By assuming obligations towards Russia, the Turkish Sultan thus got the opportunity to intensify his aggression against other European states, sending the freed armed forces against them. However, the lack of coordination of his policy with the actions of the Crimean Tatars led to the fact that the Tatars penetrated the Ukrainian and Russian lands with devastating raids. Although the sultan swore "a terrible and strong oath ... in the name of the one who created heaven and earth" not to violate the terms of the Bakhchisaray truce, enshrined in the next year by the Treaty of Constantinople, the aggressive actions of the Crimeans forced Russia to seek allies against Turkey.

By that time, an anti-Turkish coalition had emerged in Western Europe, the members of which (Austria, Poland and Venice) sought to involve Russia in the union. The Russian government of Princess Sophia (1682-1689) set the condition for its participation in the Holy League to conclude "eternal peace" with Poland. This would confirm the terms of the Andrusovo truce. "Eternal Peace" (1686) outlined a turning point in relations between Russia and Poland. The efforts of the two states in the fight against Turkey were thus united.

In order to fulfill allied obligations to Poland and other members of the league, the Russian government organized two military campaigns in the Crimea. During the preparation for the first campaign, the negative properties of the local cavalry affected the outcome of the entire operation. In the ranks of these military formations, which bore the features of the organization of the times of feudal fragmentation, discipline was so low that the gatherings were slow, and some of the late nobles, as a sign of disbelief in the success of the campaign, generally arrived in mourning clothes and with black blankets on horseback. Finally, in the spring of 1678, an army of 100,000 (partly consisting of regiments of the new system), accompanied by a huge convoy, set out on a campaign. The Tatars prudently burned the steppe, and, in the conditions of the summer heat, severely suffering from lack of water and losing horses, the Russian army did not reach the Crimea. She returned to Russia, having suffered heavy losses of people and horses during an exhausting campaign.

The government organized the second Crimean campaign (1689) in early spring, and in May the Russian army reached Perekop. But this time, the troops failed to succeed. The favorite of Princess Sophia, Prince V.V. Golitsyn, who led the army in both campaigns, was a good diplomat, but turned out to be an unsuccessful commander. It was rumored that Golitsyn, who abandoned the general battle and retreated from Perekop, was bribed by the Turks.

However, the unsuccessful results of the Crimean campaigns also had positive consequences. Russia formally contributed to the fight against Turkish aggression, since these campaigns diverted the forces of the Tatars, and the Sultan thus lost the support of the numerous Crimean cavalry. This provided Russia's allies in the anti-Turkish coalition with favorable conditions for successful operations in the Western European theater of war.

With the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the Ottoman Turks decided to take control of the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus (including Abkhazia). A year later, their fleet appeared in the Sevastopol Bay, attacked and devastated the city.

Anti-Turkish coalition. An anti-Turkish coalition was formed in Transcaucasia, which included the Abkhazian principality, as can be seen from the letter of the king of the Kartvelians George VIII to the Duke of Burgundy dated 1459: “... the Christian princes ... concluded a truce among themselves and swore to fight the Turks with all their might ... each exposes his troops. I am setting out 40,000 people ... The Megrelian king Bendian is ready with his troops, the Georgian king Gorgora (from Samtskhe) is sent with 20,000 cavalry. The Duke of Anakotsia (Avogazia - Abkhazia) Rabia promised to come out with his brothers, vassals and with all the troops (30 thousand soldiers). Three Tatar princes also participate in the union ... The listed persons swore allegiance to each other, the traitor will be punished ... ". However, the union that had begun to emerge fell apart.

In the early 60s of the XV century. the Turks annexed Crimea and part of the Caucasian coast, and with the capture of Kaffa in 1475, the Genoese colonial system in the Black Sea region ceased to exist.

In 1553, the Turks tried to gain a foothold in Djigetia. They repeatedly invaded Imereti. Kutaisi, Gelati and other points were subjected to fire. All this happened against the backdrop of a confrontation between two powerful states - Turkey and Iran. Each led a win-win for himself, but insidious policy of "divide and conquer" and tried to win over to his side as many sovereign princes and kings of Transcaucasia as possible. But the half-century war between Turkey and Iran ended with a peace treaty, according to which all the disputed territories were divided into spheres of influence. Turkey got all of Western Transcaucasia (including Abkhazia). But he still needed to be conquered.

Turks in Abkhazia. In 1578, a Turkish garrison was stationed in Sevastopol for a short time. This is evidenced by the inscriptions on tombstones found on the territory of the city of Sukhum.

In the first half of the XVII century. the Turks blocked the city from the sea, as they could not take it from the land. I had to pay tribute. Abkhazian feudal lords even began to receive Turkish names. For example, the name Karabey belonged to the Lykhny prince in the 1920s. 17th century

Cossacks. At the same time, the population of Western Transcaucasia (including Abkhazia) was closely connected with the Don and Dnieper Cossacks. It saw in them its allies against the Turkish "infidels".

After successful Turkish campaigns, the Cossacks, returning to their homeland, filled a large Pitsunda bowl with gold and silver coins. Their legends contain information about joint campaigns with "Abkhazian Christians" to the Turkish shores.

Turkish landing. In retaliation, in May 1634, the Turks landed a large landing in the area of ​​Cape Kodori, devastated the surrounding area and plundered the Dranda Monastery. They imposed tribute on the Abkhaz, but they did not pay it for long, and then they stopped altogether. The Turks used the civil strife of the local feudal lords for their own selfish purposes. There were times when they couldn't. So, in 1672 "the Mingrelian prince invited the Abkhazians to help against the Turks." But such alliances were short-lived.

Sukhum-Kale. In 1724, the Turkish architect Yusuf-aga built a bastion-type fortress. She and the city itself began to be called Sukhum-Kale. The Turks interpreted this name in their own way, as "su" - water, "hum" - sand, "kala" - a fortress, a city. In the 30s of the XVIII century. in Sukhum-Kala served from 70 to 112 soldiers.

Abkhazians and Turks. After the Turks robbed and burned the Ilori temple in 1733, and then moved to northwestern Abkhazia, Shervashidze and his subjects had to convert to Islam. However, a quarrel soon arose between them and the Ottomans. The Abkhazians attacked the camp of the Turks and destroyed it. Part of the Ottomans fled with the pasha, the other died. As a result, the Abkhazians won back not only all their property, but also converted to their faith again. This victory was attributed to the miracle of St. George of Ilorsky, who that night ordered the Abkhazians to come out and thereby gave them strength in the battle.

In 1757, the ruler of Samurzakan Khutuni Shervashidze fought against the Turks in Imereti. Before dying, he defeated 16 enemies. At the instigation of the Turks, the feudal lords of Dzyapsh-ipa rebelled against the ruler of Bzyb Abkhazia, Manuchar Shervashidze. At this time, he and his two brothers, Shirvan and Zurab were exiled to Turkey. Dzyapsh-ipa as a result managed to seize the territory between the river. Psyrdzha and Kodor. Soon Zurab Shervashidze, with the help of the Turks, returned to Abkhazia as a governor.

In 1771, the Abkhazians, under the leadership of Zurab and Levan Shervashidze (owner of Samurzakano), besieged and took the Sukhumi fortress. Then they conceded it "for 20 Turkish bags and ten thousand piastres." Three years later, the Turks left Sukhum-Kale, "as a fortress useless to them." After that, Shervashidze divided Abkhazia among themselves into four parts - Bzybskaya Abkhazia (Zupu) went to Zurab; the owner of the central one - between Anakopia and Kodor (Aku) - became Keleshbey; the territory between Kodor and Aaldzga (Abzhua) was received by another nephew of Zurab - Bekirbey; Samurzakan remained with the ruler Levan.

Abkhazia and Turkey in the XVI-XVII centuries. Strengthening political, economic contacts with the Ottoman Empire during the XVI-XVII centuries. led to the gradual spread of Sunni Islam. So, if at the beginning of the XVI century. still preserved traditional (pre-Christian) and Christian beliefs throughout the territory of Abkhazia, then from its middle the process of its involvement in the Islamic world began.

Abkhazia in the 17th - 18th centuries

Muslim religion. By the 40s of the XVII century. refers to the first evidence of the Turkish geographer and historian Evliya Chelebi about Muslim Abkhazians. He wrote that they have a mosque and if someone “is called a Christian, they will kill him, but if they call him a Muslim, they will rejoice. They do not recognize the Koran and have no religion. At the same time, they do not like Christians, but they will give their souls for Muslims.” At the same time, the Abkhaz had not yet paid the sultan "kharaj", which was usually levied on non-Muslims. That part of the Abkhazians who lived in the coastal areas of Abzhua and Samurzakan were, as it were, Christians. This election of religion is also evidenced by the fact that the ruler of South-Eastern Abkhazia, Putu Shervashidze, showed loyalty to Christian teaching, and the ruler of the rest of Abkhazia, Karabey, was a supporter of Islam. The penetration of Islam into Abkhazia in the middle of the XVIII century. contributed to internecine strife, the removal of the Catholicos from Pitsunda and the expulsion of Christian priests from many places. But due to the lack of socio-economic conditions here, the seeds of a new world religion did not germinate easily on local soil.

Religious syncretism. Until the middle of the XVIII century. Abkhazian society developed at the confessional level in three religious directions - many elements of Christianity were preserved, various traditional folk cults were revived, and the influence of Islam expanded.

Jan Reynnegs, doctor, traveler, observed in the second half of the 18th century. a mixture of traditional and Christian beliefs among the Abkhaz. In the first days of May, they gathered in the sacred forest near the large iron cross, where the hermits lived. Everyone brought wooden crosses with them and put them everywhere, and then exchanged them as a sign of friendship. In many places in Abkhazia, roughly crafted iron crosses are found, the lower end of which is a point for a wooden shaft.

The revival of the traditional religion among the Abkhazians can also be traced in the funeral rite. They continue to bury in cemeteries near abandoned churches, but with a Christian western orientation (head to the west). There is a custom of backyard and roadside burials. In coastal areas, the traditional rite of air burials is being revived and is becoming popular. He surprised travelers. At the same time, a horse was sacrificed, as once. Then they hung a box with the deceased on a tree, and next to it were his belongings and weapons that he used in the war. Cults associated with the worship of trees (especially walnut and oak), groves, fire and hearth chains, mountain spirits, the sun and moon, animals (especially the bull, dog, horse), earth, water and their deities, iron and forge, have also revived. the soul of the dead, the god Antsva, etc. So, under these conditions, there was little room for Christianity and Islam. And only by the end of the XVIII century. the ruling elite of the Abkhazians more or less turns to Islam.

economy. The basis of the economy of Abkhazia at that time was agriculture, cattle breeding, hunting, beekeeping and various forms of handicraft activities.

Various authors (for example, the Georgian geographer-historian of the first half of the 18th century Vakhushti Bagrationi) noted that the land in Abkhazia is fertile and the climate is mild. It has many fruits, grapes, livestock, animals, birds and fish. The local large goat with soft mottled hair, long horns and a beard to the knees was distinguished by its special beauty.

The main agricultural crop in Abkhazia until the XVIII century. it was millet. Then they began to use more corn and, especially, beans, penetrating from Turkey. The main tools of labor were a wooden plow with an iron tip, on the tip of which a hardened steel strip was welded, a hoe and an ax. The daily food of the Abkhaz included cheese, milk and game. Prominent role until the end of the XVIII century. pig breeding played. According to eyewitnesses, the pigs were "the size of a donkey" here. Cheap lard and ham were prepared from pork for sale.

Trade. A large amount of wax was exported from Abkhazia. Due to the lack of a full-fledged urban life at that time, each peasant household met its needs on its own. Abkhazian women perfectly spun threads, which were exported to Smyrna and Thessaloniki. Men produced iron using the ancient “raw-dough method”, making high-quality chain mail, forging sharp daggers and sabers. At that time in Abkhazia, money did not have circulation - the exchange was in kind. Armenian colonies from the Persian city of Jugha appeared here in order to revive trade. The most famous was the bargaining in Isguar (Cape Kodori), which consisted of two hundred small wicker huts where merchants lived. Similar auctions took place in the Sukhumi fortress and near Gudauta, on the Bambor Cape, where expensive boxwood was exchanged for salt and iron.

But the most important subject of trade was the people who were most interested in Turkish merchants, who in this respect outdid the Genoese. They sold mostly prisoners, but for a large sum - and their fellow tribesmen. Young, strong, handsome men (15 rubles) and 13-18-year-old girls (20 rubles) were most valued. According to Chardin, the Turks annually exported up to 12 thousand slaves. In this regard, Putu Shervashidze became especially famous.

In exchange for people, Turkish merchants imported goods from various countries to Abkhazia: all kinds of carpets, blankets, canvases, leather, shawls, cloth, silks, saddles, harnesses, iron, copper, boilers, smoking pipes, salted fish, sugar, salt, etc. of course, a variety of weapons - guns, sabers, daggers, knives, pistols, gunpowder, arrows.

This continued until the double-headed eagle of Tsarist Russia loomed on the horizon. Due to rebelliousness, Abkhazia was faced with new tragic upheavals associated with mahadzhirstvo, the forcible eviction of most of the Abkhaz people from their homeland.

In the middle of the 17th century, Turkey began to lag behind Western European countries in its development. At the same time, the military power of the Ottoman Empire also decreased. But this did not stop her aggressive aspirations. In the early 70s, the troops of the Turkish Sultan and his vassal, the Crimean Khan, invaded Poland and Ukraine, reaching the Dnieper.

On March 31, 1683, the Austrian Emperor Leopold I concluded an agreement with the King of Poland, Jan Sobieski, against Turkey. Military assistance was promised by Bavaria and Saxony. Brandenburg refused to oppose the Turks. The rest of the German principalities did not respond at all. Monetary assistance was provided by Savoy, Genoa, Spain, Portugal and Pope Innocent XI himself.

The Sultan gathered a huge army and entrusted it to the Grand Vizier Kare-Mustafa, to whom he handed the green banner of the prophet, which meant the beginning of a holy war.

On July 14, 1683, the Turkish army, led by the Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha, laid siege to Vienna. On the third day of the siege, the Turks, having occupied the suburbs, surrounded the city from all sides.

The general danger of an "Islamic invasion" forced the rulers of the Christian countries of Central Europe to reconsider their neutrality and urgently send troops to help Austria. 6 thousand soldiers from Swabia and Franconia, 10 thousand from Saxony, a small detachment from Hanover approached Vienna. The Polish army of 15,000 was led to Vienna by Jan Sobessky. They joined the imperial troops defending Vienna and the regiments of the Saxon elector, the total number of which was about 50 thousand soldiers.

During the siege and battle, the Turks lost 48.5 thousand people killed, wounded and captured, 300 guns, all their banners. (Novichev A.D. Decree. Op. C.I 86.) Among the dead were 6 pashas, ​​but Mustafa himself fled to Belgrade, where he was executed by order of the Sultan. In the Turkish camp, the vizier's tent was captured with enormous wealth, including the green banner of the prophet, which the king sent as a gift to the Pope.

Holy League

After the defeat at Vienna, the Ottoman Empire was forced to go on the defensive and gradually retreated from Central Europe. After the storming of Vienna, the Saxons, Swabians, Franconians left, only the Austrians, Bavarian and Polish units remained. But the war continued for a long time. On March 5, 1684, an anti-Turkish coalition called the Holy League was created to fight the Ottoman Empire, which included Austria, Poland, Venice, Malta, and in 1686 Russia. The remnants of the Turkish army suffered another defeat from Jan Sobessky on the Danube and rolled back to Buda.

In 1686, Austrian troops occupied Buda, captured eastern Hungary, Slavonia, Banat, and occupied Belgrade. In 1697, Austrian troops under the command of Eugene of Savoy defeated the Turkish army at Zenta. The struggle of Austria against Turkey was facilitated by the Azov campaigns of Peter the Great in 1695-1696.

480 rub. | 150 UAH | $7.5 ", MOUSEOFF, FGCOLOR, "#FFFFCC",BGCOLOR, "#393939");" onMouseOut="return nd();"> Thesis - 480 rubles, shipping 10 minutes 24 hours a day, seven days a week and holidays

Magilina Inessa Vladimirovna Muscovy and the project of the anti-Turkish coalition at the end of the 16th - beginning of the 17th centuries. : dissertation... candidate of historical sciences: 07.00.02 / Magilina Inessa Vladimirovna; [Place of protection: Volgograd. state un-t].- Volgograd, 2009.- 380 p.: ill. RSL OD, 61 09-7/726

Introduction

Chapter I. The Eastern Policy of the Moscow State and the Project of the Anti-Turkish Coalition

1.1. The Anti-Turkish Coalition as an Instrument of the Eastern Policy of the Moscow State 31

1.2. The activities of the Moscow state in the process of organizing an anti-Turkish coalition

the second half of the 80s. XVI century 54

1.3. The project of the anti-Turkish triumvirate of the early modern period 82

Chapter II. In search of a military-political alliance

2.1. The efforts of the Muscovite state to conclude an agreement with the Holy Roman Empire 123

2.2. Military-political agreement between the Muscovite state and Persia. 144

2.3. The project of the anti-Turkish alliance of Shah Abbas I and plans for its implementation 176

2.4. The historical significance of the diplomatic mission of A.F. Zhirovo-Zasekin to Persia 202

Chapter III. The question of creating an anti-Turkish coalition at the beginning of the 17th century

3.1. Eastern Policy of Boris Godunov and Persian-Imperial Negotiations 224

3.2. Anti-Turkish program of False Dmitry I 251

3.3. Diplomatic mission of the Carmelites in Persia 264

3.4. Imperial-Persian embassies in Muscovy during the Time of Troubles 285

3.5. Changes in the European foreign policy situation and the position of the Muscovite state and Persia 313

Conclusion 350

Bibliography, 354

Applications 378

Introduction to work

The relevance of research. After the fall of Constantinople, one of the main problems of international relations was the repulse of Ottoman aggression on European territories. For successful action against the Ottomans, the interested European powers needed to create an anti-Turkish league or coalition. 1 The main goal of the coalition was to develop projects for the collective opposition to the Ottomans. Initially, it was planned to conclude an alliance between Spain, Venice, the Roman Curia and the Holy Roman Empire. However, the establishment of trade and political contacts with Persia allowed European governments to realize at the end of the 15th century that the Ottoman Empire could be blocked both from the west and from the east and would not be able to wage war on two fronts: against Christian Europeans and Shiite Persians. Due to contradictions between European states, the idea of ​​creating a broad anti-Turkish coalition 2 became possible only in the 1980s. 16th century The creation of a coalition was the first attempt to form international political alliances consisting of several powers.

The Moscow state acted as an active participant in the anti-Turkish coalition and the main mediator between Persia and Western Europe in the process of concluding a military-political alliance. Participation in the coalition provided the Muscovite state with a chance to integrate into the European community, the opportunity to become its full member, to strengthen and, possibly, expand its southern borders.

The concept of "league" and "coalition" are identical, but have a qualitative difference. "League" is an association (union) of organizations or states, "coalition" - involves the conclusion of an alliance between states to achieve a specific goal. In this case, the coalition was created to fight the Ottoman Empire. In the documentation of the XVI century. the term “league” is more often used, although in practical terms the anti-Turkish alliance is precisely a “coalition”.

2 The negotiation process to create an anti-Turkish coalition can be divided into 3 stages: 1453-1524, the second quarter - the beginning of the 80s. 16th century and since the late 80s. 16th century until 1618 (beginning of the Thirty Years' War in Europe). At the first stage, the European powers unsuccessfully tried to attract Uzun Hassan to the union, and then, after the creation of a single Persian state, Shah Ismail I. A distinctive feature of the third period was the possibility of participating in the anti-Turkish coalition, in addition to sovereign states, the Danubian principalities and the Balkan peoples, who were under the Turkish yoke.

4
The international position of the Moscow state, its role in

international politics of the late 16th - early 17th centuries. were due

several factors. First, the level of political, economic and

social independence of the state. Secondly, the desire for

recognition of its independence by other European and Asian

powers. The third factor is the geostrategic position (geographic

location between Western Europe and Asia and political and strategic

value) of the Muscovite state - influenced the political and economic

relations between European and Eastern powers. Fourth

factor - awareness of oneself as part of the "post-Byzantine world", independence from

Horde yoke - had the greatest influence and determined, mainly,

eastern policy of the Muscovite state before the beginning of the Thirty

Thus, the study of the process of participation and the role of the Moscow state in the creation of an anti-Turkish coalition seems to be very relevant both from the point of view of studying the history of Russia in the late 16th - early 17th centuries, and the history of international relations of this period.

The degree of study of the topic. The process of accumulation of historical information about the participation of the Muscovite state in the creation of an anti-Turkish coalition in the late 16th - early 17th centuries. took place both in domestic and foreign historiography.

The question of the entry of the Muscovite state into the anti-Turkish league was touched upon in general works on the history of Russia starting from the end of the 18th century. According to M.M. Shcherbatov, the Moscow government sympathized with the creation of an anti-Turkish league, but was not going to take an active part in it. The historian believed that the coalition could help the Muscovite state conclude peace with Poland on favorable terms. 4 M.M. Karamzin, unlike M.M. Shcherbatov, believed that the participation of the Moscow state in the league was possible, but for this he had to secure formal

3 See term: Khoroshkevich A.L. Russia in the system of international relations in the middle of the XVI century. M., 2003. S. 559.

4 [Shcherbatov M.M.J History of Russia from ancient times, composed by Prince Mikhail Shcherbatov: in 7
v. St. Petersburg, 1791.T.6-7.C.629.

5 agreements with the closest allies in this struggle. One of

such allies was the Holy Roman Empire. In relationship with

Persian Shah, the Moscow government adhered to a wait-and-see

tactics. Trud M.M. Karamzin contains valuable information on the

topic in the form of extracts from archival documents^ lost to the present

time. For example, information about the embassy in Persia, Prince. I.P.

Romodanovsky 1606 SM. Solovyov noted the importance of relationships

Muscovy with European countries, in particular with the Habsburgs,

and emphasized that such a policy was more beneficial to the Austrian

emperors than to the Moscow court. He paid special attention to the eastern

aspect of Russian foreign policy after the capture of Kazan and Astrakhan. Historian

was the first to introduce the concept of the "Eastern Question" into science and pointed out the fact

tripartite negotiations in Moscow in 1593-1594 aimed at creating

anti-Turkish alliance of the Muscovite state, the Holy Roman Empire and

Persia, but did not reach the goal. 6 Noted historians have addressed the issue

entry of the Moscow state into the anti-Turkish coalition in terms of

the role and foreign policy position of Russia, which she occupied after

reign of Peter I. Such an evaluative stereotype interprets the policy

states of previous eras from the standpoint of its political interests are more

late time.

The first special work devoted to Russian-Persian

relationships, was the study of CM. Bronevsky (1803-1810), made in

the beginning of the 19th century, on the instructions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince. A.A. Czartoryski. AT

for a number of reasons, the manuscript of SM. Bronevsky was published only

in 1996. The manuscript is based on documents from the archives of the College of Foreign Affairs.

According to the researcher, the Muscovite state received in 1589

an offer from Sixtus V and Emperor Rudolf II to become a member

anti-Turkish alliance. B. Godunov, on behalf of Tsar Fedor, agreed to enter

league, subject to the conclusion of an agreement with all Christian sovereigns.

5 Karamzin N.M. History of the Russian State in 3 books, containing 12 volumes. SPb., 1843. Prince.
III. T. 9. S. 131,413.

6 Solovyov SM. History of Russia since ancient times. 1584-1613. M., 1989. Book. IV. T. 8. S. 461-463.

CM. Bronevsky argued that it was this proposal that prompted the Moscow government to intensify its eastern policy. It intended to strengthen its own positions in the Transcaucasus. This was facilitated by the proposals of the Persian Shah Mohammed Soltan Khudabende to conclude an alliance against the Turks. CM. Bronevsky adhered to the opinion of M.M. Shcherbatov that the Moscow authorities were not going to conclude an alliance against the Ottomans, but tried by their actions through the mediation of Clement VIII and Rudolf II to force Poland to make peace on favorable terms for her.

With the release of SM. Solovyov, the interest of historians in the "Eastern Question" and its significance for Russian political doctrine was renewed. This was facilitated by the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, which required a historical justification for Russia's role in the liberation of the Balkan peoples. Works on the “eastern question” by historians V.V. Makusheva, F.I. Uspensky and SL. Zhigarev.

Slavicist V.V. Makushev used in his research work unpublished materials from the Italian archives. The historian analyzed two anti-Turkish projects of the last quarter of the 16th century. from the Ambrosian Library, testifying to the preparation of an uprising of the Balkan Slavs with the assistance of the Muscovite state. 8 V.V. Makushev cited evidence of the potential capabilities of the Muscovite state, which consisted in the Cossacks "continuously fighting the Turks during this period of time." nine

Uspensky F.I. formulated the concept of the "Eastern Question" as a phenomenon of foreign policy. Based on the views of SM. Solovyova, F.I. Uspensky believed that in the Muscovite state from the end of the 15th century. "Eastern question" was understood as "a question of Russian politics". 10 The historian convincingly showed that the mere awareness of this fact did not yet give the Muscovite state political and socio-economic opportunities for the implementation of its eastern policy. Only from the second half of the XVI century.

7 Bronevsky SM. Historical extracts on Russia's relations with Persia, Georgia and, in general, with the mountain
peoples living in the Caucasus, from the time of Ivan Vasilyevich to the present. SPb., 1996. S. 11-16.40.

8 Makushev V.V. Eastern question in the XVI-XVII centuries. (According to unpublished Italian monuments) // Slavic
collection. T. 3. St. Petersburg, 1876. S. 24-26.

9 Ibid. S. 32.

10 Uspensky F.L. How the "Eastern Question" arose and developed in Russia. SPb., 1887. S. 32.

7
"Eastern question" was skillfully used in foreign policy

Moscow state."

Legal historian S.A. Zhigarev in his multi-volume work devoted to Russian politics in the "Eastern Question" paid the main attention to the historical and legal substantiation of the role and place of Russia in this process. Following N.M. Karamzin S.A. Zhigarev emphasized the wait-and-see nature of the position of the Moscow government in the process of creating an anti-Turkish coalition. The historian believed that the Moscow authorities sought to induce the Empire and Persia to take active military action against the Ottoman Empire, but they themselves were not going to participate in the war. Like SM. Solovyov S.A. Zhigarev believed that the main direction of Moscow's foreign policy in the last quarter of the 16th century. there was a struggle for Livonia and access to the Baltic Sea. thirteen

Summarizing the position of V.V. Makusheva, F.I. Uspensky and S.L. Zhigarev, we can say that the “Eastern Question”, identified by historians with the struggle against Turkey, had an autonomous significance in the foreign policy doctrine of the Moscow state and played a secondary role in relation to the Baltic problem. Such a scheme easily fits into the basic principles of Westernist concepts, but does not provide answers to questions related to the foreign policy activities of the Moscow authorities to create an anti-Turkish coalition.

Based on the materials of the Georgian and Persian embassy books of 1587-1613, the archivist S.A. Belokurov noted the emergence of the Caucasian question in the eastern policy of the Muscovite state, its influence on Russian-Persian relations. The historian believed that the main goal of Russian-imperial relations was diplomatic efforts to conclude an anti-Turkish alliance between the emperor, tsar and shah. S.A. Belokurov suggested that the victories over Kazan and Astrakhan greatly raised the prestige of the Muscovite state in

11 Ibid. S. 94.

12 Zhigarev S.L. Russian policy in the Eastern question (its history in the 16th-19th centuries, critical assessment and
future tasks). Historical and legal essays: in 2 vols. M., 1896. S. 39.

13 Ibid. S. 77.

8 the eyes of Persia. As a result, in 1553 a Persian

embassy to establish permanent diplomatic contacts. fourteen

the most valuable monuments of diplomatic and trade relations of Muscovite Russia

with Persia. 15 He was the first to draw attention to the forms of contracts between

European and Eastern rulers. Emphasizing their fundamental

difference, he noted that the “peace treaties” corresponded to

"Shert" letters of Muslim rulers. 16 This remark provides a clue to

understanding the ways of concluding treaties between Muslim and

Christian sovereigns.

The richest documentary material on the relations of the Moscow

states with Western European countries gathered at the beginning of the 20th century. E.F.

Shmurlo. In a note to the publication of documents from Italian and Spanish

archives of E.F. Shmurlo emphasized that in the development of close diplomatic

ties were interested in both the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs, and

Moscow government. The main goal of their cooperation was anti-Turkish

union, but each side also pursued its own national interests. 17

Orientalist V.V. Barthold believed that European, incl. and Moscow

sovereigns needed in the XVI-XVII centuries. in Persia, primarily as a political

an ally in the fight against the Ottoman Empire and only then as a trading partner.

Developing relations with Persia, Russia tried to achieve other goals. So,

the campaign of governor Buturlin in 1604, the scientist considered an attempt by the Moscow authorities

to gain a foothold in the Northern Transcaucasus, and not with help; Shah's troops fighting in

Dagestan. eighteen

Belokurov S.A. Historical review of the relations of the Caucasus with the political formations of the East European Plain and with the Muscovite state until the beginning of the 17th century. M., 1889. S. 111-112.

5 Monuments of diplomatic and trade relations between Muscovy and Persia / Ed. Veselovsky N.I. In Zt.SPb., 1890-1898.

16 Veselovsky N.I. Errors and errors in the publication of documents on the intercourse of Russian sovereigns with Asian owners. SPb., 1910 S. 26.

n Monuments of cultural and diplomatic relations between Russia and Italy. [Inventories of the Italian archives, documents, reports of the scientific correspondent of the Academy of Sciences Evgenia F. Shmurlo]. T. I. Issue. 2. St. Petersburg, 1907. S. 21. 18 Bartold V.V. The place of the Caspian regions in the history of the Muslim world. Baku, 1925; His own. History of the study of the East in Europe and Russia. Lectures delivered at the University and at the Leningrad Institute of Living Oriental Languages. L., 1925. S. 213.

9
In the 30s. 20th century study of issues related to

relations between Russia and Persia continued undeservedly

currently forgotten by E.S. Zevakin and M.A. Polievktov.

Zevakin E.S. specifically studied diplomatic relations between the Muscovite state and Persia in the second half of the 16th-17th centuries. 19 According to the scientist, one of the main aspects of the foreign policy relations of Persia with European states in the last quarter of the 16th century. had relations with the Holy Roman Empire. The Persian question in Russian-imperial relations eventually came down to the question of a Russian-imperial-Persian alliance directed against the Ottoman/Empire. Unlike V.V. Barthold, he believed that European states could need Persia as an ally in the anti-Turkish coalition only in the 16th century. From the beginning of the second quarter of the XVII century. economic interests came to the fore.

Unlike its predecessors, M.A. Polievktov managed to distinguish 2 directions of Russian foreign policy of the late 16th - early 17th centuries: the Baltic and the Black Sea-Caucasian (i.e. eastern). The historian believed that the main task of the Moscow eastern policy at the end of the XVI century. there were efforts aimed at paralyzing the actions of the Ottomans in the North Caucasus. From the first quarter of the 17th century. protecting their own interests in this region has become paramount. Valuable information of a historical and biographical nature is provided by the researcher in the annotations to the register of travelers in the Caucasus and Persia in the 13th-18th centuries. 21

In the postwar period, N.A. Smirnov suggested that the confrontation between the Muscovite state and the Ottoman Empire was a continuation of the struggle against the Tatar-Mongols. The fight against the Ottomans brought the Muscovite state closer to Persia and the Holy Roman Empire, who were seeking help from Moscow. According to the scientist, the resolution of contradictions

19 Zevakin E.S. History of diplomatic and trade relations between Russia and Persia in the 16th-17th centuries. 1934. Archive
orientalists of the Leningrad branch of IVAN. Category 1. Op. 6. Unit ridge 3. L. 1-67. Unfortunately, this valuable
the work of the researcher is still unpublished.

20 Zevakin E.S. The Persian question in Russian-European relations in the 17th century. // Historical notes. 1940. No. 8.
pp. 128-162.

21 Polievktov M.A. Economic and political intelligence of the Moscow state of the XVII century in the Caucasus.
Tiflis, 1932, p. 16; His own. European travelers in the Caucasus in the XHI-XVIII centuries. Tiflis, 1935.

10 between the Moscow state and Turkey would inevitably lead to

war. The historian believed that the initiator of the creation of the anti-Turkish coalition was

Boris Godunov, and believed that the embassy of N. Varkoch from Emperor Rudolf II

sought help in Moscow not only against Turkey, but also against Poland. 22

According to Ya.S. Lurie, the main direction of foreign policy
Moscow State in the last quarter of the 16th century. was Baltic. But
there was also a Black Sea-Caspian direction. Both courses of foreign
policies that emerged in the middle of the century merged with each other: the struggle for
The Baltic was to be fought against Turkey. The researcher reported that
Ivan IV promised to join the anti-Turkish league only on the condition that in
it will include all Christian states, including Poland. He believed that
in this way the Muscovite state could provide itself with protection from
aggressive plans of Stefan Batory. I'M WITH. Lurie also expressed the controversial
the opinion that Boris Godunov's negotiations for an alliance against the Ottoman
empires were only a diplomatic maneuver, and the king did not fight the sultan
was going to. . /

Researcher of Russian-English relations N.T. Nakashidze concluded that from the second half of the 16th century. The "Eastern question" became a pan-European problem, in which Spain, the Holy Roman Empire, France, England and the Muscovite state took part. At this time, the active foreign policy of the Moscow government contributed to the creation of an anti-Turkish coalition. B. Godunov understood that in order to solve both the Baltic and the "Turkish-Crimean" problems, it was necessary to conclude an alliance with the European powers. But, as N.T. Nakashidze, the emperor and the popes did not want the strengthening of the Muscovite state in the international arena. Therefore, Moscow was assigned a secondary role in the coalition. It was assumed that she would neutralize the Crimean Khanate in a long war, provide a coalition

22 Smirnov NA. Russia and Turkey in the XVI-XVII centuries. In 2 vols. M., 1946. T. 1. S. 140-153.

23 Lurie Ya.S. New data on the embassy of Sugorsky and Artsybashev in 1576 // Historical Notes. 1948. T.
27. S. 297; his eye. Issues of domestic and foreign policy in the messages of Ivan the Terrible // Messages of Ivan
Grozny. Preparation of the text by D.S. Likhachev and Ya.S. Lurie. Translation and comments I'M WITH. Lurie. M.-L., 1951. S. 492-
551; his ex. Russian-English relations and international politics in the second half of the 16th century. //
International relations of Russia until the 17th century. M., 1961. S. 419-443.

money and will help improve the relations of the Holy Roman Empire with Persia and Georgia. 24

The issue of creating an anti-Turkish coalition was also paid attention to by a major
Soviet scientist I.B. Greeks. He believed that the Muscovite state had become
be interested in the projects of creating an anti-Turkish coalition under Vasily III.
The historian saw the reason for this not only in the desire of the Grand Duke to increase his
status among European sovereigns, but also in the permanent Turkish-Crimean
aggression in the countries of Eastern Europe from the 20-30s. 16th century At the same time, according to
I.B. Grekov, the dependence of the Tatar states on Turkey was constantly increasing.
Volga and Crimea. The Ottoman Empire sought to weaken as much as possible
Moscow state with the help of raids of the Crimean and Kazan Tatars. This is
helped Turkish politicians manipulate the balance of power between
Moscow and Warsaw. 25,

The intentions of the Moscow authorities to enter the war with the Ottoman Empire concerned T.G. Tivadze in a dissertation on the place of Persia in the foreign policy of the Muscovite state in the late 16th - early 17th centuries. The historian adhered to the position of Ya.S. Lurie that the negotiations of the Moscow state on the creation of an anti-Turkish alliance with Western European partners were only a diplomatic maneuver. At the same time, T.G. Tivadze believed that the Moscow government had a great interest in an alliance with Persia. The Shah was the first to propose to the tsar to restore relations that had been interrupted in the middle of the 16th century, but the Muscovite state acted as the initiator of the military-political alliance with Persia. The union could help Moscow oust the Ottomans from the Caspian regions and strengthen its position in the North Caucasus.

A.P. Novoseltsev believed that the Muscovite state had in the second half of the XVI century. close diplomatic ties with Persia, due to common interests in the fight against Turkey. In his opinion, Persia managed to conclude an agreement with the Muscovite state, the result of which was

24 Nakashidze N.T. Russian-English relations. Tbilisi, 1955, p. 34.

25: Grekov I.B. Essays on the history of international relations in Eastern Europe in the XIV-XVI centuries. M., 1963. S. 233.

26 Tivadze T.G. The Iranian question in the foreign policy of the Muscovite state at the end of the 16th and at the beginning of the 17th centuries:

Buturlin's military expedition to the Caucasus. In addition to these two powers, the anti-Turkish coalition included the Georgian kingdoms, the Kazakh khanates, Khorezm and the power of the Great Mogul. The conclusion of A.P. Novoseltsev that from the beginning of the 20s. 17th century in first place in Russian

Persian relations came out questions of a trade and economic nature.

In his work on the history of the Russian-Iranian embassies of the late XVI - early XVII centuries. P.P. Bushev noted that the joint struggle with Turkey and the Crimean Khanate was the core of Russian-Persian relations of the period under review. However, in general, relations between the two states were reduced not to a military-political alliance, but to trade and commercial activities. The historian concluded that the Moscow state and Iran had different approaches to solving their primary political tasks. He believed that the political line of Moscow diplomacy in relation to Persia in the noted period was more consistent, direct and testified to the tsar's firm intention to conclude an anti-Turkish military-defensive alliance. The position of Persia, on the contrary, was distinguished by duality and insincerity. According to P.P. Bushev, the Shah did not at all intend to conclude a military alliance with the Muscovite state. The picture presented by the researcher turned out to be clearly incomplete, since in his work he relied mainly on materials from inventory 1 of fund 77 “Relations between Russia and Persia” of the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts, published by N.I. Veselovsky. Unfortunately, the most important documents of inventories 2 and 3 of the same fund, containing letters and treaties of Russian tsars and Persian shahs, as well as materials from fund 32 “Relations between Russia and the Roman Empire”, were out of sight of the scientist, which make it possible to make significant additions to the characterization of Russian-Persian relations. 28

The only special work devoted to the project of creating an anti-Turkish coalition in the 70s. 16th century, publications of a major

Novoseltsev A.P. Russian-Iranian political relations in the second half of the 16th century. // International relations of Russia until the XVII century. M., 1961. S. 444-461; his eyue. Russian-Iranian relations in the first half of the 17th century. // International relations of Russia in the XVII-XVIII centuries. Economy, politics, culture. M., 1966. S. 103-121. 28 Bushev P.P. History of embassies and diplomatic relations of the Russian and Iranian states in 1586-1612. M., 1976. S. 435-442.

13
specialist of Russian-Polish relations B.N. Flory. Historian

convincingly proved that already in the reign of Ivan IV one of the main

issues of foreign policy of the Moscow state was the search for allies for

fight against the Ottoman Empire. In his opinion, the most suitable

the candidate for such an alliance was Poland, not the Holy Roman Empire.

The opportunity to improve relations with Poland allowed the Moscow authorities

start negotiations for an alliance against the Turks and Tatars. scientist linked

"Baltic" problem with the solution of the "Eastern" issue in cooperation with

Poland, assuming a close connection between these areas of foreign

Politics of the Moscow state in the second half of the 16th century. . B.N. Florya believed that the Muscovite state resumed in the 80s. 16th century negotiations with Persia and Poland on the creation of an anti-Turkish coalition. One of the goals of the union was to be the elimination of the Turkish protectorate over the Crimean Khanate. In order to fight the Turks, Poland needed to create a large standing army, and therefore, to change the taxation system. This would lead to the strengthening of the central government, the reduction of the rights and freedoms of the gentry. Therefore, the Polish gentry preferred to maintain peaceful relations with the Ottoman Empire. This is a valuable observation by B.N. Flory explains why Poland has always been opposed to the creation of an anti-Turkish coalition. The scientist believed that Persia was also unable to join the anti-Turkish coalition. But he came to the controversial conclusion that the main reason for B. Godunov's failure to create an alliance against Turkey was that he tried to direct this agreement against Poland, an ally of the Holy Roman Empire. thirty

In his Ph.D. thesis on the embassies of N. Varkoch to Russia and the attempt to form an anti-Turkish coalition at the end of the 16th century. I. Prochazka noted that the main goal of the imperial embassies in Moscow was to conclude a military-strategic agreement between the Muscovite state and the Holy Roman Empire against Turkey. But, following the traditional view

29 Florya B.N. The project of the anti-Iggur coalition in Russian foreign policy in the 70s. 16th century // Social
economic and political history of South-Eastern Europe to ser. 19th century Kishinev, 1980. S. 118-132.

30 Florya B.N. Russian-Austrian relations at the turn of the XVI-XVII centuries. (Embassy of Afanasy Vlasyev in
Empire) // International relations of the countries of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and Slavic
German relations. M., 1968. S. 54-80; His own. Russian-Polish Relations and the Baltic Question at the End of the 16th
- early 17th century M., 1973; His own. Russia and the Czech uprising against the Habsburgs. M., 1986.

14 Soviet historiography of the 1980s, the dissertation student tried to link the problem

anti-Turkish coalition with Russian-Polish and Russian-Swedish relations.

Varkocha to Moscow and concluded that they were sent to create

anti-Turkish alliance between Moscow and Prague. However, the conclusions made by I.

Prokhazka that the anti-Turkish coalition was necessary for Moscow

to the state in order to break the ring of powers hostile to it, is debatable. Except

In addition, the statement of I. Prochazka that it was Russia that tried to draw

Persia into an anti-Turkish coalition and that the Shah by all available means

tried to avoid it, not true at all. It is likely that such conclusions

the researcher came because he used a very limited circle

sources, ignoring the most important of them, in particular the reports of N. Varkoch

about the progress of the negotiations. 31

The foreign policy of Abbas I was touched upon in works on the Persian-European

diplomatic relations of the XVI-XVII centuries. Azerbaijani researchers

EM. Shakhmaliev, O.A. Efendiev, Kh.A. Kambai-zade and Ya.M. Makhmudov. 32 Them

views on this problem can be summarized in several provisions. In

foreign policy of Shah Abbas I in the second half of the 16th - early 17th centuries.

the return of Khorasan to the Safavid state; return of Iranian

territories captured by Turkey; end of Portuguese rule in

Hormuz and the establishment of complete control over the Persian Gulf. Search

allies against Turkey, the shah carried out in Europe without the participation of the Moscow

states. It was not even considered as a potential ally.

The Western European policy of Abbas I pursued economic goals, in no way

not related to the creation of an anti-Turkish coalition. Above

provisions seem to be very controversial, giving incomplete, in places

31 Prochaska I. The Embassy of Nikolai Varkoch to Russia and the problem of the formation of anti-Turkish anti-Turkish at the end of the 16th century
coalitions in Eastern Europe: dis.... cand. ist. Sciences: 07.00.02/ Prokhazka Jiri.- M., 1981. - 144 sheets.

32 Shakhmaliev E.M. On the issue of diplomatic relations between the first Safavids and Western countries // Proceedings
Azerbaijan State University, history and philosophy series. 1950. No. 4. S. 51-67; Efendiev
O.A. Azerbaijani State of the Safavids in the 16th century. Baku, 1981; Kambay-Zade H.A. Safavid state
in the Eastern Policy of the Western European Powers at the End of the 16th and the Beginning of the 17th Centuries // Countries of the Middle and
Middle East in the system of international relations. Baku, 1990. S. 21-29; Makhmudov Ya.M. Relationships
states of Ak-Koyunlu and Safavids with Western countries. Baku, 1991.

15 a distorted view of Persian foreign policy, due to

the limitations and specificity of the sources used

Azerbaijani scientists. .

The author of a fundamental work on the history of Persia, John Malcolm, was the first foreign scholar to characterize Russian-Iranian relations in the late 16th - early 17th centuries. as trade and economic. His research is descriptive in nature and is valuable primarily because it is based on Persian sources. The English historian first highlighted the role of the Shirley brothers in the reorganization of the Persian army and in the organization of the Persian embassy to Europe in 1600-1601. 34

In foreign historiography, the Jesuit historian Fr. Pavel Pirling was the first to touch upon the problem of creating an anti-Turkish coalition in the second half of the 16th century. He made a significant contribution to the study of this issue. The undoubted merit of the researcher is in the publication of secret documents from the archives of the Vatican, available only to Catholic priests. According to P. Pierling, it was in the Roman Curia that the idea was born to involve the Muscovite state in the anti-Turkish league. Papal legate A. Possevino^ met in the 1580s. in Moscow with Ivan IV. Returning home, he compiled an ideological and political justification for the idea of ​​Balkan pan-Slavism with the Muscovite state as its leader. P. Pirling believed that the Roman Curia needed the Muscovite state as an intermediary to attract Persia to the ranks of the league. He noted that B. Godunov, while assuring the Turks and the Crimean Tatars of friendship, was simultaneously engaged in the creation of an anti-Turkish league. Since the time of Ivan IV, the only and obligatory condition of the Moscow authorities was the signing of an anti-Turkish treaty in Moscow. P. Pirling reproached B. Godunov that instead of providing military assistance to the Holy Roman Empire, he paid off the emperor with material assistance. The researcher assessed the position of the Moscow state in relation to

33 The authors used predominantly Persian medieval chronicles, characterized by tendentious
material, and English sources. The extensive documentation of the Posolsky Prikaz concerning the Russian-
Azerbaijani researchers did not consider Persian relations at all, links mainly
made to work Busheva P.P. History of embassies and diplomatic relations between Russian and Iranian
states in 1586-1612, which is very biased.

34 Malcolm J. Histoire de la Perse. V. II. Paris, 1821.

anti-Turkish coalition as a whole as positive and considered the period 1593-1603. the most favorable for its creation.

The negotiation process of creating an anti-Turkish coalition was considered by the researcher of Russian-Austrian relations X. і Ubersberger. He was the first to draw attention to the differences in the political structure of the Holy Roman Empire and the Muscovite state, which led to the unequal attitude of their rulers to the implementation of foreign policy tasks. The scientist believed that in relations with the emperor, B. Godunov's main goal was not to conclude an anti-Turkish alliance, but to obtain guarantees in the event the throne passed into his hands. The emperor had to take obligations to protect the Godunov dynasty from the claims of Poland. Thus, the Muscovite state, under the pretext of concluding an anti-Turkish alliance, was going to draw the Empire into a war with Poland. X. Ubersberger incorrectly identified the Holy Roman Empire with Austria-Hungary in the second half of the 19th century, so when a historian speaks of the policy of "Austria", it is necessary to understand by this the policy of a particular emperor, in particular Rudolf P. 36

The French orientalist of Iranian origin, Khanbaba Bayani, published valuable documents of the diplomatic correspondence of Abbas I and Sefi I with European sovereigns from the London and Paris archives. He believed that the main goal of the relationship between the Muscovite state and Persia was the conclusion of a military-defensive alliance against Turkey. European states were interested in this union to an even greater extent. 37

Around the same time, a small work on the history of Iranian diplomacy was published by Reza Sardari, who lived in Paris. The work listed the Russian embassies to Persia in 1590-1618. and one Persian to Moscow in 1616. Sardari touched only briefly on the goals and objectives of the embassies. He believed that during this period between the Muscovite state and Persia there were peaceful and

Pearling P. Papes et tsars (1547-1597): D "aprns des documents nouveaux. Paris, 1890; Pearling P. Un missionnaire diplomate au seizieme siccle // Revue du monde catholique. Paris, 1894. T. XXIV. P. 526-543; Pearling P. Lettre du Dmitri dit le faux a Clement VIII. Paris, 1898; Pearling P. La Russie et le Saint-Siege. Etudes diplomatiques. T. I, T. II, T. III. Paris, 1896-1901.

36 Uebersbergers H. Osterreich und RuCland seit dem Ende des 15 Jahrhunderts. bd. 1: 1488-1605. Wien u Leipzig, 1906.

37 BayaniK. Les relation de Gigan avec PEurope occidentale a I "epoque Safavide (Portugal, Espagne, Angleterre, Holland
et France); (avec documents inedita). Paris, 1937. /

17 /

good neighborly relations. According to R. Sardari, the Shah himself

offered B. Godunov the trading cities of Derbent and Baku as a “gesture

good will". But he took this as a sign of weakness of Persia and later in every possible way

tried to emphasize the supremacy of his own power. Unfortunately,

The researcher did not indicate the sources of his information. However, the analysis of the text

work suggests that their circle was very limited and they had

Russian immigrant background. R. Sardari's information about goals, objectives

and the results of the embassies is far from complete, and the conclusions are highly controversial.

He identified the goals and objectives of Russian foreign policy of the late XVI - early

17th century and the 18th century, confused the Muscovite state with the Russian Empire,

called B. Godunov and M. Romanov emperors. 38

Based on Iranian sources, the French orientalist L. Bellan compiled a detailed description of the reign of Shah Abbas I. The study contains brief information about the arrival of Russian ambassadors to the court of Abbas I, as well as about the Shah's plans to create an anti-Turkish coalition. Particularly valuable is the information about the negotiations in 1602 between Abass I and the imperial ambassador G. Tekander regarding the conclusion of an offensive alliance against Turkey, which is not in the ambassador's report on his trip. L. Bellan believed that the Shirley brothers played an important role in bringing Persia into the anti-Turkish coalition. The embassy of A. Shirley and Hussein Ali bek to Europe (1599-1600) had 2 tasks: to conclude an offensive alliance against the Ottomans and to agree on the supply of Persian raw silk to European markets. 39

The Czech researcher J. Matousek studied the goals and objectives of European policy in the period of preparation for the war against the Ottomans in the early 1590s. A significant place in his work is given to Russian-imperial relations, which were carried out during this period through the embassies of N. Varkoch in 1593 and 1594-1595. Considering the Russo-Imperial-Persian negotiations in Moscow in 1593, the historian concluded that all three sides agreed

Sardar R.. Un chapitre de Г histoire diplomatique de l "lran. (Les Traites entre PIran et la Russie depuis le XVI siecle jusqu" a 1917). Paris, 1941. 39 Bellan L.L. Chah Abbas.: Sa vie, son histoire. Paris, 1932.

18 conclude an agreement on joint struggle against the Ottomans. The historian considered

that the Roman Curia was going to join the union, but on condition

signing of the treaty in Rome. 40

English scientists L. Lockhart and P. Saike, who studied the history of Persia, relying on Persian chronicles, came to the erroneous conclusion that between the Muscovite state and Persia until the middle of the 17th century. there were no political contacts. In contrast to ties with England, with which ties have been established since the beginning of the 60s. 16th century and, according to Lockhart and Sykes, evolve without interruption into a military alliance, with the help of which Abbas carried out the liberation of Hormuz from the Spaniards in 1620. 41

The Austrian researchers W. Laich, B. von Palombini, K. Voselka emphasized that the initiative to create an anti-Turkish coalition always came from Western Europe, and the Muscovite state in the proposed union was assigned a secondary role. They believed that the relationship between the Muscovite state and the Holy Roman > empire at the end of the sixteenth century. were distinguished by intensity and ostentatious splendor, but negotiations on the creation of an anti-Turkish alliance were inconclusive. 42. V. Laich, following Ubersberger, argued that the socio-political and economic specifics of the development of the Holy Roman Empire and the Muscovite state influenced a different approach to solving foreign policy problems. Similarly, the historian believed that the Muscovite state, under the pretext of concluding an anti-Turkish alliance, was going to draw the Empire into a war with Poland. V. Lyach considered the return of the South Russian lands to be the main interests of the Muscovite state in the fight against the Ottomans. Poland also claimed these lands. Therefore, the interests of the Moscow state and Poland collided not only in the Baltic, but also in the Black Sea direction. 4 B. von Palombini claimed that at the end of the 16th century. Moscow state, having settled

40 MatousekJ. Tureska valka v evropske politice v letach 1592-1594, Obrazs z dejin diplomacie protireformacni. praha,
1935. P. 218-223.

41 Lockhart L. The fall of the Safavi Dinasty and the Afghan occupation of Persia. Cambridge, 1958.; Sykes P. A. The
History of Persia. V.I. London, 1951.

42 Leitsch W. Moskau und die Politik des Kaiserhofes im XVII Jahrhundert (1604-1654). Graz-Koln, 1960. S. 36;
Palombini Barbara von. Bilndniswerben abendlandischer Machte um Persien 1453-1600. Wiesbaden, 1968. S. 107;
VocelkaK. Die politische Propaganda Kaiser Rudolf II (1576-1612). Vienna, 1981.

43 Leitsch W. Op. cit. S. 34.

19 relations with Poland, was ready to join the anti-Turkish league as

"temporarily interested state". 44 K. Voselka succeeded in proving that

early 1590s. the idea of ​​creating an anti-Turkish league acquired a new content.

European governments began to be guided by political and

economic benefits, and not medieval slogans like "crusade

campaign against the infidels. The Moscow authorities acted in a similar way.

The Roman Curia, for example, proposed creating an anti-Turkish league in the form of an alliance

Christian states to maintain European peace. According to

Voselki, imperial-Persian diplomatic relations were established

only in 1600 with the arrival in Prague of the great embassy of Hussein Ali bek and

Anthony Shirley. As a result of negotiations, the shah opened a second front in 1603 with

Ottomans, which allowed the emperor to insist on continuing the war. However

no serious military-political imperial-Persian agreement

was not concluded. 45 Imperial-Persian relations K. Voselka considered

"exotic". 46

Jan Paul Niederkorn, exploring the history of the "Long Turkish War",

which the Empire led from 1593 to 1606, tried to summarize the role and participation in

each of the European countries. Relying on imperial and Italian

documents, the historian claims that the plan to create a broad anti-Turkish league

developed the Roman Curia by the early 1590s. Ya.P. Niederkorn called

European coalition, because Spain was supposed to take part in it,

Holy Roman Empire, France and Venice, although participation was supposed

Muscovy and Persia. The league remained open to minors

Italian states. Participation in it of Poland was not provided. Scientist

adhered to the opinion of V. Laich and K. Voselka that the Moscow authorities

were not opposed to participating in the anti-Turkish league, but they persecuted, like others,

their political goals. At the same time, Godunov avoided open conflict with

Turkey and took a wait-and-see attitude. Ya.P. Niederkorn believed that

the condition for the participation of the Moscow state in the league was joining the coalition

PalombiniB. Op. cit. S. 103.

VocelkaTO. Op. cit.

VocelkaK. Rudolf II und Seine Zeit. Wien-Koln-Graz, 1985 S. 194.

20 Spain, Roman Curia, Holy Roman Empire and Venice.

It seems important to note the Austrian historian about the different approaches

pope and emperor to resolve the issue of joint military operations

league members. Clement VIII believed that Muscovy would accept

direct participation in hostilities in the territory of the South-Eastern

Europe: in Moldova and Bulgaria. Rudolph II expected from Moscow above all

monetary assistance and actions against the Crimean Tatars. YAP. Niederkorn thought

that Clement VIII was mistaken about the degree of influence of Moscow

states against the Balkan peoples, since it had no political relations with them

connections. More for the role of inspirers in the fight against Ottoman rule

approached the Roman Curia and the Holy Roman Empire. 47 Explorer

ignored the plans of the Roman Curia itself, which clearly outlined

the role of the Moscow state in the involvement of the Balkan Slavs in

anti-Turkish movement. In addition, the plans of the Moscow state

regarding the anti-Turkish struggle are outlined not on archival materials, but on

Analysis of the domestic (pre-revolutionary / and Soviet), as well as

foreign historiography led to the conclusion that the history of participation

of the Moscow state in the project of creating an anti-Turkish coalition at the end

XVI - early XVII centuries. not specifically studied and insufficiently studied. AT

post-Soviet period the problem under consideration neither in Russia nor abroad

not specifically studied. Scientists have touched on certain aspects of this topic in

the process of general research of Russian history, the study of the history of Russian

diplomacy, Russian-imperial and Russian-Iranian relations, history of creation

earlier coalitions. In scientific literature only in general terms

issues of bilateral and trilateral relations between

Muscovy, the Holy Roman Empire and Persia, connected

with the creation of an anti-Turkish league. Background, causes and features

the emergence of the idea of ​​creating a coalition, activating the eastern direction

47 Niederkorn J.P. Die europaischen Machte und der "Lange Tiirkerkrieg" Kaiser Rudolf II (1593-1606). Vienna, 1993. S. 67-70; 453-460.

21 foreign policy of the Moscow state, changes in priorities

Russian-imperial and Russian-Persian relations have not been studied. Conditions for

implementation of the project of the anti-Turkish coalition have not been identified. Specificity and

the dynamics of the process of creating an anti-Turkish alliance are not defined.

The causes and effects shown by historians, as well as the assessments of events, are controversial.

Researchers' data on the process of creating an anti-Turkish coalition at the end

XVI - early XVII centuries. fragmentary, contain factual inaccuracies. They are

require verification and significant supplementation with information from archival and

Purpose and objectives of the study. The purpose of the dissertation research is to find out the reasons and features of the process of participation of the Moscow state in the project of creating an anti-Turkish coalition as an independent direction of Eastern policy.

To achieve this goal, the following tasks are defined:

Reveal the prerequisites, determine the features of the emergence of the idea of ​​​​creation
anti-Turkish coalition of European states;

to determine the reasons for the activation of the eastern direction of the foreign policy of the Moscow state in the end of the 16th - n. XVII centuries;

highlight the conditions for the implementation of the project of an anti-Turkish coalition consisting of the Muscovite state, the Holy Roman Empire and Persia;

Reveal the reasons, clarify the goals and features of the integration process
Moscow State into the European community through participation in
anti-Turkish coalition; /

trace the specifics and dynamics of the development of the process of creating an anti-Turkish coalition;

clarify the reasons for the change in foreign policy priorities in Russian-Austrian and Russian-Persian relations.

Timeline of the study cover the period from 1587 to 1618. - the time of the greatest diplomatic activity of the European powers, the Muscovite state and Persia in creating an anti-Turkish coalition. The lower chronological boundary is due to the beginning of practical actions

22
Moscow state aimed at creating a coalition.

The upper chronological boundary of the study was determined by the start date

Thirty Years' War, which changed foreign policy priorities

majority of coalition members.

Geographic scope of the study limited to the territories of states and peoples that were part of the anti-Turkish coalition or were in the sphere of their political influence.

Methodological basis dissertations are the principles of historicism and
objectivity, allowing to study objects and phenomena in variety and
specific historical conditions of their emergence and development. During

dissertation work, general historical and special methods of scientific research were used. Historical-genetic method helped to trace the dynamics of the creation and development of the anti-Turkish coalition. Historical comparative method made it possible to identify the common and specific features of the member states of the anti-Turkish coalition, regularities and random phenomena in the development of relations between them. Historical-typological method made it possible to develop a classification of the types of interstate agreements and treaties between the Christian states and Persia in the time period under consideration, the periodization of the process of creating an anti-Turkish coalition. Combination historical and comparative and historical and typological methods made it possible to identify common and specific features characteristic of different periods of the coalition-building process. Historical-system method made it possible to consider the relationship of the powers of the anti-Turkish coalition as a single system of their international relations at the end of the 16th - beginning of the 17th centuries, to take into account the national interests of these states, to trace their influence on the development of the idea of ​​creating an anti-Turkish coalition. Method of structural analysis of historical sources helped to determine the place of the idea of ​​creating an anti-Turkish coalition in the foreign policy of each of the considered powers, to identify the specifics of the understanding of this idea by the governments of the powers.

23
sourceresearch base constitute

start XVII centuries on the history of the creation of the anti-Turkish coalition, participation in this

process of the Moscow state and other countries. Written sources

can be divided into 4 groups depending on the origin, purpose of creation

and the nature of the information they contain:

documentation of Russian origin, office documentation

foreign origin, chronicles, memoirs, diaries and travel notes.

1. Record keeping documentation of Russian origin. Some of the sources of this group are published in the monuments of diplomatic relations between Russia and foreign powers, edited by N.N. Bantysh-Kamensky and N.I. Veselovsky, in Don affairs and in Bit books of the period 1475-1605. and Time of Troubles. 48 Unlike N.I. Veselovsky, N.N. Bantysh-Kamensky published documents in facsimile. The collections include materials on the relations of the Muscovite state with the Holy Roman Empire and Persia in 1488-1621: boyar lists and discharge paintings, embassy books, article lists (ambassador reports), orders to ambassadors, replies and petitions.

Unpublished sources are represented by documents from the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts (RGADA): F. 32 Relations of Russia with the Roman Empire, 49 F. 77 Relations of Russia with Persia, 50 F. PO Relations of Russia with Georgia, F. 115 Kabardian, Circassian and other affairs , "files from the archives of the St. Petersburg branch of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences

48 Monuments of diplomatic relations of Ancient Russia with foreign powers. Relations with the Roman
Empire / Ed. N.N. Bantysh-Kamensky. T. I, from 1488 to 1594. T. II, from 1594 to 1621. St. Petersburg, 1851 - 1852;
Monuments of diplomatic and trade relations of Moscow Russia with Persia / Ed. N.I. Veselovsky. T.
1.SP6., 1890;T. 2. St. Petersburg, 1892; T. 3. St. Petersburg, 1898; Don Affairs: In 5 vols. T. 1.M., 1898; Bit records for the Troubled
time collected by Active Member S.A. Belokurov. M., 1907; Discharge book 1475-1598 / Underg. IN AND.
Buganov. M., 1966; Discharge book 1559-1605 / Preparatory work. L.F. Kuzmin. M., 1974; Discharge book 1475-1605 T.
I-III / Preparation. N.G. Savich. M., 1977-1982.

49 RGADA. F. 32. Op. I. 1488-17.19. Register 1 - books and deeds. Book. 5. 1584-1594. L. 266-312; Register 2 - letters and
contracts. 1593. Unit. ridge one; Op. 2. Diplomas. 1573-1699. Unit ridge 23-25, 29; Op. 3. 1490-1713. Treatises. 152 units ridge

50 RGADA. F. 77. Op. 1. Books and deeds 1588-1719 Book. 2. 1588-1589. L. 1-26; Book. 4. 1592-1594. L. 1-93; Book. 5.
1595-1617; Book. 6. 1618-1624. L. 1-114435 items; F. 77. Op. 2. Letters 1603-1717. 93 items; Op. 3. Treatises 1588-
1719. 15 items. Op. 3. Unit ridge 5.

51 RGADA. F.PO.Op. 1.D. 1586-1695. L. 1-39; Op. 2. D. 1587-1614. L. 1-63.

52 RGADA. F. 115. Op. 1. D. 1578-1720. L. 1-16.

24
(IRI SPb.): F. 178 Astrakhan acts or "Astrakhan order

ward". 53 They include embassy books, article lists, orders, replies,

petitions, draft speeches of ambassadors at reception audiences, verbatim

records of negotiations, collections of letters that were exchanged among themselves

sovereigns, treatises (treaties) between states, diplomatic letters.

In the course of the study, in the composition of funds 32 and 77 of the RGADA, it was possible to find

many important documents that were not included in the publications of N.N. Bantysh-

Kamensky and N.I. Veselovsky: most of the documents of the registry 2 inventory 1,

files of inventory 2 F. 32, ambassadorial books No. 2, 4 and 6, partially book No. 5 of inventory 1,

files of inventories 2 and 3 F. 77. Many of the documents of F. 32 were drawn up in German

language, some in Latin. Among them are many materials that

missing from the Austrian archives.

The sources of the first group contain extensive data on diplomatic correspondence between the Prague, Moscow and Persian courts, draft treaties on a military offensive alliance against the Ottoman Empire, which were supposed to be concluded between the members of the anti-Turkish coalition. These sources were deposited in the affairs of the Posolsky Prikaz for the period 1588 to 1719. Valuable information was found in the office materials on the negotiation process to create an anti-Turkish offensive alliance between the Moscow state, the Holy Roman Empire and Persia, the routes and conditions of stay in various countries of the allied embassies. The documents give an idea of ​​the composition, work and needs of diplomatic missions, the powers of ambassadors, the nature and forms of relations between the allied states, highlight the political relations of the coalition member states, make it possible to clarify the role of the Moscow state in the anti-Turkish alliance, to trace the changes in the foreign policy of the allied states that occurred at the beginning 17th century

2. Record keeping documents of foreign origin. The sources of this group are represented by documents of foreign diplomatic departments extracted by Russian and foreign historians.

53 IRI SPb. F. 178. Op. 1. Item No. 115; Unit Mound No. 138; Unit No. 191; Unit hr. No. 201; Unit ridge No. 225.

25 from foreign archives and libraries. Most of them are published on

original language in collections of documents published under the editorship of Russian and

French scientists A.I. Turgenev, 54 D. Berchet, 55 E. Charrière, 56 T. de Gonto

Biron de Salignac, 57 E.L. Shmurlo. 58

The same group of sources includes diplomatic documents of the Carmelite Order under the conditional title "Chronicle of the Carmelites", published in 1939 in London. 59 The "Chronicle" contains instructions and reports of the Carmelites who carried out the diplomatic tasks of the Roman Curia in Persia, the correspondence of the papal office with the Persian shahs, the proposals of Shah Abbas I to create an anti-Turkish coalition, the plans of the Roman Curia and some other European states to create an anti-Turkish alliance. The Chronicle documents the negotiation process for the creation of an anti-Turkish league between the Roman Curia, Spain, the Holy Roman Empire and Persia.

Correspondence between the Roman pontiffs and the Muscovite sovereigns 61 and the monuments of diplomatic relations between Russia and Italy are diplomatic documents 62 devoted to the creation of an anti-Turkish coalition during the reigns of Vasily III and Ivan IV. Unpublished materials consist of a collection of documents F. 30 of the RGADA, extracted by Russian scientists from the archives of the Vatican, Rome and Venice, archives and libraries

France and England.

It is noteworthy that the documentation of a diplomatic nature on the topic under consideration in the Austrian and Persian archives is very

Historica Russiae Monumenta, ex antiques exterarum gentium archivis et bibliothecis deprompta, ab A.J. Turgenevio. V. I. SPb., 1841; V. II. SPb., 1842; Supplementum ad Historica Russiae Monumenta. SPb., 1848.

55 Berchet G La Repubblica di Venezia e la Persia. Torino, 1865.

56 Negociations de la France dans le Levant ou correspondans, memo ires et actes diplomatiques des ambassadeurs de
France a Constantinople et des ambassadeurs, envoyes ou residents a Venise, Raguse, Rome, Malte et Jerusalem en
Turquie, Perse, Georgie, Crimee, Syrie, Egypte etc. / Par E.Charriere. Paris, 1853.

57 Ambassade en Turquie Jean de Goniaut Biron baron de Salignac 1605 a 1610 Correspondance diplomatique et
documents inedit (publies et annotes) / Par le Comte Theodor de Gontant Biron. Paris, M DCCC LXXXIX (1887).
58 Monuments of cultural and diplomatic relations between Russia and Italy. [Descriptions of the Italian archives,
documents, reports of the scientific correspondent of the Academy of Sciences Evgenia F. Shmurlo]. T. I. Issue. 2. St. Petersburg, 1907.

59 A Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia. Papal Mission of the XVII-th and XVIII-th Centuries. London, 1939.

61 Correspondence of popes with Russian sovereigns in the 16th century. SPb., 1834.

62 Monuments of cultural and diplomatic relations between Russia and Italy. T. 1. Issue. 1. L., 1925; Russia and Italy.
Collection of historical materials concerning relations between Russia and Italy. T. 2. Issue. 2. St. Petersburg, 1913.

63 RGADA. F. 30. Op. 1. Unit ridge 163.

26 few and difficult to access. 64 This is probably due to the fact that

Holy Roman Empire at the end of the 16th - beginning of the 17th centuries. absent

diplomatic department, such documents were not systematized and

settled in the imperial archive randomly. In addition, the emperor had

several residences scattered throughout the territory of the Empire. in Persia with

By the coming to power of the Kazhgarov dynasty, all the documents,

associated with the rule of the Safavids. Court historiographer of the next shah

usually compiled a chronicle without relying on archival materials, that is, from memory

and by the impression made on him personally. Therefore, Iranian

researchers of international diplomatic relations of the noted

period used mainly foreign sources, including

Russian origin.

Documentation of foreign origin

represented by letters of foreign sovereigns /, reports, reports and

reports of foreign ambassadors, dispatches of papal nuncios and other

diplomatic correspondence of foreign powers on the conclusion

anti-Turkish coalition. The sources of the second group contain valuable data on

development of projects for the creation of an anti-Turkish coalition, secret instructions

European diplomats in Persia, secret reports of European

diplomats to their rulers. Documents give insight into relationships

Moscow state with foreign countries, internal political

events of the Moscow state, plans for the campaign of False Dmitry I against

Turkey, embassies of the Holy Roman Empire in Moscow, international

position of the Ottoman Empire. Sources allow you to find out the reaction

Ottoman Empire to the actions of European states directed against

her, the attitude of Turkey towards the states of the anti-Turkish coalition (including

Muscovy and Persia), to highlight the proposals of the Roman Curia on

the role of the Muscovite state in the proposed union.

Lobanov NA. New documents on the history of Russian-German relations at the beginning of the 17th century. 1604-1654 Vienna State Archives // Modern and Contemporary History. 2002. No. I. S. 202-208; Stanley L.P. Muslim dynasties chronological and genealogical tables with historical introductions. SPb., 1899. S. 27.

3. Chronicles. Represented by materials from published

monuments of Russian annals - the Nikon Chronicle and the New Chronicler. In the Nikon chronicle, descriptions of the Shamkhal and Gilan "guests" at the court of the Moscow sovereign are repeatedly found. 65 The New Chronicle reflects historical events from the end of the reign of Ivan IV to the 1730s, including data on the arrivals and receptions of Persian ambassadors. 66 Information from the annalistic monuments makes it possible to form a general idea of ​​the events in the Muscovite state and Russian diplomacy of the period under consideration, supplements the information from the embassy books F. 77 of the RGADA.

4. Memoirs, diaries, travel notes. Represented by memories
diaries and reports of foreign ambassadors and travelers:
imperial ambassadors Niklas von Varkoch, 67 Michael Schiele, 68 Oruj bek Bayat -
Secretary of the Persian Embassy Hussein Ali bey Bayat and A. Shirley in
Europe, 69 Stefan Kakas von Zalonkemeny and Georg Tekthander von der
Yabel, 70 Spanish ambassadors in Persia A. de Gouvea 71 and Garcia da Silva da
Figueroa, 72 Polish ambassadors and at the court of False Dmitry I. 73 Sources of this group
supplement the data of other documents on work, instructions and powers
ambassadors with instructions to create an anti-Turkish coalition at the end of the XVI -
early 17th century In addition, the travel notes of the Spanish ambassadors give
representation of the Spanish king's response to Abbas I's proposals for an alliance
against the Ottoman Empire, on the settlement of the conflict situation in

Chronicle collection, called the patriarchal or Nikon chronicle / / Complete collection of Russian chronicles (PSRL) / [Reproduction of the text ed. 1910]. T.6. M., 1965. 06 New chronicler // PSRL. /[ Reproduce text ed. 1910]. T. 14. M., 1965.

67 Description of the journey to Moscow of the ambassador of the Roman Emperor Nicholas Varkocha since July 22, 1593 M., 1874.

68 Report on the trip to Moscow of the courtier of the Roman Emperor Michael Chalet in 1598 // CHOIDR. 1875.
Book. 2. -S. 132-157.

69 The complete version of Oruj bey's work was translated from Spanish. lang. in English. and published G. Le Strepjem. See: Don
Juan of Persia a shi "ah catholic 1599 -1601. London, 1926. The full version of Orudzh-bek's notes has recently been released
Bayat in Russian. See: Russia and Europe through the eyes Oruj-bek Bayat- Don Juan Persian / Per. with
English, introduction, comments. and decree. O. Efendiyeva, A. Farzaliyeva. SPb., 2007.

70 Kakash and Tekthander. Journey to Persia through Muscovy in 1602-1603. / per. with him. A. Stankevich
M., 1896.

71 Gouveantis Automus. Relation des grandes guerres et victoires obtenues par le roy de Perse Chah-Abbas contre les
empereurs de Turque Mahomet et Achmet son fils Rouen, 1646.

72 Don Garcias de Figueroa de Silva. L "ambassade en Perse contenant la politique de ce grand empire les moeurs du Roy
Schach Abbas etc. Paris, 1667.

73 Diary of incidents in Moscow and the embassy to Moscow N. Olesnitsky and his secretary A. Gonsevsky
/ Per. Polish, foreword N.G. Ustryalova // The legend of contemporaries about Dmitry the Pretender. St. Petersburg, 1859, 4.2.
-WITH. 199-262.

28 Hormuz, the evolution of the Shah's attitude towards European sovereigns and the Spanish

the king in particular.

This group of documents includes a unique and little accessible to a wide range of researchers source about the anti-Turkish mission of papal envoys to Persia in 1604-1612. - about. Paul Simon and Fr. Jeanne-Thadde, compiled and published by Fr. Berthold-Ignacio de Sainte-Anne. 74 Of great value is the information contained in it about the negotiations between papal ambassadors and False Dmitry I regarding the anti-Turkish alliance and their stay in the Muscovite state during the Time of Troubles.

Thus, the main part of the source base of the dissertation research was the office documentation of the Ambassadorial Order of the Moscow State and foreign diplomatic departments. Some of the sources are introduced into scientific circulation for the first time. Many of the documents used in the work were compiled in foreign languages ​​and translated into Russian for the first time in the course of this study; history of new materials, to restore the picture of the negotiation process, to identify the causes, goals, conditions, dynamics and features of the participation of the Moscow state and other countries in the creation of an anti-Turkish alliance in this period.

Scientific novelty of the research. For the first time, a special scientific study was carried out on the participation of the Moscow state in the project of creating an anti-Turkish coalition.

The evolution of the idea > of creating an anti-Turkish coalition in the foreign policy of European states is traced. In the last quarter of the XVI century. the idea of ​​creating an anti-Turkish coalition was transformed in connection with the ongoing socio-political and economic changes in the international situation.

74 Bertold-Ignace de Sainte-Anne. Reverend Pere. Histoire de L "Etablissement de la Misson de Perse par les Peres Carmes-Dechausses (de l" annee 1604 a 1612); Bruxelle, 1886.

The reasons are revealed, the goals and features of the process are clarified

integration of the Moscow state into the European community through
participation in the anti-Turkish coalition. Contrary to the traditional opinion of Russian
and foreign researchers, the Muscovite state intended

to participate in military and political actions against the Ottoman Empire. His military-political and military-strategic plans related to the creation of a coalition were of a multidimensional and long-term nature.

The conditions for the implementation of the project of the anti-Turkish coalition in
composition of the Muscovite State, the Holy Roman Empire and Persia.
The Holy Roman Empire and Persia shared borders with the Ottomans
empire and were in a state of permanent war with it.
The geostrategic position of the Moscow state allowed him to
act as a mediator and coordinator, as well as direct
participant in the struggle against the Ottoman Empire.

Financial, human and diplomatic resources identified
Moscow state, necessary for participation in the anti-Turkish coalition, and
also possible forms of his participation in the anti-Turkish campaign. Moscow
the state could involve in the military anti-Turkish campaign detachments of the Don
and partly Zaporizhzhya Cossacks, vassal Kabardian and Circassian
squads, place in the fortresses of Transcaucasia, located at the intersection
roads, streltsy garrisons, to exert forceful and diplomatic pressure on
Crimean Tatars, assist Persia in the rapid implementation through Europe
raw silk, supply firearms to Persia in exchange for
territorial concessions on her part.

The reasons for the change in foreign policy priorities in Russian-imperial and Russian-Persian relations at the beginning of the 17th century are clarified. It was found out that the participation of the Muscovite state in the process of creating an anti-Turkish coalition was an independent direction of its eastern policy of the late 16th - early 17th centuries. The stages of this process are highlighted. It is determined that the process at different stages of development had different dynamics and different significance for the coalition members. Achievements in custody

the anti-Turkish agreement were actually reduced to zero as a result of the Troubles in the Muscovite state and the signing of a peace treaty between the Holy Roman Empire and the Ottoman Empire. The creation of an anti-Turkish coalition became impossible. With the beginning of the Thirty Years' War in Europe, the idea of ​​creating an anti-Turkish coalition ceased to be relevant until the last quarter of the 17th century.

The structure and content of the dissertation work is determined by its general concept, purpose, objectives and logic of the study. The dissertation consists of an introduction, three chapters, a conclusion, a list of sources and references, and an appendix.

The dissertation has a certain structural composition, which is related to the fact that the work examines two problems in their relationship: the issue of creating a pan-European anti-Turkish military-strategic alliance with the participation of the Muscovite state and Persia and the evolution of Russian-imperial and Russian-Persian relations. Both research problems are considered in interrelation, development and chronological sequence. This specificity is reflected in the content of the chapters, their number and the chronological sequence of the structure of the work.

The Anti-Turkish Coalition as an Instrument of the Eastern Policy of the Moscow State

The Ottoman threat or the "Eastern question" was perceived by the European community as a struggle between Christian Europe and the Ottoman Empire.2 After 1453, the Roman pontiffs made repeated attempts to organize a new crusade. At the end of the XV - beginning of the XVI century. the medieval concept of the crusade as "the liberation of the Holy Sepulcher from the infidels" has undergone major changes. For the papacy, of course, issues of faith were of priority, because. only the Roman pontiff had the religious and political authority to call Christendom to a "holy war" against the infidels. But now the religious-philosophical idea has acquired a specific political-geographical content. The new crusade is a struggle against the Ottomans, against the alien cultural and religious world of Islam, which threatened to destroy the Christian world. The fight against the "major military power of the Middle Ages"4 was possible only under the condition of "nemico commune" - the unification of the military-technical potentials of all interested countries. Hence the need arose for the creation of an anti-Turkish coalition.5 Various variants of an anti-Turkish league or coalition were considered in the Roman Curia. The final version was to satisfy all interested parties. It was rather difficult to do this, taking into account the contradictions between the European states.6 Spain, the Holy Roman Empire and Venice were supposed to be in the anti-Turkish coalition. The Roman Curia was given the role of ideological leader. The listed states had land or sea borders with the Ottoman Empire and were in a state of permanent war with the Ottomans. The Holy Roman Empire was most interested in creating an anti-Turkish coalition, the Empire was a confederation of German, Slavic and Italian principalities and lands. there was opposition to Ottoman aggression.8 From 1526, when the Kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary became part of the Empire, in the eyes of Europe it began to be considered a “shield of the Christian world against the Turkish threat.”9 During the first half of the 16th century. The empire gradually ceded territories in the Balkans and Hungary to the Ottomans and was in dire need of allies who could share the burden of the anti-Turkish struggle with it. Therefore, the problem of creating an anti-Turkish coalition in the country's foreign policy was a priority. Theoretically, other European states, in particular France, England, and Poland, could join the anti-Turkish coalition. But these countries pursued their own, narrow national interests in the matter of creating an anti-Turkish coalition. Poland, such plans remained only hypothetical projects. In order to change the situation, it was necessary to make serious adjustments to the composition of the league participants. The Roman Curia began to consider options for political union with states outside the sphere of influence of the Catholic Church, including non-Christians. The issue of such an alliance for the Roman Curia from the theological point of view was difficult. From an orthodox point of view, it was considered unacceptable and “contrary to faith” to expand the league at the expense of non-Christian states.11 In the 16th century. on the issue of the anti-Turkish struggle, the Roman pontiffs turned out to be more pragmatic politicians than orthodox high priests. They managed to substantiate theologically the need to create a league specifically against the Ottomans "in alliance with 12 interested states, including non-Christians."

The efforts of the Muscovite state to conclude a treaty with the Holy Roman Empire

The Ottoman threat or the "Eastern question" was perceived by the European community as a struggle between Christian Europe and the Ottoman Empire.2 After 1453, the Roman pontiffs made repeated attempts to organize a new crusade. At the end of the XV - beginning of the XVI century. the medieval concept of the crusade as "the liberation of the Holy Sepulcher from the infidels" has undergone major changes. For the papacy, of course, issues of faith were of priority, because. only the Roman pontiff had the religious and political authority to call Christendom to a "holy war" against the infidels. But now the religious-philosophical idea has acquired a specific political-geographical content. The new crusade is a struggle against the Ottomans, against the alien cultural and religious world of Islam, which threatened to destroy the Christian world. The fight against the "major military power of the Middle Ages"4 was possible only under the condition of "nemico commune" - the unification of the military-technical potentials of all interested countries. Hence the need arose for the creation of an anti-Turkish coalition.5 Various variants of an anti-Turkish league or coalition were considered in the Roman Curia. The final version was to satisfy all interested parties. It was rather difficult to do this, taking into account the contradictions between the European states.6 Spain, the Holy Roman Empire and Venice were supposed to be in the anti-Turkish coalition. The Roman Curia was given the role of ideological leader. The listed states had land or sea borders with the Ottoman Empire and were in a state of permanent war with the Ottomans. The Holy Roman Empire was most interested in creating an anti-Turkish coalition, the Empire was a confederation of German, Slavic and Italian principalities and lands. there was opposition to Ottoman aggression.8 From 1526, when the Kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary became part of the Empire, in the eyes of Europe it began to be considered a “shield of the Christian world against the Turkish threat.”9 During the first half of the 16th century. The empire gradually ceded territories in the Balkans and Hungary to the Ottomans and was in dire need of allies who could share the burden of the anti-Turkish struggle with it. Therefore, the problem of creating an anti-Turkish coalition in the country's foreign policy was a priority. Theoretically, other European states, in particular France, England, and Poland, could join the anti-Turkish coalition. But these countries pursued their own, narrow national interests in the matter of creating an anti-Turkish coalition. Poland, such plans remained only hypothetical projects. In order to change the situation, it was necessary to make serious adjustments to the composition of the league participants. The Roman Curia began to consider options for political union with states outside the sphere of influence of the Catholic Church, including non-Christians. The issue of such an alliance for the Roman Curia from the theological point of view was difficult. From an orthodox point of view, it was considered unacceptable and “contrary to faith” to expand the league at the expense of non-Christian states.11 In the 16th century. on the issue of the anti-Turkish struggle, the Roman pontiffs turned out to be more pragmatic politicians than orthodox high priests. They managed to substantiate theologically the need to create a league specifically against the Ottomans "in alliance with 12 interested states, including non-Christians." After sending "Turkish aid" to the emperor in Moscow, they rightly hoped for a positive solution to the issue of an alliance agreement. The Moscow government demonstrated maximum goodwill and seriousness of intentions. The emperor and his government could not ignore the gesture of voluntary financial assistance, because. were interested in continuing this kind of service. Moscow envoys M.I. Velyaminov and A. Vlasyev in September 1595. Upon their return to Moscow, the ambassadors reported in detail on the alignment of forces in Europe. Circumstances favored at least a detailed discussion of the articles of the future treaty. Together with Velyaminov and Vlasyev, the messenger Jan Prochinsky arrived in Moscow on December 1, 1595 with the emperor’s gratitude for the “royal treasury.” Don or Donau), viceroy of the land of Lower Lausitz and chairman of the Court of Appeal of Bohemia.3 This was the most solid embassy in the entire history of Russian-imperial relations. Burgrave Abraham von Donau was not only a noble and influential nobleman, but also a rich man, so he was able to equip an embassy caravan of 120 nobles, not counting the attendants. 4

The embassy arrived in Moscow on April 28, and on May 22, 1597, during the first audience with the Moscow sovereign, Lou Pauli filed letters from his immediate master, Archduke Maximilian, addressed to Tsar Fyodor Ioannovich and B. Godunov.5 Why is this detail important for the embassy of Abraham von Donau? The fact is that the Austrian historians are trying to substantiate the thesis that the Moscow side poorly understood what exactly the emperor was seeking from it and that the embassy of A. Donau again, once again, was discussing the rights and opportunities of Archduke Maximilian to the Polish throne. The issue of the Polish crown was very interested in Maximilian, and the Moscow government allegedly tried to regain the Kievan lands in this way. Emperor Rudolf II himself did not share these claims of his younger brother, because. they prevented him from establishing relations with the Polish king Sigismund III.6

With this point of view, the Russian historian B.N. Florya, who also believes that the main goal of bilateral relations between the Empire and the Muscovite state should have been a joint struggle, believed that the messenger L. Pauli submitted this letter to Godunov. February 1, 1597, that is, when he gave the news of the arrival of the imperial embassy. See: Lists of Diplomatic Persons. P. 16. This fact raises some doubts, because bilateral relations between the Moscow court and Archduke Maximilian developed quite intensively and the issues discussed between them could not have such a long delay. Perhaps L. Pauli brought Maximilian's letter in the summer of 1596, received an answer to it, and in October 1596 he was again sent to Moscow as a messenger of the emperor.

Poland. However, it is worth emphasizing that negotiations about the affairs of the emperor and the affairs of the archduke, although they often took place during the same embassy, ​​were always held separately. Moreover, the imperial ambassador could represent the interests of Maximilian and even the interests of the Spanish king, as N. Varkoch did, but the archduke's ambassador always spoke only on his behalf and never discussed the problems of the emperor.

Eastern Policy of Boris Godunov and Persian-Imperial Negotiations

August 28, 1603 to Moscow together with A.F. Zhirovo-Zasekin received the embassy of Shah Abbas headed by Lachin Bek. Despite the fact that information about the embassy of Lachin Bek is completely absent in the materials on Russian-Persian relations, it is very important for understanding the relationship between possible allies in the anti-Turkish coalition during this period of time. Scanty information about the mission of Lachin bek was preserved only in materials on Russian-imperial relations, reflecting the stay of the embassy of G. Logau in Moscow. This fact is symbolic, because If we consider Russian-Persian relations during this period of time in isolation from the idea of ​​an anti-Turkish alliance, then this episode seems at least strange. If we assume the relationship with the issues discussed with the emperor's embassy, ​​then this fact seems quite understandable. For the first time M.M. Shcherbatov, who wrote that he found brief information about the arrival of the embassy in Moscow in the Digit Book for 7111-7112. At the same time, the historian emphasized that in the archive of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs he could not find either a description of the reception of the Persian ambassador, or the reasons for his arrival in Moscow. Despite the almost complete lack of information about the content of the negotiations between Tsar Boris and Lachin bek, M.M. Shcherbatov was struck by the gifts that the ambassador delivered to Moscow on behalf of Shah Abbas. The most valuable gift of Abbas to Tsar Boris was “an armchair, forged with silver and richly decorated, which still exists and shows that he (Lachin-bek) was one of the great ambassadors, and that the reason for his embassy had rather important reasons.”3 Such a conclusion from the Shah's gift was made by M.M. Shcherbatov. But the Moscow side also attached special importance to him, which is clearly seen from the speech of the bailiff I. Sudakov to the Austrian ambassador G. Logau: amateur reminders. And for the honor of the Royal Majesty, he sent to our Great Sovereign, His Royal Majesty, the place Royal gold was made from lala and from the yacht and with other expensive stone of the former Great Sovereigns of Persitsky.

A description of the reception of the embassy has been preserved in the Bit Book. “In the summer of 7112, on September 4, the sovereign and Grand Duke Boris Fedorovich of All Russia visited the first Kizilbash ambassador Lachin bek. And the sovereign was in royal dress in the Golden Chamber; the bells were in a white dress when after the book. Ivan Mikhailovich Katyrev-Rostovsky, yes, Prince. Ivan Ondreevich Bolshoy Khovansky, yes, Semyon Dmitriev's son, and Fedor Ulyanov, son of the Tulupova-Velyaminovs. The bailiffs were with the ambassador, Prince. Fyodor Ondrevich Zvenigorodsky, yes Ondrey Matveev, son of Voeikov, and clerk Dorofei Bokhin.5 to. the embassy was received seven days after entering Moscow.

However, the Digit Books do not have information about the purpose of the embassies and the content of the negotiations. The bailiff I. Sudakov thus explained to G. Logau the purpose of the embassy of Lachin bek. “And the Shah sent him to the Royal Majesty about friendship and love, ... And he ordered that he, Shah Abbas Majesty, in all the will of our Great Sovereign, and that the Royal Majesty would command him, and he would teach by that stand together according to the command of the Tsar's Majesty.”8 Moreover, in the original version, the goal was stated somewhat differently, but in our opinion, it was this formulation that reflected the actual tasks of Lachin bek's mission. “So that our Great Sovereign, His Royal Majesty, keep the Shah in friendship and love and be with him in unity and in the end against all enemies.”9