The signing of the treaty of alliance between England and Japan. Britain in the Russo-Japanese War

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1. MANCHURIAAndKOREAAFTERSino-Japanese War

Having won a victory over China in 1895, the ruling circles of Japan sought to strengthen their presence in Korea. Therefore, the end of the Sino-Japanese war gradually developed into preparations for a new war, this time with Russia. The Japanese hoped to oust Russia from Korea and Manchuria, finally secure the Liaodong Peninsula for themselves and, if they were lucky, seize Russian territories in the Far East and regain Sakhalin, which was slipping literally from under their noses.

Russia continued its territorial acquisitions. Northern China and Korea were in the zone of Russian interests.

In 1895, taking advantage of the fact that China needed money to pay indemnity to Japan, Russian diplomats and Finance Minister S. Yu Witte agreed on a French loan for China and the creation of a Russian-Chinese bank, in whose management the Russian Ministry of Finance played a decisive role. At the same time, it was decided to start building a section of the Siberian railway on Chinese territory.

A lot of diplomatic work has been done. The first step was the creation of a special fund of the Russian-Chinese bank, serving the bribery of top Chinese officials. The second step was the signing in Moscow in June 1896 of an agreement "on a defensive alliance against Japan." For the implementation of "military assistance" to Russia, a concession was granted for the construction of a railway through Manchuria to Vladivostok (the agreement was signed on September 8, 1896). At the insistence of the Chinese side, the concession was formally transferred not to the Russian government, but to the Russian-Chinese Bank, which, in order to implement it, created the “Society of the Chinese Eastern Railway”.

The signing of this agreement made it possible to prevent a foreign presence in Manchuria and to tie the economy of eastern China to the Siberian railway.

Simultaneously with the advance in Manchuria, Russia also achieved success in Korea. On May 14, 1896, under an agreement signed in Seoul, Japan and Russia received the right to maintain their troops in Korea, and an agreement signed in Moscow on June 9 of the same year recognized mutually equal rights for both powers in this country.

Having founded the Russian-Korean Bank and sent military instructors and a financial adviser to Seoul, the Russian government at first actually acquired greater political significance in Korea. However, Japan, having received the support of England, began to oust Russia. The Russian government was forced to recognize Japan's predominant economic interests in Korea, close the Russian-Korean Bank and recall its financial adviser to the Korean king. This was the first major concession to Japan by Russia.

“We have clearly placed Korea under Japanese dominance,” This is how Witte assessed the situation.

2. ASRUSSIANGOODTO PORT ARTHUR

Taking advantage of the complete inability of the Chinese government to defend its territories, on November 14, 1897, the Germans captured Jiaozhou (Qingdao). Russia enjoyed the advantage of anchorage in Jiangzhou. And Kaiser Wilhelm II offered Russia a compromise. Germany will not object to the Russian capture of Port Arthur if Russia does not object to the capture of Jiaozhou.

Soon (in December 1897), Russian ships anchored in Port Arthur, and in March 1898 an agreement was concluded with China on the lease of the Liaodong Peninsula, the occupation of the leased territory by Russian troops and the granting of a concession for the construction of a branch line from the Chinese Eastern Railway to Port -Arthur and Far.

In turn, the ruling circles of Japan accelerated preparations for a new, wider expansion, hoping to complete this preparation before Russia completed the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway. “The war became inevitable,” General Kuropatkin later wrote, “but we did not realize this, we did not properly prepare for it.”

MISSION OF ITO In June 1901, the comparatively moderate cabinet of Prime Minister Ito resigned in Japan. Extreme militarists, represented by members of the Katsura cabinet, came to power. That same summer, the Japanese government resumed negotiations with England on an alliance.

Convinced once again of the indecisiveness of their British friends, the Japanese government undertook a roundabout diplomatic maneuver in the fall. It sent to St. Petersburg former Prime Minister Marquis Ito, a well-known opponent of the war with Russia. He was instructed to begin negotiations there on a Russo-Japanese agreement.

Russian politicians and the tsar himself gave the Marquis of Ito more than a royal reception. They spoke to him about political questions in the Far East and took an extremely benevolent position.

Marquis Ito was told that Russia's main interest in Korea was freedom of navigation in the Tsushima Strait. It was also added that if this condition was accepted, Russia would not hesitate to recognize Japan's supreme political and commercial interests in Korea.

True, while recognizing Japan's right to send its troops into Korea, the Russian government demanded that the number of these troops and the duration of their stay in Korea be limited and "that Korea should not be used for strategic purposes."

In addition, these troops could not cross a certain zone near the Russian-Korean border. In exchange, recognition of Russian predominance in Manchuria and other areas of China adjacent to the Russian border was required.

More precisely, the Russians insisted that the Japanese refrain from any interference in these matters, leaving their settlement entirely to Russia and China. The Russian government tempted the Japanese that, if they agreed to the proposed terms, it would arrange a large financial loan in Paris.

Ito advised his government to conclude an agreement with Russia, but the militaristic leaders of Japan, Yamagato and Katsuro, starting negotiations with St. Petersburg, did not at all strive to complete them. The mission of Marquis Ito was for them only a means of putting pressure on England: the fear of a Russo-Japanese deal was supposed to induce England to overcome the last hesitation and conclude an alliance with Japan for the war against Russia.

3. ANGLO-JAPANESE TREATY

The maneuver of the Japanese military party was crowned with success: on January 30, 1902, England and Japan signed an alliance treaty.

In its first article, both sides recognized one after another the right to intervene in the internal affairs of China and Korea and protect their interests "if they are threatened either by the aggressive actions of any other power, or by the unrest that has arisen in China and Korea."

The second article obliged each of the parties to observe strict neutrality in the event that the other side, defending its interests in China or Korea, found itself in a state of war with a third power. In the event of a war between one of the allies and two or more powers, the agreement (according to Article 3) obliged the other contracting party to provide him with military assistance:

The Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance was a major victory for Japanese foreign policy. He gave Japan the opportunity to start a war with Russia, having the confidence that no power would provide Russia with armed support for fear of a war not only with Japan, but also with England. At the same time, England also provided financial assistance to Japan.

Russian diplomacy immediately turned to France with a proposal to jointly come up with a response to the Anglo-Japanese alliance. France did not approve of the diversion of Russian forces to the Far East.

Nevertheless, she agreed that on March 20, 1902, both allied governments published a common declaration. It read: “Being compelled to take into account the possibility of hostile actions by other powers or a repetition of unrest in China, both allied governments reserve the right to take care in such cases of taking measures necessary to protect their interests.”

This declaration was of a non-binding nature. France did not provide significant assistance to its ally in the Far East.

As a result of the Anglo-Japanese treaty, England was able to deliver a serious blow to Russia with the help of Japan and, in addition, to a certain extent, increase its influence in Europe in the struggle against a new rival, Germany. war treaty gun battleship

The ruling circles of the United States of America also hoped, with the help of Japan, to weaken Russia's influence in the Far East and to strengthen their own influence in China (particularly in Manchuria) and Korea.

To this end, the Americans were prepared to provide Japan with far-reaching support. In turn, Germany, seeking to undermine or weaken the alliance between Russia and France, as well as free its hands in Europe and create more favorable conditions for its penetration into the Middle East, secretly encouraged both Russia and Japan to war against each other.

Thus, the planned war against Russia was in the interests not only of Japan, but of England, the United States of America and Germany.

In the summer of 1901, the Russian government resumed negotiations with China on the Manchu question, gradually abandoning its original claims. On April 8, 1902, a Russian-Chinese agreement was signed, according to which Russia undertook to withdraw its troops from Manchuria in three steps within 18 months.

The only thing Russian diplomacy managed to insist on was the reservation that the evacuation of troops could be stopped by unrest in Manchuria or by the same actions of foreign powers that would not allow Russia to withdraw its troops.

At the end of the summer of 1902, the Japanese government, as if in continuation of the mission of Ito, proposed to the Russian government the following agreement: Russia recognizes the Japanese protectorate over Korea, in exchange Japan recognizes for Russia in Manchuria only freedom of action, in the sense of protecting the Russian railways there. This proposal in St. Petersburg was considered unsatisfactory.

Just at this time, a court group led by Bezobrazov began to exert a great influence on Nicholas II. This group urged Nicholas II not to leave Manchuria contrary to the agreement concluded with China. Moreover, not content with Manchuria, the tsar was incited to penetrate into Korea, in which, since 1898, Russia had actually tolerated the predominant influence of Japan.

Bezobrazov and people close to him acquired a private forest concession in Korea. The territory of the concession covered the basins of two rivers: the Yalu and the Tumen, and stretched for 800 kilometers along the Sino-Korean and Russian-Korean borders from the Gulf of Korea to the Sea of ​​Japan. In short, it occupied the entire border zone. Formally, the concession was acquired by a private joint-stock company. In fact, behind him was the tsarist government, which, under the guise of forest guards, brought troops into the concession.

Trying to penetrate into Korea, the Russian government delayed the evacuation of troops from Manchuria, although the deadlines set by the agreement on April 8, 1902, had already passed. Meanwhile, Russia's military training in the Far East lagged far behind its political plans.

AN ATTEMPT FOR AN ENGLISH-RUSSIAN RAPPROACH With the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, England finally found with whose hands she should beat her Russian rival. Shortly thereafter, on May 31, 1902, England made peace with the Transvaal.

It was no longer necessary for England to maintain relations with her most dangerous adversary, Germany, at all costs.

At the same time, the second German naval program opened the eyes of many British people to the fact that it was Germany that posed the most serious threat to England. Negotiations for an Anglo-German alliance ceased. British imperialism was preparing to enter into an open struggle with the German rival.

In the face of a powerful enemy, England began to seek reconciliation with Russia and France. Having ascended the English throne after the death of Queen Victoria, Edward VII was a well-known supporter of the Anglo-Russian rapprochement. Having secured an alliance with Japan, British diplomacy made a new attempt to negotiate with Russia.

King Edward believed that the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance frightened the tsarist government. He expected that Russia would now show more compliance.

The main knot of Anglo-Russian contradictions was not at all in Manchuria. England was interested in Manchuria only because it could serve as a springboard from which it was easy for Russia to rush to the Chinese capital, and then to the rest of China.

Provided that Russia did not go further than Manchuria, England was even ready to recognize the special interests and special position of Russia in this region, subject to the principle of "open doors" for British trade. British diplomacy brought this to the attention of Petersburg.

In exchange, she insistently sought Russia's renunciation of direct diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, established in 1901. She also wanted Russia to recognize Tibet as being outside its sphere of influence. Finally, she sought to include southern Iran in the sphere of influence of England.

All these attempts by England amounted to encircling the Indian frontier with a belt of buffer territories subject to British control. England was ready to recognize northern Iran as a sphere of influence of Russia.

The Russian government did not want to either break with Afghanistan or give part of Iran to the British. The Russian government considered the British proposals unacceptable. But it was ready to continue negotiations, and they were carried on throughout 1903.

At the beginning of the next year, negotiations were interrupted by a Japanese surprise attack on Russia.

4. ON THEBORDERCLOUDSWALKHMURO

By 1904, Japan was ready for action. Without dominance at sea, the Japanese could not successfully fortify themselves on the mainland, therefore, first of all, they needed to destroy the Russian Pacific Fleet and capture its Port Arthur base, located at the tip of the Liaodong Peninsula in Manchuria. The first part of the Japanese war plan was to blockade Port Arthur by land and sea, capture it and destroy the Port Arthur squadron. The second part of the Japanese plan was to destroy the Russian ground forces in Manchuria, and thereby force Russia to abandon the further continuation of hostilities. The Japanese knew very well that the Russians had the only supply line - the Trans-Siberian Railway, which was a single-line highway, 8,850 km long, connecting Moscow with Port Arthur, and a 160-kilometer gap in this route in the area of ​​​​Lake Baikal The crossing of the wagons was carried out by two icebreaker ferries.) significantly exacerbated the rear problems. Despite the huge number of people the largest Russian army in the world, together with 3 million trained reserve troops, totaled 4.5 million people), in the east of Lake Baikal, the Russians could simultaneously place only two corps with a total number of 98 thousand people with 148 guns and 8 machine guns, and these forces were scattered over the vast territory of Manchuria, Primorye and Transbaikalia.

The number of security guards of the Trans-Siberian Railway reached 24 thousand people. Having gained superiority at sea, the Japanese were able to quickly land on the mainland and oppose these forces with their entire army, consisting of 283 thousand people with 820 guns, and also soon reinforce it with a reserve of 100 thousand trained fighters. The Russian Navy in the Far East consisted of 7 "squadron battleships": "Tsesarevich", "Retvizan", "Peresvet", "Victory", "Sevastopol", "Petropavlovsk", "Poltava"; 4 armored cruisers: "Bayan", "Russia", "Gromoboy", "Rurik" (the last three were based in Vladivostok); 5 armored cruisers: "Bogatyr" (based on Vladivostok), "Varyag" (stationary in Chemulpo), "Pallada", "Diana", "Askold"; 2 light cruisers: "Novik", "Boyarin"; 27 destroyers, 10 destroyers, 2 minelayers, 3 gunboats and 5 auxiliary ships. Almost all warships met international standards for their classes. Of the battleships, the Tsesarevich and Retvizan were the newest and most powerful ships. "Peresvet" and "Victory" belonged to the class of lightweight battleships of the cruising type - with 254 mm main battery guns and a large radius of action. The bulk of the fleet (1st Pacific Squadron and part of the Siberian Flotilla under the command of Vice Admiral Otto Wilhelmovich Stark) was based in Port Arthur; two cruisers were in the Korean port of Chemulpo and 4 more (Vladivostok detachment of cruisers under the command of Vice Admiral P.A. Bezobrazov) in Vladivostok.

The main naval force of the Japanese was 6 of the same type of the latest squadron battleships armed with 12-inch (305-mm) guns. In addition, their fleet included an older battleship, 8 armored cruisers, 12 light cruisers, 27 destroyers, 19 small destroyers and auxiliary ships (80 pennants in total). In general, the Japanese army and navy, not having a great material advantage, were noticeably superior to the Russian forces in tactics and training, and also had better command.

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The history of the end of the Second World War is interesting.

As you know, on August 6, 1945, the US Air Force dropped a nuclear bomb on Hiroshima, and then on August 9, 1945, on Nagasaki. The plans were to drop several more bombs, the third of which would be ready by August 17-18 and would have been dropped if such an order had been given by Truman. Tom did not have to solve the dilemma, since on August 14-15 the Japanese government announced its surrender.

Soviet and Russian citizens, of course, know that by dropping nuclear bombs, the Americans committed a war crime, purely to scare Stalin, and the Americans and the Japanese - that they forced Japan to capitulate in World War II, which saved at least a million human lives, mostly military and Japanese civilians, and, of course, allied soldiers, mostly Americans.

Imagine for a moment, did the Americans scare Stalin with a nuclear bomb, even if they suddenly set such a goal? The answer is obvious - no. The USSR entered the war with Japan only on August 8, 1945, i.e. 2 days after the bombing of Hiroshima. The date of May 8 is not accidental. At the Yalta Conference on February 4-11, 1945, Stalin promised that the USSR would go to war with Japan 2-3 months after the end of the war with Germany, with which [Japan] had a neutrality pact concluded on April 13, 1941 (see. the main events of World War II according to the author of this LJ). Thus, Stalin fulfilled his promise on the last day of the promised 2-3 months after the surrender of Germany, but immediately after the bombing of Hiroshima. Whether he fulfilled this promise or not without it is an interesting question, perhaps historians have an answer to it, but I do not know.

So, Japan announced its surrender on August 14-15, but this did not lead to the end of hostilities against the USSR. The Soviet army continued to advance in Manchuria. Again, it is obvious to Soviet and Russian citizens that hostilities continued because the Japanese army refused to surrender because some did not reach the surrender order, and some ignored it. The question is, of course, what would happen if the Soviet army stopped offensive operations after August 14-15. Would this lead to the surrender of the Japanese and save about 10 thousand lives of Soviet soldiers?

As is known, between Japan and the USSR, and after Russia, there is still no peace treaty. The problem of a peace treaty is linked to the so-called "northern territories" or the disputed islands of the Lesser Kuril Ridge.

Let's start. Under the cut, a Google earth image of the territory of Hokkaido (Japan) and now Russian territories to the north - Sakhalin, the Kuriles and Kamchatka. The Kuril Islands are divided into the Big Ridge, which includes large and small islands from Shumshu in the north to Kunashir in the south, and the Small Ridge, which includes Shikotan in the north to the islands of the Habomai group in the south (limited in the diagram by white lines).

From the blog

To understand the problem of disputed territories, let's plunge into the deaf history of the development of the Far East by the Japanese and Russians. Before those and others, local Ainu and other nationalities lived there, whose opinion, according to the good old tradition, does not bother anyone because of their almost complete disappearance (Ainu) and / or Russification (Kamchadals). The Japanese were the first to enter these territories. First they came to Hokkaido, and by 1637 they had mapped Sakhalin and the Kuriles.


From the blog

Later, Russians came to these places, drew up maps and dates, and in 1786 Catherine II declared the Kuriles her possessions. Sakhalin thus remained a draw.


From the blog

In 1855, namely on February 7, an agreement was signed between Japan and Russia, according to which Urup and the islands of the Great Kuril ridge to the north went to Russia, and Iturup and the islands to the south, including all the islands of the Lesser Kuril ridge - to Japan. Sakhalin, in modern terms, was a disputed possession. True, due to the small number of Japanese and Russian populations, the issue was not so serious at the state level, except that merchants had problems.


From the blog

In 1875, the issue of Sakhalin was settled in St. Petersburg. Sakhalin passed completely to Russia, in return Japan received all the Kuril Islands.


From the blog

In 1904, the Russo-Japanese War began in the Far East, in which Russia was defeated, and as a result, in 1905, the southern part of Sakhalin passed to Japan. In 1925 the USSR recognizes this state of affairs. After there were all sorts of minor skirmishes, but the status quo lasted until the end of World War II.


From the blog

Finally, at the Yalta Conference on February 4-11, 1945, Stalin discussed the issue of the Far East with the Allies. I repeat, he promised that the USSR would enter the war with Japan after the victory over Germany, which was already just around the corner, but in return the USSR would return Sakhalin, as illegally conquered by Japan during the war of 1905, and would receive the Kuriles, though in an indefinite amount.

And here the most interesting begins in the context of the Kuril Islands.

On August 16-23, with fighting, the Soviet Army defeats the Japanese grouping in the Northern Kuriles (Shumshu). On August 27-28, without a fight, since the Japanese surrendered, the Soviet Army takes Urup. On September 1, there is a landing on Kunashir and Shikotan, the Japanese do not offer any resistance.


From the blog

September 2, 1945 Japan signs its surrender - World War II is officially over. And here comes the Crimean operation to seize the islands of the Lesser Kuril Ridge, located south of Shikotan, known as the Habomai Islands.

The war is over, and the Soviet land continues to grow with native Japanese islands. Moreover, I never found when Tanfilyev Island (a completely deserted and flat piece of land off the very coast of Hokkaido) became ours. But it is certain that in 1946 a frontier post was organized there, which became a well-known massacre, which was staged by two Russian border guards in 1994.


From the blog

As a result, Japan does not recognize the seizure of its "northern territories" by the USSR and does not recognize that these territories have passed to Russia as the legal successor of the USSR. February 7 (according to the date of the agreement with Russia in 1855) celebrates the day of the Northern Territories, which, according to the agreement of 1855, include all the islands south of Urup.

An attempt (unsuccessful) to solve this problem was made in 1951 in San Francisco. Japan, under this treaty, must renounce any claims to Sakhalin and the Kuriles, with the exception of Shikotan and the Habomai group. The USSR did not sign the treaty. The United States signed the treaty with the proviso: It is envisaged that the terms of the Treaty will not mean the recognition for the USSR of any rights or claims in the territories that belonged to Japan on December 7, 1941, which would prejudice the rights and legal foundations of Japan in these territories, nor will any however there were provisions in favor of the USSR with respect to Japan contained in the Yalta Agreement.»

Soviet comments on the treaty:

Gromyko's (USSR Foreign Minister) remark on the treaty: The Soviet delegation has already drawn the attention of the conference to the inadmissibility of such a situation when the draft peace treaty with Japan does not say that Japan should recognize the sovereignty of the Soviet Union over South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. The project is in gross contradiction with the obligations in respect of these territories undertaken by the United States and Britain under the Yalta Agreement. http://www.hrono.ru/dokum/195_dok/19510908gromy.php

In 1956, the USSR promised Japan to return Shikotan and the Habomai group if Japan did not lay claim to Kunashir and Iturup. Whether the Japanese agreed with this or not, opinions differ. We say yes - Shikotan and Habomai are yours, and Kunashir and Iturup are ours. The Japanese say that everything south of Urup is theirs.

UPD Declaration text: At the same time, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting the wishes of Japan and taking into account the interests of the Japanese state, agrees to the transfer of the Habomai Islands and the Shikotan Islands to Japan, however, that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan will be made after the conclusion.

The Japanese then played back (like under pressure from the Americans), linking together all the islands south of Urup.

I do not want to predict how history will unfold further, but most likely Japan will take advantage of ancient Chinese wisdom and wait until all the disputed islands sail to them themselves. The only question is whether they will stop at the 1855 treaty or go further to the 1875 treaty.

____________________________

Shinzo Abe announced that he would annex the disputed islands of the South Kuril chain to Japan. “I will solve the problem of the northern territories and conclude a peace treaty. As a politician, as a prime minister, I want to achieve this at all costs,” he promised his compatriots.

According to Japanese tradition, Shinzo Abe will have to do hara-kiri if he does not keep his word. It is quite possible that Vladimir Putin will help the Japanese prime minister live to a ripe old age and die a natural death.

In my opinion, everything goes to the fact that the long-standing conflict will be settled. The time to establish decent relations with Japan was chosen very well - for the empty hard-to-reach lands, which their former owners now and then look nostalgically, you can get a lot of material benefits from one of the most powerful economies in the world. And the lifting of sanctions as a condition for the transfer of the islands is far from the only and not the main concession, which, I am sure, our Foreign Ministry is now seeking.

So the quite expected surge of quasi-patriotism of our liberals, directed at the Russian president, should be prevented.

I have already had to analyze in detail the history of the islands of Tarabarov and Bolshoy Ussuriysky on the Amur, the loss of which Moscow snobs cannot come to terms with. The post also discussed the dispute with Norway over maritime territories, which was also settled.

I also touched upon the secret negotiations between the human rights activist Lev Ponomarev and the Japanese diplomat about the "northern territories", filmed on video and posted online. Generally speaking, one of this video it is enough for our caring citizens to bashfully swallow the return of the islands to Japan, if it takes place. But since concerned citizens will definitely not keep silent, we must understand the essence of the problem.

background

February 7, 1855 - Shimoda Treatise on Commerce and Frontiers. The now disputed islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the Habomai group of islands have been ceded to Japan (therefore, February 7 is annually celebrated in Japan as Northern Territories Day). The question of the status of Sakhalin remained unresolved.

May 7, 1875 - Petersburg Treaty. Japan transferred the rights to all 18 Kuril Islands in exchange for the entire Sakhalin.

August 23, 1905 - Treaty of Portsmouth following the results of the Russo-Japanese War. Russia ceded the southern part of Sakhalin.

February 11, 1945 - Yalta Conference. The USSR, USA and Great Britain reached a written agreement on the entry of the Soviet Union into the war with Japan on the condition that South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands be returned to it after the end of the war.

On February 2, 1946, on the basis of the Yalta Agreements, the Yuzhno-Sakhalin Region was created in the USSR - on the territory of the southern part of Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Islands. On January 2, 1947, it was merged with the Sakhalin Oblast of the Khabarovsk Territory, which expanded to the borders of the modern Sakhalin Oblast.

Japan enters the Cold War

On September 8, 1951, the Peace Treaty between the Allied Powers and Japan was signed in San Francisco. Regarding the now disputed territories, it says the following: "Japan renounces all rights, titles and claims to the Kuril Islands and to that part of Sakhalin Island and the islands adjacent to it, sovereignty over which Japan acquired under the Portsmouth Treaty of September 5, 1905."

The USSR sent a delegation to San Francisco headed by Deputy Foreign Minister A. Gromyko. But not in order to sign a document, but to voice their position. We formulated the mentioned clause of the treaty as follows: “Japan recognizes the full sovereignty of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics over the southern part of Sakhalin Island with all the islands adjacent to it and the Kuril Islands and renounces all rights, titles and claims to these territories.”

Of course, in our wording, the treaty is specific and more in line with the spirit and letter of the Yalta agreements. However, the Anglo-American version was adopted. The USSR did not sign it, Japan did.

Today, some historians believe that the USSR should have signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty in the form in which it was proposed by the Americans - this would strengthen our negotiating position. “We should have signed a contract. I don’t know why we didn’t do this - perhaps because of vanity or pride, but above all, because Stalin overestimated his capabilities and the degree of his influence on the United States, ”N.S. wrote in his memoirs .Khrushchev. But soon, as we shall see later, he himself made a mistake.

From today's standpoint, the lack of a signature under the notorious treaty is sometimes considered almost a diplomatic failure. However, the international situation of that time was much more complicated and was not limited to the Far East. Perhaps, what seems to someone a loss, in those conditions became a necessary measure.

Japan and sanctions

It is sometimes erroneously believed that since we do not have a peace treaty with Japan, we are in a state of war. However, this is not at all the case.

On December 12, 1956, a ceremony for the exchange of letters took place in Tokyo, marking the entry into force of the Joint Declaration. According to the document, the USSR agreed to "the transfer of the Habomai Islands and the Shikotan Islands to Japan, however, that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan will be made after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan."

The parties came to this wording after several rounds of lengthy negotiations. Japan's initial proposal was simple: a return to Potsdam - that is, the transfer of all the Kuriles and South Sakhalin to it. Of course, such a proposal by the losing side of the war looked somewhat frivolous.

The USSR was not going to cede an inch, but unexpectedly for the Japanese, Habomai and Shikotan suddenly offered. This was a reserve position, approved by the Politburo, but announced prematurely - the head of the Soviet delegation, Ya.A. On August 9, 1956, during a conversation with his counterpart in the garden of the Japanese embassy in London, the reserve position was announced. It was she who entered the text of the Joint Declaration.

It must be clarified that the influence of the United States on Japan at that time was enormous (however, as now). They closely monitored all her contacts with the USSR and, undoubtedly, were the third participant in the negotiations, although invisible.

At the end of August 1956, Washington threatened Tokyo that if, under a peace treaty with the USSR, Japan renounces its claims to Kunashir and Iturup, the United States will forever retain the occupied island of Okinawa and the entire Ryukyu archipelago. The note included a wording that clearly played on the national feelings of the Japanese: “The US government has come to the conclusion that the islands of Iturup and Kunashir (along with the islands of Habomai and Shikotan, which are part of Hokkaido) have always been part of Japan and should rightly be considered as belonging to Japan ". That is, the Yalta agreements were publicly disavowed.

The affiliation of the "northern territories" of Hokkaido, of course, is a lie - on all military and pre-war Japanese maps, the islands have always been part of the Kuril ridge and have never been designated separately. However, the idea was well received. It was on this geographical absurdity that entire generations of politicians in the Land of the Rising Sun made their careers.

The peace treaty has not yet been signed - in our relations we are guided by the Joint Declaration of 1956.

Issue price

I think that even in the first term of his presidency, Vladimir Putin decided to settle all disputed territorial issues with his neighbors. Including with Japan. In any case, back in 2004, Sergey Lavrov formulated the position of the Russian leadership: “We have always fulfilled and will continue to fulfill our obligations, especially ratified documents, but, of course, to the extent that our partners are ready to fulfill the same agreements . So far, as we know, we have not been able to reach an understanding of these volumes as we see it and as we saw it in 1956.

"Until Japan's ownership of all four islands is clearly defined, no peace treaty will be concluded," then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi responded. The negotiation process has again reached an impasse.

However, this year we again remembered the peace treaty with Japan.

In May, at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, Vladimir Putin said that Russia was ready to negotiate with Japan on the disputed islands, and the solution should be a compromise. That is, none of the parties should feel like a loser. “Are you ready to negotiate? Yes, ready. But we were surprised to hear recently that Japan has joined some kind of sanctions - and here Japan, I do not really understand - and is suspending the negotiation process on this topic. So we are ready, is Japan ready, I haven’t learned for myself, ”said the President of the Russian Federation.

It seems that the pain point is found correctly. And the negotiation process (I hope, this time in offices tightly closed from American ears) has been in full swing for at least six months. Otherwise, Shinzo Abe would not have made such promises.

If we fulfill the terms of the 1956 Joint Declaration and return the two islands to Japan, 2,100 people will have to be resettled. All of them live on Shikotan, only a frontier post is located on Habomai. Most likely, the problem of the presence of our armed forces on the islands is being discussed. However, for complete control over the region, the troops deployed on Sakhalin, Kunashir and Iturup are quite enough.

Another question is what reciprocal concessions we expect from Japan. It is clear that the sanctions should be lifted - this is not even discussed. Perhaps access to credits and technologies, expansion of participation in joint projects? Not excluded.

Be that as it may, Shinzo Abe faces a difficult choice. The conclusion of the long-awaited peace treaty with Russia, spiced with "northern territories", would certainly have made him the politician of the century in his homeland. It will inevitably lead to tension in relations between Japan and the United States. I wonder what the Prime Minister would prefer.

And we will somehow survive the internal Russian tension that our liberals will inflate.


From the blog

The Habomai group of islands is labeled "Other Islands" on this map. These are several white spots between Shikotan and Hokkaido.

(The post was written more than two years ago, but the situation has not changed as of the current day, but talk about the Kuriles has intensified again in recent days, - ed.)

In the spring of 1945, the war with Germany ended. But World War II continued. Japan was not going to give up, despite the fact that she no longer had any chances of success. After the defeat of the Third Reich, the Allied forces could be thrown completely against the Japanese.

And here we come to one historical point, which must be considered more closely. After all, it is known that the liberals blame Stalin for everything. This point in history is after the defeat of Germany. What was Stalin supposed to do? He had two options:

  • fight with Japan;
  • don't fight.

And for both actions, he, most interestingly, had quite a legal basis. International treaties, what is called "international law".

Therefore, if you want to denigrate Stalin, you can say:

  • in the case of non-participation of the USSR in the war against Japan - that Stalin "betrayed the allies";
  • in the case of Moscow's participation in the war, one can say that "Stalin treacherously attacked Japan", which, in fact, Russian liberals often say.

Let's figure it out.

  1. Japan was an extremely unfriendly state for the USSR, which, after the end of the Civil War, constantly looked in our direction with the desire to “take a little for itself” the territory of the USSR. (About the Russian-Japanese war of 1905-1907, support for revolutionaries, the capture of half of our Sakhalin following the war, support for Ataman Semyonov in the civil war, the creation of the Far Eastern Republic - we will not recall here.)
  2. Japan and the USSR fought directly against each other in two military conflicts: on Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol (Mongolia), although the war was not declared. However, the connection between the level of relations and the general geopolitical situation cannot be overlooked. The fighting at Khalkhin Gol ended with the signing of an armistice in September 1939, and only the next day after that, Stalin sent troops into Poland.
  3. The unexpected improvement in relations between Germany and the USSR (Non-Aggression Pact) led to the fact that Japan, under the influence of Germany, was also forced to improve relations with the USSR. The result of which was the signing of an almost similar document between the Soviet Union and Japan.

There he is.

Treaty of neutrality between the USSR and Japan.

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, guided by the desire to strengthen peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries, decided to conclude an agreement on neutrality, for this purpose they appointed their Representatives:

From the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

From His Majesty the Emperor of Japan - Yusuke Matsuota, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Commander of the Order of the Sacred Treasure, First Class, and Yuushitsugu Tatekawa, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Lieutenant General, Commander of the Order of the Rising Sun, First Class and Order of the Golden Kite, Fourth Class who, after exchanging their credentials, found in due and proper form, have agreed as follows:

Paragraph 1

Both contracting parties undertake to maintain peaceful and friendly relations between them and mutually respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the other Party.

Point 2

Should one of the Contracting Parties become the object of hostilities by one or more third forces, the other Party shall remain neutral throughout the conflict.

Point 3

The existing Treaty enters into force on the day of ratification by both contracting parties and remains in force for five years. In the event that no Contracting Party denounces the Treaty in the year of expiration, it will be deemed to be automatically renewed for another five years.

Item 4

This Treaty shall be subject to ratification as soon as possible. The instruments of ratification should also be exchanged in Tokyo as soon as possible.

In confirmation of this, the above-named Representatives signed the existing Treaty in two copies, compiled in Russian and Japanese, and sealed.

  1. For Japan, the situation looked very curious. Hitler was so indifferent to his allies and so carried away by his game that his ally, Japan, concluded a non-aggression pact with the Russians. Just before the German attack. As a result, the Japanese were so shocked by the behavior of their Berlin "ally" that they did not terminate the agreement and did not strike at the USSR.
  2. However, it cannot be said that they did not bring benefits to Hitler. In Manchuria, that is, China, the Japanese had a million-strong Kwantung Army stationed next to our borders. However, their peacefulness was caused not by their “parity” and not even by the “lesson of Khalkhin Gol” taught by Zhukov, but by our army of 1.2 million people. Which throughout the war from 1941 to 1945 stood with us in the Far East, instead of being thrown against Hitler.
  3. But now the wheel of war rolled to the West, the defeat of Hitler became a matter of time, and for the leadership of the USSR, the question of what to do with the Japanese in the future came to the fore. Obviously, Stalin had to help England and the United States, who were at war with Japan. This was negotiated at the Yalta Conference (February 1945) and the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945. At the Yalta Conference (February 11), the Crimean Agreement of the Three Great Powers on the Far East was concluded, in which it was said that in two three months after the surrender of Germany, the USSR will enter the war against Japan.
  4. Stalin began to fulfill the agreements. In the text of the Non-Aggression Treaty with Japan, it was written that the denunciation of the treaty must be at least a year before its end (April 25, 1946). As a result, on April 5, 1945, the government of the USSR made a statement.

USSR government statement

The Neutrality Pact between the Soviet Union and Japan was concluded on April 13, 1941, i.e. before the German attack on the USSR and before the outbreak of war between Japan, on the one hand, and England and the United States of America, on the other.

Since that time, the situation has changed radically. Germany attacked the USSR, and Japan, an ally of Germany, helps the latter in her war against the USSR. In addition, Japan is at war with the United States and England, which are allies of the Soviet Union.

In this situation, the Neutrality Pact between Japan and the USSR lost its meaning, and the extension of this Pact became impossible.

In view of the foregoing and in accordance with Article 3 of the said Pact, which provides for the right to denounce one year before the expiration of the five-year term of the Pact, the Soviet Government hereby declares to the Government of Japan its desire to denounce the Pact of April 13, 1941.

  1. The treaty was denounced (terminated), but its text stated that in this case it would cease to be valid on April 25, 1946. Could Stalin terminate the treaty with Japan BEFORE the defeat of Hitler? Of course not. It would be stupid. Could Stalin not help the allies to fight the Japanese, referring to the Treaty? Of course not. Neither the allies would have understood, nor the interests of the country would have received anything from this. The losses of the USSR in the war with Japan - 12.5 thousand people. At stake are obligations to the United States and England, the return of the Kuriles and Sakhalin, the struggle for influence in China and Korea (already with former allies). Obviously, Stalin could not, did not want and should not have shied away from participation in the war in the Far East.
  2. The USSR did not carry out any treacherous attack on Japan. On August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union officially declared war on the land of the rising sun, starting on August 9.

Japan had no choice but to surrender. And on September 2, she was signed aboard the battleship Missouri.

The relationship between the USSR (Russia) and Japan did not end there, and our article, covering only one of their aspects, has come to an end. In conclusion - the text of the very statement of the government of the USSR, which explains everything.

Statement of the USSR Government to the Government of Japan

After the defeat and surrender of Nazi Germany, Japan turned out to be the only great power that still stands for the continuation of the war.

The demand of the three powers - the United States of America, Great Britain and China dated July 26 of this year for the unconditional surrender of the Japanese armed forces was rejected by Japan. Thus, the proposal of the Japanese government to the Soviet Union for mediation in the war in the Far East loses all ground.

Considering Japan's refusal to capitulate, the Allies turned to the Soviet government with a proposal to join the war against Japanese aggression and thereby shorten the end of the war, reduce the number of casualties and help restore world peace as soon as possible.

True to its allied duty, the Soviet Government accepted the proposal and acceded to the Declaration of the Allied Powers of July 26 of this year.

The Soviet government considers that such a policy of its own is the only means capable of hastening the onset of peace, liberating the peoples from further sacrifices and suffering, and enabling the Japanese people to get rid of the dangers and destruction that Germany experienced after its refusal of unconditional surrender.

In view of the foregoing, the Soviet Government declares that from tomorrow, that is, from August 9, the Soviet Union will consider itself in a state of war with Japan.

Did Stalin do the right thing? Definitely correct. I think that there were simply no other options for behavior, and the option chosen by the leadership of the USSR was the most beneficial for our country in every sense and from all sides.

The maneuver of the Japanese military party was crowned with success: on January 30, 1902, England and Japan signed an alliance treaty.

In its first article, both sides recognized each other the right to intervene in the internal affairs of China and Korea in order to protect their interests, "if they are threatened either by the aggressive actions of any other power, or by the unrest that has arisen" in China and Korea ".

The second article obliged each of the parties to observe strict neutrality in the event that the other side, protecting its interests in China or Korea, found itself in a state of war with a third power. In the event of a war between one of the allies and two or more powers, the treaty (according to Article 3) obliged the other contracting party to provide him with military assistance.

The Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance was a major victory for Japanese foreign policy. He gave Japan the opportunity to start a war with Russia, having the confidence that not a single power would provide Russia with armed support for fear of a war not only with Japan, but also with England. At the same time, England also provided financial assistance to Japan.

Russian diplomacy immediately turned to France with a proposal to jointly come up with a response to the Anglo-Japanese alliance. France did not approve of the diversion of Russian forces to the Far East.

Nevertheless, she agreed that on March 20, 1902, both allied governments published a common declaration. It read: "Being compelled to take into account the possibility of hostile actions by other powers or a repetition of unrest in China, both allied governments reserve the right to take care in such cases to take measures necessary to protect their interests." This declaration was of little binding character. France did not provide significant assistance to its ally in the Far East.

As a result of the Anglo-Japanese treaty, England got the opportunity to deal a serious blow to Russia with the help of Japan and, in addition, to a certain extent, increase its influence in Europe in the fight against a new rival - Germany.

The ruling circles of the United States of America also hoped, with the help of Japan, to weaken the influence of Russia in the Far East and to strengthen their own influence in China (in particular, in Manchuria) and in Korea.

To this end, the Americans were prepared to provide Japan with far-reaching support. In turn, Germany, seeking to undermine or weaken the alliance between Russia and France, as well as free its hands in Europe and create more favorable conditions for its penetration into the Middle East, secretly encouraged both Russia and Japan to war against each other.

Thus, the planned war against Russia was in the interests not only of Japan, but of England, the United States of America and Germany.

In the summer of 1901, the Russian government resumed negotiations with China on the Manchu question, gradually abandoning its original claims. On April 8, 1902, a Russian-Chinese agreement was signed, according to which Russia undertook to withdraw its troops from Manchuria in three steps within 18 months.

The only thing Russian diplomacy managed to insist on was the reservation that the evacuation of troops could be stopped by unrest in Manchuria or by the same actions of foreign powers that would not allow Russia to withdraw its troops.

At the end of the summer of 1902, the Japanese government, as if in continuation of the mission of Ito, proposed to the Russian government the following agreement: Russia recognizes the Japanese protectorate over Korea, in exchange Japan recognizes for Russia in Manchuria only freedom of action, in the sense of protecting the Russian railways there. This proposal in St. Petersburg was considered unsatisfactory.

Just at this time, an irresponsible court group led by Bezobrazov began to exert great influence on Nicholas II. This group urged Nicholas II not to leave Manchuria contrary to the agreement concluded with China. Moreover, not content with Manchuria, the tsar was incited to penetrate into Korea, in which, since 1898, Russia had actually tolerated the predominant influence of Japan.

Bezobrazov and people close to him acquired a private forest concession in Korea. The territory of the concession covered the basins of two rivers: the Yalu and the Tumen, and stretched for 800 kilometers along the Sino-Korean and Russian-Korean borders from the Gulf of Korea to the Sea of ​​Japan. In short, it occupied the entire border zone. Formally, the concession was acquired by a private joint-stock company. In fact, behind him was the tsarist government, which, under the guise of forest guards, brought troops into the concession.

Trying to penetrate into Korea, the Russian government delayed the evacuation of troops from Manchuria, although the deadlines set by the agreement on April 8, 1902, had already passed. Meanwhile, Russia's military training in the Far East lagged far behind its political plans.

"Opening" of the country and the conclusion of unequal treaties

40s of the XIX century. were marked by the active struggle of England for the seizure of colonial positions in China. For the United States, the Far East was also of considerable interest as a huge potential market, the components of which were Japan and China.

In 1845, Congress gave the President of the United States authority to establish trade relations with Japan. After several unsuccessful attempts to start negotiations with the Japanese, a military expedition to Japan was equipped. On July 8, 1853, Commodore Perry's squadron entered the Uraga Bay south of the capital, the ships pointed their guns menacingly at the shore. Perry refused to move the talks to Nagasaki and handed over to the shogun a letter from the president, as well as models of the latest American-made cars.

The apparent military demonstration was combined with a promise to wait until the spring of 1854 for an answer, when American ships would return to Japan after visiting Chinese ports. The appearance of the "black squadron" (steam ships left a plume of black smoke while moving) caused a terrible panic in the cities and villages. The shogunate, breaking with the tradition established by itself, asked the imperial house for advice on the situation. In dismay, the government even turned to the Dutch for advice and a request to help organize the defense of Edo. However, Bakufu officials understood that in such circumstances it was difficult to count on success in organizing an armed rebuff, even with the use of Dutch weapons. It was decided, under the guise of lengthy negotiations with the Americans, to avoid a specific response to the US demand to open the country. However, the arrival of Commodore Perry in February 1854 at Uraga Bay changed the situation completely. Nine warships equipped with 250 guns, a crew of 1,800 men, Perry's demands, accompanied by threats to call the entire American fleet to Edo, and finally, the landing of 500 naval sailors during the negotiations showed the shogunate both the possibility of military intervention and the seriousness of the plans of the overseas power. regarding Japan.

On March 31, 1854, the first Japanese-American treaty was signed in Kanagawa (Yokohama). American ships received the right to enter the ports of Shimoda (Izu Peninsula) and Hakodate, where food, water, coal and other goods could be purchased for money or in exchange for goods through the intermediary of shogun officials. The treaty signed in Kanagawa was not a trade agreement, and the Americans insisted on concluding another one, modeled on the US-Chinese treaty of 1844. On October 14, 1854, an Anglo-Japanese treaty was signed, repeating the main provisions of Kanagawa.

Almost simultaneously with Perry's squadron - on August 21, 1853, a Russian mission headed by Vice Admiral Putyatin arrived in Nagasaki. She had a directive only by peaceful means to seek the establishment of trade relations, as well as the recognition of Russian possessions of Sakhalin, which was part of the Amur Territory, and the Kuril Islands. Negotiations, which the shogunal government dragged out in every possible way, did not lead to the conclusion of an agreement. Putyatin failed to reach an agreement with Perry either - he evaded contacts, clearly seeking to be the first to conclude an agreement with Japan and receive maximum privileges. The outbreak of the Russian-Turkish war and the threat of an attack by the Anglo-French squadron on Petropavlovsk and the Russian Primorye forced Putyatin to leave Nagasaki and sail north.

The treaty between Russia and Japan was signed on February 7, 1855 in Shimoda. The border was drawn between the islands of Urup and Iturup, but the issue of Sakhalin remained unresolved, the island remained jointly owned by both countries.

According to the agreements signed with England and Russia, the port of Nagasaki was opened for the ships of these countries.

The United States and Britain were not satisfied with the treaties concluded with Japan. The treaties imposed on China were built on the basis of a regime of inequality - they wanted to use this principle in treaty relations with Japan as well. However, the first country to supplement the terms of the treaties concluded by Japan with Western countries in order to obtain new privileges was the Netherlands.

Signed in 1856-1857. two Dutch-Japanese treaties formalized the establishment of consular jurisdiction for the Dutch, the introduction of customs duties in the amount of 35% of the value of goods, the opening of the port of Nagasaki for trade, etc. But the American-Japanese treaty of 1858 became the model for all subsequent agreements with Western countries. , unequal and humiliating for Japan. It was concluded after almost two years of negotiations conducted in Shimoda by US First Consul General Harris. The treaty provided for freedom of trade, established consular jurisdiction and the right of permanent residence for Americans on the basis of the creation of special extraterritorial settlements (settlements) for foreigners in ports and cities open or to be opened in the coming years [Hakodate, Shimoda, Kanagawa (Yokohama), Nagasaki, Niigata, Hyogo (Kobe), Osaka, Edo]. The scale of customs duties had a minimum level of 5% and a maximum of 35%, depending on the product. But the main thing was that Japan, having signed this treaty, lost the right of customs autonomy and could not protest against the reduced import tariff. This treaty of "friendship and trade" assumed the mediation of the United States in the conflict situation between Japan and any Western power, it included an article on the right of Japan to purchase American weapons and invite military experts from the United States.

On August 7, 1858, an agreement on trade and navigation between Russia and Japan was signed in Edo, which was valid until 1895. The trade agreement provided the Russians with the right of extraterritoriality, most favored nation and other privileges. However, the Russian-Japanese treatise did not have articles on mediation and on the provision of ships and weapons to Japan, which emphasized the long-standing Russian position of neutrality and non-interference in the internal affairs of its neighbor.

Tsarist Russia, which aspired to the Far Eastern markets and received the same privileges as other countries, actually did not use them because of its economic backwardness, the rivalry of the USA, England and France, as well as the stubborn position of Japan, which did not want to recognize Russia's historical rights to the Kuril Islands. islands and South Sakhalin.

A whole series of so-called Ansei treaties ( From the name of the Ansei period (1854-1859)), concluded by Japan with Western countries in 1854-1858. (Japanese-American - March 31, 1854, July 29, 1858; Dutch-Japanese - January 30, 1856, 1858; Anglo-Japanese - October 14, 1854; August 26, 1858; French-Japanese - October 9, 1858; Russian-Japanese - February 7, 1855, August 19, 1858), completed the long isolation of the country and at the same time became the boundary of a new period - its transformation into a dependent state.

The signing of the Japanese-American treaty of 1858 led to increased political unrest in the country and a split in the ruling group. If in the first years after the opening of the country (1854-1859) the forces opposing the government were only formed and covered mainly various (starting from the daimyo and ending with the serving samurai) layers of the ruling class, then the conclusion of the agreement became the impetus for expanding the social base and activating the entire movement.