Command Syrian Arab Army changed the tactics of attacks on positions Islamic State 1(banned in Russia). Not so long ago, the SAA operated in the desert exclusively along the routes, without providing flanks, with vulnerable rear communications, as a result of which it naturally suffered losses and was forced to retreat. Now, apparently, the task is to ensure an offensive along the entire width of the front.
So, at the beginning of summer, a special unit Syrian Arab Army"Tiger Force" under the command of Brigadier General Suheil al-Hassan Together with detachments of the National Defense Forces (NDF), they carried out successful operations in the provinces of Aleppo and Raqqa. From terrorists "Islamic State"(banned in the Russian Federation) not only oil and gas fields were liberated, but also the strategically important city of Resafa. Thanks to this, it was possible to create the so-called "Khanasser cauldron", which became the reason for the liberation from terrorists of a significant territory north of the Itria-Resafa highway.
Now it allows pro-government forces along the road to the oasis of As-Sukhna. According to the latest data, the "Tigers" and the NDF detachments are now 110-120 kilometers from the city of Deir ez-Zor, which has been besieged by IS 1 (banned in the Russian Federation) for several years, and by all means they need to take a road junction near Debaisin oil field. This will make it possible to unite with the pro-government forces operating in the area of the Arak field in the east of Palmyra in order to advance to Deir ez-Zor through the oasis of As-Sukhna, which, in fact, is the last serious obstacle on the way to the besieged city.
The meeting of pro-government forces will provide another cauldron, which will allow taking the strategic foothold of terrorists in the east of the province of Hama Akerbat. The attack of the SAA on this city from the west, from Salamia, even with the serious support of the Russian Aerospace Forces, did not bring any significant results. Too convenient location for terrorists, powerful rear communications, underground tunnels made the creation of the "Akerbat cauldron" the only way to eliminate the outpost of terrorists.
The boilers are used by pro-government forces in southern Syria as well. During the second phase of the "Great Dawn" campaign, on the border between the provinces of Es-Suwayda and Damascus, with the help of boilers, about two hundred square kilometers of territory were liberated from pro-American radicals.
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Sociology, Russian University of Economics named after G.V. Plekhanov Alexander Perendzhiev in conversation with Federal News Agency (FAN) emphasized that the new tactics Syrian Arab Army is a direct result of the work of Russian military advisers.
“The environment is generally a classic form of achieving victory. It is necessary to achieve exactly the environment in the confrontation with the militants "Islamic State"(banned in the Russian Federation), also because the terrorists use the so-called "cloud tactics", "clot movements", unexpected appearances from different flanks, strikes within the units themselves, forced only to defend themselves, while the militants take possession of the settlement " .
The expert noted that the Syrian army alone was not able to independently find a method of countering the maneuvering actions of terrorists. And it was our military advisers on the ground, sometimes at the cost of their lives, who studied this cunning tactic and developed not only a methodology for repelling, but also for defeating the enemy.
“It was our advisers, together with the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, who developed tactics to counter terrorists, as a result of which offensives were launched with the development of boilers.”
Our interlocutor drew attention to the fact that the offensive along the routes, which was previously used by the CAA, is a comfortable movement. In the desert, due to the lack of communications, it is much more difficult to move forward.
“From the history of wars, we know that heavy maneuvers in the desert and access to the flank and rear of the enemy involve moving through unfavorable terrain in the desert. And I think this was also foreseen by our advisors. When advancing in a desert area, of course, it is necessary to provide a complex of material support: the supply of water, food, ammunition, and so on. In addition, after the fighters arrive at the place, after some time it will be necessary to carry out rotations.
According to Alexandra Perendzhieva, in the new actions of the CAA, a clear algorithm of actions should have been thought out:
“The military organism itself, the military command and control system of the SAA is becoming more complicated, but due to this complication and understanding of who and how should act, victory is achieved. Military advisers are just training Syrian soldiers and officers to teach how to manage this complicated system.”
1 The organization is prohibited on the territory of the Russian Federation.
Under the hot sun of Syria
SYRIA... You pronounce this word, and the ancient history of the country and the turbulent events of recent decades are resurrected in your memory. Many other things are connected with this word, in particular, the excitement and feelings caused by the proposal to go to Syria.
Inviting me to his place, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov began the conversation with a tough and direct question: "Tell me honestly, General, did we choose you right?" Then Dmitry Fedorovich briefly but succinctly described the situation in the Middle East, directly in the Syrian Arab Republic. He spoke about the growing contradictions between the Arab countries, about the beginning of the war between Iran and Iraq, about the expansionist aspirations of Israel, the intensification of the actions of the extremist organization "Muslim Brotherhood" aimed at destabilizing the situation in Syria.
Before the departure, there were also detailed conversations with the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov, other officials of the Ministry of Defense. Of great importance was also familiarity with the documents that determine the nature and dynamics of the development of Soviet-Syrian military cooperation.
The situation in the region appeared before me in more detail after the first meetings with the USSR Ambassador to Syria Vladimir Ivanovich Yukhin, as well as with the officers of the office of the chief military adviser. In the very first days, I was received by President Sarhafez Assad, Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas, and other top officials of the country. Subsequently, I maintained constant working contacts with military leaders through personal meetings or by telephone.
Of interest are some facts of the biographies of the President of the CAP and the Minister of Defense.
X. Assad was born in 1930 in a small town in the northwest of the country, not far from Latakia. He was the eldest son in a large peasant family, he became interested in social and political activities at school. At the same time as Syria gained independence, he joined the Baath (Arab Socialist Renaissance Party). In 1955, H. Assad entered the air force school. Diligence and talent made him the best pilot in the country. He improved his flying skills in the Soviet Union, at the aviation training center near Frunze. I have often heard from President Assad warm words about this period of his life.
In 1963, an underground military group organized by H. Assad
could the Ba'ath party take power. A cautious and pragmatic leader who knows how to balance "on the edge", H. Assad has earned respect in the party and the people.
Syrian Defense Minister M. Tlas graduated from a tank college, served and fought in Egypt. Being the commander of a tank battalion, he met H. Assad. They agreed in their views, together participated in the political struggle. In 1970, Tlass played one of the important roles in the removal of the former head of state from power. In 1972, he received the rank of Corps General, became Minister of Defense, and First Deputy Commander-in-Chief. M. Tlas studied in the Soviet Union, graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff. One of his many scientific works is devoted to the military heritage of Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov. M, Tlas is a comprehensively educated person and, undoubtedly, gifted. He is the author of several collections of poetry, a portrait painter, an excellent photographer, a recognized specialist in improving cameras in Syria. ... But let's go back to the autumn of 1980.
Events developed rapidly. In early October, Iraq and Jordan began to accuse Syria of fueling the conflict between Iran and Iraq. In Baghdad and Amman, there were reports that Syrian and Lebanese units were allegedly operating as part of the Iranian troops. In a conversation about this, the Chief of the General Staff of the Syrian Armed Forces, Corps General X. Shehabi, told me: "Iran does not need foreign volunteers. It has millions of its valiant fighters ready to repel the Iraqi invaders."
These days, Syria announced the establishment of new relations with the USSR. On October 9, the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed in Moscow between the Soviet Union and Syria. This document obliged the entire apparatus of the chief military adviser to a great deal. First of all, it was necessary to step up work to improve the forms of operational and combat training of the Syrian troops and headquarters. To solve these difficult tasks, it was necessary to strengthen the composition of advisers with hard-working, knowledgeable specialists. The USSR Ministry of Defense met our proposals: in a short time, the main links of the Soviet apparatus were staffed with experienced generals and officers. Major General V.N. arrived at the post of deputy for armaments. Guryev is a highly qualified specialist and an excellent organizer. Lieutenant General K.S. became Senior Advisor for Air Defense (Air Defense). Babenko. He was transferred to Syria from the post of deputy commander of the Baku Air Defense District. Air Force Major General V.A. Sokolov and Major General Yu.S. Ulchenko.
We worked regardless of the time. Already in mid-November, to the surprise of CAP Minister of Defense M. Tlas, documents on operational and combat training for 1981 were developed and translated into Arabic.
Supreme Commander-in-Chief H. Assad gratefully accepted our proposals and ordered them to be implemented in all levels of the Syrian armed forces.
From about mid-November, some dissatisfaction began to appear on the part of the Syrian military leadership with respect to the Soviet representatives. About the reasons for it, Ambassador V.I. Yukhin learned on November 19, when they were invited to the Minister of Defense of Syria. He said that Syria has mobilization resources. In the event of war, and it is not far off, the country can deploy a million-strong army, but there are no weapons for it, and for some reason Moscow does not understand this.
The conversation ended with the delivery of a message from the Chairman of the CAP Council of Ministers A. Kasem addressed to A.N. Kosygin. The letter expressed the dissatisfaction of the Syrian leadership with the decisions taken in Moscow on the supply of weapons and military equipment, a request was made to send to Syria in 1981-1982. new special property worth about 2 billion rubles, as well as a revision of the balance of payments.
The question of the priority of deliveries over all other aspects of the Soviet-Syrian military cooperation remained for a long time in the center of attention of both countries. Significant progress has been made on this issue since the beginning of 1982, when the approach of a major military conflict was increasingly felt in the Middle East.
Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov demanded a detailed report on the state of the Syrian armed forces with conclusions and proposals. For several days in a row they prepared a document, arguing for each position. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR agreed with our conclusions. However, a call soon followed from Ogarkov with a question about the strengths and weaknesses of the Israeli army. I reported my point of view. Nikolai Vasilyevich listened attentively, considered my considerations reasonable and wished me success.
Ogarkov's call was probably connected with the invitation to the Chief of General Staff of CAP X. Shekhabi that followed a few days later. He gave me two messages addressed to N.V. Ogarkov, which are given below with abbreviations. The first specifically stated:
"Dear Comrade Marshal! On behalf of the government, I have the honor to inform you that, in accordance with the decision of the political leadership of Syria, our delegation will only have the authority to sign a supply agreement, with regard to the agreement
on accommodation and calls, then this agreement is under consideration by the political leadership of the country, taking into account the development of current events within the country, in the region and in the world. [...]
We express the hope that our delegation will be received by you at a certain time for the final signing of the supply agreement. X. Shekhabi" The second message read: "Dear friend, comrade. marshal! The conditions that our Soviet friends put forward, linking the signing of an agreement on supplies with the signing of an agreement on calls, lay a new direction in relations between our two countries, and this direction does not correspond to the spirit of the agreement signed by our two presidents in October 1980. [...]
I hope our friends understand that the question of entry and accommodation is a special matter. It is related to many issues in the region, as well as independence and sovereignty, and therefore needs more detailed bilateral study and reflection in order to prevent irreparable mistakes.
We have rejected and continue to reject all attacks and comparisons made by the enemies of our cooperation with you and the parallels they draw regarding the alliance between the United States and Israel. But it is impossible not to take into account, and even more so to forget, that in the last year alone the United States provided Israel with $3 billion in aid, and Egypt with $1.5 billion, and, as we know, without preconditions.
Finishing the letter, I would like to say: we see it as our duty to develop and consolidate our cooperation. Such cooperation that would serve our common interests and raise our relations to an even higher level than at present. X. Shekhabi".
Two days later the ambassador received instructions from Moscow. First:
"Damascus, Soviet ambassador. Together with the chief military adviser to the Minister of Defense, visit Tlass and convey from the political leadership of the USSR our consent to receive in Moscow in April 1982, within the agreed time frame, the Syrian government delegation for negotiations and
signing an agreement on the supply of special equipment in accordance with the decisions of the Soviet government known to the Syrian side. Telegraph about execution. Gromyko".
"Only for you and the chief military adviser.
Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU No. 723 of April 8, 1982
In order to support the H. Assad regime in its fight against anti-government protests inside the country and the Arab reaction, it was considered expedient for us not to link the accommodation agreement with the supply agreement. L. Brezhnev. April 8, 1982." These telegrams became a real balm for the ambassador and me. They meant that the main thing had been achieved: to prevent such a development of events when the USSR would, voluntarily or involuntarily, be drawn into the Middle East conflict.
On June 3, I sent a cipher-telegram to Moscow: “To the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. I report that in the coming days we should expect an invasion of the ground grouping of the Israeli Armed Forces into Lebanon” 3.6.1982
He reported his proposals to CAP Minister of Defense M. Tlas, then to the President. They fully agreed with this assessment of the situation.
As we expected, on June 5 Israeli aircraft attacked concentrations of Palestinian militias in the areas of Nabatiyah, Arnun, Saida and others.
A new war has begun in Lebanon. It was assessed differently, and even now it is still considered contradictory by political and military figures, the media. Looking ahead, I will say that the war, despite the fierceness of the fighting, the size of the losses of the parties in personnel and military equipment, was limited, the operations did not extend to the deep regions of Syria and Israel.
The combat plan developed by the Israeli General Staff provided for the exit of Israeli units to the approaches to Beirut as soon as possible.
In the Bekaa Valley, through which the shortest route to Damascus ran, an Israeli armored division was advancing. It was reinforced by "Nakhal" (military youth formations) units. The paramilitary Palestinian formations opposing it, of course, could not stop it.
Taking into account the current situation, the Syrian command has put forward here three forward detachments, one tank battalion each from the 91st tank brigade, to the lines equipped in advance in engineering terms. Each battalion was reinforced by a company of machine gunners from the commando regiment and was covered by Osa anti-aircraft missile systems. Advance detachments with similar means of reinforcement were also advanced in the central sector of the defensive zone. The main forces of the Syrian group in Lebanon (three divisions in the first echelon and two in the second) were in spare areas by the beginning of the war. Only limited forces were left in the defense zone. At the same time, decoys were widely used: inflatable tanks camouflaged to match the color of the terrain, guns, anti-aircraft missile systems coated with metallized paint and equipped with thermal emitters. Due to this, the Israeli troops' fire strike before forcing the Zahrani River on June 8 did not reach the real goal. But the airborne assault and the advanced enemy detachments that crossed to the opposite bank of the river met an organized rebuff. The enemy was stopped, and in some places driven back to their original lines.
The main forces of the Israeli troops on the northern bank of the Zahrani River concentrated by the morning of June 9th. By this time, Syrian troops had moved out of the reserve areas and occupied pre-equipped defensive zones. At dawn, four armored divisions of Israel, supported by artillery and aviation on a front of more than 100 km - from the Mediterranean coast to the mountainous regions of Harmon - went on the offensive. The most powerful armed forces in the Middle East clashed in confrontation. On both sides, the battle involved: more than 200 thousand personnel (excluding Palestinians); about 3,000 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles; over 3,000 guns and mortars; about 900 aircraft. According to the reports of Soviet military advisers to the commanders of corps, divisions, brigades, the Syrian troops fought well on the whole.
At a meeting with the leadership of the General Staff, which was personally held by Commander-in-Chief H. Assad, it was reported that over the course of four days the Syrian Air Force made 958 sorties and shot down 23 Israeli aircraft in air battles. CAP air defense systems destroyed 35 air targets, including 27 combat aircraft, the Ground Forces destroyed 160 Israeli tanks, more than 10 artillery and anti-aircraft missile batteries, the enemy troops suffered heavy losses in manpower. On June 10, the initiative passed into the hands of the Syrian command. A favorable environment has developed for the transition to more active actions. The Syrians began to prepare a counterattack by the forces of the 1st and 3rd tank divisions, the 47th and 51st separate tank brigades and four commando regiments against the flank and rear of the enemy, who had broken through along the Mediterranean coast and reached Beirut. There was a real opportunity to surround and destroy the aggressor.
However, events took a different turn, undesirable for Syria. The United States and its allies hastened to the rescue of Israel. A series of visits by high-ranking representatives of the American administration followed in Damascus. The result of their negotiations with the leaders of the CAP, accompanied by pressure and promises, was the order of President X, Assad, dated June 11, 1982, to stop the hostilities of the Syrian troops against the Israelis and consolidate them on the achieved lines. This truce was not in favor of Syria. The Americans and their NATO allies used the respite to concentrate their fleets in the Mediterranean, and in particular off the coast of Lebanon. The Israeli command received time to regroup forces and assets.
In world public opinion, the impression could have been that Syria was defeated and capitulated. It was especially disappointing that even in Moscow not everyone understood the current situation. From various branches of the armed forces and military branches, one commission after another began to arrive in Damascus, without asking the consent of the CAP leadership. They were interested, in particular, in the reasons for the destruction of anti-aircraft missile systems, and, oddly enough, they were looking for the culprits primarily among their own. It is not difficult to imagine how the officers of the Soviet apparatus felt in this confusion. It was no longer possible to put up with this state of affairs, and I decided to turn to the Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov. By phone, I reported that the truce was not for long, the fight between Syria and Israel was still ahead. The conversation went on for over an hour. Dmitry Fedorovich did not interrupt, listened attentively to me, in conclusion he said: “We must agree with you. We will take measures to improve the situation. Tell the Syrian leadership: let them immediately, today, send a delegation to Moscow to determine what equipment, weapons and ammunition should be put in the first place. With this delegation, let your deputy for armaments fly out. Inspectors, except for Yurasov and Gorshkov, be seconded immediately to Moscow."
In continuation and reinforcement of a telephone conversation with D.F. Ustinov, I sent a cipher telegram to him with the following content: "According to various sources, and sometimes from persons who were far from the real events, conclusions are drawn about some kind of defeat and even complete defeat of the Syrian armed forces in Lebanon in repelling Israeli aggression. It is impossible to agree with such conclusions and reports.
Firstly, such conclusions are completely in line with the desire of the United States and the entire world Jewish mafia: to discredit Soviet weapons, our operational art and tactics, to create the "myth of invincibility" they want at this stage.
Secondly, this is not true. The Syrian armed forces, as you know, entered into active hostilities only on June 9, 1982, when the Israelis transferred the hostilities to their zone of responsibility, i.e. on the fourth day of the war. Four armored divisions and two separate brigades of Israeli troops were severely defeated. By the morning of June 11, the Syrian troops completely seized the initiative and began to counterattack in an organized manner. In the Damascus direction, artillery counter-preparation was carried out in the area of concentration of the arrived enemy 14th Panzer Division and thwarted its entry into the battle. Syrian troops also repelled a psychic attack in Lebanon, undertaken with the aim of breaking through the defenses in the Bekaa Valley and capturing the Beirut-Damascus highway. It was this current situation - the transfer of the initiative into the hands of the Syrians - that frightened the United States. They realized that at this stage they could lose their "mace" in the face of Israel in the Middle East and undertook political and diplomatic pressure, deceit and blackmail to force the Syrian leadership to agree to a ceasefire.
Thirdly, Soviet weapons and military equipment, with their skillful use, have shown their reliability over the latest American-Israeli ones, and our tanks, especially the T-72 and T-62, are completely superior.
Fourthly, the Syrian formations and units that took part in the hostilities not only did not lose their combat ability, but, on the contrary, became stronger, believing in their strength, convinced of the reliability and superiority of Soviet weapons in their hands. They continue to firmly hold the defensive lines they occupy in Lebanon for the hour of the ceasefire, improve them in engineering terms and are ready to repel enemy attacks in the event of a resumption of hostilities.
The operational-strategic leadership was carried out and continues with the help of our advisers at the central apparatus of the Syrian Ministry of Defense. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief - President H. Assad and the Minister of Defense of the Syrian Arab Republic M. Tlas are working in close contact with us. Decisions on military matters are worked out jointly.
Fifthly, the Air Force and Air Defense, electronic warfare units, radio and radio engineering units equipped with our equipment have done and are doing everything possible to complete the tasks. But we must admit that our technology is inferior to the technology of the United States and Israel. There are many vulnerabilities in these types of armed forces, military branches and special forces of the CAP Armed Forces, which I reported to you earlier and will be reported in detail upon L.I.'s arrival in Moscow. Gorshkov - Deputy Chief of the Military Industrial Complex under the Council of Ministers of the USSR and First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the country's Air Defense, Colonel-General E.S. Yurasov. Yashkin.
June 12, 1982." I must emphasize that after this report, the situation began to improve, including with regard to the coverage of events in the Middle East in the domestic media. Correspondents of Krasnaya Zvezda, TASS, political observers of the State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company appeared in Damascus.
The Syrian leaders made a significant contribution to debunking the myth created by Western propaganda about the backlog of our equipment and weapons.
"This is a baseless lie," President X. Assad said at the 20th Syrian Trade Union Congress. The President gave the following example: “They talked a lot about the Israeli Merkava tank, claiming that it was the best in the world. However, the battles showed that the T-72 tank was the best among the tanks participating in the battle. Where this tank opposed the Israeli , the latter could not stand it." Similar statements have been repeatedly made by CAP Minister of Defense M. Tlas.
Many examples refuting the fabrications of Zionist propaganda were published by the Syrian press.
"Our weapons are good, and our fighters are able to use them with maximum efficiency" - under this heading, the Syrian newspaper "Tishrin" published a report from the air defense unit in two issues. In one of the battles, the soldiers of this unit shot down an Israeli Phantom aircraft, which was making a reconnaissance flight over the positions of Syrian units.
Among the measures taken at that time by the Soviet leadership in order to support Syria in its struggle against Israeli aggression, the arrival of a representative delegation from Moscow headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov.
The delegation's working group was engaged in determining the needs of the Syrian armed forces for new equipment, weapons, and ammunition. It was about the ammunition of the so-called volumetric explosion, as well as air-to-air missiles of the AA-8, AA-7 types. Soon, Soviet MIG-23 and MIG-25 aircraft began to arrive at CAP. In terms of their combat qualities, they were not inferior to the American F-15 and F-16 vehicles.
The intensification of the supply of Soviet weapons to Syria, the moral support provided by the dispatch of such a representative delegation to Damascus, were all the more important because a few days earlier, on July 18, Israeli troops, violating the terms of the truce, launched fire strikes on Syrian positions. Israeli troops made one attempt after another to break through the defenses of the Syrians in the Bekaa Valley, but they were unsuccessful. And here an important role was played not only by the stubbornness of the Syrian infantrymen, artillerymen, tankers, not only by the skills acquired by the commanding staff in the rapid concentration of forces and means in threatened areas. Skillful engineering equipment of positions meant a lot. I must admit that it was not easy for our advisers to achieve this. Syrian officers said: why waste strength, dig into the ground, if a truce has been reached? Later, having learned in battles the role of the engineering equipment of the area, they sincerely thanked us.
In the course of hostilities, mobile anti-tank units armed with bassoon anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) have proven themselves well. The story of their appearance in the Syrian mechanized brigades is as follows. On one of the first days of the war, an adviser to the commander of the Syrian troops in Lebanon, Major General M.P. Nosenko started talking about a mobile anti-tank reserve.
"The idea is good, Mikhail Petrovich, but what to create it from?" I asked.
"Our Bassoon ATGMs will do. I know their capabilities well. We will pick up vehicles for their installation here," MP replied. Nosenko.
At the next report to Moscow, I shared this idea with the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov. He supported our proposal. Literally on the second day, 120 Fagot ATGMs and six sets of ammunition for them were delivered by special flights to Syria. In the mechanized brigades of the 1st and 3rd tank divisions and in the newly created 10th mechanized division, mobile anti-tank platoons were formed on all-terrain vehicles. For several days of fighting, they destroyed more than 150 enemy tanks. Only one 21st mechanized brigade of the 3rd Panzer Division in the battles on the outskirts of the Damascus Plateau destroyed 59 combat vehicles.
I would like to give other examples of the skillful actions of our advisers and specialists, their courage and valor.
In the battles to hold the Beirut-Damascus highway and on the approaches to the Damascus Plateau, the situation sometimes developed in such a way that they had to take up arms. On July 20, I had to worry about Major General M.P. Nosenko. The enemy landed a tactical landing in the rear of the Syrian troops. Part of it leaked in the direction of the M.P. Nosenko. A control group consisting of five Soviet and three Syrian officers, as well as two crews of radio stations, entered the fray. For about an hour, she repelled the onslaught, until a tank company approached. Together, the enemy was destroyed. In this battle, two of our sergeants and two Syrian officers were killed. Was wounded and M.P. Nosenko.
Anything happened during the fight. Military adviser to the commander of the 10th mechanized division, Major General V.V. Gubkin had to temporarily take command of the unit. The division received the task of occupying a defense zone in the mountainous regions of Aley. During the reconnaissance, the division commander, Brigadier General Et-Din Akla, fell ill. Before being evacuated to the hospital, he asked General Gubkin to complete the work. He ordered the unit commanders to unquestioningly follow the adviser's instructions. The division occupied the defense zone in a timely manner and equipped it in engineering terms. Then she successfully repelled all enemy attacks.
Remembering the time spent under the hot sun of Syria and Lebanon, I always feel a sense of pride in my comrades-in-arms, military advisers and specialists. The vast majority of them are people of high duty and honor, true masters of their craft. This is evidenced by the high awards that marked their contribution to strengthening the defense capability of Syria, Major General M.P. Nosenko was awarded the Orders of the Red Banner and the Red Star, as well as four orders of the Syrian Arab Republic. Military Advisor to the Commander of the CAP Air Force Lieutenant General of Aviation V.A. Sokolov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, the Red Star and two Syrian awards. Courage and courage were shown by advisers who were in the air defense forces under the leadership of Lieutenant General K.S. Babenko.
A team of advisers worked purposefully in the electronic warfare units under the leadership of Major General Yu.S. Ulchenko. In a short time, he managed to introduce new equipment in the CAP armed forces.
Kind words deserve advisers to the commanders of divisions, brigades and battalions. Most of the time they worked on the front line, helping the Syrian commanders organize the battle, while showing courage and courage. I would like to mention the adviser to the commander of the 7th mechanized division, and then to the commander of the 1st army corps, Major General N.V. Logvinov, advisers to major generals N.A. Lisovsky, V.V. Gubkin.
On the events of the second half of 1982, as well as 1983-1984. I'll tell you briefly.
At the end of August, Israel resumed air strikes and artillery attacks on Syrian positions and attacks along the entire front. A new offensive was launched in Beirut with the aim of taking the city. Syria, in response, was forced to send commando regiments, two mechanized brigades and four independent tank battalions into eastern Beirut. The Israeli attacks faltered.
New Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel turned to US President R. Reagan with a request for assistance. Washington was just waiting for this. In mid-September, NATO naval forces set up a naval blockade around Beirut. These days, Israel again tried to break through the defenses of the Syrian troops, and again failed. It was, in fact, the last serious attempt by Israel to achieve its goals in Lebanon. It ended in complete failure both militarily and politically. At the same time, Israel defiantly began to concentrate fresh troops in southern Lebanon, to regroup them in order to liberate the territory for the deployment of NATO forces.
We understood that the leadership of Syria needed support, and we reported on this. At the end of October 1982, the ambassador and I were summoned to Moscow. We were followed by a Syrian delegation led by President X. Assad.
Negotiations began. From our side, L.I. Brezhnev, N.A. Tikhonov, Yu.V. Andropov, D.F., Ustinov, A.A. Gromyko, N.V. Ogarkov, Ambassador to the Syrian Arab Republic V.I. Yukhin and the author of these lines. The main result of these negotiations can be called the decision to transfer to Syria two anti-aircraft missile regiments, electronic warfare units.
The Syrian Air Force and Air Defense were replenished with new Soviet equipment. As a result of the measures taken, Syria's air defense has become much more effective than it was in June 1982. This was clearly manifested in December 1983, when the naval blockade of Lebanon began by the forces of four NATO states - the USA, England, France, and Italy. High-capacity naval artillery and bomber aircraft began to deliver massive strikes against the troops of the national-patriotic forces of Lebanon, the defensive positions of the Syrian troops in its central part. At the same time, Israeli aircraft, missile forces and artillery fired on Syrian troops in the Bekaa Valley and in the mountainous regions of Barouk.
The Syrian army retaliated. According to intelligence, this caused significant damage to the Israelis. The fire from their side became much weaker.
In March 1984, in connection with a change in the situation, it was decided to withdraw our military contingent from the territory of the CAP and transfer Soviet military equipment and weapons to the armed forces of Syria.
Soviet military advisers and specialists continued to carry out their friendly mission in Syria in subsequent years. I would like to believe that their contribution to strengthening the defense capability of this ancient and beautiful country will be duly appreciated by its grateful people.
Retired Colonel General G.P. YASHKIN
4-05-2016, 06:00
Russian servicemen have been present in Syria for quite a long time. This fact was confirmed at the recent V Moscow Conference on International Security by the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov: “Russian military advisers assist the Syrian army command in planning combat operations against bandit formations, participate in the training and preparation for combat operations of reserve formations and military units ".
A group of Soviet military specialists, as a consolidated military formation of the USSR Armed Forces, was sent to Syria back in 1956. Later, in 1973 and 1983, the size of the contingent was increased by the regular units of the Soviet army, which was seen as a confrontation in the Cold War between the USSR and the USA and the struggle for influence in the strategically important region of the Middle East.
In Syria, for many decades there was a traditionally strong and well-equipped apparatus of Soviet military advisers and specialists who were part of all the administrative units of the Syrian army. The scope of their duties sometimes went beyond the powers of advisers.
Soviet military advisers and specialists - pilots, sailors, anti-aircraft gunners, tankers - were directly involved in the hostilities on the Syrian-Israeli front. Of the most famous - "Six Day War" (1967), "War of Attrition" (1970), "War in the Air" (1972), "Doomsday War" (1973), "Lebanese War" (1982) ), “Occupation and Naval Blockade of Lebanon by NATO Forces” (1983).
In subsequent years, Soviet specialists passed on combat experience to the Arabs and trained the Syrians in the use of military equipment and weapons, which were supplied to Syria from the Soviet Union, and later from Russia.
“Since the late 1970s, our military advisers have not taken part in active hostilities in Syria,” says Colonel Anatoly Matveychuk, a former adviser to the head of the Syrian military academy in Aleppo. - For the most part, the work of the office of the Chief Military Adviser at that time was limited to advisory functions, teaching, training the Syrians in the use of military equipment that was supplied from our country.
Emphasis was placed on training local instructors who were to subsequently train local specialists for the Syrian army. Much attention was paid to the political training of the Syrians - the socialist ideology of those times affected. But the technical skills in training were the main ones - the Syrian soldiers, being brave warriors, did not master complex military equipment as successfully as the standards required.
The current contingent of Russian military advisers in Syria is increasing, taking into account the development of the situation in this country. Just do not confuse it with ensuring the security of the Russian contingent, which guards the air base at the Khmeimim airfield and a number of Russian facilities on the territory of this country. There, in addition to the flight and technical personnel of the Russian Aerospace Forces, who are the main participants in the operation to destroy the Islamic State terrorist organization (banned in the Russian Federation), there are other security forces.
It is clear that they do not line up along the runway in Khmeimim and perform their tasks, including those related to the possible evacuation of Russian aircraft crews, at a distance outside the base. But this contingent is not Russian advisers, but precisely forces designed to ensure security.
“Coordination of the Syrian army by Russian advisers is a strategic task,” says Colonel Anatoly Matveychuk. - The current military operations that were carried out in the province of Aleppo and during the liberation of Palmyra, in terms of a depth of 100 kilometers, are a strategic operation. The experience of our officers and generals, who are now in Syria, is extremely necessary in such a situation.
They have behind them the experience of Afghanistan, the Chechen campaigns. For example, now Syrian drivers are trained by our advisers in one month, instead of the previous three. In exactly the same proportion, the effectiveness of the command and staff actions of the Syrian military leaders has increased.”
Among those currently serving as the chief military adviser in Syria are high-ranking Russian officers who serve both as instructors in military academies and as consultants to the high headquarters of the Syrian army. Russian junior advisers train their counterparts at the brigade to battalion level.
Technical specialists are retraining the Syrians for modern types of weapons, which Russia regularly supplies under agreements with this Arab republic. There is also a whole staff of Russian military Arabic interpreters, among which there are even cadets-linguists of the last courses of the Military University.
“The advisory apparatus in Syria reached three thousand people, they were specialists of various levels,” says military expert Vladislav Shurygin. - He was severely hacked at one time by the ex-Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov, multiplying, figuratively speaking, by zero. The number of advisers decreased by five times.
Now a full-fledged structure of advisers is being deployed that can help the Syrian government army to effectively conduct military operations against jihadists, which was demonstrated during the latest offensive operations of the Syrian government army. And their role here is no less than air strikes by the Russian Aerospace Forces.”
The expert believes that it makes no sense for Russia to send full-fledged combat units to Syria for a ground operation in which heavy human losses are inevitable. The most effective use is precisely military advisers who will train the Syrians at the level of battalion-tactical groups, and, if necessary, coordinate their actions during hostilities.
“The role of advisers is a key one,” says Vladislav Shurygin. - To win - you need to learn how to fight. This is what our advisers, who have vast combat experience, are capable of teaching to Syrian colleagues. And the effect is already clearly visible - if a year ago Syrian tanks were rolling back and forth with indiscriminate firing, now well-thought-out tactics are visible in organizing their offensive. And it was our advisers who trained the Syrians.”
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Russian servicemen have been present in Syria for quite a long time. This fact was confirmed by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, at the recent V Moscow Conference on International Security: “Russian military advisers assist the command of the Syrian army in planning combat operations against bandit formations, participate in the training and preparation for combat operations of reserve formations and military units ". A group of Soviet military specialists, as a consolidated military formation of the USSR Armed Forces, was sent to Syria back in 1956. Later, in 1973 and 1983, the size of the contingent was increased by regular units of the Soviet army, which was seen as a confrontation in the Cold War between the USSR and the USA and a struggle for influence in the strategically important region of the Middle East. For many decades, Syria has been traditionally strong and a staffed apparatus of Soviet military advisers and specialists who were part of all the administrative units of the Syrian army. The range of their duties sometimes went beyond the powers of advisers. Soviet military advisers and specialists - pilots, sailors, anti-aircraft gunners, tankers - took a direct part in the hostilities on the Syrian-Israeli front. Of the most famous - "Six Day War" (1967), "War of Attrition" (1970), "War in the Air" (1972), "Doomsday War" (1973), "Lebanese War" (1982) ), “The occupation and naval blockade of Lebanon by NATO forces” (1983). In subsequent years, Soviet specialists transferred combat experience to the Arabs and taught the Syrians how to use military equipment and weapons that were supplied to Syria from the Soviet Union, and later from Russia. “Already since the late 70s of the last century, our military advisers have not taken part in active hostilities in Syria,” says Colonel Anatoly Matveychuk, former adviser to the head of the Syrian military academy in Aleppo. - For the most part, the work of the office of the chief military adviser at that time was reduced precisely to advisory functions, teaching work, training the Syrians in the use of military equipment that was supplied from our country. The emphasis was on training local instructors, who were supposed to subsequently train local specialists for the Syrian army. Much attention was paid to the political training of the Syrians - the socialist ideology of those times affected. But the technical skills in training were the main ones: the Syrian soldiers, being brave warriors, did not master complex military equipment as successfully as the standards required. The current contingent of Russian military advisers in Syria is increasing, taking into account the development of the situation in this country. Just do not confuse it with ensuring the security of the Russian contingent, which guards the air base at the Khmeimim airfield and a number of Russian facilities on the territory of this country. There, in addition to the flight and technical personnel of the Russian Aerospace Forces, who are the main participants in the operation to destroy the terrorist organization "Islamic State" (banned in the Russian Federation), there are other security forces. It is clear that they do not line up along the runway in Khmeimim and perform their tasks, including those related to the possible evacuation of Russian aircraft crews outside the base. But this contingent is not Russian advisers, but precisely forces designed to ensure security. “Coordination of the actions of the Syrian army by Russian advisers is a strategic task,” says Colonel Anatoly Matveychuk. - The current military operations that were carried out in the province of Aleppo and during the liberation of Palmyra are strategic. The experience of our officers and generals, who are now in Syria, is extremely necessary in such a situation. They have behind them the experience of Afghanistan and the Chechen campaigns. Here's an example: now Syrian drivers are trained by our advisers in one month, instead of the previous three. The effectiveness of the command and staff actions of the Syrian military leaders has increased in exactly the same proportion.” Syrian army. Russian advisers in the junior rank train their colleagues at the brigade to battalion level. Technical specialists are retraining the Syrians for modern types of weapons that Russia regularly supplies under agreements with this Arab republic. There is also a whole staff of Russian military Arabic translators, among whom there are even linguist cadets of the last courses of the Military University. “The advisory apparatus in Syria reached three thousand people, they were specialists of various levels,” says military expert Vladislav Shurygin. - He was severely hacked at one time by the ex-Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov, multiplying, figuratively speaking, by zero. The number of advisers has decreased by five times. Now a full-fledged structure of advisers is being deployed that can help the Syrian government army to effectively conduct military operations against jihadists, which was demonstrated during the latest offensive operations of the Syrian government army. And their role here is no less than air strikes by the Russian aviation of the Aerospace Forces.” The expert believes that it makes no sense for Russia to send full-fledged combat units to Syria for a ground operation in which heavy casualties are inevitable. The most effective is the use of military advisers, who will train the Syrians at the level of battalion-tactical groups, and, if necessary, coordinate their actions during hostilities. “The role of advisers is a key one,” says Vladislav Shurygin. - To win, you need to learn how to fight. This is what our advisers, who have vast combat experience, are capable of teaching to Syrian colleagues. And the effect is already obvious: if a year ago Syrian tanks were rolling back and forth, firing randomly, now well-thought-out tactics are visible in organizing their offensive. And it was our advisers who trained the Syrians.”
And assisting Syria in the construction of the national armed forces. Later, at the invitation of President Hafez al-Assad, it was necessary to increase the size of the contingent by sending units of the Soviet Army to Syria in order to provide military assistance to the already formed Syrian Armed Forces in repelling Israeli military aggression. Total from 1956 to 1991. 16,282 people were seconded to Syria through the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, including 294 generals, 11,169 officers, 624 ensigns, 2,179 soldiers and sergeants, and 2,016 workers and employees of the SA and Navy. Forty-four people died and died of wounds.
| Chief Military Adviser to the Minister of National Defense of the SAR senior group of Soviet military specialists |
||
| Rank | Name | years |
|---|---|---|
| colonel | N. Ulyanov | 1959 – 1961 |
| major general | V. Andryushchenko | 1961 – 1963 |
| lieutenant general | V. Shanin | 1963 – 1964 |
| major general | S. Belonozhko | 1964 – 1967 |
| colonel general | M. Frolenkov | 1967 – 1970 |
| lieutenant general | S. Magometov | 1970 – 1972 |
| lieutenant general | V. Makarov | 1972 – 1974 |
| lieutenant general | M. Tereshchenko | 1974 – 1977 |
| lieutenant general | V. Budakov | 1977 – 1980 |
| colonel general | G. Yashkin | 1980 – 1984 |
| colonel general | V. Gordienko | 1984 – 1986 |
| lieutenant general | E. Smirnov | 1986 – 1988 |
| lieutenant general | V. Kopylov | 1988 – 1991 |
| lieutenant general | V. Tsvetkov | 1991 – 1994 |
The chief military adviser maintained close contacts with the Minister of Defense, and with the General Staff, and with the commanders of the branches of the armed forces, and with the chiefs of the armed forces. Senior advisers to the commanders of the Naval Forces, the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces, as well as advisers to a number of departments of the Ministry of Defense, were directly subordinate to him. A small headquarters worked under him, headed by the chief of staff - adviser to the chief of the general staff of the army and the armed forces, who led advisers at the departments of the General Staff of the SAR.
In the troops, military advisers were attached to the commanders of divisions, brigades, individual regiments, chiefs of staff and main chiefs of the military branches, as well as to the deputy division commanders for the technical part and rear. The composition of military specialists was determined depending on the volume and degree of complexity of the weapons and military equipment supplied by the Soviet Union, the ability to train the required number of Syrian military personnel and, together with them, provide support for equipment in constant combat readiness. The leadership of military specialists was carried out by the senior group of specialists - the deputy chief military adviser for armaments. Various advice was given to the Syrian side, as a rule, orally, but written recommendations were developed on the most important issues of building the armed forces. Painstaking joint work was carried out to form and train a missile brigade equipped with the R-17 operational-tactical missile system. The training process lasted seven months and included five periods during which the actions of combat and control groups were practiced. Special tactical exercises were held in the presence of the President of the Republic and other officials. The targets were hit with high accuracy, which was enthusiastically reported by the local press.
Soviet specialists paid special attention to the development by the Syrian side of new military equipment and weapons: T-62 tanks, Su-7, MiG-23 and MiG-25 aircraft, 130-mm artillery systems, Strela missile systems and more modern modifications of ATGMs. By the end of the 1970s, the Syrian Armed Forces not only fully restored their combat power, but also significantly increased in quantitative and especially qualitative terms. They sharply increased combat skills. Lieutenant General M. N. Tereshchenko positively characterized the degree of combat readiness of the Syrian troops at that time, saying that thanks to the help of Soviet specialists, they learned how to conduct a modern battle. This situation gave the Syrian leadership a certain carte blanche in the confrontation with Israel, which in the early 80s launched a broad campaign against the Palestinian resistance fighters, generously supported by the Syrian military-political leadership.
In October 1980, an agreement was concluded between the USSR and Syria, one of the clauses of which read: "If a third party invades the territory of Syria, then the Soviet Union will be involved in the events." In this case, under third party Israel was meant. Damascus was firmly promised that in the near future, Syria would be able to independently, without the support of the Arab countries, resist Israel and even, if necessary, fight with it. This, of course, required colossal deliveries of weapons and military equipment to a friendly Middle Eastern country, and deliveries on preferential terms.
Tensions in the Middle East region
According to Grigory Yashkin himself, the first thing he had to face in Syria was the unpreparedness of the Syrian armed forces, especially parts of the Air Force and Air Defense, to repel possible Israeli air raids. Soon, other specialists began to arrive from the USSR. A multi-hundred team of advisers and specialists quickly got involved in the work. They were to:
The situation in the quarters of the group
The solution of the listed, far from simple tasks took place in the conditions of armed clashes with opponents of the H. Assad regime. A group of Soviet specialists also suffered losses. In the city of Kham, on the way of Soviet specialists to the airfield, an ambush was organized, during which four Soviet officers were shot. After some time, the headquarters of the Air Force and Air Defense was blown up in Damascus, about a hundred Syrians were killed, there were many wounded, including six advisers, in particular, Major General N. Glagolev, Advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and Air Defense.
Later, the successful activities of Soviet military advisers in Syria attracted the attention of the enemies of President Assad. By the fall of 1981, they began to openly hunt for the Soviet military. G. Yashkin's GVS car was fired twice, and on October 4, 1981, an attempt was made to guard the building where the headquarters of the chief military adviser was located, the families of other advisers lived, while the sentry was seriously wounded. On October 5, the enemy managed to blow up this building. As a result of the terrorist attack, six people were killed and about two hundred were injured, twenty-three of them were seriously injured, General Yashkin was shell-shocked.
Since April 1981, Israeli aircraft, as if by mistake, instead of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, began to strike at Syrian troops, in connection with which the question arose of their cover. In the second half of April 1981, a mixed anti-aircraft missile brigade, two anti-aircraft artillery regiments, two radio-technical battalions and two electronic warfare battalions were introduced into the territory of Lebanon and secretly dispersed. The result affected in the very near future: according to G. Yashkin, 4 Israeli aircraft were shot down (three F-16s and one F-15; the Israeli side did not confirm the loss). The raids on the positions of the Syrian troops have ceased.
Escalation of the conflict and the landing of American troops
Seeing the failures which?] the Israeli army, the Americans came to the aid of the Israelis [source?] . Marines landed on the Lebanese coast, part of the forces of the American group was introduced into West Beirut. In the current situation, Syria expected from the USSR to increase assistance in proportion to the threat that had arisen. At the end of October 1982, the USSR Ambassador V. V. Yukhin and the chief military adviser G. Yashkin were summoned to Moscow. After reports on the current situation, the Syrian leadership was invited to Moscow, and a new stage began in joint Soviet-Syrian activities. In early January 1983, the 231st long-range anti-aircraft missile regiment, manned by Soviet anti-aircraft gunners, arrived in Syria under the legend of conducting the Kavkaz-2 exercises. The regiment concentrated in the Doumeira region, 40 km west of Damascus, and immediately took up combat duty. Other military units soon arrived: a technical regiment, an EW helicopter squadron, ground-based EW units; in early February - the 220th long-range anti-aircraft missile regiment (both anti-aircraft missile regiments arrived from the Moscow Air Defense District) and took up positions 5 km east of Homs. Reserve Colonel Ivan Teterev, who commanded the 220th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment in Syria, noted that in carrying out the combat mission of providing international assistance to the SAR, Soviet anti-aircraft gunners were regularly on combat duty. The personnel of the regiments served in the field, incredibly difficult conditions, in an atmosphere of high nervous tension, away from their homeland, without families, without vacations, with a minimum time for readiness to open fire.
New automated control systems have arrived; new military anti-aircraft missile systems "Osa" for staffing mixed brigades with combined arms divisions; MiG-25 and MiG-23 MLD aircraft with new on-board radars capable of tracking 4-6 targets and automatically launching missiles at them; new rockets and bombs of volumetric explosion and ammunition of increased power. Along the way, the composition of advisers and specialists was increased, the position of deputy chief military adviser was introduced, which became Major General M. Kolesov. At the headquarters, since 1983, there was an operational control group from the Soviet naval squadron. In the Lebanese-Syrian direction, she interacted with the Syrian armed forces, especially with fighter aircraft and long-range anti-aircraft missile regiments.
Thus, in the post-war period, Soviet military personnel were constantly stationed in the Middle East for several decades. It fell to their lot to be constant active participants in almost all regional crises, conflicts and wars. Steadfastly enduring the hardships and deprivations of a difficult army service, aggravated by a long separation from their homeland, a difficult climate, they fulfilled their international and military duty with honor and dignity, often risking their own lives.
In the fall of 1983, the Israelis withdrew their troops from Lebanon [source?] (according to other sources, the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon took place in May 2000), the strategic initiative passed to Syria. The leadership of Syria, encouraged by the support of the Soviet Union, took advantage of the successes achieved in a peculiar way, moving from a dead defense to an “offensive” on the diplomatic front, and began to openly threaten Israel, and to reinforce their threats, in particular, by the fact that the Syrian press openly stated that behind Syria stands the entire Soviet nuclear missile potential. The leadership of the Soviet Union, which introduced a contingent solely to stabilize the situation in the region, in order to balance the forces of the warring parties, but certainly not in order to escalate the Arab-Israeli conflict with unpredictable consequences for the whole world, decided to withdraw regular Soviet troops, leaving in the country only a significantly limited group of advisers and specialists, sufficient to organize the country's defense in the event of Israeli aggression, but too small to ensure independent (offensive) actions of the Syrian troops. The decision of the Soviet leadership came as a complete surprise to the Syrian leadership and even caused some confusion. However, Moscow hastened to reassure Damascus, saying that the troops would remain until the summer of 1984. During this time, it was supposed to transfer all the materiel to the Syrian military personnel, and conduct the necessary retraining courses with them so that they mastered the Soviet equipment transferred to them. In July 1984, the entire personnel of the Soviet military units left the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic. The Soviet regiments fulfilled their combat mission with honor. About 80% of officers, ensigns, soldiers and sergeants were awarded orders and medals of the SAR, many were awarded orders and medals of the USSR.
It should be noted that the current President of Syria, and at that time still captain Bashar al-Assad, studied flying as a fighter pilot at a military base near the city of Frunze (now Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan). At a meeting with President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev, President Assad stated that the solution of the most important problems of Central Asia, the Caucasus and Europe is impossible without Russia. He also supported the actions of Russian troops in South Ossetia, noting in an interview with the Kommersant newspaper that "the war unleashed in Georgia is the culmination of attempts to encircle and isolate Russia." According to him, issues of military-technical cooperation occupy a priority place in Russian-Syrian relations: “The purchase of weapons (by Damascus) is very important. True, from time to time there are various obstacles. Often bureaucratic, sometimes there are delays due to production reasons. There are also financial problems. I think we need to speed up,” he said. Assad also said that Russia did not offer Syria to place Iskander missile systems on its territory in response to US plans for missile defense, but the Syrian authorities would be ready to consider such a proposal. The Syrian leader assured that Damascus is ready to cooperate with Russia in everything that can strengthen its security.
see also
Notes
Sources
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- Syrian History - Destruction in the al-Qunaytra village in the Golan Heights, after the Israeli withdrawal in 1974
- Yashkin G.P. We fought in Syria // Vestnik PVO: Monthly magazine of the Air Defense Forces of the USSR. - M .: Krasnaya Zvezda, 1988. - No. 4. - ISSN 0134-918X.
- Pochtarev A. On the Lebanese direction // a red star: Central press organ of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. - M .: Krasnaya Zvezda Publishing House, 2002. - V. February 28. - S. 2.
- Losses of the Israeli Air Force in Lebanon
- Teterev I. About benefits, about anti-communists // Kommersant-Vlast: Analytical weekly. - M .: Kommersant Publishing House, 1999. - No. 20 (321). - P. 48. Circulation - 73,100 copies.
- Yaremenko V. A., Pochtarev A. N., Usikov A. V. Syria in the Arab-Israeli War (1982) // Russia (USSR) in Local Wars and Military Conflicts of the Second Half of the 20th Century / Ed. V. A. Zolotareva,. - M .: Triada-farm, 2002. - S. 476-581. - 494 p. - (Russian Military Historical Library). - 1 thousand, copies. - ISBN 5-86090-065-1
- About the status of the Shebaa Farms area
- Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and his Syrian counterpart Bashar al-Assad will discuss issues of cooperation (HTML) on Thursday. News. Weapons of Russia: Information agency. Retrieved 2 December 2012.
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Group of Soviet troops in Germany | Northern Group of Forces | Central Group of Forces | Southern Group of Forces |
