By the garrison of the Petrograd district to all soldiers of the guard, army, artillery and navy for immediate and precise execution, and to the workers of Petrograd for information.
The Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies decided:
1) In all companies, battalions, regiments, parks, batteries, squadrons and individual services of various military directorates and on ships of the navy, immediately select committees from elected representatives from the lower ranks of the above military units.
2) In all military units that have not yet elected their representatives to the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, elect one representative from the companies, who will appear with written certificates in the building of the State Duma by 10 o'clock in the morning on March 2.
3) In all its political actions, the military unit is subordinate to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and its committees.
4) The orders of the military commission of the State Duma should be carried out, except in cases where they contradict the orders and resolutions of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.
5) All kinds of weapons, such as: rifles, machine guns, armored vehicles, etc., must be at the disposal and under the control of company and battalion committees and in no case be issued to officers even at their request.
6) In the ranks and in the performance of official duties, soldiers must observe the strictest military discipline, but outside the service and in formation in their political, general civil and private life, soldiers cannot be diminished in any way in those rights that all citizens enjoy. In particular, rising to the front and the obligatory salute outside the service are canceled.
7) The title of officers is also canceled: Your Excellency, Nobleness, etc., and is replaced by the appeal: Mr. General, Mr. Colonel, etc.
Rough treatment of soldiers of all military ranks and, in particular, addressing them as “you” is prohibited, and any violation of this, as well as all misunderstandings between officers and soldiers, must be brought to the attention of the company committees.
Read this order in all companies, battalions, regiments, crews, batteries and other combat and non-combat teams.
Petrogradsky workers' council and soldiers' deputies
Proceedings of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers
Declaration of the Provisional Government on its composition and tasks
March 3, 1917
Citizens!
The Provisional Committee of the members of the State Duma, with the assistance and sympathy of the capital's troops and the population, has now achieved such a degree of success over the dark forces of the old regime that it allows it to proceed to a more stable organization of executive power.
For this purpose, the Provisional Committee of the State Duma appoints the following persons as ministers of the first public cabinet, the confidence in which the country has been ensured by their past social and political activities.
Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Interior
Prince G.E. Lvov.
Minister of Foreign Affairs - P.N. Milyukov.
Minister of War and Naval - A. I. Guchkov.
Minister of Railways - N.V. Nekrasov.
Minister of Trade and Industry - AI Konovalov.
Minister of Finance - M.I. Tereshchenko.
Minister of Education - A. A. Manuilov.
[Chief Prosecutor] of the Holy Synod - V.L. Lvov.
Minister of Agriculture - A. I. Shingarev.
Minister of Justice - A.F. Kerensky.
In its present activities, the Cabinet will be guided by the following principles:
1) Full and immediate amnesty for all political and religious cases, including: terrorist attacks, military uprisings and agrarian crimes, etc.
2) Freedom of speech, press, unions, meetings and strikes, with the extension of political freedoms to military personnel within the limits allowed by military technical conditions.
3) Cancellation of all class, religious and national restrictions.
4) Immediate preparations for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly on the basis of a universal, equal, secret and direct vote, which will establish the form of government and the constitution of the country.
5) Replacing the police with a people's militia with elected leaders subordinate to local self-government bodies.
6) Elections to local self-government bodies based on universal, direct, equal and secret suffrage.
7) Non-disarmament and non-withdrawal from Petrograd of military units that took part in the revolutionary movement.
8) While maintaining strict military discipline in the ranks and in the performance of military service - the elimination for soldiers of all restrictions in the use of public rights granted to all other citizens.
The Provisional Government considers it its duty to add that it does not at all intend to take advantage of military circumstances for any delay in the implementation of the above reforms and measures.
Chairman of the State Duma M. Rodzianko.
Chairman of the Council of Ministers book. Lvov. Ministers:
Milyukov, Nekrasov, Manuilov, Konovalov,
Tereshchenko, V. Lvov, Shingarev, Kerensky.
Proceedings of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and
Kostyaev Eduard Valentinovich– Candidate of History, Associate Professor of the Department of the History of the Fatherland and Culture of the Saratov State TechnicalUniversity. Yu.A. Gagarin
T The topic of making any decisions by power structures that affect the state of the armed forces of the state and are capable of strengthening or weakening its defense capability is also relevant at the present time. The negative consequences of the military reform of the late 1980s are still well remembered. of the last century, and we can observe with our own eyes the cleansing of the Augean stables currently being carried out by the Minister of Defense Shoigu - the solution to the numerous problems of our army left by his predecessors. This indicates with what caution one must take decisions on the reform of the armed forces, because if they are ill-considered, they can very quickly weaken the defense capability of the state and thus endanger its independence and sovereignty.
In our history, there has already been a vivid example of how a decision made in the conditions of euphoria after the victory of the February Revolution from the good intentions of democratizing the army paved, among other factors, the road to hell - led to Russia's inglorious exit from the First World War on the humiliating conditions of Brest- Lithuanian peace treaty. The Social Democrats, who then played the first roles in the new power structures, were directly involved in the development, adoption, and practical implementation of the notorious Order No. 1 of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies (Petrosoviet). But, unfortunately, in the historical literature this topic is either undeservedly bypassed [Tyutyukin 1994: 253-260; Tyutyukin 2000: 241-242; Political History… 1993: 22-25; Basil 1984: 26-35; Miller 1994:57-69; Galili 1994: 77-78], or is honored with brief mentions in order to point out the significant influence of the soldiers' representatives on the appearance of this document. The specific role that the Social Democrats played in the process of its development and implementation is not reported. Filling this gap in historiography is the task of this article.
Such well-known "defencists" as the Menshevik Semyon Klivansky and the non-factional Social Democrat Nikolai Sokolov took an active part in the development and editing of Order No. 1, issued on March 1, 1917 by the Council "for the garrison of the Petrograd district to all soldiers of the guard, army, artillery and navy for immediate and precise execution, and for the workers of Petrograd for information. According to it, soldiers were equalized in rights with officers, rude treatment of the lower ranks was prohibited (in particular, “poking”), traditional forms of army subordination were canceled (for example, standing up to the front and the obligatory salute of honor by soldiers to officers during off-duty hours), soldier committees were legalized , the election of commanders was introduced, the army was allowed to conduct political activities. The Petrograd garrison was subordinate to the Soviet and was obliged to carry out only its orders [Denikin 2003: 169-170].
According to the memoirs of the Mensheviks Zaslavsky and Kantorovich, at that time (March 1, 1917) as the executive committee (executive committee) of the Petrograd Soviet was busy with the question of attitude towards the Provisional Government, a noisy meeting of soldiers was going on in the next room, chaired by Sokolov. There were no "prominent and responsible figures" of the executive committee, and Klivansky commanded the attention of the soldiers more than others. The meeting was under the impression of rumors about the beginning of the disarmament of the soldiers, about the menacing behavior of the officers. At the suggestion of Klivansky, the following measures were planned:
“1) Immediately suggest ... the soldiers not to issue weapons to anyone. 2) Offer. soldiers to immediately elect representatives to the Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies. 3) Offer. soldiers to obey in their political speeches only to the Council. 4) Offer. soldiers, submitting to officers at the front, at the same time consider them equal citizens outside the front.
To these planned Klivan measures, the meeting added its own: “the choice of company and battalion committees that would manage all the internal order of the regiments; subordination of the military commission only as long as its orders do not diverge from the decisions of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, ”etc. Sokolov led the commission, but there was essentially no leadership. The appeal was given the appearance of an order. It was composed by several people on the instructions of the meeting, where unknown soldiers came to the podium, made proposals, one more radical than the other, and left with loud applause. It would be a mistake to look for the individual author of this work, who received historical fame under the name of “Order No. 1”. It was made up of an impersonal mass of soldiers. [Zaslavsky, Kantorovich 1924: 50-51].
The reaction of soldiers and officers to the appearance of Order No. 1 was the opposite. The first, as Shlyapnikov wrote, were "beside themselves with delight" [Shlyapnikov 1992: 190-191]. We observe a different reaction to its content among the higher officers. According to Denikin, Order No. 1 gave “the first, main impetus to the collapse of the army” [Denikin 2003: 169], and General Krasnov wrote that “the Peace of Brest was an inevitable consequence of Order No. 1 and the destruction of the army” [Krasnov 1991: 103]. General Lukomsky also noted that Order No. 1 “undermined discipline, depriving the officer command staff. power over soldiers” [Lukomsky 1991: 30].
As a result, on June 21, 1917, the soldiers of the 703rd Surami Regiment of the 10th Army of the Western Front “thanked” their defender Sokolov, who came to “fight the darkness of ignorance and moral decay that manifested itself in this regiment”, by the fact that the editor of Order No. 1 and "the creator of the new army system" was beaten half to death and arrested by them when he tried "on behalf of the Soviet. call on the regiment to fulfill its duty and participate in the offensive” [Denikin 2003: 488, 519].
Anticipating the negative consequences of the spread of Order No. 1 at the front, on March 5, 1917, the executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet hastened to publish an explanation on its application: “This explanation,” we read from Zaslavsky and Kantorovich, “called Order No. 2, concerned. the question of the election of command personnel, which was resolved in the negative sense; in addition, it was finally established that order No. 1 was applicable only within the Petrograd garrison and to the front. cannot spread. This clarification significantly weakened the initial impression caused by Order No. 1, but nevertheless, a psychological atmosphere of hostility and distrust in the circles of senior officers was created, and it was already difficult to dispel it. 2 days after Order No. 2, the executive committee again addressed with a brief explanation-appeal to the troops, in which attention was drawn to the observance of discipline. Among others, the appeal was signed by Menshevik Matvey Skobelev, deputy chairman of the Petrosoviet [Zaslavsky, Kantorovich 1924: 74]. However, according to Denikin, Order No. 2 was not distributed among the troops and did not affect "the course of events brought to life by Order No. 1" [Denikin 2003: 173].
On May 4, 1917, a meeting was held in the Mariinsky Palace under the chairmanship of Prince Lvov, in which all members of the Provisional Government and the executive committee of the Petrosoviet took part, on the one hand, and on the other, the Supreme Commander Alekseev and the commanders-in-chief of the fronts: Western - Gurko, South-Western - Brusilov, Northern - Dragomirov and Romanian - Shcherbachev. When General Alekseev directly told the meeting participants that the army was “on the verge of destruction” and the beginning of its disintegration was laid by Order No. 1, Skobelev stood up to defend the latter, declaring: “Order No. 1 might become clear to you if you imagined the situation in which it was published. In front of the Soviet was an unorganized mass of soldiers who went over to the side of the revolution and were abandoned by their officers. In conditions when the victory of the revolution had not yet been ensured, Order No. 1 ordered ... elected soldiers' committees to take control of the weapons of military units and in no case give them to officers if they so demand. What was the reason for such a measure? The fact that at the moment the soldiers went over to the side of the insurgent people, all the officers of the Petrograd garrison left the regiments and disappeared. It is easy to understand that this behavior of the officers, in the midst of a life-and-death struggle between the old regime and the revolution, caused alarm in the Soviet as well as among the soldiers. There was a fear that the officers would find forces obedient to them and make an attempt to disarm the revolutionary regiments. Could the Council, under these conditions, not take the measures that it took? But even under these conditions, the Council did not forget to remind the soldiers of their military duty and included in Order No. 1 the prescription that in the ranks and in the performance of military duties, soldiers must observe the strictest military discipline” [Tsereteli 1963: 407, 409].
However, General Denikin still believed that the Soviet deliberately destroyed discipline in the army by Order No. 1, "humiliating and depersonalizing the command staff" [Denikin 2003: 223]. As evidence, he cited the words of Skobelev: “In the troops that overthrew the old regime, the command staff did not join the rebels and, in order to deprive him of his significance, we were forced to issue order No. 1.” [Denikin 2003: 374]. Even more sincere, according to Denikin, was the non-factional Social Democrat Joseph Goldenberg, who declared: “Order No. 1 is not a mistake, but a necessity. It was not edited by Sokolov; it is the unanimous expression of the will of the Council. The day we "made the revolution" we realized that if the old army was not destroyed, it would crush the revolution. We had to choose between the army and the revolution. We did not hesitate: we made a decision in favor of the latter and used - I boldly affirm this - the appropriate means" [Denikin 2003: 172].
Thoughtlessly using this “proper means” for the sake of maximum democratization of the army of the victorious revolution, the Russian Social Democrats still did not calculate all the possible consequences of issuing Order No. war and huge territorial losses under the terms of the Brest Peace. This is a very clear indication to posterity of the need to take the most responsible and balanced approach to decisions concerning the fate of the armed forces of the state.
Literature
Galili Z. 1994. From a group of circles to the zenith of political influence. Documents of the Menshevik Party of the First Six Months of the Revolutionary 1917 -Mensheviks in 1917. T.1. January to July events. M. S. 70-105.
Denikin A. I. 2003. Essays on Russian Troubles: In 3 vols. T. 1. The collapse of power and the army (February - September 1917).M.: Iris-Press, 600 p.
Zaslavsky D.O., Kantorovich V.A. 1924.Chronicle of the February Revolution. T. 1. 1917 February - May. Pg.
Krasnov P.N. 1991. On the home front. -Archive of the Russian Revolution. In 22 vols. T. 1. M.
Lukomsky A. 1991. From the memories. -Archive of the Russian Revolution. In 22 t. T. 2. M.
Miller W. 1994. The Menshevik Party in 1917. Fragments of history in the assessments of a Russian researcher. -Mensheviks in 1917. In 3 vols. T. 1. Mensheviks in 1917: From January to July events. M.
Political history of Russia in parties and persons. 1993. M.: Terra.
Tyutyukin S.V. 1994. "Soft" Marxists: Mensheviks. -History of political parties in Russia(under the editorship of A.I. Zevelev). M.: Higher school.
Tyutyukin S.V. 2000. Mensheviks. -Political parties of Russia: history and modernity. M.: ROSSPEN.
Tyutyukin S.V. 2002. Menshevism: Pages of history. M.: ROSSPEN, 560 p.
Shlyapnikov A.G. 1992.The eve of the seventeenth year. Seventeenth year. In 3 books. T. 2: Seventeenth year.Book. 1-2. Moscow: Politizdat.
Tsereteli I.G. 1963. Memories of the February Revolution. Book. 2. Paris.
Basil J.D. 1984. The Mensheviks in the Revolution of 1917.Columbus, Ohio: Slavica Publishers.
Galili Z. 1989. The Menshevik Leaders in the Russian Revolution: Social Realities and Political Strategies.Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Wade R.A. 1969. The Russian Search for Peace. February - October 1917.Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Wade R.A. 2000. The Russian Revolution, 1917. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Appendix.
ORDER #1
PETROGRAD COBETA OF WORKERS AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES ON THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE ARMY.
March 1, 1917
Order No. 1 of the Petrograd Soviet was adopted on March 1, 1917, at a joint meeting of the workers' and soldiers' sections of the Soviet. D
By the garrison of the Petrograd district to all soldiers of the guard, army, artillery and navy for immediate and precise execution, and to the workers of Petrograd for information.
The Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies decided:
1) In all companies, battalions, regiments, parks, batteries, squadrons and individual services of various military directorates and on ships of the navy, immediately select committees from elected representatives from the lower ranks of the above military units.
2) In all military units that have not yet elected their representatives to the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, elect one representative from the companies, who will appear with written certificates in the building of the State Duma by 10 o'clock in the morning on March 2.
3) In all its political actions, the military unit is subordinate to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and its committees.
4) The orders of the military commission of the State Duma should be carried out, except in cases where they contradict the orders and resolutions of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.
5) All kinds of weapons, such as: rifles, machine guns, armored vehicles, etc., must be at the disposal and under the control of company and battalion committees and in no case be issued to officers even at their request.
6) In the ranks and in the performance of official duties, soldiers must observe the strictest military discipline, but outside the service and in formation in their political, general civil and private life, soldiers cannot be diminished in any way in those rights that all citizens enjoy. In particular, rising to the front and the obligatory salute outside the service are canceled.
7) The title of officers is also canceled: Your Excellency, Nobleness, etc., and is replaced by the appeal: Mr. General, Mr. Colonel, etc.
Rough treatment of soldiers of all military ranks and, in particular, addressing them as “you” is prohibited, and any violation of this, as well as all misunderstandings between officers and soldiers, the latter are obliged to bring to the attention of company commanders.
Read this order in all companies, battalions, regiments, crews, batteries and other combat and non-combat teams.
Reader on the history of the USSR. 1861-1917. M.. 1970. S. 528-529.
ORDER NО 1 OF THE PETROGRAD COUNCIL
the first after the victory of Feb. Revolution of 1917 order for the Petrograd garrison. military district, adopted on March 1 (14), 1917 at a joint meeting of the workers' and soldiers' sections of Petrograd. advice on the initiative and directly. the participation of the soldiers' deputies, who expressed indignation at the demands of Rodzianko and Milyukov for the disarmament of the revolutionaries. soldiers and returning them to the barracks. P. No. 1 was drafted by a commission elected by the Council (presiding officer N. D. Sokolov, member of the Council). Item No. 1 legitimized army committees (or Soviets) that had arisen spontaneously in the army. He found that military units in all political. speeches are subordinate to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and elected soldiers' committees; military orders. commissions of the State Dumas were ordered to be carried out only in those cases when they did not contradict the orders and resolutions of the Council. According to the order, the weapon was to be at the disposal and under the control of company and battalion kits and in no case be issued to officers. Thus, attempts were thwarted by the Provisional Committee of the State Duma to restore in parts unlimited. the power of the officers. The order endowed the soldier with civil. rights, put them on an equal footing with officers out of service and formation, forbade rough treatment of soldiers, canceled titles.
The effect of the order extended far beyond the garrison. He contributed to the democratization of the army and the organization of the soldier masses into an active political. strength. At the same time, P. No. 1 did not reflect the main requirement of the soldiers - the election of command personnel in the army; this was a manifestation of the conciliatory policy of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. However, despite the absence of a clause on election in the order, the soldiers pl. parts displaced reaction. officers, electing supporters of the revolution to command posts. On 4 (17) March, at a meeting of the soldiers' section of the Soviet, they demanded a decree on the election of commanders. But the conciliatory leadership of the Soviet, yielding to the pressure of the bourgeoisie and the generals, did not agree to expand the rights of the soldiers' committees. Order No. 2, adopted by the Council on March 5 (18), limited the effect of P. No. 1: it did not confirm the unconditional right of control of soldiers' kits over the use of weapons and strictly limited the effect of P. No. 1 to the limits of petrogr. garrison.
Published: Revolutionary. movement in Russia after the overthrow of the autocracy, M., 1957, p. 189-90.
Lit .: Vel. Oct. socialist. the revolution. Chronicle of events, vol. 1, M., 1957; Shlyapnikov A., Seventeenth year, vol. 1, M.-P., 1923; Miller, V., From the History of Order No. 1 of the Petrograd Soviet, "Military History Journal", 1966, No. 5; Drabkina F., Order No 2, "KA", 1929, No 6.
S. I. Sidorov. Moscow.
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Order text:
Order No. 1 of the Petrograd Soviet was adopted on March 1, 1917, at a joint meeting of the workers' and soldiers' sections of the Soviet. A special commission was formed to develop the order. It was headed by a member of the Executive Committee of the Petrosoviet N.D. Sokolov, who left interesting memoirs about how the text of the order was created.
By the garrison of the Petrograd district to all soldiers of the guard, army, artillery and navy for immediate and precise execution, and to the workers of Petrograd for information.
The Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies decided:
1) In all companies, battalions, regiments, parks, batteries, squadrons and individual services of various military directorates and on ships of the navy, immediately select committees from elected representatives from the lower ranks of the above military units.
2) In all military units that have not yet elected their representatives to the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, elect one representative from the companies, who will appear with written certificates in the building of the State Duma by 10 o'clock in the morning on March 2.
3) In all its political actions, the military unit is subordinate to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and its committees.
4) The orders of the military commission of the State Duma should be carried out, except in cases where they contradict the orders and resolutions of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.
5) All kinds of weapons, such as: rifles, machine guns, armored vehicles, etc., must be at the disposal and under the control of company and battalion committees and in no case be issued to officers even at their request.
6) In the ranks and in the performance of official duties, soldiers must observe the strictest military discipline, but outside the service and in formation in their political, general civil and private life, soldiers cannot be diminished in any way in those rights that all citizens enjoy. In particular, rising to the front and the obligatory salute outside the service are canceled.
7) The title of officers is also canceled: Your Excellency, Nobleness, etc., and is replaced by the appeal: Mr. General, Mr. Colonel, etc.
Rough treatment of soldiers of all military ranks and, in particular, addressing them as "you" is prohibited, and any violation of this, as well as all misunderstandings between officers and soldiers, the latter are obliged to bring to the attention of company commanders.
Read this order in all companies, battalions, regiments, crews, batteries and other combat and non-combat teams.
Conclusion: By agreement with the Petrograd Soviet, a radical democratization of the army was carried out. It was carried out on the basis of Order No. 1 of the Petrograd Soviet of March 1, 1917 for the garrison of the Petrograd Military District. The Petrograd Soviet decided to elect soldiers' committees in all divisions, units and on ships, to elect one representative from each company to the Council of Workers' Deputies, stressed that military units in all their political speeches are subordinate to the Council and their committees, and all orders of the military commission of the State Duma were subject to execution only if they did not contradict the orders and decisions of the Council. The soldiers were required to observe the strictest military discipline in the ranks and during the "dispatch of official duties", and outside the service and the ranks they could not be "diminished in those rights that all citizens enjoy." Order No. 1 abolished the titles of officers who were not allowed to issue weapons that were at the disposal and under the control of company and battalion committees. One of the members of the Petrosoviet, I. Goldenberg, subsequently admitted that Order No. 1 “is not a mistake, but a necessity,” since “we realized that if we do not crush the old army, then it will crush the revolution.” Despite the fact that the order applied only to the troops of the Petrograd garrison, it became widespread in the army and in the rear, causing the disintegration of the troops and a drop in their combat effectiveness. The military field courts were abolished in the army, the institute of commissars was introduced to control the activities of officers, about 150 senior ranks were dismissed into the reserve, including 70 division chiefs. By decree of March 12, the government abolished the death penalty, reinstating it on July 12, and established revolutionary military courts. The basic rights of military personnel were set out in the Order of the Military and Naval Minister A.F. Kerensky on May 9 on the implementation of the Declaration of the Rights of a Soldier of the Provisional Government. The order noted that all servicemen enjoy all the rights of citizens, have the right to be members of political, national, religious, economic and trade union organizations, the obligatory salute, corporal punishment, and so on are cancelled.
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✪ Professor of Moscow State Pedagogical University V.Zh.Tsvetkov on the creation of the Petrosoviet and the Provisional Government
✪ 1917. February Revolution
At the beginning of 1917, the Working Group of the Central Military-Industrial Complex, headed by the Menshevik K. A. Gvozdev, supported the organization of a general strike on the anniversary of Bloody Sunday. At the end of January 1917, the Working Group of the TsVPK began to organize a new anti-government demonstration, timed to coincide with the opening of the regular session of the State Duma; the appeal issued by her demanded "the decisive elimination of the autocratic regime", which finally overflowed the patience of the authorities. On the night of January 26 (February 8) to January 27 (February 9), the entire leadership of the Working Group was arrested. They were released from prison already during the February Revolution by the insurgent workers and soldiers. On the morning of February 27 (March 12), they were released and, together with revolutionary soldiers and workers, arrived at the Tauride Palace, where at that time members of the Duma faction of the Mensheviks were already there.
Here, together with members of the Menshevik faction of the Duma, representatives of other socialist parties, leaders of legal trade unions, cooperatives and other organizations, a Provisional Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies - body for convening the constituent assembly of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. It included K. A. Gvozdev, B. O. Bogdanov (Mensheviks, leaders of the working group of the TsVPK), N. S. Chkheidze, M. I. Skobelev (deputies of the State Duma from the Menshevik faction), N. Yu. Kapelinsky, K. S. Grinevich (Shekhter) (Menshevik-internationalists), N. D. Sokolov (non-factional Social Democrat), G. M. Erlikh (Bund).
Bolsheviks in the composition Provisional Executive Committee did not have. Having concentrated their main forces on the streets, the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee and other Bolshevik organizations underestimated other forms of influence on the developing movement and, in particular, missed the Tauride Palace, where leaders of various socialist parties were concentrated, which took over the organization of the Soviet. The Provisional Executive Committee called on the workers to elect deputies to the Petrograd Soviet (one deputy for a thousand workers, but not less than one deputy for each factory), and for the insurgent soldiers to elect one of their representatives for each company.
The first (constituent) meeting of the Petrosoviet opened in the Tauride Palace on February 27 (March 12) at 9 pm and ended on the night of February 28. It elected the original composition permanent Executive Committee and adopted the appeal "To the population of Petrograd and Russia", which stated:
The Soviet of Workers' Deputies, which sits in the State Duma, sets as its main task the organization of the people's forces and the struggle for the final consolidation of political freedom and people's rule in Russia...
We invite the entire population of the capital to immediately rally around the Council, form local committees in the districts and take control of all local affairs. All together, with common forces, we will fight for the complete elimination of the old government and the convocation of a Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage.
The meeting participants approved the proposal of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RSDLP to organize workers' militia .
The newspaper became the official printed organ of the Petrograd Soviet. « Proceedings of the Petrograd Council of Workers' Deputies » , which began to appear on February 28 (March 13).
Alternative point of view
There is an opinion that the Petrograd Soviet was a "disorderly gathering of delegates from local factories and regiments", among the participants of which there was class hatred, revolutionary anger and disgust for the front (among the soldiers). Some historians believe that the Petrograd Soviet did not have democratic legitimacy, with the real power of the Soviet due to the chaos that reigned in the city and the fear that the representatives of the bourgeois Provisional Government had of the Petrograd crowd.
Executive committee
In the initial composition of the permanent Executive Committee of the Petrosoviet of 15 people. only 2 Bolsheviks entered - A. G. Shlyapnikov and P. A. Zalutsky. On February 28 (March 13), the number of the Executive Committee was increased to 20 people at the expense of representatives from political parties. On March 1 (14), an additional 10 representatives from soldiers and sailors were elected to the Executive Committee, including 2 Bolsheviks. On the same day, the Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies formed from representatives of the Petrograd garrison merged with the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. At the same time, the number of representatives of the garrison far exceeded the number of workers. Thus a single Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was formed. By March 2 (15) March, the Executive Committee already consisted of 36 members, among whom were 7 Bolsheviks.
The head of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet was N. S. Chkheidze, a member of the IV State Duma (leader of the faction of the Social Democrats-Mensheviks), a freemason, a member of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma created at the same time.
The comrades of the chairman are the Menshevik M.I. Skobelev and the Socialist-Revolutionary A.F. Kerensky (all three are members of the Fourth State Duma).
Chkheidze and Kerensky were appointed by the Petrograd Soviet as its representatives in the Provisional Committee of the State Duma. At the same time, the first commissions of the Executive Committee of the Council were formed - military and food, which established close cooperation with the relevant commissions of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma. By March 3 (16) the number of commissions increased to eleven. On April 17 (30), after the All-Russian Conference of Soviets, at which 16 representatives of the provincial Soviets and front-line army units were included in the Executive Committee of the Petrosoviet, the Bureau of the Executive Committee was created to conduct current affairs.
1) All individual lower ranks and military units immediately return to their barracks;
2) all officer ranks to return to their units and take all measures to restore order;
3) the commanders of the units to arrive at the State Duma to receive orders at 11 o'clock. on the morning of February 28th.
At the evening meeting of the Petrograd Soviet on March 1 (14), the Council of Workers' Deputies and the Council of Soldiers' Deputies, formed from representatives of the Petrograd garrison, were united and the Executive Committee of the Council was expanded by electing 10 representatives from soldiers and sailors. The question of the actions of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma in relation to the garrison of Petrograd, which caused alarm among the deputies of the Council, was raised for discussion at the meeting of the joint Council, since they were considered by them as an attempt to return the "old order". Late in the evening, following the results of the discussion, Order No. 1 was adopted, summarizing the requirements of the soldiers' representatives. The order ordered the creation of elective committees in military units from representatives of the lower ranks. The main thing in Order No. 1 was the provision according to which, in all political speeches, military units were no longer subordinate to officers, but to their own elected committees and the Council. The order provided that all the weapons of the military units were transferred to the disposal and control of the soldiers' committees. With the adoption of Order No. 1 in the Russian army, the principle of unity of command fundamental to any army was violated; as a result, there was a sharp drop in discipline and combat effectiveness, which ultimately contributed to its collapse.
At midnight, a joint meeting of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma, the Central Committee of the Cadet Party, the Bureau of the Progressive Bloc and the Executive Committee of the Petrosoviet began, at which the parties tried to resolve their disagreements that had already arisen. According to A. I. Spiridovich, the main reason for the strife was the fate of the "counter-revolutionary" officers, for whom representatives of the Duma stood up. Richard Pipes also points out that the monarchist Milyukov, who headed the delegation of the Duma, succeeded in persuading the members of the Soviet to abandon the introduction of elective officers and the immediate establishment of a republic. In addition, the Provisional Government being formed was obliged to announce a political amnesty, ensure democratic freedoms for all citizens, abolish estate, religious and national restrictions, replace the police with a people's militia subordinate to local self-government bodies, begin preparations for elections to the Constituent Assembly and local self-government bodies on the basis of universal , an equal, direct and secret ballot, not to disarm or withdraw from Petrograd the military units that took part in the revolutionary movement. The Petrograd Soviet, in turn, undertook to condemn all kinds of excesses and theft of property, the aimless seizure of public institutions, the hostile attitude of soldiers towards officers, and to call on soldiers and officers to cooperate. The agrarian question and the question of the war were not raised at that meeting. The Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, which discussed this issue at a meeting that preceded the negotiations with the Duma Committee, decided not to enter the Provisional Government itself. A.F. Kerensky, however, did not obey this decision and accepted the post of Minister of Justice, having received the consent of the Petrosoviet the very next day, retroactively.
The real power of the Petrosoviet was actually concentrated in the hands of its Executive Committee, whose members were appointed by the socialist parties represented in the Petrosoviet. Historian Richard Pipes characterized the Petrosoviet as a "layered structure": "on top - a body acting on behalf of the Soviet, consisting of socialist intellectuals, formalized in the Executive Committee, below - an unmanaged rural gathering" .
During the first month, the Petrosoviet carried out its activities within the capital, however, at the All-Russian Conference of Soviets, which took place at the turn of March-April 1917, 16 representatives of the provincial Soviets and front-line army units were included in the Executive Committee of the Petrosoviet, which expanded its powers throughout the country until the convocation First All-Russian Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.
Initially, the leadership of the Petrosoviet had no intention of creating an alternative power structure in the person of the Soviets. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks considered the Soviets just a way to support the new government from below, so they coordinated their activities with the Provisional Government. So, having decided to arrest the royal family, the Executive Committee asked the Provisional Government how it would react to this arrest. Gradually, however, the Soviets became a counterbalance to the Provisional Government. Feeling this trend, the leader of the Bolsheviks V.I. Lenin, who returned from emigration on April 3 (16), in his "April Theses" put forward the idea of transferring all power to the Soviets and the slogan "All power to the Soviets!", Characterizing the system of Soviets as a new type of state . But the majority of the Petrosoviet - Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries - regarded this slogan as extremist, being sure of the need for a coalition with the bourgeoisie and the prematureness of socialism. With Lenin's return to Russia, the Bolshevik wing begins to rapidly separate and isolate itself from the March common front of revolutionary democracy.
The Executive Committee of the Petrosoviet, in the name of "Russian democracy", promised "by all means to oppose the aggressive policy of its ruling classes" and called on the peoples of Europe to joint actions in favor of peace. Undoubtedly, this document was intended for both external and internal use. Russian democracy focused the attention of European democracy on the fact that with the fall of the autocracy, the main factor in the chauvinist propaganda of the powers of the central bloc, the “Russian threat,” disappeared, and offered the German socialists to throw off their own monarchical regime. At the same time, the Manifesto warned, and this could not but impress the “defencists” (supporters of the policy of continuing Russia’s participation in the world war) that: “We will staunchly defend our own freedom from any reactionary encroachments, both from within and from without. The Russian revolution will not retreat before the bayonets of the conquerors and will not allow itself to be crushed by an external military force.
At the end of March, a conflict broke out between the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet and the Provisional Government, connected with the contradictions between the Manifesto "To the Peoples of the World" adopted by the Executive Committee, which condemned the aggressive policy of the warring countries, and the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs P. N. Milyukov to the press about the goals of the war from the point of view of the government , which spoke of the annexation of Galicia and the acquisition of Constantinople, as well as the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. It ended with the publication on March 27 (April 9) of a compromise official statement by the Provisional Government on the aims of the war. A month later, however, a new dispute over the aims of the war caused a political crisis.
March 29 (April 11) - April 3 (16) in Petrograd, the All-Russian Conference of Soviets organized by the Petrograd Council was held, which became the first significant step in formalizing the Soviets that spontaneously arose during the February Revolution into a single all-Russian system. The Meeting elected a new Executive Committee of the Petrosoviet, which became the highest Soviet authority until the convening of the I All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. In their resolution, the delegates approved the policy of continuing Russia's participation in the world war ("defencism"), supporting the policy of the Provisional Government on this issue, on the condition that "the renunciation of aggressive aspirations."
The so-called Kronstadt incident- it began with the fact that on May 17 (30) (according to other sources, May 16 (29)), the Kronstadt Soviet declared itself the only authority in the city, announced its non-recognition of the Provisional Government and its intention to continue to deal only with the Petrograd Soviet. On May 21 (June 3) a delegation of the Petrosoviet headed by its chairman N. S. Chkheidze set off for Kronstadt. The trip, however, did not resolve the conflict. On May 22 (June 4), the Petrograd Soviet discussed this issue at its meeting, but the vote on the prepared resolution was postponed. The next step was taken by the Provisional Government: Minister of Posts and Telegraphs I. G. Tsereteli and Minister of Labor M. I. Skobelev were sent to Kronstadt - both of them were not only ministers, but also played a prominent role in the Petrograd Soviet. During the trip, a compromise agreement was reached, but after their departure, the Kronstadt Soviet again returned to its old position. On May 26 (June 8) a meeting of the Petrosoviet took place, at which members of the executive committee and socialist ministers subjected the Kronstadters to harsh criticism "for treachery, duplicity and betrayal of their obligations." The resolution adopted as a result of the discussion was quite tough and demanded unconditional submission to the Provisional Government.
After the formation at the I All-Russian Congress of Soviets (held from June 3 (16) to June 24 (July 7), 1917) of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies (All-Russian Central Executive Committee), the executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet became part of it, the activities of sections and departments of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee ( nonresident, military, economic, agrarian, food, railway, legal, etc.) was closely connected with the work of commissions and departments of the Petrosoviet. With the beginning of the work of the congress, the role and political significance of the Petrograd Soviet gradually fade into the background. In June 1917, the executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet formed the City Department of the Bureau of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, which primarily directed the activities of the Petrograd proletariat and the garrison.
On March 9 (22), when the Bolshevik faction of the Petrosoviet took shape organizationally, it numbered only about 40 people. Given the predominance of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in the Soviet, the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) called on the party organizations of Petrograd to seek early re-elections of deputies. On May 7 (20) Pravda published a draft order for the Bolshevik deputies elected to the Soviets. Even partial re-elections markedly changed the balance of power in the Petrograd Soviet. By the beginning of July, the Bolshevik faction numbered about 400 people. The Bolsheviks gained predominance in the workers' section of the Soviet, but the soldiers' section still continued to follow the Socialist-Revolutionary leaders. All this determined the great fluctuations in the political line of the Petrograd Soviet in July-August.
A radical change in the political composition of the Petrosoviet occurred in late August - early September. The fall of Riga (August 21 (September 3), 1917) and the mutiny of General Kornilov led to a "left" in the mood of the majority of the non-party delegates of the Council. During the days of Kornilov's speech at the Petrograd Soviet, the first Military Revolutionary Committee was created to organize the defense of the capital; after the liquidation of the rebellion, this committee was dissolved.
Taking advantage of the failure of the Kornilov speech (August 28 (September 10), 1917) and the ensuing political crisis, the Bolsheviks managed at the evening meeting on August 31 (September 13), 1917, to pass their resolution “On Power”, which demanded the transfer of all power in Russia to the Soviets. For the first time in the history of the Petrograd Soviet, when voting on a cardinal question, the Bolshevik Party received a majority of the deputy votes. In an attempt to prevent the Bolshevization of the Petrograd Soviet, its Socialist Revolutionary-Menshevik Presidium - N. S. Chkheidze, A. R. Gots, F. I. Dan, I. G. Tsereteli, V. M. Chernov - resigned, which led to 9 (22 ) September 1917 to the election of the head of the Petrosoviet, Lev Trotsky, who had been released from Kresty shortly before. On September 25 (October 8), 1917, re-elections of the executive committee of the Petrosoviet took place. In the workers' section, 230 deputies voted for the Bolsheviks, 156 for the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. By the beginning of November, the Bolsheviks had up to 90% of the votes in the Petrograd Soviet.
The demand of the majority of the deputies of the Petrograd Soviet on August 31 for the transfer of all power in Russia to the Soviets marked the beginning of the rapid process of Bolshevization of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies. A situation arose again, reminiscent of the days of the first months of dual power, the confrontation between the Soviet and the government. However, now the Soviet supported basically only one party from the former united front of revolutionary democracy. The remaining parties - the Mensheviks, the Socialist Revolutionaries, the People's Socialists, who advocated the power of a coalition government headed by A.F. Kerensky - were supported by a minority of deputies.
Relying on the solid majority of their supporters in the Petrosoviet, the Bolsheviks were able, despite the opposition of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, to convene the II All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and organize the October armed uprising.
On the eve of the II Congress, the Bolshevik Petrograd Soviet organized a regional congress, the I Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region, which included Petrograd and the Baltic Fleet. The congress was held on October 11-13 (24-26), 1917 in Petrograd and was characterized by a sharp predominance of radical socialists: out of 94 congress delegates, there were 51 Bolsheviks and 24 Left Social Revolutionaries. The Northern Regional Committee, elected at the congress, consisting of 11 Bolsheviks and 6 Left Social Revolutionaries, launched a stormy activity in preparation for the II All-Russian Congress. On October 16, telegrams were sent on behalf of the Bolshevik Petrosoviet, Moscow Council and the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region to the local Soviets with a proposal to send their delegates to the Congress by October 20. This activity took place against the backdrop of the unwillingness of the Mensheviks and Right Social Revolutionaries to convene this Congress in general, as in fact prejudging the will of the Constituent Assembly on the question of power in the country.
