In December 1979, Soviet troops entered Afghanistan to support the friendly regime and intended to withdraw within a year at the most. But the good intentions of the Soviet Union turned into a long war. Today, some try to present this war as villainy or the result of a conspiracy. Let's look at those events as a tragedy, and try to dispel the myths that are emerging today.

Fact: the introduction of OKSAV is a forced measure to protect geopolitical interests

On December 12, 1979, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a decision was made and formalized in a secret resolution on the deployment of troops to Afghanistan. These measures were resorted to not at all in order to seize the territory of Afghanistan. The interest of the Soviet Union was primarily to protect its own borders, and secondly, to counteract US attempts to gain a foothold in the region. The formal basis for the introduction of troops was the repeated requests of the leadership of Afghanistan.

On the one hand, the participants in the conflict were the armed forces of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and on the other, the armed opposition (mujahideen, or dushmans). Dushmans received support from NATO members and Pakistani intelligence services. The struggle was for complete political control over Afghan territory.

According to statistics, Soviet troops were in Afghanistan for 9 years and 64 days. The maximum number of Soviet troops in 1985 reached 108.8 thousand, after which it steadily decreased. The withdrawal of troops began 8 years and 5 months after the start of the presence in the country, and by August 1988 the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was only 40 thousand. To date, the United States of America and its allies have been in this country for more than 11 years.

Myth: Western aid to the Mujahideen only began after the Soviet invasion

Western propaganda portrayed the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan as an aggression for the sake of seizing new territories. However, the West began to support the leaders of the Mujahideen even before 1979. Robert Gates, who at the time was a CIA officer and served as Secretary of Defense under President Obama, describes the events of March 1979 in his memoirs. Then, according to him, the CIA discussed the issue of whether it is worth supporting the Mujahideen further in order to "draw the USSR into the swamp," and it was decided to supply the Mujahideen with money and weapons.

In total, according to updated data, the losses of the Soviet Army in the Afghan war amounted to 14.427 thousand people dead and missing. More than 53 thousand people were shell-shocked, wounded or injured. For courage and heroism shown in Afghanistan, more than 200 thousand servicemen were awarded orders and medals (11 thousand were awarded posthumously), 86 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (28 posthumously).

In roughly the same amount of time, the US Army in Vietnam lost 47,378 combat casualties and 10,779 more dead. More than 152 thousand were wounded, 2.3 thousand were missing.

Myth: The USSR withdrew troops from Afghanistan because the CIA provided the Mujahideen with Stinger missiles

Pro-Western media claimed that it was Charlie Wilson who turned the tide of the war by convincing Ronald Reagan of the need to supply the Mujahideen with portable anti-aircraft missile systems designed to fight helicopters. This myth was voiced in the book "Charlie Wilson's War" by George Crile and in the film of the same name, where Tom Hanks played the role of a loud congressman.

In fact, the "Stringers" only forced the Soviet troops to change tactics. The Mujahideen did not have night vision devices, and helicopters operated at night. The pilots attacked from a higher altitude, which, of course, reduced their accuracy, but the level of losses of Afghan and Soviet aircraft, in comparison with the statistics of the first six years of the war, remained practically unchanged.

The decision to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan was made by the USSR government in October 1985 - even before the Mujahideen began to receive "Stringers" in significant quantities, which happened only in the fall of 1986. An analysis of the declassified protocols of the Politburo meetings shows that no innovations in the armament of the Afghan Mujahideen, including the Stringers as the reason for the withdrawal of troops, have ever been mentioned.

Fact: During the time of the American presence in Afghanistan, drug production has increased significantly.

Unlike the once introduced Soviet contingent, the US military does not control the entire territory of Afghanistan. It is also undeniable that after Afghanistan was occupied by NATO troops, drug production in this country increased significantly. There is an opinion that the Americans turn a blind eye to the rapid growth of heroin production quite consciously, realizing that an active fight against the drug business will sharply increase the losses of American troops.

If until 2001 drug trafficking in Afghanistan was repeatedly discussed in the UN Security Council, then later this issue was no longer brought up for discussion. It is also a fact that twice as many people die from heroin produced in Afghanistan every year in Russia and Ukraine than in 10 years of war in Afghanistan.

After the withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent from Afghanistan, the United States continued to maintain close ties with the Mujahideen. Washington blocked all proposals of President Mohammed Najibullah for negotiations and concessions. The Americans continued to arm the jihadists and guerrillas, hoping that they would overthrow the pro-Moscow regime of Najibullah.

This time was for Afghanistan the most destructive period in the recent history of the country: Pakistan and the West deprived the country of a unique opportunity to end the civil war. Charles Cogan, who served as the CIA's Director of Operations in South Asia and the Middle East from 1979-1984, later admitted: “I doubt whether it was worth our inertia to help the Mujahideen after the Soviets left. Looking back, I think it was a mistake."

Fact: the Americans were forced to buy weapons donated to them from the Afghans

When Soviet troops entered Afghanistan, the United States, according to various estimates, gave the Mujahideen from 500 to 2 thousand Stinger portable anti-aircraft missile systems. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country, the American government began to buy back donated missiles at $183,000 each, while the cost of the Stinger was $38,000.

Myth: The Mujahideen overthrew the Kabul regime and won a major victory over Moscow

The main factor that undermined Najibullah's position was Moscow's statement in September 1991, shortly after the collapse of the coup against Gorbachev. Yeltsin, who came to power, decided to reduce the country's international obligations. Russia has announced that it is halting the supply of arms to Kabul, as well as the supply of food and any other aid.

This decision was disastrous for the morale of Najibullah's supporters, whose regime lasted only 2 years after the Soviet troops left Afghanistan. Many military leaders and political allies of Najibullah went over to the side of the Mujahideen. As a result, Najibullah's army was not defeated. She just melted away. It so happened that Moscow overthrew the government, for which it was paid with the lives of Soviet people.

Fact: the USSR made a fatal mistake - it could not leave Afghanistan in time

The "Afghan unfinished construction" had a very negative impact on the USSR. There is an opinion that it was the unsuccessful Soviet military intervention that became one of the main reasons for the disappearance from the political map of the world. If the introduction of troops in 1979 strengthened “anti-Russian sentiments” both in the West, and in the countries of the socialist camp, and in the Islamic world, then the forced withdrawal of troops and the change of political allies and partners in Kabul became one of the most fatal mistakes, casting doubt on all that positive what the USSR did not only during the ten-year stay of OKSVA, but also for many years before that.

Myth: The US is rebuilding the Afghan economy today

According to statistics, over 12 years, the United States has invested $96.6 billion in the Afghan economy. True, no one dares to say how much went to the appointment. It is known that American businessmen who are engaged in the restoration of the Afghan economy, resolved by the war, have come up with a multi-stage corruption scheme for embezzling funds from the US budget through Afghanistan. According to the Stringer Bureau of International Investigation, multibillion-dollar sums are disappearing in an unknown direction.

During the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the USSR built two gas pipelines, several GSE and CHPPs, power lines, 2 airports, more than a dozen oil depots, industrial enterprises, bakeries, a Mother and Child Center, clinics, a Polytechnic Institute, vocational schools, schools - in total more than 200 different industrial facilities and social infrastructure.

Of the weapons among the Mujahideen, the English Lee-Enfeld rifles and AK-74 / AKM assault rifles were especially popular. This mujahideen is armed in the old fashioned way: a simple, apparently, single-shot rifle with a bolt action. He is dressed in the traditional Afghan civilian attire: a long loose shirt, baggy trousers that do not reach the ankles, and a brown vest typical of the Mujahideen. Over his clothes, his chest and waist are wrapped in a blue scarf; he carries his property in a field bag. Footwear - leather sandals of local production. A variety of headdresses were worn on the head - turbans, fur hats and caps.

MOJAHED 1981

The figure depicts the appearance of a partisan, typical for the beginning of the war. Specialized equipment has not yet begun to flow to the Mujahideen. The guerrilla is wearing ordinary Afghan clothing. Legs and sandals are wrapped with impromptu footcloths tied with colored cords to protect them from the cold. The weapon is also decorated with colored cords - the Lie-Enfeld Mk.III rifle. The rifle is probably a family heirloom, a trophy kept since the Third Afghan War, but it is possible that local village craftsmen made a copy of the rifle, such cases are known. The patterned leather harness is equipped with pockets for equipment. This fighter, most likely, is a bad shooter; at the beginning of the war, the Afghans did not have enough ammunition to learn how to accurately fire from rifles and machine guns. In areas where there were no leaders of the rank of Masud or Amin Bardak, local mullahs or maliks led the resistance, and relatives and friends united in detachments.

The picture also shows a 12.7 mm DShKM machine gun, nicknamed "Dashika" by the Afghans. Soviet-designed heavy machine guns became the main means of air defense for opposition units. Despite the fact that 12.7-mm bullets did not penetrate the armor of Mi-24 combat helicopters, hitting vulnerable places not covered by armor more than once led to the death of combat helicopters. DShK machine guns were also used in ambushes, as they could hit infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers. The Mujahideen had both Soviet and Chinese-made 12.7 mm machine guns, including the latest machine guns with large mechanical sights. The DShK machine gun in the hands of an experienced crew was a very effective weapon.

MOJAHED 1983

The fighting of the Mujahideen from the border tribe of the Pathans was very effective. Especially after 1983. The picture shows a fighter trained under Colonel Safi. The Mujahideen is dressed in a cheap locally made jacket, a spacious Afghan shirt of gray-blue color, which in the province of Paktia could well be considered camouflage; on his feet are brown boots. Armament - an AKMS assault rifle with a wooden butt painted with flowers. Pay attention to the Chinese-made chest pouch for magazines for the Kalashnikov assault rifle. In the hands of the partisans, he holds an 82-mm mine for the Soviet-designed M1937 mortar, these mortars were very popular with the Mujahideen and were almost their only heavy weapons. Safi used 82-mm mortars to shell Khost, Urgun and a number of Soviet strongholds in the border areas. A simple and reliable mortar had the only drawback - an insufficient firing range, only 3 km, because of which its calculation was at risk of falling under the artillery raid of Soviet or Afghan guns.

Ramatullah Safi

COL RAMATULLAH SAFI

Colonel of the Royal Afghan Army, commander of the commando brigade, Ramatullah Safi spent two years in captivity of the Kabul regime. In 1984, he supported the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, one of the seven Mujahideen groups based in Peshawar. Safi trained militants and personally took part in operations in the province of Paktam. The former colonel's toilet is a mixture of Afghan and Western clothing. The headdress is a traditional Afghan "pakhti" hat, but dressed in the manner of an English military beret, not without reason Safi himself studied with British instructors. Ramatullah Safi remained an Anglophile for the rest of his life. The jacket is locally made, the shirt and trousers are also traditional for Afghans, but for colonels these garments have a more "militarist" cut than usual. The jacket covers an automatic pistol in a shoulder holster. Safi is also armed with a Chinese-made AK-47 assault rifle adorned with religious flags.

Hamid Walid

HAMID WALID, WARDAK PROVINCE

Hamid Walid is depicted wearing a Soviet aviation headset. Walid always wore this headset in combat situations. Walid was considered one of the best RPG-7 shooters in all of Central Afghanistan. He has 12 armored vehicles and several trucks on his personal account. An intellectual, a man of high culture, Walid, like Massoud, was educated at the French Lyceum in Kabul and, like Massoud, spoke French fluently. Walid fought shoulder to shoulder with his lyceum comrade Amin Bardak, leader of the Mujahideen in Wardak province, until he was killed in an attack on a Soviet convoy in the Ghazni region on July 23, 1983. vest. Behind him, in a backpack of local production, are spare grenades for RPG-7.

Ahmad Shah Massoud

AHMAD SHAH MASUD, PANJSHER VALLEY

Ahmad Shah Massoud was the most famous leader of the Afghan opposition outside the country. He became famous as an outstanding guerrilla organizer and leader, whose military art and understanding of the tactics of modern warfare stood out sharply from the general background. A few words about Ahmad Shah Massoud himself. He was born in 1953 in the village of Jangalak (Parvan province) in the family of a feudal lord, Tajik by nationality. He graduated from the 12th grade of the Lyceum "Nadiriya" in Kabul (1972) and two years of engineering faculty of Kabul University (1974). In the same 1974, he joined the Muslim Brotherhood and gained combat experience in other countries. In 1978, he returned to Afghanistan and began to create armed detachments in the Panjshir Gorge. Thus, Ahmad Shah Massoud, having risen at the head of professional detachments, managed to organize a kind of front.

Masud is dressed in his usual suit - trousers and a jacket from a Western-style uniform, headdress - pukhti, note the traditional Panjshir scarf; on the feet - army-style boots. Western uniforms were not uncommon in Massoud's well-organized and generously supplied units from abroad. Under his jacket, Ahmad Shah Massoud usually carried a Spanish Star automatic pistol in a shoulder holster. In the picture, he is depicted with a captured AKS-74 Kalashnikov assault rifle equipped with a BG-15 underbarrel 40-mm grenade launcher.

Khalid Akram

DR KHALID AKRAM

Khalid Akram was interned in Kabul before his escape to Pakistan. He provided medical assistance to the Mujahideen. The Dok Khalid is equipped with both a medical bag with a red crescent (the Muslim equivalent of the red cross) and a 7.62mm AKMS assault rifle. - the machine gun was necessary for the medic for self-defense. As Khalid joked, his equipment was intended for "microorganism" (a sanitary bag for the wounded) and "for macroorganism" (a machine gun for the Soviet Army). Khalid is dressed in the usual Afghan clothing: a long shirt, wide trousers, chapati sandals and pakhti hats; an embroidered pakhor blanket is thrown over the shoulder.

At the same time, being the name of a participant in jihad or a rebel (rebel). The Soviet army and the Afghan authorities called them spooks(dari دشمان - dusman, dushmon, Pashto دښمان - duxman,dusman- "enemy"), or simply rebels, and the Afghans called Soviet soldiers Shuravi (dari شوروی - šuravî, shuravi- "Soviet"). Soviet soldiers often, in everyday life, used the slang word "spirits" to refer to them - a derivative of "dushmans".
Dushmans wore the same traditional Afghan clothes as the local population, outwardly not standing out from it (shirts, black vests, turban or pakol).

Ideology and strategy of the Afghan dushmans (mujahideen)

Tactics

• ZGU, ZU-25-2, ZU-23-4 anti-aircraft installations made in China, USSR, Czechoslovakia;
• Anti-aircraft guns of small caliber "Oerlikon";
• Man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems Strela-2 MANPADS - USSR, China, Egypt, Jevelin, Bluepipe - England, Stinger, Redeye - USA;

• Italian mines (TS -1, TS-2.5, TS-1.6, TS-50, SH-55);
• American - M-19, M 18A-1, DSME-S, Claymore;
• Swedish - M-102, English MAK-7, as well as Czechoslovak and Soviet production.

Mujahideen leaders

Mujahideen allies

• United States represented by the CIA.
• Great Britain represented by MI6
• UAE, as well as some organizations and individuals in other Arab countries.
• Pakistan was a kind of channel for the transfer of American aid; its own support was expressed mainly in providing a place for training camps and camps for Soviet prisoners of war on its territory, as well as in the participation of Pakistani instructors in the training of the Mujahideen.
• Iran (supported the Shiite part of the Afghan Mujahideen based in the west of the country along the border with Iran, as well as the detachments of the Afghan Mujahideen, consisting of Shia Hazaras and Ismaili Hazaras living in the central part of Afghanistan, the provinces of Bamiyan and Daykundi, in the province of Baghlan in the north countries).
• The PRC supplied the Mujahideen with weapons, supplying them through Pakistan.
• Egypt - the supply of weapons to the Mujahideen, financial assistance.

Sources of supply and financing

After the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, the CIA formed a network of training camps and supply bases for the Mujahideen in Pakistan. In the future, the main sources of funding for the Mujahideen were:

• drug trade (thanks to the dushmans, who later formed the Northern Alliance, Afghanistan became the world's largest producer of opium and heroin, giving the name to the drug trade area - the Golden Crescent);
• artisanal gold mining and the sale of gold dust;
• sponsorship of the USA, UAE, Pakistan, China, Arab countries, Muslim organizations.

The most famous party leaders

• The Mujahideen were not homogeneous, the detachments consisted of a large number of small formations, the commanders of which often fought not only with the Soviet troops, but also among themselves. The reason is the different national composition (Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Charaymaks, Nuristanis and others) and religious (Sunnis, Shiites, Ismailis), different sources of sponsorship.
• Their largest coalition is the Sunni Islamic Unity of the Afghan Mujahideen, or the Peshawar Seven, created in May 1985, which included six Pashtun and one Tajik groups (the leader of the Tajik Jamiat-i Islami party, Burhanuddin Rabbani, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, became president of Afghanistan ). There was also a military-political organization of the Shiite Mujahideen - the "Shiite Eight", based in Iran.

Peshawar Seven - "Alliance of Seven"

The Alliance of Seven, or the Peshawar Seven, is a military-political alliance of the leaders of the Afghan Mujahideen. Established in 1982, headquartered in Peshawar, Pakistan. He was represented by the leaders of various fundamental Islamic parties, predominantly the Pashtun majority of the Sunni trend in Islam. The alliance included, among other things, four fundamentalist parties that proclaimed the creation of an Islamic state in Afghanistan as their main goal.
Afghan society, which is a large number of different social groups that differ from each other in ethnic, confessional and other characteristics, living independently or in close proximity to other groups, characterized it as very heterogeneous. Therefore, the forces of the Afghan rebels were divided ethnically, geographically, confessionally. Numerous attempts by various resistance groups to unite into a single organized force could not eliminate their division into two main groups: Islamic fundamentalists and moderate nationalists. These are:

• Islamic Party of Afghanistan (IPA). It was led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. He enjoyed the special location of the US CIA and received up to 40% of all US aid to the opposition.
• "Islamic Society of Afghanistan" (ISA) under the leadership of Burhanuddin Rabbani.
• "Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan" (ISLA). The head of this party was Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. ISOA focused mainly on Saudi Arabia and received most of its assistance from it.
• Islamic Party of Afghanistan Yunus Khales (IPA). The same name with the "Islamic Party of Afghanistan" Gulbuddin Hetmatyar. Party leader Yunus Khales is the only one of all the leaders of the "seven" who directly participated in the hostilities.

The other three parties of the "seven" were called traditionalist. They advocated the return of Afghanistan to pre-revolutionary forms of government. This is:

• "National Islamic Front of Afghanistan" (NIFA). Said Ahmad Geylani was at the head, Abdul Rahim Wardak commanded the armed detachments. He enjoyed the greatest influence among Afghan refugees in Pakistan. It was considered the most secular and pro-Western of the Mujahideen movements.
• National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (NFSA). The party headed by Sebgatullah Mojaddedi was not numerous. She was in monarchist positions, advocated the return to Afghanistan of the former king Zahir Shah.
• Islamic Revolution Movement of Afghanistan (DIRA). The leader of this group is Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi, a religious figure. Among the traditionalist parties, he was closest to the fundamentalists.

Shiite Eight - "Alliance of Eight"

The "Shiite Eight", often called the "Alliance of Eight", included eight parties oriented towards the Shiite and Ismaili part of the population of Afghan society. All of them enjoyed financial and other support from the Islamic Republic of Iran and its spiritual leaders.
Living in the provinces bordering Iran - Herat, Farah, partly Helmand, Shiite Tajiks, Charaimaks, as well as Shiite Hazaras and Ismaili Hazaras living in the central part of Afghanistan in the provinces - Bamiyan, Daykundi, Ghor, Uruzgan, Ghazni, Baghlan, Balkh and Samangan. Shiites and Ismailis, not being the majority of the Afghan population throughout the history of the existence of the Afghan state, experienced religious and national discrimination by the majority - Pashtuns and Tajiks.
The formation of the "Alliance of Eight" was expedient not only from the point of view of the financial independence of the Shiite part of society from the influence of Sunni Pakistan, that is, the Pashtuns who manage the financial flows of the CIA as part of Operation Cyclone, but also an attempt to independently participate in the political division of power in the country. The Shiite G8 are the eight Shiite parties of the Afghan Mujahideen:

• "Hezbe Alla" (Party of Allah), leader Karim Ahmadi "Karim - yak daste" ("Karim one-armed"), an authoritative Shiite mullah, the headquarters of the party was in Mashhad, Iran, the party branches - Tehran, Nishapur, Iranian Zabul . Represented in the western and southern provinces of RA Farah, Nimruz and Kandahar).
• "Nasr" (Victory Party) leaders: Sheikh Mohammad Hussein Sadiqi, Sheikh Abdul Ali Mazari, Sheikh Shafak - the areas of influence of these leaders extend to the traditional places of residence of the Hazaras in the Khazarjats - Bamiyan, Daykundi, Ghazni, Uruzgan, Ghor, Baghlan and others. Nasr was headquartered in Mashhad and Qom, Iran. Represented in the Central Province of the Republic of Armenia, in the region of Khazarajat (Bamiyan, Ghazni, Wardak, Uruzgan, Baghlan, Samangan, Balkh, Parvan and Gor).
• Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Afghanistan (IRGC) - leader Sheikh Akbari, also headquartered in Mashhad and Qom, Iran. Introduced in the provinces of Ghor and Bamiyan, Balkh, Wardak, Uruzgan.
• "Islamic Movement of Afghanistan" (IMA) - leader Sheikh Mohammad Assef Mohseni (Assef Kandagari) headquarters in Qom, Iran. Present in the provinces of Wardak, Bamiyan, Balkh, Helmand, Nimruz.
• "Council of Islamic Accord" (CIS) - leaders: Sheikh Said Ali Beheshti, Said Mohammad Hassan (Said Jargan). The headquarters was located in Mashhad, Iran. Represented in the provinces of Ghazni and Bamiyan.
• "Movement of the Islamic Revolution" (DIR) - leader Sheikh Nasrullah Mansour. The headquarters was located in Mashhad, Iran. Introduced in the province of Herat.
• "Organization of Fighters for Islam" (OBI) - leader Sheikh Mosbah Zadeh, leader of the Hazaras of Bamiyan. Headquarters in Mashhad, Iran.
• “RAAD Party - Thunder” - leaders: Sheikh Seyyid Abdul Jaffar Nadiri, Mohammad Khazai, Seyyid Ismail Balkhi. Headquarters in Mashhad, Iran. Represented in the provinces of Balkh and Herat.

The most famous field commanders of the Mujahideen

An excerpt characterizing the Afghan Mujahideen

“What nonsense sometimes comes to mind! thought Prince Andrei; but it’s only true that this girl is so sweet, so special, that she won’t dance here for a month and get married ... This is a rarity here, ”he thought, when Natasha, straightening the rose that had fallen back from her corsage, sat down beside him.
At the end of the cotillion, the old count in his blue tailcoat approached the dancers. He invited Prince Andrei to his place and asked his daughter if she was having fun? Natasha did not answer and only smiled with such a smile that said reproachfully: "How could you ask about this?"
- So much fun, like never before in my life! - she said, and Prince Andrei noticed how quickly her thin hands rose to hug her father and immediately fell. Natasha was as happy as ever in her life. She was at that highest stage of happiness when a person becomes completely trusting and does not believe in the possibility of evil, misfortune and grief.

Pierre at this ball for the first time felt insulted by the position that his wife occupied in higher spheres. He was sullen and distracted. There was a wide crease across his forehead, and he, standing at the window, looked through his glasses, seeing no one.
Natasha, on her way to dinner, walked past him.
The gloomy, unhappy face of Pierre struck her. She stopped in front of him. She wanted to help him, to convey to him the surplus of her happiness.
“How fun, Count,” she said, “isn't it?
Pierre smiled absently, obviously not understanding what was being said to him.
“Yes, I am very glad,” he said.
“How can they be dissatisfied with something,” thought Natasha. Especially one as good as this Bezukhov?” In Natasha's eyes, all those who were at the ball were equally kind, sweet, wonderful people who loved each other: no one could offend each other, and therefore everyone should have been happy.

The next day, Prince Andrei remembered yesterday's ball, but did not dwell on it for a long time. “Yes, the ball was very brilliant. And yet ... yes, Rostova is very nice. There is something fresh, special, not Petersburg, which distinguishes her. That's all he thought about yesterday's ball, and after drinking tea, he sat down to work.
But from fatigue or insomnia (the day was not good for classes, and Prince Andrei could not do anything), he criticized his own work, as often happened to him, and was glad when he heard that someone had arrived.
The visitor was Bitsky, who served in various commissions, visited all the societies of St. Petersburg, a passionate admirer of new ideas and Speransky, and an anxious news reporter of St. Petersburg, one of those people who choose a direction like a dress - according to fashion, but who for this reason seem to be the most ardent partisans of trends . He anxiously, barely having time to take off his hat, ran to Prince Andrei and immediately began to speak. He had just learned the details of the meeting of the State Council this morning, opened by the sovereign, and enthusiastically talked about it. The emperor's speech was extraordinary. It was one of those speeches only given by constitutional monarchs. “The sovereign directly said that the council and the senate are state estates; he said that government should not be based on arbitrariness, but on firm principles. The sovereign said that the finances should be transformed and the reports should be made public,” Bitsky said, hitting on well-known words and opening his eyes significantly.
“Yes, this event is an era, the greatest era in our history,” he concluded.
Prince Andrei listened to the story of the opening of the State Council, which he looked forward to with such impatience and to which he attributed such importance, and was surprised that this event, now that it had taken place, not only did not touch him, but seemed to him more than insignificant. He listened with quiet mockery to Bitsky's enthusiastic story. The simplest thought came into his head: “What business is it for me and Bitsky, what business is it for us what the sovereign was pleased to say in the council! Can all this make me happier and better?
And this simple reasoning suddenly destroyed for Prince Andrei all the former interest in the transformations being made. On the same day, Prince Andrei was supposed to dine at Speransky's "en petit comite", [in a small meeting,] as the owner told him, inviting him. This dinner in the family and friendly circle of the person whom he admired so much had previously interested Prince Andrei, especially since he had not yet seen Speransky in his home life; but now he did not want to go.
At the appointed hour of dinner, however, Prince Andrei was already entering Speransky's own small house near the Tauride Garden. In the parquet dining room of a small house, distinguished by unusual cleanliness (reminiscent of monastic purity), Prince Andrei, who was somewhat late, had already found at five o'clock the entire company of this petit comite, Speransky's intimate acquaintances, who had gathered. There were no ladies except Speransky's little daughter (with a long face like her father) and her governess. The guests were Gervais, Magnitsky and Stolypin. Even from the hall, Prince Andrei heard loud voices and ringing, distinct laughter - laughter, similar to the one they laugh on the stage. Someone in a voice similar to Speransky's voice distinctly beat out: ha ... ha ... ha ... Prince Andrey had never heard Speransky's laughter, and this sonorous, subtle laughter of a statesman struck him strangely.
Prince Andrei entered the dining room. The whole society stood between two windows at a small table with snacks. Speransky, in a gray tailcoat with a star, apparently in that still white waistcoat and high white tie, in which he was at the famous meeting of the State Council, stood at the table with a cheerful face. The guests surrounded him. Magnitsky, addressing Mikhail Mikhailovich, told an anecdote. Speransky listened, laughing forward at what Magnitsky would say. While Prince Andrei entered the room, Magnitsky's words were again drowned out by laughter. Stolypin boomed loudly, chewing a piece of bread with cheese; Gervais hissed softly, and Speransky laughed thinly and distinctly.
Speransky, still laughing, gave Prince Andrei his white, tender hand.
“Very glad to see you, prince,” he said. - Wait a minute ... he turned to Magnitsky, interrupting his story. - We have an agreement today: a dinner of pleasure, and not a word about business. - And he again turned to the narrator, and again laughed.
Prince Andrei listened to his laughter with surprise and sadness of disappointment and looked at the laughing Speransky. It was not Speransky, but another person, it seemed to Prince Andrei. Everything that previously seemed mysterious and attractive to Prince Andrei in Speransky suddenly became clear and unattractive to him.
At the table, the conversation did not stop for a moment and seemed to consist of a collection of funny anecdotes. Magnitsky had not even finished his story when someone else declared his readiness to tell something that was even funnier. Anecdotes for the most part concerned, if not the service world itself, then officials. It seemed that in this society the insignificance of these persons was so finally decided that the only attitude towards them could only be good-naturedly comic. Speransky told how at this morning's council, when asked by a deaf dignitary about his opinion, this dignitary answered that he was of the same opinion. Gervais told the whole case about the audit, remarkable for the nonsense of all the actors. Stolypin stammered into the conversation and began talking with vehemence about the abuses of the old order of things, threatening to make the conversation serious. Magnitsky began to tease Stolypin's vehemence, Gervais interjected a joke, and the conversation again took its former, cheerful direction.
Obviously, after his labors, Speransky liked to relax and have fun in a friendly circle, and all his guests, understanding his desire, tried to amuse him and have fun themselves. But this fun seemed to Prince Andrei heavy and sad. The subtle sound of Speransky's voice struck him unpleasantly, and the incessant laughter with its false note for some reason offended Prince Andrei's feelings. Prince Andrei did not laugh and was afraid that he would be difficult for this society. But no one noticed his inconsistency with the general mood. Everyone seemed to be having a lot of fun.
Several times he wanted to enter into a conversation, but each time his word was thrown out like a cork out of water; and he could not joke with them together.
There was nothing bad or inappropriate in what they said, everything was witty and could have been funny; but something, that very thing that is the salt of fun, not only did not exist, but they did not even know that it happens.
After dinner, Speransky's daughter and her governess got up. Speransky caressed his daughter with his white hand and kissed her. And this gesture seemed unnatural to Prince Andrei.
The men, in English, remained at the table and drinking port. In the middle of the conversation about the Spanish affairs of Napoleon, approving of which, everyone was of the same opinion, Prince Andrei began to contradict them. Speransky smiled and, obviously wishing to divert the conversation from the accepted direction, told an anecdote that had nothing to do with the conversation. For a few moments everyone was silent.
After sitting at the table, Speransky corked up a bottle of wine and saying: “Today good wine goes in boots”, gave it to the servant and got up. Everyone stood up and also noisily talking went into the living room. Speransky was given two envelopes brought by a courier. He took them and went into the office. As soon as he left, the general merriment ceased, and the guests began talking judiciously and quietly to each other.
- Well, now the declamation! - said Speransky, leaving the office. - Amazing talent! - he turned to Prince Andrei. Magnitsky immediately struck a pose and began to speak French humorous verses, composed by him on some famous people of St. Petersburg, and was interrupted several times by applause. Prince Andrei, at the end of the poems, went up to Speransky, saying goodbye to him.
- Where are you going so early? Speransky said.
I promised tonight...
They were silent. Prince Andrei looked closely into those mirrored eyes that did not let him in, and it became funny to him how he could expect anything from Speransky and from all his activities connected with him, and how he could attribute importance to what Speransky was doing. This neat, sad laughter did not cease to sound in the ears of Prince Andrei for a long time after he left Speransky.
Returning home, Prince Andrei began to recall his Petersburg life during these four months, as if something new. He recalled his efforts, searches, the history of his draft military regulations, which was taken into account and about which they tried to keep silent solely because another work, very bad, had already been done and presented to the sovereign; remembered the meetings of the committee, of which Berg was a member; I recalled how diligently and at length everything relating to the form and process of committee meetings was discussed in these meetings, and how diligently and briefly everything related to the essence of the matter was avoided. He remembered his legislative work, how he anxiously translated articles of the Roman and French code into Russian, and he felt ashamed of himself. Then he vividly imagined Bogucharovo, his activities in the countryside, his trip to Ryazan, remembered the peasants, Dron the headman, and applying to them the rights of persons, which he divided into paragraphs, he wondered how he could have been engaged in such idle work for so long.

The next day, Prince Andrei went on visits to some houses where he had not yet been, including the Rostovs, with whom he renewed his acquaintance at the last ball. In addition to the laws of courtesy, according to which he needed to be with the Rostovs, Prince Andrei wanted to see at home this special, lively girl, who left him a pleasant memory.
Natasha was one of the first to meet him. She was in a homely blue dress, in which she seemed to Prince Andrei even better than in the ballroom. She and the entire Rostov family accepted Prince Andrei as an old friend, simply and cordially. The whole family, which Prince Andrei used to strictly judge, now seemed to him made up of beautiful, simple and kind people. The hospitality and good nature of the old count, which was especially charmingly striking in St. Petersburg, was such that Prince Andrei could not refuse dinner. “Yes, these are kind, glorious people,” thought Bolkonsky, who, of course, did not understand in the slightest degree the treasure that they have in Natasha; but kind people who make up the best background for this especially poetic, overflowing life, lovely girl to stand out on it!
Prince Andrei felt in Natasha the presence of a completely alien to him, a special world, full of some joys unknown to him, that alien world that even then, in Otradnenskaya alley and at the window, on a moonlit night, teased him so much. Now this world no longer teased him, there was no alien world; but he himself, entering into it, found in it a new pleasure for himself.
After dinner, Natasha, at the request of Prince Andrei, went to the clavichord and began to sing. Prince Andrei stood at the window, talking to the ladies, and listened to her. In the middle of a sentence, Prince Andrei fell silent and suddenly felt tears rising to his throat, the possibility of which he did not know behind him. He looked at the singing Natasha, and something new and happy happened in his soul. He was happy and at the same time sad. He had absolutely nothing to cry about, but he was ready to cry. About what? About old love? About the little princess? About your disappointments?... About your hopes for the future?... Yes and no. The main thing he wanted to weep about was the terrible opposition he suddenly realized vividly between something infinitely great and indefinable that was in him, and something narrow and corporeal that he himself was, and even she was. This opposition tormented and delighted him during her singing.
Natasha had just finished singing, she went up to him and asked him how he liked her voice? She asked this and was embarrassed after she said it, realizing that it was not necessary to ask. He smiled at her and said that he liked her singing as much as everything she did.
Prince Andrei left the Rostovs late in the evening. He went to bed out of the habit of going to bed, but soon saw that he could not sleep. Lighting a candle, he sat in bed, then got up, then lay down again, not at all burdened by insomnia: he felt so joyful and new in his soul, as if he had stepped out of a stuffy room into the free light of God. It never occurred to him that he was in love with Rostov; he did not think of her; he only imagined it to himself, and as a result of this his whole life appeared to him in a new light. “What am I struggling with, what am I fussing about in this narrow, closed frame, when life, all life with all its joys is open to me?” he said to himself. And for the first time after a long time he began to make happy plans for the future. He decided by himself that he needed to take up the education of his son, finding him an educator and entrusting him; then you have to retire and go abroad, see England, Switzerland, Italy. “I need to use my freedom while I feel so much strength and youth in myself,” he said to himself. Pierre was right when he said that one must believe in the possibility of happiness in order to be happy, and I now believe in him. Let's leave the dead to bury the dead, but as long as you're alive, you have to live and be happy," he thought.

One morning, Colonel Adolf Berg, whom Pierre knew as he knew everyone in Moscow and St. Petersburg, in a clean uniform from a needle, with temples pomaded in front, as the sovereign Alexander Pavlovich wore, came to him.
- I was just now at the countess, your wife, and was so unhappy that my request could not be fulfilled; I hope that with you, Count, I will be happier,” he said, smiling.
What do you want, Colonel? I am at your service.
“Now, Count, I’m completely settled in a new apartment,” Berg said, obviously knowing that hearing this could not but be pleasant; - and therefore wanted to do so, a small evening for my and my wife's acquaintances. (He smiled even more pleasantly.) I wanted to ask the countess and you to do me the honor of visiting us for a cup of tea and ... for dinner.
- Only Countess Elena Vasilyevna, considering the company of some Bergs humiliating for herself, could have the cruelty to refuse such an invitation. - Berg explained so clearly why he wants to gather a small and good society, and why it will be pleasant for him, and why he spares money for cards and for something bad, but for a good society he is ready to incur expenses that Pierre could not refuse and promised to be.
- Only it's not too late, count, if I dare to ask, so without 10 minutes at eight, I dare to ask. We will form a party, our general will be. He is very kind to me. Let's have dinner, Count. So do me a favor.
Contrary to his habit of being late, Pierre that day, instead of eight minutes to 10 minutes, arrived at the Bergs at eight o'clock at a quarter.
Bergi, having stocked up what was needed for the evening, were already ready to receive guests.
Berg and his wife sat in the new, clean, bright study, decorated with busts and pictures and new furniture. Berg, in a brand new, buttoned-up uniform, was sitting next to his wife, explaining to her that it is always possible and necessary to have acquaintances of people who are taller than themselves, because then only there is pleasantness from acquaintances. “If you take something, you can ask for something. Look how I lived from the first ranks (Berg considered his life not for years, but for the highest awards). My comrades are now nothing, and I am in the vacancy of a regimental commander, I have the good fortune to be your husband (he got up and kissed Vera's hand, but on the way to her he turned back the corner of the rolled-up carpet). And how did I get all this? The main thing is the ability to choose your acquaintances. It goes without saying that one must be virtuous and orderly.”
Berg smiled with the consciousness of his superiority over a weak woman and fell silent, thinking that all the same this dear wife of his is a weak woman who cannot comprehend all that constitutes the dignity of a man - ein Mann zu sein [to be a man]. Vera at the same time also smiled with the consciousness of her superiority over a virtuous, good husband, but who still erroneously, like all men, according to Vera's concept, understood life. Berg, judging by his wife, considered all women weak and stupid. Vera, judging by one of her husbands and spreading this remark, believed that all men ascribe reason only to themselves, and at the same time they do not understand anything, they are proud and selfish.
Berg got up and, embracing his wife carefully so as not to wrinkle the lace cape, for which he paid dearly, kissed her in the middle of her lips.
“The only thing is that we shouldn’t have children so soon,” he said from the unconscious filiation of ideas.
“Yes,” Vera answered, “I don’t want that at all. We must live for society.
“That’s exactly what Princess Yusupova wore,” said Berg, with a happy and kind smile, pointing to the cape.
At this time, the arrival of Count Bezukhy was reported. Both spouses looked at each other with a self-satisfied smile, each attributing the honor of this visit to himself.
"That's what it means to be able to make acquaintances, thought Berg, that's what it means to be able to behave!"
“Just please, when I am entertaining guests,” Vera said, “you don’t interrupt me, because I know what to do with everyone, and in what society what to say.
Berg smiled too.
“It’s impossible: sometimes a man’s conversation should be with men,” he said.
Pierre was received in a brand new living room, in which it was impossible to sit down anywhere without violating symmetry, cleanliness and order, and therefore it was very understandable and not strange that Berg generously offered to destroy the symmetry of an armchair or sofa for a dear guest, and apparently being himself in in this regard, in painful indecision, offered a solution to this issue to the choice of the guest. Pierre upset the symmetry by pulling out a chair for himself, and immediately Berg and Vera began the evening, interrupting one another and entertaining the guest.
Vera, deciding in her mind that Pierre should be occupied with a conversation about the French embassy, ​​immediately began this conversation. Berg, deciding that a man's conversation was also necessary, interrupted his wife's speech, touching on the question of the war with Austria and involuntarily jumped from the general conversation to personal considerations about the proposals that were made to him to participate in the Austrian campaign, and about the reasons why he did not accept them. Despite the fact that the conversation was very awkward, and that Vera was angry at the interference of the male element, both spouses felt with pleasure that, despite the fact that there was only one guest, the evening started very well, and that the evening was like two drops of water are like any other evening with conversations, tea and candles lit.
Boris, Berg's old comrade, soon arrived. He treated Berg and Vera with a certain tinge of superiority and patronage. A lady came for Boris with a colonel, then the general himself, then the Rostovs, and the evening was completely, undoubtedly, similar to all evenings. Berg and Vera could not help smiling at the sight of this movement around the living room, at the sound of this incoherent conversation, the rustling of dresses and bows. Everything was, like everyone else, especially the general, who praised the apartment, patted Berg on the shoulder, and with fatherly arbitrariness ordered the setting up of the Boston table. The general sat down with Count Ilya Andreich, as if he were the most distinguished guest after himself. Old men with old men, young with young, the hostess at the tea table, on which were exactly the same cookies in a silver basket that the Panins had at the evening, everything was exactly the same as the others.

| The participation of the USSR in the conflicts of the Cold War. War in Afghanistan (1979-1989)

Background material on the war in Afghanistan
(1979-1989)

Fortified areas of the Afghan Mujahideen
(1979-1989)

Fortified areas of the Afghan Mujahideen (1979-1989) - "fortified areas", "base areas", "fortifications", "strongholds" of the Afghan Mujahideen during the Afghan war (1979-1989) - a key link in the system of organizing the armed struggle of the Afghan opposition formations with a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and government forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Significant long-term fortifications, fundamental complexes with powerful defensive communications, fortifications and other protective structures, organized according to a single plan for interaction (control) of the fire system.

They were called upon to conduct long-term combat operations in a stable defense on a wide front, in complete isolation with relatively small forces and means, to inflict maximum damage on the superior - besieging and assaulting forces of the Soviet troops, using heavy artillery and ground attack aircraft.

Built and equipped at the expense of the Unions of Islamic Parties of Afghanistan: the Peshawar Seven and the Shiite Eight, attracted within the framework of international financial and military assistance to the formations of the Afghan opposition.

They were located throughout the DRA, equipped in the border areas in the zone of the Afghan-Pakistani or Afghan-Iranian borders, simultaneously performing the functions of strongholds and large transshipment bases.

The largest during the Afghan war (1979-1989) were the "Basic areas": "Jawara", "Tora-Bora", "Kokari-Sharshari".

Base areas of the Afghan opposition

In 1981 in Afghanistan, the equipping of combat areas with enemy air defense systems reached a large scale. “Around the fortified areas and bases of the Mujahideen, there were up to several dozen anti-aircraft firing points. Risk reduction was achieved by the skillful use of the terrain, which ensured the secrecy of the approach and the suddenness of reaching the target, as well as the choice of escape routes after the attack. On the side of the enemy were good knowledge of the terrain, the support of the population and the ability to use natural shelters and camouflage. Opposition detachments moved quickly and quickly dispersed in case of danger. It was not easy to detect them from the air even on a tip-off due to the lack of characteristic landmarks in the monotonous terrain. In addition, planes and helicopters increasingly ran into anti-aircraft fire.

"Jawara"

Javara (Pashto. "Wolf Pit") - a fortified area of ​​the Afghan Mujahideen during the Afghan war (1979-1989). (“Fortified area”, “base area”, “stronghold and transshipment base”) - a long-term defensive structure significant in territory, “stronghold and transshipment base” of a numerous armed formation as part of the “south-eastern united group” of a major field commander, one of the leaders of the "Peshawar Seven" - Jalaluddin Haqqani in the zone of the Afghan-Pakistani border of the Khost province of the Republic of Afghanistan.

Fortification "Javara" - a complex with powerful defensive communications from protective structures and fortifications, organized according to a single control plan (interaction) of the "fire system" in order to conduct long-term defensive operations with superior enemy forces. About 20% of the total volume of material resources of foreign aid from neighboring Pakistan passed through the transshipment base "Jawara": food, equipment, weapons and ammunition.

"Javara" was a major object of propaganda value - a platform for broadcasting sympathetic to the Mujahideen journalists and politicians. It consisted of many galleries and shelters, warehouses and living quarters - a hospital, a barracks, a headquarters bunker, etc.

The fortified area in the southeastern province of Khost is a fortification with powerful defensive communications, protective structures and fortifications, with a single plan for the interaction (control) of the fire system in a stable defense, in conditions of complete isolation, it is able to effectively withstand significantly superior forces and means (ground forces, artillery and aviation), attacking the enemy on a wide front, inflicting maximum damage with insignificant forces.

The construction of the Javara base began even before the PDPA came to power to fight the Daoud regime and continued for a long time. The fortification was a complex of ground and underground (tunnel type with a protective thickness of 15–20 m) structures, which housed everything necessary for life, everyday life and combat activities: a command post with a communication center, training and propaganda centers, several barracks, many weapons depots, ammunition and materiel, car repair and weapons workshops, ammunition ammunition shop (for assembling BUR cartridges), a hospital, a prison, many warehouses of weapons, ammunition and materiel. Specialists were trained in mine-blasting, the use of anti-aircraft guns (DShK, ZGU) and other types of weapons, and specialized centers were also created with separate training for specialists in the combat use of man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems (Mamadgart, Varsak, Sadda, Aravali, etc.) and missile launchers. (From the book "We attack from heaven" by Sergey Sergeev)

The vital activity of the fortified area was supported by reserve and alternative energy sources. It was equipped with an autonomous water supply system with an artesian well. The presence of a stationary medical institution. The base was guarded by a detachment of field commander Jalaluddin Haqqani, and Pashtuns living in the region were used as auxiliary forces.

An excerpt from the memoirs of Army General V.I. Varennikov about the Javara base:

“... Everyone seems to know about the assault on Ishmael. We heard something about the Maginot Line. These fortifications were considered impregnable. Is it permissible to compare them with the JAVAR database? But the fact that the base itself and the defenses around it were built according to the latest science and technology and were considered impregnable by Western and Eastern specialists is an indisputable fact ... ”Varennikov V.I. "Unique" (book 5th chapter 4th)

There were administrative buildings and residential buildings to accommodate high-ranking officials and foreign representatives. The base had autonomous electricity and water supply. The approaches to the base were covered by three lines of strongholds, equipped on the dominant heights with firing structures with shelters. The entire area had exceptionally strong air defense - a large number of MANPADS, DShK, ZGU.

"Tora Bora"

Tora-Bora ("Tora-Bora" or "Tura-Bura") - a fortified area of ​​the Afghan Mujahideen during the Afghan war (1979-1989), the radical Islamic movement "Taliban" and the international terrorist organization "Al-Qaeda" during the reign of the "Taliban regime" and the entry of troops from the Western anti-Taliban coalition ISAF.

Fortified area "Tora-Bora" - "Fortified area", strategic "base area", "stronghold and transshipment base" - a long-term defensive structure significant in territory, a key link in the rear system of the "eastern united grouping" under the command of a large field commander, one from the leaders of the "Peshawar Seven" - Yunus Khales.

It is a labyrinth of tunnels, going to a depth of 400 m, with many galleries, storage facilities, living quarters and shelters, bunkers, weapons and ammunition depots. The total length of the messages is more than 25 km. Located in a hard-to-reach mountain range at an altitude of 4000 m (above sea level), 85 km south of Jalalabad, Nangarhar province.

Used by the Afghan Mujahideen and international terrorists led by Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar, Yunus Khales and other field commanders of the Pashtun tribes during the Afghan war of 1979-1989. and later, with the goal of fighting in a stable defense with the superior forces of the "Northern Alliance" and the "troops of the Western anti-Taliban coalition."

"Kokari-Sharshari"

Kokari-Sharshari - a fortified area of ​​the Afghan Mujahideen during the Afghan war (1979-1989). "Fortified area", "base area", "fortification structure", "strong point", "transshipment base" - a long-term defensive structure of considerable territory, a stronghold and transshipment point of a numerous armed formation as part of the "western united group" of a large field commander Ismail -khana (Turan Ismail), in the mountain range "Kukhe-Senge-Surakh" - "White Mountains" in the zone of the Afghan-Iranian border, Herat province.

The base area "Kokari-Sharshari" aka "Kokari-Shershari", "Kakari-Shashari", "Kakari-Shushari", "Sharshar", "Sher-Sher" is a fortification complex of protective structures and fortifications with powerful defensive communications organized according to a unified control plan (interaction) of the fire system, it was called upon to conduct long-term combat operations in a stable defense on a wide front in complete isolation, with relatively small forces and means to inflict maximum damage on the superior - besieging and assaulting forces of the Soviet troops, using heavy artillery and attack aircraft.

The base in the province of Herat was built in 1984–1985. in accordance with a plan developed by West German and Iranian military engineers. In neighboring Iran, the rebels underwent general military training in 34 centers (camps): the study of the material part of small arms; practical shooting; mastering the basics of combat tactics; development of orientation skills on the ground; provision of primary health care; religious and political training, a course of anti-government and anti-Soviet propaganda. For the indoctrination of students, a special propaganda faculty was created at the Kuma Theological Center. The fact that propaganda is one of the foundations of guerrilla warfare was immediately understood by the spooks. Leaflets to the local population, appeals to our soldiers came across often.

“Kokari-Sharshari. Among the "Afghans" this place was reputed to be thin and "famous" for its solid defense fortifications and communications. We had to destroy them, as well as capture the weapons and ammunition depots of the Mujahideen gang under the command of field commander Turan Ismail Khan. In about thirty minutes we were already flying up to the landing site. Scorched earth, mountains low by Afghan standards, the dry bed of the Harirud River - the place where, according to the topographic map, the border between Afghanistan and Iran passes.

The strategic transshipment and stronghold is a key link in the partisan activities of the Afghan Mujahideen in the region bordering Iran, the west of the Republic of Afghanistan in the area of ​​​​responsibility of the commander of the "western united group" of the Mujahideen - Ismail Khan (Turan Ismail) command", "communication center", "relay", "barracks", "bomb shelter", "hospital" with modern medical equipment and medicines, "warehouses" with stocks of food, drinking water, weapons and ammunition were located in a multi-level complex - a powerful reinforced concrete structure capable of withstanding bombing and assault strikes by aviation and heavy artillery. Despite fierce resistance, on August 25, 1986, the Kokari group was defeated. The defenders who survived the defense, realizing the doom of the citadel, using the communication channels in the underground communications system, leaving the defended positions, with the commander of the formations, Ismail Khan, retired to the territory of Iran.

“... We still took the fortified area of ​​Ismail Khan in Kokari-Sharshari. His gang was broken. And only a very small part of the surviving dushmans, having abandoned their weapons and ammunition, went to Iran together with Ismail Khan ... "

- Commander of the 149th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment A.I. Skorodumov

"Alburz, Agarsay, Shorcha, Bayramshah"

The fortified areas (strongholds and transshipment bases) of the field commanders: Zabiullo, Mohammad Alim, Atta Mohammad Nur - "Alburs", "Agarsay", "Bayramshah", "Shorcha" and others were located in the zone: Marmolsky, Tangimarmolsky, Shadiansky, Ak Dara, Gor Dara, Tashkurgan gorges of the Red Rocks mountain range in the provinces of Balkh and Samangan 80-100 km. to the south, southwest of the city of Mazar-i-Sharif - the north of the Republic of Afghanistan. - the north of the Republic of Afghanistan. The largest combined-arms operations to capture these base areas during the Afghan war (1979-1989) were: in 1980, August 1981, 1982, March 1983, January-February 1984, etc.

The Marmol gorge with a total length of 110 kilometers included four mountain sections following one after another - starting from Chimtal, Balkh, Dideydi, Nakhri Shakhi, Marmol and ending with the Khulm section.

The Marmol area was a hard-to-reach area, well prepared by the Mujahideen in engineering terms. A plateau surrounded by mountains, the excess of which above the plateau was about 800 meters. In the center of the plateau was a hill. The road went to the region along the narrow Tangimarmol passage in the mountains. To protect themselves from the actions of the Soviet troops, the Mujahideen mined this passage.

The minefields of the rebels blew up the tanks of the 40th Army, they laid large charges in the form of air bombs on the slopes of the mountains. All the charges were brought together in a single network, which, when detonated, was supposed to bring down the mountains on the heads of the armored group that entered the passage. However, engineering intelligence was able to identify these charges and disrupt the network, and then clear the passage.

On the heights where the positions of the rebels were located, powerful air strikes were inflicted, and then SA and Border Troops units were landed around the entire circumference of the plateau. Following them, the main forces entered the area, which completed the defeat of the base area. In this area, a large number of warehouses with weapons and ammunition located in caves were identified, which were also mined. A prison was also found in the area.

Mention of operations in the province of Balkh in the area of ​​the "Red Rocks", 70 km. southwest of the city of Mazar-i-Sharif: “... At the same time, there are cases when, in the course of hostilities, rebels launch direct attacks on areas where our units are entrenched (BALKH province, landing area 4 MCP 149 MSP, 8 MCP 122 SMEs in the operation "MARMOL"), as well as fierce resistance and persistence in the areas. The rebels put up fierce resistance, and only after repeated air strikes and artillery fire is it possible to break their morale.

Subsequently, one of the divisions of the border troops of the USSR was stationed in the "Marmol Gorge" on one of the heights in the center of the plateau.

Operations to seize the SD in the Marmol area

The elimination of the rear system, the capture of powerful fortified areas (UR) of fortification complexes - strongholds and transshipment bases of the Afghan Mujahideen: "Alburs", "Agarsay", "Bayramshah", "Shorcha" in the zone of Marmol, Tangimarmol, Shadian and Tashkurgan gorges of the Krasnye mountain range Rocks" in the province of Balkh during the Afghan war (1979-1989) were carried out during the combined arms "Marmol operations" by units of the 201st Gatchina Double Red Banner Motorized Rifle Division, other divisions of OKSVA, units of the border troops (KSAPO) of the KGB of the USSR and government forces of the DRA against armed formations Afghan Mujahideen of the "Islamic Society of Afghanistan" Burhanuddin Rabbani (field commanders: Zabiullo, Mohammad Alim, Atta Mohammad Nur, etc.) with the involvement of significant forces and means - "Marmol operations".

Combined-arms operations: 1980, August 1981, 1982, March 1983, January-February 1984, September 1985, 1986, 1987, etc. were carried out in order to paralyze the activities of anti-government forces: the defeat of armed formations , mastery of fortified (basic) areas: "Agarsay", "Alburs", "Bayramshah", "Shorcha", the capture of strongholds and transshipment bases of the opposition, depots of weapons and ammunition in the zone of the "Marmol, Tangimarmol, Shadian and Tashkurgan gorges" of the mountain range "Red rocks" Balkh province, blocking the supply of material resources from the transshipment "bases of Balkh" to other northern provinces of Afghanistan: Samangan, Jawzjan, Sari-Pul, Faryab, etc. The result of the operations was the capture of strongholds, a significant amount of captured weapons and ammunition.

"Darzab"

Darzab is a fortified area (UR) (base area), a stronghold and transit point of the Afghan Mujahideen (1979-1989) of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan party of Burhanuddin Rabbani at the junction of the provinces of Faryab and Jowzjan, the north of the Republic of Afghanistan. The village "Darzab" and the stronghold of the same name lay in the foothills, in a three hundred meter canyon of a mountainous area.

The defeat of a large opposition base area in the Darzab region on the border of the provinces of Jowzjan and Faryab, carried out from February 15 to 19, 1982, was preceded by thorough reconnaissance training. The territory (zone) of the planned military operation to defeat the "large base area" of the "Darzab" rebels in the northern region of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan included the area of ​​​​contact between the provinces of Faryab and Jawzjan.

Operation to seize SD "Darzab"

In January 1982, the chief of staff of the 40th Army, Major General Ter-Grigoryants N.G. was appointed head of the "Darzab operation" to block and destroy the enemy grouping in the province of Faryab (Meymen).

According to intelligence, the underground government of Afghanistan, supported by the United States, Pakistan and other countries, was created in the area. Their further plans included the separation of part of the country's territory from the center and the creation of a powerful center of resistance on it. Naturally, this could not be allowed. In a short time, under the leadership of Major General Ter-Grigoryants, an "air-ground operation" was planned and carried out. About 1000 military personnel of the Soviet Army and the DRA Armed Forces, about 15 aircraft and more than two dozen transport helicopters and fire support helicopters were involved.

“Aircraft with paratroopers on board from Kabul landed at the Mazar-i-Sharif airfield. There, having connected with the Afghan units according to a pre-planned scheme, the paratroopers with weapons and ammunition boarded MI-8MT helicopters. Fighter-bomber aviation began to strike at previously identified targets. Ground units of the special forces began moving to the planned area for joint operations with the landing force after its landing. 4 battalions of the Airborne Forces, 2 battalions of the OoSpN GRU (OKSVA) and 4 battalions of the Armed Forces of the DRA, with the support of artillery and aviation, entered into prolonged hostilities in the mountains with the rebels in the Darzab region. The operation was commanded by the chief of staff of the 40th Army, General N.G. Ter-Grigoryants.

The first stage of the operation on January 29, 1982, provided for the landing of tactical airborne assault units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division on the dominant heights, saddling the spurs and launching units of the DRA Armed Forces into the Darzab village.

However, the weather made its own adjustments to the course of the operation: “... Contrary to the optimistic forecasts of meteorologists, the helicopters with the landing force turned out to be over a continuous veil of thick clouds. The capabilities of navigation equipment on military transport helicopters of that time left much to be desired. Crew navigators were only able to approximately determine the location of the helicopters relative to the landing area.

When approaching the landing site, heavy machine-gun fire was opened on the helicopters. In this regard, the arriving units reached the landing site only the second time. The landing was carried out at a minimum height and speed. The rest of the helicopters did not succeed in flying up to the designated targets on the spurs. Despite the low cloudiness, helicopters landed troops, which occupied the dominant heights and did not allow armed opposition detachments to escape from the Darzab area.

Helicopter aviation, using a narrow space in the sky, where the cloud had not yet reunited with the mountains, chose the tactic: “Moving in a spiral, one after another entered this gap, under which, like in a bowl, between the mountains, the rebellious Darzab was located. Having barely completed this maneuver, the crews saw the settlement itself, but the cloud rapidly settling to the ground left no room for further maneuvering. However, the helicopters were discovered by the enemy, and heavy fire was opened on them.

The advance detachment of units of the 350th Guards Airborne Regiment (350th Guards Airborne Regiment) of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division (103rd Airborne Division) was landed on the spurs of two ridges in the area of ​​the Darzab gorge. Under a veil of clouds, mountains and an area occupied by the enemy stretched. The rebels, using knowledge of the terrain and the current natural anomalies - with weapons, in front of the paratroopers, disappeared in the fog beyond the reach of firing.

The immediate task of the troops was to land and secure on landing sites. Further: to seize the adjacent dominant heights and provide fire cover for the landing of the main landing forces and the headquarters of the 40th Army.

The landing of units was accompanied by the entry into battle. In a fierce two-hour battle, the paratroopers managed to capture a number of strategic heights. The landing force with units of the main forces continued to arrive in the area of ​​operation. “The ensuing battle was already in a continuous cloud, and the shooting became more and more chaotic and erratic. Under such conditions, there was a real danger of firing at their units. Major General Ter-Grigoryants gave the command to cease fire and gain a foothold in the landing area. Soon the shooting died down from the opposite side. A new battle began a few hours later, when the cloud covering the mountains finally dissipated.

In the course of continuous fighting, during the day and night, "two dominant heights above the gorge were captured. As a result, by morning the landing area for the main forces was covered. The rebels, realizing that they were not able to throw the NE from the heights, no longer attacked.

Aviation and artillery of the SV worked for more than four hours on the indicated targets. On the heights held, during the day, the landing of the main forces was thrown - two regiments of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division: the 350th and 357th OPDP (both, two battalions).

At the end of the landing, the units were given the task of "advancing to the indicated line to block the area, from where the consolidated units were to come out to comb the settlement of Darzab ...".

According to intelligence, in this village there was a "training school for junior rebel commanders." The second stage of the operation began on the morning of January 31 and lasted almost two days. In addition to the paratroopers of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, two detachments (battalions) of the GRU special forces (154th and 177th OoSpN) took part in the operation.

For three days, the paratroopers did not leave the battlefield. They collected all the remaining provisions from the personnel, distributed them over two days. "The snow in the area of ​​​​the strong point, the paratroopers, ate almost all of it." It was also important to keep people from the cold and not to let the wounded die. TNT was burned to heat them. Even in a critical situation, "the paratroopers did not wait until they were killed." Having formed a reconnaissance group, every night they carried out a sortie and made raids.

In order to evade mortar fire, the units dug in using improvised means; bayonet-knives and helmets. By the morning of the first day, three dugouts were dug in the frozen ground: large two-meter pits - one per platoon, with communication passages. This saved the lives of the paratroopers.

During the protracted confrontation, helicopter pilots used installations of unguided rockets (NURS) from failed helicopters. Having deployed the skeletons of rotorcraft in the right direction, the landing force received at its disposal a kind of multiple launch rocket system. These NURS salvos from the ground turned out to be a complete surprise for the enemy and made it possible to significantly increase the firepower of the SV units. With air support from Mi-24 attack helicopters, the paratroopers defeated the enemy in the mountainous area. After that, they successfully connected with the special forces units, which by that time had already blocked and destroyed the rebels on the outskirts of Darzab. The goals and objectives of the first stage of the operation were fulfilled.

The second stage of the operation In the course of combing the bottom of the gorge, the forces of paratroopers and special forces were reunited. On February 2, units of the 103rd Airborne Division carried out tasks to provide cover for the site, from where all the forces and means involved in the operation departed for the Maiman airfield, and later on, military transport aircraft were transferred to Kabul.

However, the final stage of the operation went according to an unplanned scenario. After the departure of the main forces, units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division were waiting for evacuation by helicopter. But the weather intervened. The snow fell sharply. When the helicopters entered the area of ​​the operation to collect troops, they failed to land.

Since the units closest to the sites were at a distance of 80 km, in the current situation it was necessary to urgently regain control over the dominant heights and wait for the weather to evacuate. Closer to the night, the snow piled up to a meter level. The temperature dropped to minus 20 degrees. Meanwhile, the rebels, mistakenly assuming the departure of the SV, began to return to the "area", which made a fatal mistake.

Having run into an ambush of paratroopers, the rebels attempted a counterattack - in order to break through, but they did not succeed. The first few attacks of the rebels were repulsed. Having assessed the situation, the rebels pulled up mortars, and with a regularity of 20-30 minutes began to conduct continuous three-five-minute fire. "In ambush", the rebels lost more than 10 people killed. About 50 weapons were collected at the battle site.

During the operation "Base" was completely destroyed. "The defeat of the "impregnable Darzab" contributed to some stabilization of the situation in the northern provinces of the DRA, and reduced the activity of the opposition in the region."

"Krer" (Karera)

Krer - the base area (the Soviet military called "Karera") - the base area (fortification - a stronghold and transshipment base) of the Afghan Mujahideen of the "Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan" in the east of the Republic of Afghanistan. Under the leadership of the Mujahideen leader of the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. It is located to the east of the county center of Sarkani in the province of Kunar, on the border with Pakistan. In the mountainous region of the Gulpray (Gulprey) pass near the settlement of Mamunda, two bases "Shahid Abdul Latif" and "Fatha" were equipped. Both had access to Pakistan in the Bajar region. These bases were both strongholds and served as a major transshipment base in the province of Kunar. Proximity to Pakistan contributed to the rapid build-up of the base's forces from the adjacent territory.

It was equipped by the Afghan armed opposition in the early 1980s, twenty kilometers south of the administrative center of the Kunar province, the city of Asadabad, at the junction of the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to available intelligence, the garrison of the fortified area consisted of 80-100 militants belonging to the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan (ISLA), one of the seven most implacable opposition parties to the Kabul government. The fortified area was located on a high mountainous area (altitude about 2000 meters), the northern slopes and hollows of the gorges of which were covered with evergreen shrubs and forests, occupying the territory of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The main battle formations of the fortified area were strongholds, guard posts warning, equipped in engineering terms, located on the peaks and ridges of mountain ranges, connected by a single fire system, radio and telephone communications.

The garrison of the fortified area in the Afghan mountainous region "Krer" was represented by the regiment, with the commander Asadullah, a native of the village of Charkala in the province of Kunar. In 1978, he emigrated to Pakistan, where he studied at the ISOA military academy. The formation of Assadullah was part of the grouping of Osama bin Zeid, a major field commander and an ardent adherent of Islam. The regiment was in the ISOA society leader Rasul Sayaf (Abdul Rab Rasul Sayaf (Ustad)), (one of the seven parties of the Peshawar Seven union.

The operation to seize the UR "Krer"

At the end of March 1986, Soviet and Afghan troops attempted to capture the fortified area "Krer". The strength of the regiment in the garrison increased to 400 people due to reinforcements from neighboring Pakistan. “As a result of a ground-air operation in the fortified area of ​​Krer on March 28, 1986, Soviet troops destroyed 26 Mujahideen, destroyed military installations, but lost 42 people in the course of a fifteen-hour battle. On March 29-30, during the release of the base, the Mujahideen destroyed 70 Afghan and 50 Soviet servicemen. On March 29-31, during a two-day battle in the Krer gorge, the Mujahideen inflicted heavy damage on the Soviet troops, losing 42 people, but drove them out of the fortified area and captured three prisoners.

The “base” of the Mujahideen of the “Karera” fortified area was located in a remote area of ​​​​the Kunar region - the mountains, overgrown with forest, fettered the landing of helicopters, and the proximity of the Pakistani border helped to perfectly equip the base. It became a powerful fortified area with a developed network of underground communications, a plant for the production of cartridges and layered air defense. From the nearby mountains, the places of probable landings were well targeted. Two detachments (1st and 5th battalions) of the GRU special forces from Asadabad (334th OoSpN) and Jalalabad (154th OoSpN) took part in the March 1986 operation.

“During the capture of the Karera fortified area at the end of March 1986, the target itself was located in an extremely difficult high-mountainous wooded region of the Kunar Gorge, directly at the Pakistani border. It was well protected by engineering structures, equipped with cave shelters and numerous firing points, which required the concentration of forces from both special forces detachments from Jalalabad and Asadabad. It turned out on the spot that the approaches to the fortified area were protected by strongholds on neighboring heights, which also had considerable firepower.

During a fierce battle, reinforcements from neighboring units (camps) arrived to help the Krera Mujahideen. While waiting for air cover, the landing force used captured weapons in battle. The proximity of the border hampered the coordination of the authorities of the command to carry out an airstrike - by order of the aviation command it was forbidden to enter the border ten-kilometer zone. As a result, having suffered losses, the special forces units were taken by helicopters from the mountain peaks. Conditions for evacuation were unsatisfactory. Helicopters could not land to load the wounded and the bodies of the dead ..

Goshta is the base area (stronghold and transshipment base) of the Afghan Mujahideen (1979-1989) in the east of the Republic of Afghanistan in the province of Nangarhar on the border with Pakistan. From the fortified (base) areas in the north-west of the province of Nangahar - Goshta was captured and completely destroyed by the GRU special forces in January 1986.

"Goshta" was taken along with large trophies, including: three ZGU-1 anti-aircraft mountain installations, seven DShKs, three mortars and over 70 "barrels", including sniper weapons. Weapons and ammunition were taken out for two days, the rest were blown up and mined. The GRU special forces did not suffer losses in the operation.

The operation to seize the Goshta UR

“The operation of the 15th BRPN to capture in January 1986 a powerful fortified area near the n. Goshta, passed near the Pakistani border. The area had layered air defense, the shooters were experienced and competently built an attack on helicopters. The formation of 6 Mi-8MT was attacked by dense small arms fire and multiple grenade launchers that fired at self-destruction grenades and created a front of fire and shrapnel. Then the DShK opened fire on individual vehicles, and two helicopters were damaged, so the operation had to be curtailed and its implementation postponed to a later period. New forces were involved in the operation, aviation was reinforced by helicopters of the Bagram 335th ORP and Su-25 of the 378th OSHAP. On the morning of January 18, 18 Mi-24Ps delivered a massive strike; from the infantry, the head of the attack was the chief of staff of the 154th OSPN, Mr. D. Lyuty, who was on board one of the helicopters. From the Book "We attack from heaven" author Sergey Sergeev.

The operation to capture the Gosht was carried out with minimal losses. It was possible to destroy about 60 rebels, all warehouses with ammunition and equipment, capture as trophies three 14.5-mm ZPU-1 anti-aircraft machine gun mounts, seven 12.7-mm DShK machine guns, one 82-mm BO-82 recoilless rifle, three 82-mm mortar (all Chinese-made weapons) and over thirty small arms, including the American 7.62-mm M-21 sniper rifle, very rare in Afghanistan, as well as one Strela-2 MANPADS.

"Lurkoh"

Lurkoh is the base area of ​​the Afghan Mujahideen (1979-1989) in the province of Farah in the southwestern part of the Republic of Afghanistan. It was located south of the city of Shindand in the mountain range of the same name, in an unusual mountain-relief formation in a predominantly desert area, “rose among the plain with an impenetrable heap of rocks and gorges, occupying several tens of kilometers. The fortress created by nature itself was chosen by local gangs, creating a base camp there, from where they raided nearby roads and attacked military posts. The approaches to Lurkokh were protected by minefields, rocky fortifications, literally every break in the gorges and paths was covered by firing points. Taking advantage of invulnerability, the enemy began to use Lurkoh as a command post, where the leaders of the surrounding gangs gathered.

The "base", which haunted for more than a year and a half, "was made, as they say, with the latest engineering technology." Huge storages, concrete structures and shelters were equipped among the rocks. Tens of thousands of tons of fuel, food and ammunition could be hidden there. Everything that the dushmans got as a result of raids on roads - and not only Soviet columns, but also ordinary Afghans were attacked - was transported there. Dushmans were not particularly choosy in the choice of prey - we found there French glassware, containers with chemical fertilizers, and much more.

The armed formations used the geographic location of the massif, far from populated areas, away from inhabited places, garrisons, where the troops were limited to episodic military operations, and with their completion, the rebels returned to the "area". The military operations carried out against the “dushman base” did not bring success. At the cost of tangible losses, it was possible to enter the mountain ravines, but the enemy was not at all going to "fight to the death" to hold positions, under the pressure of the army, he dissolved in the adjacent mountains and returned to the abandoned caves, as soon as the troops retreated. It made no sense for the army to keep the object, where, in fact, there were no villages, and it was too expensive to leave outposts and posts there.

From the memoirs of the commander of the 5th MSD Boris Gromov: “This massif was an interesting and unusual place. On a completely bare plain, stone blocks rose within a radius of six kilometers. The largest peak was at an altitude of more than three kilometers above sea level. According to our and Afghan intelligence, in the center of the massif there was a large base with weapons, ammunition and food. The rebels there “were equipped with an impregnable camp, from where they raided the road along which our and Afghan columns continuously marched to Kandahar, as well as the location of the 70th separate infantry brigade. All approaches and radial gorges leading to the center of the mountain range were mined"

Operations to seize the UR "Lurkoh"

The command to capture the base area "Lurkokh" - at the initial stage, was carried out by Major General Yu. .V.Gromov. The duration of the operation was more than four weeks.

Divisional Commander Gromov B.V. received reports from officers who had a thorough knowledge of the situation around "Lurkoh". Their position was that it was inexpedient to move deep into the mountain range in order to avoid a head-on clash. It was proposed to mine all the entrances and exits to the gorges, enclosing the rebels in a bag to keep them constantly under the influence of artillery and aircraft. The command of the Armed Forces of the DRA had a different opinion: they proposed to make a powerful breakthrough in depth, destroy the "base", and send the SV forward.

The stronghold and transit point in Lurkoh had to be liquidated. However, in the course of another attempt to advance deep into the mountain range, the units encountered stubborn, desperate resistance from the rebels. Apparently. The base, apparently, was equipped a long time ago, and with a perspective: huge stocks of ammunition and food allowed the rebels to hold out for a long time. To capture "Lurkoh", it was necessary to clear all the prudently targeted points of the gorge. It was extremely difficult to do this without loss. Movement along the mountain ranges, to capture the dominant heights, was stopped by oncoming heavy fire.

The landing in "Lurkoh", due to the numerical and positional advantages, in favor of the rebels, was inappropriate. The forces of artillery, called for preliminary processing by strikes on the slopes - in order to exclude the loss of foot groups, were not enough. At the current stage, the SV did not have the necessary number of helicopters and front-line aviation for landing, as well as forces (aviation) covering helicopters. One of the main problems was also the lack of proper communication for commanding the landing in the mountains, especially when descending into the gorge. The loss of contact with the foot groups was tantamount to their death.

At the current stage, the SVs have not yet been equipped with aviation complexes with radio repeaters, those that later hung in the air during each of the hostilities. If the units of the SV had imposed a fight on the rebels, it would have led to great casualties. ” Based on this, it was decided not to carry out the operation inside the "Lurkoh", but to limit itself to only the chosen measures: the approaches to the mountain range were mined, the gorges were treated with artillery. Reinforced barriers were set up between the Lurkokha rocks and the road to intercept the rebels. It took five days, after which the units of the division returned to the barracks. A few months later, the base in Lurkoha again began to remind of itself.

The death of General Khakhalov

General Khakhalov arrived in the DRA, arrived in the area of ​​​​the military operation on the orders of the Air Force Commander-in-Chief, Air Marshal P.S. Kugakhov, in order to check the effectiveness of the use of Su-25 attack aircraft in the mountain range. “There was a serious struggle for non-fulfilment of this order, since, according to Kutakhov’s plan, after each bombing and assault strike from the air, motorized rifle units had to go to the center of Lurkokh in order to make sure that yes, the aviation had reached its goal.”

For several days, General Khakhalov was in the vicinity of Lurkoh. The command of the operation in every possible way prevented his initiative to fly around the mountain range. Taking advantage of the temporary absence of the divisional commander, General B. Gromov, when his deputy was in charge of the hostilities, despite persistent advice not to do this, he flew in two helicopters over the mountain gorges into the depths of the Lurkokh.

“Khakhalov never returned from there. The helicopter was shot down by the rebels and crashed near their base.” After the emergency, the command of the 5th MSD was forced to "with fierce battles make their way through the mountains and ridges, along the bottom of two gorges to the center of the mountain range." A swift operation was carried out in order to pick up the bodies of the general and crew members, so as not to leave them for reproach. When they reached the center of Lurkokh and finally took possession of this fortified area, not far from the base they found the wreckage of a downed helicopter and the remains of officers. "They were scary to look at..."

“The dushmans brutally mocked the bodies of the general, and he was in uniform, and the helicopter pilots - they gouged out their eyes, cut off their ears ...” It took a week to complete the operation. Eight people were killed during the fighting. “The base was destroyed, especially strong structures were blown up, the entire “district” was mined again, and they left it. This completed the operation." Much later, Lurkoh again came to the attention of the command of the 40th Army. “The gangs operating there reminded of themselves at the end of 1985. In response to the attacks of the rebels, a series of massive bombing and assault air strikes were inflicted, after which Lurkoh no longer caused much concern.

"Vasatichignai"

Vasatichignai fortified region of the UR - the base area (stronghold and transit point) of the Afghan Mujahideen (1979-1989) in the south of the Republic of Afghanistan in the province of Kandahar on the border with Pakistan. Equipped in a mountain range seventy kilometers east of Kandahar, in spurs stretching "along the Kandahar-Kabul highway" for fifteen kilometers. south of the concrete in the depths of one of the gorges of the ridge. The base area "Vasatichignai" is a key stronghold and transshipment base "in the system of escorting caravans on the routes of the central direction in the provinces of Kandahar and Zabul." The base area was under the control of field commander Abdul Rezak.

A brief description of the base area: “The entrance to the gorge was covered by two hills - strongholds of the defense system. On the tops were equipped with firing positions for heavy machine guns. Trenches were cut in the rocky ground, stones were laid in several rows along the parapet, poured with concrete on top for reinforcement. Between the hills is the entrance to the base area "Vasatichignai". The gorge is long, winding, in some places it narrows to ten meters. The road is well rolled on a high embankment. A steep slope stretched along the left side of the road, and a mountain stream shimmered under the steep bank on the right.

Operation to capture the UR "Vasatichignai"

Units were involved in capturing the Vasatichignai base area: the 70th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 70th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Kandahar), “including the reconnaissance company of the 70th Motorized Rifle Brigade, an airborne assault battalion, a tank battalion and units of cannon and rocket artillery” ; GRU special forces detachments: 173rd OoSpn (Kandahar) and 370th OoSpn (Lashkargah)); ground attack aircraft and heavy artillery. The operation was carried out under the overall command of Lieutenant General Gusev.

After careful collection of information, study of aerial photography data, an operation plan was developed, the route for the movement of forces and means of the 70th Motorized Rifle Brigade to the "object" was outlined. The officers of the DRA Armed Forces found in their ranks a serviceman who had previously lived in the village of Vasatichignai, who specified the location of important infrastructure facilities in the base area: the organization of security and defense; air defense system; notification scheme; also the probable course of action in the event of an attack by the SV. It was possible to establish: the number of the rebel detachment, permanently located at the base, is one hundred and fifty people; the gang leader's name is Abdul Rezak.

“The terrain is very rugged, there is no road. Dust raised by machinery makes observation difficult. The surrounding hills are cut by deep ravines. The route is extremely difficult. Cars, winding between the hills, make their way forward. Suddenly, a cannonade of explosions is heard ahead in the direction of travel. A bombing and assault strike began, preceding the landing of assault groups. For half an hour aviation works on the slopes of the ridge in which the base area is located.

The base area was captured and destroyed. During the operation, the parties suffered losses in manpower and equipment.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Long after February 1989, Afghan field commanders recalled attacks by Soviet special forces. The fighters of the GRU elite destroyed the Mujahideen caravans and bases, reducing the losses of the main military contingent to the lowest possible numbers.

Read also: Reports from the militia of Novorossia today

Amine

A year after the April Revolution (1978) in Afghanistan, a fierce struggle for power began between the first General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee Nur Mohammad Taraki and Afghan Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin. The point of no return was Taraki's plot against Amin, which nearly cost the Prime Minister his life. It happened in September 1979.
Having lured a political opponent to their residence under the security guarantees of the Soviet ambassador Puzanov, the guards of the PDPA Secretary General opened heavy fire on the arriving Taraki delegation, killing almost all of his bodyguards. The head of government managed to escape, after which, on his orders, the Kabul garrison of General Yakub took control of the residence of the Secretary General. Despite protests from the Kremlin, on October 9 of the same year, Mohammad Taraki was finished. He was strangled by Captain Abdul Hadud, a man from Amin's secret police.
Moscow clearly did not like this state of affairs, and yet the main argument in favor of eliminating the new Afghan leader was the total repression against Taraki's supporters and enemies of "April 1978". The fact is that Amin was a Maoist to the core and, moreover, a Pashtun nationalist. The mass executions and burying alive of opponents of the revolution that took place in Afghanistan in the autumn and early winter of 1979 clearly harmed the image of socialism.

Islamic guerrillas

Operation Storm, as a result of which Amin was killed, was brilliantly carried out by the Soviet special forces. However, the civil strife did not stop, since the confrontation between Amin and Taraki was only part of the civil war that broke out after the April revolution.

The entry of a limited military contingent of the Soviet Army only added fuel to the fire. According to historians, the Afghans saw in this action a continuation of the Anglo-Afghan wars of the 19th-20th centuries. At first, the Mujahideen fought mainly with outdated Lee-Enfield rifles, but two years later modern Western weapons began to enter the partisan detachments. Soon, the most combat-ready forces of the Mujahideen concentrated in the 200-kilometer-long Panjshir Valley, which since 1980 has housed the Islamic Society of Afghanistan, field commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, a smart and cruel man.

It was he who organized numerous attacks on transport convoys plying along the Hairatan-Kabul road. The Afghan partisans managed to inflict significant damage on the supply of units of the 40th Soviet Army and directly on the capital. In addition, the Mujahideen were active in the Bagram Valley, regularly shelling the airfield of Soviet aviation stationed there.

Special forces go into battle

Major military operations against the militants gave only a temporary effect. Two battalions of special forces were sent to Afghanistan for the targeted fight against partisans. One is from the Central Asian, the second from the Turkestan military districts.
In the spring of 1982, the commandos settled in the village of Rukh and began to fight against the Mujahideen.

Significant losses on the part of the detachments of Ahmad Shah forced the field commander to agree to a truce with the employees of the GRU of the Soviet Army. Interestingly, the Mujahideen agreed not to touch only Soviet soldiers, reserving the right to attack government troops. However, Ahmad Shah told his subordinates that he was acting according to the laws of jihad, according to which the kafer must be deceived in order to then be killed.

Afghan counter-ambushes

After an agreement with Dr. Masud, the special forces were sent to another place - to Gulbahar, where they were assigned an extensive area of ​​​​responsibility, which included Kabul, Kapisa, Parvan, Wardak. It was a difficult time for our soldiers, since the Afghan guerrillas, not without the help of American military specialists, mastered the tactics of anti-ambush actions.

Receiving information about where the Soviet special forces planned to ambush caravans, the militants worked ahead of the curve. So, on January 14, 1984, in the Sorubi district, militants of field commander Abdul Khak killed and wounded several dozen soldiers from the Jalalabad battalion of the GRU.

Mujahideen fighters

Soon, conclusions were drawn from bitter experience, the GRU grouping was strengthened. During the period from 1984 to 1985, six more special forces battalions arrived in Afghanistan, which were located along the borders with Iran and Pakistan.

The training of fighters has also increased. The command staff mainly consisted of graduates of the Ryazan Airborne School, as well as intelligence faculties of other schools. The leadership of the GRU chose the only true practice - it gave the officers the right to hunt without undue coordination.

The result was not long in coming. For example, at the end of 1984, fighters of the Jalalabad battalion ambushed Pashtunistan, which had never had Europeans before. As a result, a column of 220 militants was completely destroyed.

After 1985, about 20% of all caravans never reached the bases of the Mujahideen. The partisans had to take every precaution, which reduced the intensity of supplies. Sometimes Soviet special operations led to unexpected results. On September 18, 1985, in one of these battles, the soldiers of Senior Lieutenant Krivenko near the village of Takhsildar killed an armed American Thornton, who ended up in a Mujahideen caravan. Thus, the world learned about the active participation of US citizens on the side of the Islamists.

mission Impossible

The European publication Militarishe Rundschau, following the results of the Afghan war, wrote that “operations carried out by special forces units in many border areas, combined with bombing and mining, crossed out the ability of the Mujahideen to carry out the supply of weapons using caravans inland with the impunity that they reveled in the first period of the war ".

At the same time, the level of losses of the Soviet army during the almost ten-year war is considered the highest achievement, taking into account the vast territory and mountainous terrain. According to official figures, we are talking about 15 thousand soldiers and officers who died in that military mission. However, there are some experts who are sure that the Soviet Union could have solved all the tasks set if it were not for the active assistance to the Islamists from the Western powers, primarily the United States.