Bomb for Uncle Joe Filatiev Eduard Nikolaevich
Soviet atomic project
Whenever " uranium issue" stood before the governments of Great Britain, Germany, France or the USA, it was solved very simply: physicists were offered to create a uranium bomb.
In the Soviet Union, in exactly the same situation, they acted differently: scientists were required to prepare a uranium report. That is, just to clarify the issue and give some recommendations. Hence the colossal difference in approaches to solving the problem - after all, bomb very significantly different from report.
In the West, the brightest minds of mankind, outstanding scientists, Nobel laureates were attracted to the creation of atomic weapons. We assembled a whole army of experienced engineers and technicians.
In the USSR, to draw up a report, performers of a completely different kind were needed - they were fluent in the pen, had organizational skills, and were able to clearly and distinctly state the essence of the matter.
Meanwhile - let's remember this once again - most of the venerable scientists of the country of the Soviets did not categorically believe in the success of "taming" uranium nuclei! Even references to secret research allegedly carried out abroad did not convince anyone. Foreign experiments rather aroused fears: is this not misinformation? Is it not a “linden” thrown to us on purpose, so that, having pecked at it, the naive Bolsheviks, with their inherent enthusiasm, launched large-scale work. In the midst of the war! And they would have overstrained themselves from an unbearable burden.
So, or something like that, a lot of people thought at the time. Including Academician Ioffe, whom Stalin's order placed at the head of this whole grandiose and fantastic undertaking.
But thoughts - thoughts, but the deed had to be done. And Abram Fedorovich went to Kazan, where the physics institutes evacuated from Moscow and Leningrad were located, and began to select a team to entrust her with the execution of a government task.
According to Ioffe, the team of nuclear scientists could well be headed by ... Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences Alikhanov ... or Professor Kurchatov.
But Abram Isaakovich Alikhanov was in Armenia at that moment. There, on Mount Alagez, he studied cosmic rays. Four years later, Stalin will ask Beria what the rays coming from space can have to do with the creation of an atomic bomb. Lavrenty Pavlovich will pass this question on to Alikhanov, and he will write a lengthy note to the leader, in which, in particular, he will say:
« The great interest shown by physicists in the problem of cosmic rays is due to the fact that in the stream of cosmic rays we encounter particles of enormous energies, measured in billions and hundreds of billions of volts.
Collisions of cosmic particles (mesotrons, protons, electrons, etc.) with the nuclei of atoms of matter make it possible to study the properties of elementary particles of matter and, in particular, protons and neutrons, from which the nuclei are built ...
Due to their high energies, cosmic particles not only easily split nuclei, but, passing through matter, cause phenomena that are not observed in ordinary nuclear reactions.
Stalin will carefully read the explanation sent to him and impose a brief resolution on it:
"I agree. I. Stalin.
But this will happen only at the beginning of 1946. In the autumn of 1942, Alikhanov was far from Moscow.
But Professor Kurchatov had already returned from Sevastopol to Kazan by that time, managed to recover from pneumonia and even grow a beard.
Anatoly Alexandrov said:
“At the end of 1942, Igor Vasilievich arrived in Kazan. We began to call him Beard. I think that the beard, which greatly aged his beautiful young face, made it easier for him to contact older people. Beard was only 39 years old, he was very young until he grew a beard. With a beard, no one would call him a boy. He laughed that he made a vow not to shave until he solved the problem.».
Physicist Veniamin Aronovich Zuckerman:
“Maria Nikolaevna Khariton told how in 1942, after the Sevastopol epic, seeing Kurchatov with a beard, she asked him:
- Igor Vasilyevich, why such decorations from pre-Petrine times?
He jokingly recited two lines from a popular war song:
- We’ll drive the Fritz out, there will be time, we’ll shave ...
Soon they began to call him the Beard, and sometimes - Prince Igor. With something elusive, his appearance resembled an epic hero, a handsome Russian prince».
It was to this cheerful bearded man, who managed to become a good specialist in degaussing ships, that in the fall of 1942, Ioffe was instructed to deal with "uranium problem" appointing him head "special laboratory of the atomic nucleus". It was organized at the Academy of Sciences and consisted of only eleven people.
Georgy Flerov, who also became her employee, recalled:
« Starting work, we were beggars and, using the right given to us, we collected from the remnants of military units and institutes of the Academy of Sciences the voltmeters and tools we needed.
It was true. Although someone has the right to exclaim:
Can not be! Equipping the nuclear laboratory with devices and tools was specifically stipulated in the Order of the State Defense Committee! Stalin himself signed it!
Yes, the GKO Order ordered scientists to allocate “... 6 tons of steel of different grades, 0.5 tons of non-ferrous metals, as well as ... two lathes. In addition, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade was instructed to "... purchase abroad at the request of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR for the laboratory of the atomic nucleus of equipment and chemicals for 30 thousand rubles. The main directorate of the civil air fleet was to "... ensure by October 5, 1942, the delivery by plane to Kazan from Leningrad of 20 kg of uranium and 200 kg of equipment for physical research belonging to the Physico-Technical Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences».
The drafters of the Order, signed by Stalin, apparently believed that the physicists who would prepare a report to the leader would be provided to the maximum.
However, Kurchatov, having learned that he would have to conduct all the research with the help of two lathes and six tons of steel, must have been thoroughly depressed. But what could he do? The time was hot - the Germans stood near Stalingrad! The order of the GKO was to be carried out, that is, to prepare a "uranium" report by the specified date. So I had to roll up my sleeves and get to work.
Anatoly Alexandrov immediately noticed then how much Kurchatov had changed:
“Although his style of behavior, communication with people was the same as before, he felt a deep spiritual restructuring taking place in him. With his highly developed sense of responsibility for the cause, the new task fell on him with a huge burden.”
At this time, the ocean also made a choice. They were looking for a worthy candidate for the post of scientific director of the atomic project. Leslie Groves, who commanded this case, at first wanted to put Nobel laureate Ernest Lawrence in charge of nuclear physicists, but he refused for a number of reasons. Then the choice fell on 38-year-old physicist from the University of California, Robert Oppenheimer. In October 1942, Groves invited him to become the scientific director of the Manhattan Project. Oppenheimer agreed.
At that time, the Soviet atomic project was headed by a man whose status was much more significant than that of the American Leslie Groves - Vyacheslav Molotov. But he was only considered a leader, because he had a lot of worries (important, most responsible - state ones).
The next most important was Abram Ioffe, who also had plenty of cases.
Igor Kurchatov had to take care of all the "nuclear affairs" (and a great many of them fell on the small staff of the special laboratory of the atomic nucleus). There were so many problems that it was very difficult to find the head of the laboratory on the spot.
On October 22, 1942, Kurchatov arrived in Moscow and began to look for those who could be involved in work on atomic topics. One of the first to be found was Julius Khariton, who later wrote:
“Since March 1942, I was seconded to the so-called “Six” - officially it is NII-6 of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition ... We were engaged in surrogating explosives, since there was little TNT, shaped charges ...
Igor Vasilyevich came to me. He began to talk about the need to return to the interrupted work on the uranium problem. His words struck me as complete nonsense. Then the Germans occupied a significant part of our territory. It seemed to me that we should help the army in every possible way. And then there's the uranium problem. The war will probably end before we make atomic weapons. Once the war is over, then, as it seemed to me, it will be possible to deal with nuclear energy and nuclear weapons with a clear conscience.
Igor Vasilyevich was in no hurry, he suggested attending seminars… I started attending them at first occasionally, then more often, so gradually my thoughts began to return to the uranium problem.”
Julius Borisovich Khariton did not indicate the exact date when his meeting with Kurchatov took place. But the mention that Igor Vasilievich was not too persistent suggests that their first conversation about "resumption of work" took place, most likely, in mid-November.
Then Kurchatov went to Kikoin.
Isaak Konstantinovich Kikoin was sent to the Urals in the mid-1930s to organize a branch of the Phystech. There he lived and worked. At the end of 1942, Kurchatov suddenly came to see him.
Many years later, Kikoin recalled:
«… Kurchatov unexpectedly appeared in Sverdlovsk, whom I did not immediately recognize, since I had not seen him since the beginning of the war, and who grew a luxurious beard, promising to part with it after the victory over fascism…
For some reason, he became interested in the subject matter of my laboratory and asked what I was doing. I was busy at that time with defense topics, the content of which I told him. Outwardly, his visit then did not affect anything, but later it became clear that he had an assignment to probe the possibility of involving me in a new topic.
For the role "great scientist" Kikoin was not very good. He himself then said with revelation:
“All of us, including me, were not experts in the problem we were considering, but we were young, and we had enough impudence, we were “knee-deep sea”.
Apparently, this desperate recklessness of the 34-year-old Sverdlovsk citizen attracted Kurchatov. And very soon Kikoin was requested to the capital.
And Kurchatov at that time continued to be, as it were, at a crossroads - much was unclear, a host of questions arose. But in the third decade of November 1942, he was unexpectedly introduced to the data obtained in foreign laboratories.
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Back in the prewar years, scientists from Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov and other institutes of the country made fundamental discoveries and calculations on the branched chain reaction of uranium nuclear fission and the conditions for the occurrence of a nuclear explosion. However, the outbreak of war with Germany, with its tragic consequences for the country, almost completely stopped work on nuclear physics. It was only after the US nuclear strike on Japanese cities that work on the creation of its own atomic bomb took on a large-scale character in the USSR. For these purposes, in August 1945, the country created a Special Interdepartmental Committee for the Solution of the Nuclear Problem for Military Purposes (Chairman L.P. Beria) and the First Main Directorate under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (Head B.L. Vannikov) on current issues of the problem. In a short time, a specialized nuclear industry was created almost from scratch on the basis of all industries of the country, which ensured the manufacture of the most diverse and completely new types of special equipment, apparatus, materials, large-scale construction of nuclear facilities in various regions of the country.
In the second half of the 1940s. there was a real threat of atomic bombing of the Russian largest industrial centers, as evidenced by the declassified US strategic plans. Therefore, the implementation of the USSR nuclear project was a response measure that ensured the security of the Soviet Union.
The historical experience of the implementation of the Soviet atomic project shows that this super-task was successfully solved in a fairly short period of time in a mobilization-type economy. The chronology of the development of the nuclear industry in the USSR (1945-1991) is presented in Appendix 1.
The most important feature of nuclear weapons was that they acted as an effective tool in the foreign policy of both the United States and the USSR, with the help of which it was possible to prevent a third world thermonuclear war. The parity of nuclear weapons between the two superpowers ensured stable progressive development in the second half of the 20th century. It should be noted that in modern conditions, the presence of nuclear weapons in Russia is still an effective means of deterring the potential of aggressors, their attempts to threaten the very existence of the Russian state.
The nuclear project in the USA and the USSR was implemented in fundamentally different socio-political systems. This became a demonstration of alternative ways of developing scientific and technological progress, a demonstration of the possibilities of a multivariate equally successful approach to the implementation of a qualitatively new scientific and technical task.
And until the end of the 1980s. the production of nuclear weapons in the USSR was the biggest state secret, and therefore the history of the industry, as well as security issues, were inaccessible to both the public and Soviet researchers. During the 1940-80s. even the use of the term "nuclear industry" was forbidden, not only in print, but also orally. The nuclear industry, like no other economy, was created and functioned with the active participation of directive, special bodies, which used predominantly command-and-control methods of management up to coercion and violence, increasing responsibility for the implementation of decisions, often elevated to an absolute.
At first, the nuclear industry in the USSR was created and developed in the public sector to solve military problems: the creation of an atomic bomb, the production of plutonium, the development of ship reactors, etc. The possibility of generating electricity at the reactor plants of the nuclear weapons complex turned out to be a concomitant property that was used for peaceful purposes. Therefore, in parallel with military developments, large-scale studies began to be carried out on the possibility of using atomic energy for peaceful purposes, primarily for the production of electricity, as well as in science, medicine, and industry. The beginning of the peaceful use of nuclear energy is considered to be the day of July 26, 1954, when the world's first nuclear power plant (NPP) was put into operation in the city of Obninsk near Moscow. Its power was 5 MW(el). The launch of the first nuclear power plant gave rise to hopes for clean energy with virtually unlimited resource potential. This event clearly demonstrated that atomic energy can be transformed, according to Academician I.V. Kurchatov, "into a powerful source of energy that brings prosperity and joy to all people on earth."
In Russia, since 1954, 2 areas of dual-purpose reactors have been forcibly worked out, which could combine the production of electricity and the production of weapons-grade plutonium: the uranium-graphite type RBMK (high-power channel reactor) and the vessel type VVER (pressure-cooled power reactor). The first dual-purpose reactor EI-2 was created by 1958 and was put into operation at the Siberian NPP in Tomsk-7 in December 1958. It was the 2nd NPP in Russia. Its power was increased to 600 MW. The third NPP started operating in July 1961 in Krasnoyarsk-26. In April 1964, the first block of the Beloyarsk NPP gave commercial current. It was already the 4th nuclear power plant. Subsequently, 2 more units were installed at the BNPP, one of which was equipped with a fast neutron reactor. The Novovoronezh NPP became the fifth NPP in Russia, the 1st unit of which was launched in September 1964. By 1980, 5 units with VVER-440 and VVER-1000 reactors were operating at NVNPP. The sixth NPP - Dimitrovogradskaya (1968) with a BOR-60 fast neutron reactor, the 7th - Kola NPP (1973) with 4 units with VVER-440 reactors, the 8th - Leningrad NPP (1973) , 4 units with RBMK-1000 reactors, 9th - Bilibino NPP (1974) with 4 units that operate according to the scheme of a nuclear thermal power plant supplying electricity and heat to a large area, 10th - Kursk NPP (1976 ), 4 units with RBMK-1000 reactors, 11th - Smolensk NPP (1982), 3 units with RBMK-1000 and 1 - with RBMK-1500, 12th - Kalinin NPP (1984), 2 units with VVER-1000 reactors, 13th - Balaklava NPP (1985), 4 units with VVER-1000 reactors.
Atomic energy has made a real revolution in the fleet, especially the submarine. The nuclear engine of submarines allows them to stay underwater for months, overtake any surface ships, move to any distance, which made nuclear submarines (NS) the main means of destroying the enemy. The first Russian nuclear submarine - "Leninsky Komsomol" - was launched in August 1956, and by 1991 240 boats had been built. During this period, 5 generations of nuclear submarines were created.
Another area of peaceful use of nuclear energy was nuclear explosions for national economic purposes. With their help, such tasks were solved as: deep sounding for the purpose of exploration of minerals; intensification of oil and gas production; creation of underground reservoirs; soil movement; extinguishing gas fountains; destruction of rock solidity; other tasks.
In total in the USSR in the period from 1965 to 1988. 124 peaceful nuclear explosions were carried out in the interests of the national economy (including 117 outside the borders of nuclear test sites). Of these, three ("Globus-1" in the Ivanovo region, "Kraton-3" and Kristall in Yakutia) were accompanied by accidents in which radioactive decay products leaked. At the same time, Academician A.V. Yablokov gives other figures. In 169 peaceful nuclear explosions, 186 nuclear devices were blown up. At the same time, officially, according to VNIPIpromtekhnologii of the Ministry of Atomic Energy, the territory was contaminated in 4 cases (Kraton-3, Kristall, Taiga and Globus-1 facilities). According to the Central Research Institute of Atomic Information of the Ministry of Atomic Energy, by 1994 (that is, 20-30 years after the PNE), in 24 cases out of 115, “local above-ground pollution around the wells” remained.
Here are just some examples of peaceful nuclear explosions in the USSR. With the help of nuclear explosions, uncontrolled gas fountains were extinguished, in which millions of cubic meters of gas burned daily. For the first time in the world, a gas fountain was extinguished with a nuclear explosion in 1966 at the Urta-Bulak field in Uzbekistan. Camouflage explosion - an explosion produced so deep underground that the explosion cavity does not communicate with the earth's surface. 15 explosions were carried out near Astrakhan, 6 explosions near Uralsk to create gas condensate storage facilities.
So, the nuclear industry, like a number of some other industries, was a part and basis of the national security of the USSR and therefore was tightly regulated by the state. The creation and improvement of nuclear weapons was a task of paramount national importance. The use of the peaceful atom in the Soviet Union is a great example of accelerated modernization in the high-tech sector. At the same time, the entire system of the nuclear industry required new approaches to safety.
| The creators of atomic weapons I. V. Kurchatov and A. D. Sakharov for a walk. |
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| One of the recently declassified documents of the "Atomic Project of the USSR" with the visa of IV Stalin. |
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| Academician Ya. B. Zeldovich. 1987 (Photo by S. Novikov.) |
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| Scientific director of the Federal Nuclear Center "Arzamas-16" Academician Yu. B. Khariton next to the model of the first atomic bomb. Sarov, 1992. (Photo by V. Gubarev.) |
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| Academician BV Litvinov at the smallest nuclear charge in the Museum of Atomic Weapons in Sarov. |
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| The Museum of Atomic Weapons in Sarov. |
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| A group of physicists at the Plutonium Institute (NII-9): second from left - Academician A.P. Aleksandrov, third from left - Academician A.A. Bochvar. |
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| Director of NII-9 Academician AA Bochvar in his office. |
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| Production of uranium pellets at the plant in Elektrostal. |
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| Monument to the head of the "Atomic Project of the USSR" I. V. Kurchatov in the city of Snezhinsk ("Chelyabinsk-70"). |
Cannon of ... neutrons
The first steps in creating the most advanced weapons capable of shooting down nuclear warheads, neutralizing missiles and disabling space guidance and tracking systems can perhaps be traced back to January 1944. Such a statement at first glance looks ridiculous, but nevertheless, one declassified document of the "Atomic Project of the USSR" makes us believe in this and take a different look at our past.
So, January 1944. While there is no atomic bomb, even in the laboratories of Los Alamos, no one can say exactly when it will appear. Well, our prospects are even more vague. And although the basic schemes of the "work" of nuclear charges are already known, both overseas and we have to overcome a huge number of barriers before the atomic bomb becomes a reality. At this very time, Academician A. I. Alikhanov publishes a work on how to "defuse uranium bombs."
Abram Isaakovich Alikhanov is one of the leaders of the USSR Atomic Project. Under his leadership, the first heavy water reactors were created. It can be said that Alikhanov even competed with Kurchatov and sometimes outstripped him in this rivalry. So it was in 1943 at the elections to full members of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Alikhanov won more votes and "surpassed" Kurchatov. Igor Vasilyevich became an academician a couple of days later - he was elected to an additional vacancy.
A. I. Alikhanov headed Laboratory No. 3 of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, which, from December 1, 1945, operated in parallel with Laboratory No. 2, headed by I. V. Kurchatov. It is likely that Alikhanov's 1943 "uranium bomb disposal" research played an important role in his scientific career. On January 4, 1944, Abram Isaakovich presented I. V. Kurchatov with a “Note” based on the results of this work. He showed it to his associates. Obviously, the "bombers" headed by Yu. B. Khariton also got acquainted with the "Note". After their approval, the document was sent to L.P. Beria. In the Note, Academician Alikhanov first describes how the atomic bomb works:
"The explosion occurs after the approach of the two halves of the bomb, when the total mass of uranium is above the critical mass necessary for the development of a chain reaction. After this approach, the hit of one neutron causes an explosion ... If, however, the bomb is irradiated with a strong neutron flux during the approach of its halves, then the chain reaction begins to develop at a negligible excess of the mass over the critical ..., i.e. even when one half is at a certain distance from the other.In this case, the energy of the explosion will be 10,000 times less, but quite sufficient to break the shell of the bomb and so way to destroy it."
Further, Alikhanov gives three options for "defusing the atomic bomb" - "killers", if we use the terminology of the present day. Each proposal of the scientist sounds fantastic, but from the point of view of physics it is absolutely real. The first of them is:
“The best way to irradiate a bomb with neutrons would be to introduce into the body of the bomb during its fall a small ampoule from a mixture of a radioactive substance with beryllium ... The volume of the ampoule will not be more than an ordinary armor-piercing bullet. The most difficult moment in this method is the question of hitting the bomb on the fly. However, it seems likely that the development of centimeter and millimeter wave radar and automatic fire control will make it possible to approach the solution of this problem ... "
It will not be long before institutes and research centers appear in the country, which, in particular, will solve the problems raised by the "fantasies" of Academician Alikhanov.
"The second possible method of irradiating a bomb with neutrons can be based on the fact that the uranium-heavy water boiler is such a powerful source of neutrons that even at a distance of a kilometer the number of neutrons is sufficient to neutralize the bomb. The uranium-heavy water boiler, apparently , will turn out to be a not very cumbersome system, and it can be delivered at high speed (by plane) to the place of the expected bomb fall with an accuracy of 100-1000 meters ... "
In the same Note, Academician Alikhanov predicts the appearance of a "neutron bomb", which will be discussed only in the mid-1970s, when the scientist will no longer be alive:
"An even more powerful source, but already pulsed, can be ... a bomb operating on continuous neutron irradiation. It can be made to operate periodically, like an internal combustion engine, and at the right time to force the mode instantly."
In fact, the scientist suggested using a neutron gun to protect against an atomic bomb - a new option for the destruction of all life on Earth! But then he did not understand it ...
And, finally, Alikhanov calls cosmic rays one of the "shields" against the atomic bomb. On this occasion, in the "Note" we read:
"... the third method of neutron irradiation is the creation of neutrons in the bomb itself by artificial cosmic rays. From these rays, with sufficient energy, the bomb cannot be protected ..."
A. I. Alikhanov's "Note" came into the office of L. P. Beria in March 1944. I. V. Kurchatov accompanied it with a request to entrust the relevant institutes with the development of all three methods of protection against a uranium bomb. The further fate of this document is unknown ...
Is it possible to buy a cyclotron in America?
On January 31, 1944, the President of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Academician A. A. Bogomolets, sent a letter to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, N. S. Khrushchev, which, in particular, stated:
“Considering the danger of our backwardness and the need for the rapid development of nuclear physics in the Ukrainian SSR, I ask you to contact Comrade A.I. lagging behind by several years and using the rich experience of the United States ... Since no one in the USSR has experience in operating a large cyclotron facility, it is absolutely necessary to send several qualified physicists to the United States to learn operating experience, participate in the design of a cyclotron and fulfill orders ... "
The total cost of the cyclotron was about 500 thousand dollars. It was intended for the laboratory of Academician A. I. Leipunsky, whom the President of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine also recommended to send to the United States.
N. S. Khrushchev, the arguments of scientists seemed convincing, and he turned to A. I. Mikoyan:
"If there is any opportunity to purchase a cyclotron in America, I beg you to satisfy the request of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences."
To Nikita Sergeevich's credit, it should be noted that in all his posts he tried to support science and scientists. And thanks to this, we have achieved outstanding success in rocket science, space exploration and the creation of nuclear weapons. But for the sake of justice, it is worth recalling that N. S. Khrushchev also stood behind T. D. Lysenko and thereby caused enormous damage to our biology, genetics and science as a whole.
Letters from A. A. Bogomolets and N. S. Khrushchev immediately fell into the department of Beria. They decided that they contained two gross errors. The scientists of Ukraine (read - the USSR), firstly, reveal the low level of physical research in the country, and secondly, they show the interest of our scientists in work related to new weapons, since only cyclotrons can accumulate new substances.
So the letters of Bogomolets and Khrushchev ended up in a secret archive. However, the story of the "Ukrainian cyclotron" did not end there. Other prominent scientists thought about him, not only in Ukraine, but also in the "big" academy in Moscow. Academician A.I. Leipunsky took up the matter. On August 8, 1945, he writes to I.V. Stalin:
The "atomic" bomb is not an isolated invention, but the beginning of a major revolution in military technology and the national economy. Nuclear physics is at the beginning of its development, there are still many problems, the solution of which will determine the development of new directions ... Therefore, it is especially important to take all possible measures to accelerate the development of nuclear physics and nuclear technology in the USSR and to educate numerous specialists in this field ... "
AI Leipunsky believes that there should be several research centers similar to Laboratory No. 2, one of them is in Kyiv, where a site for the construction of a cyclotron has already been prepared and a corresponding project has been made. The scientist is counting on success, because just two days before that, the Americans detonated an atomic bomb over Hiroshima.
Stalin sent an appeal to A.I. Leipunsky to L.P. Beria. He instructed to consider it at the Technical Council of the First Main Directorate (PGU). Everyone who took part in the meeting, of course, supported their colleague from Kyiv, but no funds were found for the construction of the cyclotron, and there was no question of buying it abroad ... Neither the leadership of the Academy of Sciences nor Leipunsky knew anything about the results of the secret meeting . A year later, without waiting for an answer, he again turned to PSU with a request to help in the construction of the cyclotron. This time there was a positive response, and Academician A.I. Leipunsky began to work - first in Moscow, and then in Obninsk.
All the secrets of "Enormosa"
Scouts "traveled through the atomic empire", which was created by physicists in Europe and America, starting in October 1941. They mined unique information for Soviet scientists, and month after month it became more and more. The maximum number of intelligence materials entered the USSR in 1944 - this, of course, was the greatest achievement of our intelligence.
"Enormous" is the code name assigned back in 1941 by the NKVD of the USSR to work on the atomic bomb carried out by intelligence. Many documents on "Enormous" have not yet been declassified, and there is no hope that this will happen in the coming years. But what has become known cannot but amaze ... From the declassified materials, for example, it follows that on November 5, 1944, our scientists were informed in detail about the state of scientific work on the Enormous problem in the USA, England, Canada, France, in Germany:
"The United States is the most important center of Enormous work, both in terms of scale and results achieved. Work continues to develop very successfully. The results of research conducted at the country's leading universities are quickly being implemented in practice: design work is being carried out simultaneously with work in laboratories, semi-production installations are being built and factory construction is being carried out on a large scale ... According to reports, the 1st experimental bomb should be ready in the fall of 1944 ... "
"The main part of the work of the British on Enormous is being carried out in Canada, where they were transferred for reasons of greater security from enemy air raids and in order to get closer to the Americans ..."
"The work is being carried out in Montreal, in the system of the Canadian National Research Council. The scientific team, consisting of those transferred from England and local workers, has increased significantly and amounts to 250 people. The main objects of work are the construction of two nuclear installations of the uranium-graphite system ..."
"The famous French physicist Joliot-Curie, engaged in research in the field of Enormose, has allegedly achieved significant results. Although the British, and perhaps also the Americans, have already made some attempts to get closer to Joliot, the latter, apparently, will remain in France and is unlikely to cooperate with anyone without the official consent of his government.Thus, there is another center of work on "Enormous ..."
"We do not have exact data on the state of development of the Enormoz problem in this country (we are talking about Germany. - Approx. Ed.). The available information is contradictory. According to one of them, the Germans have achieved significant results, according to others - Germany, with its economic and martial law can not conduct any serious scientific work in the field of "Enormosa".
Thus, thanks to intelligence, the Soviet government and scientists led by I. V. Kurchatov had a fairly good idea of the achievements in the creation of nuclear weapons throughout the world. The reliability of the information was confirmed by various sources - at that time, physicists collaborated with intelligence, they linked hopes of victory over fascism with our country.
Documents of the First Main Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR testify:
“During the period of intelligence development, that is, from the end of 1941 to the present, quite significant results have been achieved. During this time, agents have been created that systematically supplied us with valuable information that made it possible to monitor the development of scientific work in countries, as well as valuable technical materials the essence of the problem…”
Time will pass, and the work of Soviet intelligence on the "Atomic Project of the USSR" will go down in the history of the twentieth century as one of the most productive.
"Trust Khariton and Sobolev!"
This is how one can formulate the request with which Kurchatov addressed the leadership of the NKGB of the USSR on April 30, 1945.
Igor Vasilyevich himself got acquainted with the materials coming from intelligence agents (sometimes I. K. Kikoin connected), and then "distributed" them to one or another employee of Laboratory No. 2. Naturally, they did not know how and from where Kurchatov received information about atomic boilers , on the design of the atomic bomb, on the methods of separating uranium isotopes, on plutonium. More and more information came from intelligence officers, and Kurchatov could no longer cope with the translations of materials himself. In addition, he was afraid to miss important details on the design of the bomb or on its calculation.
Kurchatov's "Notes" to the head of the First Main Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR G. B. Ovakimyan contain a request to allow the translation of intelligence materials by Yu. B. Khariton and S. L. Sobolev. In one of them, he writes in particular:
"... I ask for your permission to be allowed to work on ... the translation of Prof. Yu. B. Khariton (from the 2nd half of p. 2 to the end, with the exception of p. 22). Prof. Yu. uranium bomb and is one of the largest scientists in our country on explosive phenomena. Until now, he was not familiar with the materials even in the Russian text, and only I verbally informed him about the probabilities of spontaneous fission of uranium-235 and uranium-238 and about the general grounds " implosion"-method". (Igor Vasilyevich highlighted the words that Khariton had never read materials obtained by intelligence. - Approx. Aut.)
In another "Note" Kurchatov writes to G. B. Ovakimyan: "I ask for your permission to allow Academician Sergei Lvovich Sobolev to work on the translation of materials on mathematical issues of the separation plant. Until now, Academician S. L. Sobolev got acquainted with the Russian text of materials on these issues , and their translation was carried out either by your employees or by Professor I.K.
Nothing has been preserved in the archives of the "Atomic Project of the USSR" about how the leaders of the NKGB of the USSR reacted to Kurchatov's request, and Yu. B. Khariton and S. L. Sobolev themselves never spoke about this episode of their lives. Most likely, they were never allowed to see the intelligence documents, and they received only Russian texts. The NKGB feared that the originals could reveal sources of information, and the fewer people knew about their existence, the more reliable the intelligence work was. This principle was strictly observed, therefore, even today, half a century later, many pages of the "Atomic Project of the USSR" are still covered with a veil of secrecy.
Branch in Leningrad
Most of the physicists who were responsible for the implementation of the "Atomic Project of the USSR" came from the Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology. Naturally, Kurchatov considered it necessary to create a branch of Laboratory No. 2 there. There was a powerful industry in the city, and there were enough physicists ... At least, that was before the war and the blockade. I. K. Kikoin, A. I. Alikhanov, S. L. Sobolev and I. N. Voznesensky left for Leningrad.
Later, Academician I. K. Kikoin spoke about this trip as follows:
“We ... went to Leningrad in order to find out which of the scientists who survived after the blockade could be involved in work in the branch of Laboratory No. 2. I. N. Voznesensky was lucky - he managed to find about 10 specialists for his work (through the NKVD) The situation with physicists was worse - there were only a few of them, since a significant part of them, mainly employees of the Physico-Technical Institute, were evacuated, the rest died in Leningrad. At the same time, we probed the state of the city's leading enterprises and the possibility of involving them in our work ... "
Despite all the difficulties, a branch of the Laboratory No. 2 was created (GKO Decree No. 5407ss of March 15, 1944). I. K. Kikoin was appointed its leader. At the branch, he also formed the Special Design Bureau (OKB), headed by I. N. Voznesensky. The team was recruited mainly from employees of the Physico-Technical Institute, who returned from Sverdlovsk, where they worked during the war years. A month later, the branch of Laboratory No. 2 and the Design Bureau began to operate. They were to create methods for the separation of uranium isotopes and design experimental equipment for the industrial production of nuclear explosives.
Academician A.I. Alikhanov also rushed to Leningrad. He considered it his hometown and, naturally, thought that it was he who should head the new laboratory. However, there were other reasons too...
On March 3, 1944, Alikhanov sent a letter to one of the leaders of the "Atomic Project of the USSR" M. G. Pervukhin, in which he very "transparently" hinted at his difficult relationship with I. V. Kurchatov. Abram Isaakovich never mentioned his last name, but between the lines one could see resentment and unwillingness to remain "in the shadow" of Kurchatov. Alikhanov himself believed that in terms of work experience, in terms of authority among physicists, he was not inferior to Igor Vasilyevich.
It seems to me that Alikhanov's letter reveals the essence of the relationship between the two scientists. It is generally accepted that Kurchatov's authority was indisputable, and his opinion was almost a law for colleagues and officials. But it's not. There was a struggle within the Atomic Project. Sometimes it became obvious, for example, in the rivalry between Kurchatov and Alikhanov.
In a letter to Pervukhin, Alikhanov did not hide the conflict of the situation. He wrote:
“You rejected my project of moving my laboratory to Leningrad, based on the considerations that work on nuclear issues is concentrated in Moscow, and my colleagues and I are specialists in this field of physics. At first, I understood my role in Laboratory No. 2 in the same way, however very soon I had to make sure that all the materials that contained any information on questions of my specialty - the atomic nucleus, were hidden from me. area…"
Abram Isaakovich did not know when he wrote this letter that all prohibitions and restrictions did not come from Kurchatov, not from Pervukhin, and not even from Beria. This was the will of Stalin himself, for whom the intelligence materials coming from America meant much more than the work of Soviet physicists. Information about the work on the atomic bomb was at that time more political than technical. Hence the many restrictions imposed by the special services.
But Academician Alikhanov judged the situation in his own way:
"... inside Laboratory No. 2, I did not have and do not have any, even petty rights, which is very well known to the service and technical staff of the laboratory. On certain organizational or scientific issues, I was involved not due to the established procedure, but depending on the desire of the leadership laboratories For these reasons, it seems to me that the only way out is to move to Leningrad, especially in connection with the creation of a branch there ... "
M. G. Pervukhin invited Alikhanov to his place. They talked at length and at length. Abram Isaakovich learned that the fate of the branch in Leningrad had already been decided - I. K. Kikoin had been appointed its head. Alikhanov took this news as another slap in the face. The conflict was resolved only in December 1945, when he was appointed director of Laboratory No. 3. However, Alikhanov was not destined to come out of Kurchatov's "shadow" ...
Source not declassified
The flow of classified information from America increased as the work on the "Manhattan Project" expanded. The Americans failed to prevent the leakage of classified information, and this became more and more obvious to our intelligence agencies ...
In March 1944, the GRU of the General Staff of the Red Army received a thick stack of new documents - a detailed report on the creation of nuclear weapons. It is curious that until today the true name of the source of this information is unknown. Even in the archives of the GRU trace of him is lost.
The source - one of the scientists employed in the "Manhattan Project" - handed over to "Achilles" (this was the pseudonym of the GRU officer A. A. Adams) not only about a thousand pages of documentation on the bomb, but also samples of pure uranium and beryllium. This "package" safely reached Moscow through diplomatic channels.
Achilles' cover letter allows us to better imagine the atmosphere in which our scouts had to work. In particular, he writes:
"Dear Director!
... This time the nature of the material being sent is so important that it will require both from my side and from yours, especially from yours, special attention and urgent action ...
I do not know to what extent you are aware that they are working hard on the problem of using the energy of uranium (I'm not sure if this element is called in Russian) for military purposes. I personally do not know enough molecular physics to tell you in detail what the task of this work is, but I can report that this work is already here at the stage of technology for the production of a new element - plutonium, which should play a huge role in a real war ...
A secret fund of one billion dollars, which is at the personal disposal of the president, has been allocated and has almost been spent on research work and work on the development of a technology for the production of the previously named elements. Six world-famous scientists: Fermi, Allison, Compton, Urey, Oppenheimer, and others (most of whom received the Nobel Prize) are at the head of this project. Thousands of engineers and technicians of various nationalities are involved in this work...
Three main plutonium production methods were used in the initial stage of research: the diffusion method, the mass spectrometric method, and the atomic transmutation method. Apparently, the latter method gave more positive results. It is important for our scientists to know if someone is working in this area with us ...
I have a connection with a highly qualified source who would be more helpful if he could meet with our highly qualified chemists and physicists... This is just the beginning. I will receive materials from him several times. In the first opportunity about 1000 pages. The material is top secret. I, despite the fact that I hung around the universities for about two years, until recently, did not manage to find out anything concrete. They have learned to keep secrets here... The staff is carefully checked. There are a lot of rumors around these enterprises. Persons working at peripheral enterprises go there for a year without the right to leave the territory of enterprises that are guarded by military units ...
My source told me that a projectile is already being designed, which, when dropped on the ground, will destroy everything living in an area of hundreds of miles by radiation. He would not want such a projectile to be dropped on the soil of our country. The total destruction of Japan is planned, but there is no guarantee that our allies will not try to influence us when they have such weapons at their disposal ...
It's hard for me to write. My eyesight is very limited, but my letters are not important, but the material is important: I hope it will be given the necessary attention and a quick reaction will follow, which will guide me in my future work ...
Sending samples of uranium and beryllium…"
As you know, another source of information - the physicist Klaus Fuchs, also obtained for us a lot of undoubtedly invaluable materials. They became a kind of "guiding thread" that led Kurchatov's team through the labyrinths of nuclear physics in the shortest way, thanks to which many mistakes were avoided in the development and creation of the atomic bomb.
But we will remember not only Klaus Fuchs, who, by the way, lived to a ripe old age. There are many more names hidden in history. Perhaps we will never know about all those who sought to help our country in the implementation of the Atomic Project. It was gratitude for our victory, for the salvation of mankind from fascism - the USSR was helped by scientists who worked in the USA, Canada and England. Their names, most likely, will never be revealed - and it is not for us to judge whether this is right or not ... Let's just remember that such people lived and fought for our future.
Achilles wrote his report in July 1944, but he already knew that atomic bombs would be used against Japan. Foresight or knowledge of facts? Was the Americans already planning atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the summer of 1944?
It seems to me that the Achilles report calls us to take a fresh look at the history of the development of the Manhattan Project - it is possible that many of its pages should be written differently than it is presented to the public today.
Who was the prisoner?
Already in the spring of 1945, special detachments were sent to Germany from the USSR, looking for physicists and other specialists who could work for the "USSR Atomic Project". A little later, at the beginning of 1946, I. V. Kurchatov made the following confession:
“Until May 1945, there were no hopes of creating a uranium-graphite boiler, since we had only 7 tons of uranium oxide at our disposal, and the required 100 tons of uranium could not be produced before 1948. In the middle of last year, Comrade Beria sent a special a group of workers of Laboratory No. 2 and the NKVD, headed by comrades Zavenyagin, Makhnev and Kikoin, to search for uranium and uranium raw materials.As a result of great work, the group found and exported to the USSR 300 tons of uranium oxide and its compounds, which seriously changed the situation not only with uranium -graphite boiler, but also with all other uranium structures ... "
It seems to me that with this confession, Igor Vasilievich puts a worthy end to the dispute that historians have been waging for many decades. Some insisted on the decisive participation of German specialists in our Atomic Project and the use of materials mined in Germany, others tried to downplay and sometimes completely obscure their role in the creation of Soviet atomic weapons. The truth, as is often the case, lies somewhere in the middle. Kurchatov testifies to this. But Igor Vasilievich did not tell the whole truth. He could not do this, because at that time all documents were still stamped "Top Secret". It took half a century for it to finally be removed...
Documents show that the main events around uranium begin to unfold in Germany in April 1945. At this time, L.P. Beria receives two letters - one from V.A. Makhnev, who is directly responsible for the Atomic Project, and the other from V.N. Merkulov, who monitors all information coming from intelligence officers.
The first letter says, in part:
"In Upper Silesia, 45 kilometers south of the city of Liegnitz, where hostilities are now taking place, there is the Schmideberg uranium deposit ... It is advisable to send several geologists and ore processing specialists to the 2nd Ukrainian Front to determine the characteristics of the named deposit on the spot and At the same time, specialists should be sent to the 3rd Ukrainian Front to familiarize themselves with the Radium Institute in Vienna, which, apparently, was used by the Germans for work on uranium.
I ask you to allow the following specialists to be urgently sent to these areas:
on the 3rd Ukrainian Front - physicist G. N. Flerova, physicist I. N. Golovina (from Laboratory No. 2 of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR);
to the 2nd Ukrainian Front - geologist prof. Rusakov M. P., geologist Malinovsky F. M. (from the Committee for Geology under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR).
Both groups of specialists listed must be led by NKVD employees ... "
The last postscript is typical for that time: scientists were controlled even in cases where their reliability was not in doubt. Well, they themselves said that the presence of NKVD workers was explained by ensuring their safety. However, such a statement is not without foundation: the allies closely followed the work of groups of Soviet specialists, of course, in those cases when they became aware of them.
Our scouts also did not take their eyes off their "wards". This is evidenced, in particular, by Merkulov's letter:
"According to intelligence data received from a source that is not in doubt about the sincerity, the NKGB resident in London reported that the Germans removed the uranium reserves available in France and Belgium in 1942 to Silesia and other eastern regions of Germany ... "
At that time it was not yet known that in total more than 3,500 tons of uranium salts were exported from Belgium to Germany, from which almost 15 tons of metallic uranium were obtained by the end of the war. Part of this uranium was found and transported to the USSR ...
In the days when the Soviet people rejoiced, celebrating Victory Day, Kurchatov sent a number of letters to Beria. Igor Vasilievich is in a hurry, he understands that delay can be disastrous for the project: the work will drag on for months, and possibly for years, if now, these days, the most energetic measures are not taken to search for uranium.
"The latest information we received about work abroad shows that at present 6 uranium-graphite boilers are already operating in America, each of which contains about 30 tons of uranium metal. Two of these boilers are used for scientific research, and four, the most powerful , - to obtain plutonium.
The information indicates that the impetus for the grandiose work on uranium, which is now being carried out in America, was given by reports received from Germany on successes in the field of "uranium-heavy water" boilers. In this regard, I consider it absolutely necessary that a group of scientists from Laboratory No. 2 of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, led by Comrade V. A. Makhnev, make an urgent trip to Berlin to clarify the results of scientific work, the removal of uranium, heavy water, and other materials, and also for a survey of German scientists involved in uranium ... "
On the same day, Beria receives interesting information from the army in the field. It reports that the Institute for Theoretical Physics was discovered in Berlin, where work was underway on uranium and radium. 50 kilograms of metallic uranium and about two tons of uranium oxide were found there. It was decided to urgently send G. N. Flerov and L. A. Artsimovich to Berlin to inspect the laboratories of the institute and talk with scientists.
Three days later, on May 8, Kurchatov presents to Beria a list of German scientists who may be involved in work on uranium in Germany. It has 35 people. Igor Vasilievich knew their names from those publications in scientific journals that were available to him. Unfortunately, it turned out that most of the physicists on this list work in America.
Events, I repeat, developed rapidly. Already on May 10, V. A. Makhnev transmitted a note to L. P. Beria via HF, in which he informs about the first results of the work of his group in Germany. In addition to a detailed list of equipment and materials found in scientific institutions in Berlin and other cities, the note contains information that later played a special role in the "USSR Atomic Project":
"... 3. In the same area there is a completely preserved private institute of the world-famous scientist Baron von Ardenne, whose laboratory is leading in the field of electron microscopy throughout the world ... Von Ardenne gave me a statement addressed to the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR that he only wants to work with Russian physicists and puts the institute and himself at the disposal of the Soviet government. If there is the slightest opportunity, it is advisable to urgently take a decision on the removal of equipment from this institute and its employees for work in the USSR ... "
This is how Laboratory "A" appeared in the Soviet Union. She was in Sukhumi, in the building of the Sinop sanatorium. The laboratory, headed by Manfred von Ardenne, was part of the Ninth Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR.
The Ardenne group took its rightful place in the "Atomic Project of the USSR": it developed new methods for the separation of uranium isotopes. One of them still bears the name of its creator ...
On June 18, 1945, the first results of the work of a group of Soviet scientists in Germany were summed up. Information was received in the name of L.P. Beria:
"We report that in accordance with the Decree of the State Defense Committee and your order, the following enterprises and institutions were dismantled in Germany and shipped to the Soviet Union ... (this list has not been declassified to this day. - Approx. Aut.). ... Totally shipped and sent to the USSR 7 echelons - 380 wagons ... Together with the equipment of physical institutes and chemical and metallurgical enterprises, 39 German scientists, engineers, craftsmen and, in addition to them, 61 people - members of their families, and a total of 99 Germans were sent to the USSR ... hidden about 250-300 tons of uranium compounds and about 7 tons of metallic uranium. They are fully shipped to the Soviet Union ... "
It was assumed that part of the equipment for the "Atomic Project of the USSR" would come from those areas of Germany that were occupied by the Allies, but later should go to the Soviet zone. However, nothing came of it. The US intelligence services were well informed about the export of scientists, materials and equipment to the USSR. They did everything possible to leave in Germany "a scientific desert without physicists and physics." And they succeeded.
German scientists worked fruitfully in the "USSR Atomic Project". Many of them, after the creation of the atomic bomb, were marked by Soviet state awards and considerable cash prizes. Almost all of them, after the death of Stalin, went back to Germany, now to the GDR and the FRG.
Academician Zh. I. Alferov recalls:
Paradoxical thinking has always been inherent in Alexandrov. Is it possible to become a great scientist without this?!
Vladimir GUBAREV
By the end of the 1930s, Soviet physics had already made significant progress in studying the process of nuclear fission. The authority in the international scientific world of such researchers as A.F. Ioffe, I.V. Kurchatov, G.N. Flerov, L.I. Rusinov, I.E. Tamm, Ya.I. Frenkel, Ya.B. Zeldovich, Yu.B. Khariton, L.D. Landau was very big. At the same time, until the end of the 1930s, the study of nuclear physics seemed to be still a matter of purely scientific knowledge, having no practical value, except perhaps in some areas of medicine. Back in 1936, at a session of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the leadership of the Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology was criticized for research in nuclear physics that had no practical prospects, and the director of the Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology A.I. Leipunsky was arrested in June 1938, accused of "losing vigilance", as well as helping "enemies of the people", such as the repressed great theoretical physicist L.D. Landau.
On the eve of World War II, some scientists speculated about the possibility of using nuclear energy to create a powerful bomb, but so far few believed in its reality. The outbreak of war and the evacuation of scientific institutes forced the suspension of experiments in the field of nuclear physics.
Conclusion of the Scientific Research Chemical Institute of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR (NIHI NKO USSR) on applications for inventions by employees of the Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology, sent to the Department of Military Chemical Protection.
Meanwhile, on the eve of the war, a division of scientific and technical intelligence already existed in the central apparatus of the NKVD. And its analysts drew attention to a seemingly minor fact: with the outbreak of war, the names of all scientists involved in nuclear topics disappeared from Western scientific reference books, and their new articles in journals also ceased to appear. Soviet intelligence suggested that this topic was classified, therefore, in the West, including Nazi Germany, there were real prospects for creating atomic weapons. In the fall, the London residency reported that work was beginning in England on a nuclear bomb, then similar information came from intelligence officers in the United States. In February 1942, a notebook with scientific notes was found from a captured German officer, it was about the plans of the Nazis to use atomic weapons.
By the spring of 1942, it became clear from intelligence data that it was necessary to intensify work on the creation of our own nuclear weapons. At the same time, scientists reported to Stalin that it was possible in principle to obtain it. On September 28, 1942, a GKO resolution "On the organization of work on uranium" was adopted. A secret Laboratory No. 2 was created, headed by I.V. Kurchatov (later - the I.V. Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy). Kurchatov was appointed scientific director of work on uranium.
Of course, active intelligence activities also continued. In 1943, a young but already very prominent scientist Klaus Fuchs (1911-1988) got in touch with Soviet agents. He was a German physicist, a communist, in 1933 he fled from Germany to England, where he continued his scientific career. He was one of the prominent participants in the Manhattan Project (joint Anglo-American work on the atomic bomb), in connection with which he moved to the United States. Fuchs transmitted information to Soviet intelligence about the progress of work on the atomic bomb. He acted disinterestedly, out of ideological convictions, because, like a number of other prominent scientists, he realized quite early how dangerous the US nuclear monopoly would be for the whole world. After the war, Fuchs returned to England, and in 1950 he was arrested by the British secret services for espionage, sentenced to 14 years in prison. Released in 1959, he settled in the GDR, where he continued his scientific work.
Klaus Fuchs was not the only Western scientist who decided to cooperate with Soviet intelligence. Their motives were similar: they understood that the nuclear monopoly of one power is extremely dangerous, moreover, they foresaw that the nuclear parity of rival states could play a deterrent role. In November 1945, Soviet agents met in Copenhagen with the great theoretical physicist Niels Bohr, who took part in the work on the Manhattan Project, back in 1944 in a memorandum addressed to President Roosevelt called for a ban on the use of nuclear weapons. In addition, in 1941, Bohr was visited by his former colleague Werner Heisenberg, who led the work on the atomic bomb in Nazi Germany and tried to persuade Bohr to cooperate with the Nazis. Having met in November 1945 with a Soviet intelligence agent, physicist Terletsky, Bohr decided to answer his questions. Of course, the great scientist understood that in this way he was helping to create the Soviet atomic bomb.
The information received by intelligence was reported to I.V. Kurchatov, often without indicating the source. This information could not replace the own research of domestic scientists, but made it possible to significantly speed up the work.
But the main and most difficult problem was not the creation of conditions for the work of scientists. Even then it was clear that a lot of uranium was required to make a bomb, and even more so several bombs. And in the USSR before the war there was only one explored deposit, a small mine in Taboshara (in the mountains of Kyrgyzstan). After all, uranium was not previously given much importance and no searches were made for it. Now it was necessary to urgently organize the exploration of new deposits, and then their development. All work on uranium exploration was transferred under the control of the NKVD and strictly classified. All forces of geologists are directed to the search for uranium ores. Students and graduate students of geologists were recalled from the front.
After the victory over fascist Germany, it was decided to use its scientific and industrial resources. The Nazis did not have time to get their atomic bomb, but developments in this direction were carried out and advanced quite far. Experts on nuclear issues, the so-called "Makhnev Commission", were sent to the zone controlled by Soviet troops. They chose the equipment of industrial enterprises that had survived after the hostilities in order to transport it to the USSR. A significant number of German nuclear scientists moved semi-voluntarily to the Soviet Union, and a "Laboratory G" was built for them in Agudzery (near Sukhumi). The Allies did the same, recruiting German scientists in the western zone of occupation. A kind of secret rivalry arose for German specialists. Another circumstance was also important: the Soviet side managed to take out a significant supply of heavy water, collected by that time in Germany (the Germans, in turn, captured heavy water in occupied Norway, where there was the world's first installation for its production).
In July 1945, when the American atomic bomb had already been made and the bombing of Hiroshima was being prepared, Stalin met with President Truman during the Potsdam Conference. Truman and members of the American delegation tried to probe the ground and understand from Stalin's reaction: does the USSR already possess atomic secrets? However, Stalin managed to remain impenetrable and led the president astray.
On August 20, 1945, by a decree of the GKO, a Special Committee was formed to direct all Soviet work on the atomic project. L.P. led them. Beria. Scientific leadership remained with I.V. Kurchatov. The Special Committee was in charge of not only scientific laboratories. To create an atomic bomb, it was necessary to deploy a grandiose and multifaceted activity. Exploration of uranium ores, the creation of an industry for their processing, the training of qualified personnel, which required a lot, the construction of scientific and industrial enterprises. Even before the completion of work on the bomb, Soviet experts thought about the possibility of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
The atomic project was strictly classified, work on a nuclear bomb, even in top secret documents, was called "work on the first problem." Intelligence continued to be active, where they created a special bureau for nuclear espionage - Bureau No. 2, headed by P.A. Sudoplatov.
It should not be forgotten that for the successful use of nuclear weapons, appropriate delivery vehicles were required, therefore, in parallel with the atomic project, huge efforts were made to create Soviet rocket technology. This also required not only scientific developments, but the organization of new research institutes, industrial enterprises, including related ones. For example, one experimental rocket launch at that time consumed the entire supply of liquid oxygen in the country, thus it was necessary to dramatically expand its production. All this took place in a country devastated by the war, experiencing an acute shortage of any consumer goods - clothing, shoes, basic household items, and most importantly, starving.
Memorandum of L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about the trip of S. Terletsky, an employee of the "C" department of the NKVD of the USSR, to the Institute of Theoretical Physics and Niels Bohr's answers to questions on the atomic problem.
Attached is the certificate of I.V. Kurchatov with an assessment of the information received from N. Bor.
State Archive of the Russian Federation
Exactly 75 years ago, Joseph Stalin, chairman of the USSR State Defense Committee, signed the decision to create an atomic bomb.
Despite the fact that deep scientific research on uranium began in 1942, the United States, insanely enriched during World War II, was technologically ahead of the USSR.
It was very difficult to overcome this gap: the country was in the conditions of the most difficult war with Nazi Germany.
The explosion of a single-phase nuclear bomb with a power of 23 kt. Landfill in Nevada (1953)
At the Potsdam Conference, which began on July 17, 1945, the 33rd US President Harry Truman told Stalin that the United States had rewarded weapons of unprecedented power: the day before, in the state of New Mexico (USA), the Americans had tested a plutonium bomb, called "Thing".
Stalin reacted to Truman's statement so calmly that Western leaders thought that the head of the USSR simply did not understand what was at stake. Later, Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Armed Forces Georgy Zhukov will describe this episode in detail.
“After the meeting of the heads of government, G. Truman informed I. V. Stalin that the United States had an unusually large bomb, without calling it an atomic weapon. At the time of this information, as they later wrote abroad, W. Churchill fixed his eyes on Stalin's face, watching his reaction.
But he did not betray his feelings in any way, pretending that he did not find anything in the words of G. Truman. Like Churchill, so many other Anglo-American authors later believed that, probably, I. V. Stalin really did not understand the meaning of the message made to him.
Stalin understood everything perfectly! It is known that after a conversation with Truman, during a break in the conference, Stalin asked his assistant to tell Igor Kurchatov, scientific director of the USSR atomic project, to speed up work on the uranium project.
Joseph Stalin
The Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the USSR hid his true feelings for at least two reasons. First, because it was Truman's open blackmail against the Soviet state and a test of Stalin's psychological strength. The head of the USSR once again received proof that, unlike Franklin Roosevelt, Truman was going to speak with the USSR exclusively in the language of force.
Secondly, it was necessary to maintain secrecy. It was impossible to allow yesterday's allies in the anti-Hitler coalition to suspect that Stalin was receiving from Great Britain and the United States the latest intelligence on the nuclear research of the two states.
The USSR received its most valuable intelligence information from the German nuclear physicist Klaus Fuchs, who left for England in 1933 when Hitler came to power. In 1943, Fuchs was sent to Los Alamos (USA) to a scientific laboratory in which they were developing the atomic bomb.
Another important source of information was British intelligence officer John Cairncross, who was recruited in the mid-1930s. From the US, secret documents came from the nuclear physicist Bruno Pontecorvo.
Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov at the Radium Institute, c. 1930
You can often come across the assertion that the nuclear project of the USSR completely repeated the American one, since Soviet intelligence simply stole all the necessary information. The basis of such a statement is either a complete misunderstanding of how large-scale the nuclear project is, or a banal desire to denigrate Soviet achievements.
Even with exhaustive intelligence data, it is impossible to create an atomic bomb without creating a uranium industry, without successfully solving a huge number of scientific, theoretical, experimental and engineering problems.
Exploration helped speed up the process of implementing the nuclear project as much as possible. Thanks to the information received, it was possible to eliminate false paths for the implementation of the project, increasing the chances that the first test of the atomic bomb would be successful.
According to the Hero of the Russian Federation intelligence officer Vladimir Barkovsky: “The atomic bomb was made not by intelligence, but by specialists relying on the scientific, technical and economic potential of the country.
All Soviet people should bow to I. V. Kurchatov and his associates for the fact that, under incredibly difficult conditions compared to the United States, they managed to create atomic weapons in a short time, which prevented an unpredictable development of events that could take on a critical, even fatal character for our country.
Intelligence really played an important role in the creation of Soviet atomic weapons, but one should not oppose scientists and intelligence officers to each other.
Hydrogen bomb AN602 "Tsar bomb"
There really was a high probability of a critical and fatal development of events. The USSR knew that the production of uranium-235 and plutonium-236 allowed the United States to create eight atomic bombs a year. The Soviet leadership had no illusions for whom this entire arsenal was intended. The United States has already used atomic strikes against the civilian population of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Military parity was broken. It is likely that the United States would launch new atomic strikes to eliminate the only competitor on the path to world domination. As can be seen from the plans to attack the USSR, Washington had doubts only about the number of atomic bombs needed to completely destroy the industrial potential of the USSR and demoralize the Red Army - the strongest army in the world after the end of the Great Patriotic War.
For example, the first plan of attack on Russia, called "Totality", appeared in yesterday's allies in the anti-Hitler coalition as early as November 1945.
As part of this plan, it was supposed to destroy 20 important Soviet cities with the help of conventional and atomic bombs. The US military leadership believed that at least 10 million Soviet citizens should die as a result of such a bombing.
Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov. 1989
In mid-1948, a new plan of attack on the USSR appeared - Chariotir. In this regard, the US military insisted on the destruction of 70 cities with the help of 133 atomic bombs, eight of them would fall on Moscow, and seven on Leningrad. In the next two years of the war, it was planned to drop another 200 atomic and 250 thousand tons of conventional bombs.
The Offtacle attack plan, developed in October 1949, provided for the destruction of 104 Soviet cities with 220 atomic bombs, and 72 atomic bombs were in reserve, just in case.
When the first atomic bomb was tested in the USSR in August 1949, the Dropshot plan was urgently developed in Washington, which provided for the start of a coalition war against the USSR from January 1, 1957.
Up to 20 million soldiers from NATO countries and a number of other states of Europe and Asia were to participate in a future war against Russia. However, staff exercises showed that the United States would not be able to achieve its intended goals. In 1950, the issue of a preventive nuclear war with the USSR was officially withdrawn.
The atomic project of the USSR was a feat of the whole people, who several years ago saved the world from fascism. This time, the Soviet Union saved the world from a new atomic aggression from the United States. The history of the competition between Soviet and American nuclear doctrines began with the creation of a nuclear and then a nuclear-missile shield.
Funnel from an atomic bomb explosion at the Totsk test site
Alexander Vansu
