Russian-French Union 1891. Russian-French Union: history and significance

The alliance between Russia and France was dictated not only by the commonality of the military-strategic interests of both powers, the presence of a threat from common enemies. By that time, a solid economic foundation was already in place for the union. Since the 1970s, Russia was in dire need of free capital to invest in industry and railway construction; France, on the contrary, did not find a sufficient number of objects for its own investment and actively exported its capital abroad. Since then, the share of French capital in the Russian economy has gradually begun to grow. For 1869-1887. 17 foreign enterprises were founded in Russia, 9 of them French. Kinyapina N.S. Foreign policy of Russia in the second half of the XIX century. - M., 1974 So already in the early 90s, the foundation was laid for Russia's financial dependence on France. The economic prerequisites for the union also had a special military-technical aspect. Already in 1888, the brother of Alexander III, Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich, who arrived in Paris on an unofficial visit, managed to place a mutually beneficial order for the manufacture of 500,000 rifles for the Russian army at French military factories.

In the context of the growing rapprochement between Russia and France, champions of an active offensive policy against Germany advocated for an alliance in both countries. In France, as long as she was on the defensive with Germany, an alliance with Russia was not a burning need. Now, when France has recovered from the consequences of the defeat of 1870 and the question of revenge has become the order of the day for French foreign policy, among its leaders (including President S. Carnot and Prime Minister Ch. Freycinet) the course towards an alliance with Russia has sharply prevailed. History of Russia's foreign policy in the second half of the 19th century. M., 1997.

In Russia, meanwhile, the landlords and the bourgeoisie were pushing the government towards an alliance with France, offended by the economic sanctions of Germany and therefore advocating a turn in the domestic economy from German to French loans. In addition, wide (politically very different) circles of the Russian public were interested in the Russian-French alliance, which took into account the totality of mutually beneficial prerequisites for this alliance. In society, in the government, and even at the royal court, a “French” party began to take shape. Its forerunner was the famous "white general" M.D. Skobelev.

True, the “German” party was also strong at the court and in the government of Russia: Minister of Foreign Affairs N.K. Gire, his closest assistant and future successor V.N. Lamzdorf, Minister of War P.S. Vannovsky, ambassadors in Germany P.A. Saburov and Pavel Shuvalov. The court support of this party was the wife of the tsar's brother Vladimir Alexandrovich, Grand Duchess Maria Pavlovna (nee Princess of Mecklenburg-Schwerin). On the one hand, she influenced the tsar's family in favor of Germany, and on the other hand, she assisted the German government, informing him about the plans of Alexander III and about Russian affairs. In terms of influence on the tsar and the government, as well as in terms of energy, perseverance and “caliber” of the composition, the “German” party was inferior to the “French”, but on the other hand, a number of objective factors that prevented the Russian-French rapprochement affected the first in favor. Rosenthal E.M. Diplomatic history of the Russian-French alliance at the beginning of the 20th century. M., 1960

This shows why the Russo-French alliance took shape, although steadily, but slowly and with difficulty. It was preceded by a series of preliminary steps towards rapprochement between the two countries - mutual steps, but more active on the part of France.

In the spring of 1890, after Germany refused to renew the Russo-German "reinsurance" treaty, the French authorities skillfully took advantage of the difficult situation for Russia. In order to win the favor of Alexander III, on May 29, 1890, they immediately arrested a large group (27 people) of Russian political emigrants in Paris. At the same time, the French police did not disdain the services of a provocateur. Agent of the Petersburg Okhrana since 1883 A.M. Gekkelman (aka Landesen, Petrovsky, Baer and General von Harting), with the knowledge of the police authorities of Paris and, apparently, for a certain bribe, staged preparations for the assassination of Alexander III in the French capital: he himself delivered bombs to the apartment of the "terrorists", aimed at her to the police and escaped safely. The arrested victims of his provocation were put on trial and (except three women, acquitted with purely French gallantry) sentenced to imprisonment. Alexander III, having learned about this, exclaimed: “Finally, there is a government in France!” World History: In 24 vols. T. 18. Eve of World War I // Badak A.N., I.E. Voynich, N.M. Volchek et al. Minsk, 1999

The following year, 1891, the opposing side gave a new impetus to the formation of the Russian-French bloc, advertising the renewal of the Triple Alliance. In response, France and Russia are taking a second practical step towards rapprochement. On July 13 (25), 1891, a French military squadron came to Kronstadt on an official visit. Her visit was an impressive display of Franco-Russian friendship. The squadron was met by Alexander III himself. The Russian autocrat, standing, bareheaded, humbly listened to the French revolutionary anthem "La Marseillaise", for the performance of which in Russia itself people were punished as a "state crime".

The new year entailed a new step in the creation of the Russian-French alliance. R. Boisdefre, who by that time had headed the General Staff of France, was again invited to the military maneuvers of the Russian army. On August 5 (17), 1892 in St. Petersburg, he and General N.N. Obruchev signed the agreed text of the military convention, which actually meant an agreement between Russia and France on an alliance.

The Convention was to enter into force after its ratification by the Emperor of Russia and the President of France. The ministers of foreign affairs were supposed to prepare and submit its text for ratification. However, Gire deliberately (in the interests of Germany) delayed the performance, citing the fact that illness prevented him from studying the details with due care. The French government, beyond his expectations, helped him: it became entangled in the autumn of 1892 in the grandiose Panamanian scam. 1. Rotshtein F. A. International relations at the end of the 19th century.

France gave the Russian sailors such an enthusiastic reception that Alexander III left all doubts. He ordered Giers to expedite the presentation of the Russo-French Convention and approved it on December 14. Then, an exchange of letters between St. Petersburg and Paris, as provided for by the diplomatic protocol, took place, and on December 23, 1893 (January 4, 1894), the convention officially entered into force. The Russo-French alliance was formalized.

Like the Triple Alliance, the Russian-French alliance was created outwardly as a defensive one. In essence, both of them harbored an aggressive principle as rivals in the struggle for the division and redistribution of spheres of influence, sources of raw materials, markets on the way to a European and world war. The 1894 alliance between Russia and France basically completed the regrouping of forces that took place in Europe after the Berlin Congress of 1878. F. Engels defined the results of the development of international relations in 1879-1894 as follows: “The major military powers of the continent were divided into two large, camps threatening each other: Russia and France on the one hand, Germany and Austria-Hungary on the other. The balance of power between them largely depended on which side England, the most economically developed power of the world at that time, would take. The ruling circles of England still preferred to remain outside the blocs, continuing the policy of "brilliant isolation". But the Anglo-German antagonism, which was growing due to colonial claims to each other, forced England to lean more and more definitely towards the Russian-French bloc.

By the mid-1980s, Russian-French diplomatic relations were restored at the level of ambassadors. The selection of a new ambassador was treated with great attention in Paris. It was a professional diplomat A. Laboulet, apparently not without a long-term aim: in Paris they understood that before looking for ways to conclude an alliance with Russia, it was necessary to establish diplomatic relations.

At the end of November 1886, the tsar spoke to the ambassador about his desire to improve relations with France, about the difficult international situation and the need for interaction: “We need you, and you need us. I hope France understands this." Cit. Quoted from: History of Russia's foreign policy in the second half of the 19th century. M., 1997. S. 295.

The beginning of this political course was successful. French diplomacy easily found a place where, without sacrificing anything or losing anything, France could render services to Russia and, on this basis, establish contacts with it. These were Balkan affairs. In the practical issue that arose in connection with the reunification of Rumelia with Bulgaria, the Bulgarian-Serbian conflict, French diplomacy willingly kept pace with Russian and supported her. The tsarist government, not spoiled by sympathetic attention even from its partners in the alliance of the three emperors - Austria and Germany, immediately managed to appreciate the friendly position of the French government. Manfred A. Z. Formation of the Russian-French Union. M., 1975. S. 195.

In the direction of rapprochement with France, the Russian government had long been pushed by the insults emanating from Berlin and the valuable successes of France in restoring its army. Katkov, until recently a supporter of maintaining closeness with Germany, now pointed to France as the only and most valuable ally against England and wrote to the Tsar that Russia and France had a common enemy, “unless we force France to get along with him by erroneous policy. This enemy is England, in the fight against which only France in all of Europe could be a useful collaborator for us. Cit. Quoted from: Rotshtein F.A. International relations at the end of the 19th century. S. 182.

But the government was suspicious of these projects, since the tsarist government had an instinctive disgust for the republican system of France, not believing in its political concessions, and contrary to Katkov’s opinion, it was not without reason that Russia would meet resistance from France to its policy towards Turkey. .

When, during the aggravation of Franco-German relations in connection with the activities of Boulanger in 1887, the French government turned to St. king, was rejected by Gears.

But when France redirected to Russia the Bulgarian delegation, which had come for advice on a candidate for the Bulgarian throne, this made a favorable impression on Russia, and France's loans of 200 million rubles in 1888, 280 million in 1889, and then others, still Russian public opinion and the tsar were more disposed towards France. The events of 1889 and 1890 finally decided the fate of Franco-Russian relations: in August 1889, Wilhelm II sent to England with a demonstrative display of friendship, recalling in public speeches the Anglo-Prussian brotherhood in arms at Waterloo. In 1890 - 1891, the organization and rearmament of the French armies were completed. In 1889, a three-year military service law went into effect. In the years 1890-1892, in the new conditions that had been created inside the country and in Europe, an alliance with Russia became the main goal of the foreign policy programs of all parties and groups of the ruling classes and broad sections of the population. There. pp. 183 - 185.

In January and March 1890, new Russian loans worth 650 million francs were placed in France. Soon French officers attended military exercises in Narva. The French Ambassador Laboulet believed that the ground was ripe enough for direct negotiations on an agreement between the two countries. Manfred A. Z. Formation of the Russian-French Union. M., 1975. S. 307.

At the same time, in the autumn of 1890, Laboulet raised the question of the visit of the French squadron to Russian waters. But the Russian government did not immediately give a definite positive answer, it showed more restraint than the French. The restraint of the Russian government was largely due to the fact that hesitations and doubts in determining the course of foreign policy had not yet been overcome. In 1887 - 1890 there really was no definite opinion. Surrounded by the Russian emperor were supporters of a pro-German orientation, such as Minister Nikolai Karlovich Girs and Count Vladimir Nikolaevich Lamzdorf, who occupied, at first glance, a modest post, the position of head of the minister's office. They believed that rapprochement with republican France was completely impossible for the imperial government. But at the same time, tsarism could not ignore the growing threat from Germany and Austria-Hungary, could not help but see the anti-Russian direction of the government of Bismarck, and then Wilhelm II. For the ruling circles and the ruling classes of Russia it was also obvious - this did not require special foresight - that in the person of France a counterbalance was being created to the Austro-German coalition, directed with its tip against Russia and France, that therefore it was necessary to strengthen ties with France. There. S. 310.

The resignation in 1890 of Bismarck because of the "Russian question" caused a real panic in the Russian government. The new German chancellor, Caprivi, refused to renew the three-year separate treaty of 1887.

But in Russia they did not want to part with their illusions about an alliance with Germany, considering it a political spokesman for conservative-monarchist solidarity and continental balance. In 1889, the tsar found it necessary to go to Berlin, his ministers in every possible way repelled the idea of a change of orientation. The idea of rapprochement with France was not resolutely perceived, and the ambassador in Paris, Morenheim, received, for example, an order to leave his post for the duration of the world exhibition in 1889, so as not to participate in this "apotheosis of the revolution" (1789). But the consciousness of political loneliness imperceptibly led to an actual rapprochement with France. Rotshtein F. A. International Relations at the End of the 19th Century. pp. 186 - 190.

Significant changes that took place in the international situation in 1890-1891 forced the Russian government to accelerate rapprochement with France.

The deterioration of Russian-German economic relations also took on more and more acute forms every month. In the early 1990s, German economic policy was clearly unfavorable to Russian economic interests. The economic policy of Germany seriously infringed on the interests of Russian exporters of agricultural products. By the early 1890s, the customs war between Germany and Russia had become fierce. Manfred A. Z. Formation of the Russian-French Union. M., 1975. S. 314 - 315.

For the ruling circles of the Russian Empire, it became obvious that it would be politically unwise to go further along the path of concessions to Germany and ignore the French desire for rapprochement. In March 1891, the French ambassador resumed negotiations with the Russian government on the visit of the French squadron to Kronstadt.

On July 25, a French squadron under the command of Admiral Gervais approached the Kronstadt raid. The Kronstadt visit of the French military squadron became an interval of demonstrative Franco-Russian friendship. French sailors were met by all official, high-ranking Russia, headed by Tsar Alexander III. In France, the Kronstadt celebrations made an even greater impression than in Russia. Girs, put in need by the emperor, contrary to his personal preferences, presented a report to the king.

The report stated: 1) the establishment of a cordial agreement between the two powers, with all practical consequences, and 2) an agreement on measures to be taken jointly in the event that peace is violated by one of the powers of the Triple Alliance.

Alexander III approved the idea of an agreement with France, and wished that in the 2nd paragraph it was more precisely defined what exactly should be considered an act of aggression against one of the two contracting powers.

The negotiations in Petersburg were facilitated to a certain extent by the fact that about three weeks earlier, in June, General Obruchev had had a series of important conversations in Paris with General Boisdeffre. The main topic of conversation was the question of a military convention. The big questions about the main foreign policy tasks set by each of the parties were also considered. Bouaderf considered it necessary to conclude a military convention providing for the simultaneous mobilization of armies in the event of a German attack; he expressed bewilderment that France's readiness for this act did not meet with practical support from Russia. There. pp. 322 - 324.

Negotiations were conducted throughout July and August 1891, and the French delegation, of necessity, had to accept the amendments made by the Russian side. On July 28, despite Sunday, the tsar received Girs, who reported on the progress of the negotiations, and generally approved the agreement as worked out on the merits, including two main points. After the final text of the agreement had been established, it took the form of an exchange of letters between Russian Foreign Minister Giers and French Foreign Minister Ribot. There. S. 328.

The text of the agreement was drawn up in Russian and French.

The August 27 agreement marked the establishment of a mutually agreed, definite form of cooperation between the two states. It was one of the existing foundations of the Russian-French alliance.

The Franco-Russian alliance was essentially a foregone conclusion by the formation of a coalition of middle powers led by militaristic, aggressive Germany. Threatening both France and Russia at the same time, which she would like to strike in turn, at different times, the German coalition, the German coalition, despite all the tricks and maneuvers of Bismarckian diplomacy, pushed France and Russia towards each other.

For all the enormous significance that the August 1891 agreement had for France, it seemed to the French state leaders from the very beginning insufficient. The French considered it necessary to start with a military agreement.

The French side invariably insisted on the development of an initial military agreement or, when it had to give in to Russian demands in August 1891, on the inclusion of a clause on simultaneous mobilization in the text of a political agreement.

France was more interested in the agreement than Russia. Therefore, in August 1891, the French side, abandoning the dispute, accepted the entire Russian program of the agreement. But, having achieved the first success, Freycinet and Ribot did not abandon their intended goal and soon resumed their actions in order to encourage the Russian government to take the next step. Minister of Foreign Affairs Giers, after negotiations with Freycinet, recognized as possible and even desirable an agreement that would provide: 1) the obligation to support each other with all their might in the event of an attack on one of the parties; 2) the obligation to mobilize the armies of both countries, if Germany or Austria mobilizes, even if war is not declared; 3) an obligation to make the necessary preparations to give the military efforts of both powers the greatest effectiveness.

The agreement reached during the Gears talks on a common policy in the Middle East was quickly implemented. The Russian-French alliance in the Middle East became effective.

This also affected Berlin. At the end of October 1891, they announced their readiness to make economic concessions. Perhaps the Kronstadt demonstration of French-Russian unity also played a certain role in this, which, as the Germans rightly suspected, was hiding some kind of political agreements. At the beginning of 1891, negotiations began on the conclusion of a Russian-German trade agreement.

But the economic and domestic political situation in Russia by this time had become much more complicated - the huge size of the crop failure in 1891 became apparent: the country was threatened with famine. A special decree banned the export of all types of bread and potatoes. Under these conditions, the German side was in no hurry to make a final decision. At the end of February 1892, it became obvious that without concessions from Russia, Germany would not agree to provide it with a conventional tariff established in relation to other states.

Shuvalov, Giers, Lamsdorf and Vyshnegradsky tended to accept the German demands. “Our financial and economic situation is terrible! We certainly need peace and tranquility,” the Minister of Finance stated. He argued: "The Germans are so necessary for us that I agree to concessions on both financial and tariff issues." History of Russia's foreign policy in the second half of the 19th century. M., 1997. S. 193 - 196.

Considering Berlin's belligerent mood, the Russian Foreign Ministry sought to avoid aggravating relations with Germany, but did not trust France either. Giers rightly believed that the adoption of military obligations, firmly linking France and Russia, would deprive the latter of their freedom.

In the trade balance of Russia, the role of France was immeasurably smaller than that of Germany. France invited Russia to enter into trade negotiations with it, and since 1892 established the most favored nation treatment for Russian goods. There.

Alexander III gradually came to the conclusion that it was necessary to conclude a military treaty.

The Russian government agreed to move on to direct consideration of the draft military convention. The French draft military convention was clearly one-sided, it provided for the concentration of forces of the two countries for the war against Germany. For Russia, the same side remained unacceptable in the French proposals - the unilateral concentration of all forces only against Germany. The possible and almost inevitable clash with Austria was not taken into account. The situation was created that if Austria attacked Russia, then French help would not be guaranteed to her. That is why General Obruchev objected to this French proposal.

Bouaderf received a directive from his leadership to make concessions and accept the Russian version, since France was most afraid of further delaying the agreement.

On August 17, 1892, the convention was signed by Obruchev and Bouaderf. Draft military convention of 5/17 August 1892. // E. E. Yurovskaya. Workshop on New History. 1870 - 1917. M., 1979. S. 283. This convention essentially meant a close military alliance between France and Russia. It was directly related to the previous agreement (1891) and was its natural complement.

And the procedure for formalizing the union - first a political agreement, then a military one - and the content of the agreement were adopted in accordance with the opinion of the Russian side. The design of the Russian-French alliance and its content, reflecting the forced compliance of the French side, expressed that at that time France needed an alliance with Russia more than Russia, it was a necessity for France. Manfred A. Z. Formation of the Russian-French Union. M., 1975. S. 346.

So, as mentioned above, Russia managed to insist that France would help Russia if it was attacked not only by Germany, but also by Austria (in the original version it sounded: “If France or Russia is attacked by the Triple Alliance or Germany alone .. . "Draft military convention of August 5/17, 1892. // E. E. Yurovskaya. Workshop on New History. 1870 - 1917. M., 1979. P. 283.).

In the same way, the immediate mobilization of allied forces was assumed when not only the Triple Alliance or Germany was mobilized, but also one of the countries of the union (the French version assumed mobilization only when the forces of the Triple Alliance or Germany were mobilized only). Manfred A. Z. Formation of the Russian-French Union. M., 1975.

It is important to mention that the military force used against Germany on the French side was to be 1,300,000 men, and on the Russian side only 700,000 to 800,000 men. There.

Thus, we see that the initiative came from France, and its version of the convention was one-sided, but since it badly needed Russia, the Russian side managed to amend the agreement in its favor.

December 27, 1893 - January 4, 1894, an exchange of letters took place between Montebello and Gears, according to which the military convention entered into force and became binding. Thus, on January 4, 1894, the formalization of the Russian-French alliance was finally completed. There. S. 350.

So, the initiative came from France. The Russian government, very conservative, for a long time did not want to make contact with republican France. But gradually ideological considerations began to fade into the background before strategic considerations, and the alliance was concluded. At the same time, since the initiator was France, which was in dire need of an ally, the Russian version was adopted.

1.3 Russo-French alliance

The main reasons for rapprochement with France include: acute contradictions in the Balkans between Russia, on the one hand, Austria-Hungary and Germany, on the other, predetermined the fragility of the "Union of Three Emperors". In 1882, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy formed the Tripartite Alliance, directed against France and posing a danger to Russia, which refused to join it. At the end of the 80s. Russia's economic relations with Germany deteriorated sharply, while French capital actively penetrated into Russia, becoming an important source of financing for its economy.

The emerging political and economic rapprochement between Russia and France leads to the conclusion in August 1891 of a secret agreement on mutual assistance in the event of military aggression by the countries of the Triple Alliance. In 1892, a military convention was signed on joint military operations against Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy in the event of their attack on one of the countries. The final registration of the union took place in 1894 after the approval of the Russian-French military convention by Alexander III.

The Russo-French economic rapprochement paved the way for a political rapprochement between republican France and monarchist Russia. Such rapprochement was also dictated by the entire foreign policy situation of that time. At the beginning of June 1890, 3 months after Bismarck's resignation, Germany refused to renew the "reinsurance agreement". This irritated even the supporters of the German-Russian alliance among Russian government circles.

Under these conditions, the Russian government was forced to think about the further foreign policy orientation of Russia. Fear of isolation forced to speed up the formation of a military-political alliance with France. In 1893, Germany launched a particularly fierce economic war against Russia, the Russian government defiantly sent a Russian squadron on a return visit to Toulon. At the same time, as a result of preliminary negotiations between representatives of the general staffs of both countries, on December 27, 1893, a Franco-Russian military convention was signed. The Franco-Russian alliance has become a fact. The Franco-Russian military convention, developed in connection with the increase in the German army, laid the military foundation for the Russian-French alliance. The convention stated that France should send armies of 1300 thousand people against Germany, Russia from 700 to 800 thousand. Both sides pledged to bring these forces into action “fully and with all speed”, so that Germany would have to fight simultaneously on West, and in the East. The provisions of the convention were also secret. St. Petersburg insisted on this so as not to speed up the military-strategic rapprochement between Berlin and Vienna. But it was difficult to keep such an important international treaty secret for a long time, and two years later France and Russia officially recognize their allied obligations.

The final registration of the Franco-Russian took place in January 1894.

1.4 Politics in Central Asia

By the beginning of the XX century. Central Asia has become the main supplier of cotton for Russian industry.

The accession of Central Asia was accompanied by the colonization of lands. On average, about 50 thousand people moved here every year. The political stability of the region, the availability of free land and relatively low taxes attracted residents from Russian provinces, China and other neighboring states.

The accession of the Central Asian peoples to Russia was accompanied by many progressive phenomena. Internecine wars ceased, slavery and the slave trade were abolished. In Central Asia, a single legislation with Russia was established, reflecting the positive changes of the era.

The process of capitalist development began in Central Asia. Trade turnover is growing noticeably, especially in connection with the development of cotton growing and sericulture. Secular schools began to be created in the cities. Russian scientists launched a wide range of activities to study the nature, history and culture of Central Asia. A particularly notable contribution belongs to P.L. Semenov-Tyan-Shansky, N.M. Przhevalsky, V.V. Barthold and others.

1.5 Outcomes of foreign policy in the late 19th century

In the last quarter of the XIX century. European tension was constantly growing due to the deepening contradictions between the great powers: Russia, England, France, Germany and Austria-Hungary. Their confrontation determined the situation in the world, affecting the interests of other states as well. Conflicts have engulfed many regions: the Near and Middle East, the Balkan Peninsula. North Africa, Far East, Southeast Asia. Therefore, for Russia, as well as for other states, the most important problem was the search for allies to solve their own problems in these conflicts. End of the 19th century early 20th century was marked by the creation of two hostile blocs ..

The first of the blocs of the tripartite alliance began to take shape in the late 1970s. In 1879, Germany and Austria-Hungary entered into a secret alliance against Russia and France. After Italy joined it, in 1882 the Tripartite Alliance of the Central European Powers arose. This union pursued an aggressive policy in the Balkans, the Near and Middle East. Austria-Hungary was preparing to invade Serbia. Germany increased its influence in Turkey and Iraq, stepped up its colonial policy in Africa and the Far East. The figurative phrase of Chancellor O. Bismarck that the Germans "also need their place in the sun" became the motto of German diplomacy.

Despite the twofold (in 1881 and 1884) extension of the treaty of the three emperors and the signing of the "reinsurance treaty" in 1887, distrust in Russian-German relations grew. Both sides imposed protectionist customs tariffs and unfavorable trade terms on each other. Germany was preparing for war against Russia and France. The German General Staff already in the 80s of the XIX century. began to develop similar military-strategic plans.

Russia in its foreign policy was forced to reconsider its traditional orientation towards the Central European states and look for new allies. She began an active rapprochement with France. It was pushed to this by the anti-Russian policy of Germany in the Middle East, the growth of German militarism and the resumption of the Triple Alliance in 1891. In July 1891, the French squadron arrived in Kronstadt. Simultaneously with the visit of warships, Russian-French negotiations between diplomats and the military on the conclusion of an alliance took place. In 1891-1892. the first documents (a political agreement and a military convention) were signed on joint actions in case one of the parties was threatened by an attack by Germany or Austria-Hungary. The ratification of the convention in 1893 meant the finalization of the Russian-French alliance, which had an anti-German orientation.

With the formation of two opposing alliances (Triple and Russian-French), a new stage in the history of international relations opened, associated with the deepening of contradictions in Europe and the fierce struggle of the great powers for the further division of the world into spheres of influence.

Chapter 2. The foreign policy of the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 20th century

Started in the 18th century the policy of limiting and regulating the estate Cossack administration, it functioned within the rigid framework of the autocratic system of state administration. It can be concluded that the functions of local government at the beginning of the 19th century were constantly expanding due to the complication of local life, the aggravation of social relations; the administration is constantly...

Regress. 2. Ideas of traditions and modernization in conservative ideology 2.1 From traditions to "conservative creativity" Before we talk about how the ideas of traditions and modernization were expressed in the works of Russian conservatives of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, let's define the content of these terms. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia gives such a definition to the term "tradition" - (from lat. traditio - ...

The alliance between Russia and France was dictated not only by the common military-strategic interests of both powers, by the presence of a threat from common enemies. By that time /348/ there was already a solid economic basis for the union. Since the 1970s, Russia was in dire need of free capital to invest in industry and railway construction; France, on the contrary, did not find a sufficient number of objects for its own investment and actively exported its capital abroad. Since then, the share of French capital in the Russian economy has gradually begun to grow. For 1869-1887. 17 foreign enterprises were founded in Russia, 9 of them French.

French financiers very productively used the deterioration of Russian-German relations. Parisian banks bought up Russian valuables that had been dumped on the German money market. In 1888, the first Russian loan bonds in the amount of 500 million francs were issued on the Paris Stock Exchange, followed by loans in 1889 (for 700 million and 1200 million francs), 1890 and 1891. French capital in a short time became the main creditor of tsarism. Thus, already in the early 1990s, the foundation was laid for Russia's financial dependence on France. The economic prerequisites for the union also had a special military-technical aspect. Already in 1888, the brother of Alexander III, Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich, who arrived in Paris on an unofficial visit, managed to place a mutually beneficial order for the manufacture of 500,000 rifles for the Russian army at French military factories.

The cultural prerequisites for an alliance between Russia and France were long-standing and strong. No other country had such a powerful cultural impact on Russia as France. The names of F. Voltaire and J.J. Rousseau, A. Saint-Simon and C. Fourier, V. Hugo and O. Balzac, J. Cuvier and P.S. Laplace, J.L. David and O. Rodin, J. Bizet and C. Gounod were known to every educated Russian. In France, they always knew less about Russian culture than in Russia - about French. But since the 1980s, the French, as never before, have been joining Russian cultural values. There are publishing houses specializing in replicating the masterpieces of Russian literature - the works of L.N. Tolstoy and F.M. Dostoevsky, I.A. Goncharova and M.E. Saltykov-Shchedrin, not to mention I.S. Turgenev, who lived in France for a long time and became one of the most beloved writers for the French. The book by M. de Vopoe "The Russian Romance", published in 1886, became in France not only a scientific and literary, but also a social event.

In the context of the growing rapprochement between Russia and France, champions of an active offensive policy against Germany advocated for an alliance in both countries. In France, as long as she was on the defensive with Germany, an alliance with Russia was not a burning need. Now, when France recovered from the consequences of the defeat of 1870 /349/ and the question of revenge arose in the order of the day for French foreign policy, among its leaders (including President S. Carnot and Prime Minister Ch. Freycinet) the course towards an alliance with Russia.

On February 17 (according to the Russian calendar, 5th) February 1882 in Paris, Skobelev, at his own peril and risk, delivered a “daredevil” speech to Serbian students - a speech that bypassed the European press and plunged into confusion the diplomatic circles of Russia and Germany. “Not a single victory of General Skobelev made such a noise in Europe as his speech in Paris,” the Kievlyanin newspaper reasonably noted at the same time. Russian Ambassador to France, Prince N.A. Orlov (the son of the chief of the gendarmes A.F. Orlov) was so shocked by this speech that he reported to Girs that Skobelev "openly pretends to be Garibaldi." What was the "white general" talking about so loudly? He branded official Russia for being a victim of "foreign influences" and losing its bearings as to who is its friend and who is its enemy. “If you want me to name you this enemy, so dangerous for Russia and for the Slavs,<...>I'll name it to you, - thundered Skobelev. - This is the author of the "onslaught on the East" - he is familiar to all of you - this is Germany. I repeat to you and ask you not to forget this: the enemy is Germany. The struggle between the Slavs and the Teutons is inevitable. She is even very close!

In Germany and France, as well as in Austria-Hungary, Skobelev's speech became the political topic of the day for a long time. The impression from her was all the stronger because she was perceived as an inspiration "from above". “That Skobelev, a general in active service, the most famous of the Russian military figures of that time, says without authorization by anyone, solely on his own behalf, no one believed this either in France or in Germany,” E.V. rightly concluded. Tarle. Skobelev died suddenly four months after this speech. But the "French" party in the Russian "top" continued to gain strength. It was made up of the spiritual shepherd of the king K.P. Pobedonostsev, head of government N.P. Ignatiev and D.A. Tolstoy, /350/ Chief of the General Staff N.N. Obruchev, the most authoritative of the generals (soon to become field marshal) I.V. Gurko, the most influential of the horsemen of the press M.N. Katkov. In January 1887, the tsar had already said this to Girs about the national antipathies of Russians towards Germany: “Before, I thought that it was only Katkov, but now I am convinced that this is all of Russia.”

True, the “German” party was also strong at the court and in the government of Russia: Minister of Foreign Affairs N.K. Girs, his closest assistant and future successor V.N. Lamzdorf, Minister of War P.S. Vannovsky, ambassadors in Germany P.A. Saburov and Pavel Shuvalov. The court support of this party was the wife of the tsar's brother Vladimir Alexandrovich, Grand Duchess Maria Pavlovna (nee Princess of Mecklenburg-Schwerin). On the one hand, she influenced the tsar's family in favor of Germany, and on the other hand, she assisted the German government, informing him about the plans of Alexander III and about Russian affairs. In terms of influence on the tsar and the government, as well as in terms of energy, perseverance and "caliber" of the composition, the "German" party was inferior to the "French", but on the other hand, a number of objective factors hindering the Russian-French rapprochement.

The first of these was the geographical factor of remoteness. A military alliance required operational relations, and those between countries located at opposite ends of Europe seemed very difficult at the end of the 19th century, when there was no radio, no air, or even motor transport, and telegraph and telephone communications were only just being improved. However, this factor promised the Russian-French alliance and obvious benefits, since it contained a deadly threat for Germany of a war on two fronts.

The differences in their state and political system hindered the alliance between Russia and France more. In the eyes of such a reactionary as Alexander III, the alliance of the tsarist autocracy with republican democracy looked almost unnatural, especially since it oriented Russia against the German Empire, headed by the Hohenzollern dynasty, traditionally friendly and even related to tsarism. It was on this monarchist mindset of the autocrat that the "German" party built its policy. Gire directly spoke in September 1887 to the German chargé d'affaires at the court of Alexander III (future chancellor) B. von Bulow: “I give you my head for cutting off, that never, never will Emperor Alexander raise his hand against Emperor Wilhelm, nor against him / 351 / son, nor against his grandson. At the same time, Giret was sincerely surprised: “How can these French be so stupid as to imagine that Emperor Alexander will go with all sorts of Clemenceau against his uncle! This alliance could only inspire horror in the emperor, who would not drag chestnuts from the fire in favor of the Commune.

In the spring of 1890, after Germany refused to renew the Russo-German "reinsurance" treaty, the French authorities skillfully took advantage of the difficult situation for Russia. In order to win the favor of Alexander III, on May 29, 1890, they immediately arrested a large group (27 people) of Russian political emigrants in Paris. At the same time, the French police did not disdain the services of a provocateur. Agent of the Petersburg Okhrana since 1883 A.M. Gekkelman (aka Landesen, Petrovsky, Baer and General von Harting), with the knowledge of the police authorities of Paris and, apparently, for a certain bribe, staged preparations for the assassination of Alexander III in the French capital: he himself delivered bombs to the apartment of the "terrorists", aimed at her to the police and escaped safely. The arrested victims of his provocation were put on trial and (except three women, acquitted with purely French gallantry) sentenced to imprisonment. Alexander III, learning about this, exclaimed: "Finally, there is a government in France!"

This situation looked especially piquant because the French government was headed at that time by Charles Louis Freycinet - the same Freycinet who was the head of the French government in 1880, when it refused to extradite the Narodnaya Volya L.N. Hartmann, accused of preparing a terrorist act against Alexander II. Now Freycinet, as it were, atoned for before Alexander III the long-standing sin of the affront inflicted on his father.

The police action of 1890 in Paris made the ground for political rapprochement between the governments of Russia and France. In the summer of the same year, the first practical step towards union. Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Empire N.N. Obruchev invited (of course, with the highest sanction) to the maneuvers of the Russian troops, the deputy / 352 / chief of the French General Staff, R. Boisdefre. Negotiations between Obruchev and Boisdefre, although they were not formalized by any agreement, showed the interest of the military leadership of both parties in the union treaty.

Following the squadron's visit, a new round of diplomatic negotiations took place, which resulted in a kind of consultative pact between Russia and France, signed by two foreign ministers - N.K. Girs and A. Ribot. Under this pact, the parties undertook, in the event of a threat of attack on one of them, to agree on joint measures that could be taken "immediately and simultaneously." “The former revolutionary embraces the future” - this is how V.O. Klyuchevsky. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu called 1891 the "year of Kronstadt". Indeed, the royal reception given to the French sailors in Kronstadt became, as it were, an event of the year with far-reaching consequences. The newspaper St. Petersburg Vedomosti stated with satisfaction: "The two powers, bound by natural friendship, have such a formidable force of bayonets that the Triple Alliance must involuntarily stop in thought." On the other hand, the German Attorney B. Bülow, in his report to Reich Chancellor L. Caprivi, assessed the Kronstadt meeting as "a very important factor that weighs heavily against the renewed Triple Alliance."

The Convention was to enter into force after its ratification by the Emperor of Russia and the President of France. The ministers of foreign affairs were supposed to prepare and submit its text for ratification. However, Gire deliberately (in the interests of Germany) delayed the performance, citing the fact that illness prevented him from studying the details with due care. The French government, beyond his expectations, helped him: it got entangled in the autumn of 1892 in a grandiose Panamanian scam.

The fact is that an international joint-stock company created in France in 1879 for the construction of the Panama Canal under the chairmanship of Ferdinand Lesseps (the same one who built the Suez Canal in 1859-1869), went bankrupt as a result of embezzlement and bribery of many prominent officials , including three former prime ministers. A number of these individuals, hopelessly compromised, were put on trial. In France, a ministerial leapfrog began. Giers and Lamzdorf gloated, anticipating the reaction of Alexander III. “The Sovereign,” we read in Lamzdorf’s diary, “will have the opportunity to see how dangerous and imprudent it is to be too closely associated with states without a permanent government, which France is at present.”

The Tsar did not rush Giers to study the convention, but then the German government, for which Giers tried so hard, upset his whole game. In the spring of 1893, Germany began another customs war against Russia, and on August 3, its Reichstag adopted a new military law, according to which the German armed forces grew from 2 million 800 thousand to 4 million 300 thousand people. Having received detailed information about this from the French General Staff, Alexander III became angry and defiantly took a new step towards rapprochement with France, namely, he sent a Russian military squadron to Toulon on a return visit. True, the king was still cautious. He requested /354/ lists of those admirals who speak French well and those who speak French poorly. From the second list, the king ordered to choose the worst speaker of French. This turned out to be Vice Admiral F.K. Avelan. He was sent at the head of the squadron to France, "to talk less there."

Historiographic reference. The historiography of this topic is relatively small. Unlike previous and subsequent years, Russia's foreign policy in 1879-1894. historians were of little interest, with the exception of such a central plot in this topic as the Russian-French alliance.

Russian pre-revolutionary historiography and at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries. traditionally continued to single out the Eastern question from all issues of domestic foreign policy, although over time it faded further and further into the background. Even the Russian-French alliance did not become the subject of special studies for Russian historians until 1917.

In Soviet historiography, all aspects of the foreign policy of tsarism in 1879-1894. considered in one way or another. /355/ E.V. Tarle, and later F.A. Rothstein reviewed them in the consolidated works on the history of European diplomacy at the end of the 19th century. In 1928, the 1st volume of S.D. Skazkina about the "Union of the 3 Emperors" 1881-1887. (Volume 2 was not written). On the basis of archival, previously unstudied data, Skazkin revealed the causes of the emergence and collapse of this union and all aspects of its activity as the last attempt by the three most reactionary monarchies of Europe to maintain at least benevolent neutrality between them - an attempt doomed to failure due to the aggravation their mutually hegemonic claims, mainly in the Balkans. An equally thorough work on the Russo-French alliance of 1894 appeared only in 1975. Here, the process of gradual rapprochement between Russia and France 20 years before the registration of the union treaty between them was studied in all its complexity, everything was considered in detail - economic, political, military, cultural - the prerequisites for the union and its significance is shown on a large scale. No comparison with the works of S.D. Skazkina and A.Z. Manfred's work on the same topics V.M. Khvostov, overly politicized and declarative.

In the West (primarily in France) the literature on the Russo-French alliance of 1894 is immeasurably richer. R. Giraud studied the economic prerequisites for the union, E. Daudet, J. Michon, W. Langer and others - its diplomatic and military essence, and from different positions: Michon, for example, developed an untenable, albeit widespread in English and German literature, version that the Russo-French alliance "arose out of the Eastern question."

Heckelmann-Landesen in gratitude for the service in 1890, Alexander III rewarded very generously. The provocateur became (under the name of von Harting) the head of the Russian secret police abroad with the rank of general and a high salary.

M.E. Saltykov-Shchedrin, in his essays Abroad, bitterly sneered at how, once in Paris, he heard the Marseillaise singing right on the street: “I myself, of course, did not sing - but how not to suffer for being present! »

Collection of treaties between Russia and other states (1856-1917). S. 281.

Since then, the very term "Panama" has become a household name for particularly large scams.

See for example: Zhikharev S.A. Russian policy in the Eastern question. M., 1896. T. 1-2; Goryainov S.M. Bosporus and Dardanelles. SPb., 1907.

Cm.: Tarle E.V. Europe in the era of imperialism. 1871-1919. M., 1927; Rotstein F.A. International relations at the end of the XIX century. M.; L., 1960.

Cm.: Skazkin S.D. End of the Austro-Russian-German alliance. M., 1928. Vol. 1 (2nd ed. - M., 1974).

Cm.: Manfred A.Z. Formation of the Russian-French Union. M., 1975.

Cm.: Khvostov V.M. Franco-Russian alliance and its historical significance. M., 1955; History of diplomacy. 2nd ed. M., 1963. T. 2. Ch. 5, 8 (the author of the volume is V.M. Khvostov).

Cm.: Girault R. Emprunts russes et investissements francais en Russie. 1887-1914. P., 1973.

Cm.: Debidur A. Diplomatic history of Europe. M., 1947. T. 2.; Taylor A. Struggle for supremacy in Europe (1848-1918). M., 1958; Renouvin P. La paix armee el la grande guerre (1871-1919). P., 1939. The review and analytical article by F. Engels “Foreign policy of Russian tsarism” (K. Marx, F. Engels Soch. 2nd ed. T. 22) retains great scientific importance.

For a long time, it consolidated friendly relations between Germany and Russia. He preferred to see Austria-Hungary, Russia's most dangerous rival in the Balkans, as his main ally.

To avoid diplomatic isolation, Russian Foreign Minister Nikolai Girs began negotiations with the government of Sadi Carnot. The union of the authoritarian empire and the democratic republic, which amazed all of Europe, was formalized by an agreement in 1891 and a secret military convention on August 18, 1892. The parties pledged to provide mutual assistance in the event of an attack by Germany or Austria-Hungary on Russia or Italy and Germany on France. Later, the alliance was confirmed by the Russo-French Naval Convention of 1912.

No less important than the military and cultural dimension was the economic dimension of the Franco-Russian alliance. Of great importance for the development of the Russian economy were loans placed in France, both state and municipal, banking and industrial. In addition to loans, the participation of French capital in Russian joint-stock enterprises also played an important role. At the beginning of the 20th century, about a quarter of all French investments outside of France came from Russia.

Notes

Links

Documents on the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance (1891-1893)
Nikolai Troitsky Russian-French Union // Russia in the 19th century. Lecture course. M., 1997.
V. I. Bovykin. French capital in Russian joint-stock enterprises on the eve of October

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