Warrior 2 rank. Ed.

). Warriors considered military reserve of the 2nd and 3rd stage, existed until 1917.

Warrior

State militia soldier

Members of the militia enjoy general civil rights and are subject to the jurisdiction of a general court, with the exception of: 1) failure to appear for conscription for active service or for training camps and 2) crimes and misdemeanors associated with violation of the laws of discipline and duties of military service, as well as minor misdemeanors while in service in training sessions. From the moment of being called up for active service, for the reinforcement of permanent troops or for the formation of militia units, all restrictions and special rules established for military personnel apply to those who are in the militia. While in active military service, the ranks of the militia retain their positions, which they occupied in the state civil service, the maintenance assigned to them, pensions and the right to credit the time spent in military service, within the length of service established for the production of civil ranks, etc. P..

Write a review on the article "Warrior"

Notes

ill. 92. Warriors in tegils and iron hats // A. V. Viskovatova.
ill. 2562. Arrows of the militia of the Vologda and Olonets provinces, 1812 // Historical description of clothing and weapons of the Russian troops, with drawings, compiled by the highest command: in 30 volumes, in 60 books. / Ed. A. V. Viskovatova.
ill. 2527. Equestrian Cossack of the Moscow militia 1812-1831 // Historical description of clothing and weapons of the Russian troops, with drawings, compiled by the highest command: in 30 tons, in 60 books. / Ed. A. V. Viskovatova.
ill. 1340. Banners granted: a) to the Georgian militia in 1842 b) to the Georgian Cavalry Team of Hunters in 1854. // Historical description of clothing and weapons of the Russian troops, with drawings, compiled by the highest command: in 30 tons, in 60 books. / Ed. A. V. Viskovatova.
Military Encyclopedic Dictionary (VES), M ., VI, g., 863 pages with illustrations (ill.), 30 sheets (ill.)

Literature

// Encyclopedic Dictionary of Brockhaus and Efron
// Encyclopedic Dictionary of Brockhaus and Efron: in 86 volumes (82 volumes and 4 additional). - St. Petersburg. , 1890-1907.
The Great Soviet Encyclopedia (BSE), Third Edition, published by the Soviet Encyclopedia publishing house in -1978 in 30 volumes;
Radio control - Tachanka / [gen. ed. N. V. Ogarkova]. - M. : Military publishing house of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1980. - 693 p. - (Soviet military encyclopedia: [in 8 volumes]; 1976-1980, v. 7).;
Military Encyclopedic Dictionary (VES), M ., VI, g., 863 pages with illustrations (ill.), 30 sheets (ill.);
Edited by: V.A. Zolotareva, V.V. Marushchenko, S.S. Avtyushin. In the name of Russia: Russian state, army and military education. - M .: "Rus-RKB", 1999. - S. 336 + incl .. - ISBN 5-86273-020-6.

An excerpt characterizing the Warrior

- I'm asking you. I don't know anything except that I got to you by force.
- What about us, brother? Horror! I’m sorry, brother, they laughed at Mack, but it’s even worse for themselves, ”said Nesvitsky. - Sit down and eat something.
“Now, prince, you won’t find any wagons, and your Peter God knows where,” said another adjutant.
- Where is the main apartment?
- We will spend the night in Znaim.
“And so I packed everything I needed for myself on two horses,” said Nesvitsky, “and they made excellent packs for me. Though through the Bohemian mountains to escape. Bad, brother. What are you, really unwell, why are you trembling so? Nesvitsky asked, noticing how Prince Andrei twitched, as if from touching a Leyden jar.
“Nothing,” answered Prince Andrei.
At that moment he remembered his recent encounter with the doctor's wife and the Furshtat officer.
What is the Commander-in-Chief doing here? - he asked.
“I don’t understand anything,” said Nesvitsky.
“I only understand that everything is vile, vile and vile,” said Prince Andrei and went to the house where the commander-in-chief was standing.
Passing by Kutuzov's carriage, the tortured riding horses of the retinue, and the Cossacks, who were talking loudly among themselves, Prince Andrei entered the hallway. Kutuzov himself, as Prince Andrei was told, was in the hut with Prince Bagration and Weyrother. Weyrother was the Austrian general who replaced the slain Schmitt. In the passage little Kozlovsky was squatting in front of the clerk. The clerk, on an inverted tub, turned up the cuffs of his uniform, hastily wrote. Kozlovsky's face was exhausted - he, apparently, also did not sleep the night. He glanced at Prince Andrei and did not even nod his head at him.
- The second line ... Did you write? - he continued, dictating to the clerk, - Kyiv grenadier, Podolsky ...
“You won’t be in time, your honor,” the clerk answered irreverently and angrily, looking back at Kozlovsky.
At that time, Kutuzov's animatedly dissatisfied voice was heard from behind the door, interrupted by another, unfamiliar voice. By the sound of these voices, by the inattention with which Kozlovsky looked at him, by the irreverence of the exhausted clerk, by the fact that the clerk and Kozlovsky were sitting so close to the commander-in-chief on the floor near the tub, and by the fact that the Cossacks holding the horses laughed loudly under by the window of the house - for all this, Prince Andrei felt that something important and unfortunate was about to happen.
Prince Andrei urged Kozlovsky with questions.
“Now, prince,” said Kozlovsky. - Disposition to Bagration.
What about surrender?
- There is none; orders for battle were made.
Prince Andrei went to the door, through which voices were heard. But just as he was about to open the door, the voices in the room fell silent, the door opened of its own accord, and Kutuzov, with his aquiline nose on his plump face, appeared on the threshold.
Prince Andrei stood directly opposite Kutuzov; but from the expression of the commander-in-chief's only sighted eye, it was clear that thought and care occupied him so much that it seemed as if his vision was obscured. He looked directly at the face of his adjutant and did not recognize him.
- Well, are you finished? he turned to Kozlovsky.
“Just a second, Your Excellency.
Bagration, short, with an oriental type of hard and motionless face, dry, not yet an old man, followed the commander-in-chief.
“I have the honor to appear,” Prince Andrei repeated rather loudly, handing the envelope.
“Ah, from Vienna?” Good. After, after!
Kutuzov went out with Bagration to the porch.
“Well, good-bye, prince,” he said to Bagration. “Christ is with you. I bless you for a great achievement.
Kutuzov's face suddenly softened, and tears appeared in his eyes. He pulled Bagration to himself with his left hand, and with his right hand, on which there was a ring, he apparently crossed him with a habitual gesture and offered him a plump cheek, instead of which Bagration kissed him on the neck.
- Christ is with you! Kutuzov repeated and went up to the carriage. “Sit down with me,” he said to Bolkonsky.
“Your Excellency, I would like to be of service here. Let me stay in the detachment of Prince Bagration.
“Sit down,” said Kutuzov and, noticing that Bolkonsky was slowing down, “I myself need good officers, I myself need them.
They got into the carriage and drove in silence for several minutes.
“There is still a lot ahead, a lot of things will happen,” he said with an senile expression of insight, as if he understood everything that was going on in Bolkonsky’s soul. “If one tenth of his detachment comes tomorrow, I will thank God,” added Kutuzov, as if talking to himself.
Prince Andrei glanced at Kutuzov, and involuntarily caught in his eyes, half a yard away from him, the cleanly washed-out assemblies of a scar on Kutuzov's temple, where an Ishmael bullet had pierced his head, and his leaky eye. “Yes, he has the right to speak so calmly about the death of these people!” thought Bolkonsky.
“That is why I ask you to send me to this detachment,” he said.
Kutuzov did not answer. He seemed to have already forgotten what he had said, and sat in thought. Five minutes later, swaying smoothly on the soft springs of the carriage, Kutuzov turned to Prince Andrei. There was no trace of excitement on his face. With subtle mockery, he asked Prince Andrei about the details of his meeting with the emperor, about the reviews heard at court about the Kremlin affair, and about some mutual acquaintances of women.

Kutuzov, through his spy, received on November 1 news that put the army under his command in an almost hopeless situation. The scout reported that the French in huge forces, having crossed the Vienna bridge, headed for the route of communication between Kutuzov and the troops marching from Russia. If Kutuzov decided to remain in Krems, Napoleon's 1500-strong army would cut him off from all communications, surround his exhausted 40,000-strong army, and he would be in the position of Mack near Ulm. If Kutuzov decided to leave the road leading to communications with troops from Russia, then he would have to enter without a road into the unknown regions of the Bohemian
mountains, defending themselves against superior enemy forces, and abandon all hope of communication with Buxhowden. If Kutuzov decided to retreat along the road from Krems to Olmutz to join forces from Russia, then he risked being warned on this road by the French who crossed the bridge in Vienna, and thus being forced to accept the battle on the march, with all the burdens and wagons, and dealing with an enemy who was three times his size and surrounded him on two sides.

The first decade of the new 20th century… The European air was saturated with the atmosphere of the upcoming war: saber-rattling, militant slogans from all sides. A certain tribute to these sentiments was paid at the beginning of the war by Sergei Yesenin (poems "The heroic whistle", "The daring one"). In the critical article “Yaroslavnas are crying,” he wrote: “Listen to the horrors of war,” the strings of great and small poets rang out in unison. On the pages of newspapers and magazines, the names of Balmont, Bryusov, Sologub, Gorodetsky, Lipetsky and others are full of names. They all touch the same string of the “burst shot”.
Sergei Alexandrovich “was one of the representatives of this united people, his poetry was an expression of the same general mood from the position of the peasantry, which he was closely familiar with. This unity of the whole people in the face of the enemy, of course, is modified in the course of the war, but Yesenin's attitude to the war does not change significantly. Even under the Provisional Government, he supports the war to the bitter end,” writes Esenin scholar M. Pavlovsky (USA). However, Yesenin himself, from the words recorded in 1921 by I.N. Rozanov, reported: “A sharp difference with many Petersburg poets of that era was reflected in the fact that they succumbed to militant patriotism, and I, with all my love for the Ryazan fields and for my compatriots, always had a sharp attitude towards the imperialist war and militant patriotism. This patriotism is organically completely alien to me. I even had troubles because I don't write patriotic poems on the theme "thunder of victory, resound", but a poet can only write about what he is organically connected with.
The mood of the rural population of the Ryazan province of that period is vividly characterized by the article of the journalist L. Dnepovich (Fedorchenko Leonid Semenovich, also published under the pseudonym N. Charov) “War and the Ryazan village”: “... The village has now received, as it were, one soul and one heart that cannot do not fight in unison with those fighting on the battlefield. And our Ryazan village is a lot of examples of such a mood. It is characteristic that, according to some of our correspondents, in many villages the usual gatherings for autumn, where the village youth used to have fun, have been completely canceled, as if by tacit agreement of the remaining youth. .<...>Many girls left the villages as nurses in<…>infirmaries<…>. Our village is all absorbed in the worries connected with the war.”
However, in fact, the attitude of the Ryazan peasants to the world war was ambiguous. So, Konstantinovskaya landowner L.I. Kashina, who helped the families of peasants whose fathers, husbands or sons fought at the front, wrote on August 16, 1915 to her cousin N.V. Viktorov: “The village is, in my opinion, indifferent. The other day, the priest, following the decree, asked the peasants to help the soldiers' families with work, and they answer: “What help them, they receive money from the treasury!” I don’t know what it is: indifference from lack of culture or something else…”.
Hopes for a quick victory were not justified. The situation at the fronts was extremely unfortunate, and on March 15, 1915, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the government of the Russian Empire issued a circular obliging all governors to take “measures to ensure that persons who turn 20 by January 1, 1916, are assigned to the subject assigned plots not later than May 1, 1915." And on March 16, Sovereign Emperor Nicholas II already signed a decree on the early conscription of recruits in 1916, to which I belonged. Yesenin.
On April 24, Sergei Alexandrovich informed M.P. Balzamov, that he is going to return from Petrograd to his native places by the deadline: “I will be in Ryazan on May 15th. I need a call.<…>To the 1st<мая>I'll be home. in Konstantinov.
On May 11, in a letter to the editorial secretary of the New Journal for All, prose writer A.A. The poet wrote to Dobrovolsky already from his native village: “Every day I go to the meadows and to the ravine and play rainstorm. The other day I got beat up pretty good. Nearly got his head blown off. I folded, you know, a slanderous addition to the headman, but alone at night he went and hummed her. Sotskie raked me up and dragged me. Anyway, I'll catch them all. They smashed my liver. Well, now hold on. The recruit is all for me, but the peasants are afraid of us.” In the memoirs of one of Yesenin's comrades, N.P. Kalinkin, we read: “Before leaving for Ryazan, they arranged a farewell for us in the village. We then gulnuli then finally firmly. Clearly, not with joy, but with great grief. By this time, the war had taken more than one breadwinner from Konstantinov's families. Yesenin was with us. He well conveyed our mood in the poem “Across the village along a crooked path ...”:

Through the village along a crooked path
On a summer evening blue
Recruits went with a shower
Rough-necked bunch.
Singing about loved ones
Yes, the last few days
"Farewell, dear village,
Dark grove and stumps.
The dawns foamed and melted.
Everyone was shouting, puffing out their chests:
“Before recruiting, grief was looming,
And now it's time to roam...
Waving fair-haired curls,
They started dancing merrily
The girls rattled them with beads,
They called for the village.
The brave guys came out
For humic wattle,
And the girls are stupid
Run away - catch up!
Above the green hills
Scarves fluttered.
Through the fields, wandering with purses,
The old people smiled.
Through the bushes, in the grass above the basts,
Under the fearful exclamation of owls,
The grove laughed at them with tongues
With overflowing voices.
Through the village along a crooked path,
Cheered on the stumps
Recruit played in the shower
About the rest of the days.

1914 (published in the Ogonyok magazine on July 26, 1915).
Complementary information about this period in the life of the poet "Memoirs" E.A. Yesenina, read by her in 1945 at a joint meeting of the State Literary Museum and IMLI them. Gorky: “According to our village custom, all city conscripts had to buy wine, it was called “position”, and they came to Sergei for “position”. You can’t refuse, take it wherever you want, and put the wine, otherwise they can cripple.”
The terms of conscription were strictly regulated by the highest decrees and orders of the government of the Russian Empire. On May 15, 1915, meetings of county presences for military service began in the Ryazan province. Since the village of Konstantinovo was then part of the Kuzminskaya volost (volost foreman Fedor Matveevich Frolov), and the latter - in the Ryazan district, then S.A. Yesenin in Ryazan visited the Ryazan district presence for military service. According to the “Ryazan Address-Calendars” and “Memorable Books of the Ryazan Province” studied by us, it was located on Myasnitskaya Street (now Gorky Street), in the house of the Kalinkin Association. The chairman of the presence was the district marshal of the nobility. About what the Kalinkin partnership had in Ryazan in their own house on the street. Myasnitskaya beer warehouses, we learn from the “Commemorative book of the Ryazan province, ed. 1914".
D.V., a connoisseur of the history of his native land, from Ryazan, helped us to establish the very location of the indicated house. Yeroshin. He said that, according to local old-timers, the house of the former Kalinkinsky partnership is located at: st. Gorky, 98. This is a beautiful two-story building.
Well-known in pre-revolutionary Russia, the Kalinkin Brewery Association was engaged in the production of various varieties of domestic beer. In Ryazan, in several buildings adjacent to each other on Myasnitskaya, the partnership was used to bottle and store beer. On the ground floor of this building there was a tavern and a billiard room of the partnership, which were very popular among Ryazan residents. On the second floor there was located the presence we were looking for - the Ryazan district for military service. In 1925, the Ryazan warehouse of the state Trekhgorny brewery Mosselprom was located here, and in subsequent years, the well-known Ryazan plant of soft drinks, known to all of us, functioned in the complex of buildings of the former Kalinkinsky partnership. This is a very important Yesenin address in the city of Ryazan, which was found during the search work.
It was here on May 20, 1915 that conscript Sergei Yesenin came along with his fellow villagers. The date of appearance was determined according to the memoirs of the same N.P. Kalinkina: “An early draft into the army was announced (a year ahead of schedule), according to which all Konstantinov’s children born in 1895 were to appear in Ryazan on May 20, 1915.”
Yesenin visited this building more than once, since he was first sent to the medical commission from the county conscription presence. On June 2, the poet informed the secretary of the editorial office of the magazine "Voice of Life" L.V. about the expected results of the examination. Berman: “They shaved me into soldiers, but I think they turn me back, because I drooped<близорукий>. I can't see far. Send for a commission<или>". Judging by the tone of these words, at that moment Yesenin was already almost sure that he would receive a deferment from the draft. And on June 12 or 13 from Konstantinov in a letter to the young poet V.S. He reports to Chernyavsky, as a fact, about the postponement until the autumn of his conscription for military service: “In the eyes (that is, as short-sighted - Yu.B.) they left.” Perhaps, in addition to short-sightedness, the general state of health of the recruit Yesenin was also affected by the case when he was seriously beaten by the Konstantinovsky sotskys.
When viewing in the State Archive of the Ryazan Region an archive inventory of the files kept in the Ryazan district for military service, it was established that conscripts, recruits, warriors, white-ticketers, etc. underwent a medical re-examination at the Ryazan Provincial Zemstvo Hospital. The address of the latter is established according to the same “Commemorative book of the Ryazan province, ed. 1914”, where on page 74 it says: “Provincial Zemstvo Hospital, Seminarskaya St., House of the Zemstvo. Phone number 17. The monumental, built in 1816, two-story building of the former provincial zemstvo hospital has been well preserved to this day. Currently here at St. Seminarskaya (former Kalyaeva), 46, houses the city polyclinic No. 14. It was in this building that in May 1915 S.A. was with his fellow villagers for a medical examination. Yesenin. This place is also an important Yesenin address in the city of Ryazan.
For a very long time, no documentary evidence of this event was known. Searches in the State archive of the Ryazan region gave certain results. The “Book of the Ryazan District Military Presence” was discovered to record evidence of deferrals under Articles 47, 61, 63 and 79. Set warrior. pov. For 1915 (hand-written and 1916 - Yu.B.) ", where on the back of sheet 33 there is an entry number 508, dated May 1915:" No. of the lot - 40, No. of the draft list and section - 20, Esinin ( so in the record - Yu.B.) Sergey Alexandrovich, Kuzmin<ской>in<олости>, with. Constant<тиново>, <отсрочка представлена по>47 art. until January 15, 1916" In the "Book" 42 sheets are numbered, laced and sealed with a red wax seal with an imprint of the military presence. The spelling of Yesenin's surname is slightly distorted, instead of the second letter "e" it is written "i". Unfortunately, the clerk did not indicate the exact date of registration of the event, writing only "May". However, on the previous sheet there is an entry “May 16”, after which 8 people are registered in one handwriting. Then three May registrations are made in other handwriting.
On the next page from the entry we are interested in, registration is recorded as early as May 21. So, most likely, the recording was made on May 20, 1915, as N.P. Kalinkin. In the comments to the Complete Works of S.A. Yesenin stated: "We do not have data on why Yesenin was not called up for military service (after a delay) in the fall of 1915." Now it becomes clear to us that the postponement was not until the fall, but until January 15, 1916. Yesenin himself might not have known about this for sure, since the Kuzminsky volost clerk received the documents on the postponement. Therefore, Sergei Alexandrovich wrote in letters to his friends about the postponement until autumn. As a small digression, we add that in this fund in the case “Correspondence on petitions of various persons for granting deferrals of conscription” we found materials in March 1916 in obtaining a certificate of registration to the 4th conscription station of the Ryazan district of the closest friend of childhood and adolescence S.A . Yesenin - Claudius Petrovich Vorontsov, who at that time was a graduate of the Yaroslavl Theological Seminary, who in 1920 became the Komsomol leader of Konstantinov's youth.
Sergei's father, Alexander Nikitich Yesenin, also visited these ancient historical buildings. In 1916, he came to Ryazan to be drafted from the city of Moscow, where, as you know, he served in the butcher's shop of the merchant Krylov. Like his son, he was sent to the medical commission, but was not called up due to an existing chronic illness - bronchial asthma.
“In Ryazan, our father accidentally ended up with the father of Grisha Panfilov<Андреем Федоровичем >who was also drafted into the army. Grisha's father, having heard a familiar surname, asked him if he was related to Serezha Yesenin "3, - recalls Ekaterina Yesenina. On October 20, 1916, Sergei, in a letter to his mother Tatyana Fedorovna, said: “My father recently sent me a letter in which he writes that he is lying<в больнице>with the father of Grisha Panfilov. For me, this is some kind of finger pointing a vicious circle.” Perhaps Alexander Nikitich met Grisha Panfilov's father in Ryazan this time not in connection with the call for military service, as E.A. writes in his memoirs. Yesenin, but simply being treated in the Ryazan Provincial Zemstvo Hospital.
As a result of the delay received by S.A. Yesenin spends several months in his native village. He meets with the young Petrograd poet L.I. Kannegiser. Together they go around all the places adjacent to Konstantinov, travel on foot to Ryazan, to the St. John the Theologian Monastery. Sergei works a lot, writes poetry, including “Ulogiy” (“I am a miserable wanderer ...”), “Robber”, the poem “Mikola”, the story “Yar”, the stories “Bobyl and my friend”, “By white water”, leads a large correspondence. During this period, his poems were published in the Monthly Journal, New Journal for Everyone, Northern Notes, Russian Thought, Ogonyok, the Birzhevye Vedomosti newspaper, etc.
Summer flew by very quickly, autumn came. According to the memoirs of E.A. Yesenina: “At home we have a real alarm. The war with the Germans required more and more victims. The turn has come to our Sergei. The cause for concern was the Highest Manifesto on the convocation of the state militia of the 2nd category and the decree of the Sovereign Emperor to the Governing Senate of September 3 on the conscription of militia warriors of 2- of the first category from 1916 to 1912 inclusive, to which Yesenin belonged.
He already knew his worth, understood the uniqueness of his creative talent. We understand his then emotional experiences and torments. On the one hand, these are high patriotic impulses, and on the other hand, numerous funerals that come to his native village, a purely human fear of a young lad to fall on the battlefield as mere cannon fodder. Not having any support among those in power in the provincial center, the poet was going to Petrograd, where he remembered a good reception. Moreover, the peasant poet N.A. Klyuev invited to the first meeting. The development of events was accelerated by the publication in the newspaper “Ryazansky Vestnik” dated September 29, 1915 (No. 222) of information “On warriors of the 2nd category”: “The following telegram was sent to governors, town governors and heads of regions, No. 30141 regarding warriors of the 2nd category: “Conscripted warriors of the 2nd category, capable of carrying weapons, who now find themselves with diseases indicated in the schedule letter A, are not accepted for service.<…>Warriors with visual acuity of less than 0.5 in both eyes can wear glasses and are accepted for non-combatant service.
On the same day, S.A. Yesenin leaves Konstantinovo and travels through Moscow to Petrograd. Here begins a very important period in the life of the poet. This is the time of writing and publishing significant poetic works, the creation and active participation in the work of the literary and artistic society "Strada", the publication of his first poetry collection "Radunitsa", a period of numerous performances to a wide metropolitan audience. This is the time of new acquaintances with venerable poets and writers, representatives of the creative intelligentsia, communication with influential people and even presentations to royalty. And everywhere success and enthusiastic reception. That's just the upcoming military service stirred up the soul. Yes, and here Sergei Alexandrovich was lucky. In determining the fate of a warrior of the 2nd category, S.A. Yesenin, his friends S.M. played a big role. Gorodetsky, M.P. Murashev, N.A. Klyuev and, of course, the main one - Colonel D.N. Loman, staff officer at the Palace Commandant, ktitor of the Fedorovsky Sovereign Cathedral, head of the military hospital train No. 143 and the infirmary in the Fedorovsky town.
In the memoirs of a journalist and publishing worker M.P. Murashov, we find the following useful information for us: “Spring of 1916. The imperialist war is in full swing. In spring and autumn, young people were drafted into the army. After a year's delay, Yesenin was also going to be called up again. Alarmed, he came to me and asked me to help him buy a railway ticket for a trip to his homeland, to the village, and then to Ryazan to be called up. I began to dissuade him, arguing that in the event of a draft in Ryazan, he would end up in an army unit, and from there it would not be easy to get him out. He advised to be called up in Petrograd, and took all the trouble upon himself. And indeed, I arranged for Yesenin to be drafted into a military unit under the Petrograd military commander. The turnout was scheduled for 15 April. Although the poet calmed down a little, the forthcoming call depressed him.” In the book "Sergey Yesenin in Tsarskoe Selo" the researcher of the life and work of Yesenin L.F. Karokhin writes: “Judging by the memoirs of Mikhail Murashev, Sergei Yesenin was for some time in one of the reserve battalions in Petrograd in Baskov lane (house 7).<…>From the reserve battalion, Yesenin was transferred to the Trophy Commission, where he stayed for several days, and only after that the place of his military service was finally determined - the Fedorovsky town of Tsarskoye Selo. April 5 N.A. Klyuev, in response to his letter to Tsarskoye Selo, which began with the words: “To Colonel Loman about the song brother Sergei Yesenin,” received from D.N. Loman's certificate for transfer to Yesenin /
On April 16, on the basis of the order of the Office of the Chief Plenipotentiary of the Northern District of the Russian Red Cross Society dated April 14, No. 2899/25833, S.A. Yesenin was seconded by the Petrograd reserve of orderlies to the Tsarskoye Selo military hospital train No. 143. And on April 20, he arrived at the place of his military service, presenting on the spot the documents issued to him by the Petrograd reserve of orderlies. Thus began the period of his military service, which influenced not only his fate, but also left a noticeable mark on the poet's work.
At the initiative of the author of the article, in 2014, in memory of this event and the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War in Ryazan, with a large gathering of the public, a memorial plaque was installed and opened on the former building of the Ryazan district for military service.

This is an excerpt from the interrogation of a prisoner of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Donetsk. Link to the video of the interrogation at the end of the page. The prisoner of war speaks Surzhik (a mixture of Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian languages), he deciphered everything for you in Russian.

I am a soldier Zhemelinsky Vasil Leonidovich. I live in the Kirovograd region, Dalinsky district, the village of Marfivka. Unmarried, living with parents. Parents live there at the place of registration.

He served in the information and telecommunications communications unit and the 57th separate motorized infantry brigade, was also seconded to the 34th brigade of the 2nd battalion of the 2nd company. I got into military service in 2016. On March 14, I was called up, on the 15th I already signed the contract. On March 15, it will be two years since I have been in military service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Basically, I went because of the money, there was not enough money in civilian life, so I went to serve on a contract. In Lviv, he trained at the Yavoriv training ground. From February 16 to February 17 of this year, the commander set the task for our group to advance towards the enemy, to find out their positions. The group consisted of eight people. We moved out and began to move closer to the enemy, they found us and started shooting. The battle began and our group was broken. Two were wounded, two were killed, I was taken prisoner. The rest basically fled. They abandoned me, they just abandoned me. Although they could help.

- Does Ukraine violate the ceasefire regime?
Yes, they do. Although the commanders do not bring us. We are trying to follow the situation from the media, TV, the Internet. From the infantry every day there are violations. And from a large 120s (120-mm mortar), well, like that. From the large-caliber headquarters gives the order, mainly the company commander.
120th mortars, ZU, LNG, BRDM from this also give the order to open fire.

- Have you seen foreign instructors in the places of deployment of the Ukrainian army?
- Yes, in the training center at the Yavoriv training ground. There are Americans and Poles, groups of them. They built a good city where they live. Their houses are very good, with all the conditions, better than ours. We live in tents, they live, one might say, in mansions. They have their own technology. They train Ukrainian servicemen. Ukrainian military. A group of Americans and Poles came to our positions not so long ago. They examined the positions and asked how they served. We went to the Sand area, examined the territory.
- Do any commissions come to check the combat positions of Ukrainian units?
- Yes, just recently. From the headquarters of the ATO, there were generals, colonels, and foreigners were with them. Two groups. It turns out that they were on two cars, Americans and Poles. They also examined the positions, everything is complete. They checked the readiness of the positions and whether they were ready to attack, go into battle at any moment, if there was an order.
- If your battalion was given an order to go on the offensive, would many of them carry it out?
- I think the order would be executed, the order is the order. They would, but there would be no point. There are few people, people are tired of this war. People are not allowed to go on vacation.

- What is your personal attitude to everything that happens?
- My personal attitude is that she would soon end this war and just return home.
- What is the morale of the Ukrainian servicemen on the front line?
- Most people want to quit after a rotation, which probably won't happen. Most of those who have been serving since the 14th, they are already tired of all this, they are fed up. Yes, and families are dripping on the brain. No father or son at home. Those who have recently come to the service, they will serve. They serve mainly for money. If we now remove the ATO salary, 10 thousand hryvnias. pay (approx. 20 thousand rubles), many would quit, this is 100%.
- What can you say about the fact that you were declared a deserter?
- This is just an attitude towards the soldiers, so you can say about any soldier who is on the front line. Send him to his death, and this is not only now, this is for all time. They just sent soldiers to their deaths. They can say this about all of them: "they went AWOL, now it is not known where, traitors to Ukraine" and the like. They do not think how parents then live with the fact that their son will be considered a traitor. You are on the front line, performing a combat mission. And then they will say that you went to SOC. They treat us soldiers like creatures. SOCH is the unauthorized abandonment of a part. I want to tell mom, dad - I'm alive and well. Hello. Don't worry everything will be fine.

Subscribe to the channel. It's interesting here.

Plan:

1 Warrior
2 State militia soldier

Introduction

Warriors in tegils and iron caps, A. V. Viskovatov, “Historical description of clothing and weapons of the Russian troops” Part 1, 1841 (g.).

Warrior(from: Rat), in the military affairs of Russia, this term has the following meanings:

Warrior, Ratai, Military (military) man in Russia. Unlike the warriors of the princely squad warriors from among the rural population (smerds) and townspeople were collected in an amount determined by the prince, only as needed;
In Russia of the Imperial period - a soldier of the state militia (reserve of the Armed Forces). Warriors the military reserve of the 2nd and 3rd stage were considered, they existed until 1917;
Revolver "Warrior" - a five-shot revolver of 13x45 caliber that allows the use of cartridges both traumatic (with 2 rubber bullets) and filled with an irritant (tear or irritant gas);
Revolver "Warrior" - a five-shot revolver of 410x45 Rubber caliber, which allows the use of cartridges of both traumatic action (bullet diameter 16 mm, weight about 3 grams) and filled with irritant;

1. Warrior

Warriors of the Moscow state - Data people. The temporarily existing order for the collection of military people was in charge of the data people.

2. Soldier of the state militia

Members of the militia, except for officers, are called warriors and are divided into two categories. The first category, intended both for the formation of special militia units and for replenishment, if necessary, of parts of the permanent troops, consists of those who served in the troops and are listed in the militia from the reserve, and of those enlisted in the militia when called up for service - persons who are physically quite fit for service, except for those enjoying benefits due to marital status of the 1st category; in the second, intended exclusively for the formation of militia units - physically unfit for service in the permanent troops, but capable of carrying weapons, and preferential 1st category.

In peacetime, only all those listed in the militia from the reserve and four younger ages from those enrolled in the militia at the initial call are kept. The same persons can be called up for training camps, no more than two times in total, for a period of up to 6 weeks. First time training camp warriors militias were produced in 1890 and have been repeated annually since then.

The state militia of the 1st category is convened by the Highest Decree to the government senate, and the call warriors 2nd category - the Highest Manifesto. The dissolution of the militia is announced by a personal decree. The convened militia is formed into foot squads, cavalry hundreds, artillery batteries, engineer companies, naval crews, semi-crews and companies. Formation must be completed in 28 days. Places of formation of militia units are determined in advance; in these places, under the administrations of district military commanders, in peacetime, special lower ranks are formed, two for each company, hundred or battery. Part of the expenses for the education and maintenance of the militia units is attributed to the treasury (maintenance of personnel, supply of weapons, convoys, etc.), part - to the account of zemstvo institutions (the initial supply of warriors with uniforms, the establishment of household supplies, etc.).

Militia units are assigned a special uniform. It is supposed to introduce militia units into the composition of the active armies only as an exception; in general, the purpose of the militia is to replace the reserve troops.

Members of the militia enjoy general civil rights and are subject to the jurisdiction of a general court, with the exception of: 1) failure to appear for conscription for active service or for training camps and 2) crimes and misdemeanors associated with violation of the laws of discipline and duties of military service, as well as minor misdemeanors while in service in training sessions. From the moment of being called up for active service, for the reinforcement of permanent troops or for the formation of militia units, all restrictions and special rules established for military personnel apply to those who are in the militia. While in active military service, the ranks of the militia retain the positions that they occupied in the state civil service, the maintenance assigned to them, pensions and the right to count the time spent in military service in the length of service established for the production of civil ranks, etc. P..

Notes

Military Encyclopedic Dictionary (VES), M ., VI, 1984, 863 pages with illustrations (ill.), 30 sheets (ill.)
"War" in the dictionary. - feb-web.ru/feb/slovoss/ss-abc/ss5/ss5-0271.htm

Literature

The Great Soviet Encyclopedia (BSE), Third Edition, published by the Soviet Encyclopedia publishing house in 1969-1978 in 30 volumes;
Soviet military encyclopedia (SVE), M ., Order of the Red Banner of Labor, military publishing house (VI) of the USSR Ministry of Defense in 1977-1979 in 8 volumes;
Military Encyclopedic Dictionary (VES), M ., VI, 1984, 863 pages with illustrations (ill.), 30 sheets (ill.);
In the Name of Russia: The Russian state, army and military education / textbook on public-state training (OGP) for officers and ensigns of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation / Edited by: V. A. Zolotarev, V. V. Marushchenko, S. S. Avtyushin. - M .: publishing house "Rus-RKB", 1999. - 336 p. + incl.
Edited by: V.A. Zolotareva, V.V. Marushchenko, S.S. Avtyushin. In the name of Russia: the Russian state, the army and military education. - M .: "Rus-RKB", 1999. - S. 336 + incl .. - ISBN 5-86273-020-6

The strength and losses of the Russian armed forces in the First World War

Use of human resources during the war years

It was already mentioned earlier that before the start of mobilization, the Russian army numbered 1 million 423 thousand people. [ ] During the war, another 13 million 700 thousand people were drafted into it. Thus, in total, 15 million 378 thousand people were put under arms. (round about 15.5 million people) For peasant Russia, this was a huge figure: half of the able-bodied men went to the army (out of 1,000 people - 474); out of every 100 peasant farms, 60 men of the most “draughty” age died at the call, as a result, more than half of the farms were left without breadwinners.

In relation to the entire population of the country (without distinction of sex and age), out of every thousand citizens, 112 people left for the war. Full statistical information about the called-up human contingent is given in table 47, compiled from the most reliable sources [ ] .

Table 47

Volumes of conscription of human resources to the Russian army at various stages of the war

Time period	Categories of conscripts	Number of people called (in thousand)	Total taken from the population (cumulative total) (in thousand)
1914
On 18.07.	The size of the Russian army at the beginning of mobilization		1423
During August - September	The lower ranks of the army and navy, officers, doctors and nurses, class ranks (military officials, Cossacks)	3115
	Warriors * reserve militias of the 1st category at the age of 40 - 43 years old, who have served active duty	400
	Warriors of the reserve militia of the 1st category, who did not serve in the army, aged 22-25 years	400
During October - November	Warriors of the reserve militia of the 1st category, who did not serve in the army, aged 22-32 years	500
	Recruits** aged 21	715
Total		5130	6553
1915
During January - August	Warriors of the militia reserve of the 1st category, who did not serve in the army, aged 21-36 years	1080
		1305

Continuation of the table. 47

During September - November	Warriors of the militia reserve of the 1st category, who did not serve in the army, aged 20-38 years	405
	Warriors of the reserve militia, 2nd category, aged 20-26 years	1325
	Recruits aged 21	932
Total		5047	11600
1916
During January - August	Warriors of the militia reserve of the 1st category, who did not serve in the army, aged 2 1-40 years	130
	Reserve militia warriors, 2nd category, aged 28-31	600
	Re-certified white-ticketers***	100
	Recruits aged 19	908

Ratnik - a soldier of the state militia of Russia, which existed until October 1917. The militia included: persons liable for military service (from 20 to 43 years old), who in peacetime were exempted from conscription due to unfitness for military service, but were considered fit for it in war time; persons who previously completed military service and were in the reserve (up to 43 years). The state militia was divided into warriors of the 1st category, fit for military service and intended to replenish the army, and warriors of the 2nd category, fit for non-combatant service. Due to the fact that by the middle of 1915 almost the entire contingent of militia warriors of the 1st category had been exhausted, the question arose of replenishing the active army with warriors of the 2nd category. - Military History Journal, 1993, No. 6, p. 62-66).Recruit - in pre-revolutionary Russia, a person of military age enrolled in active military service by a county, city or district military presence. After the draft, the recruits were sent to military units as part of special marching teams or in stages in their own clothes, with the issuance of fodder money on the route. From the moment they arrived at the unit, they became soldiers (sailors). The draft age for recruits during the war dropped from 21 to 19.White ticket - a person exempted from conscription in the army due to unfitness for military service for health reasons.

Table 48 provides generalized information about the age composition of the entire human contingent drafted into the Russian army on the eve and during the war.

Thus, in total, 15 million 378 thousand people were involved in the Russian armed forces during the war. Of them:

Consisted in the army before the start of mobilization - 1 million 423 thousand people;
Called for mobilization - 13 million 955 thousand people.

Including:

Reserve officials of all categories - 3 million 115 thousand people;
Militia warriors of the 1st category, transferred from the reserve 400 thousand people;
Warriors of the militia of the 1st category who did not pass active military service - 2 million 705 thousand people;
Militia warriors of the 2nd category - 3 million 75 thousand people;
Recruits - 4 million 460 thousand people;
Re-examined white-ticketers - 200 thousand people.

Table 48

The age composition of the Russian army during the war

The following is information on the number of persons liable for military service who were subject to conscription during the war in accordance with the law on military service, but received a deferment as they worked for the needs of the state's defense on October 1, 1916. This information is calculated by the following figures:

1) Reserve officers who worked at factories and enterprises of the military and naval departments, railways, commercial and port ships - 173 thousand people;
2) Militia warriors who worked at the same defense facilities - 433 thousand people.
3) Employees in government institutions, whose departure to the army could adversely affect the work of these institutions 64 thousand people.

Thus, a total of 670 thousand people received a deferment.

In addition, the law of December 6, 1915 provided additional deferrals for all categories of persons liable for military service who worked for defense. Among them:

recruits - 99850;
militia warriors under 26 years old - 175650;
those who worked on the construction of railways - 72,000;
employees for free employment in the department of communications - 173498;
employees in zemstvo and city unions - 5352;
employees of institutions of military-industrial committees - 976312;
employees in private credit institutions - 3700 people.

The total number of those who received a deferment among those who worked for the needs of defense was 1,506,362.

] conscripts. By the end of the war, the number of deferrals had risen to 2.5 million [ ] . In relation to the total number of those drafted into the army (15 million 378 thousand people), this amounted to 16%. The total number of conscripts drafted into the army (15.378 million people) and those liable for military service who received a deferment because their work was recognized as extremely important in the framework of the country's war effort (2.5 million people) reached a huge figure of 18 million people.Staffing and strength of the active army

According to the “Regulations on the field command and control of troops in wartime” (1912), the active army of Russia in the First World War was called the land and sea armed forces, military departments and institutions subordinate to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The territory intended for the deployment and deployment of the active army was called the theater of military operations.

Inside the country there were reserve troops involved in the training of drafted recruits and warriors, security service troops, as well as numerous institutions serving the army in the field. All these rear structures of the armed forces were subordinate to the Minister of War.

The size of the Russian active army was constantly changing depending on the losses incurred and their replenishment. A similar relationship between income, expenditure and the presence of people existed in the Russian armed forces as a whole. Thus, after the call-up of reserve ranks of the first stage, their number (together with the pre-war personnel) was increased by August 1 to 4 million 700 thousand people. [

], in the active army of military personnel from this total number there should have been 3 million 500 thousand [ ]

Due to the fact that the concentration of forces intended for the full staffing of the army ended only 2.5 months after the announcement of mobilization, that is, by October 1, then to establish the strength of the troops and institutions that were in the theater of operations before the start of the draft contingent, it was not possible (due to the lack of documents on this issue) [

] . Moreover, during this time, several bloody battles took place in the East European theater of operations (East Prussian and Warsaw-Ivangarod operations, the Battle of Galicia), in which the Russian army suffered huge losses. As a result, its population by the end of the concentration was only 2 million 700 thousand people. [ ] Meanwhile, intense fighting continued (Lodz and Czestochowa-Krakow operations in November), resulting in numerous combat losses in the troops. In addition, the number of sick soldiers and officers has increased. Therefore, the above figure decreased by December 1 to 2 million people.

The catastrophic decrease in the number of personnel of the active Russian army was the result of those enormous losses; which she had to bear in 1914 in order to save France from being defeated by the Germans during the Battle of Marne. Replenishments, due to the ill-conceived organization of reserve troops, did not have time to arrive on time. In divisions, instead of 15 thousand fighters, there were an average of 7-8 thousand people.

Finally, by January 1, 1915, thanks to the adoption of emergency measures, the staffing of front-line units and formations was basically over. Their total number increased to 3 million 500 thousand people. However, the fierce January-February battles (the August defensive operation, the beginning of the Prasnysh defensive operation on the North-Western Front) again reduced the strength of the active troops by February 15 to 3 million 200 thousand people. After the understaffing of the depleted units and the arrival of new formations at the front, the strength of the active army increased significantly and by April 1, 1915, amounted to 4 million 200 thousand people.

However, less than three weeks later, on April 19, the Austro-German superior forces managed to carry out the Gorlitsky breakthrough in Galicia. The troops of the Russian Southwestern Front, which at that time experienced an acute shortage of ammunition, again suffered heavy losses. The size of the active army again decreased and by May 15 amounted to 3 million 900 thousand people.

One of the officers of the British military mission, Captain Neilson, who witnessed the heavy fighting of the 3rd Russian Army of the South-Western Front (it was mainly hit by the blow of the combined enemy forces), in his report of July 11, reports: “All the latest offensives were just killings, since we, without artillery preparation, attacked the enemy, who had numerous light and heavy artillery” [

] .

Due to heavy losses in the summer campaign of 1915, the number of active troops by September 15 is reduced to 3 million 800 thousand people, despite their repeated replenishment. A month later, this figure begins to increase slightly and again reaches 3 million 900 thousand people. Due to the fact that in October 1915 the intensity of hostilities decreased significantly, the level of staffing of the troops of the fronts quickly increased, reaching 4 million 900 thousand people on November 1.

Introduction by General M.V. Alekseev to the post of Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (August 23, 1915) marks the beginning of the introduction of more advanced scientific methods in higher command and control. Energetic, thoughtful work is being carried out to restore the armed forces after the failures and upheavals experienced in the summer of 1915. The existing units are fully equipped, new formations are created, and the organization of reserve troops is improving. As a result, the size of the active army is growing rapidly. By February 1, 1916, it reaches 6 million 200 thousand people. By April 1 of the same year, it increased to 6300 thousand, and by July 1 - 6 million 800 thousand people.

The victorious battles of the troops of the Southwestern Front (“Brusilovsky breakthrough”), which were fought in May - July 1916 (mainly in the interests of helping France, attacked near Verdun, and for the sake of saving Italy from its complete defeat by the Austro-Hungarian troops), were also accompanied by significant losses. Therefore, the number of Russian troops decreased by September 1 to 6 million 500 thousand people. (taking into account the received replenishment). At this level, it remained until the beginning of October, and due to the subsequent lull in hostilities, it quickly increased to 6 million 845 thousand people. The same number was presented in the secret report of the Minister of War for 1916 as of January 1, 1917 [

] ).

In connection with the revolutions of 1917 (February and October), the collapse of the active Russian army begins due to the increased desertion among the rank and file and the fall in discipline in the troops. This state is beginning to be reflected in the statistical indicators of its numbers. This is evidenced by the final data for the two periods of 1917: on May 1, the actual composition of the active army decreased to 6 million 800 thousand people. [

] (taking into account the received replenishment); as of September 1 - up to 6 million people. [ ] The Petrograd Military District, which at that time was only listed in the active army, was excluded from the account.

Below are tables 49 and 50, which contain more detailed statistics on the size of the active army from 1914 to 1917.

Table 49

The composition of the troops, departments and institutions of the army in the field by periods (from October 1, 1914 to November 1, 1916)

Periods	Consisted on the list
	Total	Including
		officers	class ranks	Soldier
				Combatants	non-combatants
On October 1, 1914	2711253	38156	17512	2283831	371754
On December 1, 1914	2000000	27400	14400	1675000	283200
On January 1, 1915	3513745	48886	27023	2890392	547444
On May 15, 1915	3941689	52872	20212	3356071	512534
On September 15, 1915	3855722	58011	24357	3190402	582952
On February 1, 1916	6206743	89432	37876	5042450	1036985
On June 1, 1916	6773061	105797	43850	5569607	1053807
On November 1, 1916	6963503	115201	49871	5574516	1223915

Table 50

Information on the number of military officials on the fronts of the Russian army as of May 1, 1917 (in thousands)

Name of fronts	officers	class ranks	Soldier	Total
West	27,3	11,2	1368,3	1406,8
Northern	25,9	9,4	1199,4	1234,7
Southwestern	46,9	19,1	2318,1	2384,1
Romanian	27,7	11,0	1347,7	1386,4
Caucasian	8,8	2,3	329,6	340,7
Total	136,6	53,0	6563,1	6752,7

Russia in World War 1914-1918. (in numbers). - M., 1925. p. 24.

It must immediately be emphasized that the information given in tables 49 and 50 on the strength of the active army far exceeds the number of “active bayonets” or “fighters” in it. This is due to the fact that the front formations contained a large number of lower ranks, who were actually engaged in logistic support. According to N. N. Golovin, who studied this issue for a long time, at the end of 1914 the “combat element” was about 75% of the active army, and at the end of 1916 - only 50%. If we apply this scale to table 49, it turns out that the number of “fighters” fluctuated during the war between 1 million 500 thousand people. (as of December 1, 1914) and 3 million 500 thousand people (as of November 1, 1916).

General M.V. Alekseev, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, wrote about this in one of his notes: We recruit about 2,000 thousand fighters. If this is the actual ratio, then we come to the impermissible conclusion that one fighter is served by two rear people ... for each military unit has its own unofficial warehouses serviced by people from the line, each has a lot of people on the way, sent for shopping, with a broken wagon , in various workshops. All this creates a bleak picture of our situation. They tell us from the center that they gave the active army 14 million, they left 6, that the army has 8 million, and we all continue to ask because of the severe shortage in the combat units of the infantry” [

] .

General M. V. Alekseev was rightly indignant at the excessive “swelling” of the rear of the active army itself due to a decrease in the number of “combat element”. However, neither the Supreme Commander-in-Chief nor his headquarters were able to cope with this negative phenomenon, generated by the poor organization of logistics support for the active troops.

The total number of deep rear troops subordinate to the Minister of War (including the reserve troops located in the internal military districts) was measured by the following figures:

As of December 31, 1915 - 2,300,000 people,
As of December 31, 1916 - 2,550,000 people.
As of November 1, 1917 - 1,500,000 people.

With the declaration of war, 500 reserve battalions were formed inside the country, and soon another 500 similar battalions of the second stage were added to them. But the losses suffered by the Russian army in the first campaigns were so great that the organization and the number of reserve troops established by the Minister of War did not at all meet the needs of the army. The reinforcements sent to the fronts at the end of 1914, about 1 million 500 thousand people, could not bring the existing formations and units to full strength. Due to the lack of military-trained resources, throughout 1915, poorly prepared reinforcements were sent to the front.

General A.A. Polivanov, who replaced V. A. Sukhomlinov as Minister of War in June 1915, sought to establish at least some order in ensuring the staffing of the troops. This made it possible to significantly reduce in 1916 and 1917. the number of poorly trained replacements sent to the front by increasing the time for their preparation to 4-5 months. This is evidenced by comparative data for three years (see table 51).

Table 51

The number of annually sent replenishment to the active army in 1915-1917. (in absolute numbers)

Types of troops	Number of people sent to the active army (by years)
Types of troops	1915	1916	1917	Total
To the infantry	3094250	2336000	1743989	7174239
Number of marching companies	12377	9344	-	-
To regular cavalry	34333	24278	52239	1 10850
In the Cossacks	65458	72732	27363	165553
In artillery units	70000	80000	-	150000
To the engineering department	22000	20000	76000	118000
Total	3286041	2533010	1899591	7718642

Note. The table was compiled according to the statistical materials of the book by N. N. Golovin “Russian Military Efforts in the World War”. - Military History Journal, 1993, No. 4, p. 26.

Information about the human losses of the Russian armed forces in the First World War, found in domestic and foreign sources, suffers for the most part from inconsistency and inconsistency. This is explained primarily by the unequal completeness and reliability of the materials used by the researchers, as well as significant differences in the method of calculating losses. As a result, the difference, for example, in the number of killed and dead Russian soldiers and officers, varies in published works from several tens of thousands to 1-2 million people. In confirmation of this fact, we present here a number of figures for the irretrievable demographic losses of the Russian army, taken by us from various domestic sources: ., 3,000,000 people [

]

However, according to the well-known demographer B. Ts. Urlanis, none of the above figures can claim at least approximate accuracy [

] .

Similar discrepancies in the calculation of the losses of the Russian army take place in foreign publications. Here are a few figures on the number of dead Russian soldiers shown in a number of Western sources (3,000,000 people, 2,762,000 people, 1,700,000 people, 1,290,000 people, 1,500,000 people, 5,350,000 people ., 2,000,000 people, 2,250,000 people) [

] .

“Determining the losses of Russia in the First World War is a rather difficult task,” wrote B.Ts. Urlanis. - Statistical materials about Russia's losses are very contradictory, incomplete and often unreliable. This partly led to the fact that fantastic figures about Russian losses in the war of 1914-1918 appeared in the world press. Therefore, - Urlanis continued further, - it is necessary to critically examine the main primary sources and then approach the determination of the most reliable number of Russian soldiers and officers killed during this war ”[

] .

And such work was successfully carried out by the author of the above statement. He managed to achieve the greatest reliability in calculating the losses of the Russian army in the First World War, so our research in this area is based mainly on the statistical data of B. Ts. Urlanis. Other authoritative sources (already mentioned earlier) are also widely used and provide valuable background material on the subject under consideration.

The greatest importance in the course of our research was given to establishing the number of irretrievable casualties of the Russian army, including by their types and categories of military personnel. In the collected form, these data are presented in table 52.

Table 52

Irreversible demographic losses of the Russian army in the war of 1914-1918. (in absolute numbers)

Types of losses	Total	Including
Types of losses	Total	Officers and class ranks	lower ranks
Irretrievable combat losses
Killed, died at the stages of sanitary evacuation	1200000	23134	1176866
Missing (presumed dead or deceased)	439369	733	432038
Died from wounds in hospitals	240000	7123	232877
Died from gas poisoning	11000	161	10839
Total	1890369	37749	1852620
Irrecoverable non-combat losses
Died of disease	155000	10350	144650
Died in captivity	190000	1140	188860
Died, died as a result of accidents and other causes	19000	2160	16840
Total	364000	13650	350350
Total	2254369	51399	2202970

Notes. The table is compiled according to the following sources: Urlanis B. Ts. Wars and population of Europe. - M., 1960; Golovin N. N. Military efforts of Russia in the world war. - Military History Journal, 1993, Nos. 1-2, 4, 6-7, 10-11); Russia in World War 1914-1918. (in numbers). M., 1925.

It should also be noted here that in the last of the mentioned sources (published by the Central Statistical Bureau), all data on the losses of the Russian army turned out to be underestimated against their actual number by 1.92 times. The specified “multiplicity factor” was obtained by us as a result of a mathematical comparison of the final (basic) figure of killed Russian soldiers and officers for the entire period of the war - 1,200,000 people. (calculated by B.Ts. Urlanis and N.N. Golovin) with a similar figure in the CSB publication - 626,440 people. (1,200,000: 626,440 = 1.92).

The sanitary losses of the army (wounded, sick, victims of gases) were colossal. Suffice it to say that only 5,148,180 military personnel hospitalized during the war who needed long-term treatment were taken into account, of which 2,844,500 were wounded. and sick 2 303 680 people. (Russia in the World War of 1914 - 1918 (in numbers). - M., 1925, p. 4, 25).

And if we take into account all cases of injuries that did not require evacuation to hospitals, then the number of sanitary losses will increase by another 50%.

The total number of troops and losses of the Russian army calculated by us in the First World War made it possible to show the "arrival" and "expenditure" of the country's human contingent involved in the Russian armed forces (see Table 53).

Table 53

	people (in thousand)
Was in the army and navy at the beginning of the war	1423,0
Called up during the war	13955,0
Total attracted to the army and navy during the war years	15378
Departed from the armed forces during the war years (total)	7429,0
Including: killed, died from wounds, diseases, from gas poisoning, accidents and died from among the missing (demographic losses)	2254,4
Was in medical institutions, convalescent teams and short holidays (wounded and sick)	350,0
Was on long-term treatment and dismissed from service due to disability (seriously injured)	349,0
Dismissed from military service soldiers who reached the age limit of 43 on September 1, 1917 (based on the decree of the Provisional Government of April 1, 1917)	226,6
Was in captivity (in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria)	2384,0
deserted	1865,0
Remained in the armed forces (total) of them: - as part of the army; - as part of rear formations and military command and control bodies subordinate to the Minister of War (reserve regiments of military districts, spare parts of special combat arms, departments and institutions of the Military Ministry)	7949,0 6512,0 1437,0

The participation of the Russian Navy in the First World War was mainly coastal defensive in nature. At the same time, 32 warships were lost, and the casualties amounted (together with the wounded and captured) to 6063 people (see tables 54 and 55).

Table 54

List of ships of the Russian fleet that died in 1914-1917

N° p / p	Date of death	Name of the ship	Fleet	area of death	Note
battleships
1	7.10.1917	"Empress Maria"	Black Sea Fleet	On the roads of Sevastopol	Blown up by German saboteurs
2	4.IO.I917	"Glory"	bf	moonsund strait	Sunk by crew due to damage
Cruisers
1	28.09.1914	"Pallada"	bf	The Gulf of Finland	Sunk by a German submarine
2	17.10.1914	"Pearl"	Sib. fl.	Penang, Malacca Strait	Sunk by German ships
3	6.11.1916	"Rurik"	bf	The Gulf of Finland	Hit a mine
4	22.12.1917	"Peresvet"	Fl. ate	In the area of Port Said	Hit a mine
Destroyers
1	29.11.1914	"Executive"	bf	Mouth of the Gulf of Finland
2	29.11.1914	"Volatile"	bf	Mouth of the Gulf of Finland
3	2.04.1916	"Tough"	bf	Sevastopol raid	Hit a mine

Continuation of the table. 54

4	21.08.1916	"Volunteer"	bf	Irbensky Strait
5	28.10.1916	"Kazan"	bf	The Gulf of Finland	Sunk by the German square.
6	26.02.1916	"Lieutenant Pushchin"	Black Sea Fleet	In the region of Varna	Hit a mine
7	30.6.1917	"Lieutenant Gifted"	Black Sea Fleet	In the region of the mouth of the Danube
8	22.08.1917	"Slim"	bf	Gulf of Riga
9	26.09.1917	"Hunter"	bf	Irbensky Strait	Hit a mine
10	14.10.1917	"Thunder"	bf	Kassarsky reach (Moonsund Strait)	Sunk by crew due to major damage
11	27.11.1917	"Vigilant"	bf	Gulf of Bothnia	Hit a mine
Submarines
1	1.03.1916	"Shark"	bf	In the district of Libava Memel
2	10.05.1916	"Catfish"	bf	In the Åland Islands
3	28.04.1917	"Walrus"	Black Sea Fleet	In the Bosphorus Eregli region
4	13.05.1917	"Leopard"	bf	Central part of the Balt. seas
5	1.06.1917	"Lioness"	bf	In the district about. Gotland
6	8.06.1917	"AG-15"	bf	In the Ganges region (Gangut)
7	1.11.1917	"AG-14"	bf	In the district of Libava
8	1.12.1917	"Cheetah"	bf	Central part of the Balt. seas
gunboats
1	16.10.1914	"Donets"	Black Sea Fleet	In the Odessa harbor	Raised in 1915
2	6.08.1915	"Sea lion"	bf	Gulf of Riga	Sunk by German ships
3	7.08.1915	"Korean"	bf	Gulf of Riga	Scuttled by crew due to severe damage

Continuation of the table. 54

minelayers
1	16.10.1914	"Rod"	Black Sea Fleet	Near m. Fiolent	Flooded by the crew
2	22.05.1915	"Yenisei"	bf	In the area of the Baltic port
minesweepers
1	14.08.1914	"Conductor"	bf	In the district about. Dago
2	9.09.1914	Minesweeper #07	bf	In the district about. Dago
3	9.09.1914	Minesweeper #08	bf	In the district about. Dago
Hospital
1	17.03.1916	"Portuguese"	Black Sea Fleet	In the district of metro Syurmen

Table 55

The casualties of the Russian fleet in the First World War [

]

Fleet name	Types of losses					Total
Fleet name	Killed, drowned	Died of wounds	Died of disease	Wounded	Captured and missing	Total
Baltic	2223	65	48	577	482	3395
Black Sea	673	128	2	446	127	1376
Siberian military flotilla	178	10	4	99	1	292
Total *	3074	203	54	1122	6!0	5063

All losses of the Russian fleet are already included in the total number of losses of the Russian armed forces in the world war.

Of particular interest is the analysis of the military losses of the Russian army in comparison with similar indicators of the armed forces of other powers participating in the war (see table 56).

Table 56

Losses of the armed forces of the main participants in the First World War

States	Types of losses (in thousands)			Total loss (in thousand)	Army strength (in thousand)	% of losses from the number armies
States	Demographer. losses	Sanitary losses	Captured	Total loss (in thousand)	Army strength (in thousand)	% of losses from the number armies
Entente countries
Russia	2254,4	3749,0	3343,9	9347,3	15500,0	60,3
England	908,4	2035,9	358,8	3303,1	9500,0	34,8
France	1397,8	2800,0	504,0	4701,8	8407,0	55,9
Italy	381,0	800,0	500,0	1681,0	5600,0	30,0
Belgium	38,2	150,0	70,0	258,2	500,0	51,6
Serbia and Montenegro	40,0	152,0	200,0	392,0	800,0	49,0
Triple Alliance countries
Germany	2350,0	4510,0	1000,0	7860,0	13251,0	59,3
Austria-Hungary	1100,0	1980,0	1800,0	4880,0	9000,0	54,2
Turkey	250,0	763,7	479,6	1493,3	2800,0	53,3
Bulgaria	33,0	92,4	78,0	203,4	450,0	45,2

Note. The information given in the table about the size of the armies of the warring states and the main types of losses in the First World War (with the exception of data on the size and demographic losses of the Russian army) are taken from the following sources (with some clarifications made to them): Urlanis B. Ts. Wars and population Europe. - M., 1960, p. 154-157, 312-313, 374-377; World War in numbers. - M.-L., 1934, p. 22-23.

Table 56 shows that the Russian army, compared with the armies of other members of the military coalitions, suffered the largest losses in the First World War, amounting to more than 60% of the total number of armed forces. That is, more than the defeated (a year later) Germany and Austria-Hungary. Virtually the entire cadre (1.4 million people) and those liable for military service in the 1st and 2nd stages (5.6 million people) were knocked out, from which the main strike force of the Russian army was formed. After three years of the war, a catastrophic drop in combat capability was discovered in it, and at the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918, the army practically disintegrated. This was due to a number of objective and subjective reasons, the main of which are:

1) The extremely unfavorable geopolitical position of Russia compared to other countries of the Entente, as a result of which the Russian army, for the first time in world practice, had to hold the front from the Baltic to the Black Sea with a length of 1934 km for 3.5 years (not counting the 1100-kilometer length of the Caucasian front) , fighting against the combined forces of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. At the same time, on the Western Front - from the English Channel to Switzerland (630 km), the combined armed forces of France, the British Empire and Belgium were concentrated against the troops of the German army, which in 1917 were thoroughly strengthened by the American army. In addition, four Russian brigades were sent to help them.

2) Unsatisfactory leadership of the armed forces and the course of hostilities by the Supreme High Command and the Russian government, the complete dependence of their operational-strategic planning on the requirements of the Western allies to the detriment of Russian national interests.

3) A significant socio-economic gap between industrially developed Germany, Great Britain and France - on the one hand, and agrarian-industrial Russia - on the other, which was expressed in the extremely low level of logistics of the Russian army with modern types of weapons, lack of rifles and ammunition ( rifle, shell and cartridge “hunger”), the low educational level of the bulk of the soldiers, the lack of necessary military training among 60% of recruits. All this led to huge human losses in the Russian army.

4) The self-serving policy of Russia's allies in the Entente, who waged war "to the last Russian soldier", using the Eastern theater of operations as a counterbalance to the German offensive on the Western Front and repeatedly forcing the top military-political leadership of Russia to prematurely send unprepared troops into battle in violation of the earlier agreed strategic plans [

] .

Ultimately, the Russian armed forces played the role of a "steam roller" for grinding a large part of the combined military power of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. However, neither Russia nor its army was destined to be in the ranks of the victors after the end of the war.

The results of the First World War are well known: the military-political victory over the coalition of the Central Powers went to the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan. In Russia, at that time, a large-scale struggle unfolded between the forces of the victorious socialist revolution and the supporters of the overthrown bourgeois-landowner system. From the fire of the world imperialist war, the country fell into the fire of civil war and foreign military intervention, which lasted until 1922.

When analyzing the main events of the First World War and the involvement of the Russian state in them, it is necessary, in our opinion, to take into account the following circumstances. Russia, as one of the great world powers of that time, played a significant role in the preparation of the war of 1914-1918. However, its significance in the deep processes of the maturation of this cataclysm was determined by political factors rather than economic (the struggle for new markets) and geostrategic (the struggle for new territories). Moreover, the production and economic potential of the country, if taken in relation to the population and the size of the territory, was relatively small and focused mainly on the domestic market. Based on this, Russia practically did not have any expansionist plans regarding the acquisition of new territories during the war.

This position of the Russian state was due to the fact that even before the end of the XIX century. expanded its possessions to the necessary limits (due to the annexation and development of adjacent territories in the east and south of the country). Therefore, Russia was one of the powers that were more interested in maintaining the division of the world that had already been made than in redistributing it.

As for the striving of certain bourgeois circles to seize the Turkish Black Sea straits (the Bosporus and the Dardanelles), the following circumstance must be borne in mind here. According to the original plan of the war, Russia did not intend to annex the straits. This is evidenced by the fact that on September 26, 1914, Russian Foreign Minister S.D. Sazonov sent an official note to the governments of France and England, which set out the point of view of the Russian government on the question of the goals of the Entente during the war that had begun in the Balkans. It said that “the Turks should remain in Constantinople and its environs,” but Russia should receive guarantees of free passage through the straits. There were no direct claims to the straits and adjacent Turkish territory at that time. They arose at the state level after Turkey took the side of Germany [

] .

Despite the low standard of living of the population, Russia played an important role in the pre-war arms race. This was explained not only by the imperial ambitions of its ruling circles, but also by other reasons: the geographical position of the country; the loss of the fleet during the Russo-Japanese War and the need for its revival; the weakness of the army revealed during the same war and revolution of 1905; the obvious brewing of a pan-European clash of the main world powers. At the same time, Russia held the initiative in the emerging process of civilized regulation of international disputes and limitation of the destructive nature of wars, which corresponded to the Russian historical tradition [

] .

Of course, Russia, like most great powers, did not act in the international arena in isolation, but as part of a military-political grouping - the Triple Entente, in which it represented an independent, but not a leading force. At one time, the Russian government even hoped to stay away from a probable Anglo-German conflict, but then the aggravation of its own contradictions with Germany and the sharp strengthening of the German-Austrian military alliance forced it to abandon maneuvering and take the path of strengthening the Entente.

It should also be emphasized that, on the whole, Russia's policy in Europe and the Middle East did not differ in the period under review by belligerence. Its lack of readiness for an all-out battle and the internal instability caused by the revolution of 1905 prompted caution and the search for compromises [

] .

At the same time, the imperial ambitions of the ruling bureaucracy at that time did not allow even a partial rejection of the great-power role of Russia, especially in the traditional East Slavic issue. The national-patriotic mood of the Russian public was also of some importance, which was clearly reflected on the eve of the war on the pages of the press, in speeches from the Duma rostrum and in the sermons of the Russian Orthodox Church. Therefore, those that took place at the turn of 1913-1914. the hesitations of the ruling circles of Russia were replaced by their firm determination not to retreat in the face of the challenge from Germany and Austria-Hungary. This social attitude played a decisive role during the fateful July crisis of 1914.

Despite the fact that the Russian state entered the war during the period of the ongoing reorganization of its armed forces, which was to be completed by 1917, it made a huge contribution to the victory of the Entente countries. Suffice it to say that already at the very beginning of the war, at the cost of the death of the army of A.V. Samsonov in East Prussia, Russia saved France.

[ 141 ] Russia in World War 1914-1918. (in numbers). - M., 1925. S. 4.

[ 142 ] Ibid. S. 18; Golovin N.N. Military efforts of Russia in the world war. Military History Journal, 1993, No. 6, p. 58-61.[ 143 ] “Military History Journal”, 1993, No. 6, p. 66.[ 144 ] “Military History Journal”, 1993, No. 6, p. 66.] Russia in the World War 1914-1918. (in numbers). - M., 1925, p. 24.[ 152 ] Ibid. Tab. 10, 13.[ 153 ] Ibid. S. 23; Military History Journal, 1993, No. 4, p. 23.[ 154 ] Military Historical Journal, 1993, No. 4. p. 24.[ 155 ] Military Historical Journal, 1993, No. 4, p. 26.[ 156 ] Proceedings of the Commission for the Survey of the Sanitary Consequences of the War of 1914-1918. - M.-Pg., 1923, p. 227; Russia in World War 1914-1918. (in numbers). - M., 1925, p. 108; Sanitary service of the Russian army in the war 1914-1917. - Kuibyshev, 1942, p. 464; Avraamov V. Victims of the imperialist war in Russia. - News of the People's Commissariat of Health, 1920, No. 1-2, p. 41; Sazonov L. I. Losses of Russia in the war of 1914-1919. - Proceedings of the Commission for the Survey of the Sanitary Consequences of the War of 1914-1918. - M.-Pg., 1923, p. 168; World War in numbers. - M. - L., 1934, p. 21; Frunze M. V. Collected Works. - M.-L., 1926. T. 2, p. 73-78. ] Obtained by calculation: the incomplete number of officers and class ranks who died from wounds and concussions (bruises) (3622 + 88 = 3710), multiplied by the “multiplicity factor” (3710 x 1.92 = 7123). There. S. 35.[ 167 ] Urlanis B. Ts. Wars and population of Europe. - M., 1960, p. 299, 381.[ 168 ] Obtained by calculation: the incomplete number of officers and class officials who died from gas poisoning - 84 people, multiplied by the “multiplicity factor” (84 x 1.92 = 161 people). - There. 169 ] Obtained by calculation using the “proportionality factor” (6.9%), which is the percentage of the ratio between the number of officers who died suddenly from diseases and the same number of lower ranks who died. The number of officer and class ranks who died from diseases is determined as follows: 155,000 x 0.069 = 10,350 people. - Right there. S. 99.[ 170 ] Ibid. pp. 320, 325, 381.[ 171 ] According to the calculations of B. Ts. Urlanis, the death rate from accidents and other causes not related to military operations (died from non-combat injuries, drowned, committed suicide, were shot by the verdicts of military courts), was equal to 1% of the total number of lethal in the Russian army combat losses. In our case, this amounted to 19 thousand people. (1% of 189369 people).[ 172 ] Obtained by calculation using the “proportionality factor” calculated from partial data on the death rate of Russian officers in German and Austro-Hungarian captivity: 451: 75882 = 0.06 (6%). Then the total number of officers and class officials who died in captivity was established (190,000 x 0.06 = 1140). - Urlanis B. Ts. Wars and population of Europe. M., 1960, p. 316. ] The number was obtained by calculation as the average value between the maximum and minimum numbers of prisoners of war (2417.0 thousand people and 2351.0 thousand people), given in the study of N.N. Golovin. - “Military History Journal”, 1993, No. 2, p. 56-58.[ 182 ] The number was obtained by calculation: 1,500 thousand people were added to the number of registered deserters (for the period from the beginning of the war to August 1, 1917 - 365.0 thousand people). unregistered (as of September 1, 1917). - Military History Journal, 1993, No. 4, p. thirty.[ 183 ] Calculated on the basis of data on the number of military personnel who were on quartermaster allowance of the fronts (Northern, Western, Southwestern, Romanian, Caucasian) and front-line military districts (Petrograd and Odessa) as of September 1, 1917. The result of the calculation is 6512 thousand people. (minus 700.0 thousand people of the Romanian troops who were on the allowance of the Russian Romanian front). - Russia in World War 1914-1918. (in numbers). - M., 1925, p. 23.[ 184 ] The number was obtained by calculation: from the total number of troops in the rear military districts on February 1, 1917 - 1442.3 thousand people. (minus the troops of the Petrograd and Odessa front-line military districts - 404.4 thousand people), the estimated figure (318.3 thousand people) was deducted, by which the number of servicemen in the rear military districts decreased over the period from February 1 to February 1 September 1917. To the result (1124 thousand people), the number of servicemen who were in the spare parts of the special branches of the armed forces (313.0 thousand people) was added. - Right there. S. 20.[ 185 ] Russia in World War 1914-1918. (in numbers). - M., 1925, p. 36.[ 186 ] Including 320 thousand people. died from wounds. - Urlanis B. Ts. Wars and population of Europe. - M., 1960, p. 174. World War I. Prologue of the 20th century. - M., 1998. S. 481.[ 194 ] World War I. Prologue of the 20th century. - M., 1998, p. 161.[ 195 ] Ignatiev A.V. Russia and the Origin of the Great War. - World War I. Prologue of the 20th century. - M., 1998, p. 103.

[ 196 ] World War I. Prologue of the 20th century. - M., 1998, p. 103.

	Portal "Warfare "
	warrior in Wiktionary
	Warrior at Wikiquote
	in Wikisource

Portal for the student. Self-training

Warrior 2 rank. Ed.

Warrior

State militia soldier

see also

Write a review on the article "Warrior"

Notes

Literature

Links

An excerpt characterizing the Warrior

Plan:

Introduction

1. Warrior

2. Soldier of the state militia

Notes

Literature

Portal for the student. Self-training

Warrior

State militia soldier

see also

Write a review on the article "Warrior"

Notes

Literature

Links

An excerpt characterizing the Warrior

Plan:

Introduction

1. Warrior

2. Soldier of the state militia

Notes

Literature

RELATED ARTICLES