The state should not only act with great foresight, but also be able to wait patiently
It would seem that the young Soviet branch of science could in no way compete with the German industrial institutions, which had a powerful material base, excellent scientists and strong traditions. German concerns have long maintained large research institutions. Here they well remembered the statement of Professor P. Thyssen: “Research is the foundation of technical superiority over the enemy. Research is the basis for worldwide competition." However, it is not enough to have power - you still need to use it correctly.
The People's Commissariat of the tank industry of the USSR was able to fully utilize its modest scientific resources. All research institutions and organizations that could bring at least some benefit were involved in solving the pressing problems of tank building.
It should be noted that this was facilitated by the entire system of Soviet applied science, originally created to serve the interests of not individual firms and factories, but at least the industry. By the way, such a system does not necessarily stem from the socialist system: the first industry-wide scientific structure appeared in Sweden in 1747 as part of the so-called Iron Office. By the way, it still operates today under the name "Association of Steel Producers of the Scandinavian Countries."
Departmental institutions of the NKTP
The People's Commissariat of the tank industry of the war years consisted of two main research institutions: the "armor" institute TsNII-48 and the design and technology institute 8GSPI.
NII-48 (director - A. S. Zavyalov) became part of the newly formed NKTP in the fall of 1941 and was immediately evacuated to Sverdlovsk, closer to the new tank factories. In accordance with the regulations approved on July 15, 1942, it became officially known as the State Central Research Institute of the NKTP of the USSR (TsNII-48). His list of tasks included:
"a) development and introduction into production of new types of armor and armor, structural and tool steel grades, non-ferrous and various special alloys in order to reduce the scarce or potentially scarce alloying elements contained in them, improve the quality of products manufactured by NKTP plants, and increase productivity the latter;
b) development and implementation of rational wartime metallurgical technology in the industries existing at the NKTP factories and armored factories of other people's commissariats, in order to maximize the output of products, improve their quality, increase the productivity of factories and reduce the consumption rates of metal, raw materials and materials;
Collage by Andrey Sedykh
c) technological assistance to factories in mastering new technologies or equipment for them, as well as working methods in order to overcome bottlenecks and production difficulties that arise at factories;
d) assistance in improving the technical qualifications of workers at NKTP plants by transferring to them the theoretical and practical experience accumulated in the USSR and abroad in armor production and other industries of the profile of NKTP plants;
e) organization of interfactory exchange of advanced technical experience of factories;
f) development of the theory and new ways of using armor protection for the armament of the Red Army;
g) coordination of all research work carried out in the NKTP system on issues of armor, metal science, metallurgy, hot working and welding of metals and alloys;
h) comprehensive technical assistance to design bureaus and other organizations and enterprises of other people's commissariats on all issues of armored production.
A clear idea of the scope of NII-48's activities is provided by its annual reports. So, in 1943 alone, proposals were developed and partially implemented in practice to reduce the number of consumed rolled profile sizes by 2.5 times. The technical processes for forging and stamping parts of the T-34 tank were also unified for all plants, the technical conditions for their heat treatment were revised, the processes for welding T-34 armored hulls and steel casting were unified, a chemical-thermal method for sharpening cutters was created, casting of tank turrets into a chill mold was introduced at UZTM, new grades of armor steel: 68L for cast parts T-34, an improved version of 8C for rolled armor, I-3 - steel with high hardness in a highly tempered state. At the Ural Tank Plant, employees of NII-48 worked out and introduced into production an improved brand of high-speed steel I-323. To this it is necessary to add surveys of defeats of domestic and enemy armored vehicles, which have become regular, both at repair plants and directly on the battlefield. The received reports and recommendations were immediately brought to the attention of all the chief designers of combat vehicles.
Or, for example, information of a different kind: during January-October 1944, at meetings of the Technical Council of the NKTP (where representatives of all factories were invited), the following reports of TsNII-48 were discussed:
"Unified technological processes for the manufacture of castings from iron, steel and non-ferrous metals."
"Documentation on the technology of forging - stamping".
"Influence of strain rate on metal penetration resistance".
"Modern Types of Anti-tank Artillery and the Development of Tank Armor".
"High-tempered armor of high hardness".
"Technological properties of low-alloyed high-speed steel P823 and the results of its implementation in the production of plant No. 183".
"Improving the strength of steel due to intensifiers (boron-containing additives, zirconium, etc.)".
"Improving the strength of steel for heavily loaded gears".
"Improving the fatigue strength of crankshafts made from steel grade 18KhNMA".
"Normals of chemical composition and mechanical properties of steel grades used in tank building".
And so - throughout the war years. The workload and pace are unbelievable, given that at the end of 1943, TsNII-48 had only 236 employees, including janitors and technicians. True, among them were 2 academicians, 1 corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 4 doctors and 10 candidates of sciences.
The 8th State Union Design Institute of the Tank Industry (director - A. I. Solin) was evacuated to Chelyabinsk at the end of 1941. In the first period of the war, all the forces of the 8GSPI were directed to fulfill the tasks of the People's Commissariat for the deployment and commissioning of evacuated tank and engine factories, as well as the development of simplified wartime technologies.
By the middle of 1942, other tasks came to the fore: the unification of technological processes (primarily machining and assembly) and the provision of various scientific and technical assistance to enterprises. So, at the Ural Tank Plant, a team of scientists and designers 8GSPI in the summer and autumn was engaged in a comprehensive calculation of the plant's capacity, theoretical calculations of the tank's transmission, reduction of the range of ferrous metals used, improvement of the design and manufacturing technology of 26 machine parts, unification of the cutting tool. The Central Bureau of Standardization, which operated as part of the 8GSPI, created and implemented directly at enterprises standards in the field of drawing facilities, parts and assemblies of tanks, organization of control and measuring facilities, unification of tools, fixtures, dies, and technological documentation. Thanks to the help of the bureau, the thirty-four manufacturing plants managed to achieve complete interchangeability in terms of components: final drive, final clutch, gearbox, main clutch, drive wheel, road wheels with external and internal shock absorption, sloth. The introduction of the developments of the bureau made it possible, according to estimates in 1944, to reduce the labor intensity in the industry by 0.5 million machine hours per year. The quality of Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns was largely predetermined by technical control standards, also drawn up by employees of the 8GSPI.
A separate and important area of work of the 8GSPI is the creation of documentation for the army repairmen and repair plants of the NKTP for the restoration of tanks and engines of all types, including captured ones and those supplied by the Allies. During 1942 alone, technical conditions appeared for the overhaul and military repairs of the KV, T-34, T-60 and T-70 tanks and the V-2-34, V-2KV and GAZ-202 engines, as well as albums of drawings of devices for dismantling and installation of T-34 and KV units in the field.
Involved technological research institutes and laboratories
In addition to the main institutions, scientists from many design and technological institutions that previously operated in other sectors of the national economy worked for the tank industry.
It is known that the main part of the staff of the central laboratory of plant No. 183 was made up of employees of the Kharkov Institute of Metals, which was evacuated along with the enterprise in 1941. At one time, in 1928, this scientific institution was established as a branch of the Leningrad All-Union Institute of Metals of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR. The latter has been conducting its own since 1914 and was originally called the Central Scientific and Technical Laboratory of the Military Department. In September 1930, the Kharkov Institute of Metals became independent, but retained its former research topics: heat power engineering of metallurgical furnaces, foundry technology, hot and cold working and welding, physical and mechanical properties of metals.
The State Allied Research Laboratory of Cutting Tools and Electric Welding named after Ignatiev (LARIG) was located on the site of plant No. 183 in accordance with the order of the NKTP dated December 26, 1941, and retained the status of an independent institution. The duties of the laboratory included the provision of technical assistance to all enterprises in the industry in the design, manufacture and repair of cutting tools, as well as the development of electric welding machines.
The first major result of the work of LARIG was obtained in July 1942: at plant No. 183, the introduction of boring multi-cutter blocks developed in the laboratory began. At the end of the year, scientists, using new cutters of their own design and changing their modes of operation, achieved a significant increase in the productivity of carousel machines that processed the drive wheels of the tank. Thus, the "bottleneck" that limited the tank conveyor was eliminated.
During the same 1942, LARIG completed the work begun before the war on the introduction of cast cutter holders instead of the generally accepted forged ones. This reduced the cost of the tool and unloaded the forging industry. It turned out that cast holders, although inferior in mechanical strength to forged ones, served no worse than the latter. By the end of the year, the laboratory introduced shortened taps into production. This project also began before the war, and together with the 8GSPI Institute.
At another NKTP enterprise, Uralmashzavod, ENIMS operated during the war years, that is, the Experimental Scientific Institute of Metal-cutting Machine Tools. Its employees developed, and UZTM manufactured a number of unique machine tools and entire automatic lines used throughout the people's commissariat.
So, in the spring of 1942, at the Ural Tank Plant No. 183, the ENIMS brigade “set up” the production of rollers with internal shock absorption. She created the technological process and working drawings for three fixtures and 14 positions of cutting and auxiliary tools. In addition, projects for a multi-spindle drilling head and modernization of the ZHOR rotary machine were completed. An additional task for ENIMS was the development and manufacture of eight special machines for turning wheels.
The same thing happened in the processing of balancers. The ENIMS team was engaged in both the technological process as a whole and the creation of a special tool. In addition, the institute took over the design and manufacture of two modular boring machines: one multi-spindle and one multi-position. By the end of 1942, both were made.
Academic and university science
The most famous academic institution that worked for the tank industry is the Kyiv Institute of Electric Welding of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, headed by Academician E. O. Paton. During 1942–1943, the institute, together with employees of the armored hull department of plant No. 183, created a whole range of machine guns of various types and purposes. In 1945, UTZ used the following auto-welding machines:
Universal type for welding straight longitudinal seams;
- universal self-propelled carts;
-simplified specialized carts;
- installations for welding of circular seams at a motionless product;
- installations with a carousel for product rotation when welding circular seams;
- self-propelled units with a common drive for feeding the electrode wire and moving the head for welding seams on bulky structures.
In 1945, automatic weapons accounted for 23 percent of the welding work (by weight of weld metal) on the hull and 30 percent on the turret of the T-34 tank. The use of automatic machines made it possible already in 1942 at only one plant No. 183 to release 60 qualified welders, and in 1945 - 140. A very important circumstance: the high quality of the seam in automatic welding eliminated the negative consequences of refusing to machine the edges of armor parts. Throughout the war, as the instruction for the operation of automatic welding machines at the enterprises of the industry, the “Guidelines for Automatic Welding of Armored Structures” compiled by employees of the Institute of Electric Welding of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR in 1942 were used.
The activities of the institute were not limited to automatic welding. Its employees introduced a method of repairing cracks in tank tracks using welding with austenite electrodes, a device for cutting round holes in armor plates. The scientists also developed a scheme for the in-line production of high-quality MD electrodes and a technology for drying them on a conveyor.
Much less known are the results of work at the NKTP of the Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology. Throughout the war, he continued to study the problems of the interaction of the projectile and armor, created various options for constructive armor barriers and multilayer armor. It is known that prototypes were manufactured and fired at Uralmash.
A very interesting story is connected with Bauman Moscow State Technical University. At the beginning of 1942, the leadership of the NKTP became interested in a cutting tool with rational sharpening angles, created in the course of many years of work by scientists from this famous Russian university. It was known that such a tool had already been used at the factories of the People's Commissariat of Arms.
To begin with, an attempt was made to obtain information about the innovation directly from the People's Commissariat of Armaments, but, apparently, without much success. As a result, scientists from the Department of Theory of Machining and Tools of the Moscow State Technical University headed by Professor I.M. In the summer and autumn of 1943, quite successful experiments were carried out, and on November 12, an order was issued by the NKTP for the widespread introduction of such a tool and the dispatch of MVTU employees to factories No. 183 and No. tool with rational geometry.
The project turned out to be more than successful: cutters, drills and milling cutters had 1.6-5 times longer durability and allowed to increase machine productivity by 25-30 percent. Simultaneously with rational geometry, MVTU scientists proposed a system of chip breakers for cutters. With their help, plant No. 183 at least partially solved the problems with cleaning and further disposal of chips.
By the end of the war, scientists of the cutting department of the Moscow State Technical University. Bauman compiled a special manual called "Guidelines on the geometry of the cutting tool." By order of the People's Commissariat, they were approved "... as mandatory in the design of special cutting tools at the NKTP factories and in the further development of new 8GPI normals" and sent to all enterprises and institutions of the industry.
Another interesting technology - surface hardening of steel parts using high-frequency currents - was introduced at the enterprises of the tank industry by employees of the laboratory of electrothermy of the Leningrad Electrotechnical Institute, headed by Professor V.P. Vologdin. At the beginning of 1942, the laboratory staff consisted of only 19 people, and 9 of them operated at the Chelyabinsk Kirov Plant. The most massive parts were chosen as the object of processing - final drive gears, cylinder liners and piston pins of the V-2 diesel engine. Once mastered, the new technology freed up to 70 percent of CHKZ thermal furnaces, and the operation time decreased from tens of hours to tens of minutes.
At Tagil Plant No. 183, HDTV hardening technology was introduced in 1944. At first, three parts were subjected to surface hardening - the trunnion of the gun, the main friction clutch and the axle of the drive wheel roller.
The list of research institutes and laboratories that created technologies for the tank industry of the USSR is not exhausted by the examples given. But what has been said is enough to understand: during the war years, the NKTP turned into the largest scientific and production association in our country.
Swan, crayfish and pike in the German version
In contrast to the USSR, German industrial science was divided into cramped corporate cells and cut off from university science by an iron curtain. In any case, this is what a large group of scientific and technical leaders of the former Third Reich claims in the review “The Rise and Decline of German Science” compiled after the end of the war. Let us quote a rather extensive quotation: “The research organization of industry was independent, did not need the help of any ministry, state research council or other departments ... This organization worked for itself and at the same time behind closed doors. The consequence was that a researcher from any higher educational institution not only knew nothing, but did not even suspect about those discoveries and improvements that were being made in industrial laboratories. This happened because it was beneficial for any concern, for reasons of competition, to keep the inventions of their scientists secret. As a result, knowledge did not flow into a large common cauldron and could only bring partial success for a common cause. The Minister of Armaments and Military Production A. Speer tried to unite industrialists in the system of branch "committees" and "centers", to establish technological interaction between factories, but he could not completely solve the problem. Corporate interests were above all.
If branch institutes worked for concerns, then German university science in the first period of the Second World War was generally out of work. Based on the strategy of a lightning war, the leadership of the Reich considered it possible to complete it with the one with which the troops entered the battle. Consequently, all studies that did not promise results in the shortest possible time (no more than a year) were declared unnecessary and curtailed. We read further the review “The Rise and Decline of German Science”: “Scientists were assigned to the category of human resources from which replenishment for the front was scooped ... As a result, despite the objections of the arms department and various other authorities, several thousand highly qualified scientists from universities, higher technical educational institutions and various research institutes, including indispensable specialists in research in the field of high frequencies, nuclear physics, chemistry, engine building, etc., were drafted into the army at the beginning of the war and were used in lower positions and even as a soldier." Major defeats and the appearance on the battlefield of new types of weapons (Soviet T-34 tanks, British radars, American long-range bombers, etc.) forced Hitler and his entourage to moderate their rejection of intellectuals: 10 thousand scientists, engineers and technicians were recalled from the front . Among them were even 100 humanitarians. J. Goebbels had to issue a special directive on the prohibition of attacks against scientists in the press, on radio, in cinema and theater.
But it was too late: due to the loss of pace, the results of research and new developments, sometimes promising, did not have time to get into the troops. Let us give the general conclusion of the same review “The Rise and Decline of German Science”: “Science and technology are incompatible with improvisation. A state that wants to receive the real fruits of science and technology must not only act with great foresight and skill, but also be able to patiently wait for these fruits.
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MILITARY THOUGHT No. 7/2008, pp. 26-31
Military science at the present stage
Retired Major GeneralI.N. VOROBYOV ,
doctor of military sciences
ColonelV.A. KISELYOV ,
doctor of military sciences
IN RECENT years, the journal Voennaya Mysl has published a number of articles devoted to questions of military science. Noteworthy is the conclusion made by Professor Major General S.A. Tyushkevich, that "the state of our military science does not fully meet modern requirements ...". The military philosopher G.P. Belokonev in the article "Philosophy and military science". Unfortunately, the authors did not adequately substantiate their thesis, and most importantly, they did not put forward constructive proposals for solving this problem. While agreeing in principle with the opinion of the authors, we would like to express our opinions on this issue.
The main reason that Russian military science began to decline and lose its prestige as the most advanced military science in the world starting from the 90s of the last century was the fact that military development in the country, military service, military history, as well as methodological the basis of military science - dialectical materialism - were subjected to the most acute ideological obstruction, and in a number of cases - falsification. The centuries-old traditions of the Russian state at the end of the 20th century were simply ignored during the implementation of military reform in our country. The negative consequences of such a policy immediately affected the combat capability of the Armed Forces, which dropped sharply.
Now there is an acute issue of reviving military science, increasing its role and place in the system of other social sciences, clearly defining tasks in ensuring the military security of the state, preparing the Armed Forces for armed struggle, and developing new forms and methods of conducting it.
It is important to pay attention to the fact that recently the country's military leadership has been striving to raise the status of military science, to intensify the research, theoretical activities of scientific organizations of the Ministry of Defense and to ensure proactive scientific and practical study of the most important problems in the field of military policy in the interests of strengthening the state's defense capability.
Former Minister of Defense, now First Deputy Prime Minister of the Government of the Russian Federation Security Council. Ivanov, speaking on January 24, 2004 at the military-scientific conference of the Academy of Military Sciences, emphasized that "the further development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the creation of a professional army of the 21st century is impossible without military science, standing at the height of the most modern requirements."
It is positive that at present military science is becoming one of the state priorities. At the same time, it is important that this be backed up by the necessary funding of the military-industrial complex, conducting promising research projects, training military scientists and publishing works on general theoretical and methodological problems of military science, including foreign publications on military topics.
At the present stage, military science faces ever more complex tasks. This is due to the fact that the main object of her research - war, like a chameleon, constantly changes its appearance, becomes difficult to predict. Recently, the term "wrong" wars has even flashed in the press, as opposed to the established views on "classical" wars. Yes, indeed, if we take the two wars against Iraq (1991 and 2003), then by their nature, methods of waging, types of weapons used, they do not fit into the prevailing stereotypes. It turns out that military practice has begun to outstrip military theory, and military science is beginning to lose its main function as a "searchlight" of military events, which, of course, cannot be reconciled with.
Life and the practice of military construction urgently demand from military science accurate and well-founded forecasts for 15-20 years and more ahead. Now it is extremely important to know: what an armed struggle, an operation, a battle can be technologically; how the content of military-political, military-economic and military-technical factors, their influence on the forms and methods of military operations will change; what requirements must be met by the composition, organization and technical equipment of the Armed Forces, the forms and methods of command and control of troops in peacetime and wartime; how to prepare the population and mobilization resources for war.
Military historical experience has shown that military science could rise in its development to a qualitatively new level, develop correct long-term guidelines for military development, military doctrine, and not only keep up with scientific and technological progress, but also outstrip it when it relied on time-tested philosophical and methodological basis - dialectical materialism. Here it is appropriate to cite the judgment of A.A. Svechina: "Dialectics cannot be expelled from the everyday life of strategic thought, since it constitutes its essence."
Relying precisely on dialectical principles, the system of known laws and regularities inherent in war, military science is able to "look" far ahead, to play the role of a "seer" in military organizational development. Now, when more and more new concepts of so-called non-contact, remote, robotic, aerospace, situational, transcontinental wars are emerging, the creative function of military science is especially important. The emergence of new views on the nature of the armed struggle of the future at the present stage is natural and inevitable, just as on the eve of the Second World War, new theories of air warfare (D. Duet), mechanized wars by small professional armies (D. Fuller, W. Mitchell, S. de Gaulle), which, although not suddenly justified, foreshadowed the coming changes in the methods of warfare. In part, they were "taken into service" by the Nazi army.
To assess how various technological discoveries will affect the development of forms and methods of military operations is the primary task of futurological forecasts.
Extrapolating the directions of the development of armed struggle, the following leading trends can be distinguished: further integration of the combat use of the types of armed forces in all spatial spheres - on continents, seas, oceans, under water, in the ether, near-Earth airspace, near, middle and far space; complication of conditions, methods of unleashing and waging both large-scale and local wars and armed conflicts with unlimited strategic possibilities; the likelihood of conducting fleeting, but extremely tense, decisive and dynamic military operations; strengthening the role of information confrontation; further aggravation of the contradictions between the means of attack and defense; transformation of power and non-power forms of struggle with the transfer of the center of gravity to non-traditional types using the strategy of "indirect actions".
The military science of the 21st century should be a science of divination, unacceptable to dogma, immutable canons, and at the same time relying on the experience acquired by previous generations, developed methodological principles, such as the purposefulness and non-stereotyping of the search; logical sequence of research; consistency; perspective; reasoning of the received results; objectivity of conclusions; historicity.
In general terms, the goal of predictive research is to determine the fundamental guidelines for transformative military-theoretical and practical activities, the formation of an asymmetric military policy, the planning of advanced military development, and the development of new concepts for the use of armed forces based on new high technologies. The transition from the mechanized wars of the industrial society to the intellectual, information wars of the technological era implies the need to develop a new strategy, new operational art and new tactics of the future using electromagnetic, acoustic, gravitational and other types of weapons, including those based on new physical principles. The effectiveness of forecasting the armed struggle of the technological era depends on the depth of revealing its new patterns, the ability to use them correctly, to model them, on the completeness of the disclosure of new factors influencing the forms and methods of conducting non-contact, remote warfare, identifying their relationship, extrapolating trends, applying correlative analysis.
The gradual evolutionary process of the technologization of armed struggle, characteristic of the past, is now giving way to not just a rapid, but an abrupt renewal of its material basis. But if the base is modernized cardinally and in the shortest possible time, then the superstructure must also undergo corresponding transformations - the forms and methods of military operations. In practice, this means the possibility of the emergence of non-standard wars - gravitational, robotic, cybernetic, space, etc.
The use of third-generation combat orbital systems capable of hitting objects not only in space, but also from space using the entire arsenal of "star wars" - from combat space stations (platforms) to aerospace aircraft and reusable spaceships - gives reason expect in the future space operations to be carried out in near-Earth airspace to destroy means of nuclear attack in flight, to block outer space, to destroy orbital and ground-based space constellations, to seize and hold important areas of near-Earth space, and to suppress the radio engineering systems of orbital ground-based constellations.
The ability of space weapons to hit basic military facilities anywhere in the world will give armed confrontation a volume-global character. This means that there will be no inaccessible places for space and other means of destruction in the location of the warring parties, which means that the concepts of "front" and "rear", "operational lines" and "flanks" will lose their former meaning.
It follows logically from what has been considered that to create a model of an operation of the future means to create a physical, mental or combined analogue of such an operation that would reflect the experience of the past and new patterns of military operations, taking into account the development of weapons and military equipment.
Nowadays, more and more attention is being paid to the study of information warfare, which is expected to develop into an independent form of struggle along with economic, political, ideological, diplomatic, armed and other forms of struggle. Based on the experience of local wars, since the 1980s, the United States has been making intensive efforts to improve information technology.
The principles of conducting information warfare are: secrecy, sophistication, systematic, active, variety of techniques, plausibility, selectivity, knowledge of the opponent's psychology, reflective control of his behavior; preemption of the enemy. The components of such a struggle can be: information blockade, counterintelligence activities, electronic suppression of enemy combat control systems; conducting an electronic fire information and strike operation; a combination of fire, electronic and massive information and psychological impact on the enemy.
In the United States, information confrontation is considered as one of the methods of conducting the so-called "controlled war" (R. Kann), when the strongest side, through informational influence, dictates its will to the enemy without the use of weapons. Forceful actions in such a confrontation are envisaged at the final phase of actions, if the political, diplomatic and other possibilities of "bloodless crushing" of the enemy state are exhausted. What is new in conducting a complex information-strike operation, based on the experience of local wars, is that the massive use of the latest radio-electronic means, setting up radio curtains, radio interference, creating a false radio-electronic situation, simulating false radio networks, radio blockade of enemy information collection and processing channels are combined with air- ground operation.
The predictive power of military science largely depends on the improvement of research methods that make it possible to extract, systematize and analyze knowledge, to make generalizations, conclusions, conclusions and verify their truth. However, it should be noted that the methods developed to date impose fundamental limitations on the possibility of forecasting both in the time range and in the range of forecasting objects. The point is that not all factors influencing armed struggle lend themselves to predictive assessments. Hence, the maximum possible lead time for a forecast of a given accuracy in armed combat is still small, and the magnitude of the deviation of the forecast from the actual state of the object can be quite significant. Based on this, it is important to improve the methodology of military scientific research, which would ensure the interconnection and subordination of forecasts of various levels of the hierarchy of the forecasting object (wars, operations, battles, battles), the continuity of the research process, the consistency of various types of forecasts, and the identification of emerging contradictions and ways to resolve them. , correction of the obtained forecast results.
The arsenal of modern methods for studying military science is extensive. These are, first of all, general scientific methods: intuitive-logical, logical, historical, heuristic, extrapolation, system analysis, mathematical modeling, empirical, probability theory, factor analysis, the "tree of goals" method, etc. The peculiarity of human intelligence, as noted by N. Wiener, is that the human brain has the ability to operate with vaguely defined concepts. This gives him the opportunity to solve logical problems of various complexity, to create, to foresee, to discover something new. Great hopes at one time were placed on the use of cybernetic and mathematical modeling methods, the use of electronic computers for collecting, processing and analyzing information in the process of forecasting. However, these hopes were only partially realized.
Despite certain prognostic shifts, the "barrier of uncertainty" in military affairs could not be overcome with the help of new methods. The greatest advances in forecasting have been made in those areas that are relatively easy to quantify (development of weapons systems, determination of the combat potential of troop groupings, military-economic capabilities of the parties, calculation of the correlation of forces, etc.). Whereas it is necessary to rely on qualitative indicators and concepts, which constitute the core of warfare forecasting, the "far-sightedness" of military theory is still limited.
Such specific methods of studying military science as research and experimental military, aviation and naval exercises, research command and staff exercises, military games and maneuvers, which are carried out to solve problems of strategy, operational art and tactics, questions of building the Armed Forces, improving combat and mobilization readiness, organizational structure, development and use of weapons and military equipment. Scientific and methodological improvement of ongoing exercises and military games using computer technology is one of the important areas of predictive research.
The sharp deterioration of the geostrategic position of Russia after the collapse of the USSR, the unsettled land border in many directions and, at the same time, the reduction to a minimum of the Armed Forces, especially the Ground Forces, require the development of new approaches in determining the organizational structure of formations, formations and units, the system of arrangement and methods of manning, organization and services, creating the necessary stocks of material resources. We believe that the system of building the Armed Forces should be based on the principles of strategic mobility, their ability to respond flexibly to emerging crises by quickly maneuvering forces and means to threatened areas.
Solving the problems of military science is also inextricably linked with the development of theories of military training and indoctrination, military economics, armaments, command and control of the Armed Forces, the theory of types and logistics of the Armed Forces, in which many unresolved issues related to changes in the ideology and policy of the state have accumulated.
Russia, perhaps like no other country in the world, has a rich military history. The unprecedented exploits of our ancestors, who throughout the thousand-year history of Russia had to fight for the preservation and establishment of their statehood, are now hushed up, and even distorted in history textbooks in secondary schools.
Today, military science is faced with the task of protecting our military history from falsifications and unfounded attacks. There are many ill-wishers who seek to discredit the holy of holies - the feat of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, to debunk the military activities of Soviet military leaders.
It is striking that on the ideological front, our state is now taking a defensive position, it seems to be justifying itself for the fact that the Soviet Armed Forces in World War II had to liberate the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Baltic States from the fascist yoke, and after the war to fight Bandera in Western Ukraine , "forest brothers" in the Baltic.
One of the authors of the article had to start his military service in the pre-war period as a cadet of the newly established Tallinn Military Infantry School in 1940 in Estonia, and subsequently, during the war, participate in military operations to liberate the Baltic states in 1944-1945 from fascist invaders. I testify that we, Soviet soldiers, treated the local population - Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians with great warmth and goodwill during the war. Therefore, today it becomes especially insulting when we see with what black ingratitude the leadership of the Baltic states responds to the soldiers-liberators, calling them occupiers and equating them with fascist executioners - SS men. The actions of the Estonian authorities in relation to the monument in Tallinn - the “bronze Soviet soldier” cannot be called anything other than a desecration of the fallen Soviet soldiers.
In conclusion, I would like to note the sad fact that for more than a decade military-theoretical works, textbooks and teaching aids on tactics, so necessary for military students and cadets of military educational institutions, students of civilian universities, students of general education schools, have not been published for more than a decade. ROSTO organizations. The experience of combat and operational training does not even become the property of military academies and military schools, since, as in the old days, combat training information bulletins are not published. For many years, the works of military classics and modern foreign military scientists have not been published.
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Military Thought. 2002. No. 5. S. 67.
Military Thought. 2004. No. 5. S. 53.
Svech and N A. Strategy: 2nd ed. M., 1927. S. 246.
In the Renaissance in culture, rational, philosophical and scientific ideas again come to the fore, as in the era of antiquity, from the point of view of which medieval concepts begin to be rethought. Another important feature of the Renaissance culture is a new understanding of man. The Renaissance man no longer recognizes himself as a creature of God, but as a free master, placed in the center of the world, who, by his will and desire, can become either a lower or a higher being. Although a person recognizes his Divine origin, he himself feels himself a creator.
Both of these features of the Renaissance culture also lead to a new understanding of nature, science and human action. Natural laws gradually take the place of Divine laws, hidden natural processes take the place of hidden Divine forces, processes and energies, and created and creative nature turns into the concept of nature as a source of hidden natural processes that obey the laws of nature. Science and knowledge are now understood not only as describing nature, but also as revealing and establishing its laws. In this case, the identification of the laws of nature is only partly their description, more importantly, the identification of the laws of nature presupposes their constitution. In the concept of the law of nature, ideas of creation, as well as similarities between the natural and the human (nature is fundamentally cognizable, its processes can serve man) are visible.
Finally, a necessary condition for human activity aimed at using the forces and energies of nature is a preliminary knowledge of the "laws of nature." Another necessary condition is the definition of human triggering actions, so to speak, releasing, triggering the processes of nature. However, the Renaissance only creates the preconditions for the formation of science in its modern sense, and its worldview foundations and methodological principles are formulated in the works of the philosophers of the New Age. F. Bacon declares nature to be the main object of the new science and a condition for practical (engineering) action producing a "new nature", a source of natural processes, however, caused (launched) by human practical actions. From this period, an understanding of nature begins to form as an endless reservoir of materials, forces, energies that a person can use, provided that he describes the laws of nature in science. This is how the foundations for the formation of an engineering attitude to the world are created.
The main components of engineering activity are design and design. Design is a type of engineering work that is carried out in various areas of human activity: in the design of technical systems, design, clothing modeling, etc. In engineering, design is an obligatory part of the design process and is associated with the development of the design of a technical system, which then materializes during manufacturing in production . Design includes the analysis and synthesis of various design options, their calculations, the execution of drawings, etc. The development of design options is usually associated with the formulation and solution of problems of technical creativity. At the level of design, the implementation of a technical idea takes place within the framework of experimental design, which is associated with the formulation and solution of problems of technical creativity. During the design process, a drawing of a technical product or system is created, specific technical characteristics are calculated and specific implementation conditions are fixed (material nature, performance, degree of environmental friendliness, economic efficiency, etc.). The result of design development is a technical product, a finished design. Design is combined with the development of appropriate technological conditions, i.e. methods and technical conditions for the implementation of a particular model. Therefore, design is associated with technology, which reveals the mechanism for organizing the process for the production of a particular product. Design - the activity of a person or organization to create a project, that is, a prototype, a prototype of a proposed or possible object, state; a set of documentation designed to create a specific object, its operation, repair and liquidation, as well as to verify or reproduce intermediate and final solutions on the basis of which this object was developed.
Specialized knowledge was required for engineering activities. At first, it was knowledge of two kinds - natural science (selected or specially constructed) and actually technological (description of structures, technological operations, etc.). As long as it was about individual inventions, there were no problems. However, starting from the 18th century, industrial production and the need to replicate and modify invented engineering devices (steam boilers and spinning machines, machine tools, engines for steamships and steam locomotives, etc.) took shape. The amount of calculations and design increases dramatically due to the fact that more and more often an engineer is dealing not only with the development of a fundamentally new engineering object (i.e. invention), but also with the creation of a similar (modified) product (for example, a machine of the same class, but with other characteristics - different power, speed, dimensions, weight, design, etc.). In other words, the engineer is now busy both creating new engineering objects and developing a whole class of engineering objects similar to those invented. In a cognitive sense, this meant the emergence of not only new problems due to the increased need for calculations and design, but also new opportunities. The development of the field of homogeneous engineering objects made it possible to reduce one case to another, one group of knowledge to another. If the first samples of the invented object were described using the knowledge of a certain natural science, then all subsequent, modified ones were reduced to the first samples. As a result, certain groups of natural science knowledge and schemes of engineering objects begin to stand out (reflect) - those that are combined by the reduction procedure itself. In fact, these were the first knowledge and objects of technical sciences, but not yet existing in their own form: knowledge in the form of grouped natural science knowledge participating in information, and objects in the form of schemes of an engineering object, to which such groups of natural science knowledge belonged. Two other processes were superimposed on this process: ontologization and mathematization.
Ontologization is a step-by-step process of schematization of engineering devices, during which these objects were divided into separate parts and each was replaced by an "idealized representation" (scheme, model). For example, in the process of invention, calculations and design of machines (lifting, steam, spinning, mills, clocks, machine tools, etc.) by the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries, they were divided, on the one hand, into large parts (for example, J. Christian singled out the engine, transmission mechanism, tool in the car), and on the other hand, into smaller ones (the so-called "simple machines" - an inclined plane, block, screw, lever, etc.). Such idealized representations were introduced so that, on the one hand, mathematical knowledge could be applied to an engineering object, and, on the other hand, natural science knowledge. In relation to an engineering object, such representations were schematic descriptions of its structure (or the structure of its elements), in relation to natural science and mathematics, they set certain types of ideal objects (geometric figures, vectors, algebraic equations, etc.; motion of a body along an inclined planes, addition of forces and planes, body rotation, etc.).
The replacement of an engineering object with mathematical models was necessary both in itself as a necessary condition for the invention, design and calculation, and as a stage in the construction of the ideal objects of natural science necessary for these procedures.
Overlapping each other, the three main processes described here (information, ontologization and mathematization) lead to the formation of the first ideal objects and theoretical knowledge of technical science.
The further development of technical science took place under the influence of several factors. One factor is the reduction of all new cases (i.e. homogeneous objects of engineering activity) to those already studied in technical science. Such a reduction presupposes the transformation of objects studied in technical science, the acquisition of new knowledge (relations) about them. Almost from the first steps in the formation of technical science, the ideal of organization of fundamental science was extended to it. In accordance with this ideal, knowledge of relations was treated as laws or theorems, and procedures for obtaining it were treated as proofs. Carrying out the proofs implied not only the reduction of new ideal objects to the old ones already described in the theory, but also the division of knowledge acquisition procedures into compact, visible parts, which always entails the allocation of intermediate knowledge. Such knowledge and objects, resulting from the splitting of long and cumbersome proofs into simpler (clearer ones), formed the second group of knowledge of technical science (in the theory itself, they, of course, did not separate into separate groups, but alternated with others). The third group included knowledge that made it possible to replace cumbersome methods and procedures for obtaining relations between the parameters of an engineering object with simple and elegant procedures. For example, in some cases, cumbersome transformation procedures and information obtained in two layers are greatly simplified after the original object is replaced first with the help of equations of mathematical analysis, then in graph theory, and transformations are carried out in each of the layers. It is characteristic that the successive replacement of the object of technical science in two or more different languages leads to the fact that the corresponding divisions and characteristics of such languages (more precisely, their ontological representations) are projected onto the object. As a result, several types of characteristics are "fused" (through the mechanism of reflection and awareness) in the ideal object of technical theory: conductors, resistances, capacitances and inductances, and all these elements are interconnected in a certain way); b) characteristics directly or indirectly transferred from fundamental science (knowledge of currents, voltages, electric and magnetic fields, as well as the laws connecting them); c) characteristics taken from the mathematical language of the first, second. .., the nth layer (for example, in the theory of electrical engineering one speaks of the most general interpretation of the Kirchhoff equations, given in the language of graph theory). All these characteristics in the technical theory are so modified and rethought (some incompatible ones are omitted, others are changed, others are attributed, added from the outside) that a fundamentally new object arises - the actually ideal object of technical science, which in its structure recreated in a compressed form all of the listed types characteristics. The second process that significantly influenced the formation and development of technical science is the process of mathematization. From a certain stage in the development of technical science, researchers move from the use of individual mathematical knowledge or fragments of mathematical theories to the use of entire mathematical apparatuses (languages) in technical science. They were driven to this by the need to carry out in the course of invention and design not only analysis, but also the synthesis of individual processes and the structural elements that provide them. In addition, they sought to explore the entire field of engineering possibilities, i.e. we tried to understand what other characteristics and relations of an engineering object can be obtained, what calculations can, in principle, be made. During the analysis, the research engineer seeks to gain knowledge about engineering objects, describe their structure, functioning, individual processes, dependent and independent parameters, relationships and relationships between them. In the process of synthesis, on the basis of the analysis performed, he constructs and conducts the calculation (however, the operations of synthesis and analysis alternate, defining each other).
What are the conditions for the use of mathematical apparatus in the technical sciences? First of all, for this it is necessary to introduce the ideal objects of technical sciences into the ontology of the corresponding mathematical language, i.e. represent them as consisting of elements, relations and operations characteristic of objects of mathematics of interest to the engineer. But, as a rule, the ideal objects of technical science differed significantly from the objects of the chosen mathematical apparatus. Therefore, a long process of further schematization of engineering objects and ontologization begins, ending with the construction of such new ideal objects of technical science that can already be introduced into the ontology of a certain mathematics. From this moment, the research engineer gets the opportunity to: a) successfully solve the problems of synthesis-analysis, b) explore the entire area of engineering objects under study for theoretically possible cases, c) reach the theory of ideal engineering devices (for example, the theory of an ideal steam engine, the theory of mechanisms , the theory of radio engineering devices, etc.). The theory of an ideal engineering device is the construction and description (analysis) of a model of engineering objects of a certain class (we called them homogeneous), made, so to speak, in the language of ideal objects of the corresponding technical theory. An ideal device is a construction that a researcher creates from the elements and relationships of ideal objects of technical science, but which is precisely a model of engineering objects of a certain class, since it imitates the main processes and constructive formations of these engineering devices. In other words, not just independent ideal objects appear in technical science, but also independent objects of study of a quasi-natural nature. The construction of such model structures greatly facilitates engineering activities, since the research engineer can now analyze and study the main processes and conditions that determine the operation of the engineering object he creates (in particular, the ideal cases themselves).
If we now briefly summarize the considered stage in the formation of technical sciences of the classical type, we can note the following. The stimulus for the emergence of technical sciences is the emergence, as a result of the development of industrial production, of areas of homogeneous engineering objects and the application of the knowledge of natural sciences in the course of inventions, design and calculations. The processes of information, ontologization and mathematization determine the formation of the first ideal objects and theoretical knowledge of technical science, the creation of the first technical theories. The desire to apply not individual mathematical knowledge, but entirely certain mathematicians, to explore homogeneous areas of engineering objects, to create engineering devices, so to speak, for the future leads to the next stage of formation. New ideal objects of technical sciences are being created, which can already be introduced into mathematical ontology; on their basis, systems of technical knowledge are developed and, finally, the theory of the "ideal engineering device" is created. The latter means the appearance in the technical sciences of a specific quasi-natural object of study, i.e. technical science finally becomes independent.
The last stage in the formation of technical science is connected with the conscious organization and construction of the theory of this science. By extending the logical principles of scientific character developed by the philosophy and methodology of sciences to the technical sciences, researchers identify in the technical sciences the initial principles and knowledge (the equivalent of the laws and initial provisions of fundamental science), derive secondary knowledge and provisions from them, and organize all knowledge into a system. However, unlike natural science, technical science also includes calculations, descriptions of technical devices, and methodological instructions. The orientation of representatives of technical science towards engineering forces them to indicate the "context" in which the provisions of technical science can be used. Calculations, descriptions of technical devices, methodological instructions just define this context.
Technical sciences were formed in close interaction with the formation engineering education. Let's consider this process on the example of Russia.
Technical education in Russia was initiated by the Engineering (1700) and Mathematical and Navigation Schools (1701). The teaching methodology was more of a craft apprenticeship: practical engineers explained to individual students or small groups of students how to build one or another type of structure or machine, how to carry out practically one or another type of engineering activity. New theoretical information was communicated only in the course of such explanations, the textbooks were descriptive. At the same time, the profession of an engineer became more complicated and the practice made new demands on the training of qualified engineering personnel.
Only after the founding by G. Monge in 1794 of the Paris Polytechnic School, which from the very beginning of its foundation was oriented towards high theoretical training of students, did the situation in engineering education change. Many engineering educational institutions in Germany, Spain, Sweden, and the USA were built on the model of this school. In Russia, on its model, in 1809 the Institute of the Corps of Railway Engineers was created, the head of which was appointed Monge's student A.A. Betancourt. He developed a project, in accordance with which schools were established for the training of secondary technical personnel: a military construction school and a school for conductors of communications in St. Petersburg. Later (in 1884), this idea was developed and implemented by the outstanding Russian scientist, member of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences, I.A. technicians (the closest assistants to engineers), and schools for craftsmen, factory and factory workers. By the end of the 19th century, the scientific training of engineers, their special, specifically higher technical education, became urgently needed. By this time, many trade, secondary technical schools were transformed into higher technical schools and institutes, in which much attention was paid to the theoretical training of future engineers.
In addition to educational institutions, the dissemination of technical knowledge was aimed at various technical societies. For example, the Russian Technical Society, formed in 1866, in accordance with its charter, had the goal of promoting the development of technology and the technical industry in Russia both "through readings, meetings and public lectures on technical subjects" and through "petitions to the government for adoption measures that may have a beneficial effect on the development of the technical industry.
Questions for control and self-examination:
1. What are the reasons for the emergence and separation of technical sciences?
2. Describe the main characteristics of the classical technical sciences.
3. How is the formation and development of technical sciences related to engineering education?
SOVIET-GERMAN FRONT 1941–45, generalizing the name of the military confrontation between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany and its allies during the Second World War.
In a narrower, military-strategic sense, it represents the line of combat confrontation Red Army and Wehrmacht, formed in connection with the invasion of the German army into the territory of the USSR and the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, which became an integral part of the Second World War. In essence, it was a combination of fronts of the Red Army against the German invaders (Northern, Western, Southwestern, Southern, etc.; 38 fronts during the war). Its maximum length is 6.2 thousand km (November 1943).
During the war, up to 12 million soldiers and officers acted on both sides on the Soviet-German front, 160 thousand op. and mortars, 16 thousand tanks, self-propelled guns and assault. op., up to 17 thousand combat systems. The main forces of the Kr. were concentrated here. army and the Wehrmacht (up to 75% of the forces and means of Germany).
Fighting on Soviet-German front characterized by great ferocity and high activity. Before the landing of the Anglo-Amer. allies of the USSR in Sicily and in the South. Italy in the spring of 1943 Soviet-German front was the only front in Europe operating against Germany.
After the opening of the Anglo-Amer. troops second front in Europe (June 1944) Soviet-German front still continued to be the main front in the fight against fascism, on which the most important polit. and military strategist. results. With his heroic struggle, Kr. army dispelled the myth of the invincibility of the Germans. Wehrmacht, which very quickly conquered the entire Zap. Europe, thwarted the plans for a "blitzkrieg" against the Soviets. Union and Germany's achievement of world domination.
On the Soviet-German front there was a turning point during World War II. war, when Germany under the blows of Kr. army was forced to move to strategist. defense. Owls. troops also destroyed the defensive plans of the German government, forcing Germany's allies - Romania, Bulgaria, Finland and Hungary out of the war, liberated from the Germans. occupiers European states - Poland, Czechoslovakia, part of Yugoslavia and Norway, occupied significant territories of Germany and Austria with their capitals.
In a broader, military-political sense, under Soviet-German front all actions of owls are understood. people and government, aimed at repelling the aggression of Nazi Germany and its subsequent defeat. The components of this concept are, for example, the general mobilization of citizens liable for military service and the organization of the people's militia, their advancement to the front from the depths of the country, the rise of the entire people to resist the enemy under the motto "Everything for the front, everything for victory!", deployment partisan movement to deal with parts of the enemy in his rear, the creation of owls. underground and sabotage groups for reconnaissance and disorganization of the enemy in the occupied territories, the transfer of the economy to a military footing for the maximum production of military products, restructuring in accordance with the requirements of the war of the party and state. apparatuses, diplomatic work in order to create favorable foreign policy conditions for the successful conduct and end of the war, and much more. Creation of owls. the people of the united front against German-Fash. invaders allowed to eventually defeat
The emergence of new types of weapons and military equipment, new types of troops, the rearmament and reorganization of old ones, as well as the transition of fascist states in the mid-1930s to direct acts of aggression, put forward new tasks for Soviet military science. The victory of socialism in the USSR, the successes of the cultural revolution contributed to the solution of these problems.
Soviet military science, which was formed together with the Soviet Army, is a system of developing knowledge about the nature and characteristics of armed struggle, its objective laws and principles of military art, methods and forms of military defense of the socialist Fatherland. It is called upon to develop the theoretical foundations and practical recommendations for building up the Armed Forces and preparing them for a possible war. In unity with practice, Soviet military science determines ways to improve existing and create new means of armed struggle.
Having absorbed all the best from the military-theoretical heritage of the past and the first combat experience in defending the country of socialism, Soviet military science, rapidly developing and enriching itself with new theoretical positions and conclusions, avoided the one-sidedness inherent in the military theories of the capitalist states, and surpassed the latter in the development of many problems. .
Lenin developed the most important provisions that form its basis: the features and nature of the wars of the new era; about the nature and essence of the military organization of the socialist state; the need for close military unity of the socialist republics and the militant alliance of the working classes; the transformation of the country in a military situation into a single military camp; the significance and decisive influence on the fate of the war of economic, moral-political, ideological, scientific-technical and military factors proper; the basic laws of modern warfare and their use, taking into account the advantages of a socialist society; about the decisive role of the Communist Party in organizing the armed defense of the socialist Fatherland and the successful solution of defense tasks, and others.
The assertion of Lenin's theses in the theory of military affairs proceeded in a sharp struggle against the Trotskyists, the left and right opportunists, the conservative wing of the old military specialists.
The development of Soviet military science was guided by the collective wisdom of the Central Committee of the Party, which summarized everything new in the practice and theory of military affairs.
The wonderful works of M. V. Frunze were an example of the creative application of Marxism-Leninism to military affairs, party and deeply scientific analysis of the most complex problems of military theory and practice. A true Leninist, he was an unsurpassed master of applying the Marxist method to all branches of military science. In his works, he substantiated a number of fundamental provisions of Soviet military theory.
M. V. Frunze argued that the system of military development and defense of the state should be based on a clear and accurate idea of the nature of a future war; on a correct and accurate account of the forces and means that our potential adversaries will have at their disposal; on the same account of our own resources. MV Frunze developed Lenin's thesis that modern wars are waged by peoples, stressed that their scope in space and duration will inevitably increase. He pointed out the need to prepare for war not only the army, but the whole country, to rapidly develop industry, especially heavy industry, as the material basis for the military might of the socialist state.
A valuable contribution to the development of Soviet military science was made by A. S. Bubnov, K. E. Voroshilov, S. I. Gusev, A. I. Egorov, S. S. Kamenev, I. V. Stalin, V. K. Triandafillov, M. H. Tukhachevsky, B. M. Shaposhnikov. An important role was played by military academies, the Headquarters (and then the General Staff) of the Red Army, which were major centers of military-theoretical thought, as well as the commanders and headquarters of military districts.
The most important part of Soviet military science is the theory of military art, in which the leading place is rightfully occupied by a strategy designed to solve the problems of using all the country's armed forces and resources to achieve the ultimate goals of war.
The development of the strategy and the revision of its concepts were reflected in the country's defense plans, which were developed by the General Staff and approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Soviet government. Each such plan corresponded to the socio-economic condition of the country, as well as its resources and international position, was based on the developed strategic forms and methods, using which it would be possible to achieve the greatest results with the least expenditure of material and human resources.
In the second half of the 1930s, the imperialist bloc of fascist powers led by Nazi Germany, which aspired to world domination, became the main enemy of the Soviet Union. In the capitalist world he was opposed by a bloc of "democratic" bourgeois powers. The Second World War could have arisen both as a war within the capitalist world and as a war against the USSR.
Soviet military science took into account both possibilities. It did not rule out that in the coming world war, as the Comintern pointed out, the most unexpected situations were possible, for which it was necessary to prepare in advance. Various combinations of efforts of freedom-loving states and peoples were also possible. In the face of the threat of fascist enslavement hanging over Europe, the prospect of a series of national liberation wars, not only of the oppressed masses of the colonies and semi-colonies, but also of the European peoples, became quite real. Such a prospect was foreseen and scientifically substantiated by V. I. Lenin. He considered the general democratic national liberation movement as a favorable prerequisite for the subsequent struggle for socialism. It was perfectly obvious that the Soviet Union, invariably true to its international policy and its revolutionary duty, would be a class ally of the peoples waging a national liberation struggle. The forms of realization of this union depended on the specific historical situation.
The indisputable merit of Soviet military-theoretical thought in the mid-1930s was that it did not rule out the possibility of a coalition war against the aggressor, such a war in which the socialist state would fight together with peoples and governments capable of defending in one way or another the national independence of their countries from fascist aggressors. The practical development of issues of conducting coalition operations took place during the preparation of a collective security system in the 30s, during joint hostilities with the Mongolian People's Republic in the area of the Khalkhin Gol River against Japanese aggression and during the preparation of the conclusion of a military convention with England and France in the summer of 1939 G.
From the mid-1930s, the Soviet Union had to be ready to fight on two fronts: in the west against Nazi Germany and its satellites, and in the east against Japan. The southern direction was also unreliable - from Turkey. The most powerful grouping of enemy forces was in the west. Therefore, in terms of the defense of the country, the Western European theater of war was considered the main one, where it was planned to concentrate the main forces of the Soviet troops. Thus, ensuring the security of the USSR became much more complicated: the Soviet Armed Forces had to be ready to inflict a decisive defeat on the aggressor both in the west and in the east, and if necessary, in the south. A strategic deployment on two fronts was becoming inevitable.
The Soviet military strategy, based on Marxist-Leninist methodology, believed that in the fight against the aggressor coalition, the achievement of the final goals of the war would require powerful strategic efforts in several directions (simultaneously or sequentially).
While recognizing the likelihood of a long and difficult war, Soviet military theory did not rule out the possibility of fleeting armed clashes. As a result, she paid great attention to the study of the methods of mobilization deployment of the armed forces, the likely methods of unleashing the war by the aggressors, the features of its initial period, and the problems of leadership.
The imperialists, seeking to disguise their aggression, avoided an open declaration of war and practiced "crawling" into it. This was convincingly evidenced by the Japanese-Chinese war, the wars in Ethiopia and Spain, the capture of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The mobilization of the aggressor's forces for the implementation of their actions was carried out partly in advance, in stages, and ended already in the course of the war.
Covert preparations and the sudden unleashing of war by the imperialists significantly increased the role of its initial period. This, in turn, required, wrote M. N. Tukhachevsky, "to be especially strong and energetic" in the initial operations (629) . He noted: “The first period of the war must be correctly foreseen even in peacetime, correctly assessed even in peacetime, and one must properly prepare for it” (630). The aggressors assigned the operations of the initial period of the war to the invading army, well equipped with mechanized formations and aviation. Hence, the side threatened by the attack must take preventive measures so that the enemy cannot disrupt the mobilization in the border areas and the advance of the mass army to the front line (631).
Views on the content and duration of the initial period of a future war were refined and developed. If in the 1920s, according to the experience of the First World War, it included mainly preparatory measures for decisive operations, then in subsequent years, the operations themselves began to be considered the main event of this period.
Many works of Ya. I. Alksnis, R. P. Eideman, V. F. Novitsky, A. N. Lapchinsky and others were devoted to the study of the nature of the initial period of the future war. A. I. Egorov, E. A. Shilovsky, L. S. Amiragov, V. A. Medikov, S. N. Krasilnikov and others considered the theoretical solution to the problems of preparing and conducting the first operations of the war.
In the summer of 1933, the Chief of Staff of the Red Army, A.I. Egorov, presented to the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR theses on new operational and tactical problems, in which attention was drawn to the qualitative and quantitative growth of powerful technical means of combat, forcing to solve the issues of the initial period of the war and the conduct of modern operations in a different way . According to A. I. Egorov, the enemy, using covert mobilization, can quickly concentrate a strong army of large mechanized, infantry, airborne units, cavalry masses and combat aircraft and suddenly invade foreign territory. Military operations will immediately cover space to a depth of 400-600 km and will cause significant damage to communications, military depots and bases, air and naval forces. With such a strike, the enemy is capable of destroying the covering troops, disrupting mobilization in the border areas, hindering the deployment of the army, and occupying economically important areas. However, he wrote, an invading army alone cannot decide the outcome of a war (632).
AI Yegorov's theses summarized the most important conclusions reached by Soviet military thought as early as the first half of the 1930s, significantly outpacing the development of military theory in the capitalist countries.
These conclusions were improved and developed by a whole galaxy of Soviet military theorists. One of them, E. A. Shilovsky, assessed the course of the initial period of a possible future war as follows. “A fierce struggle ... will unfold from the first hours of hostilities in a larger space of the theater of operations along the front, in depth and in the air ... At the same time, one should not count on the lightning defeat of the armies of class enemies, but prepare for a stubborn and fierce struggle,” in the course of which only final victory can be achieved. However, he acknowledged, the use of new means of combat at the beginning of a war can "shock the enemy so strongly that the result of their actions will have a decisive effect on the course of subsequent operations and perhaps even on the outcome of the war" (633) .
Shilovsky recommended massive use of aviation, subordinating its main forces to the main and front commands, and training the country's armed forces in such a way as to quickly deploy a mass army equipped with modern technology, capable of carrying out major operations from the first day of the initial period of the war (634) .
L. S. Amiragov in his article “On the nature of a future war” proceeded from the fact that a coalition consisting of Germany, Japan and other states, the main carriers of open imperialist expansion, would oppose the USSR. The aggressors will strive to unleash a war suddenly and end it as soon as possible, they will try "to attach decisive importance to the initial period of the war, which in turn presupposes the widespread use of maneuverable forms of struggle" (635) .
S. N. Krasilnikov also wrote about the operations of the initial period. Taking into account the lessons of aggression against Ethiopia and China, he assumed that a future war could begin “as a sudden attack by heavy bomber aircraft from the air on the vital centers of the country, combined with a deep invasion of large motorized ... masses, supported by the actions of light combat aircraft along the railways and vehicles necessary for the concentration of combat forces "(636) .
Consequently, in the content of the initial period of the war, Soviet military thought included not only preparatory measures, but also extensive military operations on land, in the air and at sea, in advance mobilized and deployed in the border regions of the invasion armies and cover armies. In the course of these battles, the initial period of the war will develop directly and gradually into the period of operations of the main forces.
Thus, long before the Second World War, Soviet military theory correctly determined the methods of its preparation, unleashing and waging that would be applied by the imperialist aggressors, taking into account the new military-technical factors. It promptly gave appropriate recommendations for the development of plans for the defense of the USSR.
However, these recommendations were not fully implemented at that time. Soviet military theory, as is inherent in any genuine science, looked far into the future. Under the conditions of that time, the Soviet state did not yet have the proper material means to implement its conclusions. The economic potential of the country did not yet make it possible, along with the high rates of socialist construction, to equip the Armed Forces with such a quantity of the latest weapons and military equipment as was required according to the conclusions of military theory.
An important advantage of the Soviet military theory in comparison with the bourgeois ones was the correct assessment of the importance of the moral factor. The Soviet people and its Armed Forces were morally prepared by the Party for the trials that could fall to their lot in the event of a military attack by the aggressors, were in complete patriotic readiness to repulse any enemy.
Based on the conclusions drawn by military science, Soviet military doctrine provided that victory at the front in a future war could be achieved only through purposeful, joint efforts of all branches of the armed forces and combat arms, with their close interaction. At the same time, the decisive role was assigned to the ground forces, saturated with artillery, tanks and aircraft (637). Great importance was attached to the air force, which, on the one hand, was supposed to provide solid ground troops from the air, and on the other, to conduct independent operations. The navy was called upon to assist the ground forces in delivering strikes along the coast, as well as to carry out independent operations against enemy ships on sea lanes.
The decisive type of strategic action was considered to be an offensive carried out by means of large-scale strategic front-line offensive operations carried out in the main operational-strategic axes. The Field Manual of 1939 stated that in one theater of operations the forces of several armies and large air formations could be used under the unified leadership of the front command to fulfill a common strategic task.
Strategic defense was also considered a natural type of armed struggle, which was placed in a subordinate position in relation to the offensive. In defensive operations, the troops had to stubbornly hold the occupied areas or cover a certain operational direction in order to repel the enemy offensive, defeat him and create favorable conditions for a counteroffensive.
Such a type of action as an operational withdrawal was not rejected, in order to withdraw troops from the blow of superior enemy forces, create a new operational grouping and ensure the transition to the defensive. It was believed that the last two types of armed struggle would find application mainly at the operational-tactical level.
The direct leadership of the armed struggle and the activities of the rear of the country was to be carried out by the supreme body of the state and the Headquarters of the High Command subordinate to it.
The study of the organization and conduct of front-line and army operations designed to ensure the achievement of strategic goals was mainly dealt with by operational art and tactics. At the same time, special attention was paid to the problems of operational art. The theory of successive decaying operations and group tactics, which met the conditions of the 1920s, did not meet the requirements of a future war. An urgent task arose to develop a fundamentally new theory of combat and operations, to find such methods and methods of combat operations that would make it possible to successfully overcome the strong fire screen of a continuous enemy front, in a short time to defeat his groupings and achieve strategic success. The fulfillment of this responsible task was entrusted to the General Staff, the central directorates of the military branches, the Combat Training Directorate, the military academies, the headquarters of the military districts, with the involvement of the military scientific community. The foundations of the new theory, later called the theory of deep combat and operation, were developed for almost six years (1929-1935). As a result of painstaking research, the first official "Instruction for Deep Combat" was created, approved by the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on March 9, 1935.
At the same time, the Red Army Headquarters prepared a draft Operations Manual - a kind of operational charter for the entire army. This eliminated the gap between operational art and tactics that had existed for a long time. The development of new provisions, their generalization and thorough testing in practice was carried out by P. A. Belov, P. E. Dybenko, A. I. Egorov, M. V. Zakharov, G. S. Isserson, K. B. Kalinovsky, N. D. Kashirin, A. I. Kork, D. A. Kuchinsky, K. A. Meretskov, I. P. Obysov, A. I. Sedyakin, S. K. Timoshenko, V. K. Triandafillov, M. N. Tukhachevsky, I. P. Uborevich, I. F. Fedko, B. M. Shaposhnikov, E. A. Shilovsky and other theorists and military leaders. The study of the theory of deep combat was given a prominent place in the educational and scientific plans of military academies. The Operations Department of the MV Frunze Military Academy, the Academy of the General Staff, and the academies of military branches have done a great job of systematizing, applying and designing many of its provisions. The first stage in the development of the theory of deep combat and operation ended with the release of the Provisional Field Manual of the Red Army in 1936, in which this theory received official recognition.
The theory of deep operation covered the forms of armed struggle used on the front and army scales, while the theory of deep combat embraced the types of combat operations of units and formations. Front operations could be both offensive and defensive. Their tasks must be solved by the efforts of several field armies in cooperation with large mechanized formations, air and naval forces.
Simultaneous suppression of the enemy throughout the entire depth of his formation was most fully considered on the scale of a front-line operation carried out in the interests of achieving strategic goals in a specific theater of military operations.
The army operation was considered as part of a front-line operation. Usually it was carried out in one operational direction and solved a particular operational problem. On the axes of the main blows inflicted by the front, it was envisaged to use well-equipped shock armies, and on the auxiliary axes, armies of ordinary composition.
Offensive operations were considered the decisive means of achieving success in armed struggle, in which the troops performed two tasks: breaking through the enemy defenses with a simultaneous strike to its entire tactical depth and developing tactical success into operational action by swift actions of mobile troops, airborne assault forces and aviation. For an offensive with decisive goals, a deep operational formation of troops was envisaged, consisting of the first ground echelon (attack echelon), the second ground echelon (breakthrough development echelon), an air echelon with a range of 300-500 km and subsequent echelons - operational reserves. In an oncoming battle, the advanced (vanguard) ground echelon could stand out.
To conduct the operation, there were two options for the operational formation of troops: if the enemy's defense was strong, rifle formations advanced in the first echelon, and mobile formations in the second; with weak enemy defenses, rifle divisions operated in the second echelon. The width of the offensive zone of the front was set at 300-400 km, the depth of the operation - 150-200 km. For the shock army, respectively, 50 - 80 km and 25 - 30 km. The duration of an army operation is 5-6 days, the average daily rate of advance is 5-6 km.
Possible forms of an offensive operation of the front could be a strike by the concentrated forces of two or three of its adjacent armies in one sector or by several armies of two adjacent fronts in a continuous sector (200–250 km), simultaneous crushing strikes in several directions on a wide front, a strike in converging directions ( double break using a favorable front configuration). The most important conditions for the success of a deep offensive operation of the front were considered to be the gaining of air supremacy, the isolation of the battle area from suitable enemy reserves, and the disruption of the delivery of materiel to his attacked troops.
In an army operation, blows could be used by the center, one of the flanks, by all the forces of the army when it advanced in a narrow sector on the main direction of the front; in special cases, the army could strike on both flanks.
Recognition of the offensive as the main and decisive form of struggle did not exclude the need to use all types of defensive combat and operations. "The defense must withstand the superior forces of the enemy, attacking at once to the full depth" (638), - indicated in the field manuals of 1936 and 1939.
Soviet military science has developed a theory of operational and tactical defense much deeper than the military thought of the capitalist countries. A. I. Gotovtsev, A. E. Gutor, N. Ya. Kapustin, D. M. Karbyshev, M. G. Knyazev, F. P. Sudakov and others (639) took part in its development and improvement.
In general, the defense was supposed to be deep and anti-tank in order to save time and effort, hold especially important areas and objects, and pin down the advancing enemy. The defense was divided into stubborn (positional), created on a normal or wide front, and mobile (maneuverable). The army defensive area 70-100 km wide and 100-150 km deep consisted of four defensive zones: forward, tactical, operational and rear. The forward zone had a strip of developed engineering barriers, the tactical zone had the main and rear (second) strips (640), the operational zone had a barrier strip, and the rear zone was intended for the deployment and operation of army rear areas. An important place in the defense was assigned to the organization of a system of artillery and aviation counter-preparation, counterattacks and counterattacks.
For the uninterrupted supply of troops in offensive and defensive operations, it was planned to create an army rear, which included special units and institutions.
The theory of deep combat and operation was partly tested on large army maneuvers of 1935-1937, during the hostilities that the Soviet Army had to conduct in 1938-1939.
The combat and training practice of the troops, the achievements of science and technology have raised in a new way the question of the use of tanks, artillery and aviation in combat.
A. A. Ignatiev, P. I. Kolomeitsev, P. D. Korkodinov, M. K. Nozdrunov, V. T. Obukhov, A. I. Stromberg and others.
The previously adopted scheme for the use of tanks in three groups - NPP, DPP, DD (641) - in the conditions of the increased strength of anti-tank defense could not ensure the fulfillment of combat missions. Therefore, tank groups DPP and DD were excluded from the combat formations of the advancing troops. Instead of these groups, a reserve of tanks was created (provided that the troops of the first echelons were sufficiently provided with them), intended to reinforce, if necessary, the tank group of the NPP or, in the event of a successful attack, to develop it to the entire depth of the enemy’s battle formation. The transformation of tactical success into an operational one and the achievement of a decisive goal in the main direction were assigned to armored formations - tank brigades and tank groups of operational significance (642).
Practice has shown that light, high-speed tanks with bulletproof armor have become unacceptable for combat missions under the new conditions; it was necessary to expand the production of medium and heavy tanks with anti-ballistic armor, powerful cannon armament and a large power reserve.
Experience has confirmed that of all the ground combat arms, artillery has the greatest power and range of fire impact, which is called upon to clear the way for advancing troops and crush the enemy in defense with massive strikes. Modern combat has increasingly become a fire contest between the opposing sides. Numerous and diverse fire weapons took part in it, for the destruction and suppression of which mobile long-range artillery of various combat missions was needed.
The best use of artillery in combat was greatly facilitated by the successes achieved in such branches of artillery science as internal and external ballistics and artillery shooting. Scientific research of artillery scientists D. A. Wentzel, P. A. Gelvikh, I. P. Grave, V. D. Grendal, N. F. Drozdov, V. G. Dyakonov, D. E. Kozlovsky, V. V. Mechnikov, Ya. M. Shapiro made it possible by the autumn of 1939 to create new firing tables, firing rules for military and anti-aircraft artillery, to revise the manual on fire training and artillery firing course, as well as other manuals.
The draft Field Manual of 1939, in addition to artillery support groups for infantry, long-range and artillery of destruction, introduced subgroups of artillery to support units of the first echelon, separate groups of close combat artillery (consisting of mortars), anti-aircraft artillery groups, long-range groups in the corps (643) . The density of artillery per kilometer of the attack front increased from 30 - 35 to 58 - 136 guns (without anti-tank artillery) (644) . Artillery support for the offensive was divided into periods: artillery preparation, attack support, fighting in the depths of the defensive zone (645).
By the mid-1930s, a theory of the combat use of the air force had been created. Soviet aviation, having completed a complex evolution, turned from a separate type of weapon into an independent branch of the armed forces, and then soon into one of the branches of the armed forces. In parallel with this process, the operational art of the air force was developing, which was engaged in the study of the theory of preparation and conduct of combat operations by large aviation formations and formations in the interests of achieving operational and operational-strategic goals. The founder of this theory is Professor A. N. Lapchinsky, whose fundamental works - "Air Forces in Combat and Operations" (1932) and "Air Army" (1939) - gave it the necessary harmony and clarity. He also worked out in detail the problems of the struggle for air supremacy. In 1936, the theory of the preparation and conduct of air operations was set out in the form of practical recommendations in the Provisional Instructions for Independent Operations of the Air Forces of the Red Army.
In a study presented to the leadership, Commander V. V. Khripin and Colonel P. I. Malinovsky outlined the tasks of aviation in the initial period of the war (646) . In order to test the provisions put forward by them, maneuvers were carried out in 1937, during which the actions of the aviation of the fronts and the aviation army of the High Command were practiced in the initial period of the war and in the conditions of an expanded operation of the front. Important principles of the operational art of aviation were reflected in the field manuals of 1936 and 1939. They emphasized that the main condition for the success of the Air Force is their massive use (647); during decisive periods of hostilities, all types of aviation must concentrate their efforts to promote "the success of ground forces in combat and operation ... in the main direction" (648) .
Great importance was attached to the continuity of the impact of aviation on enemy troops. To this end, during the period of preparation for the operation, it was envisaged to gain air supremacy, disrupt enemy transports, exhaust his troops and disrupt control. During the period of deployment of hostilities, first, aviation preparations for the offensive were carried out in close cooperation with artillery, which later developed into support of the advancing battle formation throughout the entire depth of the breakthrough. At the same time, aviation was supposed to disrupt the enemy’s control and communications, hit his reserves, frustrate counterattacks and prevent him from occupying the second defensive line (649) .
The theory of the combat use of aviation, in addition to operational art, also had tactics as its component, which was divided into the general tactics of the air force and the tactics of individual branches of aviation. Several works are devoted to these issues: in 1935, A. K. Mednis's textbook "Attack Aviation Tactics" was published, in 1936 - the work of M. D. Smirnov "Military Aviation", in 1937 - a large scientific study by A. N. Lapchinsky "Bomber Aviation", in 1939 - the book of P. P. Ionov "Fighter Aviation".
The analysis of everything new that appeared in the naval art was devoted to the studies of V. A. Alafuzov, S. S. Ramishvili, I. S. Isakov, V. A. Belli, Yu. A. Panteleev, A. V. Tomashevich and others.
The theory of "small war" at sea with elements of linearity, which relied on the widespread use of submarines, aircraft and light surface forces, was replaced by the theory of typical naval operations carried out both independently and jointly with ground forces. These operational views were subsequently summarized in the manual on the conduct of naval operations, published in 1940. Particular attention was paid to the organization of interaction between the branches of the armed forces: ground forces, fleet and aviation, as well as the branches of the naval forces - underwater and surface - with aviation and coastal artillery. Offensive actions at sea were given the main place. The role of strike forces in maritime communications was to be performed by submarines and aircraft. The carriers of the greatest offensive and defensive power of the sea and ocean fleets were considered battleships capable of prolonged combat impact on the enemy in cooperation with other classes of ships.
On the eve of the Second World War, a theory was formed of the operational use of naval forces to achieve ultimate goals in the maritime theater, mainly through concentrated strikes delivered by heterogeneous fleet forces against the enemy fleet in the course of a series of successive and parallel operations connected by the unity of the strategic task. Based on the experience of military operations in the First World War, taking into account the actions of naval forces in connection with the wars in Spain and China, the foundations were developed for conducting mine-protecting, landing and anti-amphibious operations, as well as operations against enemy bases and to provide fire support for the coastal flank of land armies.
A great achievement was the creation in 1937 of the Combat Charter of the Navy, in the development of which I. S. Isakov and V. A. Alekin took an active part. It reflects the issues of interaction of maneuverable formations for various purposes, combining their efforts for a joint strike against the enemy on the high seas and at mine-artillery positions created in narrow places and on the approaches to naval bases. Raid actions on the enemy coast were studied and practiced in order to destroy fortified objects, strike at enemy convoys, anti-submarine barrages, groupings of ships in coastal waters, ports and naval bases.
There were also shortcomings in the development of Soviet military theory on the eve of World War II. Correctly focusing on conducting strong retaliatory strikes against the aggressor, Soviet military art was unable to fully develop the methods of combat operations of the covering echelon and the strategic deployment of the main forces in the face of the threat of a sudden strike by strong and mobile enemy groupings.
The possibility of a deep breakthrough by the enemy of the strategic defense was considered unlikely. For this reason, the theory of preparing and conducting strategic defensive operations has not received a comprehensive development. The theoretical foundations of the operational-strategic interaction of fronts and types of forces in the conditions of a future major war were also considered in general terms, mainly in the interests of resolving practical issues related to planning the defense of state borders. There was no complete clarity on how to gain air supremacy in the course of initial operations in the theater of operations.
However, the necessary prerequisites for resolving these issues in subsequent years were basically created.
In 1936 - 1939. the results of large-scale maneuvers of the Kyiv, Belorussian, Moscow and Leningrad military districts, as well as the combat experience of the Soviet troops near Lake Khasan and on the Khalkhin Gol River, military operations in local wars unleashed by the imperialists in Ethiopia, Spain, China, aggressive acts to seize Austria, Czechoslovakia and Albania. The military press widely informed the public about the nature of the struggle in these wars and armed clashes (650).
In the second half of the 1930s, military theorists and major military leaders of the capitalist countries not only recognized the achievements of the Soviet Armed Forces, but also borrowed a lot from their experience. The head of the Italian military mission, General Graziolini, who was present at the “big Russian maneuvers,” wrote: “The Red Army is organized and equipped in a modern way ...” In his opinion, the Russians have a “great passion for mobile troops,” “are fond of large mechanized formations and conduct numerous exercises with their use.
An interesting assessment of the Soviet Army was given by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the French Army, General Loiseau: “I ... saw a powerful, serious army, of very high quality both technically and morally. Her moral level and physical condition are admirable. The equipment of the Red Army is at an unusually high level. With regard to tanks, I would think it right to consider the army of the Soviet Union in the first place. The parachute landing of a large military unit, which I saw near Kyiv, I consider a fact that has no precedent in the world. The most characteristic, of course, is the closest and truly organic connection between the army and the population, the love of the people for the Red Army soldiers and commanders. I will say frankly, I have never seen such a powerful, exciting, beautiful sight in my life” (651) .
Hitler's general G. Guderian paid special attention to "combat groups operating in depth", which "pursued operational targets, struck against the flanks and rear, and simultaneously paralyzed the enemy throughout the entire depth of his defense" (652) . “The mass of tank forces,” he wrote, “should be expediently combined into combat corps, as is the case in England and Russia ...” (653) Guderian, creating the German version of the theory of deep operation, copied many of the provisions of Soviet military theorists.
Soviet military science was the first to develop methods for using airborne troops. Present at the maneuvers of the Kyiv Military District in 1935, the English General (later Field Marshal) Wavell, reporting to the government on the use of a large air assault by the Russians, said: “If I myself had not witnessed this, I would never have believed that such an operation was even possible » (654) . The massive use of airborne troops during the maneuvers of the Soviet Army in 1936 astonished many representatives of the military delegations of France, Italy, Japan and other countries. A few years later, one of the American military observers, summing up the use of airborne landings by the Nazis in Western Europe, wrote: demonstrated these methods on a large scale during the maneuvers of 1936. (655) .
Wide display at military maneuvers and exercises 1935 - 1937. achievements of Soviet military science and technology pursued quite specific goals: to test by practice the correctness of the basic theoretical provisions developed by Soviet military science, and also to clearly show that the war against the USSR is a serious and dangerous matter for its organizers, and thereby contribute to the preservation of peace. In subsequent years (1938 - 1939), the defensive power of the USSR was demonstrated in battles with the Japanese invaders in the Far East.
On the whole, the level of Soviet military science on the eve of World War II met the requirements of the time. Relying on the provisions developed by military science, the party aimed design ideas at the fastest possible development of modern, advanced models of military equipment and weapons.
