Valery Shilyaev. Triptych Tsushima. Left side. 2005
Illustration from the artist's website http://www.shilaev.ru/

Tsushima naval battle (May 14-15, 1905). Fight at about. Tsushima warships of the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons, consisting of 30 warships with the Japanese fleet (120 ships). The main goal of the Russian fleet (commanders of the squadrons, Admirals Rozhestvensky and Nebogatov) was a breakthrough to Vladivostok. The Japanese fleet (commander - Admiral Togo) had the task of completely defeating the Russian fleet. The high concentration of forces of the Japanese fleet, its better equipment and maneuverability led to military success. Despite the courage and heroism of the Russian officers and sailors, who had previously traveled 33 thousand kilometers from Kronstadt to Tsushima and entered the battle on the move, the losses for them were catastrophic: 19 ships were sunk, 3 cruisers broke into neutral ports and were interned, 2 cruisers and 2 destroyers reached Vladivostok. Of the 14 thousand people of the squadron personnel, more than 5 thousand died.

Chronicle of the battle

1905.05.27 (May 14 O.S.) Japanese Sea. The Russian 2nd Pacific squadron of Admiral Z. Rozhestvensky (11 battleships, 9 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 1 auxiliary cruiser) met with the Japanese fleet adm. H. Togo (4 battleships, 24 cruisers, 21 destroyers, 42 destroyers, 24 auxiliary cruisers) in the Tsushima Strait.

7 .fourteen. A Japanese cruiser was spotted from the Russian squadron.

9 .40. Found a detachment of Japanese cruisers.

13 .fifteen. The Russian squadron met with the main forces of the Japanese fleet.

13 .49. Russian ships opened fire from a distance of 38 cables (over 7 km).

13 .52. The Japanese fleet responded with concentrated fire on the battleships Knyaz Suvorov and Oslyabya.

14 .00 The Japanese cruiser Asama was damaged and withdrawn from the battle by the Russians.

14 .25. Having received heavy damage and lost control, the battleship "Oslyabya" went out of order.

14 .thirty. The battleship Knyaz Suvorov was put out of action and lost control.

14 .40. Russian battleship "Oslyabya" turned over and sank.

15 .40. The squadron battleship "Emperor Alexander III" received heavy damage.

16 .20. On the battleship Suvorov, only a 75-mm gun in the aft casemate survived from the artillery, which continues to fire at the enemy. The ship is a solid fire from bow to stern.

17 .20. The Russian auxiliary cruiser Ural was sunk.

17 .thirty. The destroyer "Buyny" removed from the battleship "Suvorov" the surviving staff officers and the wounded in the head Adm. Z. Rozhdestvensky.

18 .fifty. The battleship "Emperor Alexander III" was sunk.

2 .15 the battleship Navarin was sunk, the Russians sank 3 Japanese destroyers and damaged 12.

5 .00 To the south of Tsushima Island, their crew scuttled the Russian destroyer "Brilliant".

5 .23. Japanese cruiser sunk Russian destroyer "Imperfect".

8 .00 To the north of Tsushima Island, the battleship "Admiral Nakhimov" was sunk.

10 .05. A Japanese torpedo sank the battleship Shisoy Veliky.

10 .38. Adm. Nebogatov's detachment of ships (battleships "Emperor Nikolai I", "Eagle", "General-Admiral Apraksin", "Admiral Senyavin"), surrounded by the Japanese squadron, capitulated. Only the cruiser Izumrud managed to break out of the Japanese encirclement.

11 .00 After a battle with 2 Japanese auxiliary cruisers and 1 destroyer, the cruiser "Svetlana" was scuttled by the crew.

11 .thirty. The destroyer "Buyny" was sunk.

11 .fifty. The destroyer "Fast" was sunk. 12 .43. Off the coast of Korea, met by 3 Japanese destroyers, the destroyer Gromkiy was flooded by her crew.

14 .00 The team scuttled the battleship "Vladimir Monomakh"

17 .05. The commander of the Russian squadron, Vice-Adm. Z. Rozhestvensky, surrendered to Japanese captivity on the destroyer "Trouble."

18 .ten. The Japanese cruisers "Yakumo" and "Iwate" sank the Russian battleship "Admiral Ushakov" (commander cap. 1r. Miklukho-Maclay). In the Battle of Tsushima on May 27-28, 1905, the Russians lost 10 thousand people, the losses of Japan - 3 destroyers and 1 thousand people. Of the entire 2nd Pacific Squadron, only a few ships managed to escape. The cruisers "Aurora", "Oleg" and "Zhemchug" broke into the city of Manila (Philippines; USA), the destroyer "Bodry", the transports "Svir" and "Korea" in Shanghai ( China) where they were interned, the transport "Anadyr" went to the island of Madagascar (fr). Only the cruisers "Almaz", "Izumrud" and the destroyers "Brave" and "Grozny" broke into Vladivostok.

Analysis of the course of the battle

The final stage of the campaign of the 2nd Pacific Squadron to the Far East was the Battle of Tsushima on May 14, 1905 in the Korea Strait. By this time, the Russian squadron included eight squadron battleships (of which three were old), three coastal defense battleships, an armored cruiser, eight cruisers, five auxiliary cruisers and nine destroyers. The main forces of the squadron, consisting of 12 armored ships, were divided into three detachments of four ships each. The cruisers were consolidated into two detachments - cruising and reconnaissance. The squadron commander, Admiral Rozhestvensky, held his flag on the battleship Suvorov. The Japanese fleet, commanded by Admiral Togo, consisted of four squadron battleships, six coastal defense battleships, eight armored cruisers, 16 cruisers, 24 auxiliary cruisers and 63 destroyers. It was divided into eight combat detachments, of which the first and second, consisting of squadron battleships and armored cruisers, represented the main forces. The first detachment was commanded by Admiral Togo, the second - by Admiral Kamimura.

The Russian squadron in terms of the number of armored ships (squadron battleships and armored cruisers) was not inferior to the Japanese, but in qualitative terms, the superiority was on the side of the enemy. The main forces of the Japanese fleet had significantly more guns of large and medium caliber; Japanese artillery was almost three times faster than Russian artillery, and Japanese shells had five times more explosive than Russian high-explosive shells. Thus, the armored ships of the Japanese fleet had higher tactical and technical data than Russian squadron battleships and armored cruisers. To this we must add that the Japanese had multiple superiority in cruisers and especially in destroyers.

The great advantage of the Japanese fleet was that it had combat experience, while the Russian squadron, having no such, after a long and difficult transition, had to immediately engage in battle with the enemy. The Japanese had a lot of experience in carrying out live firing at long distances, gained in the first period of the war. They were well trained in the conduct of concentrated fire with several ships at a single target at long distances. The Russian gunners, on the other hand, did not have the rules of firing at long distances tested by experience and did not have the practice of conducting such firing. The experience of the Russian Port Arthur squadron in this regard was not studied and even ignored by both the leaders of the main naval headquarters and the commander of the 2nd Pacific squadron.

By the time the Russian squadron arrived in the Far East, the main forces of the Japanese fleet as part of the 1st and 2nd combat detachments were concentrated in the Korean port of Mozampo, and the cruisers and destroyers - at about. Tsushima. 20 miles south of Mozampo, between the islands of Goto - Kvelpart, the Japanese deployed a patrol of cruisers, which was supposed to timely detect the Russian squadron when approaching the Korea Strait and ensure the deployment of their main forces on the way of its movement. Thus, the initial position of the Japanese fleet before the battle was so favorable that it excluded any possibility of the passage of the Russian squadron through the Korea Strait without a fight. Rozhdestvensky decided to break through to Vladivostok by the shortest route through the Korea Strait. Considering that the Japanese fleet was much stronger than the Russian squadron, he did not draw up a battle plan, but decided to conduct it depending on the actions of the enemy fleet. Thus, the commander of the Russian squadron abandoned active operations, leaving the initiative to the enemy. Literally the same thing was repeated as in the battle in the Yellow Sea.

On the night of May 14, the Russian squadron approached the Korean Strait and formed up in a night marching order. Ahead, cruisers were deployed along the course, followed by squadron battleships and transports between them in two wake columns. Behind the squadron, two hospital ships followed at a distance of one mile. While moving through the Rozhdestvensky Strait, contrary to the elementary requirements of tactics, he refused to conduct reconnaissance and did not darken the ships, which helped the Japanese to detect the Russian squadron and concentrate their fleet on its way. The first at 2 hours and 25 minutes noticed the Russian squadron by fire and reported to Admiral Togo the auxiliary cruiser Shinano-Maru, which was on patrol between the islands of Goto-Kvelpart. Soon, due to the intensive work of Japanese radiotelegraph stations on Russian ships, they realized that they had been discovered. However, Admiral Rozhdestvensky abandoned any attempt to interfere with the negotiations of the Japanese ships.

Having received a report about the discovery of the Russians, Admiral Togo left Mozampo and deployed the main forces of his fleet in the path of the Russian squadron. The tactical plan of the commander of the Japanese fleet was to cover the head of the Russian squadron with the main forces and with concentrated fire on the flagships to disable them and thereby deprive the squadron of control, and then develop the success of the daytime battle with night attacks of destroyers and complete the defeat of the Russian squadron.

With the onset of the morning of May 14, Rozhdestvensky rebuilt his squadron, first in the formation of a wake, and then two wake columns, leaving the transports behind the squadron under the protection of cruisers. Following in the ranks of two wake columns along the Korea Strait, the Russian squadron at 1330 hours on the right of the bow discovered the main forces of the Japanese fleet, which were going to cross its course.

Admiral Togo, trying to cover the head of the Russian squadron, did not calculate his maneuver and passed at a distance of 70 cab. from the lead Russian ship. At the same time, Rozhdestvensky, believing that the Japanese were trying to attack the left column of the squadron, which consisted of old ships, again rebuilt his fleet from two wake columns into one. The main forces of the Japanese fleet, maneuvering as part of two combat detachments, having gone to the port side, began a sequential turn of 16 points in order to cover the head of the Russian squadron. This turn, made at a distance of 38 cab. from the lead Russian ship and lasting 15 minutes, put the Japanese ships in an extremely disadvantageous position. Making a successive turn on the return flight, the Japanese ships described the circulation in almost one place, and if the Russian squadron had opened fire in time and concentrated it on the turning point of the Japanese fleet, the latter could have suffered serious losses. However, this favorable moment was not used.

The lead ships of the Russian squadron opened fire only at 13:49. The fire turned out to be ineffective, because due to improper control it was not focused on those Japanese ships that were turning on the spot. As they turned, the enemy ships opened fire, concentrating it on the flagships Suvorov and Oslyabya. Each of them was simultaneously fired on by four to six Japanese battleships and cruisers. Russian squadron battleships also tried to concentrate their fire on one of the enemy ships, but due to the lack of appropriate rules and experience in such firing, they could not achieve positive results.

The superiority of the Japanese in artillery and the weakness of the reservation of Russian ships had an immediate effect. At 14:23, the battleship Oslyabya, having received serious damage, went out of action and soon sank. At about 2:30 p.m., the battleship Suvorov broke down. Having been seriously damaged and completely engulfed in flames, for another five hours it repelled the continuous attacks of enemy cruisers and destroyers, but at 1930 hours it also sank.

After the failure of the battleships "Oslyabya" and "Suvorov", the order of battle of the Russian squadron was broken, and it lost control. The Japanese took advantage of this and, going into the head of the Russian squadron, increased their fire. At the head of the Russian squadron was the battleship "Alexander III", and after its death - "Borodino".

In an effort to break through to Vladivostok, the Russian squadron was on a general course of 23 degrees. The Japanese, having a great advantage in speed, covered the head of the Russian squadron and concentrated fire on almost all of their battleships on the leading ship. Russian sailors and officers, finding themselves in a difficult situation, did not leave their combat posts and, with their characteristic courage and stamina, repulsed enemy attacks to the last.

At 1505 hours fog began, and visibility decreased so much that the opponents, having dispersed on counter courses, lost each other. At about 3:40 p.m., the Japanese again discovered the Russian ships heading to the northeast, and resumed the battle with them. At about 4 p.m., the Russian squadron, evading envelopment, turned south. Soon the fight stopped again due to fog. This time, Admiral Togo could not find the Russian squadron for an hour and a half and was eventually forced to use his main forces to search for it.

Well organized reconnaissance before the battle. During the battle, Togo neglected her, as a result of which he twice lost sight of the Russian squadron. In the daytime phase of the Battle of Tsushima, the Japanese destroyers, keeping close to their main forces, launched several torpedo attacks against Russian ships damaged in the artillery battle. These attacks were carried out simultaneously by a group of destroyers (four ships per group) from different directions. Torpedoes were fired from a distance of 4 to 9 cab. Of the 30 torpedoes, only five hit the target, and three of them hit the battleship Suvorov.

At 1751 hours, the main forces of the Japanese fleet, having discovered the Russian squadron, which at that time was fighting Japanese cruisers, attacked it again. The Japanese commander this time abandoned the head-covering maneuver and fought on parallel courses. By the end of the daytime battle, which lasted until 19 hours 12 minutes, the Japanese sank two more Russian battleships - "Alexander III" and "Borodino". With the onset of darkness, Admiral Togo stopped the artillery battle and headed with the main forces to about. Ollyndo (Dazhelet), and ordered the destroyers to attack the Russian squadron with torpedoes.

Around 20:00, up to 60 Japanese destroyers, divided into small detachments, began to cover the Russian squadron. Their attacks began at 20:45 simultaneously from three directions and were unorganized. Of the 75 torpedoes fired from a distance of 1 to 3 cabs, only six hit the target. Reflecting torpedo attacks, Russian sailors destroyed two Japanese destroyers and damaged 12. In addition, as a result of collisions between their ships, the Japanese lost another destroyer, and six destroyers were seriously damaged.

By the morning of May 15, the Russian squadron ceased to exist as an organized force. As a result of frequent evasions from attacks by Japanese destroyers, Russian ships dispersed throughout the Korea Strait. Only individual ships tried to break through to Vladivostok on their own. Encountering superior Japanese forces on their way, they boldly entered into a decisive battle with them and fought it to the last shell. The crews of the coastal defense battleship "Admiral Ushakov" under the command of Captain 1st Rank Miklukho-Maclay and the cruiser "Dmitry Donskoy" commanded by Captain 2nd Rank Lebedev fought heroically against the enemy. These ships died in an unequal battle, but did not lower their flags in front of the enemy. The junior flagship of the Russian squadron, Admiral Nebogatov, acted completely differently, surrendering to the Japanese without a fight.

In the Battle of Tsushima, the Russian fleet lost 8 armored ships, 4 cruisers, an auxiliary cruiser, 5 destroyers and several transports. Four armored ships and a destroyer, together with Rozhdestvensky (due to the wound, he was unconscious) and Nebogatov surrendered. Some of the ships were interned in foreign ports. And only the Almaz cruiser and two destroyers broke through to Vladivostok. The Japanese lost 3 destroyers in this battle. Many of their ships were seriously damaged.

The defeat of the Russian squadron was due to the overwhelming superiority of the enemy in forces and the unpreparedness of the Russian fleet for battle. Much of the blame for the defeat of the Russian squadron lies with Rozhestvensky, who, as a commander, made a number of serious mistakes. He ignored the experience of the Port Arthur squadron, abandoned reconnaissance and led the squadron blindly, did not have a battle plan, misused his cruisers and destroyers, refused active operations and did not organize command and control in battle.

The Japanese fleet, having sufficient time and operating under favorable conditions, was well prepared for a meeting with the Russian squadron. The Japanese chose an advantageous position for the battle, thanks to which they discovered the Russian squadron in a timely manner and concentrated their main forces on its route. However, Admiral Togo also made serious mistakes. He miscalculated his maneuvering before the battle, as a result of which he could not cover the head of the Russian squadron when it was discovered. Having made a sequential turn in 38 cab. from the Russian squadron. Togo exposed his ships to her attack, and only the inept actions of Rozhdestvensky saved the Japanese fleet from the serious consequences of this wrong maneuver. Togo did not organize tactical reconnaissance during the battle, as a result of which he repeatedly lost contact with the Russian squadron, incorrectly used the cruisers in the battle, resorting to the search for the Russian squadron by the main forces.

The experience of the Tsushima battle once again confirmed that the main means of striking in battle was large-caliber artillery, which decided the outcome of the battle. Medium-caliber artillery, due to the increase in combat distance, did not justify itself. It became necessary to develop new, more advanced methods of controlling artillery fire, as well as the possibility of using torpedo weapons from destroyers in day and night conditions to build on the success achieved in artillery combat. An increase in the penetration ability of armor-piercing and destructive high-explosive shells required an increase in the armor area of ​​the ship's side and reinforcement of horizontal armor. The battle order of the fleet - a single-keel column with a large number of ships - did not justify itself, since it made it difficult to use weapons and control forces in battle. The advent of radio increased the ability to communicate and control forces at a distance of up to 100 miles.

Used materials from the book: "One Hundred Great Battles", M. "Veche", 2002

Literature

1. Bykov P.D. Battle near about. Tsushima // Russian naval art. Sat. Art. / Rev. ed. R.N. Mordvinov. - M., 1951. S. 348-367.

2. History of naval art / Ed. ed. ON THE. Petersburg. - M., 1953. - T.Z. - S. 66-67.

3. History of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. / Ed. I.I. Rostunov. - M., 1977. S. 324-348.

4. Kilichenkov A. Togo's mistake and Admiral Rozhdestvensky's last chance. [On the tactics of the naval battle at Tsushima, 1905]. // Marine collection. - 1990. -№ 3.-S. 80-84.

5. Marine atlas. Descriptions for cards. - M., 1959. - T.Z, part 1. - S. 698-704.

6. Marine Atlas / Ed. ed. G.I. Levchenko. - M., 1958. - T.Z, part 1. - L. 34.

7. Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 The work of the military-historical commission on the description of the Russo-Japanese war. -T.I-9. -SPb., 1910.

8. Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 The work of the military-historical commission on the description of the actions of the fleet in the war of 1904-1905. at the Marine Gen. Headquarters. - KN.1-4, 6, 7. - St. Petersburg-Pg., 1912-1917.

Read further:

War in the context of world politics.

Russo-Japanese War 1904 - 1905(chronological table).

Defense of Port Arthur(detailed chronicle of the battle and its analysis).

It's hard to say what really happened. None of those who were at that moment with Admiral Rozhdestvensky on the bridge of the flagship battleship, except for the admiral himself, survived the battle. And Admiral Rozhdestvensky himself kept silent on this matter, never explaining the motives and reasons for his actions in the battle anywhere. Let's try to do it for him. Offering his version of these events. Events so strongly affected the fate of Russia.

In May 1905, the Russian squadron slowly entered the Tsushima Strait. And it seemed that everything was done to ensure that the patrol ships of the enemy found it. The squadron was accompanied by several transport and auxiliary vessels. Which limited her speed to 9 knots. And two hospital ships, according to the requirements of that time, shone with all the lights, like Christmas trees. And the very first line of Japanese patrols discovered Russian ships. And it is precisely on these "Christmas trees". Immediately earned Japanese radio stations transmitting information about Russian ships. And the main forces of the Japanese fleet came out to meet the Russian squadron. Radio stations, which also worked non-stop. Realizing the danger, the commanders of the Russian ships suggested that the commander of the squadron, Admiral Rozhdestvensky, drive away the Japanese intelligence officers. And the commander of the auxiliary cruiser "Ural", which had a first-class radio station for its time, proposed to drown out the work of Japanese radio stations.

Hospital ship "Eagle".

Auxiliary cruiser "Ural". Four more such ships separated from the Russian squadron and began raiding operations off the coast of Japan. "Ural" remained with the squadron.

But the admiral forbade everything. And open fire on Japanese intelligence officers and drown out the work of their radio stations. Instead, he ordered the squadron to be reorganized from marching order to combat. That is, from two columns, into one. But 40 minutes before the start of the battle, Rozhdestvensky ordered to rebuild the squadron again. Exactly the opposite from one column to two. But now these columns of battleships were located in a ledge to the right. And as soon as the Russians finished rebuilding, the smoke of the ships of the main forces of the Japanese fleet appeared on the horizon. The commander of which, Admiral Togo, was completing a maneuver that would guarantee him victory. All he had to do was turn right. And put the system of their ships across the movement of the Russian squadron. Bringing down the fire of all their guns on the lead ship of the enemy.

Admiral Togo

But when he saw that the Russian battleships were marching, instead, Admiral Togo turned left. To approach the weakest ships of the Russian squadron. Intending to attack them first. And right there, the Russian squadron began rebuilding in one column. And opening fire, literally bombarded the Japanese flagship with a hail of shells. At some point in the battle, six Russian ships were firing at the Japanese flagship at the same time. In a short 15 minutes, more than 30 large-caliber shells hit the "Japanese". Admiral Rozhdestvensky did what the commander exists for in the fleet, he led his squadron without losses and outplayed the Japanese admiral. Forcing him to expose his ships to the concentrated fire of the rapidly approaching Russian battleships.

Scheme of the beginning of the Tsushima battle.

Rozhdestvensky did what he wanted, taking advantage of the only chance to win. He gave the enemy the opportunity to identify the squadron, made it clear that it was slow-moving and was moving along the eastern, narrow strait. He did not interfere with the transfer of information by scouts. And the work of the radio stations of the main forces of the Japanese. And at the last moment, before the collision, rebuilt the squadron. Accurately calculated the time of the collision. Knowing that Admiral Togo will not have time to receive decrypted information about his maneuver.

The battleship Sagami leads a convoy of ships

Most likely, Admiral Rozhdestvensky also counted on two armored cruisers located in Vladivostok. Which three days before the Tsushima battle left the port. According to the official version, to check the operation of radio stations. But just in time to approach the Tsushima Strait together with the main forces of the Russian fleet. But then chance intervened. A year before, the Japanese had set up a minefield in the fairway. Several times Russian cruisers freely passed this minefield. But it was on the eve of the Tsushima battle that the flagship of this detachment, the armored cruiser Gromoboy, touched a mine and failed. The detachment returned to Vladivostok. Depriving Admiral Rozhdestvensky of the opportunity to strengthen his squadron already during the battle. The fact that this was planned is indicated by the presence of the same auxiliary cruiser Ural in the squadron. Designed for raider operations on communications and completely unsuitable for squadron combat. But having the best radio station in the squadron. With the help of which he was supposed to take the cruiser from Vladivostok to the battlefield.

Armored cruiser "Gromoboy" in the dry dock of Vladivostok.

Did this, Admiral Rozhdestvensky knowing exactly where the Japanese squadron was. And the Japanese themselves helped him in this. More precisely, their radio stations. Experienced radio operators, by the strength of the radio signal, or by the "spark", as they said then, can determine the distance to another radio station. The narrow strait indicated the exact direction of the enemy, and the signal strength of the Japanese radio stations showed the distance to him. The Japanese expected to see one column of Russian ships. But they saw two, and hurried to attack the weakest ships. But the Russian columns marched in a ledge to the right. This made it possible for Rozhdestvensky to rebuild the squadron and try to attack the weakest Japanese ships on his own. Covering which Admiral Togo was forced to continue the maneuver. Literally deploying their armadillos in succession. This is how he set his flagship under the concentrated fire of the best Russian ships. At this moment, about 30 large-caliber shells hit the Japanese flagship. And the next battleship in the ranks is 18. In principle, this was enough to disable enemy ships. But unfortunately only in principle.

Damage to the Russian and Japanese battleships in battle.

Paradoxically, the biggest Japanese secret of the time was Russian shells. More precisely, their negligible impact on enemy ships. In pursuit of armor penetration, Russian engineers reduced the weight of the projectile, by 20%, in relation to foreign projectiles of a similar caliber. What predetermined the higher speed of the shells of Russian guns. And in order to make their shells safe, they were equipped with gunpowder-based explosives. At the same time, it was assumed that, having broken through the armor, the projectile would explode behind it. For this, very crude fuses were installed, which did not explode even when they hit the unarmored part of the side. But the power of explosives, in shells, was sometimes not enough, even to break the shell itself. And as a result, Russian shells, hitting the ship, left a neat round hole. Which the Japanese quickly closed up. And the fuses of the Russian shells were not up to par. The striker turned out to be too soft and did not prick the primer. And Rozhdestvensky's squadron was generally supplied with defective shells. With a high moisture content, in explosives. As a result, even the shells that hit the Japanese ships did not explode en masse. It was the quality of the Russian shells that predetermined that the Japanese ships withstood the massive Russian fire. And they themselves, taking advantage of the advantage in squadron speed, began to cover the head of the Russian column. Here even there is a doubt that if the Japanese did not know about the mediocre quality of Russian shells, then Togo would have risked performing his risky maneuver. No, he could not have known about the disgusting quality of the shells supplied to the second squadron. But it is quite possible that he correctly assessed the risk to his ships and made his maneuver. Which will later be called brilliant, but which not a single naval commander in his right mind will do. And as a result, the Japanese won in the battle of Tsushima. Despite the heroism of the Russians and the victory of Rozhdestvensky at the maneuvering stage of the battle.

Painting dedicated to the heroic death of the coastal defense battleship "Admiral Ushakov"

And yet Rozhdestvensky is personally to blame for this defeat. As Chief of the Main Naval Staff, he personally oversaw technical issues in the fleet. And it was on his conscience that these unsuitable shells turned out to be. Yes, and in the Japanese fleet, there were 2 ships that could be part of his squadron. But from which he personally so recklessly refused. In Italy, 2 armored cruisers were built for Argentina. The ships were already ready when the customer refused them. And the Italians offered these ships to Russia. But Rozhdestvensky, being the chief of the Naval Staff, refused them. Motivating by the fact that these ships do not fit the Russian fleet by type. They approached the Japanese fleet. The Japanese bought them immediately. And as soon as these ships reached Japan, the war began. At the same time, there was a squadron of two battleships, three cruisers and more than a dozen destroyers in the Mediterranean. Went to the Pacific Ocean. And the idea was put forward to accompany these ships with their own ships. And under the threat of destroying these ships, do not allow a war to arise until our fleet is strengthened. But for this, it was necessary to leave the destroyers, without the guardianship of large ships. And Rozhdestvensky, forbade accompanying the Japanese, ordering to escort the destroyers. As a result, this squadron, before the start of the war, did not sing to strengthen our Pacific Fleet. And the armored cruisers bought by the Japanese managed to do it.

Armored cruiser "Kasuga", which could also serve in the Russian Imperial Navy

Admiral Rozhdestvensky, quite rightly, could show himself to be one of the greatest Russian naval commanders. Who led the fleet without loss across three oceans, and did everything to defeat the Japanese. But as an administrator, he lost the war before it even started. Having missed the opportunity to strengthen your fleet, weaken the enemy fleet. And failing to provide the forces entrusted to him with ammunition of the proper quality. Which dishonored his name. In the end, being captured by the Japanese.

A ship that lived up to its name. On it, Admiral Rozhdestvensky was captured by the Japanese.

As you know, ignorance of history leads to its repetition. And the underestimation of the role of defective shells in the Tsushima battle once again played a negative role in our history. In another place and at another time. In the summer of 1941, at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. At that time, our main tank and anti-tank ammunition was a 45-mm projectile. Which was supposed to confidently penetrate the armor of German tanks up to 800 meters. But in reality, our tanks and anti-tank guns of this caliber were useless from 400 meters. The Germans immediately identified this and set a safe distance for their tanks at 400 meters. It turned out that in pursuit of an increase in the production of shells, there was a violation of the technology and their manufacture. And massively overheated, and therefore more fragile shells were fired. Which simply split when they hit the German armor. Without causing much harm to German tanks. And allowing the German tankers to shoot our soldiers almost without hindrance. Just like the Japanese of our sailors at Tsushima.

Model projectile 45mm

The shock of the Russian sailors who survived Tsushima is easy to understand. The shock of real events turned out to be too heavy to free oneself from the hypnosis of the overwhelming superiority of Japanese weapons and try to understand the true reasons for the death of the squadron.

Indeed, Russian armor-piercing shells had serious drawbacks: a small amount of explosives, an extremely tight fuse (designed to fire only after the shell penetrated the armor), which is why they often did not explode when they hit the unarmored part of the side or the superstructure. Of the twenty-four 305-mm shells that hit the Japanese armored ships, eight (33%) did not explode. This, no doubt, had a negative impact on their effectiveness. But Russian shells in Tsushima pierced the armored casemates of 152-mm guns on Mikasa and Shikishima (Terni's six-inch armor), on Azuma - Krupp's six-inch armor. The Asama cruiser suffered the most - the shell pierced the thick armor of the aft end and damaged the steering.

In Japanese 305-mm high-explosive projectiles with a very sensitive fuse, 8.5% of the mass was occupied by shimose (lyddite, or melinite), which was superior in blasting action to smokeless powder of Russian counterparts. On the other hand, Japanese shells did not penetrate even thin armor and had the unpleasant property of exploding in the barrels of their own guns.

"Eagle" received about 70 hits by shells with a caliber of 152 to 305 mm. The external picture of the destruction was impressive - numerous holes in the unarmored side, crippled superstructures, destroyed and burnt rosters and rowboats. The ship was severely damaged, losing 41 killed and 87 wounded.

However, he retained the course and a significant part of the fighting capacity, including three 305-mm, five 152-mm and ten 75-mm guns. None of the Japanese shells penetrated the armor. The effect of enemy hits affected the intensity of the armadillo's fire; nevertheless, on May 14, he fired one hundred and eighty-five 305-mm and more than eight hundred 152-mm shells at the enemy.

"Mikasa" received about 40 hits and lost 113 people. On the ship, apart from small ones, one 305-mm and two 152-mm guns failed. The battleship fired at the same time no faster than the "Eagle"; he expended 124 shells of the main caliber. Therefore, the quality of the Japanese ammunition does not give grounds for recognizing it as the main factor that decided the outcome of the battle. The imperfection of the ships of the Borodino type, which in difficult conditions showed good survivability, was not such.

The main reason for the death of four Russian ships was not the miraculous effect of Japanese shells (by the way, after the war the Japanese abandoned them), but a huge number of hits. Battleships of the Borodino type kept intact their armored side to the very end, which provided the necessary buoyancy. However, numerous hits led to the formation of huge holes in the light unarmored board, where water was poured from shells constantly bursting near. The incessant fires played a fatal role; during their extinguishing, a huge amount of water was thrown onto the decks. Getting inside, it contributed to a decrease in stability and the appearance of a roll. By itself, he was not dangerous, since with an established hold service he quickly straightened. The position changed when they did not have time to straighten it and it reached 6-7 degrees. At the same time, holes in the light side and cannon ports entered the water, which caused loss of stability and capsizing. One of the factors contributing to this was the overload of the squadron ships, which led to the fact that the upper armor belt was immersed in water with a list of 6.5 degrees instead of 10.5 according to the project.

The rate of the Japanese command on high-explosive shells was not the best way to destroy armored ships. She demanded an indispensable condition - a huge number of hits. During the battle in the Yellow Sea, the Japanese failed to do this with a single battleship of the Port Arthur squadron. Such a super-density of hits on Russian ships could only be given by the consistent concentration of all the ships of the Japanese battle line on one or two targets at the same time, which could be ensured by a maneuver, which was the “line over the T”. The maneuver chosen by Togo allowed him to destroy the Russian armored squadron with artillery fire. In fact, for the Japanese admiral, this was the only real opportunity to achieve a decisive victory, everything depended on whether he could outplay the Russian commander in tactics. Only one thing was required from Rozhdestvensky - to prevent the enemy from putting a "line" over his column. What really happened is public knowledge.

Thus, the Japanese won the victory due to superiority in tactics, in particular, in the tactical use of artillery. This allowed them to use their weapons in a favorable situation and, by concentrating fire on the best Russian battleships, achieve a large number of hits. Their impact was sufficient to disable and destroy three battleships of the Borodino and Oslyabi types.

With good shooting accuracy (3.2% of hits from the number of large and medium-caliber shells fired), the Japanese hit four Borodino-class ships, which received at least 265 shells out of about 360 that hit 12 Russian armored ships. Only 10 shells hit the battleships of the Nebogatov detachment, but they themselves were in unfavorable firing conditions and, with a high consumption of ammunition, did not achieve noticeable success.

The quality of the shooting of Russian battleships, of course, reduced the fire impact of the enemy. Therefore. with fairly high accuracy in particular cases and sufficient intensity, the overall firing efficiency of the armored detachments of the Russian squadron turned out to be three times lower than that of the enemy - only 1.2% of hits, which, with the exception of Mikasa and Nishin, are fairly even distributed along the Japanese battle line.

The Japanese maneuver was aimed at creating favorable conditions for the operation of artillery and served as an effective means of evading Russian fire. On the contrary, the Russian ships were connected by a 9-knot squadron speed and direction of movement, which made it much easier for the Japanese to cover the head of the squadron.

In total, 22 Russian warships went to the bottom, 5045 Russian sailors were killed, drowned, burned alive. Russia, having suffered a catastrophe unprecedented in the history of its fleet, was thrown into the category of minor maritime powers.

The experience of the Russo-Japanese war was carefully studied by experts from all maritime powers. He had a great influence on the further development of fleets and naval art. Thus, the theorists recognized the reception of head coverage as a classic and recommended it as universal.

Increased combat distances reduced the importance of medium-caliber guns; this required a revision of the artillery weapon system. There was a need to develop new methods of fire control, which would ensure its effectiveness at long distances. The use of powerful high-explosive shells made it necessary to further increase the area of ​​​​the side armor, and an increase in the combat distance - to strengthen the horizontal protection. The importance of survivability and stability of ships, as well as superiority in speed, was clearly revealed.

This clearly implied the need to create battleships of a new type instead of squadron battleships.

Battle

On May 23, 1905, Rozhdestvensky's squadron made the last loading of coal. Stocks were again taken in excess of the norm, as a result of which the battleships were overloaded, sinking deep into the sea. On May 25, all excess transports were sent to Shanghai. The squadron was put on full alert. Rozhdestvensky did not organize reconnaissance so as not to discover the squadron.

However, the Japanese already guessed which way the Russian ships would go. Japanese Admiral Togo has been waiting for Russian ships since January 1905. The Japanese command assumed that the Russians would try to break through to Vladivostok or capture some harbor in the Formosa region (modern Taiwan) and from there conduct operations against the Japanese Empire. At a meeting in Tokyo, it was decided to proceed from defense, concentrate forces in the Korea Strait and act according to the situation. In anticipation of the Russian fleet, the Japanese overhauled the ships, replacing all defective guns with new ones. Previous battles have made the Japanese fleet a single fighting unit. Therefore, by the time the Russian squadron appeared, the Japanese fleet was in the best condition, a single unit with great combat experience, which was inspired by previous successes.

The main forces of the Japanese fleet were divided into 3 squadrons (each with several detachments). The 1st squadron was commanded by Admiral Togo, who held the flag on the battleship Mikaso. In the 1st combat detachment (the armored core of the fleet) there were 4 squadron battleships of the 1st class, 2 armored cruisers of the 1st class and a mine cruiser. The 1st squadron also included: 3rd combat detachment (4 armored cruisers of the 2nd and 3rd classes), 1st detachment of destroyers (5 destroyers), 2nd detachment of destroyers (4 units), 3rd destroyer detachment (4 ships), 14th destroyer detachment (4 destroyers). The 2nd squadron was under the flag of Vice Admiral H. Kamimura. It consisted of: the 2nd combat detachment (6 armored cruisers of the 1st class and advice note), the 4th combat detachment (4 armored cruisers), the 4th and 5th destroyer detachments (4 ships each), 9th th and 19th destroyer detachments. 3rd squadron under the flag of Vice Admiral S. Kataoka. The 3rd squadron included: 5th combat detachment (obsolete battleship, 3 cruisers of the 2nd class, advice note), 6th combat detachment (4 armored cruisers of the 3rd class), 7th combat detachment (obsolete battleship , cruiser of the 3rd class, 4 gunboats), 1st, 5th, 10th, 11th, 15th, 17th, 18th and 20th detachments of destroyers (4 units each), 16th detachment of destroyers (2 destroyers), detachment of special purpose ships (it included auxiliary cruisers).

The Japanese fleet comes out to meet the 2nd Pacific Squadron

The balance of power was in favor of the Japanese. For linear armored ships there was an approximate equality: 12:12. For large-caliber guns of 300 mm (254-305 mm), the advantage was on the side of the Russian squadron - 41:17; on other guns, the Japanese had an advantage: 200 mm - 6:30, 150 mm - 52:80. The Japanese had a great advantage in such important indicators as the number of shots per minute, the weight in kg of metal and explosives. For guns of 300-, 250- and 200 mm caliber, the Russian squadron fired 14 rounds per minute, the Japanese - 60; the weight of the metal was 3680 for Russian guns, for the Japanese - 9500 kg; the weight of the explosive for the Russians, for the Japanese - 1330 kg. Russian ships were also inferior in the segment of 150 and 120 mm guns. By the number of shots per minute: Russian ships - 120, Japanese - 300; metal weight in kg for Russian guns - 4500, for the Japanese - 12350; explosives for the Russians - 108, for the Japanese - 1670. The Russian squadron was also inferior in terms of armor area: 40% versus 60% and in speed: 12-14 knots versus 12-18 knots.

Thus, the Russian squadron was inferior in rate of fire by 2-3 times; in terms of the amount of metal ejected per minute, Japanese ships exceeded Russian ones by 2 1/2 times; the stock of explosives in the Japanese shells was 5-6 times greater than in the Russians. Russian thick-walled armor-piercing shells with an extremely low bursting charge pierced Japanese armor and did not explode. Japanese shells, on the other hand, produced severe destruction and fires, literally destroying all non-metal parts of the ship (there was an excess of wood on Russian ships).

In addition, the Japanese fleet had a noticeable advantage in light cruiser forces. In a direct cruising battle, Russian ships were threatened with complete defeat. They were inferior in the number of ships and guns, and were also bound by the protection of transports. The Japanese had a huge superiority in destroyer forces: 9 Russian 350-ton destroyers against 21 destroyers and 44 destroyers of the Japanese fleet.

After the appearance of Russian ships in the Strait of Malacca, the Japanese command received accurate information about the movement of the 2nd Pacific Squadron. In mid-May, the cruisers of the Vladivostok detachment went to sea, which indicated that the Russian squadron was approaching. The Japanese fleet prepared to meet the enemy. The 1st and 2nd squadrons (the armored core of the fleet of 4 squadron battleships of the 1st class and 8 armored cruisers of the 1st class, almost equal in power to the battleships) are located on the western coast of the Korea Strait, in Mozampo; 3rd squadron - off the island of Tsushima. Auxiliary cruisers from merchant steamers made up a 100-mile guard chain, spread 120 miles south of the main body. Behind the guard chain were light cruisers and patrol ships of the main forces. All forces were connected by radiotelegraph and guarded the entrance to the Korea Bay.

Japanese Admiral Togo Heihachiro

Squadron battleship Mikasa, July 1904

Squadron battleship "Mikasa", repair of the stern turret. Reid Elliot, August 12-16, 1904

Squadron battleship Shikishima, July 6, 1906

Asahi squadron battleship

On the morning of May 25, Rozhdestvensky's squadron headed for the Tsushima Strait. The ships went in two columns with transports in the middle. On the night of May 27, the Russian squadron passed the Japanese guard chain. The ships sailed without lights and were not seen by the Japanese. But the 2 hospital ships following the squadron were illuminated. At 2 o'clock. 25 min. they were noticed by a Japanese cruiser, itself remaining undetected. At dawn, first one, and then several enemy cruisers came to the Russian squadron, which followed at a distance and at times disappeared in the morning fog. At about 10 o'clock Rozhdestvensky's squadron reorganized into one wake column. Behind them moved transports and auxiliary vessels under the cover of 3 cruisers.

At 11 o'clock. 10 minutes. Japanese cruisers appeared from behind the fog, some Russian ships opened fire on them. Rozhdestvensky ordered to stop firing. At noon, the squadron headed north-east 23 ° - to Vladivostok. Then the Russian admiral tried to rebuild the right column of the squadron into the front line, but, seeing the enemy again, he abandoned this idea. As a result, the battleships ended up in two columns.

Togo, having received a message in the morning about the appearance of the Russian fleet, immediately moved from Mozampo to the eastern side of the Korea Strait (Okinoshima Island). From intelligence reports, the Japanese admiral knew perfectly well the location of the Russian squadron. When the distance between the fleets was reduced to 30 miles around noon, Togo moved towards the Russians with the main armored forces (12 squadron battleships and armored cruisers) plus 4 light cruisers and 12 destroyers. The main forces of the Japanese fleet were to attack the head of the Russian column, and Togo sent the cruising forces around the Russian rear to capture the transports.

At 13 o'clock. 30 min. the right column of Russian battleships increased its speed to 11 knots and began to evade to the left in order to go to the head of the left column and form a common column. The cruisers and transports were instructed to withdraw to the right. At that moment Togo's ships appeared from the northeast. The Japanese ships, having a course of 15 knots, went across the Russian squadron and, being ahead and somewhat to the left of our ships, began to sequentially (one after the other at one point) turn in the opposite direction - the so-called “Togo loop”. With this maneuver, Togo took a position ahead of the Russian squadron.

The turning point was very risky for the Japanese. Rozhdestvensky got a good chance to turn the tide in his favor. Having accelerated the course of the 1st detachment to the maximum, approaching the usual distance of 15 cables for Russian gunners and concentrating fire on the turning point of the Togo squadron, the Russian squadron battleships could shoot the enemy. According to a number of military researchers, such a maneuver could cause serious damage to the armored core of the Japanese fleet and allow the 2nd Pacific squadron, if not win this battle, then at least complete the task of breaking through the main forces to Vladivostok. In addition, the newest Russian battleships of the Borodino type could try to "squeeze" the Japanese ships to the column of older Russian battleships, slow but with powerful guns. However, Rozhdestvensky either did not notice this, or did not dare to take such a step, not believing in the abilities of his squadron. And he had very little time to make such a decision.

At the time of the turn of the Japanese squadron at 13 o'clock. 49 min. Russian ships opened fire from a distance of about 8 km (45 cables). At the same time, only the head battleships could effectively hit the enemy, for the rest the distance was too great, and the ships ahead interfered. The Japanese immediately responded by concentrating fire on the two flagships - "Prince Suvorov" and "Oslyab". The Russian commander turned the squadron to the right to take a position parallel to the course of the Japanese fleet, but the enemy, using greater speed, continued to cover the head of the Russian squadron, blocking the path to Vladivostok.

After about 10 minutes, the Japanese gunners took aim and their powerful high-explosive shells began to cause great destruction on Russian ships, causing severe fires. In addition, the fire and heavy smoke made it difficult for the Russians to shoot and disrupt the control of the ships. "Oslyabya" were badly damaged and about 14 hours. 30 min. having buried its nose to the very hawse, it rolled out of action to the right, after about 10 minutes the battleship capsized and sank. Commander Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Ber was wounded at the beginning of the battle and refused to leave the ship, more than 500 people died with him. Destroyers and a tug lifted 376 people out of the water. Around the same time, the Suvorov received heavy damage. Shell fragments hit the wheelhouse, killing and injuring almost everyone who was there. Rozhdestvensky was wounded. Having lost control, the battleship rolled to the right, and then dangled between squadrons, trying to regain control. During the further battle, the battleship was fired upon more than once, attacked with torpedoes. At the beginning of 18 o'clock. the destroyer "Buyny" removed from the ship part of the headquarters, led by the seriously wounded Rozhdestvensky. Soon, Japanese cruisers and destroyers finished off the crippled flagship. The entire crew was killed. When the battleship Suvorov died, Admiral Nebogatov took command, holding the flag on the squadron battleship Emperor Nicholas I.

I. A. Vladimirov. The heroic death of the battleship "Prince Suvorov" in the battle of Tsushima

I. V. Slavinsky. The last hour of the battleship "Prince Suvorov" in the battle of Tsushima

The squadron was headed by the next battleship - "Emperor Alexander III". But soon he received severe damage and moved to the center of the squadron, giving way to Borodino as the leader. They finished off the battleship "Alexander" at 18:50. concentrated fire from the armored cruisers Nissin and Kassuga. None of the crew (857 people) survived.

The Russian squadron continued to move in relative order, trying to escape from the Japanese pincers. But, the Japanese ships, without serious damage, still blocked the way. Around 15 o'clock. Japanese cruisers went to the rear of the Russian squadron, captured two hospital ships, started a battle with the cruisers, knocking down the cruisers and transports in one heap.

After 15 o'clock. the sea was suddenly covered with fog. Under his protection, the Russian ships turned to the southeast and parted ways with the enemy. The battle was interrupted, and the Russian squadron again lay down on a course of north-east 23 °, towards Vladivostok. However, the enemy cruisers discovered the Russian squadron and the battle continued. An hour later, when fog reappeared, the Russian squadron turned south and drove off the Japanese cruisers. At 17 o'clock, in obedience to the instructions of Rear Admiral Nebogatov, "Borodino" again led the column to the northeast, to Vladivostok. Then the main forces of Togo approached again, after a short firefight, the fog separated the main forces. Around 18 o'clock. Togo again caught up with the main Russian forces, concentrating fire on Borodino and Orel. "Borodino" was severely damaged, burned. At the beginning of 19 o'clock. "Borodino" received the last critical damage, was all on fire. The battleship capsized and sank with the entire crew. Only one sailor survived (Semyon Yushin). A little earlier, Alexander III died.

At sunset, the Japanese commander withdrew the ships from the battle. By the morning of May 28, all detachments were to gather north of Evenlet Island (in the northern part of the Korea Strait). The destroyer detachments were given the task of continuing the battle, encircling the Russian squadron and completing the rout with night attacks.

Thus, on May 27, 1905, the Russian squadron suffered a heavy defeat. The 2nd Pacific squadron lost 4 of the best squadron battleships out of 5. The newest battleship Oryol, which remained afloat, was badly damaged. Other ships of the squadron also received heavy damage. Many Japanese ships received several holes, but retained their combat capability.

The passivity of the Russian command, which did not even try to defeat the enemy, went into battle without any hope of success, surrendering to the will of fate, led to tragedy. The squadron only tried to break through towards Vladivostok, and did not wage a decisive and furious battle. If the captains fought resolutely, maneuvered, tried to get close to the enemy for effective shooting, the Japanese suffered much more serious losses. However, the passivity of the leadership paralyzed almost all commanders, the squadron, like a herd of bulls, stupidly and stubbornly, broke through towards Vladivostok, not trying to crush the formation of Japanese ships.

Squadron battleship "Prince Suvorov"

Squadron battleship "Oslyabya" on a campaign to the Far East as part of the 2nd Pacific Squadron

Squadron battleship "Oslyabya" in front of the Korea Strait, May 1905

Ships of the 2nd squadron during one of the stops. From left to right: squadron battleships "Navarin", "Emperor Alexander III" and "Borodino"

Squadron battleship "Emperor Alexander III"

The end of the pogrom

At night, numerous Japanese destroyers surrounded the Russian fleet from the north, east and south. Nebogatov overtook the squadron on his flagship, stood in his head and moved to Vladivostok. Cruisers and destroyers, as well as the surviving transports, having not received a task, headed in different directions. The 4 battleships remaining under Nebogatov ("Nikolai", "Eagle", "Admiral Senyavin", "General-Admiral Apraksin") were surrounded by superior enemy forces in the morning and capitulated. The crews were ready to accept the last battle and die with honor, but they complied with the admiral's order.

Only the Izumrud cruiser, which had fallen into the encirclement ring, the only cruiser remaining in the squadron after the battle and guarding the remnants of the 2nd Pacific squadron from destroyer attacks at night, did not obey the order to surrender to the Japanese. "Emerald" at full speed broke through the encirclement and went to Vladivostok. The commander of the ship, Captain 2nd Rank Vasily Ferzen, who showed himself excellently during this tragic battle and breaking through the encirclement, made a number of serious mistakes on the way to Vladivostok. Apparently, the psychological stress of the battle had an effect. When entering the Gulf of Vladimir, the ship landed on stones and was blown up by the crew, fearing the appearance of the enemy. Although at high tide it was possible to lift the ship aground.

The battleship "Navarin" was not severely damaged in the daytime battle, the losses were small. But at night he gave himself away by the light of searchlights, and the attack of the Japanese destroyers led to the death of the ship. Of the 681 crew members, only three managed to escape. The battleship Sisoy the Great received heavy damage during the daytime battle. At night, she was attacked by destroyers and received mortal damage. In the morning, the battleship reached Tsushima Island, where it collided with Japanese cruisers and a destroyer. The commander of the ship M.V. Ozerov, seeing the hopelessness of the situation, agreed to surrender. The Japanese evacuated the crew, and the ship sank. The armored cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov" was seriously damaged during the day, was torpedoed at night and scuttled in the morning so as not to surrender to the enemy. The battleship "Admiral Ushakov" was seriously damaged in the daytime battle. The ship's speed dropped, and it lagged behind the main forces. On May 28, the ship refused to capitulate and accepted an unequal battle with the Japanese armored cruisers Iwate and Yakumo. Having received heavy damage, the ship was flooded by the crew. The heavily damaged cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh" was flooded by the crew in a hopeless situation. Of all the ships of the 1st rank, the cruiser "Dmitry Donskoy" was the closest to Vladivostok. The cruiser was overtaken by the Japanese. "Donskoy" accepted the battle with the superior forces of the Japanese. The cruiser died without lowering her flag.

V. S. Ermyshev Battleship "Admiral Ushakov"

"Dmitry Donskoy"

Only the rank II cruiser Almaz, the destroyers Bravy and Grozny were able to leave for Vladivostok. In addition, the Anadyr transport went to Madagascar, and then to the Baltic. Three cruisers (Zhemchug, Oleg and Aurora) went to Manila in the Philippines and were interned there. The destroyer "Bedovy", on board of which was the wounded Rozhdestvensky, was overtaken by Japanese destroyers and surrendered.

Captured Russian sailors aboard the Japanese battleship Asahi

The main causes of the disaster

From the very beginning, the campaign of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was of an adventurous nature. Ships had to be sent to the Pacific even before the war. The meaning of the campaign was finally lost after the fall of Port Arthur and the death of the 1st Pacific Squadron. From Madagascar, the squadron had to be returned back. However, due to political ambitions, the desire to somehow raise the prestige of Russia, the fleet was sent to death.

The very campaign from Libava to Tsushima was an unprecedented feat of Russian sailors in overcoming enormous difficulties, but the battle of Tsushima showed the rottenness of the Romanov empire. The battle showed the backwardness of shipbuilding and armament of the Russian fleet in comparison with the advanced powers (the Japanese fleet was created by the efforts of the leading world powers, especially England). Russian naval power in the Far East was crushed. Tsushima became a decisive prerequisite for concluding peace with Japan, although in military-strategic terms the outcome of the war was decided on land.

Tsushima became a kind of terrible landmark event for the Russian Empire, showing the need for fundamental changes in the country, the disastrous war for Russia in its current state. Unfortunately, he was not understood, and the Russian Empire perished like the 2nd Pacific Squadron - bloody and terrifying.

One of the main reasons for the death of the squadron was the lack of initiative, indecision of the Russian command (the scourge of the Russian army and navy during the Russian-Japanese war). Rozhestvensky did not dare to raise the issue of sending the squadron back after the fall of Port Arthur. The admiral led the squadron without hope of success and remained passive, giving the initiative to the enemy. There was no specific battle plan. Long-range reconnaissance was not organized, and the opportunity to defeat the Japanese cruisers, which had been separated from the main forces for a significant time, was not used. At the beginning of the battle, they did not use the chance to deliver a strong blow to the main enemy forces. The squadron did not finish its combat formation and fought on unfavorable conditions, only the lead ships could conduct normal fire. The unsuccessful formation of the squadron allowed the Japanese to focus fire on the best battleships of the Russian squadron and quickly disable them, after which the outcome of the battle was decided. During the battle, when the lead battleships failed, the squadron actually fought without command. Nebogatov took command only in the evening and in the morning handed over the ships to the Japanese.

Among the technical reasons, one can single out the "fatigue" of the ships after a long trip, when they were separated from the normal repair base for a long time. The ships were overloaded with coal and other cargoes, which reduced their seaworthiness. Russian ships were inferior to Japanese ships in the total number of guns, armor area, speed, rate of fire, weight and explosive power of the squadron shot. There was a strong lag in cruising and destroyer forces. The ship composition of the squadron was diverse in terms of armament, protection and maneuverability, which affected its combat capability. The new battleships, as the battle showed, had weak armor and low stability.

The Russian squadron, unlike the Japanese fleet, was not a single combat organism. The personnel, both commanding and private, were distinguished by diversity. There were only enough personnel commanders to fill the main responsible positions. The shortage of command staff was compensated for by the early release of the naval corps, the call-up of "old men" from the reserve (who had no experience of walking on armored ships) and the transfer from the merchant fleet (ensigns). As a result, a strong gap has formed between young people who do not have the necessary experience and sufficient knowledge, "old people" who need to update their knowledge and "civilians" who do not have normal military training. There were also not enough sailors for military service, so about a third of the crews consisted of reserves and recruits. There were many "penalties", which the commanders "exiled" on a long voyage, which did not improve discipline on the ships. The situation was no better with non-commissioned officers. Most of the personnel were assigned to the new ships only in the summer of 1904, and could not study the ships well. Due to the fact that they had to urgently finish, repair and prepare ships, the squadron did not go together in the summer of 1904, did not study. Only in August a 10-day voyage was made. During the campaign, due to a number of reasons, the crews could not learn how to maneuver ships and shoot well.

Thus, the 2nd Pacific squadron was poorly prepared, in fact, did not receive combat training. It is clear that the Russian sailors and commanders entered the battle courageously, fought bravely, but their heroism could not rectify the situation.

V. S. Ermyshev. Battleship "Oslyabya"

A.Tron The death of the squadron battleship "Emperor Alexander III"

Aleksey Novikov, a sailor on the Orel (future Soviet marine painter), described the situation well. He was arrested in 1903 for revolutionary propaganda and, as "unreliable", was transferred to the 2nd Pacific Squadron. Novikov wrote: “Many sailors were called up from the reserve. These elderly people, clearly weaned from the naval service, lived with memories of their homeland, were sick of separation from home, from children, from their wife. The war fell on them unexpectedly, like a terrible disaster, and they, preparing for an unprecedented campaign, did their work with a gloomy look of strangled men. The team included many new recruits. Beaten and miserable, they looked at everything with a frozen horror in their eyes. They were frightened by the sea, on which they first came, and even more - by the unknown future. Even among regular sailors who graduated from various special schools, there was no usual fun. Only free kicks, in contrast to the others, kept more or less cheerfully. The coastal authorities, in order to get rid of them as a harmful element, came up with the easiest way for this: write them off on ships going to war. Thus, to the horror of the senior officer, we got up to seven percent of them.

Another good image explaining the death of the squadron was given by Novikov (under the pseudonym "sailor A. Zaterty"). Here is what he saw: “We were extremely amazed that this ship did not suffer at all from our artillery. He looked as if he was now taken out of repair. Even the paint on the guns did not burn. Our sailors, having examined the Asahi, were ready to swear that on May 14 we fought not with the Japanese, but ... what good, with the British. Inside the armadillo, we were amazed at the cleanliness, neatness, practicality and expediency of the device. On our new battleships of the Borodino type, a whole half of the ship was assigned for some thirty officers; she was cluttered with cabins, and during the battle they only increased the fires; and in the other half of the ship we had not only up to 900 sailors, but also artillery and lifts. And with our enemy on the ship, everything was used mainly for guns. Then we were struck sharply by the absence of that discord between officers and sailors, which you meet at every step with us; there, on the contrary, some kind of solidarity, kindred spirit and common interests were felt between them. It was only here for the first time that we really learned who we were dealing with in battle and what the Japanese were."

The Tsushima battle in 1905 of the Russian Pacific Flotilla with the Imperial Flotilla suffered a crushing defeat. As a result of the naval battle, the Russian squadron was defeated and destroyed. The bulk of the Russian warships were torpedoed by Japanese sailors and scuttled along with the crew members. Some ships announced their surrender, only four ships returned to the shores of their native harbor. The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) ended with a major military defeat for the Russian fleet off the coast of Tsushima Island (Japan). What are the reasons for the defeat and was another outcome of events possible?

Military and political situation in the Far East

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 began with a sudden attack by combat destroyers of the Japanese fleet on Russian ships stationed in the Port Arthur roadstead. As a result of the torpedo attack, two heavy artillery ships and one surface vessel were damaged. The history of the Far East includes many military operations. All of them were aimed at seizing and redistributing spheres of influence on this piece of Russian land.

Japan's desire to dominate Northeast China and the Korean Peninsula was fiercely supported by England and the United States of America. The small allies of Russia, such as France, Germany and others, supported the Russian Emperor Nicholas II in every possible way in the matter of preserving Russian territories. However, in decisive strategic moments, they still tried to maintain neutrality. Allied assistance was shown only when it was in their commercial interests.

Making a strategic decision

The ever-increasing Japanese attacks on Port Arthur, the main base of the Russian Pacific Fleet, forced Emperor Nicholas II to take decisive measures. The decision was made in July 1904. A squadron led by Vice Admiral Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhestvensky was sent from Kronstadt to the weakened Pacific squadron to defeat and destroy the Japanese fleet.

Already on the way, the Baltic ships learn that Port Arthur has been taken, and all the ships in the roadstead are flooded. The Pacific Fleet has been destroyed. Such is the maritime history of the Russian Far East. Nevertheless, Nicholas II decides to continue the path of the imperial fleet to the shores of Japan. To reinforce the attacking squadron, a detachment of warships of Rear Admiral N. I. Nebogatov was sent.

Unequal forces of opponents

The course of the Tsushima battle could be predicted by the number of combat units of the opposing sides. The Pacific Flotilla of Vice Admiral Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhdestvensky included:

• 8 squadron heavy artillery against 4 Japanese;
• 3 coastal guard battleships against 6 enemy ships;
• 1 cruiser battleship against 8 units of the Japanese Imperial Navy;
• 8 cruisers against 16 Japanese cruisers;
• 5 against 24 auxiliary warships of Japan;
• 9 Russian vs 63 Japanese

The clear combat advantage of the Japanese Admiral Heihachiro Togo speaks for itself. The combat experience of the Japanese fleet was superior to the Russian one in all respects, despite the fact that Russia had a much richer history of naval battles. Japanese combat arrows skillfully mastered the art of hitting an enemy target at long distances, moreover, at one target from several ships. The Russian fleet had no such experience. The main occupation of that period was the imperial reviews (parades) of marine equipment, which were held annually by order of Emperor Nicholas II.

Mistakes and miscalculations of the Russian admiral

The strategic task of the naval campaign of Admiral Z. P. Rozhdestvensky was to capture the Sea of ​​Japan. This condition was set by Emperor Nicholas II. However, Z. P. Rozhdestvensky saw the following as his operational goal: to break through to Vladivostok by any means, regardless of the possible losses of his fleet. It is possible that bypassing the Japanese islands from the east would have been a strategically correct decision, and the Tsushima naval battle would not have taken place.

But the naval commander chose a different, shorter route. It was decided to go through the straits. The Korea Strait, connecting the East China and the Sea of ​​Japan, goes around the island of Tsushima, which, in turn, has two routes: the western passage and the eastern (Tsushima Strait). It was there that the Japanese admiral Heitatiro Togo was waiting for the Russian sailors.

All passages are closed

The commander of the Japanese fleet chose a strategically correct plan for possible military operations. A sentinel chain of ships was organized between the islands, which could notify the commander of possible maneuvers and the approach of Russian ships. On the outskirts of Vladivostok, the Japanese prudently set up minefields. Everything is ready for battle. The Japanese ships of the Tsushima battle were waiting for the approach of Russian ships. abandoned naval reconnaissance, fearing that his squadron would be detected by enemy reconnaissance cruisers.

The obvious outcome of the main battle of the Russo-Japanese War

To send such a motley armada across three oceans seemed to many to be madness. Veterans with worn-out mechanisms, having clocked hundreds of thousands of nautical miles, and the newest, hastily completed, untested ships were sent to this doomed campaign. Sailors always treat their ships as inanimate sentient beings. Armadillos with the names of eminent commanders seemed to specifically not want to go to inevitable death.

They got stuck on the descent during the slipway, sank right next to the factory walls during repairs, ran aground, as if giving clear warning signs to their crews.

How not to believe signs?

At the beginning of 1900, an assembly model of the battleship "Emperor Alexander III" burned down in the workshop. The launch of this ship was marked by the fall of the flagpole with the imperial standard and was accompanied by human casualties.

The battleship "Eagle" sank in the civilian harbor, and later ran aground several times, catching up with the squadron in the Gulf of Finland. The battleship "Glory" in general could not be sent on a campaign.

However, the high command had no premonitions. On September 26, 1904, the highest imperial review took place in Reval (formerly Tallinn). Nicholas II went around all the ships and wished the sailors to reach Port Arthur and connect with the first squadron of the Pacific Fleet for the joint mastery of the Sea of ​​Japan. A week later, seven battleships, a cruiser, destroyers left their native shores forever. A 220-day trip to the Japanese coast with a length of 18,000 nautical miles has begun.

Unseen circumstances

The main problem faced by the squadron command is the problem with fuel. According to the international maritime law of that time, warships of the belligerent side could enter the ports of the neutral side only for a day. England, which owned most of the loading stations along the route of the squadron, closed its ports to Russian warships.

The supply of the squadron with coal, provisions and fresh water had to be organized directly at sea. For repairs, a special workshop "Kamchatka" was equipped, staffed by artisan volunteers. By the way, they also shared the fate of military sailors. In general, the implementation of a strategic operation of this magnitude deserves the highest praise.

The heaviest loading of coal on the high seas, unbearable tropical heat, when the temperature in the boiler rooms reached 70º Celsius, the most severe storm at the Cape of Good Hope - all this did not stop the movement of the squadron. None of the ships turned back.

Circumnavigation across three oceans

The Russian squadron, like a ghost, loomed on the horizon, rarely approaching ports and harbors. The whole world followed her movement. International telegraph and telephone lines were overloaded. Correspondents and reporters guarded the squadron along the entire route:

• Port Said (Egypt);
• Djibouti (East Africa);
• Aden (Yemen);
• Dakar (Senegal);
• Conakry (Guinea);
• Cape Town (South Africa).

But all attempts were fruitless. The first long stay was in Masiba Bay (Madagascar). The cruising detachment of Rear Admiral D. G. von Felkerzam also joined there, passing a short way through the Suez Canal. During exercises in Madagascar, Admiral Z. P. Rozhdestvensky became convinced of the inability of his subordinates to shoot accurately and maneuver correctly.

However, this surprised no one. The crews were formed for the most part from recruits and penalized. Two months later - a jump across the Indian Ocean. The infinitely tired squadron was met by Chinese fishermen in the straits near Singapore, the Vietnamese in Cam Ranh. The last sea caravan to be seen from Jeju Island was Korean divers for pearls. The Tsushima battle will begin very soon, the date of the death of the squadron was approaching.

First shot at the enemy

At 1340 hours, the flagship battleship Knyaz Suvorov, under the command of Captain 1st Rank V.V. volleys. The Tsushima naval battle began. For most of the crew, the outcome was clear even in St. Petersburg.

From a letter from the commander of the battleship of the guards crew “Emperor Alexander III”, captain of the 3rd rank N. M. Bukhvustov: “You wish us victory. Needless to say, we want it. But there will be no victory. At the same time, I guarantee that we will all die, but we will not surrender. The commander kept his word and died along with the full composition of the battleship.

Tsushima battle, briefly about the main

At 14:15, exactly thirty-five minutes after the start of the battle, the battleship Oslyabya, led by Captain 1st Rank V.I. Baer, ​​with a strong bow deferent and a huge fire on the rostras, rolled out of formation and fell on the port side . Ten minutes later, he disappeared under the water, leaving on the surface only fragments of wood and people floundering in the water.

A few minutes after the death of the Oslyabya, ships torpedoed by Japanese sailors broke down one after another.

By 4 p.m., the battleship Knyaz Suvorov was out of action, which was badly damaged by Japanese shells. Resembling a burning island, it repelled enemy attacks for about five hours. In the last minutes, the Russian sailors fired back from the only surviving three-inch gun and rifles. The battleship received seven torpedo hits and went under water.

A little earlier, it was possible to remove Admiral Z. P. Rozhdestvensky with headquarters on the destroyer "Buyny". A total of 23 people were evacuated. No one else could be saved. He commanded a squadron battleship and the captain of the 1st rank, a talented marine painter Vasily Vasilyevich Ignatius, died on it.

In general, during the Russo-Japanese War, two remarkable artists died, both graduates of the naval corps and, by a strange coincidence, full namesakes. The second artist is Vasily Vasilyevich Vereshchagin, who drowned along with the battleship Petropavlovsk off the coast of Port Arthur. Then, at the same time, Admiral S.O. Makarov, who won many Russian naval battles and was the glory and pride of the Russian fleet, also died. Following the flagship "Prince Suvorov", the Russian Imperial Navy lost:

• "Sisoy the Great" under the command of Captain 1st Rank M.P. Ozerov;
• the battleship Navarin, led by the captain of the 1st rank, Baron B. A. Fitingof;
• the cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov", which was subordinate to the later captured captain of the 1st rank A. A. Rodionov;
• the squadron battleship "Admiral Ushakov", commanded by Captain 1st Rank V.N. Miklukhina (the ship was the last to die from the Russian squadron);
• "Admiral Senyavin" led by the captain of the 1st rank S. I. Grigoriev, who was captured by the Japanese.

The tragedy continues

The Battle of Tsushima in 1905 carried more and more Russian sailors and their ships into the depths of the sea. Another fatally mutilated battleship went under water with the entire crew on board. Until the last minute, people - from the commander to the stoker - had a glimmer of hope that they would be able to overcome this nightmarish Tsushima battle (1905) and the Russian coast would appear on the course north-east 23. The main thing is to survive. Many have died with this thought. Russian sailors on the battleships following behind watched the place of death of their comrades. They whispered with lips black from burning: "God rest their souls."

The battleship "Emperor Alexander III" and a little later "Borodino" died with the entire crew. Miraculously, only one sailor escaped. The outcome of the battle was predetermined. The Battle of Tsushima in 1905 made us think about the invincibility of the Russian fleet. The next morning, the remnants of the Russian squadron that survived the night torpedo attacks were handed over to the Japanese by Rear Admiral N. I. Nebogatov. Later, Admiral Nikolai Ivanovich Nebogatov was sentenced to ten years in prison by the decision of the Naval Court of His Imperial Majesty.

The fate of the commander

The commander of the destroyer "Buyny", who saved Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky, was the captain of the 2nd rank Nikolai Nikolaevich Kolomiytsev. The fate of this man is very amazing. Before the Russo-Japanese War, he was a prominent hydrographer, traveler, explorer of Taimyr, commander of the Ermak icebreaker. He participated in the Russian polar expedition of Baron Eduard Tol. Returning to Russia after Tsushima, where he proved himself to be one of the best commanders of the Russian fleet, N. N. Kolomiytsev commanded various ships. During the First World War he became a vice admiral. In 1918 he was arrested by the Bolsheviks and imprisoned in the Peter and Paul Fortress. In most Soviet-era publications, biographical information about N. N. Kolomiytsev ends with the words: “He died in Petrograd, presumably in 1918.” In 1972, a new hydrographic vessel was named after him. Only recently it became clear that Nikolai Kolomiytsev fled to Finland in 1918. Later he fought on the Black Sea on the side of Baron Wrangel. Then he moved to France, and died in the United States of America under the wheels of a military truck at the end of 1944. Thus, the ship "Nikolai Kolomiytsev" was the only ship in the Soviet fleet bearing the name of the White Guard admiral and emigrant.

History reference

From the lists of the military fleets of that time, two ships of the participant in the Tsushima battle have survived to this day. These are the well-known cruiser Aurora and the Japanese battleship Mikasa, the flagship of Admiral Heihachiro Togo. The armored Aurora at Tsushima fired about two thousand shells at the enemy, receiving, in turn, twenty-one hits. The cruiser was seriously damaged, sixteen people from its crew, including E.R. Egoriev, were killed, another 83 people were injured. Unable to go forward, the Aurora, along with the cruisers Oleg and Zhemchug, disarmed in Manila (Philippines). According to some military experts, participation in the Battle of Tsushima gives the Aurora cruiser more reason to serve as a memorial than the famous blank shot in October 1917.

In the city of Yokosuka, the battleship Mikasa stands as a museum ship. For a very long time, on the anniversary of Tsushima, meetings of veterans, participants in the Russo-Japanese War, were held on it. The Japanese treat this monument of history with great reverence.

The memory of the dead sailors at Tsushima

Of the 36 units of the Russian squadron, three came to Vladivostok. Messenger ship Almaz, destroyers Grozny and Bravy. Most of the ships and 5,000 sailors found eternal rest at the bottom of the Korea Strait near the islands of Tsushima and Evenlet. The graves of Russian sailors who died of wounds in captivity are still carefully preserved by the Japanese in Nagasaki. In 1910, in St. Petersburg, the snow-white Church of the Savior on the Waters, dedicated to the victims of Tsushima, was built with the people's money and widow's contributions. The temple did not stand for long, until the mid-30s. The Russo-Japanese War, the Battle of Tsushima - these two terms will forever remain in the eternal memory of the Russian people.