Shortly after the end of the last war with Russia, a report appeared in the newspapers that a certain Mehmed Bey, a colonel in the Turkish army, aka Mr. Bandya, a former colonel in the Hungarian army, left Constantinople and went to Circassia with several Polish volunteers. Upon his arrival there, he immediately became something of a chief of staff for Sefer Pasha, the leader of the Circassians. Those who knew the previous career of this Hungarian liberator of Circassia did not doubt at all that he went to this country for the sole purpose of selling it to Russia. At one time, it was publicly and irrefutably proved that this man was a spy in London and Paris, who was on the salary of both the French and Prussian police. It is not surprising that about a month ago a report flashed in European newspapers that Bandya, aka Mehmed Bey, was really caught in treasonous correspondence with the Russian general Philipson and that a military court held over him sentenced him to death. Nevertheless, soon after this, Bandya suddenly found himself in Constantinople and, pretending to be the victim of an intrigue, with his characteristic impudence declared that all these stories of treason, court martial, etc. were the purest inventions of his enemies.

We have come across the most important of the documents relating to this curious episode of the Circassian war, and we will give here some excerpts from them. These documents were delivered to Constantinople by the lieutenant of the Polish battalion in Circassia, Franciszek Stock, who was one of the members of the military court that condemned Bandya. These documents do not need comments.

Excerpts from the minutes of the military trial of Mehmed Bey, who is also J. Bandya, from Illoshfalva, which met in Aderby, in Circassia.

“... When Colonel Mehmed Bey arrived in Shepsugur, he asked me to deliver a letter to the commander of the Black Sea Cossacks, General Philipson. To my remark that I could not do this without notifying Sefer Pasha and without obtaining his permission, Mehmed Bey informed me that, as envoy and viceroy of the padishah and commander of the troops in Circassia, he had the right to exchange letters with the Russians, that Sefer Pasha is aware of this and that his goal is to mislead the Russians ... When Sefer Pasha and the national assembly handed me the Circassian manifesto addressed to the king, Mehmed Bey also gave me a letter for General Philipson. I did not find General Philipson in Anapa and gave the letter to the major who commanded the military forces there. The major promised to send the manifest to its destination, but refused to accept the letter, which had neither an address nor a signature. I brought the letter back, but the frequent correspondence of Mehmed Bey aroused suspicion in me, and, fearing that I myself would not be compromised, I brought the whole matter to the attention of the authorities ... "

(No. 2) Testimony of Ahmed Efendi, former Turkish secretary under Mehmed Bey:

“... Mehmed Bey was very angry with Tevfik Bey (Colonel Lapinsky) and spoke very badly of him, saying that he would put spokes in his wheels in every possible way. On the second night after our arrival in Aderby ... early at dawn, Mehmed Bey's groom woke me. Mehmed Bey himself told me that a strong rumble of cannon fire was heard from the direction of Gelendzhik. He was already on his feet and seemed out of sorts ... The report that Colonel Lapinsky had been taken prisoner with his entire detachment was received in Aderby - I don’t know how - even before the cannon fire had stopped. I heard Mehmed Bey talking about it. When news came later that neither the colonel nor his men had been taken prisoner, Mehmed Bey said in great annoyance: “Probably he sold his cannons to the Russians”…”

(No. 3) Testimony of officers and soldiers of the Polish detachment stationed in Aderby:

“On the eve of the sudden capture of Gelendzhik, Mehmed Bey came to the camp and said that he had received letters from Constantinople informing him that if they did not receive help from anywhere, then only Colonel Lapinsky would be to blame ... Mehmed Bey ordered to give the soldiers alcohol and promised them many blessings if they left their colonel and followed him ... When it later turned out that the news (that Lapinsky had been taken prisoner) was false, Mehmed Bey personally appeared in the camp and addressed the soldiers with a speech, persuading them to refuse from obedience to the colonel. When the colonel returned, Mehmed Bey pretended that he did not know anything, renounced several people who had joined him and allowed them to be punished without standing up for them. Subsequently, in the absence of the colonel, Mehmed Bey, with the help of some Hungarians, tried to raise a rebellion among the troops.

These Hungarians drew up an indictment against the colonel and tried to force the soldiers to sign it. With the exception of three people who admitted that they were persuaded to give their signature, all the others declared under oath that their signatures had been forged ... Making this forgery was all the easier because only very few soldiers in the detachment knew how to write.

(No. 4) Bandya's confessions at the military court:

“I am tired of a long interrogation, and I present to the commission this confession, written by me with my own hand and signed by me. I hope that my judges, since I save them from a long and difficult work by my confession, will rather agree to remember that the fate of my innocent family is also connected with my fate. [Here he refers to the Bandya family No. 3. In addition to the Muslim family in Constantinople, he also has a wife in Hungary and another wife in Paris.] . Formerly my name was Janos Bandja of Illosfalva; my current name is Mehmed Bey, age 40, my religion used to be Roman Catholic, but in 1853 I converted to Islam… My political activity… was directed by the former leader of my country, Lajos Kossuth… Equipped with letters of recommendation from my political leader, I am 22 December 1853 arrived in Constantinople ... I joined the Turkish army with the rank of colonel. During this time I often received letters and instructions from Kossuth concerning the interests of my country. At the same time, Kossuth sent a message to the Ottoman government in which he ardently advised the Turks to beware of an alliance with France, England or Austria and advised them to better contact the Italian and Hungarian revolutionaries ... According to the instructions that were given to me, I had to go one way or another to join the ranks of the troops intended for operations on the Circassian shores ... Arriving in Circassia, at first I limited myself to studying the state of affairs in the country and transmitting my observations to my political friends ... I tried to get close to Sefer Pasha ... According to the instructions, I had to prevent all kinds of offensive operations by the Circassians and counteract any foreign influence in Circassia. Shortly before my departure from Constantinople, Colonel Türr, who receives instructions from the same source as myself and with whom I have been politically close for many years, was ordered to join the Greek uprising. General Stein (Ferhad Pasha), also a member of our party, was sent to Anatolia. As for the plan of rapprochement with Sefer Pasha, it succeeded, and very soon I gained his full confidence. Having won this trust, I could already easily follow my instructions and carry them out ... I convinced Sefer Pasha that after the war Circassia would be returned to the rule of the Sultan ... I proved to the Turkish commanders that any offensive operations of their troops would be dangerous, because the Circassians ... in a critical the moment they leave. Circumstances favored me, and although the Russians sent their troops into the theater of operations, leaving their borders unprotected, they still did not suffer any serious raids by the Circassians. I regularly sent reports to my political leaders about my covert actions... At the same time, I came across people and circumstances that counteracted my plans. I mean the arrival in Anapa of the British Consul, Mr. Longworth. Mr. Longworth had an order to force Sefer Pasha to organize a detachment of 6,000 Circassians at the expense of Great Britain and send him to the Crimea ... I received a similar order from the Turkish authorities, but at the same time my secret leaders sent me the most decisive order to make every effort to to nullify the mission of the British Consul... In a conversation I had with Mr. Longworth... I asked for a position in the British Army with the rank of colonel or the sum of 10,000 pounds sterling... Mr. Longworth thought to win me over to his side , offering me 50,000 piastres ... My intrigue was crowned with success. Prince Sefer, so many times deceived by empty promises, had a suspicion, and he flatly refused the consul to do what he demanded of his people ... At this time, I made an enemy in the face of Prince Ibrahim Karabatyr, the son of Sefer Pasha, who was appointed command 6,000 Circassians...

On March 21, 1856, Sefer Pasha informed me that the National Assembly decided to send a deputation to the Turkish, French and British governments to ask them for the reunification of Circassia with Turkey. I managed to get Sefer Pasha to include me in this deputation... On my arrival in Constantinople... I presented my political friends and Kossuth with a detailed report on the situation in Circassia... In response, I received instructions that I should contact Colonel Türr and General Stein and worked together with them, attracting as many Hungarians as possible. At that we At some point, I established contact with Ismail Pasha, the head of the post office of the Ottoman Empire, a Circassian by birth, who seemed to me a patriot capable of making sacrifices for his homeland. I consulted with him about the way in which we could send weapons, ammunition, tools for gunsmiths to Circassia, and also send good officers and artisans there. But the real plan of the expedition was drawn up by General Stein, Colonel Türr and myself. Captain Frankini, military secretary of the Russian envoy, was present at several of our meetings. Our goal was to lure Circassia to the side of the Russians in a peaceful, slow, but sure way ... If it were possible to subordinate Circassia to my and General Stein's leadership, then our plan would have to be as follows:

1) elect some local prince who would subordinate the whole country to his control;

2) to convince the Circassians that they have nothing to expect help from either the Sultan or any other power;

3) to demoralize the highlanders with military defeats - defeats deliberate and prepared in advance;

4) to ensure that they recognize the tsar as their nominal supreme sovereign, to whom they do not pay any tribute, but whose garrisons they allow into their country ... This prince was supposed to be surrounded by Hungarians brought to Circassia; the most capable of them had to be appointed to important posts... Captain Frankini assured me that Russia was seeking only formal submission... signs of imperial favour, money and Russian orders had to do the rest...

On September 22, 1856, Ismail Pasha advised me to recruit several hundred Poles to serve in Circassia, who were in the barracks in Scutari and had previously served in the Zamoyski legion ... This proposal was not part of our plans, but it was inconvenient to reject it ... I knew earlier -on Lapinsky, who at one time served with distinction in Hungary ... He lived in Scutari ... We agreed with General Stein that the best thing would be to recruit Colonel Lapinsky, who had absolute confidence in me ... On September 24, I notified Colonel Lapinsky by letter that the Circassian patriots instruct him to form a Circassian-Polish corps. In response, the colonel demanded weapons and uniforms for 700 Poles ... Later, at a meeting attended by General Stein, Türr, Frankini and I, it was decided that Türr would go to England to buy tools and machines for making cartridges, but that he would put off sending any weapons for the time being. We wanted to check the Poles before giving them weapons... The serious objections of Colonel Lapinsky... forced me to hasten my departure, although I did not have the opportunity to take with me the Hungarian officers recruited by me... In January 1857 I received letters and instructions from Kossuth and from my other political friends. My plan was approved ... Shortly before my departure, General Stein and I pretended that there had been a chill between us. I wanted to postpone my departure still, in order to enable a few Hungarians to go with me, however, Captain Franchini declared that it was impossible to lose a single day, because our expedition was already being talked about all over Constantinople, and if the Russian embassy does not intervene in this matter, then it can be accused of complicity. On February 15, Colonel Lapinsky boarded the English steamer Kangaroo. I also boarded a steamboat... Upon arrival at Dob (the Russians call it Kabardinsk) I sent letters to Sefer Pasha, Naib and other tribal leaders; in these letters, I announced that I was sent by His Imperial Majesty the Sultan to command the military forces of Circassia ... The behavior of Colonel Lapinsky did not inspire much confidence in me ... A few weeks after the arrival of the Polish detachment in Shapsuho (the Russians call it Fort Tenginsky), the residence of Sefer Pasha, Mr. Römer arrived at Dob in a brig loaded with arms and ammunition which we had left in the Bosporus... The sudden Russian invasion in May through the Atakum gathered thousands of Circassian warriors from all parts of the country. For the first time, the Circassians saw their own artillery successfully attacking the Russians. Although this battle in itself was not serious, however, it gave importance to the Polish detachment and me ... I used this mood of the Circassians in order to complete my task; I spoke publicly as an envoy of the Sultan; I demanded obedience ... Later I learned that Colonel Lapinsky tried his best to destroy my plans ... I tried to gain supporters among the officers and soldiers of his detachment, and, since the situation of the latter was critical, I attributed the blame for this to the commander ... The capture by the Russian ship of several sandals in the ports of Sudzhuk and Gelendzhik gave me an excuse to remove the colonel to some distance from the theater of war near Atakum and completely isolate him ... A few days later I received a letter from Colonel Lapinsky in which he said that there were no military forces in Gelendzhik and that to hold the position he is not in a position to... I personally went to Gelendzhik, and Colonel Lapinsky on the spot explained to me the danger of his position and the inevitability of an attack by the Russians. Nine days later, his prediction came true...

The excitement that I maintained among the officers and soldiers in Aderby during and after the disaster in Gelendzhik was only a consequence of my decision to sow discord between Colonel Lapinsky and his detachment ... Through my emissaries, I started a rumor among the Circassians that the colonel had sold guns to the Russians ... I I was deceived by the colonel, I was deceived by his feigned sincerity, but, as it turned out, he watched me with more vigilance than ever before ...

According to the instructions given to me, I was to establish relations with the Russian general... My anonymous letter, which is now in the hands of the commission, was to serve as the beginning of a permanent correspondence, but due to the stupidity of the Russian commander, it fell into your hands...

Suddenly, Colonel Lapinsky dropped his mask and, bluntly announcing to me in the house of Sefer Pasha that he did not recognize me as either his boss or the commander of the Circassian troops, broke off all relations with me ... and also gave an order in this sense to his Polish detachment. I tried to remove him from his post with another order for the detachment, addressed to the soldiers, but my efforts were in vain ...

(Signature) Mehmed Bay"

(No. 5) Janos Bandya's letter to General Philipson.

“Is it not in the interests of Russia to pacify Circassia? It is possible, at the cost of enormous sacrifices, to take possession of the plains of Circassia for a short time, but it will never be possible to conquer the mountains and natural fortresses. Russian guns have lost their significance. Circassian artillery will successfully respond to Russian. The Circassians are no longer the same as they were five years ago; supported by a small regular army, they fight as well as the Russian troops, and will fight to the last man for their faith and their fatherland. Wouldn't it be better to give the Circassians something like an imaginary freedom, establish the power of some national prince in Circassia and keep this prince under the protection of the Russian Tsar? In a word, to turn Circassia into a second Georgia or into something similar? If Circassia is closely connected with Russia, roads to Anatolia and India will be opened for Russians. Sapienti sat [For the wise enough. Ed.]. On this basis, negotiations could begin. Think it over and give an answer."

“Having heard the confessions of Colonel Mehmed Bey at the sessions of January 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 11, and having heard the testimony of witnesses at the session on January 9, the military court at its today’s session announces Mehmed Bey, by virtue of his confession and the testimony of witnesses , convicted of treason to the country and in secret correspondence with the enemy, declares him deprived of honor and military rank in this country and sentences him to death - unanimously.

Signatures: Jakub Beckert, private; Philip Terteltaub, bombardier; Matej Bedneyzek, sergeant; Otto Linovsky, gunner; Francitec Stock, second lieutenant; Anthony Kryshchevich, second lieutenant; Michal Marecki, lieutenant; Leon Zavadsky, gunner; Stanislav Tantskovsky, lance corporal; Jan Gamanisky, sergeant; Alexander Mikhitsky, staff Sergeant; Kazimir Vystotsky, second lieutenant; Jozef Aranoski, lieutenant; Petr Stankevich, captain; Theophilus Lapinsky, colonel."

We can only add to the above documents that Sefer Pasha did not want to carry out the death sentence on a man who had the rank of colonel in the army of the Sultan, and therefore he sent him under escort to Trebizond. The Hungarians who lived in Constantinople declared that the message about the betrayal of Mehmed Bey was pure slander; however, the Polish officers immediately protested this statement and threatened, if necessary, to publish documents related to this case. Above, we have quoted these documents, because they undoubtedly represent an extremely curious contribution to the history of the Circassian war.

Regarding the behavior of the Russian embassy during this case, we can also cite the following facts. It was well known in Constantinople that the Kangaroo was chartered to transport troops and military supplies to Circassia. However, the Russian embassy did not say a word to the Port about this expedition; but on the very day that the Kangaroo left the Bosporus, the Russian ambassador sent a protest to the Porte and obtained an appointment for an investigation in order to discover the initiators of this expedition. The embassy strained every effort to involve Count Zamoyski, who at that time was in Constantinople, in the matter, but suffered a complete fiasco. Then, apparently at the request of Russia, General Stein and Ismail Pasha were sent into exile for participating in this story. After several months of exile, on the occasion of some holiday in the Russian imperial family, General Stein and Ismail Pasha, again at the request of the Russian ambassador, were allowed to return to Constantinople.

Printed according to the text of the newspaper

Translation from English

For two months, from August to October 1929, the attention of the whole country was riveted to the "fish capital of the Soviet Union." That was the name of our beloved Astrakhan in those days. Here, in the building of the Winter Drama Theater, a trial took place, which was called "Astrakhan".

How it all began

The palm of honor in identifying and eliminating crimes was given by official propaganda to our beloved ones - the press. The campaign of “self-criticism” was just growing in the country, encouraging the exposure of bureaucrats, red tape, embezzlers ... Newspapers and numerous freelance special correspondents who uncovered outrages “regardless of faces” were the heroes of the day. In November 1928, the Astrakhan district department of the OGPU received a statement from the owner of the Glass company, Akim Sitnikov, in which he reported that his former partner Alexander Bondakov had bribed tax officials. Among the bribe givers were also the owners of the large Volgar trading company, Kalinin and Batuev. After that, arrests began, which grew like a snowball.

What were they accused of

Officially, the defendants were told that they were being taken into custody on suspicion of committing crimes under Articles 117 and 118 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (giving and receiving bribes). However, almost immediately the idea arose to turn the usual criminal process into a political one. The decision to give the case a political character was taken at the highest level. On May 27, 1929, at a special meeting of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Vyacheslav Molotov said: “It seems to me that with regard to the Astrakhan case, it must be said that this is a deeply political matter.”

According to the prosecution, officials of the tax apparatus of the financial department for bribes reduced the amount of taxation, and employees of the trade department, again for bribes, provided individual private fishing enterprises with raw fish processing rates that significantly exceeded the limits set by the central economic authorities.

The central figure along the line of the financial department was Anatoly Adamov, who in 1925-1927. was chairman of the provincial tax commission. Among the inspectors, Ivan Semikov stood out in particular - 16 episodes of bribery were established on him with a fabulous sum of more than 7 thousand rubles at that time (the average monthly salary was then 20 rubles). As for the trade department, Alexander Pankov, who headed the department in 1926-1928, as well as his successor in this position, Valentin Protodyakonov, were the main figures here.

The largest group of defendants - 71 people - were those who were called "Nepmen". This is how Soviet propaganda painted the image of the “Nepman”.

“The GUBFO took everything…

A vivid example of this is Inspector Belyanin. Arriving in Astrakhan in 1925, he immediately fell into the arms of the owners of the Volgar-Vozrozhdenie grocery and flour company. The firm took "its" inspector on full board. The companions not only took on the expenses of Belyanin's living in the city center, but, given the weakness of the 28-year-old inspector for the fair sex, they contracted to support his passion, generously paying for her spending on ladies' outfits. One of the co-owners of the Volgar-Vozrozhdenie company, in his testimony during the investigation, said that the head of the enterprise Batuev, reporting at meetings with partners on the affairs of the company, among other expenses, invariably mentioned such an expense item as "On Belyanina".

Theoretically, it was possible to appeal against the arbitrariness of tax officials to the Provincial Tax Commission. However, its chairman Adamov himself did not shun money offerings and admitted that "this whole history of checking books, in the end, was nothing more than a pretext for receiving bribes."

In the house of correction

The essential question is to what extent were the confessions of the accused voluntary?

A very interesting document has been preserved on this score. This is the case of Lev Keller, a student at the Astrakhan Medical Institute. For a week he was kept in the Astrakhan district correctional house, and when he was released, he shared his impressions with fellow students. The young man told his friends how the investigations into the cases of the “Astrakhan region” are being conducted. “The regime in Ispravdom is murderous, the prisoners are mocked, put in quarantine on the bare stone floor. In the Correctional House, designed for 300 people, 800 sit, stuffed like herrings in a barrel, they are not allowed to go for walks ... Our investigative bodies use methods of torture. In order to extract evidence, the prisoner was smashed in the head with the handle of a revolver, pressed against the wall and threatened with execution ... Protodyakonov was shot with a revolver, investigator Kozlov hit one of the defendants in the face.

Soon Keller paid for the "long tongue". He was again taken into custody, accused of spreading rumors of "discrediting employees of the prosecutor's office."

Kirov's comrade-in-arms kept a brothel

This case was hastily added to the process and gave it a special "flavor". It turned out that the cashier-collector of the cooperative Tatyana Alekseeva, a member of the party since 1917, a cocaine lover, an associate of Kirov and Agabekov during their rule in Astrakhan, kept an elite brothel in her “house on the Embankment”, where local leaders liked to come to rest from the labors of the righteous comrades.

In a certificate drawn up for the investigation, organized collective orgies were described in the following terms: “Sexual intercourse took place in front of everyone, objects from both the male and female sides alternated with each other. Women got drunk drunk, lay naked on the floor, whoever wants, he took them, or arranged over them the excesses he desired and what his depraved imagination dictated to him ... ".

A long list was also attached - 53 people - regulars of the brothel. Among those who are mentioned there are practically the entire board of the Astrakhan CRC, headed by its chairman Sokolov, the heads of the labor exchange and the provincial health department, members of the district party committee and secretaries of district committees, as well as the chairman of the Astrakhan provincial court Glazkov and his deputy Kalinkin, assistants to the provincial prosecutor Chernyaev and Nasyrov .

In the wake of the scandal, personal scores began to settle. So, a certain Cherkasova considered it her duty to tell “about such persons who, for the sake of their animal carnal needs, sell the interests of the proletariat.” A vigilant scammer, reporting about her neighbor, wrote that she “changed dozens of men, satisfying her lusts in the most ugly form, mainly with an element alien to the proletariat: merchants, Armenians, Georgians, Persians.” Further, she pointed out that "this thing, not content with this, has recently got itself a real Cossack, it seems that in the past an active White Guard."

It was the scandalous episode associated with Alekseeva's brothel that was then inflated and savored in every possible way, which is why for many years it became a kind of visiting card of the Astrakhan region.

Court and sentence

The trial began on August 27 in the building of the Winter Drama Theatre. The first ten rows of stalls were taken under the dock.

On the first day, the defendants were escorted on foot from the correctional labor house (now Detention Center No. 1, known to Astrakhan residents as the "White Swan") to the theater.

Almost every day throughout the process, the regional and district press published angry letters and resolutions from various enterprises, organizations and individuals demanding that all the accused be severely punished. The children were not far behind the adults either. Pioneer Vanya Golyankin, on behalf of his young peers, demanded with unchildish ferocity: “Those who are accused of economic counter-revolution should be shot without any rigmarole, and the rest should be nailed to prison!” The apotheosis was a demonstration of many thousands organized by the authorities. Columns of people walked along Sovetskaya Street past the Winter Theater, carrying banners with the inscriptions of the shooting gallery "Renegades - to be shot!", Chanting: "Death to pests!"

The prosecution demanded the death penalty for 21 defendants. The court limited itself to fourteen. The rest were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment - from 3 to 10 years. Seven people, according to an incomprehensible and happy logic for them, were acquitted.

Every time when Azeev, who presided at the trial, called the name of the person sentenced to death, the hall exploded with applause. At the end, all those present sang the "Internationale". It looks like a mystery that the All-Russian Central Executive Committee pardoned Pankov. In 1932, the sentence against him was quietly canceled "due to insufficient evidence collected." The rest were shot on the night of December 11-12, 1929.

http://evgeniy-zarinsh.livejournal.com/14489.html

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A very remarkable document is stored in Stalin's personal fund in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History. On March 8, 1953, a message was sent to the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Nikolai Mikhailov, signed by the chairman of the Committee on Radio Information under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Alexei Puzin. It was the Allied broadcasting program for March 9, the day of Stalin's funeral. Our readers with experience remember that during the days of the funeral of Soviet leaders, who died one after another in the first half of the 1980s, various classical music was broadcast on the radio. And what could the citizens of the USSR hear on the day when the mortal body of Joseph Vissarionovich was laid next to Lenin?

It all started, as usual, with the striking of the clock. We call the tower with chimes Spasskaya, but in the text of the radio program it is called “Kremlin” for some reason. Then came the anthem of the Soviet Union, the same one, of the 1943 model, with the words “Stalin raised us - he inspired us to be loyal to the people, to work and to exploits.” Well, after the anthem, mourning programs of the “conversational genre” began. Naturally, there were no "live" responses and messages, they were read by the announcer. In the first hour - 20 minutes of "responses", 35 minutes of music by Tchaikovsky and Rachmaninoff. From 7 to 7.15 “responses”, then 45 minutes of music (the French-Belgian composer Cesar Franck was added to the “domestic” Tchaikovsky, Rachmaninoff and Kabalevsky). From 8 o'clock the broadcasting grid changes. Half an hour - the editorial of Pravda and articles from other newspapers, 15 minutes of Rachmaninoff and again newspapers (this time 15 minutes). And from 9 to 9.30 there was some kind of musical pluralism: here you have Chopin, and Schumann, and Grieg, and the composer Arakhishvili. Well, Rachmaninov, where without him?

At half past nine, a report from the Hall of Columns began. The word "report" is not entirely appropriate here. The program contains all the reprises that the announcer should read against the background of music from the Hall of Columns (a live orchestra played there and the choir sang). The texts of the reprises were approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU, and fees were paid for them ... “The last minutes of farewell are inexpressibly difficult”, “In these moments of farewell, the whole depth of the grief that has befallen the country is especially acutely felt”, “The leaders of the party and government, members of the commission for organizing the funeral approach the pedestal , pick up the coffin with the body of Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin and slowly head towards the exit from the Hall of Columns ... "

Then, when the coffin had already been taken out and rearranged on a gun carriage (in the text - an artillery carriage), music from the studio sounded on the radio: Schumann, Tchaikovsky, Mozart, Beethoven, Borodin and Chopin ("Funeral March", naturally).

And then again the reprises, prepared in advance and pronounced by the soulful voice of Yuri Levitan. Further - the broadcast of speeches at the rally, a commentary on the placement of Stalin's body in the Mausoleum and a story about the march of the Moscow garrison units.

From 12.20 the program is broadcast from the studio: “Marches and heroic music”. There are only Russian and Soviet composers. And until 16.10 no “foreignness”. Then for 50 minutes Schubert with Chopin, and again until 11 pm only Rachmaninov, Glinka, Myaskovsky, Taneyev, Glazunov, Tchaikovsky, etc. One interesting detail: the great composer Sergei Prokofiev, like Stalin, died on March 5, 1953, and also from a hypertensive crisis. He died in a communal apartment in Kamergersky lane, being practically in disgrace, after the Central Committee recognized his music as “alien to the Soviet people”. And the only tribute to his memory was the first part of his Seventh Symphony, broadcast on March 8 in the mourning program of the All-Union Radio. How the decision was made to put this work on the radio broadcasting network on the day of Stalin's funeral, we will most likely never know ...

Already late in the evening before the Latest News, which was broadcast at 23.30, a couple of things by Frank and Grieg went on, then there were Rachmaninoff and Arensky, at ten minutes to the hour (the broadcast usually ended at midnight) the Latest News was again broadcast. But after one in the morning, “Melodies and Rhythms of Foreign Classics” went on - Mozart and Beethoven sounded. And (I see in this the political short-sightedness of radio officials) - no USSR anthem at the end of the program! After the death of Stalin, the USSR fell asleep to the overture of “Leonore No. 3” by Ludwig van Beethoven!

The most curious thing is that on the day of Stalin's funeral, it seems that an "ideological sabotage" was committed. The archive contains a letter from a certain citizen to the Ministry of State Security, which claims that during the broadcast of one of the musical fragments on that day of mourning, a phrase was heard in English. The investigation, which was organized by the MGB, apparently did not bring any results. In any case, we could not find any materials on the development of this situation. And before her, were the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee after the funeral? They already shared power...

Vladislav Surkov. It allegedly contained a plan of measures to destabilize the socio-political situation in Ukraine and a document on the creation of a republic on the territory of Transcarpathia.

The documents are posted on the site "Cyber ​​Junta".

In the first of them, the need for destabilization is justified by the fact that Ukraine must be forced to return the Donbass to its composition on Russia's terms. The purpose of destabilization is early parliamentary and presidential elections, the timing of measures is November 2016-March 2017.

Among the proposed measures are negotiations with opposition parties (Oppoblok, Batkivshchyna, Lyashko's Radical Party) on the subject of organizing a "nationwide protest - Tariff Maidan" in the second half of November.

Also, to build up public opinion, it is proposed to "use blindly" people's deputies Mustafa Nayem, Sergey Leshchenko, Svetlana Zalishchuk and Olga Chervakova. They are allegedly supposed to leak data for "large-scale investigations into the corrupt activities of Poroshenko's team." For the same purposes, it is proposed to involve public figures and journalists Vitaly Shabunin, Dmitry Gnap, Denis Bigus, Alexander Dubinsky and Alexei Shalaysky.

It is also planned to introduce their own people into the environment of volunteers in order to sow panic; conduct religious processions; develop separatism in the regions.

I have not downloaded everything, those who wish to get acquainted with the full set can look at the link

I will say right away that I have certain doubts. Because the document looks like ideal material for discrediting all Poroshenko's oppositionists: the OppoBlok, the Batkivshchyna and the Young Reformers.

There is also a document on Transcarpathia, which I do not presume to comment on. If the young reformers are proposed to be used in the dark, then after all, hackers could well be used in the dark. But I find it hard to believe that, according to Surkov, the only object of attack should be Poroshenko.

Saved

Vladislav Surkov. It allegedly contained a plan of measures to destabilize the socio-political situation in Ukraine and a document on the creation of a republic on the territory of Transcarpathia. The documents are posted on the site "Cyber ​​Junta". The first of them substantiates the need for destabilization by the fact that ...

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Description

Bakashevo is a village in the Batyrevsky district of Chuvashia, part of the Bolshechemenevsky rural settlement.

the village of Bakashevo (Turi Chaka - in the past of the Tarkhanovskaya volost of the Buinsky district of the Simbirsk province). A very curious document has been preserved, clarifying the circumstances of the emergence of the village. It is cited in his book "Chuvashia in the era of feudalism" by Academician V.D. Dmitriev. He writes: "Judging by the fact that the Chuvash peasants who moved to the wild field were perfectly oriented in this area, remembered the names of rivers, fields, tracts - the names, by the way, were Chuvash everywhere - it can be argued that some villages of the north- In the eastern, central and northern regions of Chuvashia, their former locations in the southeastern and southern regions were not forgotten (this applies, in particular, to the village of Bakashevo). Ch. Karachanov, Kh. mowing in a wild field behind a notch on the Khirsherme River on both sides of the Kurukata on a dry enemy, along a birch bush near the Chuvash Syundyur volosts, and from old times this land and the hay mowing of their grandfathers’ fathers, and now it lies in vain, in dues and from yasak not given to no one and do not own it either who." Under such circumstances, the village of Bakashevo arose.

Organizations

Bakashevsky Rural House of Culture. It was located in the building of the church, where the Bolshechemenevsky rural House of Culture is located (the building was two-story, wooden). The building burned down. In 1962, a House of Culture was built on the site of a school (4-classroom) in Bakashevo. In 1990, the House of Culture burned down in a fire. In 1997, a new one-story brick building of the rural House of Culture was built.