This is the second interview about the historical myths of Russian propaganda. We are talking about the events of 1654, better known under the propaganda cliché "Reunification of Ukraine with Russia." The second component of the conversation is the motivation and logic of Ivan Mazepa's actions during the Northern War.

Olga Kovalevskaya - Doctor of Historical Sciences, Senior Researcher at the Institute of History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences Hromadske radio

Andrei Kobalia: Starting the topic of 1654, I wanted to ask what circumstances forced Bogdan Khmelnitsky to make an alliance with the Muscovite kingdom?

Olga Kovalevskaya: The thing is that in the context of those events that were taking place then, unfortunately, Bogdan Khmelnitsky in 1653 clearly understood that he did not have those allies who completely satisfied him. The Tatars in all those battles that were, showed themselves not in the best way. As a rule, all the problems that Bogdan had were due to their behavior. That is, due to non-compliance with treaty obligations, the same applied to the rest of the allies. For example, the same Moldavian ruler.

All attempts to find an ally did not justify themselves. In order to continue the war with the Commonwealth, there had to be an ally. This ally at that time Bogdan Khmelnitsky saw the Muscovite Kingdom. He repeatedly appealed to the Hetmanate to be taken under the high royal hand with the sole purpose of finding an ally and joint forces, in the end, to put the squeeze on the Commonwealth. To get the result he wanted - to clearly define the Cossack territory, which was under the control of the hetman, to determine the rights, the size of the registry and to determine the status quo.

A.K.: That is, in addition to the Moscow Kingdom, he could not have other allies, another alternative?

OK.: At that time, there was none. Prospects opened a little later, but already too late in terms of those events.

A.K.: What happened in 1654? Can this be called the reunification of Russia and Ukraine?

OK.: At that time, of course, this was not the case. The thing is that back in October 1653, when there was an appeal to Alexei Mikhailovich and to the Zemsky Sobor, which was supposed to consider this issue. The issue was indeed considered in favor of Bogdan Khmelnitsky and the entire Zaporozhye Host. What was it? You can accept Bogdan Khmelnitsky with the Zaporizhian Army and all the cities and population that lived there under the high royal hand.

But the problem simply consisted in the fact that there was a completely different political tradition in which Bogdan Khmelnitsky grew up, and representatives of the elders from the one that was in the Moscow Kingdom. Therefore, when it came to taking under the high royal hand, the representatives of the Muscovite state saw only one thing for themselves - the annexation of new lands. While for Bogdan Khmelnitsky and the foreman it looked completely different. It was a temporary military alliance, only to achieve a certain military goal. In this case, to defeat the Commonwealth and its army.

Therefore, the situation developed as follows: on January 8, 1654, in the city of Pereyaslav, the territory of the Pereyaslav regiment, the foreman, hetman gathered, there were representatives of the clergy, representatives of cities and various segments of the population. Negotiations began. A delegation from the Moscow Kingdom was presented, headed by the boyar Vasily Buturlin. There were negotiations to sign a temporary military alliance. In order for this agreement to receive legal confirmation, it was necessary to prepare the relevant documents.

In Pereyaslav itself, it was also not only about holding a solemn prayer and taking the oath from the hetman and some representatives of the elders and clergy, but also about preparing documents and submitting them to Buturlin for discussion. Only later, in March, out of 23 articles that were submitted by the foreman for discussion to the Moscow side, only 17 were approved. And in accordance with these articles, one could observe a military alliance, nothing more. What happened next is a completely different story.

Soviet poster "Forever together!". The poster depicts a Russian archer and a Ukrainian Cossack holding a shield depicting the soldiers of Kievan Rus. K.K. Ivanov, V.B. Koretsky, O.M. Savostyuk, B.A. Uspensky. 1954

A.K.: What sources can we be guided by when analyzing this event?

OK.: Usually, all the hetmans who came to power after Bogdan Khmelnytsky signed so-called articles with the Moscow State. Articles are an international treaty that fixes the duties, obligations, rights and opportunities of the two parties. What the hetman and foreman should do in relation to the Moscow state as a protector and what the Moscow state can do in relation to Ukraine (Hetmanate) as a vassal. If we talk about Khmelnitsky itself and about the March articles of 1654, this document has been lost today. Historians have never been able to find the original of this text.

Moreover, the subsequent events that took place in the history of Ukraine just show that the Moscow side was interested in losing, so to speak, this document. When the son of Bogdan Khmelnitsky, Yuriy, came to power, he was offered to sign articles that were not at all the March articles of his father. Although he was told that these were the very ones that were signed by his father. Actually it is not. The articles were called Pereyaslavsky. But in essence they were completely different.

Here the stumbling block was laid, which, in fact, laid the foundation for the subsequent myth. The hetman's rights were already quite limited. It was already about the fact that the Ukrainian lands were part of the Muscovite state precisely as, on the one hand, an autonomous territory. But on the other hand, the rights of the Moscow side on these lands were significantly expanded. Both the number of troops and the rights of the Moscow governors who were present here were greatly expanded. Great demands were placed on the hetman and foreman in relation to the Muscovite state in order to fulfill these obligations, which were fixed.

Thus, this myth subsequently began to form. But anniversaries began to play a special role, which were then celebrated in the Russian Empire in the 19th century and already in the 20th century in the Soviet Union.

А.К.: If I understand correctly, there is no original document of the March articles as such?

OK.: No, we have copies, no more.

A.K.: Then tell us a little more about the very myth of "Ukraine's reunification with Russia." It spread very strongly in Soviet times. How was it formed? What was the idea? What was this holiday?

OK.: If we talk about the events of 1954, then formally this year they were supposed to celebrate the tercentenary of this event - the Rada in Pereyaslav. It was at this time that some changes in administrative structures within the USSR were also dated. We are talking about the fact that Khrushchev decided to transfer the Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR. And at this very moment, taking advantage of the needs of the 20th century, they used those events very well. It was quickly shown that we had a reunion and now we are celebrating a reunion, although in fact there was no reunion. The Hetmanate retained its autonomy for quite a long time, and all the cases that came from the Hetmanate for discussion to the Muscovite State did not go to the internal organs of the state, but to external departments. That emphasizes the absolutely external status of this territory.

Badge for the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia http://katia-lexx.livejournal.com/1889318.html

A.K.: Having talked about the events of 1654, let's move on to the beginning of the 18th century and Mazepa. Against the backdrop of what world events did the Battle of Poltava take place? What sides were involved in the Great Northern War? Why did it start?

OK.: The thing is that everything is connected with the way in which at the very end of the 17th century, at the beginning of the 18th century, the status of the Muscovite state itself changes. There is a need to expand the territory, develop, and carry out reforms. And this was greatly facilitated by the one who specifically was in power at that time in Russia - Peter I. In 1699, first of all, Russia drew attention to the fact that it makes sense to start a struggle for access to the Baltic Sea. The predominance of Sweden in this region did not suit Russia very much. And as it turned out, not only Russia, but also Poland and Denmark. They were unhappy that at the end of the 17th century, Sweden had gained a significant advantage there. Therefore, in 1699, the so-called "Northern Union" was created. It included: Moscow kingdom, Poland and Denmark. They provoked this war against Sweden. But at the first stage of the war, this coalition was not very lucky, since the advantage was on the side of the Swedish king Charles XII and the Swedish army.

The Northern War itself stretched over a fairly large amount of time, from 1700 to 1721. As for the Battle of Poltava, it became a key one, it determined all the following events. For Ukraine, this event is interpreted by today's historians as a catastrophe. On the one hand, because for Ukraine this battle became a practical option for the implementation of the civil war, since Hetman Mazepa and the Cossacks led by Kostya Gordienko turned out to be on the side of Charles. And on the side of Peter - Ivan Skoropadsky and another part of the Cossack army. By and large, in the Battle of Poltava, they hypothetically fought against each other. In addition, the defeat of Mazepa and Charles at Poltava determined the course of all those reforms and changes that awaited the Hetmanate. After all, Peter I had long been thinking of reorganizing the army and changing the administrative structure. Mazepa's transfer to the side of Charles somewhat slowed down the process of incorporation of the Hetmanate into the already future Russian Empire, which it becomes precisely after the signing of the Treaty of Nietzstadt, which ended the Northern War in 1721.

The Battle of Poltava itself determined how relations between the Hetmanate and Muscovy would subsequently develop. On the one hand, Peter understood that it was impossible to start the reform very quickly, as this would cause another wave of uprisings, and more people would support Mazepa. On the other hand, he understood that these reforms were very necessary, otherwise the Ukrainians would continue to fight for their independence.

A.K.: Why did Mazepa go over to the side of Sweden? What were the reasons?

OK.: The reasons were just that, up to a certain point, Mazepa pursued the following policy: he believed that it was necessary to please the Moscow authorities very subtly so that they would not interfere in the internal affairs of the Hetmanate. For him, it was a reasonable enough strategy. But later he began to understand that Russia, having its own geological interests and expanding territorially, sooner or later would come into conflict with the interests of the Hetmanate, the hetman and the foreman. Russia claimed to incorporate the territory of the Hetmanate as soon as possible into its own state, to extend to its territory the administrative system that was in the Muscovite state. What happened was the division into provinces and counties. And the biggest problem is that Peter really wanted to change the structure of the Cossack army. From irregular regiments to transform into dragoon and not only regular regiments. That is the idea of ​​creating a regular army.

Naturally, the foreman and the ordinary Cossacks did not want this, they resisted it. These were the reasons that Mazepa clearly understood that sooner or later all this would begin to happen, and it was necessary to find an option how to resist this. In this case, he did his best to make sure that the military operations of the Northern War did not take place on the territory of Ukraine. But when the Swedish army approached its borders and then crossed it, he realized that he had no choice. He had to make a decision very quickly. Mazepa went over to the side of Karl, wanting to get a new protector in his person, who, having no territorial claims to Ukraine, would be able to provide him with the protection that was so lacking. So that Ukraine can strengthen its positions and become an independent state.

А.К.: What points of view are there in historical science? What do foreign, but not Russian, historians think about this? What are the neutral views on this event?

OK.: Pretty much what I said. Any researcher who is outside of Ukraine and outside of Russia has the opportunity to assess what is happening in a more balanced and detached way, without getting emotionally involved in this process. There are reasons that force the hetman to act in such a way, they really justify such actions. In addition, he did not act independently, he relied on the foreman. The foreman herself clearly understood what was happening. Ukrainian troops constantly took part in the events of the Northern War outside of Ukraine. Our troops were near Narva, on the territory of Poland, on the territory of Belarus. They suffered losses. Being in these territories, they did not have the right to obey only the colonels, the power of the Russian generals existed over them. The attitude of the generals towards the Cossacks was very negative. They were humiliated, beaten and insulted. The hetman knew about this, and, trying to protect his army, he was looking for the most acceptable option.

A.K.: That is, if we talk about Ukrainian and foreign, but not Russian historiography, they do not differ in anything?

OK.: They don't diverge. There is only one nuance. Now we are talking quite generally, but if you take specific works, for example, of the 19th century, and analyze, you need to clearly understand on what sources these works were written, who was the informant, this is very important. If the work was written on Russian sources and the informants were Russian residents, then the attitude towards Mazepa is negative or neutral-negative. If a person tried to avoid dependence on his sources as much as possible, relied not only on Russian, but also on, for example, Swedish, English, German, French sources, then a normal picture was obtained.

You can listen to the first issue about medieval Russia

January 18, 1654 in Pereyaslav (now a city in the Kyiv region), a meeting of representatives of the Zaporizhzhya Cossacks, headed by Hetman Bogdan Khmelnitsky, was held. At this forum, a decision was made publicly to unite the territory of the Zaporizhian Army with the Russian kingdom.

This was far from the first appeal to Moscow about the acceptance of the Zaporizhzhya Cossacks into the citizenship of the Russian state. The Kremlin has repeatedly received such requests over the previous decades - whenever anti-Polish demonstrations took place on the territory of the Zaporizhian Army.

By the middle of the 17th century, the frequency of such uprisings increased sharply - in 1637, the uprising of Pavlyuk took place, and already in the next 1638, the uprising of Yakov Ostryanin. This was mainly due to the fact that the former religious tolerance of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had sunk into oblivion, and Catholic pressure on the Orthodox population of Ukraine increased.

It is worth saying that Moscow reacted rather coolly to the Cossack calls for joining. Firstly, the political balance of power did not allow this, and secondly, the mood of the Cossacks quickly changed - the Cossacks easily betrayed those to whom they had just sworn allegiance.

From Bogdan Khmelnitsky, such an appeal was first received in June 1648, and also remained unanswered. However, since these calls were repeated, and Khmelnitsky himself won military victories, the Kremlin finally decided to take advantage of this.

On October 11, 1653, the Zemsky Sobor, held in Moscow, decided to accept the Hetmanate as a subject of the Russian state. After this decision, a large embassy headed by the boyar Vasily Buturlin went to Pereyaslavshchina from Moscow to conduct the negotiation process.

The city of Pereyaslavl was chosen as the venue for the General Military Council, where the embassy arrived on January 10, 1654. Bogdan Khmelnitsky, together with the general foreman, arrived on January 16.

On January 18, 1654, in Pereyaslav, a secret foremen's council of the Zaporizhzhya Cossacks took place in the morning, and on the same day in the afternoon - the General Military Council, in which representatives of the Cossack regiments, as well as residents of Pereyaslav, took part.

After the hetman read the royal charter, the foreman and the ambassadors went to the Assumption Cathedral, where the clergy were to swear them in. Khmelnitsky expressed the wish that the Moscow ambassadors be the first to take the oath on behalf of the Russian Tsar. However, Buturlin refused to take the oath on behalf of the tsar, saying that the tsar does not swear allegiance to his subjects.

After that, the Cossacks took the oath. In total, on the day of the Pereyaslav Rada, 284 people took the oath. On behalf of the king, the hetman was presented with a letter and signs of hetman power: a banner, a mace and a hat.

Although the Pereyaslav Agreement did not lead to the final and irrevocable accession of Ukraine to Russia, it was of tremendous importance.

For Moscow, it meant the acquisition of part of the lands of Western Russia, including ancient Kyiv, which the Moscow grand dukes and tsars for centuries considered their fiefdom. This event was the next stage in the gathering of the Russian land, which was reflected in their pretentious title of sovereigns of all Russia.

For the Commonwealth, this agreement was the beginning of the processes of disintegration and dismemberment, which ultimately led to the complete loss of independence at the end of the 18th century.

The accession of Ukraine to Russia (1654) took place against the backdrop of complex socio-political events associated with the desire of Ukrainians to become more independent and not depend entirely on Poland. Since 1648, the confrontation turned into an armed phase, but no matter how many victories the Cossacks under the leadership of Bogdan Khmelnitsky won over the Polish troops, they could not turn victories on the battlefield into tangible political dividends. It became clear that without the help of a powerful ally, it would not be possible to get out of the tutelage of the Commonwealth, as a result, Ukraine was reunited with Russia. Let us briefly describe the causes of the historical event.

Equality and autonomy

During the six years of the war, in numerous bloody battles, the Ukrainian people smashed the Polish troops many times with a huge effort of their forces. But, inflicting tangible blows to the Commonwealth, Khmelnitsky at first was not going to tear Ukraine away from the Polish state. He stood on the position of Cossack autonomy, that is, he sought to ensure that the Cossacks and the gentry had equal rights, and the Ukrainian lands became equal within the Commonwealth on a par with Poland and Lithuania. Then there was no talk about the reunification of Ukraine with Russia. 1654 changed the situation.

Or maybe independence?

Meanwhile, few believed in the idea of ​​equality within the framework of autonomy. Already in the first years of the war in Ukraine, and in Poland, rumors were circulating that:

1. Khmelnitsky wants to restore some "Old Russian" or create a new principality.
2. He titles himself "Prince of Russia".
3. The Cossacks want to establish an independent state.

But then the necessary prerequisites for the independence of Ukraine had not yet been formed. The main participants in the war - and these are the illiterate Cossacks and the same illiterate peasantry - could not create their own state ideology, the leading layer - the Cossack foremen and the gentry - did not have the proper political weight to realize the separatist plans. Moreover, even Hetman Khmelnytsky did not yet have popular confidence at that time. Only during the war, in the process of formation of the Ukrainian Cossack state, the idea of ​​independence spread and became more and more established.

Union with Turkey

The longer the hostilities went on, the more Khmelnytsky, foremen and the masses became convinced that Ukraine would not be able to free itself from the power of gentry Poland solely on its own without outside help. There were only two powerful neighbors ready to resist the Commonwealth: the Russian state in the east and the Ottoman Empire in the south. Khmelnytsky had little choice: either the entry of Ukraine into Russia, or the recognition of vassalage from Turkey.

Initially, the Turkish sultan, who had enough strength to resist the encroachments of Poland in Ukraine, became a contender for the role of the patron of Ukraine. Corresponding negotiations were held between Khmelnytsky and the Sultan's government. In 1651, the Ottoman Porte declared that it accepted the Zaporizhian Host as vassals. In fact, the real help of the Turkish Sultan was limited only by the fact that the Crimean Tatars, who had been at enmity with the Cossacks for centuries, took part in the battles. They remained very unreliable allies and with their treacherous behavior, robberies and captivity of the population brought more trouble than good to the Ukrainians.

Seeking help from Russia

The alliance with the Ottoman Empire did not actually take place. It was not even a matter of the weak military and financial assistance of the Sultan, but of mental incompatibility. The differences between the Orthodox and Muslims, whom the people called "infidels", turned out to be insurmountable. In this situation, the eyes of Bogdan Khmelnytsky and the population of Ukraine turned to fellow believers - the Russians.

On June 8, 1648, six years before the annexation of Ukraine to Russia (1654), Bogdan Khmelnitsky wrote the first letter of assistance to the Russian autocrat Alexei Mikhailovich. Initially, Russia was in no hurry to get involved in a full-scale war with the strong Polish-Lithuanian kingdom. But the leader of the Ukrainians for all six years urged the tsar to provide assistance, seeking the inclusion of the Russian state in the war with gentry Poland. Khmelnytsky before the Moscow ambassadors emphasized the importance of joint defense of the Orthodox faith common to the fraternal peoples, with his victories debunked exaggerated ideas about the strength of the Commonwealth, noted the great advantages that the reunification of Ukraine with Russia would have. The year 1654 showed the foresight and correctness of Khmelnitsky.

Russia's waiting position

Moscow understood the importance of an alliance with Ukraine:

1. The strategic union, first of all, opened the way to the south up to the Black Sea and to the west.
2. He weakened Poland.
3. Destroyed a possible alliance with Turkey.
4. He strengthened the state by joining the three hundred thousandth Cossack army under the Russian banner.

However, for a long time, due to difficult internal and external circumstances, as well as counting on the weakening of both warring parties - Poland and Ukraine - the tsarist government took a wait-and-see attitude. Assistance was limited to sending bread and salt to Ukraine, allowing Ukrainians to move to outlying lands, and exchanging embassies.

Approach course

Relations between Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Russian government revived in 1652-1653, during the last years of the war of liberation. Almost continuously there were embassies from Ukraine to Moscow and from Moscow to Ukraine. In January 1652, Khmelnitsky sent his envoy Ivan Iskra to the Russian capital. Iskra declared that the hetman and the entire Zaporizhian army wished that "the royal majesty would take them to its side."

In December 1652 and January 1653, Samoilo Zarudny negotiated with his comrades in Moscow. Zarudny said that the tsar "ordered them to be taken under his sovereign's High Hand." On January 6, 1653, Khmelnytsky convened a council of foremen in Chyhyryn, who decided not to put up with Poland, but to continue to fight until Ukraine became part of Russia.

In April-May 1653, negotiations in Moscow were conducted by ambassadors Kondraty Burlyai and Siluan Muzhilovsky. The tsarist government also sent ambassadors to Bohdan Khmelnitsky, in particular, at the end of May 1653, A. Matveev and I. Fomin left for Chigirin.

1654: Ukraine-Russia - together for centuries

The complication of the situation in Ukraine forced the tsarist government to speed up the decision. On June 22, 1653, the stolnik Fyodor Ladyzhensky set off for Ukraine from Moscow with a letter from Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, in which consent was given to the transfer of the lands of Ukraine under the “high royal hand”.

On October 1, 1653, the Zemsky Sobor met in Moscow, designed to finally resolve the issue of relations between Russia and Ukraine and declare war on the Commonwealth. In the Faceted Chamber of the Kremlin, it was decided "to take the Zaporizhzhya Army and Hetman Bogdan Khmelnitsky with the lands and their cities under the arm of the sovereign." This is how history was made. The reunification of Ukraine with Russia was approved not only by the tsar, but also by all segments of the population (except for the serfs, who did not have the right to vote), whose representatives gathered at the council. At the same time, the Zemsky Sobor decided to start a war with Poland.

However, this is not the final accession of Ukraine to Russia. The year 1654 required several more meetings before the final conditions for entry were worked out. The recognition by Russia of Ukraine as a free, independent country was important. This was stated in the decision of the Zemsky Sobor as follows: “So that they would not be released into citizenship by the Turkish Sultan or the Crimean Khan, because they became the oath of the royal free people.”

Signing an agreement

On January 31, 1653, the Russian embassy arrives at Khmelnitsky's headquarters - the city of Pereyaslav - with a letter of approval of the Zemsky Sobor and the "highest order". The embassy, ​​headed by V. Buturlin, was solemnly greeted by foremen and ordinary people.

On January 6, 1654, Bogdan Khmelnitsky arrived in Pereyaslav and the next day met with the ambassadors in order to discuss the terms of the union. On January 8, after secret negotiations with the foremen about the terms of joining, Bohdan Khmelnytsky went out to the people and confirmed the joining of Ukraine to Russia. 1654 was a turning point in the fate of the two peoples.

Ukrainian embassies visited Moscow several times to discuss the details of the voluntary entry of Left-Bank Ukraine under the protectorate of the Russian Empire.

History of Ukraine in dates: reunification with Russia

• 1591-1593 - an uprising against and the first appeal of Hetman Krishtof Kosinsky for help to the Russian Tsar.
• 1622, 1624 - Appeal of Bishop Isaiah Kopinsky, and then Metropolitan Job Boretsky to the Tsar to accept the Orthodox of Little Russia into Russian citizenship.
• 1648 - Bohdan Khmelnytsky raises an all-Ukrainian uprising against the gentry and on June 8 writes the first letter to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich about help and alliance. The first victories of the Cossack army and the signing of the Zborovsky peace treaty, which granted autonomy to the Zaporizhian Host.
• 1651 - the resumption of hostilities, a heavy defeat of the Cossacks near Berestechko.
• 1653 - Bogdan Khmelnytsky's new appeal to the Russians with a request to help the Cossacks and a petition for the adoption of Left-Bank Ukraine into citizenship. On October 1, the Zemsky Sobor met.
• 1654 - On January 8, the Pereyaslav Rada met, publicly deciding to unite with Russia. The Zemsky Sobor and the tsar granted most of the requests put forward by the foremen and the hetman, which provided for broad autonomy. This document finally secured the reunification of Left-bank Ukraine with Russia.