minor parties of northern ethnic groups. In the same year, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda stepped up their military assistance to the rebels. All this led to the fact that in 1997 the Sudanese government was forced to sign the Khartoum Agreement with a number of rebel groups led by General Riek Machar. Under its terms, the South Sudan Defense Army, which included former rebels, was created on the territory of South Sudan. They served as a militia in South Sudan, guarding Sudanese army garrisons and oil fields from possible attacks by unreconciled rebels. Many rebel leaders began to cooperate with Khartoum, entered into joint government bodies, and also conducted joint military operations with the northerners.
The Sudanese government was also forced to sign a declaration on the cultural autonomy of the south and its right to self-determination. In 1999, President Omar al-Bashir offered the SPNA cultural autonomy within Sudan, but John Garang rejected the offer and the fighting continued.

Peaceful agreement

Between 2002 and 2004, a ceasefire was negotiated between SPLA and the government of Sudan, although armed clashes between rebels and government forces continued. As a result, after lengthy negotiations on January 9, 2005 in Nairobi, the Vice President of Sudan, Ali Osman Mahammad Taha, and the leader of the SPNA, John Garang, signed a peace agreement.
The peace treaty defined a transitional period on the status of South Sudan, an immediate ceasefire, established demobilization, the number of armed groups, the distribution of funds from the sale of oil and other aspects of the life of the country. According to the peace treaty, autonomy was granted to the south of the country for 6 years, after which a referendum on the independence of South Sudan was to be held. Revenues from the sale of oil were distributed equally between the Sudanese authorities and the southerners, the Islamic Sharia in the south was abolished.
John Garang became the leader of the autonomous south, as well as one of the two vice-presidents of Sudan.

International assistance

In March 1989, the government of Sadiq al-Mahdi agreed with the UN on the details of a plan for the supply of humanitarian aid, called "Operation Lifeline Sudan" (Eng. "Operation Lifeline Sudan" (OLS)). As part of this operation, 100,000 tons of food was transferred to the warring parties. The second phase of the operation was approved by the government of Sudan and the SPNA in March 1990. In 1991, a drought causes food shortages throughout the country.
The US, UN and many other countries have tried to support and coordinate international assistance for northern and southern Sudan. However, due to human rights violations by Sudan and the policy of the Sudanese government towards the Gulf War, it was difficult for Sudan to receive humanitarian aid.

Effects

During the second civil war in Sudan, as a result of fighting, ethnic cleansing, starvation, between 1.5 and 2 million people were killed and died. An estimated 4-5 million people became refugees, 20% of the refugees left South Sudan.
A long and bloody conflict has exhausted the country. The economic situation was difficult, huge expenses were spent on the conduct of hostilities, and there was a constant threat of starvation.
On October 11, 2007, the SPNA withdrew from the Sudanese government, accusing Khartoum of violating the terms of the peace agreement. By this time, more than 15,000 troops from Northern Sudan had not left the territory of the south. However, the NAOS has also stated that it does not intend to return to war.
On December 13, 2007, the NAOS returned to the government. Thereafter, government seats were distributed on a rotational basis between Juba and Khartoum every three months.
On January 8, 2008, the troops of Northern Sudan finally left South Sudan.
On January 9-15, 2011, the planned independence referendum was held in South Sudan. During the plebiscite, 98.8% voted for independence, which was proclaimed on July 9, 2011. Northern Sudan recognized the south a day earlier. Difficulties in establishing the border between the two countries led to the beginning of armed clashes in South Kordofan (2011) and to the border conflict (2012) between Sudan and South Sudan.

Humanitarian consequences

The protracted civil war forced about 4 million people to become refugees. Most fled to major cities in southern Sudan such as Juba, while others fled to northern Sudan or neighboring countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Egypt. Many refugees were unable to provide themselves with food, and as a result, many died due to malnutrition and hunger. Between 1.5 and 2 million people died during the 21 years of conflict. The devastation and lack of investment in the southern part of the country led to the emergence of the "lost generation".
The peace agreement signed in 2005 did not stop the bloodshed in Darfur, where the armed conflict continued.

Eastern front

The Eastern Front is a coalition of rebel groups operating in eastern Sudan near the border with Eritrea. The Eastern Front protested against inequality and sought a redistribution of oil revenues between local authorities and official Khartoum. The rebels threatened to cut off oil supplies from fields in Port Sudan and disrupt the construction of a second oil refinery in the city.
Initially, the coalition of rebel groups was actively supported by Eritrea, but then Asmara became actively involved in the peace process. In 2006, the government of Sudan and the leadership of the front began negotiations and signed a peace agreement on October 14, 2006. The agreement provides for the division of oil revenues, as well as the further integration of the three eastern states (Red Sea, Kassala and Gedaref) into one administrative unit.

child soldiers

The armies of both sides enrolled children in their ranks. The 2005 agreement was necessary for child soldiers to be demobilized and sent home. The SPNA claimed to have released 16,000 of its child soldiers between 2001 and 2004. However, international observers (UN and Global Report 2004) found demobilized children re-recruited by the SPLA. In 2004, there were between 2,500 and 5,000 children serving in the NAOS. The rebels promised to demobilize all children by the end of 2010.

Foreign arms shipments

After Sudan gained independence, the United Kingdom became the main supplier of weapons for the Sudanese army. However, in 1967, after the Six-Day War, relations between Sudan and Great Britain deteriorated sharply, as well as with the USA and Germany. From 1968 to 1972, the USSR and other CMEA member countries delivered a large amount of weapons to Sudan, and also trained personnel for the Sudanese armed forces. A large number of tanks, aircraft and guns were put into service, which were the main weapons in the army until the end of the 1980s. As a result of the 1972 coup d'état, relations between Sudan and the USSR cooled, but arms supplies continued until 1977, and in the late 1970s, China became the main supplier of weapons for the Sudanese army. Also in the 1970s, Egypt was an important partner for Sudan. The Egyptian side supplied missiles, armored personnel carriers and other military equipment.
In the 1970s, arms supplies from the United States resumed. They reached their peak in 1982, when the cost of purchased weapons amounted to 101,000,000 US dollars. After the outbreak of the war, deliveries began to decline and finally ended in 1987. According to some reports, in 1993, Iran financed the purchase of 20 Chinese attack aircraft by Sudan. The Iranian leadership also provided financial assistance to the Sudanese government.
The rebels received weapons from Eritrea, Uganda and Ethiopia. The Israeli Embassy in Kenya was engaged in the supply of anti-tank missiles to the NAOS units

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Question #31

A new round of crisis in relations between the two regions of Sudan came at the beginning 1980s, when Khartoum effectively disavowed the key provisions (AAC) of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement. The southerners responded with a new anti-government uprising, which led to the beginning of the second civil war in the modern history of the country (1983-2005). The government was opposed by the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by the rebellious Colonel J. Garang, which, unlike its predecessors - the rebels of the first civil war - did not put forward separatist demands during the first war.

The main reasons new armed uprising thus became:

· infringement by the central government of Sudan of the political and cultural autonomy of the southern region;

Dissatisfaction of the educated part of the South Sudanese society with the authoritarian methods of governing the country, which in the 1970s - early 1980s. the government of J. Nimeiri systematically resorted to;

· South Sudan's protest against the introduction of Sharia law throughout the country;

· dissatisfaction of former members of the Anya-Nya movement with their financial situation and career prospects in the Sudanese army.

· an external factor - the interest of the neighboring countries of Sudan in destabilizing the southern region of the country and weakening the government of Nimeiri.

During the period under review, the circle of external forces that influenced the relationship between the North and the South was constantly changing. At the same time, it is possible to single out a group of international organizations and governments of foreign countries, which during the entire period of 1983-2011. or a significant part of it had the most serious levers of influence on the situation in Sudan. These include international organizations (UN, OAU, AU and IG AD), neighboring countries of Sudan ( Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Egypt, Libya, Zaire/DRC and etc.), USA, UK and, to a lesser extent, France as the most interested representatives of Western countries, European Union, China, as well as Saudi Arabia and Iran as Khartoum's key partners in the Middle East. Russia, like the USSR in 1983-1991, was not directly involved in Sudanese affairs, but its status and capabilities as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, as well as the position of an interested observer, allowed the country to be one of the significant players.

The interests and motives of the external actors involved in the conflict were diverse.. For some, in the first place was the interest in the resources of Sudan, in particular oil and water. Others were motivated by the security of their borders with the southern region of Sudan, fearing the destabilizing impact of the Sudanese conflict. Geopolitical and ideological factors played a certain role: the Cold War, a common Arab-Islamic identity, Christian solidarity and pan-Africanism. However, when helping one or another side of the conflict, international actors were guided, first of all, by their practical economic and political interests, and only then by ideological considerations.

During the years of armed conflict 1983-2005. the position of the Organization of African Unity and its legal successor, the African Union, on the main issue (the right of South Sudan to self-determination) and other issues on the negotiating agenda was ambiguous and inconsistent. All-African organizations, on the one hand, emphasized the undesirability of the collapse of Sudan, calling on the parties to preserve the unity of the country, on the other hand, supported various initiatives within the negotiation process of 1986-2005. The inconsistency of the positions of the OAU and the AU did not allow them to fully realize their potential for participation in a peaceful settlement until the very end of the civil war.

The beginning of the war

Violation of the Addis Ababa Agreement

Sudanese President Jaafar Nimeiri tried to take control of the oil fields in the south of the country, which were discovered in 1978, 79 and 82.

Islamic fundamentalists in the north of the country were unhappy with the provisions of the Addis Ababa agreement, which provided religious freedom in the south of the country to Christians and pagans. The positions of the Islamists gradually strengthened and in 1983 the President of Sudan announced that Sudan was becoming an Islamic republic and introduced Sharia throughout the country

Sudan People's Liberation Army was founded in 1983 by a group of rebels to fight the government of Sudan in order to restore the autonomy of South Sudan. The group positioned itself as a defender of all the oppressed citizens of Sudan and stood for a united Sudan. SPNA leader John Garang criticized the government for its policies, which led to the disintegration of the country.

In September 1984, President Nimeiri announced the end of the state of emergency and the liquidation of the emergency courts, but soon promulgated a new judicial act that continued the practice of the emergency courts. Despite Nimeiri's public assurances that the rights of non-Muslims would be respected, these claims were viewed with extreme suspicion by southerners and other non-Muslims.

At the beginning of 1985, there was an acute shortage of fuel and food in Khartoum, drought, famine and an escalation of the conflict in the south of the country led to a difficult internal political situation in Sudan . On April 6, 1985, General Abdel al-Rahman Swar al-Dagab, with a group of senior officers, carried out a coup d'état. They did not approve of attempts to total Islamization of Sudan. The 1983 constitution was repealed, the ruling Sudanese Socialist Union party was dissolved, former President Nimeiri went into exile, but Sharia law was not repealed. After that, a transitional military council was created, headed by Sivar ad-Daghab. After that, an interim civilian government was formed, headed by Al-Jazuli Duffallah. In April 1986, elections were held in the country, after which a new government was formed, headed by Sadiq al-Mahdi from the Umma Party. The government consisted of a coalition of the Umma Party, the Democratic Union, Hassan Turabi's National Islamic Front. This coalition was dissolved and changed several times over the course of several years. Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and his party played a central role in Sudan during this time.

Negotiations and escalation

In May 1986, Sadiq al-Mahdi's government began peace talks with the SPNA, led by John Garang. During the year, Sudanese and NAOS representatives met in Ethiopia and agreed on the early abolition of Sharia law and the holding of a constitutional conference. In 1988, the SPNA and the Sudan Democratic Union agreed on a draft peace plan, including the abolition of military agreements with Egypt and Libya, the abolition of Sharia, the end of the state of emergency, and a ceasefire.

However, due to the aggravation of the situation in the country and the difficult economic situation in November 1988, Prime Minister al-Mahdi refused to approve the peace plan. After that, the Sudan Democratic Union withdrew from the governments and, after which representatives of Islamic fundamentalists remained in the government.

In February 1989, under pressure from the army, al-Mahdi formed a new government, calling on members of the Democratic Union, and adopted a peace plan. A constitutional conference was scheduled for September 1989.

National Salvation Revolutionary Command Council

On June 30, 1989, a military coup took place in Sudan led by Colonel Omar al-Bashir. After that, the "Council of the Revolutionary Command of National Salvation" was created. led by al-Bashir. He also became Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces. Omar al-Bashir dissolved the government, banned political parties, trade unions and other "non-religious" institutions, and eliminated the free press. After that, the policy of Islamization of the country began again in Sudan.

Criminal Law 1991

In March 1991, the Criminal Law was published in Sudan, which provided for penalties under Sharia law. including hand amputations. Initially, these measures were practically not used in the south of the country, but in 1993, the government began replacing non-Muslim judges in southern Sudan. In addition, a public order police was created to monitor compliance with Sharia norms, which monitored the rule of law.

the height of the war

Under the control of the People's Army for the Liberation of Sudan were part of the equatorial territories, Bahr el-Ghazal, Upper Nile. Also, rebel units were active in the southern part of Darfur, Kordofan and the Blue Nile. Under the control of government forces were large cities in the south: Juba, Wau and Malakal.

In October 1989, after a ceasefire, hostilities resumed. In July 1992, government forces in a large-scale offensive took control of southern Sudan and captured the headquarters of the SPNA in Torit.

Under the pretext of fighting the insurgency, the Sudanese government has deployed significant army and police forces in the southern regions of the country. Often, however, these forces attacked and raided villages in order to obtain slaves and livestock. During these hostilities, according to various estimates, about 200,000 South Sudanese women and children were captured and enslaved by the Sudanese armed forces and irregular pro-government groups (People's Defense Army).

Disagreements in the NAOS

In August 1991, internal strife and a struggle for power began in the NAOS. Part of the rebels separated from the Sudan Liberation Army. An attempt was made to overthrow the leader of the NAOS, John Garang, from his post as leader. All this led to the emergence in September 1992 of the second faction of the rebels. (led by William Bani), and in February 1993 the third ( led by Cherubino Boli). April 5, 1993 in Nairobi (Kenya), the leaders of the breakaway rebel factions announced the formation of a coalition.


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ETHIOPIA AND SUDAN
1983-1988

Over 1 million people died from famine, which reached its peak between 1984 and 1986. It was caused by both natural factors and civil wars in Ethiopia and Sudan.

Most of Africa is not as prone to drought and famine as Asia. But tribal strife, the inability to farm and civil wars have increased the impact of famine in Africa on people's lives. In the 1990s, as countries around the world are getting richer, 150 million Africans, according to the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Edward Saums, “are in the most difficult economic situation, experiencing food shortages that could lead to mass starvation” .

Even in the best of times, Africa, by European standards, is a poor continent. It depends on agricultural production, which feeds 12 million people in 12 countries.

The farming methods used are long outdated and often have the exact opposite effect. For example, countries adjacent to the Sahara (Chad, Niger, Mauritania, Mali, Upper Volta, Gambia, Cape Verde), due to the onset of the desert (an average of 8 kilometers per year), are losing fertile lands. The amount of precipitation over the past 40 years is more than 25 percent.

The absence of rain is a natural phenomenon, but the advance of the Sahara is largely due to unwise farming, an excess of sheep and other farm animals. The south of the Sahara, once covered with trees and lush greenery, has now turned into a bare, eroded semi-desert.

In countries such as Zimbabwe, which is rebuilding its economy after 8 years of war, with its vast northwestern territory suffering year after year from droughts, there is hardly any hope of self-sufficiency in food in the near future. Government corruption in Ghana in the late 90s led to food shortages for 10 million people.

So, Africa has been and remains a region where hunger will rule people's lives for a long time to come. At least as long as the population is ruled by corrupt, warring governments and government clans.

Not a single state in Africa can more clearly confirm the drama of the situation by its own example than neighboring countries: Ethiopia and Sudan. Since 1983, both states have suffered from drought, famine and civil wars. Their governments are pursuing a policy of genocide using starvation. Both countries were once played as pawns in the confrontation between West and East. More precisely, between the governments of the United States and the USSR, which supported local governments or warring factions, which further aggravated the general disorder and need.

The pivotal year was 1983. As the Soviet-backed Marxist government seized power in Ethiopia, the UN demanded a truce and an end to the armed conflict. But in 1983, a civil war also broke out between North and South Sudan. Here, the US-backed government proclaimed itself democratic, although its Islamic fundamentalists declared Sharia law to apply throughout the country, escalating fighting between Arab Muslims in the north and Christians and other believers in the south.

Military operations, drought, famine (natural and social causes) claimed more than 1 million lives in Sudan from 1983 to 1988. This war, called the Second Civil War, lasted 22 years and ended in 2005, bringing more trouble. According to a 2001 estimate, by that time about 2 million people had died, and 4 had become refugees.

To understand this tangle of disasters, you need to go back to the seventies of the 20th century.

In 1973 and 1974, hundreds of thousands of people in West and East Africa suffered from hunger, and the Western world was immersed in its problems associated with an economic crisis exacerbated by OPEC's dramatic increase in the price of oil and petroleum products. As a result, almost no assistance was provided to starving Africa.

According to many analysts, this led to a real hunger pestilence, more severe than expected. It reached its apogee in 1983-1986. In fact, the Ethiopian Marxist government seized on the scholarly suggestion and used it as a smokescreen to cover its $200 million 10th anniversary celebrations while millions of poor Ethiopians lived under the threat of starvation and hundreds died daily.

The situation developed in such a way that the problem could be successfully solved by turning to international aid organizations, which in 1984 launched an offensive against hunger and disease. But the constant migration of the population, associated with the movement of refugees from one part of the country to another, made planning impossible. Food supplies could be plentiful in one part of the country, while they were in short supply in another. The issue of their redistribution within the country raised great doubts, since even convoys under the UN flag were attacked by Somali guerrillas.

Such actions began in 1980. At that time, 1.8 million of Ethiopia's 5 million starving people were in Ogaden province, where ethnic Somalis were conducting guerrilla raids on government outposts and villages. Often similar raids were made in Gama-gofa, in the southwest, where the drought was most severe. Not a single rain fell there all year. UN officials visiting Gama Ghofa, Baye, Harar and Wallo noted that 50 percent of the 600,000 livestock had already died from lack of feed.

During 1981-1982. irrigation was not possible as the rivers dried up. At the same time, the tides of the Indian Ocean became higher and made the water brackish.

Even though the market was well developed in some African countries, there were not enough products for trade. More and more people turned into nomads and wandered from one place to another, remembering the last heavy rains in sub-Saharan Africa in 1968.

In Ghana in 1983, the January hot wind blew twice as long as usual. He brought fires that destroyed fields and food stores. Together with the drought, the fires cost the state a third of the annual food production.

Finally, in mid-1983, most of the world community caught on and led a massive fight against the wave of famine that swept Africa. In September of that year, the UN forced the Ethiopian government to sign a truce with the guerrillas.

The US administration, led by Reagan, initially opposed food supplies to the Marxist government of Ethiopia, but then decided to provide humanitarian assistance and raised aid spending, bringing it up to $ 10 million.

At the end of 1984, the UN published a report in the New York Times that supposedly about 7 million Ethiopians were on the verge of starvation. Many died from diseases associated with malnutrition.
UN teams found out in what terrible conditions the population of the country lived for the last 10 years. When the Marxist government came to power (as a result of a government coup), it did not take measures to irrigate the land, improve agricultural technology.

As a result, agricultural activity in the north of the country has reduced the land to a miserable state, causing almost complete soil erosion. The area of ​​forests cleared by livestock has decreased. But the government did nothing. If it did, it would only worsen the situation. With the help of his agricultural market corporations, the government reduced the purchase price of grain, depriving the peasants of the incentive to produce excess product and sell it.

“In fact, many farmers prefer to stockpile their surplus grain rather than sell it to the government for next to nothing,” said one UN official. “It’s better to have extra food, they say, than the crumbs they get from the government.”

Meanwhile, the drought continued, and hundreds of Ethiopians continued to die of hunger every day. Scientists estimated that from May 1984 to May 1985, half a million people would die from lack of food.
“…Many others, especially children, will suffer from hunger throughout their lives, including physical and mental retardation,” said High Goyder, field spokesman for Oxfam, a British relief organization.

The service workers who traveled around the camps, who fed tens of thousands of people daily, described the state of affairs in sad and terrible tones. “So things have improved in Korem,” said William Day, a member of the independent organization Save the Children. “In a food distribution center 350 kilometers north of Addis Ababa, 150 people were dying every day three weeks ago. Three days ago (November 1984) that number dropped to 40.”

This was only a relative improvement as people continued to starve to death. It was very cold in the high altitude camps of Ethiopia. As a result, people there died from hypothermia. Having no other shelter, they dug dugouts and built stone fences around them. This was the only protection from frost and wind. Diseases were rampant in the camps. Typhus, pneumonia, dysentery, meningitis and measles claimed the lives of hundreds of people.

While governments blamed each other for the cause of the disaster, the loss of life continued. Nomads began to arrive in the camps. They built traditional low drop-shaped huts - tukus, made of mats and sticks. One of their women in Harare, eastern Ethiopia, told a Times reporter in December 1985, “The drought has killed all the animals, we have lost everything in three years. We don't have sheep or goats, and there's nothing we can do even if it rains."

Such desperation gripped many of the 1.2 million people in Harare who were gripped by the prolonged drought. One of the representatives of the rescue organization "Interaction" called it "green hunger". “Sorghum grows in the fields, there is not a single grain on it. The corn has dried up on the vine, so there is no end in sight to the famine in the near future, ”he concluded.

By January 1985, US aid to Ethiopia had increased to $40 million. But the government of the country used most of these supplies for other purposes. Food and blankets were used as bait for the supposed relocation of residents from the poor, overpopulated areas of the north to the fertile, sparsely populated areas of the south. The hidden purpose of this was undoubtedly genocide. Exhausted by hunger and disease, hundreds of thousands of refugees died on the road, the sides of which were already littered with the corpses of animals and people.

Finally, in 1986, the rains began, and the drought ended. But other problems with the improvement of weather conditions have not disappeared. A "normal" situation for Ethiopia means importing 15 percent of the food it needs and feeding 2.5 million people. (During the peak of the famine during 1984-1986, 6.5 million people received food.)

In January 1987, the leader of Ethiopia, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, began a three-year struggle to fully provide the country with food. He said that "the famine left an indelible mark on the history of the country and in the souls of its people."

High words. But the underpayment of farmers for their produce and the horror of the January 1985 resettlement, which was yet to be repeated, led UN workers to question the Ethiopian government's ability to deal with poverty, drought and famine. And not only this. In late 1987, a UN convoy transporting food to the drought-stricken provinces of Eritrea and the Tigris was attacked by people from the anti-government group, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front. 35 trucks delivering food to famine-stricken Ethiopians were set on fire. It never made it to the right place.

New problems have emerged. The civil war in Ethiopia's neighboring Sudan is gaining even greater scope. Hundreds of thousands of refugees from Sudan began to cross the western borders of Ethiopia. Tens of thousands of refugees walked thousands of kilometers on foot along the roads of Sudan, which, like a few years ago in Ethiopia, were littered with the corpses of people who died of starvation or from police bullets.

Because Sudan's government was democratic, the Reagan administration sent him $1.7 billion in aid. Over $1 million a day was to be spent on distributing food to the hungry. But workers from independent aid organizations were not allowed into the country, and the duty of distributing food was placed on the army. As a result, most of the supplies remained in the army and did not reach the starving population.

The situation became even more aggravated due to heavy floods, which literally paralyzed the country in August 1988. When the water subsided, numerous representatives of the UN and rescue agencies who arrived in the country saw clear signs of genocide in this desolation.

As in Ethiopia, the militia drove from place to place thousands of people herded into herds. Many of them died on the way. But unlike Ethiopia, where there was some kind of reasonable beginning in these movements, nothing of the kind was observed in Sudan. The only goal was the death of people. The townspeople were moved to villages, the rural population was driven to the cities, but no one could survive in unusual conditions, so they died. Diseases also multiplied. Tuberculosis was decimating entire districts.

Finally, in May 1989, a truce was signed between South and North Sudan. For the first time ever, the International Red Cross was allowed into the country. Food began to flow into the country, but the government did not distribute it among the population. A crisis was brewing. The May rains are approaching. When they start, roads will be washed out and food transport will be delayed for a long time. An active air transport of food began, which for some time gave poor countries, so badly affected by drought and famine, the hope that an end to devastation and death would be put to rest. However, the truce ended and the war lasted until 2005, as mentioned in this article. Yes, and our time is difficult to call calm and favorable.

Sudan, Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains

Causes and causes of war

Under the terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, which ended the 1st Civil War in Sudan, autonomy was created in the south of the country. Many former rebels from the Anya-nya organization have taken high positions in the military and civil administration of this autonomous region. However, this could not completely eliminate the differences between the Arab-Muslim north and the Negro-Christian south.

The main claim of the southern elite to the Khartoum authorities was the so-called "marginalization" - an extremely popular term in African countries, denoting the unfair distribution of power and income in relation to the population (elite) of a certain region. The scope of this concept is vague: it also includes the situation when the resources of the region are really predatory plundered by the central government; and a small deduction of the region's income for national needs; and even insufficient (in the opinion of the local elite) injection of funds into the region at the expense of income from other provinces of the country. The presence of an arbitrarily small number of Arab officials in the power structures of the autonomy of South Sudan could also serve as a basis for accusations of marginalization, and at the same time with dissatisfaction with the insufficient representation of southerners in the central government. Thus, the very perception of “marginalization” is often subjective.

Moreover, in the case of South Sudan in the early 1980s, we encounter a very interesting case. The discovery of oil fields here and preparations for their development aroused strong fears among southerners that they would be deprived in the future. That is, at the moment there has not yet been an active exploitation of the region's resources in the interests of the central government - but the southerners were already afraid that this would happen. And, apparently, the Khartoum government was really not going to be satisfied with a small share ...

The second most important reason for the concern of the southerners (mainly Christians or animists) was the policy of the North Sudanese Arabs to build an Islamic state. Although the Nimeiri government stated that the introduction of the provisions of the Islamic state into the constitution and daily life of the country would not affect the rights of the people of South Sudan, not everyone believed in this (and I will not call it excessive reinsurance).

Having indicated the main causes of the war, it is worth saying a few words about the immediate causes. Firstly, the Khartoum government actively implemented the Jonglei Canal project. The fact is that the flow of watery equatorial Africa flowing through the White Nile and its tributaries into the swampy area in the center of South Sudan (“sudd”) was mainly spent on crazy evaporation due to the slow flow of the river, often completely blocked by floating islands of vegetation. Of the more than 20 cubic kilometers of incoming runoff, 6-7 were sent on their way to Egypt. Therefore, a project arose to divert the waters of the White Nile past the Sudd by the shortest route, promising to release a volume of about 5 cubic kilometers of fresh water per year - a huge figure, given that under the agreement on the distribution of water resources already available, densely populated Egypt could claim 55 cubic kilometers, and Sudan - by 20. However, this project caused great concern among the local Sudda tribes, who feared a serious change in their habitat and the destruction of their traditional economic structure. In the process of writing this article, already 29 years after the beginning of the events described, I still did not meet the unequivocal conclusion of environmentalists about the possible impact of the Jonglei Canal on the ecosystem and economy of southerners, so their concern in 1983 was all the more justified.

The second, and most immediate, reason for the uprising was the decision of the central government to transfer several parts of the Sudanese army from the south to the north of the country. Within the framework of the declared unity of Sudan, this step did not look strange and/or unfair. However, it should be borne in mind that parts of the armed forces in the autonomous region were often staffed by former rebels. Many of them already showed dissatisfaction with the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972, which preserved the unity of such a diverse country and, albeit reduced, but still the influence of the Arabs in the south. This already led in 1975 to a new uprising and the creation of Anya-nya-2, however, an insufficiently large movement, the actions of which did not deserve the name "2nd Sudanese Civil War". However, the planned transfer of a significant part of the units of the southerners to the north (where they, being in a foreign region, certainly could not pose a threat to the Arab government in exploiting the resources of the south), planned by the Khartoum government, created an ideal pretext for an uprising.

Thus, assessing in aggregate both the causes and causes of the 2nd Civil War, it is impossible to conclude that the Arabs of the north of the country are completely guilty of this. Just as the fears and claims of the southerners cannot be called unfounded. However, I think that the actions of the Khartoum government after the start of the war (largely described by the terms "medieval" and "genocide") fully justify the leaders of the southerners who initiated this bloody struggle. And, regardless of the initial acts and intentions of the parties, there is no doubt that the attempt to unite in one state of Sudan peoples so different in ethnic origin and religion was initially criminal.

The beginning of the uprising

Now it is finally time to say at least a few words about the uprising itself, which led to the Civil War. It began in the early morning of May 16, 1983 in the camp of the 105th Battalion of the Sudanese Armed Forces (hereinafter SAF) a few kilometers from the city of Bor. The rebellion was initiated and led by the battalion commander, Major Kerubino Kvanyin Bol, who convinced his subordinates to disobey the order to transfer to the north of the country. The rebels opened fire on the few Arab soldiers present in the camp, temporarily taking control of the surroundings of Bor. On the same day, having received news of the Bor rebellion, a few tens of kilometers to the northeast, the 104th SAF battalion rebelled in the Ayoda area, which also guarded the Jonglei Canal route. In the latter case, Major William Nuyon Bani commanded the rebels.

The Sudanese government sent substantial forces against the rebels, forcing them to flee eastward to Ethiopia, which had supported the South Sudanese rebels from Anya-nya-2 for more than a year. However, the new uprising did not just add a certain amount of dissatisfied to the refugees in the Ethiopian camps. First, organized and trained fighters arrived there with their commanders. Secondly, among the soldiers sent to suppress the Bor rebellion was Colonel John Garang de Mabior, who came from the Nilotic Dinka tribe. Not being the initiator of the uprising, the latter nevertheless joined him, seizing the moment for desertion from the SAF units that arrived in the Bora region.

It is with the activities of John Garang that the main struggle of the South Sudanese during the 2nd Civil War is inextricably linked - someone joined it earlier, someone later; someone showed their heroism on the battlefield more, someone less - but without John Garang this would hardly have led to the result that we see today. Of course, I am getting ahead of myself in the story of the 2nd Civil War in Sudan, but not by chance. John Garang did not personally participate in the assaults on cities. John Garang's forces were losing. John Garang made mistakes. John Garang's forces were doing something inappropriate. John Garang led the Southerners to victory.

Creation of SPLA

Now back to the events of 1983. The Bor rebellion caused an active influx of dissatisfied with the Khartoum government into Ethiopia. At that moment, rebel sentiment literally roamed the air of South Sudan, so that when the news of the rebellion began, the flight of both autonomy politicians and ordinary residents began. The former, of course, immediately tried to formalize their participation in the uprising by launching violent activities in the refugee camps. Even before the arrival of the initiators of the rebellion, who spent some time fighting with government forces, a group of politicians announced the creation of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). I’ll note right away that I still prefer to use English abbreviations in the story (instead of SPLA - SPLA), since all the information for writing the article was extracted from English-language sources, and it is for them that those interested in this issue can carry out an independent search.

At the meeting of politicians that led to the creation of the SPLA, the question of creating a movement seeking the liberation of only South Sudan (SSPLA) was initially discussed. However, the influence of the colonel of the Ethiopian armed forces, who was present at the conference, turned out to be decisive, conveying wishes that could not be refused - after all, it happened in Ethiopia:

the movement must be of a socialist nature (the Ethiopian regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam himself at that time dabbled in Marxist experiments with collective farms, food requisitions and the “red terror”);

the movement should aim to "liberate" all of Sudan, not just the south.

It is possible that these requirements were agreed with the Soviet Union, which actively supported the Ethiopian regime.

Also at the aforementioned conference, it was determined who would lead the new movement. The head of the political branch (SPLM) was a veteran of South Sudanese politics Akuot Atem. The commander of the military branch (SPLA) was Guy Tut, who distinguished himself in the 1st Civil War, the field commander Anya-nya, an SAF lieutenant colonel (after the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972), who retired from military service in 1974 and has since held a number of prominent posts in the civil administration of the autonomous region. For active duty soldiers who deserted from the SAF, the politicians awarded the post of Chief of the General Staff of the SPLA, given to John Garang, who held the highest rank of colonel among them.

Upon the arrival of the military who took part in the rebellion in Ethiopia, disagreements arose between them and the politicians who created the SPLA. Already at the first meeting, John Garang put forward claims against Akuot Atem, citing his venerable age. Yes, and Guy Tut, once a famous commander, as an army commander did not arouse enthusiasm among the garangists, because he was inferior to the latter in military rank and for the last 9 years he has been engaged in political activities. John Garang went to Addis Ababa and secured an appointment with Mengistu Haile Mariam. Based on the results of a personal meeting, Mengistu decided to support him, impressed by his active character and readiness to fully support the socialist character of the movement. From Addis Ababa, the Itang camp (where refugees were concentrated after the Bor rebellion) received an order to arrest Akuot Atem and Guy Tut, but the latter, warned by one of the Ethiopian officers, fled to the Bukteng camp in Sudan.

John Garang himself returned, along with a highly empowered Ethiopian general. Although Itang was at this point entirely in the hands of Garang's supporters (the military who took part in the Bor rebellion), however, a question arose regarding the Bilpam camp, where the Anya-nya-2 fighters under the command of Gordon Kong Chuol had been based for 8 years. The Ethiopians wanted to create a united socialist insurgency in Sudan, so the latter was given a week to come to Itang to decide on his place in the SPLA. Gordon Kong refused, either fearing arrest (there had already been precedents), or disagreeing with the exchange of the post of leader of Anya-nya-2 for a not so high place in the SPLA hierarchy. After a week, the Ethiopian general appointed Colonel John Garang as the leader of the SPLA / SPLM, a deputy in the person of Major Kerubino Kwanyin, approved Major William Nuyon as the Chief of the General Staff and Captain Salwa Kiir as the Deputy Chief of the General Staff (by the way, the current President of South Sudan). At the same time, the Ethiopian granted Garang the right to appoint other members of the command and, more importantly, authorized military action against the forces of Anya-nya-2. So at the end of July 1983, the SPLA attacked and after a short fight captured Bilpam, driving Gordon Kong's forces into the already mentioned Bukteng camp. On this, the design of the new insurgent movement (SPLA) can be considered complete.

As for the dissidents from the SPLA and the members of Anya-nya-2 ousted to Bukteng, their paths soon parted. Gordon Kong and his supporters, not seeing any further opportunity to rely on any bases outside of Sudan, went over to the side of the Khartoum government, against which Anya-nya-2 began 8 years before the appearance of the SPLA. Guy Tut was killed in early 1984 by his deputy, who soon also died in another civil strife. Akuot Atem, a native of the Dinka tribe, fell shortly after the death of Guy Tut at the hands of the Nuer, who received an impulse to hate the Dinka after the failure of their leaders Gordon Kong and Guy Tut.

Population of South Sudan

Here is the time to pay attention to the ethnic composition of the rebels and the ethnic map of South Sudan as a whole. The latter is a motley conglomeration of peoples and tribes, which could not but affect the course of the events described.

The largest people in this region are the Dinka, very warlike people, divided, as it is supposed here, into several tribes, but quite capable under certain conditions to gather under the banner of a single leader. The second largest Nuer - the representatives of this tribe are unusually warlike, perhaps even more than the Dinka, but clearly inferior to the latter in the ability to act under a single command. The patchwork of Dinka and Nuer lands makes up most of the north of South Sudan, where the Shilluks, related to the two previous tribes, also live, as well as the less related Bertas (on the northeastern border of South Sudan and Ethiopia). The southern part of the region (the so-called Equatoria region) is filled with many tribes, the most significant of which, when listed from east to west, are the Didinga, Topoza, Acholi (kindred in Uganda, known for creating one of the most terrible formations of the late 20th / early 21st century - Lord's Liberation Army, LRA), Madi, Lotuko and Lokoya, Bari and Mundari, Azande. Marked in the 2nd Civil War and Murle, and Anuaki (in the east near the border with Ethiopia), and Fertit Corporation (various small tribes in the west of the region in the strip from Wau to Ragi).

It was the Dinka and the Nuer who initially formed the backbone of the rebels. It was the rivalry between their leaders that led to the most difficult consequences for the SPLA during the war. As part of a series of articles entitled "The 2nd Sudanese Civil War", the author will, as far as possible, avoid talking about events related to the Nuer, because the history of the participation of representatives of this tribe in this war is so interesting that it is planned to devote a separate article to it - and the quality reviews of other events of the 2nd Civil should not suffer. This is quite possible, since the outcome of the confrontation was decided mainly in the course of hostilities against the Khartoum Dinka government and allied detachments organized by the SPLA leadership from representatives of the most diverse tribes of South Sudan.

However, it is worth finally indicating the ethnicity of the previously mentioned heroes of our story:

the initiator of the Bor rebellion, initially the deputy commander of the SPLA, Kerubino Kwanyin Bol - Dinka;

the initiator of the uprising in Ayod, originally the chief of the General Staff, William Nuyon Bani - Nuer;

the holder of the highest military rank at the time of the rebellion and then the constant leader of the SPLA (and SPLM), John Garang - Dinka;

the very first leader of the SPLM, Akuot Atem, is a Dinka;

the very first head of the SPLA, Guy Tut is a Nuer.

Thus, the 1983 summer struggle in the Ethiopian refugee camps for the leadership of the SPLA was not between the Dinka and the Nuer, but between the military and politicians. Among the winning party were representatives of both tribes (Garang / Kerubino and Nuyon), among the losers also (Atem and Tut).

The situation with respect to the rivalry between the “new” rebels and Anya-nya-2 turned out to be somewhat more complicated: the leader of this organization Gordon Kong, who rejected the union with the SPLA, belonged to the Nuer tribe, but the departments that joined the new movement were headed by Dinka John Koang and Murle Ngachigak Ngachiluk. Thus, only the Nuer remained among the detachments of Gordon Kong, and Anya-Nya-2, which entered into an alliance with the Khartoum government, was already an exclusively tribal organization. This was not a very good sign for the SPLA - "picking up" an insurgent structure for itself, playing on social or personal motives (the duration of which is calculated for a maximum of years), is undoubtedly easier than "poaching" ethnic opponents, whose reasons for discontent lie in the centuries-old disputes of peoples.

Fighting in 1983-1984

And now, finally, to the struggle of the rebels with the government, and not just among themselves. On November 7, 1983, the SPLA captured the village of Malwal (n / a) a few dozen kilometers south of the city of Malukal. The settlement was thatched huts with less than a thousand inhabitants, so its capture (accompanied by a maximum of "battles" with the local police) served only as an application for the seriousness of the new movement. Of course, insignificant events should be excluded from the narrative, but nevertheless I decided to mark Malval as the first settlement that fell into the millstones of the 2nd Civil War in Sudan. In addition, the SPLA attacked it almost simultaneously with the city of Nasir, in which the rebels captured everything except the base of the SAF garrison. Over the next few days, the military units of the Khartoum government that advanced from neighboring regions fought with the rebels, and after a week they were able to oust the enemy from Nasir, and then from Malwal.

The November 1983 sortie of the SPLA into Sudan was only a test of strength, and the rebel leadership was preparing for a battle on the supply routes that was completely natural in those conditions, which was not at all exclusively a “battle on the roads”. In South Sudan, poor in road infrastructure, the main routes of communication ran along the rivers - primarily the Nile (giving direct access to the capital of the southern region of Juba), as well as along the Sobat (a tributary of the Nile leading to Nasir), and the Bahr el-Ghazal system (giving access from the Nile to a vast territory to the west, including the oil-bearing province of Unity). Therefore, initially, the Nile steamships became the main objects of attacks by the rebels.

In February 1984, a ship towing several barges was attacked. Government sources claimed that only 14 passengers died, while according to other sources - more than three hundred. It should be clarified that the passengers of such "convoys" were equally civilians and military (the Sudanese army initially used ordinary civilian vehicles to move along the rivers). The second confirmed by both sides rebel attack on a riverboat was only in December of this year, but it should be borne in mind that this conflict is characterized by particularly conflicting reports from the parties, so that confirmation by the government of the fact of the incident often occurred only when an incident of a significant scale.

In connection with the problems on the river routes, transport aviation acquired special importance for the government. But she also had to learn to work in the difficult conditions of the conflict - at the end of June, the Sudanese confirmed the loss of one transport worker and one combat F-5. Moreover, the government side suspected that the aircraft were hit with the help of the Strela MANPADS received by the PLA from Ethiopia.

However, not only on the water and in the air there was a “battle on the roads”. The supply of government forces in the western part of South Sudan was largely carried out by rail, which went from the north of the country to the capital of the state of Western Bahr el Ghazal, Wau. In March 1984, the SPLA blew up the railway bridge over the Lol River here, killing the garrison guarding it.

Finally, there were attacks on convoys moving overland. In August, a government detachment was ambushed and suffered heavy losses, heading from Juba to Bor. And in early October, a column between Duk and Ayod, on the Jonglei Canal, was defeated. By the way, the construction of the latter was stopped back in February - then the rebels attacked the previously mentioned Ayod and a number of other points, so the general contractor of this hydraulic facility, the French company, refused further work due to the death of several employees. Similarly, a number of oil companies have suspended their work on fields that are almost ready for development in the state of Unity.

Fighting in 1985

At the beginning of 1985, a new convoy left Juba for rebel-blocked Bor, numbering several thousand troops with a large amount of equipment. At 70 kilometers from his target, he was subjected to a powerful attack by the PLA and suffered heavy losses. However, the size of the convoy affected the outcome of the battle - it was not possible to completely destroy it. After some time, having put themselves in order, the column resumed movement. On the way, she was ambushed several more times, suffered losses and stopped for a long time. However, even after three months, the government detachment still reached Bor. It should be noted that such “long-term” convoys have become very characteristic of the Sudanese war. Due to the complete superiority of the army in heavy weapons, it was not easy to destroy them, but the government forces also had to move very carefully, given the risk of being ambushed at any moment on terrain well known to the enemy.

While the fight was going on on the roads, and the fighters of the former 104th and 105th battalions of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), who initiated the uprising, were disturbing the army garrisons in Pochalle and Akobo adjacent to Ethiopia, the leadership of the SPL was preparing new units that could adequately perform in the arena of struggle with SAF. At the same time, the title was considered as important - the first two SPLA battalions bore the name "Rhinos" and "Crocodiles". The latter in 1984 undertook an operation to capture the Boma mountain plateau south of Pochalla, convenient for creating a base area already on Sudanese territory. After initial success, the rebels were forced to retreat, having tasted the effect of the "luck on the side of the big battalions" principle.

Meanwhile, new forces were being prepared in the Ethiopian camps - a “division” with the sonorous name “Locust”, numbering up to 12 thousand fighters. And, of course, her new battalions bore no less proud names than the previous ones - "Scorpions", "Iron", "Lightning". At the very beginning of 1985, the mountainous region of Boma was again captured, now by the Scorpions battalion under the command of Ngachigak Ngachiluk. And, despite the further vicissitudes of a long civil war, Boma was never recaptured by government forces, becoming a reliable base for operations of the rebels.

From Boma, the SPLA forces moved west, defeated government troops north of the provincial center of East Equatorial Torit, and began to occupy its environs. Their activities in the area were facilitated by the assistance of the Lotuko people (and related to the latter Lokoi living in the area of ​​Liria and Ngangala), whose representative and prominent political figure in southern Sudan, Joseph Odunho, entered the leadership of the SPLM.

Moving southwest, the forward detachments of the SPLA reached the village of Ovni-ki-Bul (n / a) 20 kilometers from Magvi. This was already the territory of the Madi people, who did not show much enthusiasm to join the struggle against the northern Arabs. Therefore, it is not surprising that the SAF detachment burned the village, and the SAF units, which arrived soon, with the support of the local police, defeated and drove the enemy back.

The second direction of advance from the Lotuk area for the SPLA was western, where they captured the town of Mongalla located on the banks of the Nile. However, here too certain nuances arose - the rebels entered the area of ​​the Mandari tribe. The latter, for centuries, were the direct neighbors of the Dinka from the bor unit, and therefore "had scores" with the main striking force of the SPL. The old conflicts between Mandari and Dinka erupted more than once in the post-colonial era. In particular, shortly after the outbreak of the uprising in 1983, the Mandaris massacred Dinka merchants in Juba in the course of the struggle for the right to trade in the local market. And the Khartoum authorities, who skillfully used the “divide and rule” policy, did not interfere with this. In turn, in the same 1983, the Dinka expelled their rivals from the town of Tali Post, southwest of Bor. So the Mandari militia was well motivated and enjoyed the full support of government forces. Soon she defeated the rebels near Gur Makur (n / k) near Mongalla, forcing the SPLA to retreat from this settlement.

Here I will note another feature of this conflict. In conditions when only the Khartoum government had no shortage of heavy weapons, the presence of even a few tanks on the battlefield could become a decisive factor. Thus, in many battles with the SPL, the government side turned out to be represented mainly by some kind of tribal militia, which could hardly win without being supported by "armor" or "artificers" from the army. And such support, in turn, was extremely likely - just ask.

In September of the same year, detachments of the SPLA Southern Command, led by former SAF Major Arok Ton Arok, attacked another important Mandari city, Terekeka, now on the west bank of the Nile a little north of Mongalla. In the captured Terekek, there were serious excesses against the Mandari. Moreover, the sources note their orientation primarily against the "eastern wing" of the tribe, which may have been revenge for the recent defeat on the other side of the Nile. However, the SPLA detachments were soon forced to leave Terekeka.

Of course, the rebels were active in other areas of southern Sudan. However, for now I will only note the capture on March 3, 1985 of the village of Jack (n / c), east of Nasir near the border with Ethiopia. Although this event did not lead to further serious consequences, at least the SAF lost the entire garrison here, led by the colonel.

It was much more difficult to capture the provincial centers, although the rebels tried. In November 1985, a battalion that had just arrived after training in Ethiopia tried to take Bor. However, for the Dinka from the northern clans who made it up, the Sudda area turned out to be completely unfamiliar and unusual, which played a significant role in the final crushing defeat.

Apparently, it was this defeat that overflowed the “cup of patience” of the SPLA command in relation to the Southern Command. Arok Ton Arok was replaced with a certain Kuol Manyang Juuk. However, the epithet “some” should not be considered too pejoratively - as subsequent events showed, the most famous in the 2nd Civil War was acquired not by the leaders of successful operations, but by schismatics and traitors.

Let's finish this section with a couple of episodes from the "fight on the roads" of 1985. The continuing problems with the Nile shipping company were evidenced by the fact that in February 1986 the captain of the ship, a citizen of the FRG, who had been captured by the rebels a few months earlier, was released (which is why this case actually became known). The danger of flights to supply the garrisons was confirmed by the loss of two Buffalo transports - on March 14 at Akobo and on April 4 near Bor. Finally, at the end of the year, the SPLA bombarded the Juba airport several times with guns and mortars, albeit without much result.

Meanwhile, more serious events were approaching ...

Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005)

Part 1. Beginning

1.1. Causes and causes of war

Under the terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, which ended the 1st Civil War in Sudan, autonomy was created in the south of the country. Many former rebels from the Anya-nya organization have taken high positions in the military and civil administration of this autonomous region. However, this could not completely eliminate the differences between the Arab-Muslim north and the Negro-Christian south.

The main claim of the southern elite to the Khartoum authorities was the so-called "marginalization" - an extremely popular term in African countries, denoting the unfair distribution of power and income in relation to the population (elite) of a certain region. The scope of this concept is vague: it also includes the situation when the resources of the region are really predatory plundered by the central government; and a small deduction of the region's income for national needs; and even insufficient (in the opinion of the local elite) injection of funds into the region at the expense of income from other provinces of the country. The presence of an arbitrarily small number of Arab officials in the power structures of the autonomy of South Sudan could also serve as a basis for accusations of marginalization, and at the same time with dissatisfaction with the insufficient representation of southerners in the central government. Thus, the very perception of “marginalization” is often subjective.

Moreover, in the case of South Sudan in the early 1980s, we encounter a very interesting case. The discovery of oil fields here and preparations for their development aroused strong fears among southerners that they would be deprived in the future. That is, at the moment there has not yet been an active exploitation of the region's resources in the interests of the central government - but the southerners were already afraid that this would happen. And, apparently, the Khartoum government was really not going to be satisfied with a small share ...

The second most important reason for the concern of the southerners (mainly Christians or animists) was the policy of the North Sudanese Arabs to build an Islamic state. Although the Nimeiri government stated that the introduction of the provisions of the Islamic state into the constitution and daily life of the country would not affect the rights of the people of South Sudan, not everyone believed in this (and I will not call it excessive reinsurance).

Having indicated the main causes of the war, it is worth saying a few words about the immediate causes. Firstly, the Khartoum government actively implemented the Jonglei Canal project. The fact is that the flow of watery equatorial Africa flowing through the White Nile and its tributaries into the swampy area in the center of South Sudan (“sudd”) was mainly spent on crazy evaporation due to the slow flow of the river, often completely blocked by floating islands of vegetation. Of the more than 20 cubic kilometers of incoming flow, 6-7 were sent on their way to Khartoum and Egypt. Therefore, a project arose to divert the waters of the White Nile past the Sudd by the shortest route, promising to release a volume of about 5 cubic kilometers of fresh water per year - a huge figure, given that under the agreement on the distribution of water resources already available, densely populated Egypt could claim 55 cubic kilometers, and Sudan - by 20. However, this project caused great concern among the local Sudda tribes, who feared a serious change in their habitat and the destruction of their traditional economic structure. In the process of writing this article, already 29 years after the beginning of the events described, I still did not meet the unequivocal conclusion of environmentalists about the possible impact of the Jonglei Canal on the ecosystem and economy of southerners, so their concern in 1983 was all the more justified.

The second, and most immediate, reason for the uprising was the decision of the central government to transfer several parts of the Sudanese army from the south to the north of the country. Within the framework of the declared unity of Sudan, this step did not look strange and/or unfair. However, it should be borne in mind that parts of the armed forces in the autonomous region were often staffed by former rebels. Many of them already showed dissatisfaction with the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972, which preserved the unity of such a diverse country and, albeit reduced, but still the influence of the Arabs in the south. This already led in 1975 to a new uprising and the creation of Anya-nya-2, however, an insufficiently large movement, the actions of which did not deserve the name "2nd Sudanese Civil War". However, the planned transfer of a significant part of the units of the southerners to the north (where they, being in a foreign region, certainly could not pose a threat to the Arab government in exploiting the resources of the south), planned by the Khartoum government, created an ideal pretext for an uprising.

Thus, assessing in aggregate both the causes and causes of the 2nd Civil War, it is impossible to conclude that the Arabs of the north of the country are completely guilty of this. Just as the fears and claims of the southerners cannot be called unfounded. However, I think that the actions of the Khartoum government after the start of the war (largely described by the terms "medieval" and "genocide") fully justify the leaders of the southerners who initiated this bloody struggle. And, regardless of the initial acts and intentions of the parties, there is no doubt that the attempt to unite in one state of Sudan peoples so different in ethnic origin and religion was initially criminal.

1.2. The beginning of the uprising

Now it is finally time to say at least a few words about the uprising itself, which led to the Civil War. It began in the early morning of May 16, 1983 in the camp of the 105th Battalion of the Sudanese Armed Forces (hereinafter SAF) a few kilometers from the city of Bor. The rebellion was initiated and led by the battalion commander, Major Kerubino Kvanyin Bol, who convinced his subordinates to disobey the order to transfer to the north of the country. The rebels opened fire on the few Arab soldiers present in the camp, temporarily taking control of the surroundings of Bor. On the same day, having received news of the Bor rebellion, a few tens of kilometers to the northeast, the 104th SAF battalion rebelled in the Ayoda area, which also guarded the Jonglei Canal route. In the latter case, Major William Nuyon Bani commanded the rebels.

The Sudanese government sent substantial forces against the rebels, forcing them to flee eastward to Ethiopia, which had supported the South Sudanese rebels from Anya-nya-2 for more than a year. However, the new uprising did not just add a certain amount of dissatisfied to the refugees in the Ethiopian camps. First, organized and trained fighters arrived there with their commanders. Secondly, among the soldiers sent to suppress the Bor rebellion was Colonel John Garang de Mabior, who came from the Nilotic Dinka tribe. Not being the initiator of the uprising, the latter nevertheless joined him, seizing the moment for desertion from the SAF units that arrived in the Bora region.

It is with the activities of John Garang that the main struggle of the South Sudanese during the 2nd Civil War is inextricably linked - someone joined it earlier, someone later; someone showed their heroism on the battlefield more, someone less - but without John Garang this would hardly have led to the result that we see today. Of course, I am getting ahead of myself in the story of the 2nd Civil War in Sudan, but not by chance. John Garang did not personally participate in the assaults on cities. John Garang's forces were losing. John Garang made mistakes. John Garang's forces were doing something inappropriate. John Garang led the Southerners to victory.

1.3. Creation of SPLA

Now back to the events of 1983. The Bor rebellion caused an active influx of dissatisfied with the Khartoum government into Ethiopia. At that moment, rebel sentiment literally roamed the air of South Sudan, so that when the news of the rebellion began, the flight of both autonomy politicians and ordinary residents began. The former, of course, immediately tried to formalize their participation in the uprising by launching violent activities in the refugee camps. Even before the arrival of the initiators of the rebellion, who spent some time fighting with government forces, a group of politicians announced the creation of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). I’ll note right away that I still prefer to use English abbreviations in the story (instead of SPLA - SPLA), since all the information for writing the article was extracted from English-language sources, and it is for them that those interested in this issue can carry out an independent search.

At the meeting of politicians that led to the creation of the SPLA, the question of creating a movement seeking the liberation of only South Sudan (SSPLA) was initially discussed. However, the influence of the colonel of the Ethiopian armed forces, who was present at the conference, turned out to be decisive, conveying wishes that could not be refused - after all, it happened in Ethiopia:

  • the movement must be of a socialist nature (the Ethiopian regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam himself at that time dabbled in Marxist experiments with collective farms, food requisitions and the “red terror”);
  • the movement should aim to "liberate" all of Sudan, not just the south.

It is possible that these requirements were agreed with the Soviet Union, which actively supported the Ethiopian regime.

Also at the aforementioned conference, it was determined who would lead the new movement. The head of the political branch (SPLM) was a veteran of South Sudanese politics Akuot Atem. The commander of the military branch (SPLA) was Guy Tut, who distinguished himself in the 1st Civil War, the field commander Anya-nya, an SAF lieutenant colonel (after the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972), who retired from military service in 1974 and has since held a number of prominent posts in the civil administration of the autonomous region. For active duty soldiers who deserted from the SAF, the politicians awarded the post of Chief of the General Staff of the SPLA, given to John Garang, who held the highest rank of colonel among them.

Upon the arrival of the military who took part in the rebellion in Ethiopia, disagreements arose between them and the politicians who created the SPLA. Already at the first meeting, John Garang put forward claims against Akuot Atem, citing his venerable age. Yes, and Guy Tut, once a famous commander, as an army commander did not arouse enthusiasm among the garangists, because he was inferior to the latter in military rank and for the last 9 years he has been engaged in political activities. John Garang went to Addis Ababa and secured an appointment with Mengistu Haile Mariam. Based on the results of a personal meeting, Mengistu decided to support him, impressed by his active character and readiness to fully support the socialist character of the movement. From Addis Ababa, the Itang camp (where refugees were concentrated after the Bor rebellion) received an order to arrest Akuot Atem and Guy Tut, but the latter, warned by one of the Ethiopian officers, fled to the Bukteng camp in Sudan.

John Garang himself returned, along with a highly empowered Ethiopian general. Although Itang was at this point entirely in the hands of Garang's supporters (the military who took part in the Bor rebellion), however, a question arose regarding the Bilpam camp, where the Anya-nya-2 fighters under the command of Gordon Kong Chuol had been based for 8 years. The Ethiopians wanted to create a united socialist insurgency in Sudan, so the latter was given a week to come to Itang to decide on his place in the SPLA. Gordon Kong refused, either fearing arrest (there had already been precedents), or disagreeing with the exchange of the post of leader of Anya-nya-2 for a not so high place in the SPLA hierarchy. After a week, the Ethiopian general appointed Colonel John Garang as the leader of the SPLA / SPLM, a deputy in the person of Major Kerubino Kwanyin, approved Major William Nuyon as the Chief of the General Staff and Captain Salwa Kiir as the Deputy Chief of the General Staff (by the way, the current President of South Sudan). At the same time, the Ethiopian granted Garang the right to appoint other members of the command and, more importantly, authorized military action against the forces of Anya-nya-2. So at the end of July 1983, the SPLA attacked and after a short fight captured Bilpam, driving Gordon Kong's forces into the already mentioned Bukteng camp. On this, the design of the new insurgent movement (SPLA) can be considered complete.

As for the dissidents from the SPLA and the members of Anya-nya-2 ousted to Bukteng, their paths soon parted. Gordon Kong and his supporters, not seeing any further opportunity to rely on any bases outside of Sudan, went over to the side of the Khartoum government, against which Anya-nya-2 began 8 years before the appearance of the SPLA. Guy Tut was killed in early 1984 by his deputy, who soon also died in another civil strife. Akuot Atem, a native of the Dinka tribe, fell shortly after the death of Guy Tut at the hands of the Nuer, who received an impulse to hate the Dinka after the failure of their leaders Gordon Kong and Guy Tut.

1.4. Population of South Sudan

Here is the time to pay attention to the ethnic composition of the rebels and the ethnic map of South Sudan as a whole. The latter is a motley conglomeration of peoples and tribes, which could not but affect the course of the events described.

The largest people in this region are the Dinka, very warlike people, divided, as it is supposed here, into several tribes, but quite capable under certain conditions to gather under the banner of a single leader. The second largest Nuer - the representatives of this tribe are unusually warlike, perhaps even more than the Dinka, but clearly inferior to the latter in the ability to act under a single command. The patchwork of Dinka and Nuer lands makes up most of the north of South Sudan, where the Shilluks, related to the two previous tribes, also live, as well as the less related Bertas (on the northeastern border of South Sudan and Ethiopia). The southern part of the region (the so-called Equatoria region) is filled with many tribes, the most significant of which, when listed from east to west, are the Didinga, Topoza, Acholi (kindred in Uganda, known for creating one of the most terrible formations of the late 20th / early 21st century - Lord's Liberation Army, LRA), Madi, Lotuko and Lokoya, Bari and Mundari, Azande. Marked in the 2nd Civil War and Murle, and Anuaki (in the east near the border with Ethiopia), and Fertit Corporation (various small tribes in the west of the region in the strip from Wau to Ragi).

It was the Dinka and the Nuer who initially formed the backbone of the rebels. It was the rivalry between their leaders that led to the most difficult consequences for the SPLA during the war. As part of a series of articles entitled "The 2nd Sudanese Civil War", the author will, as far as possible, avoid talking about events related to the Nuer, because the history of the participation of representatives of this tribe in this war is so interesting that it is planned to devote a separate article to it - and the quality reviews of other events of the 2nd Civil should not suffer. This is quite possible, since the outcome of the confrontation was decided mainly in the course of hostilities against the Khartoum Dinka government and allied detachments organized by the SPLA leadership from representatives of the most diverse tribes of South Sudan.

However, it is worth finally indicating the ethnicity of the previously mentioned heroes of our story:

  • the initiator of the Bor rebellion, initially the deputy commander of the SPLA, Kerubino Kwanyin Bol - Dinka;
  • the initiator of the uprising in Ayod, originally the chief of the General Staff, William Nuyon Bani - Nuer;
  • the holder of the highest military rank at the time of the rebellion and then the constant leader of the SPLA (and SPLM), John Garang - Dinka;
  • the very first leader of the SPLM, Akuot Atem, is a Dinka;
  • the very first head of the SPLA, Guy Tut is a Nuer.

Thus, the 1983 summer struggle in the Ethiopian refugee camps for the leadership of the SPLA was not between the Dinka and the Nuer, but between the military and politicians. Among the winning party were representatives of both tribes (Garang / Kerubino and Nuyon), among the losers also (Atem and Tut).

The situation with respect to the rivalry between the “new” rebels and Anya-nya-2 turned out to be somewhat more complicated: the leader of this organization Gordon Kong, who rejected the union with the SPLA, belonged to the Nuer tribe, but the departments that joined the new movement were headed by Dinka John Koang and Murle Ngachigak Ngachiluk. Thus, only the Nuer remained among the detachments of Gordon Kong, and Anya-Nya-2, which entered into an alliance with the Khartoum government, was already an exclusively tribal organization. This was not a very good sign for the SPLA - "picking up" an insurgent structure for itself, playing on social or personal motives (the duration of which is calculated for a maximum of years), is undoubtedly easier than "poaching" ethnic opponents, whose reasons for discontent lie in the centuries-old disputes of peoples.

Before turning to the description of the hostilities, I will say a few more words about the "cartographic support" of the narrative. I believe that a full understanding of the course of any conflict without studying its development in space is impossible. Therefore, only in rare cases, the name mentioned in the text cannot be found on the maps accompanying the article, and this will be specially marked with the sign "(n / k)". In particular, it will be possible to track the ups and downs of hostilities outlined in this article using fragments of a map of Sudan prepared by the Cartography Production Mapping Association of the Main Directorate of Geodesy and Cartography under the Council of Ministers of the USSR in 1980.

I will note only one feature - after the publication of this map in Sudan, the fragmentation of large provinces was completed, as a result of which Bahr el-Ghazal was divided into Western Bahr el-Ghazal, Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, Warrap and Lake Province; Jonglei and Unity were isolated from the Upper Nile; and the Equatorial province was divided into Western, Central and Eastern Equatoria.

1.5. Fighting in 1983-1984

And now, finally, to the struggle of the rebels with the government, and not just among themselves. On November 7, 1983, the SPLA captured the village of Malwal (n / a) a few dozen kilometers south of the city of Malukal. The settlement was thatched huts with less than a thousand inhabitants, so its capture (accompanied by a maximum of "battles" with the local police) served only as an application for the seriousness of the new movement. Of course, insignificant events should be excluded from the narrative, but nevertheless I decided to mark Malval as the first settlement that fell into the millstones of the 2nd Civil War in Sudan. In addition, the SPLA attacked it almost simultaneously with the city of Nasir, in which the rebels captured everything except the base of the SAF garrison. Over the next few days, the military units of the Khartoum government that advanced from neighboring regions fought with the rebels, and after a week they were able to oust the enemy from Nasir, and then from Malwal.

The November 1983 sortie of the SPLA into Sudan was only a test of strength, and the rebel leadership was preparing for a battle on the supply routes that was completely natural in those conditions, which was not at all exclusively a “battle on the roads”. In South Sudan, poor in road infrastructure, the main routes of communication ran along the rivers - primarily the Nile (giving direct access to the capital of the southern region of Juba), as well as along the Sobat (a tributary of the Nile leading to Nasir), and the Bahr el-Ghazal system (giving access from the Nile to a vast territory to the west, including the oil-bearing province of Unity). Therefore, initially, the Nile steamships became the main objects of attacks by the rebels.

In February 1984, a ship towing several barges was attacked. Government sources claimed that only 14 passengers died, while according to other sources - more than three hundred. It should be clarified that the passengers of such "convoys" were equally civilians and military (the Sudanese army initially used ordinary civilian vehicles to move along the rivers). The second confirmed by both sides rebel attack on a riverboat was only in December of this year, but it should be borne in mind that this conflict is characterized by particularly conflicting reports from the parties, so that confirmation by the government of the fact of the incident often occurred only when an incident of a significant scale.

In connection with the problems on the river routes, transport aviation acquired special importance for the government. But she also had to learn to work in the difficult conditions of the conflict - at the end of June, the Sudanese confirmed the loss of one transport worker and one combat F-5. Moreover, the government side suspected that the aircraft were hit with the help of the Strela MANPADS received by the PLA from Ethiopia.

However, not only on the water and in the air there was a “battle on the roads”. The supply of government forces in the western part of South Sudan was largely carried out by rail, which went from the north of the country to the capital of the state of Western Bahr el Ghazal, Wau. In March 1984, the SPLA blew up the railway bridge over the Lol River here, killing the garrison guarding it.

Finally, there were attacks on convoys moving overland. In August, a government detachment was ambushed and suffered heavy losses, heading from Juba to Bor. And in early October, a column between Duk and Ayod, on the Jonglei Canal, was defeated. By the way, the construction of the latter was stopped back in February - then the rebels attacked the previously mentioned Ayod and a number of other points, so the general contractor of this hydraulic facility, the French company, refused further work due to the death of several employees. Similarly, a number of oil companies have suspended their work on fields that are almost ready for development in the state of Unity.

1.6. Fighting in 1985

At the beginning of 1985, a new convoy left Juba for rebel-blocked Bor, numbering several thousand troops with a large amount of equipment. At 70 kilometers from his target, he was subjected to a powerful attack by the PLA and suffered heavy losses. However, the size of the convoy affected the outcome of the battle - it was not possible to completely destroy it. After some time, having put themselves in order, the column resumed movement. On the way, she was ambushed several more times, suffered losses and stopped for a long time. However, even after three months, the government detachment still reached Bor. It should be noted that such “long-term” convoys have become very characteristic of the Sudanese war. Due to the complete superiority of the army in heavy weapons, it was not easy to destroy them, but the government forces also had to move very carefully, given the risk of being ambushed at any moment on terrain well known to the enemy.

While the fight was going on on the roads, and the fighters of the former 104th and 105th battalions of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), who initiated the uprising, were disturbing the army garrisons in Pochalle and Akobo adjacent to Ethiopia, the leadership of the SPL was preparing new units that could adequately perform in the arena of struggle with SAF. At the same time, the title was considered as important - the first two SPLA battalions bore the name "Rhinos" and "Crocodiles". The latter in 1984 undertook an operation to capture the Boma mountain plateau south of Pochalla, convenient for creating a base area already on Sudanese territory. After initial success, the rebels were forced to retreat, having tasted the effect of the "luck on the side of the big battalions" principle.

Meanwhile, new forces were being prepared in the Ethiopian camps - a “division” with the sonorous name “Locust”, numbering up to 12 thousand fighters. And, of course, her new battalions bore no less proud names than the previous ones - "Scorpions", "Iron", "Lightning". At the very beginning of 1985, the mountainous region of Boma was again captured, now by the Scorpions battalion under the command of Ngachigak Ngachiluk. And, despite the further vicissitudes of a long civil war, Boma was never recaptured by government forces, becoming a reliable base for operations of the rebels.

From Boma, the SPLA forces moved west, defeated government troops north of the provincial center of East Equatorial Torit, and began to occupy its environs. Their activities in the area were facilitated by the assistance of the Lotuko people (and related to the latter Lokoi living in the area of ​​Liria and Ngangala), whose representative and prominent political figure in southern Sudan, Joseph Odunho, entered the leadership of the SPLM.

Moving southwest, the forward detachments of the SPLA reached the village of Ovni-ki-Bul (n / a) 20 kilometers from Magvi. This was already the territory of the Madi people, who did not show much enthusiasm to join the struggle against the northern Arabs. Therefore, it is not surprising that the SAF detachment burned the village, and the SAF units, which arrived soon, with the support of the local police, defeated and drove the enemy back.

The second direction of advance from the Lotuk area for the SPLA was western, where they captured the town of Mongalla located on the banks of the Nile. However, here too certain nuances arose - the rebels entered the area of ​​the Mandari tribe. The latter, for centuries, were the direct neighbors of the Dinka from the bor unit, and therefore "had scores" with the main striking force of the SPL. The old conflicts between Mandari and Dinka erupted more than once in the post-colonial era. In particular, shortly after the outbreak of the uprising in 1983, the Mandaris massacred Dinka merchants in Juba in the course of the struggle for the right to trade in the local market. And the Khartoum authorities, who skillfully used the “divide and rule” policy, did not interfere with this. In turn, in the same 1983, the Dinka expelled their rivals from the town of Tali Post, southwest of Bor. So the Mandari militia was well motivated and enjoyed the full support of government forces. Soon she defeated the rebels near Gur Makur (n / k) near Mongalla, forcing the SPLA to retreat from this settlement.

Here I will note another feature of this conflict. In conditions when only the Khartoum government had no shortage of heavy weapons, the presence of even a few tanks on the battlefield could become a decisive factor. Thus, in many battles with the SPL, the government side turned out to be represented mainly by some kind of tribal militia, which could hardly win without being supported by "armor" or "artificers" from the army. And such support, in turn, was extremely likely - just ask.

In September of the same year, detachments of the SPLA Southern Command, led by former SAF Major Arok Ton Arok, attacked another important Mandari city, Terekeka, now on the west bank of the Nile a little north of Mongalla. In the captured Terekek, there were serious excesses against the Mandari. Moreover, the sources note their orientation primarily against the "eastern wing" of the tribe, which may have been revenge for the recent defeat on the other side of the Nile. However, the SPLA detachments were soon forced to leave Terekeka.

Of course, the rebels were active in other areas of southern Sudan. However, for now I will only note the capture on March 3, 1985 of the village of Jack (n / c), east of Nasir near the border with Ethiopia. Although this event did not lead to further serious consequences, at least the SAF lost the entire garrison here, led by the colonel.

It was much more difficult to capture the provincial centers, although the rebels tried. In November 1985, a battalion that had just arrived after training in Ethiopia tried to take Bor. However, for the Dinka from the northern clans who made it up, the Sudda area turned out to be completely unfamiliar and unusual, which played a significant role in the final crushing defeat.

Apparently, it was this defeat that overflowed the “cup of patience” of the SPLA command in relation to the Southern Command. Arok Ton Arok was replaced with a certain Kuol Manyang Juuk. However, the epithet “some” should not be considered too pejoratively - as subsequent events showed, the most famous in the 2nd Civil War was acquired not by the leaders of successful operations, but by schismatics and traitors.

Let's finish this section with a couple of episodes from the "fight on the roads" of 1985. The continuing problems with the Nile shipping company were evidenced by the fact that in February 1986 the captain of the ship, a citizen of the FRG, who had been captured by the rebels a few months earlier, was released (which is why this case actually became known). The danger of flights to supply the garrisons was confirmed by the loss of two Buffalo transports - on March 14 at Akobo and on April 4 near Bor. Finally, at the end of the year, the SPLA bombarded the Juba airport several times with guns and mortars, albeit without much result.

Meanwhile, more serious events were approaching ...

Pavel Nechay,