When, in the morning hours of June 22, 1941, the German army launched the Barbarossa plan - an attack on the Soviet Union, the Soviet troops were taken by surprise. And although the Red Army was armed with a large number of types armored vehicles, which were completely unknown to the Germans, however, this technical superiority could not compensate for the catastrophic tactical errors of the army command. An unexpected fact for the Wehrmacht was not only the large number of Soviet tanks that the German troops had to face, but also their high fighting qualities, especially tanks of the latest designs.

Although produced in limited quantities, literally in the last months before the German attack, the new types of Soviet tanks - the T-34 and KV, were a very serious opponent. Even before the start of Operation Barbarossa, their number and combat characteristics, and in some cases even their very existence, were not discovered by the German military intelligence services.

Tank KV-2 captured by the Germans

About what's new soviet tanks, including the KV-2, turned out to be a surprise for the German command, for example, an entry in the diary of Colonel General Franz Halder, who wrote on June 24, 1941:

"New Russian heavy tanks have appeared on the front of the Army Group North, which are armed, most likely, with a cannon of 80 mm caliber, or even 150 mm caliber, which, however, is unlikely."

But the very next day, when new updated reports arrived, Halder was forced to accept reality. He wrote:

“Scattered information is being received about new Russian tanks: weight 52 tons, forehead armor 37 cm (?), sides 8 cm, armament with a 152 mm cannon and three machine guns, crew of 5 people, speed 30 km / h, cruising range 100 km. Capabilities for fighting: 50mm guns pierce the armor under the turret, 88mm guns probably also pierce the side armor (not exactly known)."

An excellent example of this complete ignorance is the conversation that took place in early August 1941 between Adolf Hitler and the commander of the Panzergruppe 2, General Guderian:

Hitler: "If I knew that the data on the number of Russian tanks given in your book ( Guderian "Achtung Panzer", 1937) were true, I think I (perhaps) would never have started this war."

Guderian in his book estimated the number of Soviet tanks at 10,000 pieces, which caused a sharp reaction from the German censors. However, it turned out that Guderian's estimates were even too low. On August 6, 1941, the command of the German army officially announced that the total number of destroyed Soviet tanks was 13,145. This figure seems to correspond to reality, given that between 1933 and 1941 more than 30,000 armored vehicles of all types (including armored cars) were built in the USSR. Approximately 20,000 of this number were light tanks, while the number of heavy tanks was only 1,800, including the latest types. This number seems relatively small compared to the production of tanks in the USSR (for example, T-26 light tanks), but compared to the tank fleet of other European armies, it is quite significant.

Sufficiently recent Russian sources provide the following data on the composition of the Red Army on June 1, 1941:

• personnel - 5,224,066;
• field artillery - 48,647;
• mortars - 53,117;
• anti-aircraft guns - 8,680;
• tanks and other armored vehicles - 25,932;
• trucks - 193,218;
• tractors and tractors - 42,931;
• horses - 498,493.

The German high command quickly realized the danger of the situation. The fight against the new T-34 and KB tanks required enormous efforts and led to heavy losses. Therefore, just a month after the outbreak of hostilities, an army information sheet "D 343 Merkblatt fur die Bekampfung der russischen Panzerkampfwagen" was issued to instruct German soldiers on methods of dealing with Soviet tanks. We can say that it was a symbol of the shock of the collision with the T-34 and KV. By the way, it is interesting that when faced with the KV-2 tanks, the Germans at first believed that tank KV-2 model 1939 is a later version of the machine, and accordingly assigned it the KW-IIB index, i.e. an improved version compared to the 1940 model, which received the KW-IIA index.

Despite the fact that most of the KV-2 tanks were lost not in battle, but due to mechanical failures, as a result of which they had to be abandoned due to the impossibility of repair and restoration, the German advance was significantly slowed down. Sometimes only one single KV-2, which occupied a key position on the front line and was supported by infantry, was able to stop the enemy advance. The powerful armor of this tank and the weakness of the German anti-tank weapons of that time made it possible to detain even large units for many hours or even days. Some KV-2s withstood up to 20 direct hits before they could be destroyed by 88 mm anti-aircraft guns acting as anti-tank guns or calling in Ju-87 "Stuka" dive bombers to attack.

Another way to fight the "Russischer Koloss" was to attack the infantry and conduct close combat, which usually involved heavy losses. Heavy field artillery could also play a role in solving the "Problem of the KV-2". However, only the 10 cm Kanone 18, lFH 10.5cm and sFH 15cm carried a limited number of direct fire anti-tank rounds. Other field guns had to rely mainly on luck in trying to achieve a direct hit when firing KV-2s along ballistic trajectories.

The main German tanks of that period, which were at the forefront of the offensive, were rarely used to combat the KV-2. They were too poorly armed to deal effectively with a Soviet heavy tank:

• PzKpfW III had a 3.7 cm KWK gun;
• PzKpfW III - 5 cm KWK L/42;
• PzKpfW IV -7.5 cm KWK L/24;
• PzKpfW 38 (t) - 3.7 cm;
• PzKpfW 35 (t) - 3.7 cm.

Despite the fact that the number of KV-2 tanks in the first months of hostilities remained relatively small and many of them were lost without effort on the part of the enemy, in a technical aspect, its influence can hardly be overestimated. The result of the "T-34, KW Shock" for the Wehrmacht was the adoption of much better armed and armored tanks PzKpfW VI "Tiger" in 1942 and PzKpfW V "Panther" in 1943.

KV-2 training models for training Wehrmacht soldiers

After the Wehrmacht faced medium and heavy Soviet tanks already in the first days of the Barbarossa plan, the German command took urgent measures to effectively prepare its troops to fight this unexpected new enemy. In the German infantry and panzergrenadier units, a new training program was quickly adopted, adequate to the current situation. Using a large number of different models for training soldiers since the early 1930s, German units in this case also built their own wooden models of Soviet tanks on a 1: 1 scale.

Often they were extremely detailed and accurately executed. The high level and good quality of mock-up work made it possible to create models of a combat vehicle corresponding to a real tank, not only in size, but also to reproduce on it various angles of inclination of armor protection sheets, for training in the use of magnetic anti-tank mines, handrails and steps for climbing onto a tank, the location of hatches and viewing devices, firing angles, not only the main armament, but also machine guns. Training models of tanks were often mounted on four-wheeled chassis so that they could simulate their movement at the real speed of the tanks. While most of these training layouts were built to mimic the average Soviet tank T-34, some other much less common types of armored vehicles were also reproduced. Currently, only one wooden KB-2 can be documented.

Capabilities of German anti-tank guns in the fight against the KV-2

The armament and tactics of the German Wehrmacht in 1939 fully corresponded to the tactics adopted by the German command of extremely mobile operations of troops during the "Blitzkrieg". Particular attention was paid to rapid breakthroughs over considerable distances, bypassing enemy nodes of resistance. Despite the available information that the enemy, in particular the French armed forces, had heavy tanks of the Char B1 type, the German command believed that their use in battle would be compensated by the tactical advantages gained through the close interaction of the ground forces with the Luftwaffe units.

At the same time, special hopes were placed on the Ju-87 "Stuka" dive bombers, which were supposed to provide direct support to the advancing troops. In accordance with these provisions, the anti-tank units of the Wehrmacht were armed mainly with two types of anti-tank guns: a 3.7 cm PAK 35/36 gun in 37 mm caliber and a 5 cm PAK 38 gun in 50 mm caliber.

The 50 mm RAK 38 L/60 anti-tank gun entered service with the Wehrmacht at the end of 1940 to replace the 37 mm anti-tank gun.

On June 22, 1941, with the start of Operation Barbarossa, the situation on the front line changed significantly for German soldiers. Firstly, the number of Soviet tanks that took part in the hostilities turned out to be significantly larger than expected, and secondly, the new T-34 and KB tanks were well armored. In order to effectively fight against these unexpected enemies, the crews of anti-tank 37 mm and 50 mm guns, due to their weak armor penetration, had to let Soviet tanks into close range - up to 30 meters. Such tactics were possible, but extremely dangerous and led to heavy losses.

Schemes for effective fire on the KV-2 from the 88 mm L/56 tank gun. 1942 instruction sheet for German tank crews "Tigers" referring to 1942.

An even more difficult opponent was the KV-2, with its armor reaching up to 75 mm in front of the hull and 110 mm in front of the turret. 37 mm and 50 mm German armor-piercing shells bounced off it with no visible effect, even when fired from very close distances. Their use was completely ineffective, with the exception of those cases when the gunners managed to damage the tracks, or jam the KV-2 turret. The Soviet concept of a "mobile firing bunker" proved to be quite effective, although in a slightly different aspect than it was originally planned. The only German weapon capable of dealing with the KB-2 at long ranges was the 88 mm anti-aircraft gun, which in this case was used to fire at ground targets. The excellent characteristics of this weapon often saved the situation when it was used as an emergency measure in critical combat situations that arose on the front line.

The beginning of the development of 88 mm anti-aircraft guns dates back to 1928. By the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, a more advanced modification of this weapon, the Model 36, was in service, which replaced the older Model 18

Given the negative combat experience with the use of 37 mm and 50 mm anti-tank guns in the first weeks of Operation Barbarossa, the Wehrmacht immediately made efforts to develop new, more powerful weapons, which eventually culminated in the creation of the 7.5 cm PAK 40 (75 mm anti-tank gun), 8.8 cm PAK 43/41 (88 mm anti-tank gun) and 12.8 cm PAK K.44 (128 mm anti-tank gun). Although these guns were adopted too late to fight against the KV-2, they later fought quite successfully against a number of other Soviet tanks, the successors of the KV.

A source of information:

• "Military vehicles" No. 63, KV-2.

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The 6th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht was part of the 41st Panzer Corps. Together with the 56th Panzer Corps, it formed the 4th Panzer Group, the main strike force of Army Group North, whose task was to capture the Baltic states, capture Leningrad and join with the Finns. The 6th Division was commanded by Major General Franz Landgraf. It was armed mainly with Czechoslovak-made PzKw-35t tanks - light, with thin armor, but with high maneuverability and maneuverability. There were a number of more powerful PzKw-IIIs and PzKw-IVs. Before the start of the offensive, the division was divided into two tactical groups. The more powerful was commanded by Colonel Erhard Raus, the weaker by Lieutenant Colonel Erich von Seckendorf.

In the first two days of the war, the offensive of the division was successful. By the evening of June 23, the division captured the Lithuanian city of Raseiniai and crossed the Dubyssa River. The tasks assigned to the division were completed, but the Germans, who already had experience of campaigns in the west, were unpleasantly struck by the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops. One of Routh's units came under fire from snipers positioned in the fruit trees in the meadow. The snipers killed several German officers, delayed the advance of the German units for almost an hour, preventing them from quickly encircling the Soviet units. The snipers were obviously doomed because they were inside the location of the German troops. But they completed the task to the end. In the west, the Germans did not meet anything like this.
How the only KV-1 ended up in the rear of the Routh group on the morning of June 24 is not clear. It's possible that he just got lost. However, in the end, the tank blocked the only road leading from the rear to the positions of the group.

This episode was described not by full-time communist propagandists, but by Erhard Raus himself. Raus then won the entire war on the Eastern Front, passing through Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk, and finished it as commander of the 3rd Panzer Army and with the rank of colonel general. Of the 427 pages of his memoirs, which directly describe the fighting, 12 are devoted to a two-day battle with the only Russian tank at Raseiniai. Routh was clearly shaken by this tank. Therefore, there is no reason for distrust. Soviet historiography ignored this episode. Moreover, since for the first time in the domestic press he was mentioned by Suvorov-Rezun, some "patriots" began to "expose" the feat. In the sense - this is not a feat, but so-so.

The crew of the KV-1 tank (4 people) destroyed at the cost of their lives 12 trucks, 4 anti-tank guns, 1 anti-aircraft gun, possibly several tanks, and several dozen Germans killed and died from wounds.

This in itself is an outstanding result, given the fact that until 1945, in the vast majority of even victorious battles, our losses were higher than German ones. But these are only direct losses of the Germans. Indirect - losses of the Seckendorf group, which, reflecting the Soviet strike, could not receive help from the Raus group. Accordingly, for the same reason, the losses of our 2nd Panzer Division were less than if Raus had supported Seckendorf.

However, perhaps more important than the direct and indirect losses of people and equipment was the loss of time by the Germans. On June 22, 1941, the Wehrmacht had only 17 tank divisions on the entire Eastern Front, including 4 tank divisions in the 4th Panzer Group. One of them was held by KV alone. Moreover, on June 25, the 6th division could not advance solely because of the presence of a single tank in its rear. One day of delay by one division is a lot in conditions when German tank groups were advancing at a high pace, tearing apart the defenses of the Red Army and setting up a lot of "boilers" for it. After all, the Wehrmacht actually completed the task set by Barbarossa, almost completely destroying the Red Army that opposed it in the summer of 1941. But due to such "incidents" as an unforeseen tank on the road, he did it much more slowly and with much greater losses than planned. And in the end he ran into the impenetrable mud of the Russian autumn, the deadly frosts of the Russian winter and the Siberian divisions near Moscow. After that, the war turned into a hopeless protracted stage for the Germans.

And yet the most surprising thing in this battle is the behavior of four tankers, whose names we do not know and will never know. They created more problems for the Germans than the entire 2nd Panzer Division, to which, apparently, the KV belonged. If the division delayed the German offensive for one day, then the only tank - for two. No wonder Raus had to take away anti-aircraft guns from Seckendorf, although, it would seem, it should have been the other way around.

It is almost impossible to assume that the tankers had a special task to block the only supply route for the Routh group. Intelligence at that moment was simply absent. So the tank ended up on the road by accident. The tank commander himself realized what an important position he had taken. And deliberately began to hold her. It is unlikely that the tank standing in one place can be interpreted as a lack of initiative, the crew acted too skillfully. On the contrary, standing was the initiative.

To sit without getting out in a cramped iron box for two days, and in the June heat, is torture in itself. If this box is also surrounded by the enemy, whose goal is to destroy the tank along with the crew (in addition, the tank is not one of the enemy’s targets, as in a “normal” battle, but the only target), for the crew this is already an absolutely incredible physical and psychological stress. And almost all this time the tankers spent not in battle, but in anticipation of the battle, which is morally incomparably harder.

All five combat episodes - the destruction of a convoy of trucks, the destruction of an anti-tank battery, the destruction of anti-aircraft guns, firing at sappers, the last battle with tanks - in total they hardly even took an hour. The rest of the time, the KV crew wondered from which side and in what form they would be destroyed next time. The battle with anti-aircraft guns is especially indicative. The tankers deliberately hesitated until the Germans set up the cannon and began to prepare for firing - in order to shoot for sure and finish the job with one shell. Try to at least roughly imagine such an expectation.

Moreover, if on the first day the crew of the KV could still hope for the arrival of their own, then on the second, when their own did not come and even the noise of the battle near Raseinaya subsided, it became clearer than clear: the iron box in which they are fried for the second day will soon enough turn into their common coffin. They took it for granted and continued to fight.

Here is what Erhard Raus himself writes about this:

“Nothing important happened in our sector. The troops improved their positions, conducted reconnaissance in the direction of Siluva and on the east coast of Dubyssa in both directions, but mainly tried to find out what was happening on the south coast. We met only small units and individual soldiers. During this time we made contact with the patrols of Kampfgruppe von Seckendorf and the 1st Panzer Division at Lidavenai.In clearing the wooded area to the west of the bridgehead, our infantry encountered a larger force of Russians who were still holding out in two places on the west bank of the river Dubissa.

In violation of accepted rules, several prisoners captured in recent battles, including one lieutenant of the Red Army, were sent to the rear on a truck guarded by only one non-commissioned officer. Halfway back to Raseinai, the driver suddenly saw an enemy tank on the road and stopped. At this moment, the Russian prisoners (and there were about 20 of them) suddenly attacked the driver and the escort. The non-commissioned officer was sitting next to the driver facing the prisoners when they tried to snatch the weapons from both of them. The Russian lieutenant had already grabbed the non-commissioned officer's machine gun, but he managed to free one hand and hit the Russian with all his might, throwing him back. The lieutenant collapsed and took a few more people with him. Before the prisoners could again rush at the non-commissioned officer, he freed his left hand, although he was held by three. Now he was completely free. With lightning speed, he tore the machine gun from his shoulder and fired a burst at the rebellious crowd. The effect was terrible. Only a few prisoners, not counting the wounded officer, managed to jump out of the car to hide in the forest. The car, in which there were no living prisoners, quickly turned around and rushed back to the bridgehead, although the tank fired at it.

This little drama was the first sign that the only road leading to our bridgehead was blocked by the KV-1 super-heavy tank. The Russian tank, in addition, managed to destroy the telephone wires connecting us with the division headquarters. Although the intentions of the enemy remained unclear, we began to fear an attack from the rear. I immediately ordered Lieutenant Wengenrot's 3rd Battery of the 41st Tank Destroyer Battalion to take up position in the rear near the flat top of a hill close to the 6th Motorized Brigade's command post, which also served as the command post for the entire battle group. In order to strengthen our anti-tank defenses, I had to turn 180 degrees to a nearby battery of 150-mm howitzers. The 3rd company of Lieutenant Gebhardt from the 57th sapper tank battalion received an order to mine the road and its surroundings. The tanks assigned to us (half of Major Shenk's 65th tank battalion) were located in the forest. They were ordered to be ready to counter-attack as soon as it was needed.

Time passed, but the enemy tank blocking the road did not move, although from time to time it fired in the direction of Raseinaya. At noon on June 24, the scouts returned, whom I sent to clarify the situation. They reported that, apart from this tank, they did not find any troops or equipment that could attack us. The officer in charge of this unit made the logical conclusion that this was a lone tank from the detachment that attacked the von Seckendorf battle group.

Although the danger of an attack had dissipated, measures should have been taken to quickly destroy this dangerous obstacle, or at least drive the Russian tank away. With his fire, he has already set fire to 12 trucks with supplies that were coming towards us from Raseinaj. We could not evacuate the wounded in the battles for the bridgehead, and as a result, several people died without receiving medical care, including a young lieutenant who was wounded by a shot at point-blank range. If we could take them out, they would be saved. All attempts to bypass this tank were unsuccessful. The vehicles either got stuck in the mud or collided with scattered Russian units still wandering through the forest.

So I ordered Lieutenant Wengenrot's battery. recently received 50-mm anti-tank guns, make your way through the forest, approach the tank at an effective shooting distance and destroy it. The battery commander and his brave soldiers happily accepted this dangerous task and set to work with full confidence that it would not drag on for too long. From the command post at the top of the hill, we watched them as they carefully made their way through the trees from one hollow to another. We were not alone. Dozens of soldiers climbed onto the roofs and climbed the trees with intense attention, waiting for how the idea would end. We saw how the first gun came within 1,000 meters of a tank that was sticking out right in the middle of the road. Apparently, the Russians did not notice the threat. The second gun disappeared from view for some time, and then emerged from the ravine right in front of the tank and took up a well-camouflaged position. Another 30 minutes passed, and the last two guns also went to their original positions.

We watched what was happening from the top of the hill. Suddenly, someone suggested that the tank was damaged and abandoned by the crew, since it stood completely motionless on the road, representing an ideal target (You can imagine the disappointment of our comrades, who, sweating, dragged the guns to firing positions for several hours, if so it was).

Suddenly, the first of our anti-tank guns rang out, a flash flashed, and the silvery track ran straight into the tank. The distance did not exceed 600 meters. A ball of fire flashed, there was a jerky crack. Direct hit! Then came the second and third hits.

The officers and soldiers shouted with joy, like spectators at a merry spectacle. "Hit! Bravo! Done with the tank!" The tank did not react in any way until our guns scored 8 hits. Then its turret turned around, carefully found its target and began methodically destroying our guns with single shots of 80-mm guns. Two of our 50 mm guns were blown to pieces, the other two were seriously damaged. The personnel lost several people killed and wounded. Lieutenant Wengenrot led the survivors back to avoid unnecessary losses. Only after nightfall did he manage to pull out the cannons. The Russian tank was still tightly blocking the road, so we were literally paralyzed. Deeply shocked, Lieutenant Wengenrot returned to the bridgehead with his soldiers. The newly obtained weapon, which he implicitly trusted, was completely helpless against the monstrous tank. A feeling of deep disappointment swept over our entire battle group.

It was necessary to find some new way to master the situation.

It was clear that of all our weapons, only 88 mm anti-aircraft guns with their heavy armor-piercing shells could cope with the destruction of the steel giant. In the afternoon, one such gun was withdrawn from the battle near Raseinay and began to crawl cautiously towards the tank from the south. The KV-1 was still deployed to the north, since it was from this direction that the previous attack had been carried out. The long-barreled anti-aircraft gun approached to a distance of 2000 yards, from which it was already possible to achieve satisfactory results. Unfortunately, the trucks that the monstrous tank had previously destroyed were still burning along the sides of the road, and their smoke prevented the gunners from aiming. But, on the other hand, the same smoke turned into a curtain, under the cover of which the gun could be pulled even closer to the target. Having tied a lot of branches to the gun for better camouflage, the gunners slowly rolled it forward, trying not to disturb the tank.

Finally, the crew got to the edge of the forest, from where visibility was excellent. The distance to the tank now did not exceed 500 meters. We thought that the very first shot would give a direct hit and would certainly destroy the tank that was interfering with us. The calculation began to prepare the gun for firing.

Although the tank had not moved since the battle with the anti-tank battery, it turned out that its crew and commander had iron nerves. They coolly followed the approach of the anti-aircraft gun, without interfering with it, since as long as the gun was moving, it did not pose any threat to the tank. In addition, the closer the anti-aircraft gun is, the easier it will be to destroy it. The critical moment in the duel of nerves arrived when the crew began to prepare the anti-aircraft gun for firing. It is time for the tank crew to act. While the gunners, terribly nervous, aimed and loaded the gun, the tank turned the turret and fired first! Each projectile hit the target. A heavily damaged anti-aircraft gun fell into a ditch, several crew members died, and the rest were forced to flee. The tank's machine-gun fire prevented the cannon from being taken out and the dead picked up.

The failure of this attempt, on which great hopes were placed, was very unpleasant news for us. The optimism of the soldiers died along with the 88-mm gun. Our soldiers did not have the best day, chewing canned food, since it was impossible to bring hot food.

However, the biggest fears disappeared, at least for a while. The Russian attack on Raseinai was repulsed by the von Seckendorf battle group, which managed to hold Hill 106. Now there was no longer any fear that the Soviet 2nd Panzer Division would break through to our rear and cut us off. All that remained was a painful thorn in the form of a tank blocking our only supply route. We decided that if we could not cope with him during the day, then at night we would do it. The brigade headquarters discussed various options for destroying the tank for several hours, and preparations began for several of them at once.

Our sappers proposed on the night of June 24/25 to simply blow up the tank. It should be said that the sappers, not without malicious satisfaction, followed the unsuccessful attempts of the gunners to destroy the enemy. Now it was their turn to try their luck. When Lieutenant Gebhardt called for 12 volunteers, all 12 people raised their hands in unison. In order not to offend the rest, every tenth was chosen. These 12 lucky ones were looking forward to the approach of night. Lieutenant Gebhardt, who intended to personally command the operation, familiarized all the sappers in detail with the general plan of the operation and the personal task of each of them individually. After dark, the lieutenant at the head of a small column set off. The road ran east of Hill 123, across a small sandy patch to a line of trees where the tank was found, and then through sparse woods to the old staging area.

Maybe rush at them and capture them? These appear to be civilians." The temptation was great, as it seemed very easy to do so. However, the crew of the tank remained in the turret and was awake. Such an attack would have alarmed the tank crews and could jeopardize the success of the entire operation. Lieutenant Gebhardt reluctantly rejected the offer. As a result the sappers had to wait another hour for the civilians (or were they partisans?) to leave.

During this time, a thorough reconnaissance of the area was carried out. At 0100, the sappers began to act, as the tank crew fell asleep in the tower, unaware of the danger. After demolition charges were installed on the caterpillar and thick side armor, the sappers set fire to the fuse and fled. A few seconds later, a booming explosion broke the silence of the night. The task was completed, and the sappers decided that they had achieved a decisive success. However, before the echo of the explosion died out among the trees, the tank machine gun came to life, and bullets whistled around. The tank itself did not move. Probably, his caterpillar was killed, but it was not possible to find out, since the machine gun fired furiously all around. Lieutenant Gebhardt and his patrol returned to the bridgehead visibly depressed. Now they were no longer sure of success, moreover, it turned out that one person was missing. Attempts to find him in the dark led nowhere.

Shortly before dawn, we heard a second, weaker explosion somewhere near the tank, for which we could not find the cause. The tank machine gun came to life again and for several minutes poured lead all around. Then there was silence again.

Soon after that it began to get light. The rays of the morning sun dyed the forests and fields with gold. Thousands of dewdrops sparkled like diamonds on the grass and flowers, the early birds sang. The soldiers began to stretch and blink sleepily as they rose to their feet. A new day began.

The sun had not yet risen high when a barefoot soldier, slung his tied boots over his shoulder, marched past the brigade's command post. To his misfortune, it was I, the commander of the brigade, who first noticed him, and rudely called him to me. When the terrified traveler drew himself up in front of me, I demanded in intelligible language an explanation of his morning walk in such a strange way. Is he a follower of Father Kneipp? If yes, then this is not the place to demonstrate your hobbies. (Papa Kneipp created a "Back to Nature" society in the 19th century and preached physical health, cold baths, outdoor sleeping, and the like.)

Very frightened, the lone wanderer began to get confused and bleat indistinctly. Every word from this silent violator had to be pulled out literally with tongs. However, with each of his answers, my face brightened. Finally I patted him on the shoulder with a smile and shook his hand gratefully. To an outside observer who did not hear what was being said, such a development of events might seem extremely strange. What could a barefoot guy say that the attitude towards him changed so rapidly? I could not satisfy this curiosity until the order was given for the brigade for the current day with the report of the young sapper.

“I listened to the sentries and lay in a ditch next to a Russian tank. When everything was ready, I, together with the company commander, hung a demolition charge, which was twice as heavy as the instructions required, to the tank’s caterpillar, and set fire to the fuse. Since the ditch was enough deep to provide cover from fragments, I expected the results of the explosion. However, after the explosion, the tank continued to shower bullets on the edge of the forest and the ditch. It took more than an hour before the enemy calmed down. Then I got close to the tank and examined the caterpillar in the place where the charge was placed No more than half of its width was destroyed, I did not notice any other damage.

When I returned to the rally point of the sabotage group, it had already left. While looking for my boots, which I had left there, I discovered another forgotten demolition charge. I took it and returned to the tank, climbed on the hull and hung the charge from the muzzle of the gun in the hope of damaging it. The charge was too small to cause serious damage to the machine itself. I crawled under the tank and blew it up.

After the explosion, the tank immediately fired at the edge of the forest and the ditch with a machine gun. The shooting did not stop until dawn, only then I managed to crawl out from under the tank. I sadly discovered that my charge was still too low. When I got to the collection point, I tried to put on my boots, but found that they were too small and not my pair at all. One of my comrades put mine on by mistake. As a result, I had to return barefoot, and I was late."

It was the true story of a brave man. However, despite his efforts, the tank continued to block the road, firing at any moving object it saw. The fourth decision, which was born on the morning of June 25, was to call in Ju-87 dive bombers to destroy the tank. However, we were refused, because planes were required literally everywhere. But even if they were found, it is unlikely that the dive bombers would be able to destroy the tank with a direct hit. We were sure that fragments of close gaps would not frighten the crew of the steel giant.

But now this damned tank had to be destroyed at all costs. The fighting power of our bridgehead garrison will be seriously undermined if the road cannot be opened. The division will not be able to fulfill the task assigned to it. Therefore, I decided to use the last means left to us, although this plan could lead to heavy losses in men, tanks and equipment, but it did not promise guaranteed success. However, my intentions were to mislead the enemy and help keep our losses to a minimum. We intended to divert the attention of the KV-1 with a feint attack from Major Shenk's tanks and bring the 88mm guns closer to destroy the terrible monster. The terrain around the Russian tank contributed to this. There it was possible to stealthily sneak up on the tank and set up observation posts in the wooded area of ​​the eastern road. Since the forest was rather sparse, our nimble PzKw-35t could move freely in all directions.

(memories of participants in the Battle of Kursk) - Historical truth

The last battle of the prisoners of the 20th block- Military review

***

Soon the 65th tank battalion arrived and began firing at the Russian tank from three sides. The crew of the KV-1 began to noticeably get nervous. The tower spun from side to side, trying to catch the impudent German tanks on sight. The Russians fired at targets darting through the trees, but they were always late. The German tank appeared, but literally disappeared at the same moment. The crew of the KV-1 tank was confident in the strength of its armor, which resembled an elephant skin and reflected all projectiles, but the Russians wanted to destroy the enemies that vexed them, while at the same time continuing to block the road.

Fortunately for us, the Russians were seized with excitement, and they stopped watching their rear, from where misfortune was approaching them. The anti-aircraft gun took up a position near the place where one of the same had already been destroyed the day before. Its formidable barrel aimed at the tank, and the first shot rang out. The wounded KV-1 tried to turn the turret back, but the anti-aircraft gunners managed to fire 2 more shots during this time. The turret stopped rotating, but the tank did not catch fire, although we expected it to. Although the enemy no longer reacted to our fire, after two days of failure we could not believe in success. 4 more shots were fired with armor-piercing shells from an 88-mm anti-aircraft gun, which ripped open the monster's skin. Its gun rose up helplessly, but the tank continued to stand on the road, which was no longer blocked.

Witnesses of this deadly duel wanted to get closer to check the results of their shooting. To their great amazement, they found that only 2 shells penetrated the armor, while the remaining 5 88-mm shells only made deep gouges in it. We also found 8 blue circles marking where 50mm shells hit. The result of the sappers' sortie was serious damage to the caterpillar and a shallow dent in the gun barrel. On the other hand, we did not find any traces of hits from 37-mm guns and PzKW-35t tanks. Driven by curiosity, our "Davids" climbed onto the fallen "Goliath" in a vain attempt to open the tower hatch. Despite his best efforts, his lid did not budge.

Suddenly, the barrel of the gun began to move, and our soldiers rushed away in horror. Only one of the sappers retained his composure and quickly pushed a hand grenade into the hole made by the projectile in the lower part of the tower. There was a dull explosion, and the manhole cover flew off to the side. Inside the tank lay the bodies of the brave crew, who until then had received only wounds. Deeply shocked by this heroism, we buried them with full military honors. They fought to the last breath, but it was only one small drama of the great war.

After the only heavy tank blocked the road for 2 days, it began to act. Our trucks delivered to the bridgehead the supplies needed for the subsequent offensive."

***

So 4 tankers in a heavy KV-1 tank against the German battle group "Raus" with the composition:

II Panzer Regiment

I/4th Motorized Regiment

II/76th Artillery Regiment

company of the 57th tank sapper battalion

company of the 41st Tank Destroyer Battalion

Battery II / 411th Anti-Aircraft Regiment

6th motorcycle battalion.

"Tiger" against the IS, the German tank school against the Soviet, these tanks were the face and pride of their powers, they were feared and therefore respected. There were legends about them. Many pages have been written about them in electronic and printed resources of different periods. However, an objective comparison of this technique is quite rare.

This was prevented by many factors, ranging from incompetence to fanaticism. Here we will try to most objectively evaluate these machines, their comparison (if possible, of course), combat use and pay attention to the most frequent and gross mistakes of the so-called "specialists".

Being consistent in historical events, let's start with the PzVI "Tiger".

The Tiger tank was created in an effort by the German command to regain the lost advantage in tank strength, taken away by the Soviet T-34 and KV-1. It was also planned to use the tank to push through the enemy's defenses.

Here it is necessary to note the difference between the German and Soviet commands in the vision of the role of tank troops in the battle and, accordingly, the tactics of their use and the requirements for their capabilities. The Soviet command considered tanks as an element of infantry support and a means of achieving superiority over the enemy in a particular area. This idea of ​​the role of tanks prevailed all over the world. As a result, the tank brigade, whose tasks were of a local nature, was the largest tank formation. The German command, represented by the ancestor of the German tank forces, Heinz Guderian, in view of the relatively small number of tanks, as well as the small number of new-design tanks in them, relied on the "tank fist". Thus, under the lightning strikes of entire tank armies concentrated in one place, France fell in a month.

Thus, the place of the Tiger tanks was in the center of the wedge advanced forward. The task is to destroy the most dangerous enemy and break through the defense thanks to excellent armor and weapons. Ensuring the safety of the relatively vulnerable sides of the tank was to be carried out by lighter vehicles of the Pz III and PzIV types. With the retreat, the "Tigers" were used in groups of up to 10 tanks and were deployed for pinpoint elimination of threats along the entire front.

Transmission location.

due to the front transmission, the tank had a spacious fighting compartment, which had a positive effect on increasing the ammunition load and reloading speed of the gun, and also provided more comfort to the driver. But, with the advent of more powerful Soviet guns, there was a risk of damaging the transmission with a shot in the forehead. However, not a single case of its ignition was recorded. Also, the latest equipment made it possible to drive a 60-ton machine without effort and skills, like an ordinary car.

Chess pendant.

The staggered arrangement of the suspension, due to the larger area of ​​​​contact with the ground, made it possible to withstand a lot of weight, and also provided a phenomenal ride, which made it possible to successfully shoot on the move - only German tanks could boast of this; however, they had to pay with unreliability and rapid wear of structural elements, which was extremely destructive in battle.

Electric turret traverse.

The electrical control of the turret rotation allowed the gunner to work with pinpoint accuracy, but due to the complexity and weight of the structure, the rotation was slow.

Optical devices.

High-quality optics allowed the "Tiger" with a high probability to hit a standing target from 3200 meters, and a moving target from 1200 meters.

Tool.

The power of the gun, created on the basis of an 88 mm anti-aircraft gun, with a high rate of fire (6-8 rounds / min) allowed the tank to confidently hit the most armored enemy targets of that period from 2,500 meters, penetrating armor 132 mm thick from 1,000 meters at an angle of 90 degrees. On the move and on moving targets, the tank had a good chance to hit from 1200 meters.

Design.

The design did not imply rational angles of inclination. This was due to both the layout of the tank and the lack of need - 100-mm frontal armor at that time perfectly held the blow of any anti-tank gun from less than 200 meters. However, with the use of an inclined scheme, it would be possible to significantly reduce the weight of the tank. The problem of insufficient engine power for such a weight (700 hp), overloaded chassis of the Tiger and, as a result, its relatively low maneuverability and high wear of parts is a well-known problem.

Consider the IS tank.

The Soviet heavy tank IS was a profound modernization of the KV-1 tank in accordance with the changing conditions and, accordingly, the requirements for the capabilities of tanks and their priority. Therefore, unlike the KV, the IS, created during the years of the offensive, had better maneuverability, and its 122-mm gun, depending on the type of projectile, was designed to fight both long-term fortified points (bunkers) and enemy tanks of the "Tiger" type and "Panther". By the way, the 122-mm gun coped with the destruction of pillboxes much better than the 88-mm German gun. Again, thanks to the fact that it had a direct purpose, unlike the German anti-aircraft guns.

The design of the tank was a classic Soviet layout with a rear transmission and engine compartment. Accordingly, the tank turret was moved forward, which made it possible to have a better vertical aiming angle than the German tanks. Also, in comparison with the tanks of the beginning of the war, the IS was also distinguished by relatively higher quality optical devices. As for the gun, turret and hull of the tank, it would be advisable to divide it into early (IS-85), medium (IS-122) and late (IS-2) tanks. The IS-85 featured a staggered forehead hull similar to the KV-1, as well as a smaller turret and an 85mm gun mounted on the T-34-85. Later, based on reports on the combat use of IS tanks and the results, the armor protection of the tank and its firepower were found to be insufficient. A new, larger turret was developed for the 122-mm D-25 (IS-122) gun, created on the basis of the A-19 heavy artillery gun. However, the problem of improving the frontal armor of the tank was solved later, when a tank was created with straightened frontal armor like the T-34.

Appearing at the time of the offensive of the Soviet troops, the IS tank was used in tank formations, playing the role of a heavy breakthrough tank. Guards formations of IS tanks were created, however, these tanks were used by groups extremely rarely. Basically, the tank unit, in addition to the total mass of the T-34, T-34-85 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, had only 2-3 IS tanks to solve the most difficult tasks.

This episode is described in detail in the memoirs of Colonel Erhard Raus, whose group tried to destroy a Soviet tank! The 6th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht fought for 48 hours with a single Soviet KV-1 tank (Klim Voroshilov). First, the fifty-ton KV-1 shot and crushed with its caterpillars a convoy of 12 trucks with supplies, which was going to the Germans from the captured city of Raiseniai. Then he destroyed an artillery battery with aimed shots!

The Germans, of course, returned fire, but to no avail. The shells of anti-tank guns did not even leave dents on his armor - the Germans struck by this later gave the KV-1 tanks the nickname "Ghost"! The armor of the KV-1 could not be penetrated even by 150 mm howitzers. True, Routh's soldiers managed to immobilize the tank by exploding a projectile under its caterpillar. But "Klim Voroshilov" was not going to leave anywhere.

He took a strategic position on the only road leading to Raiseniai, and delayed the advance of the division for two days (the Germans could not get around him, because the road passed through swamps, where army trucks and light tanks got stuck).

Finally, by the end of the second day of the battle, Routh managed to shoot the tank from anti-aircraft guns. But, when his soldiers cautiously approached the steel monster, the tank turret suddenly turned in their direction - apparently, the crew was still alive. Only a grenade thrown into the hatch of the tank put an end to this incredible battle...

Erhard Raus fought on the Eastern Front, passing through Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk, and ended the war as commander of the 3rd Panzer Army and with the rank of colonel general. Of the 427 pages of his memoirs, which directly describe the fighting, 12 are devoted to a two-day battle with the only Russian tank at Raseiniai. Routh was clearly shaken by this tank.

Erhard Raus: “Although the tank had not moved since the battle with the anti-tank battery, it turned out that its crew and commander had iron nerves. They coolly followed the approach of the anti-aircraft gun, without interfering with it, since as long as the gun was moving, it did not pose any threat to the tank. In addition, the closer the anti-aircraft gun is, the easier it will be to destroy it.

The critical moment in the duel of nerves arrived when the crew began to prepare the anti-aircraft gun for firing. It is time for the tank crew to act. While the gunners, terribly nervous, aimed and loaded the gun, the tank turned the turret and fired first! Each projectile hit the target. A heavily damaged anti-aircraft gun fell into a ditch, several crew members died, and the rest were forced to flee. The tank's machine-gun fire prevented the cannon from being taken out and the dead picked up. The failure of this attempt, on which great hopes were placed, was very unpleasant news for us. The optimism of the soldiers died along with the 88-mm gun. Our soldiers did not have the best day, chewing canned food, since it was impossible to bring hot food.

The most surprising thing in this battle is the behavior of four tankers, whose names we do not know and will never know. They created more problems for the Germans than the entire 2nd Panzer Division, to which, apparently, the KV belonged. If the division delayed the German offensive for one day, then the only tank - for two. And all this time the crew was waiting.

All five combat episodes - the destruction of a convoy of trucks, the destruction of an anti-tank battery, the destruction of anti-aircraft guns, firing at sappers, the last battle with tanks - in total they hardly even took an hour. The rest of the time (48 hours!) The KV crew wondered from which side and in what form they would be destroyed next time. Try to at least roughly imagine such an expectation.

Moreover, if on the first day the crew of the KV could still hope for the arrival of their own, then on the second, when their own did not come and even the noise of the battle near Raseinaya subsided, it became clearer than clear: the iron box in which they are fried for the second day will soon enough turn into their common coffin. They took it for granted and continued to fight!

Erhard Raus: “Witnesses to this deadly duel wanted to get closer to check the results of their shooting. To their great amazement, they found that only 2 shells penetrated the armor, while the remaining 5 88-mm shells only made deep gouges in it. We also found 8 blue circles marking where 50mm shells hit. The result of the sappers' sortie was serious damage to the caterpillar and a shallow dent in the gun barrel. On the other hand, we did not find any traces of hits from 37-mm guns and PzKW-35t tanks.

Driven by curiosity, our "Davids" climbed onto the fallen "Goliath" in a vain attempt to open the tower hatch. Despite his best efforts, his lid did not budge. Suddenly, the barrel of the gun began to move, and our soldiers rushed away in horror. Only one of the sappers retained his composure and quickly pushed a hand grenade into the hole made by the projectile in the lower part of the tower. There was a dull explosion, and the manhole cover flew off to the side. Inside the tank lay the bodies of the brave crew, who until then had received only wounds. Deeply shocked by this heroism, we buried them with full military honors. They fought to the last breath, but it was just one small drama of the great war!”

And here is another feat of a tanker:

Destroy 22 tanks in 30 minutes. The feat of the tankman Kolobanov.

It all went like this:
In harsh silence
There is a heavy tank,
Disguised in the woods
Enemies are crowding
iron idols,
But takes the fight
Zinovy ​​Kolobanov.

These poems are just a small excerpt from a poem written in September 1941 by the poet Alexander Gitovich in honor of the commander of the 3rd tank company of the 1st tank battalion of the 1st tank division, senior lieutenant Zinovy ​​Kolobanov. A month before, on August 20, 1941, the tank crew, commanded by the 30-year-old Kolobanov, destroyed 22 German tanks in one battle. In total, during this day, 5 tanks of Kolobanov's company knocked out 43 enemy tanks. In addition, an artillery battery, a passenger car and up to two companies of the Nazi infantry were destroyed.

This happened just in those days about which there was a strong opinion: at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet troops only retreated, without putting up serious resistance to the enemy. The heroic accomplishments of Zinovy ​​​​Kolobanov and his subordinates are designed to dispel this myth - the Red Army fought the Nazi-German invaders with all its might in the summer of 1941.

Order of the divisional commander: "Stand to the death!"

At the end of August 1941, the 3rd tank company of Kolobaev defended the approaches to Leningrad near the city of Krasnogvardeysk. Every day, every hour was "worth its weight in gold" - military enterprises and civilians were evacuated from the northern capital. On August 19, Z. Kolobaev received a personal order from the division commander: to block three roads that lead to the city from Luga, Volosovo and Kingisepp. Protecting three roads with five tanks - only he could do it. The tanker by that time had gone through the Finnish war, burned in the tank three times, but each time he returned to duty.

Tanks "Kliment Voroshilov" KV-1 against the German Pz.Kpfw.35 (t)

There is a scheme of the same battle.

The position of the heavy tank KV-1 Kolobanov was at a height with clay soil, at a distance of about 150 m from the fork in the road, near which two birch trees grew, which received the name "Landmark No. 1", and about 300 m from the intersection marked "Landmark No. 2 ". The length of the viewed section of the road is about 1000 m, 22 tanks are easily placed on it with a marching distance between tanks of 40 m.

The choice of a place for firing in two opposite directions (such a position is called a caponier) is explained as follows. The enemy could take the road to Marienburg either along the road from Voiskovits or along the road from Syaskelevo. In the first case, you would have to shoot in the forehead. Therefore, the caponier was dug directly opposite the intersection in such a way that the heading angle was minimal. At the same time, I had to come to terms with the fact that the distance to the fork was reduced to a minimum.

It was on such a machine that Kolobanov fought.

Around 14:00 on August 20, after the unsuccessful aerial reconnaissance carried out by the Germans, German reconnaissance motorcyclists proceeded along the seaside road to the Voiskovitsy state farm, which Kolobanov's crew let through without hindrance, waiting for the main enemy forces to approach. For one and a half - two minutes, while the lead tank covered the distance to the intersection, Kolobanov made sure that there were no heavy tanks in the column, finally drew up a battle plan and decided to skip the entire column to the fork (Landmark No. 1). In this case, all the tanks had time to go through the turn at the beginning of the causeway and be within reach of his gun. Light tanks Pz.Kpfw.35 (t) of the German 6th Panzer Division (other sources also call the 1st or 8th Panzer Divisions) moved in the column.

Having knocked out tanks in the head, middle and at the end of the column, Kolobanov not only blocked the road from both ends, but also deprived the Germans of the opportunity to move onto the road leading to Voiskovitsy.
There was a terrible panic in the enemy column. Some tanks, trying to hide from the destructive fire, climbed down the slope and there they got stuck up to the towers in the swamp. Then they too were burned. Others, trying to turn around, ran into each other, knocking down tracks and rollers. Frightened crews, jumping out of burning cars, rushed between them in fear. Most of them came under machine-gun fire.

In 30 minutes of battle, Kolobanov's crew knocked out all 22 tanks in the column. Of the double ammunition load, 98 armor-piercing rounds were used up. After the battle on Zinovy ​​​​Kolobanov's KV-1, more than a hundred hits were counted.

Tank KV-1 with damage.

Submit for an award!

Immediately after this tank battle, which ended in the complete victory of Soviet weapons, an article appeared in the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper about the feat of the tankman Kolobanov.

And in the archives of the Ministry of Defense, a unique document has been preserved - the award list of Zinovy ​​​​Kolobanov.

Sheet 1 page.

It confirms the information on the number of destroyed tanks, but, perhaps most importantly, Zinovy ​​Kolobanov and all members of his crew were presented to the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the courage and heroism shown in the victorious battle. But the high command did not consider that the feat of the tankers deserved such a high appraisal. Zinovy ​​Kolobanov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, Andrei Usov - the Order of Lenin, Nikolai Nikiforov - the Order of the Red Banner, and Nikolai Rodnikov and Pavel Kiselkov - the Orders of the Red Star.

After the feat

For another three weeks after the battle near Voiskovitsy, the company of senior lieutenant Kolobanov held back the Germans on the outskirts of Krasnogvardeysk in the Bolshaya Zagvodka area. During this time, 5 Kolobanov tanks destroyed three mortar batteries, four anti-tank guns and 250 German soldiers and officers.

On September 13, 1941, Krasnogvardeysk was abandoned by the Red Army. Kolobanov's company was again left at the most important line at that moment - it covered the retreat of the last military column to the city of Pushkin.

Tank KV-1

September 15, 1941 Senior Lieutenant Kolobanov was seriously wounded. At night, at the cemetery of the city of Pushkin, where the tanks were refueled and ammunition, a German shell exploded next to Zinovy ​​​​Kolobanov's KV. The tanker received a shrapnel wound to the head and spine, contusion of the brain and spinal cord.

The war for Zinovy ​​​​Kolobanov is over.

He was sent for treatment to the Traumatological Institute of Leningrad, in the very city that the tanker so successfully defended. Before the blockade of the northern capital, the tank hero was evacuated and until March 15, 1945 he was treated in evacuation hospitals No. 3870 and 4007 in Sverdlovsk. But in the summer of 1945, having recovered from his wound, Zinovy ​​Kolobanov returned to duty. For another thirteen years he served in the army, having retired with the rank of lieutenant colonel, then for many years he lived and worked at a factory in Minsk.

With wife and son.

In the early 1980s, it was decided to erect a monument at the site of the battle near Voiskovitsy. Zinovy ​​Kolobanov wrote a letter to the Minister of Defense of the USSR Dmitry Ustinov with a request to allocate a tank for installation on a pedestal, and the tank was allocated, however, not the KV-1, but the later IS-2.

However, the very fact that the minister granted Kolobanov's request suggests that he knew about the tank hero and did not question his feat.
Why not a hero? To the question: “Why was the hero-tanker Kolobanov not awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union either during the Great Patriotic War or after it?” there are two answers. And both of them lie in the biography of the tanker Zinovy ​​Grigorievich Kolobanov.

The first reason is that after the war, the journalist of Krasnaya Zvezda, A. Pinchuk, published information that Kolobanov Z.G. became a Hero of the Soviet Union (at the beginning of March 1940 he received the Gold Star and the Order of Lenin) and he was awarded the extraordinary rank of captain. But for the fraternization of his subordinates with the Finnish military after the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty of March 12, 1940, Kolobov Z.G. was deprived of both the title and the award, documentary evidence confirming the receipt by Kolobanov Z.G. the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for participation in the Finnish War, no.

The second reason - on December 10, 1951, Kolobov was transferred to the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSVG), where he served until 1955. On July 10, 1952, Z. G. Kolobanov was awarded the military rank of lieutenant colonel, and on April 30, 1954, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner (for 20 years of service in the army).

At this time, a Soviet soldier deserted from a tank battalion to the British occupation zone. Saving the battalion commander from a military tribunal, the commander announced Kolobanov Z.G. on incomplete official compliance and transferred him to the Belarusian military district. In Soviet times, the presence in the biography of even one of the listed reasons was quite enough to refuse to award the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Zinovy ​​Kolobanov passed away in 1994, but veteran organizations, social activists and historians are still trying to achieve the title of Hero of Russia.

In the Gatchina district of the Leningrad region, where Zinovy ​​Kolobanov fought in 1941, a collection of signatures was organized under an appeal with a request to honor the tank hero with the high award he deserved at the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War posthumously. In the year of the 70th anniversary of the Victory, according to the public, this would be quite logical and appropriate.

By August 10, 1944, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, having crossed the river. Vistula, broke through the enemy defenses southwest of the Polish city of Sandomierz and, having overturned parts of the 4th tank army of the enemy, significantly expanded the bridgehead. In an effort to restore lost positions along the western bank of the river. Vistula, the Germans urgently transferred five divisions (including one tank division) from the Southern Ukraine Army Group, five infantry divisions from Germany, three infantry divisions from Hungary and six brigades of assault guns to the Sandomierz region. In preparation for the German counteroffensive, the Soviet command regrouped its troops. Defensive fortifications were urgently erected,
explosive barriers were set up.

On August 11, having deliberately retreated from the previously taken town of Szydlów and the village of Oglendow, they went over to the defense and part of the 6th Guards Tank Corps of the 3rd Guards Tank Army. The bridgehead by this time was uneven, resting on the river. The Vistula was a semicircle, in the center of which the 53rd Guards Tank Brigade was defending, the 52nd Guards Tank Brigade adjoining its left flank. It was not possible to open full-profile shelters for vehicles in sandy soils - the walls of the trenches immediately crumbled. This area also brought a lot of trouble to the Germans. Our tankers repeatedly observed how the Panthers often skidded in the sand and how their drivers, when trying to get out, had to expose the weak side armor of their vehicles to the fire of our troops. In previous battles for Shidluv and Oglendow, these Panther maneuvers helped inflict serious losses on the enemy (on August 11, 1944 alone, 8 enemy tanks were destroyed by tankers of the 53rd Guards Tank Brigade). Therefore, on August 12, the commander of the 53rd GvTBR, Colonel V. S. Arkhipov, with his chief of staff S. I. Kirilkin, came to the conclusion that the enemy would no longer go through open sandy fields, but would try to outflank the positions of the brigade, so they were concentrate all attention.

In front of the 2nd tank battalion of Major A. G. Korobov, the whole area was in full view. On the right flank, where the T-34 tanks of the 3rd TB of Captain I.M. Mazurin were defending, a deep and wide hollow stretched along which a field road passed from the village of Oglenduv to the town of Staszow to the rear of our troops. Behind the hollow was a swamp, where the 294th rifle regiment of the 97th rifle division went on the defensive.

The road stretching in the lowland, leading straight to the goal, could not be left without the attention of the Germans. To cover this path, the brigade command decided to ambush two T-34 tanks from the 3rd TB at the exit from the hollow on the slopes of a nameless height, instructing the deputy commander of the guard battalion, Captain P. T. Ivushkin, to command them. The remaining tanks of the battalion were in the main defensive positions a kilometer from Oglendow.

Initial assumptions about the plans of the enemy were confirmed already in the first reports of reconnaissance, which was conducted by patrols and three armored groups on tanks and motorcycles in the expected directions of the enemy's advance. In intelligence report No. 53 of the headquarters of the 6th GvTK, drawn up at 19.00 on August 13, it was reported:

"On the night of August 12-13, in the area west of Szydlów, a captured sergeant major belonging to the 1st company of the 501st separate battalion of heavy tanks of the RGK, and a private belonging to the 10th company of the 79th MP of the 16th TD, taken in the Ponik area .

The sergeant-major testified that after the unloading of the 501st separate battalion of heavy tanks of the RGK, a tank division of an unknown number was unloaded at the Koneupol station. The 501st TB consists of three TRs and a supply company.

The battalion arrived with 40 tanks, 20 of them of the Panther type and 20 of the T-IV type. Up to 30 tanks arrived in Khmilnyk, the rest are out of order and require light repairs."

The arrival of the 501st separate battalion of heavy tanks under the command of Major von Legat spoke volumes in itself. In July - August 1944, the battalion was reorganized at the training center in Ohrdruf (Ohrdruf) and received a new materiel - the pride of German tank designers, ahead of time named "all-destroying" tanks "Tiger-B".

However, the low reliability of the “raw” vehicle (which began to be developed back in 1942, but was never brought to “mind”) led to the fact that the battalion was sent to the Eastern Front on August 5 in incomplete strength, since 14 tanks with various problems was concentrated in the 1st company, which remained in the training center.

On August 9, the battalion arrived in Poland and unloaded at the Konsupol station near the city of Kielce. As the prisoners showed, of the 40 tanks, only half were Panther heavy tanks, the rest at the last moment supplemented the Pz Kpfw IV. Later it turned out that the words of the prisoners about the arrival of the Panthers were not true. Most likely, the prisoners tried to hide from the enemy the appearance of a secret novelty at the front, since these "Panthers" turned out to be the latest "Royal Tigers".

In the course of a short march from the unloading station to the headquarters of the 16th TD, located in the Khmilnik area, 10 defective tanks remained three kilometers away. Having spent a couple of days on the repair and preparation of the materiel, on August 11, the battalion, having made a 2-km march, reached the town of Szydlów. Since the march was again accompanied by breakdowns of new vehicles, by the end of the day only 11 serviceable Tiger-B tanks were in the ranks of the battalion - which had to be baptized in the attack on Staszow.

It should be noted here that the forces of the 6th GvTK did not at all provide the Soviet tankers with significant numerical superiority: the Germans were opposed by nine combat-ready T-34-76s from the 53rd GvTBr, nine T-34-76s and ten T-34-85s of the 52nd GvTbr, and the 51st GvTBR, which occupied (in the north) the defense, had eleven T-34-76 tanks and four T-34-85 tanks. Staszow also had eleven IS-2 heavy tanks and one IS-85 tank belonging to the 71st OGvTTP.

From the middle of the night from August 12 to 13, the growing roar of tank engines in the depths of the German positions was heard more and more clearly. Before dawn, the commander of the 53rd Guards Tank Brigade returned from headquarters to his tank, which served as an observation post and was in combat formations of the 1st TB, whose vehicles were hidden by a ridge of low sand dunes. Ahead on the right stretched a hollow with a road leading to Staszów. To the left on the field were scattered shocks of straw, in which Ivushkin's tanks were disguised. Closer to the exit from the hollow was the “thirty-four” of junior lieutenant A.P. Oskin, whose crew included: driver A. Stetsenko, gun commander A. Merkhaydarov, radio operator A. Grushin and loader A. Khalychev. Colonel Arkhipov and Ivushkin crept up to the mound that hid the tank, and after talking with Oskin, they ordered not to open fire without a command.

The morning was foggy. From the observation post of the commander of the 53rd brigade, neither the outskirts of the village of Oglendowa, nor the hollow, nor even the straw mounds with camouflaged tanks could be seen. The silence of the early morning was interrupted by the slowly growing roar of tank engines, and soon the approaching clang of caterpillars became audible. From the air came the rumble of the Junkers going to Staszow. Then the German artillery opened fire, but the shells swept high over the brigade's front line. Enemy reconnaissance was never able to detect the battle formations of the 53rd Tank Brigade, not to mention the ambush.

At 07:00 on August 13, the enemy, under the cover of fog, went on the offensive on an unnamed height with eleven Tiger-B tanks, accompanied by several armored personnel carriers with infantry. Ivushkin reported to the NP:

“Tanks have gone. I don't see, but I hear. They're going down the drain."

Here is how the commander of the 53rd GvTBr himself described the further course of events:

“A tank of monstrous size was getting out of the hollow. It crawled uphill in jerks, skidding in the sand. Major Korobov radioed from the left flank:

I answer:
- Do not hurry! Hit from four hundred meters.
Meanwhile, a second hulk crawled out of the hollow, then a third appeared. They appeared at considerable intervals: by the time the third tank emerged from the hollow, the first had already passed Ivushkin's ambush. "Beat?" he asked. I see how the side of the shock moved slightly, where Oskin's tank stands. A sheaf rolled down, a cannon barrel became visible. He twitched, then another and another. It was Oskin who fired. Through my binoculars I clearly saw how black holes appeared in the starboard sides of the enemy tanks. So the smoke appeared, and the flame flared up. The third tank turned to face Oskin, but, having rolled on a broken caterpillar, stopped and was finished off.

I broadcast on the radio: "307 - 305". General signal. Direct fire hit three dozen barrels at once. Yes, and howitzer divisions covered the hollow with mounted fire, and it disappeared all the way to Oglendow in clouds of smoke and sandy dust.

Junkers and Messerschmitts appeared, and almost simultaneously our fighters. A fight broke out in the air. The 2nd tank battalion of Korobov during the day fought with enemy tanks to the west of height 247.9. By the end of the day, the 53rd brigade took up defensive positions along its southern part - 300 meters east of the village of Oglendow, ready for an offensive in the direction of Shedluv. Two tanks of the 3rd TB with a company of machine gunners at 22.00 attacked the village, which by eight o'clock in the morning was completely cleared of the enemy. After that, the 3rd TB entrenched itself on the outskirts. Among the trophies taken in the village were German tanks that retreated after an unsuccessful attack. It was here that it turned out that the battle had to be fought with the latest German tanks (there was no time to figure it out on a foggy morning, and in the first reports, counting the burning tanks, they reported the destruction of three Panthers).

The 2nd TB, in cooperation with the 2nd tank company of the 71st OGvTTP and the 289th rifle regiment, at 9.00 began an offensive in the direction of Zarez. The Tigers-B, located west of Oglenduv, blocked the path of the advancing infantry with their fire. Then a platoon of IS-2 tanks of the guard, senior lieutenant Klimenkov, moved forward and opened fire on enemy tanks from pre-prepared positions, as a result of a short battle, Klimenkov burned one tank and knocked out one.

After that, the infantry, without meeting strong resistance, entered Oglendow, where the tanks of the 3rd TB were already finishing off the enemy. At this time, 7 Tiger-B tanks attacked our positions from the direction of height 272.1. Udalov, who was in an ambush in the bush east of Mokra on the IS-2 tank (Udalov fought on the IS-2 with turret No. on the head and after several well-aimed shots, one tank was burned, and the second was hit.

The enemy tanks turned away and began to move away. Udalov led his car along the forest road towards the enemy and opened fire again from the edge of the forest. Leaving another burning tank, the enemy turned back. Soon the attack of the "Royal Tigers" was repeated, this time they went in the direction of Ponik, where the IS-2 tank of Guards Belyakov was in ambush, which opened fire from a distance of 1000 m and ignited the tank with the third shell. Seeing here, too, a disastrous direction for the offensive, the remaining enemy tanks turned back.

In total, for three days of continuous fighting from August 11 to 13, 1944, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe towns of Staszow and Szydlów, the troops of the 6th GvTK captured and destroyed 24 enemy tanks, 13 of which were the latest heavy tanks "Tiger-B".

“In the period from August 9 to 19, 1944, the 52nd GvTBR captured 7 and destroyed 225 soldiers and officers, destroyed one machine gun, captured 3 cannons, destroyed 6 tanks and 10 trucks, two special vehicles.”

In addition, as follows from the reports of units and formations of the corps about prisoners and trophies captured from the enemy:

In total, from August 1 to August 29, 1944, the 53rd Tank Brigade destroyed 8 chief officers, 37 non-commissioned officers, 153 soldiers, captured 2 non-commissioned officers, 6 "Royal Tigers" and destroyed: 1 aircraft, 12 tanks, 29 howitzers , 150 rifles, 7 assault rifles, 20 machine guns, 4 mortars and 2 cannons. "It should be noted that this success was all the more impressive because the units of the 6th GvTK did not lose a single tank in these battles.

The losses of the enemy, a little later, were confirmed by intelligence report No. 39 of the headquarters of the 6th GvTK, compiled on August 16 at 19.00:

On August 16, a prisoner belonging to the 501st heavy tank battalion was captured in the Zaraz region.

The prisoner showed that the 501st separate battalion of heavy tanks was formed in Germany, received 40 new tanks: up to 20 "Royal Tigers" and up to 20 of the "T-4" type. The battalion arrived in the Khmelnyk region two weeks ago. At present, up to 26 tanks remain in the battalion, the rest have been burned and knocked out.

The prisoner, in addition to his tanks, saw the Tiger tanks of another unit. The prisoner does not know the numbering of the unit."

According to the memoirs of the commander of the 53rd GvTBr: “... who knocked out and how much is a difficult question, since the tankers of two battalions - I.M. Mazurin and A.G. howitzer and 1645th light) two self-propelled artillery (1893rd and 385th) regiments. Attack aircraft worked perfectly. Oskin's crew burned three tanks, knocked out one. Alexander Petrovich himself was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, Abubakir Merkhaidarov - the Order of Lenin. All crew members received awards.

After the battle, the commander of the 2nd TB Korobov compiled a report in which he indicated that "about 20 large tanks were advancing at the junction of his battalion and the 51st Guards Tank Brigade." The question is legitimate, but where did the rest of the "Royal Tigers" go? They are also unlucky. They were ambushed by the command of the 52nd GvTKR, which was on the defensive on the left flank of the 6th GvTK. The 2nd tank battalion of this brigade, under the command of Major A.N. Golomidov, was located on the edge of the forest on August 12 near the village of Mokre, located a few kilometers west of Staszow. Toward evening, the battalion commander called the company commander, senior lieutenant V. I. Tokarev, and, pointing to a point on the map, ordered an ambush to be organized there. A kilometer from the battle formations of the battalion, in the area of ​​​​a high-rise with bushes, two tanks, led by a company commander, ambushed.

The tank crews spent the whole night of August 13 without sleep. "Thirty-fours" were partially dug into the ground among piles of sheaves of bread. Finding both cars was completely impossible.

Here is how the further course of events was described by the commander of the 52nd Guards Tank Brigade, Hero of the Soviet Union Guards Lieutenant Colonel L. I. Kurist:

“Early in the morning, the so-called “frame” appeared in the sky - an enemy spotter aircraft. It flew over our area and disappeared. A little later, the enemy opened heavy artillery fire. "Now the Tigers and Panthers will come," Tokarev said when the raid stopped.
Komarichev and Dzhoparidze (charging) peered tensely into the distance, from where the roar of engines could be heard. A few minutes later, they saw how armored vehicles appeared from behind the hill, coming from the hollow, bypassing the height, exposing the sides to our tanks. Apparently, the Germans did not even imagine that there could be an ambush here.
"Five, six, seven... twelve..." counted Komarichev.
— Tengiz! Twenty! You know, twenty! And behind them - the infantry!
Nothing, Jora. We are guardsmen!
- Come on, armor-piercing!
Enemy tanks were also noticed by the crew of Junior Lieutenant Stepan Kraylov. The tankers decided to let the enemy at close range in order to hit for sure.
When the Germans were about five hundred meters away, Komarichev and Krainev opened fire. From the shot of Komarichev, one "Tiger" caught fire, Krainev knocked out another. The Nazis made desperate attempts to break through to the edge of the forest. Tanks took a little to the left. However, this did not help either: burning and wrecked cars remained on the battlefield. Suffering heavy losses, the Germans faltered, the tanks turned around and began to gradually retreat back. From further attempts to advance on the line occupied by the brigade, they refused.

The intensity of that battle can be judged, if only because the tank crews used up almost all the shells. Komarichev and Dzhaparidze accounted for eight Tigers and Panthers destroyed. Krainev knocked out six: "... Having entered into a confrontation with the enemy, our tankers destroyed 14 tanks, more than 50 Nazis, and most importantly, they thwarted the enemy's counterattack in their area."

Unfortunately, both commanders of tank brigades in their memoirs did not separately indicate the exact number of destroyed and lined "Royal Tigers". According to the latest data published in the book “Tactics of the Tiger-I and Tiger-II Tanks” by the English researcher Thomas Yenz, a week after the battle on August 21, 1944, in the ranks of the 501st tank battalion, there were 12 serviceable Tiger-II tanks, 27 tanks required repair, and six Tiger-II tanks were irretrievably lost. However, citing these data, the author is somewhat disingenuous. 12 Tiger-B tanks remained on the battlefield near Oglendow, Mokre and Szydlów. To date, it is clear from archive data that during these battles it was possible to utterly defeat the 501st separate battalion "Tigrov-B", while capturing three perfectly serviceable vehicles of a new model, with tower numbers 102, 502 and 234.

Tank number 502 was found standing in the courtyard of a house on the outskirts of the village of Oglendow. The reason why the crew abandoned a technically sound combat vehicle remains unclear. Most likely, since the village of Oglendow was taken by one swift throw of our tanks, the crew of the King Tiger simply fled in panic, leaving all the technical documentation inside the vehicle. The tank was full of ammunition and a sufficient supply of fuel. According to the technical documentation found in it, it turned out that the tank traveled only 444 km. When trying to start the engine, he wound up "half a turn."

Captured tanks No. 102 and No. 502 were command tanks, as they had additional means of communication.

The Germans appreciated what happened with dignity, removing von Legat from his post in a week.

Soon in the front-line newspaper of the 6th GvTK "Combat Appeal" an editorial appeared with the subtitle - "The best tanks in the world are ours, Soviet ones!". It covered the recent events on the Sandomierz bridgehead in this way: "... Seeing our tanks, superior in everything, the Germans began to build their clumsy and clumsy monsters - Tigers, Panthers and Ferdinands. But these machines are still inferior and inferior to the quality of Soviet vehicles. This has been proven from the last battles, where the retreat path of the German armies is littered with the wreckage of "Tigers" and other German equipment. The last German tanks of the "T-VIB" type "King Tiger" did not frighten the Soviet soldiers. Our tankers and gunners at the first meeting with them proved the absolute superiority of our combat vehicles against this so-called "secret" weapon of the Germans. Our valiant tankers Oskin, Udalov and Potekha in the first battle destroyed several "Royal Tigers" ... The experience of fighting on The Soviet-German front proved that the advantage of Soviet tanks over German ones is clear and undeniable. Our new tanks have a better gun, they have high cross-country ability and maneuverability."

Thus, the first step was taken towards the creation of a legend that, with its vulgar and clumsy propaganda, obscured the real and much more impressive success of our tank soldiers.

The reasons for the complete fiasco of the "Royal Tigers", which did not justify the hopes of the Germans near Sandomierz, were the skillful organization of the defense and, no doubt, the skill of our tankers. On the other hand, the enemy was let down by numerous miscalculations in planning and tactics, an unsuccessful choice of direction for the use of heavy tanks, especially the 70-ton "Royal Tigers". The desire to quickly throw into battle the “wonder weapon” that had not been brought to “mind” ultimately led to the fact that the next “pancake” prepared by German “tank cooks” did not hit the table in its proper form.

By the way, for some reason, some Western sources claim that the allegedly captured Tiger with the number 502 actually had the number 002, and that the Russians allegedly changed the number themselves. This nonsense is hard to believe. First, there is no difference what number the tank has and therefore there is no point in changing the numbers. And secondly, according to German reports, it is easy to check the tanks with which numbers were part of the 501st battalion. And then it turns out that the Royal Tiger with the number 002 never existed. But the tank with the number 502 was.

To complete the picture, I would like to note that the 501st heavy tank battalion (s.Pz.Abt.501) was formed on May 10, 1942 from two tank companies. He was part of the 7th Tank Regiment. On March 6, 1943, the third company was included in the battalion. He participated in the battles in North Africa, where in May 1943 he was almost completely destroyed. Newly established on September 9, 1943. In the summer of 1944, having received a new materiel (Royal Tigers), the battalion was included in the Northern Ukraine Army Group and sent to the Eastern Front. After the events described near Staszow, the battalion fought defensive battles near the Pilica River, again suffered heavy losses, and by autumn was withdrawn to the rear for reorganization. In the autumn, on November 27, 1944, the battalion was renamed the 424th heavy tank battalion and attached to the XXIV Panzer Corps, and the former 101st SS heavy tank battalion was then renamed the 501st.