INTERROGATION PROTOCOL POW Corporal of the 2nd Squad, 2nd Platoon, 4th Machine Gun Company of the Norwegian Volunteer Legion battalion Yentvedt Kiel. The survey was conducted on 16. 4. 1942. Born in 1919 in the city of Brevik (Norway). Norwegian by nationality, single, has a father, mother, brother, 20 years old, who is also in this battalion, in the 2nd company. In Norway, he served in the police. He voluntarily joined the army, the volunteer "Norwegian Legion", for which his parents receive 184 crowns a month. The prisoner of war himself at the front received 66 marks per month.

He is a member of the "National Norwegian Party" (Quisling's party), his brother is also. Circumstance of capture: On the night of 16. 4. 42. three enemy groups tried to reconnoiter the front edge of the location of our units. The enemy, met by artillery and machine-gun fire, hit our minefield, as a result of which a series of explosions occurred. A group of Red Army soldiers sent for a counterattack under the command of junior lieutenant Solovihin captured two wounded and delivered them to the location of their units.

During interrogation, the prisoner gave the following testimony: He joined the army voluntarily in Norway, in July 1941, in the "Norwegian Legion". In the same month, one battalion of the "Norwegian Legion", in the amount of 1000 people, was sent by steamer from Norway to Hamburg. From Hamburg he was transferred to Stettin, from where 800 people. on planes were transferred to Krasnogvardeisk, and the remaining 200 people on the Eastern Front went by truck through Riga, Krasnogvardeisk. Both groups were joined together in Krasnoye Selo, where they all arrived 5-6 weeks ago. Five weeks ago, the entire battalion arrived in the area of ​​​​the height of go. in. Konstantinovka, from where all 1000 people were transferred to Uritsk 8-10 days ago. All other parts of the "Norwegian Legion" were in Norway. The regiment, which includes the Norwegian legion, was formed a little more than a month ago from different units, with a number of soldiers of 3-4 thousand people.
The prisoner does not know the numbers of the regiment and the numbers of the division to which this regiment belongs. The battalion commander is Norwegian, Major Kvist. Regiment commander - German (does not know his last name) Division commander - German, General Elkin. The battalion of the "Norwegian Legion" in the amount of 1000 people, consisting of policemen aged 18 to 50 years, is included in this regiment. In addition, there are Germans and 200 people in the regiment. Latvians.

The Norwegian battalion is defending in Uritsk, with the front line to the east. env. Uritska; the left flank of the battalion - sowing. env. Uritsk; right flank - st. Ligovo. To the south of the Norwegian battalion, a battalion of German infantry is defending, where the prisoner does not know its right flank, a unit of Latvians is defending on the left (along the north west of Uritsk and further along the coast of the Gulf of Finland). All of the above units are part of one infantry regiment. Location of the companies of the Norwegian Legion. In the center of Uritsk - the 1st company; Left - 2nd company; On the right is the 3rd company. The machine-gun company of the battalion is distributed among these three companies. According to the testimony of the prisoner, at present there are up to 2 thousand enemy soldiers in Uritsk, of which 1 thousand are Norwegians and the remaining thousand are Germans, mainly artillerymen. The regimental headquarters and command post is presumably located in Konstantinovka. According to the prisoner, there were rumors among the soldiers that a battalion of military police was stationed in the Tolmachevo area. The prisoner testified that before the arrival of the Norwegian battalion in Uritsk, the German regiment "Leibstandard" was located there, numbering up to 2 thousand people, which consists of selected soldiers from Hitler's personal units. This regiment was in Uritsk for only 14 days, where it came from, the prisoner does not know. 10 days ago, the Leibstandard regiment left Uritsk, according to the prisoner's assumption, for rest. This regiment was replaced in Uritsk by a newly formed regiment, which also included a battalion of the Norwegian Legion. When asked why they, the Norwegians, wear the uniform of the SS-sheep, the latter replied that they arrived at the front as replenishment for the SS units, and therefore wear this uniform.

Organization and armament of the Norwegian legion. Rifle companies of 150 soldiers. The 4th machine-gun company has 150 troops. Each platoon of a machine-gun company has 36 men. There are 30-40 people in the company who are specially engaged in economic issues. In addition, there is a control cell. The 4th company is armed with: in the department (13 people) - 2 rifles, 2 SMG-34 machine guns, 2 machine guns and 4 machine guns. In companies (3 platoons) - 12 rifles, 3 heavy mortars with a caliber of 7.3-10 cm, 12 heavy machine guns. The easel machine gun is serviced by 7 soldiers, the mortar is served by 8-10 people. The artillery attached to the battalion is located 300-400 m deep. Has field howitzers, regimental guns and mortars. The regiment has a company of anti-tank guns (12 guns) with a caliber of 37 mm. There are no chemical shells in the battalion. Each company has special chem. teams of 6 people whose task is to overcome possible chem. means used by the enemy. At night, the units set up outposts; from each platoon of the 4th company, the following are posted in outposts for the night: 2 heavy machine guns, 5 light machine guns and 4 machine guns. As a guard, one shooter with a rifle is put up for each machine gun. The posted guard has two rocket launchers. Guards are also posted during the day, but in smaller numbers. The guards are in the trenches. Soldiers stand at their posts from 1.5 to 3 hours. The prisoner testified about the losses of the battalion: over the past 4 weeks, 22 people were killed in the battalion, 60-70 people were injured. 4-5 people were killed in the 4th company. and wounded 10-12 people. These losses are caused mainly by art. fire. In recent days our snipers have killed 5-6 people. In Uritsk, during the last days, 7 soldiers were killed and 10 wounded. About the tasks of the units located in the Uritsk, Konstantinovka region, the prisoner testified as follows: the task of reconnaissance. the detachment operating on the night of 16.4.42 was to blow up our bunkers, take part of our positions and capture prisoners. Intelligence operated in the amount of 24 people. (Norwegians) under the command of a Norwegian, Captain Berg. The Germans supported reconnaissance only with fire, while only the Norwegians were supposed to break into the trenches. The task of the Norwegian battalion in this sector of the front is defense. An attack on Leningrad by the Germans is planned, but, according to the prisoner, not from Uritsk, since there are no signs of this. In particular, it is imperceptible that tanks were concentrated in Uritsk. In addition, there are currently few troops in Uritsk, only 2,000. people, of which 1 thousand Norwegians (who have neither carts nor cars), and the remaining thousand are German soldiers, mainly artillerymen, who have been in Uritsk for a long time. The task of the German troops, according to the statement of the prisoner, is the encirclement of Leningrad from all sides, in order to completely surround the city and cut it off in the same way from any connections with other areas. According to the prisoner, there are enough German troops in this sector of the front to defend and defend the positions they occupy, but not enough to launch an offensive. He thinks that most of the German troops are now heading south, to the Kerch region, to regions where there is oil and where summer begins much earlier. The positions of the Germans in the Uritsk region are equally well fortified everywhere, but the weakest points in the defensive fortifications, in his opinion, are the fortifications along the coast. These areas are less fortified because the Germans understand that it is difficult for the Russians to attack from the coast, from the side of the water.
On the organization of intelligence. The prisoner showed the following: special reconnaissance. there are no units in the Norwegian battalion. Each time separate groups are sent to reconnaissance, armed with light weapons and hand grenades, having concretely assigned tasks before them. The prisoner does not know anything about setting up undercover intelligence. About the presence of Germans in the Norwegian battalion, the prisoner testified as follows: There are German "advisers" among the Norwegians in the battalion. Each company has one such "adviser". Most of these "advisers" are in the rank of lieutenant. In the 4th company, such an "advisor" is the German Lieutenant Scheid. In addition, the battalion has a German supply headquarters, which consists of 10 people.

Political and moral state and general information. According to the prisoner, discipline in the army is good. He knows no cases of desertion among the Norwegians, nor among the Germans. However, he knows about two cases of German desertion that took place in Riga. Food in the army, according to the prisoner, is good, in any case, better than what they received in Norway. Soldiers receive their entire daily ration at the front once a day, in the evening, at 5 o'clock. This food is brought to the front line by soldiers from the kitchen by special peddlers. Every soldier has breakfast, lunch and dinner whenever he wants. For a day, a soldier receives about 500 gr. bread, a small piece of butter, the same small piece of cheese or instead of sausage, 1 liter of soup. For every day and a half, soldiers receive vodka, half a bottle for 7 people. There are no epidemic diseases in the battalion, but at present there are up to 80 people in the battalion. patients (influenza, colds). Each company has two orderlies.
According to the prisoner, all the soldiers are now very pleased that spring has come and the terrible Russian winter has ended.

Soldiers Think this summer will be the last summer of war, but older soldiers are not so optimistic. The Germans tell the Norwegians that they will win the war. Therefore, the Norwegians believe that in this regard, Norway will be liberated from the Germans. The prisoner himself believes that the war will not end so soon, and that the Germans will move the front line further and further to the East. According to the prisoner, German and Norwegian soldiers, being on the Eastern Front, fulfill their obligations. The Norwegians are fighting at the front not for Germany, but for Norway. When asked why they, the Norwegians, do not fight against Germany, which occupied all of Norway, on the territory of Norway itself, the prisoner answered: firstly, the Norwegians had already tried to fight the Germans once, and within 1-2 months Norway was defeated; secondly, the Norwegians do not have weapons for this. Now the Norwegians are protecting Norway from foreign countries trying to capture part of the Norwegian territory. According to the prisoner, Norway is currently neutral, but its policy is predetermined by the great states on which it depends and by which it must be equal. A year ago the Germans occupied Norway. The Norwegians do not want to remain under the heel of the Germans, and therefore went to fight in Russia to prove to them that they, the Norwegians, know how to fight. Convinced of this, after the victory, the Germans will liberate Norway. This is how the commander of the regiment, a German, spoke about this to the Norwegians. According to the prisoner, the Norwegians are also fighting against Russia because they are afraid of Russia, which, if it wins, can also occupy Norway. If Germany wins the war, they will leave Norway. The prisoner believes that Germany was the first to start the war. However, both Germany and Russia are to blame for the imposition of war, since both countries pulled up large military formations to the borders. To a very strong extent, America and England are also involved and guilty in unleashing the war. The war is very beneficial to the imperialists of these countries, who, thanks to it, receive very large profits and are therefore extremely interested in the war. The majority of the Norwegian population is currently sympathetic to the Soviet Union and is on its side. The population has a very bad attitude towards volunteers who are sent to the Eastern Front to fight against the Soviet Union. So, for example, the prisoner cited the following fact in this regard: when the Norwegian volunteers, going to the Eastern Front, crossed one bridge in Norway, the population threw stones at them. The population of Norway, according to the captive, lives well, but many fishermen living on the coast have a very difficult time. Parents wrote to the prisoner from Norway that recently it had become bad with food, since England blocked the entire Norwegian coast. The prisoner showed the following about the relationship between German and Norwegian soldiers: the Germans do not trust the Norwegians, and the Norwegians pay them the same. In addition, the Germans, and in particular the German "advisers", try to emphasize that they occupy a dominant position in relation to the Norwegians.

Additional indications. During an additional interrogation, the prisoner testified: When passing through Krasnogvardeisk and Krasnoye Selo, the prisoner did not observe the concentration of large military units, he saw only separate groups of soldiers, numbering 3-5 people each. The newly created Norwegian military units are undergoing military training in Norway, in the barracks. During training they use German weapons. The instructors are Germans and Norwegians. The training period is 3-4 months, after which the soldiers are sent to the Norwegian army or to the front. Military training of volunteers lasts 6 months. At the command post of the company commander there is only telephone communication, no radio. The battalion headquarters has two radio sets, which are carried in knapsacks behind the back. There is no radio communication between the company and the battalion. Assessing the actions of our intelligence. groups, the prisoner declared: he was surprised by the fact that the active actions of our reconnaissance were not supported by fire, even when they approached enemy positions. He stated the same about the actions of our intelligence carried out in battle. At present, in the dugouts and trenches where the soldiers of the battalion are located, there is a lot of water, which reaches more than to the waist. Water has to be constantly pumped out. However, there were no cases of leaving firing positions due to the presence of water.

Regarding the presence of the civilian population in the settlements captured by the Germans, the prisoner testified: In Uritsk, he saw only 3-4 people from the civilian population; there is a civilian population in Konstantinovka, the Germans force this population to chop wood, help in the kitchens and clear roads. All civilians in Konstantinovka are required to wear a narrow white armband on the right sleeve, on which “Konstantinovka” is written in black letters. Whether any documents or passports are issued to the population, the prisoner does not know. In the area of ​​Konstantinovka, the prisoner read a Russian leaflet, which contained an appeal to German women and mothers so that their sons would end the senseless war and stop shedding their blood on Russian fields. The captured partisan himself did not see, but he heard from other soldiers about cases when, in Krasnoe Selo, Russian women, under the pretext of showing the whereabouts of the partisans, invited German soldiers into the forest and killed them there. The survey was conducted by: Head of RO SHTARM 42 Lieutenant Colonel Lysenko. Translated by: Technician quartermaster 2nd rank Mikhailov. Correct: Head of the 1st dept. OO NKVD 42 Army senior political instructor Zhutyaev. Archive of the Federal Security Service of St. Petersburg and Leningrad Region, d. 151, l. 147-150, (typewritten copy). Quoted from the publication Blockade Diaries and Documents (Series Archive of the Big House). - St. Petersburg: European House, 2004 ISBN 5-8015-0169-X pp. 471-478.

Solgonin loves to quote the so-called. "interrogation protocol" of the captured Lieutenant General M.F. Lukin, where he (allegedly) rants about how bad life is in the USSR, and how the people do not want to fight, and only dream of getting rid of the bloody regime. This has nothing to do with the first months of the war, but Semenych, after all, drags any "compromising evidence" from wherever he can. At the same time, he does not shy away from anything.
“Later, General Lukin slowly but surely began to turn into a poster model of an unbending hero who, once in German captivity, “contemptuously rejected all the promises and threats of the enemy.”
(quotation marks are saltine). Then the "historian" lists Lukin's post-war awards, including the posthumous title of Hero of Russia (1993). And he gives a quote from the "protocol", which, they say, has long been known to some "Western historians" and even translated into Russian. Solonin refers, however, not to "Western historians", but to the St. Petersburg magazine "New Watch" of 1994. At the same time (which is very suspicious) neither the name nor the author of the article in the journal "historian" indicates ("for some reason"). Naturally, this magazine cannot be found on the Internet; only search and small excerpts on Google Book are available. Here is the scan:

The logic of the "historian", by the way, is also lame: the title of Hero of Russia was given to Lukin in 1993, could the publication of 1994 somehow affect this? But against the background of the rest, these are trifles.
So, Hoffmann (even without an "investigation" it is known that the protocol of Lukin's interrogation comes from him). Who is this powerful old man? Reading Wikipedia: He published a number of works of a revisionist nature, including those with a revision of the number of victims of the Holocaust and support for the thesis of Germany's preventive war against the USSR. There is also a list of the doctor's "works", for example, "Stalin's war of annihilation" (I somehow already mentioned it - that's another set of lies).
It's clear. The same "historian" as Solgonin (with the difference that he slanders not his own country, but his former enemy). Solgonin, apparently, still did not dare to refer to the neo-Nazi, he hid behind the backs of the "New Watch" and unknown "Western historians", an old and small-circulation magazine, go and find it. But, as always, the "conspirator" miscalculated ...
However, the question remains: what is this Hoffmann himself referring to? In the Russian translation of Hoffmann's book ("History of the Vlasov Army"), a quote from "Lukin's interrogation" is marked with the number 313. Under this number in the list of sources is this:
"Interrogation of the captured commander of the 6th Russian Army (in German), command of the 17th Army, group Ic / OA (Major Hofs), 9.8.1941, PA Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bonn, acts of Etzdorf, vol. 24"
Stand up, fall down. The name of the captured commander is not indicated (!), But Lukin (it is he who is named in the text) was captured in October 41st, and he commanded not the 6th Army, but the 19th. How could he have been "interrogated" in August? Did Hoffmann confuse him with Muzychenko?! He really commanded the 6th Army and was captured in August ... And why on earth did the protocol of interrogation of the captured general end up in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? Solid questions...
True, in the list of sources you can find (under No. 309) and more:
Interrogation of Lieutenant General Lukin, Mikhail Fedorovich, commander of the 19th Army (recently the commander of the area of ​​the 32nd, 20th, 24th and 19th armies) (in German). Army Group Center. lc/OA, 12/14/1941, BA R 6/77
But in the text of the book number 309 is a quote from some German order! The mere fact that Hoffmann's source numbers do not match the text speaks volumes about the "level" of his book. Well, yes, it doesn’t happen to anyone ... much more important, however, is something else: Hoffmann does not refer to anything! There are NO archival details of the "protocol" (BA R 6/77 are not archival details, but some kind of document number). Where it is taken from (or simply invented?) - it is impossible to establish. Solgonin understands this perfectly, but diligently drags the dubious (to put it mildly) text into his little books, while disguising its origin in every possible way.
Finally, the text of the "protocol" itself is more like a rant on a free topic. First, the protocol is a question and answer. There is no trace of this here (on the contrary, sometimes Lukin asks questions to the interrogator - ?!). Secondly, the Germans, it turns out, are interested in Lukin's opinion about the mood of the peasants (although Lukin was a peasant almost 30 years ago, and since then he has served in the army all the time - first in the tsarist army, and then in the Red Army), some rumors about the release military equipment in the rear, about the moods of Budyonny and Timoshenko - and almost nothing about the troops that Lukin himself commanded. Thirdly, he allegedly uses the word "Russian" (well, at least not "dear Russians"). And why is the interrogation dated December 14, if Lukin (I repeat) was captured in October?
Yekaterinburg historian Oleg Nuzhdin found in the German archives and translated the protocols of interrogations of many prisoners - from generals to majors. There is also an interrogation protocol (more precisely, interrogation attempts) of Lukin - http://forum.ykt.ru/mviewtopic.jsp?id=1623206&f=15 :
Lukin, commander of the 19th Army, was taken prisoner on 10/15/41 at Lenkino, seriously wounded. In such a situation, in the field hospital No. 23, his right leg was amputated. During a short interrogation (the date is not readable, not printed, it can be assumed that 18 or 19.10) he confirmed. that in addition to his army, parts of the 24th and 32nd armies are also in the cauldron. He refused further testimony on military matters, referring to the oath of a soldier . The general is 50 years old, he is an old tsarist officer, from 19 a member of the Communist Party and a career officer. He asked, in case of publication of news of his captivity indicate. that he was taken prisoner seriously wounded, and did not surrender. If he had a weapon with him, he would have committed suicide.

In the summer of 1944, during the Belarusian offensive operation "Bagration", the troops of the Red Army defeated the Army Group "Center". Many of the commanders of the defeated German divisions and corps were captured. One of them was Major General Friedrich Steinkeller, who was captured on July 7, 1944 near Minsk.

Steinkeller was an experienced and courageous military leader who was not accustomed to hiding behind the backs of soldiers. Serving in the army since 1914, he managed to take part in both world wars. In battle, Steinkeller received 10 wounds: two during World War I and eight on the Eastern Front of World War II. On April 17, 1944, he was appointed commander of the Feldherrnhalle Panzergrenadier Division, and on June 1 he was promoted to the rank of major general. He had several awards, including the Knight's Cross, which he received in March 1943.

During the interrogation, Steinkeller revealed the details of his biography and military career, and also spoke about the history of his division and its readiness for the June battles. In the winter of 43–44, the Feldherrnhalle division took part in heavy defensive battles, first near Vitebsk, then near Narva, while suffering significant losses in personnel and equipment. According to Steinkeller, in the battles from December 1943 to April 1944, the Feldherrnhalle division lost more than 8,000 people killed and wounded. In May, the division was withdrawn to the reserve and transferred to the Mogilev region, where it began to be replenished with people and equipment.

By June 23, the strength and materiel of the division were basically brought up to the full state. Diivzia was ready for the upcoming battles. And on the eve of the offensive of the Soviet troops, Steinkeller did not even allow the thought that soon his division would be defeated, and he himself would be in Soviet captivity. Under the heading "Found in the archive" Warspot publishes an excerpt from the protocol of interrogation, during which the German general gave details about the participation of his division in the fighting in the summer of 1944, about the difficulties that arose during the retreat, and the reasons for the rapid defeat of Army Group Center .

A group of captured German generals sign an appeal to Wehrmacht officers. Major General Friedrich-Karl von Steinkeller - sixth from left
waralbum.ru

« QUESTION: Tell us how the events developed after the start of the offensive of the Red Army units and how the German units were surrounded and destroyed?

ANSWER: On June 22, the Russians went on the offensive along the entire front of the army group of the center. The front was broken through by them in many places. My division was urgently thrown on June 24 in the evening into the area of ​​the river. Pronya east. SUKHARI, into the gap between the 31st Infantry Division and a division whose number is unknown to me.

Until June 26, at the cost of huge losses, I tried to hold back the sector of my division. The situation was the same in other divisions of the 39th Army Corps. However, further presence at this line was pointless and risky, since we were already in danger of being surrounded here. On the morning of June 26, we were forced to withdraw to the bridgehead on the Dnieper, having the task, like all formations of the Mogilev group, to keep Mogilev at any cost. The situation was so critical that by the morning of June 27, I received an order from the corps to withdraw in a westerly direction to MINSK through Mogilev.

Already by this period, any order during the retreat was violated, divisions and corps were mixed up, there was a large accumulation of equipment on the roads, and all this constantly felt the influence of the Red Army units, and especially its aviation, which continuously bombarded us and demoralized the main part of the retreating troops. It was clear to us from the first days that if we did not retreat in time, we would be surrounded. There is nothing to say about occupation during the retreat of the lines, since we actually avoided the Russians, who, everywhere where we did not retreat, were ahead of us, imposed battles on us and destroyed us. There was not enough food and ammunition, since their supply had stopped from the first days of the Russian offensive. During the retreat from BYALYNICHI in the Pogost area, we ran into large tank forces. On July 1, we arrived in BEREZINO, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bwhich there was a bridgehead. By this time, my division was withdrawing not in regiments, but in groups, since most of the personnel had been lost. During the withdrawal, all units were mixed up, and it was not possible to restore order. On the approaches to BEREZINO, my division had up to 3 thousand people available, the losses were 3000 people, and up to 5000 people. personnel, along with convoys, were sent to the rear. What happened to them, I don't know for sure. I assume that they were either destroyed or captured. The first group of my division was commanded by the commander of the grenadier regiment, Major WEISBERG, the 2nd group, by the commander of the fusilier regiment, Major NUSLER, and I commanded the headquarters group. The name "group" is very conditional, since the composition was unstable. The 1st and 2nd groups had one artillery battalion each, which were actually without ammunition. There was no 3rd division, since it was completely defeated by the Russians on 30.6. They arrived in VOLMA on July 5, they all retreated along with the fighting. While in VELMA, we became aware that MINSK was completely surrounded, and therefore we were. A laconic order was received from the corps - to break through in a south-westerly direction to connect with the German units located west. MINSK. After that, all communication with the corps was interrupted.

I began to move towards the road MINSK, SLUTSK. In the area of ​​the village of SINILO, on July 6, I ran into the Russians, since there was no way to escape, I accepted the battle. Part of my people broke through, and with the other part I was forced to retreat into the forest. By this time, I had completely lost the Nussler group and most of the equipment. Only 5-6 tanks, 7-8 armored vehicles and 4 guns remained in the division, which was abandoned on the night of July 6-7 due to lack of fuel.

The situation was hopeless, the division was a miserable group, just like the rest of the divisions of the 4th army. Around 2 am on July 7, I gave the order to split up into small groups and make our way to the west. Personally, I organized a group of 10-11 people, which included, in addition to me, the commander of the artillery regiment, Lieutenant Colonel RATZEL, Art. lieutenant FADKE and 7-8 soldiers, with this group I tried to get out of the encirclement. By dawn, we were forced to hide in the forest, as we were not far from the Russians. I was noticed by the soldiers of my division, who wanted to join me, which was not entirely desirable for me, as this would have made it difficult to get out. By their movement they betrayed our presence to the Russians, the latter surrounded the forest. I managed to slip away with 6 people and hide in the rye, where I sat until lunchtime. When everything calmed down, we again tried to slip between the Russians, but the latter quickly surrounded us and captured us. Everything happened so quickly that there was no time for resistance, and besides, it would be pointless. Such is the sad story of my captivity and the story of such a quick defeat of the Feldherrnhalle division. Its history is similar to the history of many divisions of the army group of the center, which were also forced to flee and then were defeated. And all this happened due to the rapid advance of the Russians and their quick implementation of their plan to encircle our formations, which retreated in disorder, losing in most cases all control, so, for example, I lost my division headquarters before July 1-2. Our attempts to restore order during the retreat were frustrated by units of the Red Army, which constantly outstripped us and forced us to fight when we retreated.

QUESTION: What losses did the formations of the army group of the center suffer as a result of the June offensive of the Red Army units?

ANSWER: I have accurate data only about my division, which lost up to 11 thousand people in a few days of the Russian offensive, 55 T-IV tanks, 12 - 150-mm heavy infantry guns on self-propelled mounts, 8 - 150-mm heavy infantry motorized guns, 18 - 108 mm self-propelled howitzers, 12 - 105 mm motorized howitzers, 4 − 100 mm motorized guns, 24 assault guns, 12 - 7.5 cm motorized anti-tank guns, 8 - 8.8 cm and 8 - 20 mm anti-aircraft guns, up to 600 light machine guns, 18 armored cars, 20 small armored personnel carriers [ I mean Sd.Kfz. 250 - ed.], 40 large conveyors [ meaning Sd Kfz 251 - ed..] and up to 3 thousand cars, of which up to 150 pcs. cars.

As for the rest of the formations, I can say, not without reason, that they overwhelmingly had the same losses as my division, it is very difficult to make any other assumption.

QUESTION: How do you explain such a rapid defeat of the army group of the center and how much will this defeat affect the general position of Germany?

ANSWER: The first and main reason for the defeat of the army group of the center is the miscalculation of our command. The German command expected that the Russians in this area would conduct holding battles, and they would inflict the main blow in the south, where our reserves were brought up.

Thus, in the area of ​​​​the army group of the center, the Russians received a clear advantage in people and equipment.

The second reason is a number of our tactical mistakes, expressed in the fact that we, as it were, clung to certain points, areas, at a time when the Russians skillfully bypassed and surrounded us.

The third reason is that the Russians quickly saddled the main roads, which ensured their rapid advance.

The fourth reason is the advantage of the Russians in the air. Their aircraft interrupted our communications with impunity and demoralized the retreating formations. I believe that with the forces that the Russians had, they could achieve greater success if they showed more initiative, quickly reorganized in accordance with the requirements of the current situation, and acted less according to the template or plan developed by them, which the situation demanded to change.

[TsAMO F. 500 Op. 12462 D. 447. LL. 182–185.]

Protocol of interrogation P.N. Nifontov, senior sergeant of the 10th anti-tank brigade of the 40th army, in the Smersh counterintelligence department of the Podolsky special camp No. 174

I am an investigator of the ROC "Smersh" from / camp 174 Art. Lieutenant Petyagin, interrogated a former soldier: Nifontov Pavel Nikolaevich, born in 1908, native of the village of Tyulka, Dobryansky district, Molotov region, Russian, 8th grade education, candidate member of the CPSU (b) since 1942. , before being drafted into the Red Army - beg. planning department of the Zaozersky repair and maintenance base (Molotov). He was drafted into the Red Army on May 14, 1942 by the Ordzhonikidze RVC (Molotov).

On liability for giving false testimony under Art. 95 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR I am warned. Nifontov

Question: From the initial data of the questionnaire, it is known that at the time of your capture by the Germans, your party candidate card was confiscated. It's right?

Answer: Yes. It is correct that at the time of my capture by the Germans, my party candidate card was confiscated from me (the number of which I do not remember), but it was issued by the political department of the 10th anti-tank fighter brigade.

Question: Specify when and under what circumstances your party candidate card was confiscated?

Answer: Being in the service as a gun commander of the 10th Istr. anti-tank brigade, which took up defense and fought defensive battles in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe Merefa railway station, where during these battles on March 11, 1943 I was seriously shell-shocked. As a result, I was sent to a hospital near the Merefa railway station. On March 14, 1943, our brigade left the occupied line of defense and began to make a retreat in the direction of the mountains. Kharkov. In the same direction, we, the sick, began to be evacuated. Moreover, I, among 5 people, followed on foot, due to the lack of transport. Not reaching the mountains. Kharkov km 8, we learned that it was already occupied by the Germans. Then we began to follow a detour in the direction of the mountains. Chuguev. And during this march on March 17, 1943, when we were passing through the village of Vasishchevo, here we were detained by German soldiers, who during the search confiscated a party candidate card, a military ID and a Red Army book. Where they put these documents, I do not know. When we personally documents were not destroyed.

Question: Where were you taken as a communist after being detained by German soldiers?

Answer: As soon as we were detained, our group of 5 people was immediately transferred to the assembly point of prisoners of war in the village of Bezlyudovka. And on the next day of captivity, among a large group of prisoners of war, they were transferred to a camp on Kholodnaya Gora near the city of Kharkov, where we arrived on March 19, 1943.

Question: When and who interrogated you about belonging to the CPSU(b), being in German captivity?

Answer: As at the moment of captivity, so during the entire time I was in German captivity, I was never interrogated by anyone.

Question: How long were you kept in the camp of the mountains. Kharkov and what did they do there?

Answer: I was kept in the Kholodnaya Gora camp for about one month, where I did absolutely nothing. was ill. April 26, 1943, among 60 people. I was assigned to work at the Kuryazh railway station, where most of the ammunition was unloaded. On June 23, 1943, as a sick person (swelling of the legs), I and two other prisoners of war (whose names I do not remember) were sent back to Kholodnaya Gora to the camp. After staying in this camp for about 2 weeks, when the state of health improved, on July 5-6, 1943, there were about the same number of people. 80, were sent to work in the city of Liptsy, where we performed various jobs: dug dugouts and trenches, built bathhouses, and made firewood. When the German units began to retreat, then they began to drive us to the rear of the German troops through Kharkov to Kremenchug. During this retreat, we were forced to repair roads and build fortifications in separate settlements. During this retreat, on September 19, 1943, in the area of ​​the Chapaev farm in the Kobelyaksky district, I escaped from German captivity. And on September 22 of this year, in the same area, we met with units of the Red Army.

Question: Why didn't you escape from German captivity before?

Answer: He did not leave German captivity just because he was under guard all the time.

Question: Did prisoners of war leave your group?

Answer: Yes, they were leaving, but the Germans immediately caught them. One of them was shot, and the other was sent to a camp on Kholodnaya Gora.

Question: Did you know those persons who escaped from German captivity?

Answer: I don't remember the names of those people, but I knew them personally, because they worked in the same brigade.

Question: Were you aware of the intention of those persons to escape from German captivity?

Answer: No. I didn't know about it. But when those persons escaped, then I found out.

Question: How did you become aware of the perfect escape of those persons?

Answer: It became known to me only at the evening inspection, which was carried out inside the camp.

Question: Who led your group of Germans?

Answer: Our group was led by a German who had the military rank of corporal (I don't remember his last name); he did not have an interpreter, because he could speak Russian himself.

Question: What other Germans do you know?

Answer: I don't know any other Germans.

Question: Name those persons who are known to you as traitors to the Motherland?

Answer: I cannot name such persons, because I do not remember their names. But I give an explanation that from the conversations of Ignatiev Semyon and Korolev Ivan, who are in this special camp, they said in conversations that in those camps where they were kept, someone worked there as a policeman (note the surname is omitted). The latter is also in this special camp. I reported this to the counterintelligence department of the 69th Army. The protocol of interrogation from my words was written down correctly and was read by me.

Interrogated: Investigator of the ROC "Smersh" from / camp 174
Art. Lt. Petyagin

D.3412. L.3-4ob. Script. Manuscript.

Vlasov Andrey Andreevich

Record of the interrogation of a prisoner of war, Lieutenant General of the Red Army M F Lukin on December 14, 1941

Record of interrogation of a prisoner of war

Lieutenant General of the Red Army M.F. Lukin

The text of the interrogation below was sent from the territory of the USSR occupied by German troops to Berlin for review by Hitler. M.F. Lukin (1892-1970), Hero of the Russian Federation (1993), lieutenant general, who testified, commanded the 16th, 20th and 19th armies during the war. In October 1941, in the Vyazma region, he was seriously wounded and captured by the Germans, and released in May 1945.

General Lukin, seriously wounded, was taken prisoner by the Germans. We had already talked to him several times, but we didn’t talk much, due to his serious condition. Now Lieutenant General Lukin said the following:

If you want me to answer your question: "Why does the Russian people, despite all their hatred of Stalin and the Soviet system, continue to defend them?" - then I can answer in such a way as to be very honest in a conversation with you. You talk about the liberation of the peoples of Russia from the Bolshevik system and about a new order for the future of Europe, but at the same time you say that only Russians are the bearers of Bolshevism, and Ukrainians, for example, are not. This is bullshit. Bolshevism is as alien to the Russian people as it is to the Ukrainians. In general, this is an international teaching. The Bolsheviks were able to win in Russia only because agriculture was terribly neglected after the 1st World War. The communists promised land to the peasants, and factories and factories to the workers, so the people supported them. Of course, this was a terrible mistake, because today the peasant, in comparison with the past, has nothing at all. In the best case, a collective farmer in Siberia receives 4 kg of bread a day, and the average wage of a worker is 300-500 rubles a month, for which he cannot buy anything. When there is nothing to eat and there is a constant fear of the system, then of course the Russians would be very grateful for the destruction and deliverance from the Stalinist regime. Only very high representatives of the Soviet party apparatus live tolerably well. The commander of an infantry division, in comparison with them, lives poorly. But I still do not believe that in the current conditions, within the USSR, a popular, anti-Stalin uprising can take place. The Bolsheviks shed too much blood in their 20 years of power, and everyone who could raise such an uprising has already been destroyed. And even if there exists, for example, such a commander or general who would think about such an uprising and about a new Russia, he still could not do anything, since there are too many commissars and security officers around him. Even if this general only talks about it with his friends, he will still not be able to do anything, because even among the military there are a lot of scammers and no one can be trusted. Therefore, to carry out an anti-Stalinist uprising, a strong impetus from outside is needed. You Germans can crush the system, but you must not think that the people can do it themselves, despite their hatred of the regime. And you should not reproach or punish the Russians for not rebelling.

You are talking about the liberation of the peoples. But we have not heard anything about the liberation of Ukraine or Belarus, captured by you, and we are told that there will be no freedom for Russia either. This generates resistance to the aggressor. Of course, the party apparatus and the Chekists are not friends, but the invading enemy is an aggressor, and we must fight him. Starting from September of this year, 150 new rifle divisions are being formed on the Volga and east of the Volga, and possibly more, but by no means less than 150. We ourselves had to give some commanders and commissars from our army for these new divisions. In 4-5 months these divisions will either complete their formation or will already be at the front. They will also have tanks. A friend of mine told me that 60 tanks are being built daily, later this number will be increased to 80. This includes the factories of Leningrad and those factories that were evacuated to the East of the country. The main types of tanks under construction "T-34" and "KB". Also, about 20 aircraft of various types are being built per day, but there will be few artillery and submachine guns. The USA and Great Britain are helping the USSR, but I do not think that their help will be significant. There is not much oil and oil reserves to fully meet the needs, and if the Wehrmacht reaches the Caucasus, then there will be even less of them.

Here, Lieutenant General Lukin asked his interlocutor whether the Germans were going to create an alternative Russian government? To this question of Lukin, the interrogator replied that the creation of such a government would be difficult, because General Lukin himself noticed that everyone who could enter such a government was killed by the Bolsheviks. And if a government is created from random people, the Russian people will think that this government only serves the Germans.

Lukin said: “Maybe this is true. This year you created the Ministry of Eastern Territories Affairs, which helps only you. However, if an alternative Russian government is nevertheless created, many Russians will think about the following: first, an anti-Stalinist government will appear who will stand for Russia, secondly, they can believe that the Germans are really fighting only against the Bolshevik system, and not against Russia, and thirdly, they will see that there are also Russians on your side who are not against Russia but for Russia. Also, the government can become a new hope for the people. Maybe, like me, other generals also think; I know some of them who do not like communism very much, but today they cannot do anything else but support it ".

To the question of the interrogated, whom Lukin could name as alternatives, Lukin replied:

"Today in the USSR there are only two people who are quite popular - this is Budyonny and Timoshenko. Budyonny is a man of the people, in 1938 Stalin did not like him very much, and many people know this. If Budyonny and Timoshenko led the uprising, then, perhaps not much blood was shed. But they, too, must be sure that there will be Russia and a Russian government. Both Budyonny and Timoshenko are not very fond of communist principles, and although they were products of the Bolshevik system, they could come forward, if they saw an alternative.The new Russia does not have to be the same as the old one.It can even be without Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states, being in good relations with Germany.So it’s only in your power to help create such a Russia and a government, and not in ours. Zhukov and Shaposhnikov are not so popular, but they are very good soldiers. True, I do not think that the new formed divisions will be able to conduct offensive operations; they can only defend well yatsya. Very many do not want to fight, and when our attackers were on the offensive, they were often taken prisoner very easily. In the area south of Yartsevo, you had 50 guns per 1 km of the front, but our infantry still had to advance three times. There were a lot of dead, and very many did not want to break out of the encirclement, but surrendered. Still, the losses amounted to at least 10,000 people.

New rocket-launchers are beginning to arrive at the front, which previously only armies had, but now divisions will have as well. Hitherto there has been such an order that not a single installation was to be captured by you, and I myself gave the order to destroy them if they were in danger. Now there are a lot of them. If it becomes possible to more accurately organize their shooting, then their importance will increase dramatically. Since they are easy to manufacture, they will appear on the front of the installation soon. You must pay attention to them.

I don't think the Red Army will start waging chemical warfare. Now I ask you to know that all this was said by a Russian who loves his people, and I don't want it to get any worse. I ask you to keep all this a secret, since I have a family."

New watch. Russian military history magazine. (St. Petersburg). 1994. No 2. S. 173-175.

Here is given from the book: Readers on national history (1914-1945) edited by A.F. Kiseleva, E.M. Shagina. M. 1996