This is one of the best texts about the Russian-Georgian war of 2008.

Six years ago, the Russian-Georgian war broke out. It certainly created a new reality - in Georgia, Russia, in the post-Soviet space and in the world in relation to Russia. But most of us know about it from myths created by massive Russian propaganda. Here are the most common ones

Myth #1: Saakashvili started the war

The war begins the one who prepares for it in advance.

Who prepared for it and who tried to prevent it?

In June-July 2008, various information sources reported that a political decision on an imminent (presumably in August) war with Georgia had already been made in Moscow, that Putin personally oversees the preparation. The official news agency "Osinform" publishes the formula for a future war: "a peacekeeping operation to force the aggressor into peace."

On July 5, large-scale maneuvers of the North Caucasian Military District (SKVO) "Kavkaz-2008" begin. They are attended by 8,000 military personnel, 700 armored vehicles, ships of the Black Sea Fleet. The official purpose of the exercise is to prepare for the "peace enforcement operation." The troops are handing out a leaflet "Warrior, know the potential enemy!" - with a description of the armed forces of Georgia.

The best landing units of the Russian army from different regions of the country are being transferred to the border with Georgia. They replace the motorized rifle units previously stationed there. A field military hospital is being set up near the Terskoye training ground of the 58th army in the south of North Ossetia, capable of receiving 300 wounded per day.
After the end of the maneuvers, the field hospital is not dismantled. The troops participating in them do not return to their places of permanent deployment. Some of them seep into South Ossetia. Fortunately, just these days (coincidentally) the construction of a military base in Java was completed there.

By the beginning of the war (that is, before 08.08.08 - the official date of the entry of Russian troops into hostilities), about 200 armored vehicles and advanced units of the 135th and 693rd regiments of the 58th army were concentrated in Java - over 1200 people. Russia still does not recognize this (and how can one admit that Russian troops were stationed in South Ossetia to repel Georgian aggression before the aggression itself began?), but the evidence of the soldiers and officers of the 58th Army themselves, which appeared in the media, does not leave this doubts (see, for example, a selection).

Simultaneously with the military training was informational. On July 20, hacker attacks began on Georgian state and information sites. This was the second known instance of cyber warfare against a state in history. (The first one was recorded in 2007, when, after the aggravation of relations between Russia and Estonia, the websites of Estonian government institutions were brought down in the center of Tallinn due to the removal of a monument to Soviet soldiers.) The final attack took place on the morning of August 8 - against the Russian-language news sites of Georgia.

On the other hand, since August 1, Russian journalists began arriving in Tskhinvali from Vladikavkaz in an organized manner. Soon their number increased to 50 people, but not a single foreigner (with the exception of a correspondent for the Ukrainian TV channel Inter) was among them. The Russian authorities established a strict system of admission: accreditation had to be obtained from both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Through this double sieve, only the most trusted and trusted could seep through.

Thus conditions were provided not only for a massive invasion, but also for reporting only what needed to be reported about it.

The most significant thing in this multi-way combination is that the war actually began
July 29, 2008.

It was on this day that hostilities began. And they began, in accordance with the plans from Moscow, South Ossetian armed formations completely controlled by Russia.

They launched a massive and systematic shelling of the villages of South Ossetia, which are under the jurisdiction of Georgia, and the positions of the Georgian contingent of peacekeeping forces. The fire was carried out from mortars and 120-mm guns, which are generally prohibited in the conflict zone. People died.

This is not a separate aggravation in the old confrontation between the separatists and the central government. This is a clear prelude to war. Deliberate provocation to elicit retaliatory action. So the city punks send the youngster to bully a passer-by, in order to then jump out from around the corner and fall on the whole shobla with a cry: "Don't touch the kid!"

The Tbilisi authorities were well aware of what was expected of them. But it is impossible to endure blows for a long time. By the evening of August 1, the Georgians begin return artillery fire on the positions of the militants in the vicinity of Tskhinvali. The Ossetians respond by expanding the zone of shelling of Georgian villages and increasing the intensity of the fire. Large-caliber mortars and 122-millimeter guns are already being used.

A mass evacuation of the population to Russia begins from Tskhinvali. Over 20,000 people were deported within a few days. It is estimated that this is half of the actual population of the self-proclaimed republic. Tskhinvali becomes an almost deserted city.

And through the Roki tunnel - the only way for the passage of heavy equipment from North Ossetia to South - Russian armored vehicles and troops are moving.

The Georgian authorities are trying to the last to resolve the matter peacefully. Saakashvili's personal representative T. Yakobashvili arranges a meeting with the South Ossetian leadership in Tskhinvali on August 7 through the mediation of the Russian Ambassador-at-Large Yu. Popov.

Comes. Popov is not. Turns out he had a flat tire on the way. "So put a spare!" - advises the Georgian minister to the Russian ambassador. - "And the spare tire is punctured," the ambassador replies. Such a disaster. The representative of South Ossetia refuses to negotiate without a Russian mediator.

Yakobashvili is negotiating with whomever he has - the commander of the peacekeeping forces, General Kulakhmetov. He admits that "he is no longer able to control the Ossetian units." What to do? "Declare a unilateral ceasefire," advises Kulakhmetov.

Within an hour, Yakobashvili resolved the issue. At 17:00, he announces to Kulakhmetov that the Georgian government has agreed to a unilateral ceasefire. At 17:10 the Georgian guns fell silent. At 19:10 Saakashvili announced this in a live television address in Georgian and Ossetian and called for negotiations.

The answer is the intensification of shelling of Georgian villages. By 2300 they reached their peak. And at the same time, a column of Russian troops with 100 armored vehicles comes out of the Roki tunnel. The invasion has begun.
In half an hour Saakashvili will give the order to start a military operation.

Could he have done otherwise? Of course he could.

But for this it was necessary to forget that you are the president of a sovereign country, that you are a man and that you are a Georgian. And if he had done it, he would not have been either one or the other, or the third.

It was a situation of zugzwang: the rulers of Russia skillfully brought him into the war, leaving no other way out.
If he wants war, the one who prepares for it, the one who does not give the enemy a chance to avoid it, starts the war. It was Russia.

Myth #2: Russia started the war to stop the Ossetian genocide

Where did it come from.

As early as August 8, the President of South Ossetia, E. Kokoity, announced that 1,400 people had died as a result of shelling and hostilities in Tskhinvali alone - the figure is not final. The next day, August 9, the official representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the republic announced 2,100 dead civilians in Tskhinvali.
This figure - more than 2,000 dead - later appeared everywhere: in reports, in media reports, and in Internet forums.

The number of victims was supplemented by examples of the atrocities of the Georgian military: direct fire from tanks at houses where civilians were hiding, aimed fire from machine guns at children and the elderly, burning houses along with living people, decapitated corpses of girls ...

But when they began to count, it turned out that everything was not quite so. In the Tskhinvali hospital, where all the wounded and dead Ossetians were admitted, during the entire period of fighting in the city, 273 wounded and 44 killed were received, 90% of the victims were South Ossetian militias. The head of the investigative committee at the Russian Prosecutor's Office, A. Bastrykin, announced 134 dead civilians in South Ossetia during the entire war, according to Yulia Latynina, "resurrecting 1,866 people in one fell swoop."

But even after the official count, the number "2000" remained in the public mind, and even in speeches and interviews of officials, including Putin.

Although it is initially unrealistic. The official number of residents of Tskhinvali before the war was 42,000. After the evacuation in early August, half of them should have remained. The usual ratio of killed and wounded in the zone of military conflicts is 1:3. So, statistically, for every 2,000 killed, there should have been another 6,000 wounded. That is, almost every second Tskhinvalian after the Georgian assault would have been wounded or killed. And if it were so, could such a bold arithmetician as Kokoity keep silent about this? But he didn't.

How did 2,000 dead appear on the second day? And so - what a genocide without thousands of victims! "Thousands" is at least two. So it turned out 2000. Modestly - at a minimum.

As for the Georgian atrocities, not a single fact has been confirmed even after verification by such a demanding organization as Human Rights Watch. Not a single eyewitness account - only retelling of what was told. That's how rumors spread. Judging by their abundance and drama, these were specially spread rumors. Professional mischief.

On the other hand, the ethnic cleansing of Georgians by the forces of South Ossetian armed formations is not a rumor. The Georgian population in South Ossetia, where Georgian villages interspersed with Ossetian ones almost in a checkerboard pattern, no longer exists. Robbed, expelled, killed - some Georgian villages were simply razed to the ground. It was made by the hands of the brave warriors of Kokoity. They did not distinguish themselves in battles and almost did not participate (and the belligerent president himself, at the first reports of the advance of Georgian troops to Tskhinvali, fled from the capital under the shadow of Russian tanks to Java, and returned with them), but in reprisals against civilians and looting, they took their souls away.

Through their efforts, there are no more Georgians in South Ossetia. But on the territory of Georgia, outside of South Ossetia, more than 60 thousand Ossetians lived and continue to live in peace. What would have happened to them if the Georgians really started a genocide? Remember the Armenians in Baku during the Karabakh crisis.

But the fact is that there was no genocide of Ossetians in Georgia and by Georgians either before the war, or during it, or after it. There was no reason.

Myth #3: Russia went to war to protect its peacekeepers

The last thing the Georgians wanted was to fight the Russian peacekeepers.

The first thing they did when starting hostilities was to warn the Russian peacekeeping contingent.
At 23.35, President Saakashvili orders the start of the operation, and at 23.40, the commander of the Georgian peacekeeping forces, Brigadier General Mamuka Kurashvili, informs the commander of the Russian peacekeepers, General Kulakhmetov, about the advance of the troops and asks not to interfere.

"Not everything is so simple," the Russian general replied to the Georgian.

Even before that, at the initial stage of hostilities, Ossetian artillerymen and mortarmen were shelling Georgian villages near the places of deployment of peacekeepers, using them as cover, or even using direct help to direct fire. Kulakhmetov did not consider it necessary to deny this in conversations with Georgian officials. During the offensive of the Georgian troops, key figures of the South Ossetian command hid in the main headquarters. By international standards, this also made it a legitimate target.

However, in the map of targets issued to the Georgian artillerymen during the artillery preparation, the objects of the peacekeepers were marked as prohibited for fire.

In order to protect their peacekeepers, the Russian leadership did not have to send in troops and spend money on the war. It was enough to forbid Kokoity to use them as a cover - and everyone would have remained intact. But the goal was different.

Myth #4: Russia went to war to protect its citizens

The Russian authorities themselves have created their own artificial diaspora in South Ossetia by issuing Russian citizenship and Russian passports to thousands of residents of the self-proclaimed republic in Georgia. Legally, this is regarded as interference in the internal affairs of another state. As it turned out - and actually. The artificial diaspora created an artificial reason for intervention: the protection of its citizens is nothing like the newly minted ones, everything is dear to us.
Witty, of course: this way you can provide a justification for invading any country.
But not original: in the same way, Hitler created a pretext for the annexation of Czechoslovakia in 1938 under the pretext of protecting the rights of the Sudeten Germans and for presenting territorial claims to Poland. Milosevic tried to do the same in the 90s in the dismembered Yugoslavia.
First, good company. Secondly, it is known what this defense of theirs ultimately turned out to "oppressed compatriots."
Who really benefited from the practically uncontrolled issuance of Russian passports to residents of South Ossetia is the corrupt elite of the republic. The Georgians found in captured Tskhinvali hundreds of Russian passports without the signatures of the owners - these "dead souls" were probably credited with pensions and benefits from the Russian treasury.

Myth 5: Georgia bombed Tskhinvali

When Georgian troops approached Tskhinvali on the night of August 8, they only fired barrages and shelled administrative buildings. There was no need for another. The Georgians entered the whole and half-empty city, which was abandoned not only by most of the inhabitants, but also by the main forces of the militias. Kokoity, with the color of his army, fled to the Russian military base in Java. The Georgian troops were opposed by a few scattered groups of partisans with small arms. They could only run away from the tanks.

Bombing and shelling of the city from "Grads" were needed in the next two days, when the Georgians were driven out of the city by Russian troops who came to the aid of the Ossetian brothers. These were their bombs and shells. It is on their conscience that most of the dead civilians (see Myth No. 2) and the destroyed city.

Myth #6: Georgians shamefully fled

Most of us get an idea of ​​the course of modern wars from television pictures. From the picture of the August war, the viewer could remember how "timid Georgians fled", leaving equipment and barracks with made beds. And I couldn't see what wasn't shown.
For example, the defeat of a Russian column of armored vehicles by Georgian special forces on August 8. Then, out of 120 tanks and armored personnel carriers, more than half were destroyed, the commander of the 58th Army, General Khrulev, was seriously wounded. According to Saakashvili, this episode delayed the advance of Russian troops for two days. And then the Russian command brought up such forces that in the event of a direct confrontation, the Georgian army would have been completely defeated. And he gave the order to retreat so that there was something to defend Tbilisi. You can’t break a butt with a whip.
It is clear that the correlation of forces between the Russian and Georgian armies is so incommensurable that there can be no talk of any real confrontation. But this is more about Myth No. 1 - about whether the Georgians wanted war.

Myth #7: The war ended in peace

Georgia has lost 20% of its territory - lands that most Georgians consider their own. No Georgian president will dare to abandon them forever. And no one can guarantee that any of them will not dare to return the lost - including by force.

Russia acquired as satellites two formally independent quasi-states, which, besides itself, were recognized only by such influential powers as Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru - for $50 million, while Vanuatu is still being traded, well, and Hamas, which itself is not a state. In fact, these are two forever subsidized regions of Russia, doomed to be black holes in the Russian budget, oases of wild corruption and crime. Prosperity and even peace will never be there, and the possibility of criminal and national conflicts - always.

Russia has regained its Soviet image of a brutal aggressor, which, of course, amuses national pride, but only harms business, diplomacy, and ultimately the country's security.

Russia and Georgia have become and will remain irreconcilable enemies. This is for a long time. After the war, a real "cold war" began between the two states, and as the recent experience of the past shows, in the "cold war" the one who has more weapons and a stronger army does not always win.

Myth #8: South Ossetia is the land of Ossetia, not Georgia

The territory of South Ossetia is the original part of Georgia, as even geographical names speak of. The same Tskhinvali, after the war in the Russian press and official documents renamed Tskhinvali, did not become less Georgian because of this, since its root is from the ancient Georgian word meaning "hornbeam". Ossetians in the capital of South Ossetia became the national majority only by 1990. Before the inter-ethnic conflicts of the sunset of the USSR and the wars of sovereignty caused by it, there was practically no antagonism between Georgians and Ossetians. This is not even the situation in Kosovo, where an overwhelming Albanian majority has formed on primordially Serbian soil. The ethnic cleansing carried out by Kokoity with the support of Putin in 2008 is too deep and fresh a wound for the Georgians to accept.

And finally, a lot of photos of the destroyed Georgian villages

Conflict mapping.

Armed conflict in South Ossetia in August 2008.

The armed conflict in South Ossetia took place in August 2008, on August 7-16. The conflict took place on the territory of the Republic of South Ossetia, on the border of Georgia and Russia. Accordingly, Georgia, on the one hand, and Russia, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia, on the other hand, took part in the conflict.

Sources Participating countries
South Ossetia

In many sources regarding the South Ossetian conflict, there is an accusatory position towards Georgia. Undisputed participants, i.e. explicit, in this conflict, based on media publications, are Georgia, South Ossetia., Russia. But there is a tendency to introduce into this conflict such a participant as the United States.

Analysis of the resources of the parties: on the part of Georgia - the armed forces of Georgia and, presumably, the participation of foreign instructors or mercenaries. From the side of South Ossetia - the Armed Forces of South Ossetia, as well as 15 thousand Russian personnel.

Economic Resources: Economically, Georgia was at a good level, which paved the way for the creation of the necessary military power. During the conflict, Georgia suffered significant economic losses militarily. South Ossetia, in economic terms, in my opinion, is somewhat weak in itself, but Russian patronage has played an important role in this conflict.

The armed conflict in South Ossetia arose due to:

According to the official position of South Ossetia, Russia and Abkhazia: A response to Georgia's aggression against civilians in South Ossetia and Russian peacekeepers. In the South Ossetian interpretation, the war was caused by Georgia's aggression against South Ossetia, which took place on the eve of the Olympic Games. The code name of the blitzkrieg - "Clear Field" - reveals the essence of Georgia's plans - to carry out ethnic cleansing, to turn the whole of South Ossetia into a "clear field".

According to the official position of Georgia: Carrying out a military operation in the Tskhinvali region in response to the provocations of the South Ossetian armed groups; Russia's aggression against Georgia, which began from the territory of Ukraine 6 days before the hostilities in South Ossetia. The Georgian side stated that the actions of the Georgian army in South Ossetia were a response to the violation of the ceasefire.

The conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia is not only an armed confrontation in August 2008, this conflict has a long history and it is difficult to single out the emergence of this conflict as such. The conflict grew over many years and reached its peak in August 2008. In many ways, the growth of the conflict was influenced not only by the fact that South Ossetia became autonomous from Georgia, but by the fact of unfavorable relations between Russia and Georgia.

At the beginning of 2008, there was an increase in tension in the conflict zone, as well as in relations between Russia and Georgia.

On March 6, 2008, it was announced that Russia had withdrawn from the ban on trade, economic and financial ties with Abkhazia; Moscow's decision was regarded by the Georgian Foreign Ministry as "encouraging separatism in the Abkhaz region and an open attempt to encroach on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia."

In late July - early August, the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict escalated. Skirmishes and fire raids of varying degrees of intensity took place regularly. Civilians of South Ossetia began to leave the conflict zone en masse.

On the morning of August 8, 2008, several hours after the start of artillery shelling by Georgian troops of the city of Tskhinvali and the positions of Russian peacekeepers, Russia demanded the immediate convening of an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council to develop joint actions to end the violence "in connection with Georgia's aggressive actions against South Ossetia - internationally recognized party to the conflict.

During the hostilities, not only members of the enemy armed forces were killed, but also numerous civilians and Russian peacekeepers.

Already on August 12, 2008, a statement was made about the termination of the peacekeeping operation by Russia "to force Georgia to peace" and the restoration of the security of the civilian population and peacekeepers. At a meeting with EU representatives, a plan was created to resolve the conflict (the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan):

1. Do not resort to the use of force.

2. Finally stop all hostilities.

3. Free access to humanitarian aid.

4. The armed forces of Georgia are returning to their places of permanent deployment.

5. The armed forces of the Russian Federation are being withdrawn to the line preceding the start of hostilities.

6. The beginning of an international discussion on the future status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and ways to ensure their lasting security.

The main result of the entire conflict was the fact of secession and recognition by Russia of the independence of South Ossetia.

At the moment, the situation with the status of South Ossetia has remained “up in the air”. Many analysts are of the opinion that it will remain an unrecognized republic. The forecast of the conflict is such that the Georgia-South Ossetia confrontation may still continue, because. Georgia is backed by the United States, and South Ossetia is backed by Russia, these two forces themselves are also opposing sides, so the situation in Georgia-South Ossetia relations will remain unchanged.

Bibliography:

1. M. Makarychev “Caucasian Knot. Tragedy in South Ossetia, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, December 29, 2008

2. Rossiyskaya Gazeta, "Barack Obama: Russia Acts Contrary to International Rules of Law", December 8, 2008.

4. “American journalists refuted the version of the Georgian leadership about the beginning of the war in South Ossetia”, November 10, 2008.

5. UN about the conflict in South Ossetia.

6. Georgia – South Ossetia conflict escalates

8. Materials en.wikipedia.org

Little Victorious War (tm)
About the Russian-Georgian war on August 8-12, 2008.
This war is just an echo of the confrontation between the two powers - the Empire of Good (USA) and the Empire of Evil (Russia).
The United States pursued to a greater extent political goals, namely, the program of the previous administration to "promote democracy" to the East was implemented. If we consider the military component, the Pentagon was interested in evaluating the effectiveness of the training program for puppet armies in the post-Soviet space GSSOP II. Well, and a real assessment of the combat effectiveness of the Russian (as it sounds in all documents of American sources) army.

For our FSB and GRU, a different task was set - to contribute to the defeat of the Georgian army and the capture of objects of interest. Our GRU was interested in three modern RE facilities built by the Americans in Georgia. Radar in Anaklia, RER center near Gori, air defense radar on a mountain near Tbilisi. The first two were captured and taken out.

The plan for the American operation in Georgia was revealed in the spring, a few months before the war. It is known that Bush personally gave “permission” for the war, that US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who arrived in Tbilisi a month before the war, discussed the details of the operation there, assuring that the Russians would not dare to attack Georgia.

Back in 2006, there was a plan in Georgia, code-named "Tiger Throw", which assumed until May 1, 2006, with the support of the United States and the OSCE, to force Russia to withdraw its peacekeepers from South Ossetia. Following this, in order to destabilize the situation in the region, several resonant provocations were to be organized within a week against the population of Georgian enclaves in South Ossetia. At the same time, under the pretext of localizing the conflict area and ensuring the security of the Georgian population living in its immediate vicinity, it was planned to create groupings of Georgian troops on the border with South Ossetia. On May 6, formations, military units and subdivisions of law enforcement agencies of Georgia from different directions were to seize all large settlements of South Ossetia while simultaneously completely blocking the border with the Russian Federation. Further, according to the plan, the de facto leadership of South Ossetia was arrested and brought to trial. Then martial law was to be introduced in the republic, a provisional government was appointed and a curfew was established. In total, the Georgian military had 7 days for this operation. The existence of such a plan was confirmed in an interview with Reuters by former Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili.

In 2007, President Saakashvili demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia. The largest base was Akhalkalaki. The troops were withdrawn ahead of schedule - November 15, 2007, although the withdrawal was planned during 2008. Only Russian peacekeepers remained, acting under a CIS mandate in Abkhazia and under the Dagomys agreements in South Ossetia.

During Saakashvili's presidency, Georgia set a world record for the growth of the military budget, increasing it from 2003 to 2008 by more than 33 times. The leadership of Georgia sharply increased the military budget, trying to bring its armed forces to NATO standards. Georgia's budget for 2008 planned expenditures for the Ministry of Defense equivalent to $0.99 billion, which accounted for more than 25% of all Georgian budget revenues for 2008.

Georgia's weapons suppliers included the United States, England, France, Greece, Turkey, Israel, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine, Serbia and others, although the Serbian Kalashnikov factory denies direct deliveries and suggests that the assault rifles entered Georgia via Croatia and Bosnia . Ukraine supplied the following types of weapons to Georgia: Osa and Buk air defense systems, Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters, L-39 training aircraft, self-propelled guns (including heavy 2S7 Pion 203 mm caliber) as well as tanks, BMP and small arms. Georgian special forces were trained by American specialists under a program that was tested in Croatia in 1995 as part of an operation by the Croatian armed forces to seize the Serbian Krajina region, the majority of whose population was ethnic Serbs.

The war, which began on the night of August 7-8, was preceded by a five-day escalation of the situation on the border of the still unrecognized South Ossetia. Beginning on August 3, skirmishes broke out at night. Observers from the OSCE and Russian military observers were working to identify the instigators and tried to resolve the situation, tripartite negotiations were held.

Actually, from the very beginning it was clear that all the provocations were carefully planned and carried out by the Georgian side. Involve Ossetians in a shootout, and then make mournful faces and shout to the whole world that bandit Ossetians do not give life to peaceful Georgians. Control over the actions of Georgian saboteurs and their training was carried out by specialists from the CIA.

This is evidenced by the words of Mikhail Saakashvili before the war. “I will add that the purpose of this attack was not only to liberate South Ossetia for Georgia, but also to “drive”, as Saakashvili put it in a conversation with Burdzhanadze, Russian troops “on rusty tanks” and demonstrate Russian “impotence” to the whole world. In other conversations, he said that he personally wanted to put Putin in his place ... ". Someone will find it funny, but the Georgian generals and their commander-in-chief were going to drive our army all the way to Rostov.

At 23.45 on August 7, the Georgian side began a massive shelling by the artillery brigade, and in the morning the Georgian offensive began: hourly deployment and video.

Side forces

What was the Georgian army like by the night of August 8? The main force of the group was the special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tbilisi and the regions:
1. Elite Special Forces Detachment of Shavnabad;
2. "Anti-terrorist" special squad;
3. Directorate for the protection of pipelines (run by the Ministry of Internal Affairs);
4. Divisions of the first and third directorates of the Main Directorate for Special Affairs;
5. Parts of the Kakheti, Mtskheta-Mtianeti, Kvemo-Kartli, Gori and other regional departments of the same Main Directorate;
6. Batumi Marine Battalion;
7. Special forces brigade of the joint headquarters of the Ministry of Defense.

In total - up to 15 thousand military personnel of the Ministry of Defense, 5 thousand employees of the personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 30 thousand reservists. According to other sources, the number of all armed forces of Georgia during the conflict was 29 thousand people, including reservists. Of these, 2,000 were at that time in Iraq, and 17,000 were in South Ossetia, plus an unidentified number of employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and other law enforcement agencies.

Infantry - 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Infantry Brigades trained under the American GSSOP II program. The 2nd brigade was in reserve, the 4th (armed with M4, suffered the greatest losses) and the 3rd covered Tskhinvali with pincers through the Znauri district and the Prissky heights in order to reach Java. The 1st brigade was in Iraq. Only one battalion of the 1st brigade was the same Georgian peacekeeping battalion that opened fire on our peacekeepers at the beginning of the war.

In a full-fledged Georgian brigade, there are at least 1,500 people in the state.

BTT - 120 T-72 tanks modernized by Israeli specialists.

Artillery - 80 guns, 120 mortars, 27 Larm and Grad MLRS (according to other sources, LARMs are unguided projectiles for the Israeli Links MLRS, produced by IMI under the designation Pounder).

Aviation - 33 aircraft and 42 helicopters.

They were opposed by about 2,000 Ossetian militias and 340 Russian military observers. Both of them did not have heavy weapons in the front zone. The Ossetians kept 4 T-55 tanks in the greenery on the Zarskaya road.

According to other sources, the armored forces of the Republic of South Ossetia consisted of 20 tanks and 25 self-propelled guns, and according to Novaya Gazeta, about 80 T-72 and T-55 tanks remained after the Russian exercises Kavkaz-2008. As far back as January 2006, Ambassador-at-Large of the Russian Foreign Ministry Valery Kenyaikin claimed that all the weapons that are now in Tskhinvali are the equipment that the USSR armed forces were equipped with and that remained there from the times of the Soviet Union. According to him, it was about four T-55 tanks, several howitzers and armored vehicles.

After the approach of units of the 58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District, the 76th Pskov Airborne Division, the Vostok Battalion of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 42nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division and the Black Sea Fleet, the composition of the Russian Army group increased to 15 thousand people. From Abkhazia (Kodori Gorge) up to 5 thousand people of the Abkhaz militia could be involved.

"Yamadayevtsy" on the march:

Georgian and South Ossetian troops have been skirmishing and fire attacks of varying degrees of intensity since late July 2008. On the evening of August 7, the parties agreed on a ceasefire, which, however, was not really done.

Ground operation

On August 7, the Georgian army tried to occupy the Prissky heights around Tskhinvali, this attack was repulsed. On the same day, the American ambassador to Georgia, John Teft, informed Washington that Georgian troops, including units with Grad-type launchers, were moving in the direction of South Ossetia.

On the afternoon of August 7, Secretary of the Security Council of South Ossetia Anatoly Barankevich said: “Georgian troops are active along the entire border with South Ossetia. All this suggests that Georgia is launching a large-scale aggression against our republic.” Barankevich also suggested that the Georgian military has plans to storm Tskhinval in the near future.

According to some reports, on the evening of August 7, part of the units of the 58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District were alerted and received an order to advance to Tskhinval. After the war, the Georgian side began to declare this, having made public its intelligence information in September 2008.

At 7 pm on August 7, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili made a special address on television: "... a few hours ago I issued an order, a very painful order, as commander-in-chief, that not a single Georgian unit, not a single police and other unit subject to our control , did not return fire ... I propose a ceasefire, I propose that negotiations be held immediately ... I propose that the Russian Federation be the guarantor of South Ossetian autonomy on the territory of Georgia." "I am ready to take this step for the sake of peace, and I am ready for the Georgian state to forgive all the crimes that have been committed over the past years, so that we achieve peace, and for the peace process and negotiations to move forward ... for the sake of peace, we are ready to go any compromise, any agreement."

Half an hour before midnight, the artillery brigade begins a hurricane shelling of the positions of the Ossetians and our peacekeepers.

At 0300 Spetsnaz, 1st, 3rd and 4th Infantry Brigades go on the offensive.

At the crossing, a traffic jam formed from the advancing troops, an Ossetian mortar battery hit it. Unimaginable chaos began, part of the reservists, throwing their weapons, began to retreat and came under fire from the special forces of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Many of the reservists were from the region bordering Armenia, ethnic Armenians, all fled.

Only Maksim Hakobyan died, there were several wounded. This stalled the advance for an hour.

Video of the first day:

All that is visible on the footage is the city center around the headquarters of the peacekeeping forces.

The heaviest fighting was in the "upper town" of military observers. There, 140 Russian soldiers under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Konstantin Timerman held the defense for almost two days. After the artillery strike, their communication failed, Georgian tanks went on the attack twice.

Parking lot on fire

Here they are bombed by aircraft:

By evening, a reconnaissance platoon made its way to the "upper town" to help, providing communication. It was a reconnaissance platoon of Captain Ukhvatov, in a night battle they destroyed the servants of the Grad installation and captured the spotter.

Two tanks broke through. The one standing at the barracks was burned by its own during the retreat (the ammunition was shot, the undercarriage was damaged), the captain and 4 fighters covered the withdrawal of the main forces, by lunchtime the paratroopers of the 54th Airborne Division came out to them).

According to the memoirs of Georgian soldiers, "artillery support was only if you knew the numbers of mobile artillery officers." Often, an ordinary infantryman acted as a gunner, giving commands on the mobile like “a little further and to the right ... no, no, I made a mistake a little to the left.”

In total, under different command, at different hours of 3 days, up to 2 thousand Ossetians fought in Tskhinvali (according to other estimates - no less than three thousand).

The battle for Tskhinvali continued until 16.00, then the Georgian units retreated to their original positions, losing 7 tanks (3 on the square in front of the parliament, 1 "upper town", 3 "oak grove"), 2 Cobra armored cars (Turkish wheeled armored personnel carrier based on the American armored car HMMWV). In one of them they found a body with a Ukrainian passport with the name Borisenko.

In 15-20 minutes this "Cobra" will be killed, trophy video:

12.00 Russia entered the war.

Russian aviation is bombing Georgian troops to the entire depth of the front line and rear bases. They bombed the roads to Tskhinvali, in one of these bombings, in the "oak grove" they burned 3 tanks, a truck, a Chevrolet of the medical service and 22 Georgian soldiers of the 42nd battalion of the 4th infantry brigade.

"Oak Grove" under the number 3:

The 42nd Battalion fled in panic, the commanders and the Americans jumped into the cars and rushed off. Those who did not have time to get into the cars ran away. All this army swept past the 43rd battalion, which was followed by comrades. The commander of the 42nd battalion was killed in action the next day.

2 reinforced battalions (800 people) of the 58th Army under the command of General Khrulev begin to make their way to Tskhinvali. By the end of the day, they managed to recapture the village of Tbet and break the encirclement of the city.

On August 9, the Georgian parliament unanimously approved the decree of President Mikheil Saakashvili declaring martial law and full mobilization for a period of 15 days. In the text of the decree, the introduction of martial law was justified by the need to "prevent destabilization in the region, armed attacks on civilians and facts of violence, in order to protect human rights and freedoms."

The first loss of the Russian Air Force in the August war. The SU-25BM aircraft of Colonel Oleg Terebunsky from the 368th Assault Aviation Regiment (Budyonnovsk airfield), shot down over the territory of South Ossetia in the area of ​​the Zar Pass, between Dzhava and Tskhinvali. It was hit by a missile from a MANPADS by South Ossetian militias around 18:00 on August 8. The fall of the burning aircraft and its wreckage were recorded on a video camera by the film crew of the Russian state television channel Vesti and shown on television as the downing of a Georgian aircraft. The incorrect identification of the aircraft, which caused "friendly fire" and led to the first combat loss, probably occurred due to the fact that this was one of the first sorties of Russian aviation in the conflict, and the South Ossetian side was not yet aware of the participation of Russian aviation in it.
In addition, just a few hours earlier, four Georgian Su-25s had bombed a nearby area, after which the Ossetians had reason to assume the continuation of Georgian air raids. Lieutenant Colonel Terebunsky successfully ejected, was quickly discovered and evacuated by the Russian side.
Anton Lavrov, Torzhok

And here is what we managed to dig up from colleagues from "Russia". Consider the "source", with all the replicas.

The following video was made by the political officer of the battalion of the 135th regiment. Column 135 regiment on the march. Refugees. Frames are taken from the amateur film "South Ossetia. Chronicle of War", the author of which is the political officer. Therefore, the first video, excuse me, with "music" ...

The same political officer removes the consequences of the shelling of the column by Georgian mortars. An infantry fighting vehicle is on fire, in which ammunition is torn. This is the Zar road at the entrance to Tskhinval, 4 kilometers away, just above the cemetery. Approximately from 11 to 13 Moscow time. Now without music.

Well, our shooting of the same day, but a little later. Exactly 20 minutes before that, Sasha Sladkov (correspondent of TV channel Rossiya) and General Khrulev drove past us in the direction of Tskhinvali.

The battalion tactical group (BTG) near the village of Khetagurovo came under mortar fire. The Georgian spotter aimed artillery fire at the convoy and the group retreated, losing one BMP and two trucks of mortars, two more trucks were damaged and taken out the next day.

Battle or "ambush of Khrulev's column":

Around 15.00 BTG went on the offensive, the task was to reach the southern outskirts of Tskhinvali to the "upper town". The BTG column passed what was a Georgian post, the reservists and the tank crew left the position without a fight. Moving through the city in the direction of the "Upper Town", in the "Shanghai" microdistrict, the column literally "bumped" on the fighters of the 2nd Georgian infantry brigade. In the oncoming battle that ensued, General Khrulev was wounded in the shin.

All 8 Georgian scouts were killed, they were literally mowed down at close range. The battle distances were almost 8-10 meters. But one of the Georgian soldiers managed to throw a grenade, with a fragment of which General Khrulev was wounded. Part of the column with the wounded retreated to the height of Sarabuk, 5 km away, the other went further, occupying the outskirts of the city at the foot of the high-rise "Upper Town".

The battle in the city lasted about seven hours.

The video clearly shows how the BTG enters the city, Major Denis Vetchinov blows up an abandoned Georgian tank in the area of ​​the "oak grove". Further, the BTG goes through the city and on the very outskirts, a concrete fence on the left, enters into battle with the forward company of the 2nd Infantry Battalion of Georgia entering the city.

The group of Captain Semiletov on eight infantry fighting vehicles, having defeated the forward company of the Georgian 2nd infantry brigade at the brewery, went two more blocks, reaching the outskirts. Here, in the area of ​​the 14th kindergarten, ours began a battle with the main forces of the 2nd infantry Georgian brigade, immediately losing 2 infantry fighting vehicles.

During the 7-hour battle in the microdistrict "Shanghai" Russian soldiers destroyed a tank and an armored personnel carrier of Georgians. At the crossroads, a Georgian jeep with a machine gun crawled out under the tracks, they were shot point-blank. By nightfall, having used up ammunition on all six infantry fighting vehicles, the group withdrew. The scouts put about 30 civilians from nearby houses, who had run for help, into the BMP.

After the battle, the bodies of the dead Georgians remained in the place of the notorious "ambush".

By the end of August 9, the Georgians retreat to their strongholds and fortified positions. Behind them are 4 mountains hanging over Tskhinval, and fortified areas in Nikozi and the surrounding Georgian villages.

At night, a powerful artillery strike on Tskhinvali again followed, and early in the morning the Georgian units repeated the assault attempt. This time they met more organized resistance, falling into the "fire bags" of the Ossetians, they could not move towards the center. The battle continued until the evening.

200 planes of the Transcaucasian Military District destroyed all the airfields of Georgia, even bombed two fields of flying clubs.

August 8, 2008
(1) 09:45 2 Russian military fighters dropped about 3-5 bombs near the village of Shavshvebi, on the highway between Poti and Tbilisi and 300-500 meters from the Georgian military radars (bombed the radar, damaged the antennas and the warehouse).
(2) 10:30 Russian Su-24s bombed the village of Variani in the Kareli region, 75 kilometers west of Tbilisi. Seven civilians were wounded (the rear base of the 4th brigade was bombed, the fuel depot and the BZ depot were destroyed).
(3) 10:57 Two out of six Russian planes dropped three bombs in Gori. One of them fell near the stadium, the second near the slope of Gorijvari and the third near the artillery brigade (reservists were bombed, losses are listed as civilian).
(4) 15:05 Russian warplanes drop two bombs on Vaziani military airport (reservists were bombed).
(5) (6) 16:30 30 Russian air bombs fell in Marneuli and Bolnisi, on the territory of military air bases, 20 km and 35 km south of Tbilisi, respectively. Two aircraft were destroyed on the ground. In addition, several buildings were destroyed, there are casualties.
(7) 17:00 The second bombing of the military air base in Marneuli (the runway was broken, 2 Su-25s were damaged, there were no more cars in the parking lots).
(8) 17:35 The military air base in Marneuli, 20 km south of Tbilisi, was bombed for the third time, as a result of which 1 person was killed and 4 were injured. As a result of three explosions, three aircraft were destroyed (tankers burned down).
(9) 18:45 Georgian artillery brigade in Gori was bombarded by five Russian planes.

August 9, 2008
(10) 00:12 The military port of Poti came under rocket fire, killing 4 civilians, one policeman, wounding 33 reservists, and killing Navy Corporal Pichkhaya.
(11) 00:17 Senaki military base was bombed, 1 soldier and 5 reservists were killed. The railway station in Senaki was also bombed, killing eight.
(12) 00:20 Vaziani airfield, which is 2-3 kilometers from Tbilisi International Airport, was bombed again.
(13) 01:00 Poti, the port was hit by a tactical missile "Tochka-U".
(14) 1:20 Gatchiani bombardment in the Gardabani regions (not a clear fact, most likely "free hunting").
(15) 10:00 Russian Air Force bombed the Kopitnari airfield a few kilometers from Kutaisi (very successful bombing, half of the Georgian aviation was destroyed).
(16) 10:22 The Russian Air Force continues to bomb Gori.
(17) 12:40 Kopitnari airfield was bombed again (finished off).
(18) 14:00 The Russian Air Force bombed the positions of the 5th brigade, including the airfield in the village of Omarishara
(19) 16:35 They bombed (no data).
(20) 22:30 The Russian Air Force bombarded Chkhalta, the administrative center of Upper Abkhazia. No casualties have been reported.

August 10, 2008
(21) 5:45 A Russian bomber entered Georgian airspace from Dagestan and dropped 3 bombs on the Tbilisi aircraft factory (bombed the plant's runway).
(22) 7:40 Russian bombs fell in the village of Urta in the Zugdidi region (preparation for the offensive, they are bombing the police and reservists).
(23) 8:45 Ten Russian planes attacked Upper Abkhazia.
(24) 11:15 In the village of Shavshvebi, between Gori and Kareli, an attack helicopter field airfield was bombed, 3 MI-24s burned down.
(25) 15:00 The Russians bombed the village of Knolevi in ​​the northern region of Kareli (the 3rd brigade of the Georgian Armed Forces).
(26) 15:10 Russian troops and Abkhaz militias are shelling the Kodori Gorge.
(27) 16:05 Burn, military bases were bombed.
(28) 16:10 Russian aircraft fired on the only remaining bridge on the highway connecting the eastern and western parts of the country.
(29) 19:05 Tbilisi civil airport, radar destroyed by X-59 missile.
(30) 19:10 "Tbilaviamsheni" aircraft factory, the runway was bombed.
(31) 19:35 Two bombers bombed Senaki (Western Georgia).
(32) 20:25 Two bombers bombed the Kodori Gorge (Upper Abkhazia).

August 11, 2008
(33) 00:30 A radar station in the village of Shavshvebi, west of Gori, was hit by an airstrike.
(34) 00:31 Bombed the Kodori Gorge (Upper Abkhazia).
(35) 3:05 Villages of Sharabijebi, Kapandichi and Makhov near Batumi (Georgian-Turkish border). Batumi airport was bombed.
(36) 3:12 They bombed the territory of the military base in Khelvachauri (near the Georgian-Turkish border).
(37) 3:26 Kodori Gorge (Upper Abkhazia). Shelling from ships with artillery.
(38) 4:30 Georgian Air Force Central Command Center, bombing.
(39) 4:37 Civilian radar station in the village of Eninisi, 5 kilometers from the center of Tbilisi, was partially destroyed by Russian bombing.
(40) 5:00 Russian planes bombed the Shiraki airfield in the Dedoplistskaro region in the east of the country.
(41) 06:10 Gori tank battalion was bombed again (36 soldiers killed).
(42) 7:15 Senaki airport, airstrip and Senaki military base were bombed by Russian aircraft (3 helicopters were destroyed).

August 12, 2008
(43) 09:30 - 10:55 They bombed the central square and the market in Gori (a collection point for Georgian reservists).

Animated map of Russian Air Force bombing strikes with a breakdown by points:

4 reconnaissance groups of the fleet operated on the shore - they did not suffer losses, they completed combat missions. They blew up an air defense radar damaged by aviation, an S-125 air defense division, 6 ships and a coastal radar station.

At present, the Georgian navy has been disbanded, the surviving 2 Grifs have been handed over to the Coast Guard, and two landing ships have been decommissioned.

Ground operation

On the morning of August 10, advanced Russian units entered the city, all the same BTGs of the 135th and 693rd motorized rifle regiments, a company of the Vostok battalion and paratroopers of the 76th division.

Junior Lieutenant V.V. Neff, the commander of the T-62 platoon, tactically correctly placed his tanks at the intersection of Moskovskaya and Chochieva streets, organized observation.

In a battle near school No. 12, tankers of junior lieutenant Neff burned a Georgian T-72 tank at close range and shot the servants of a mortar battery in the school yard;

By the middle of the day on August 10, the city and the surrounding environs were completely cleared of Georgian troops, the Georgians fled, leaving the corpses of their dead comrades on the streets

A network of battalion tactical groups began an operation to encircle the enemy. The air assault battalions of the Pskov division bypassed the "Likhvan corridor" of Tskhinvali, capturing Georgian villages.

On the night of August 11, the BTG broke through the front and went to Gori, capturing the height with a TV tower and the Georgian battery of D-30 howitzers. The crews simply fled, falling under fire.

On the same day, on the central square of Gori, where reservists walked in herds, and the operational headquarters of Georgians and American “advisers” were located in the hotel, in the former home of pioneers, a Georgian reservist accidentally fired a grenade launcher into a fuel tank in a boiler room. The explosion was mistaken for a bombing, panic began.

A rumor spread that the Russians were already in Gori, our aviation was constantly flying over the city, the Georgians had no connection, the command disappeared.

In the evening and at night, the Georgian army, huddled in a huge herd, ran along the Georgian Military Highway to Tbilisi. The commander was the first to do this, “moved due to shell shock,” as he now explains. The rest began to follow him.

Russian armored formations took the 3rd and 4th brigades in pincers near Tskhinvali. The troops, who were surrounded, abandoned their equipment, weapons, fled, dressed in civilian clothes.

The last battle took place in Zemo-Khviti. During the offensive, the column came under fire from an artillery battery, losing a tank and 2 infantry fighting vehicles.

Video of the fight.

During the attack on Gori, perhaps the most amazing battle took place here. The BMD-1, which was part of the air assault battalion, had an engine failure, and the crew with the paratroopers remained on the road to wait for the repair vehicle. At that moment, the headquarters column of the 2nd Infantry Brigade was leaving the encirclement. During the battle, 11 fighters burned two Urals and damaged 5 Land Rovers.

The story of the soldiers of 104 dshp ("tank" - this is how the paratroopers call the BMD, there were about 200 Georgian fighters):

On the morning of August 12, everything was over, President Medvedev announced the end of the "peace enforcement operation."

Side losses.

Aviation (4th Air Force and Air Defense Army) lost 4 aircraft: 1 Tu-22, 2 Su-25 and 1 Su-24 (according to some sources, another Su-24, although, most likely, the dispute is about the wreckage of a Georgian aircraft shot down over Gufta ).

Infantry
67 fighters (mostly those who were hit by artillery on August 8-9). Named list. Other sources name 71 dead and 340 wounded. According to Georgia - up to 400 killed.

Georgia

Aviation - 25 aircraft and 37 helicopters (see above).

Shot down and captured
68 T-72
25 BMP-1/2 (including Ukrainian BMP-1U Shkval)
14 BTR-70/80

65 tanks of the Georgian army and 15 BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles were captured (21 captured tanks were destroyed).

The number of armored vehicles knocked out and burned in battles is 19 T-72 tanks.

air defense
Captured 5 Osa launchers (division), 4 Buk launchers (Ukraine), 2 Israeli-made Spider launchers.

The S-125 division was destroyed near Poti.

11 trucks, 4 armored personnel carriers, 2 German demining vehicles, 37 guns and 96 mortars were captured.

Infantry
Killed: 180 - army, 29 - Ministry of Internal Affairs, 111 - reservists, national guard (all in the lists of civilians).

Sanitary losses: 1964 wounded.

According to Georgia: 412 dead (including 170 servicemen and employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 228 civilians), 1,747 wounded and 24 missing. According to other sources - the total loss of up to 3,000 people among the army and law enforcement officers.

South Ossetia

According to various estimates, from 162 to 1692 dead.

Abkhazia - 1 dead and two wounded.

US losses

2 killed instructors who were in combat formations of Georgians in Tskhinvali (data withheld). According to other sources, they were captured in the village. Kekhvi.

2 prisoners.
One was captured near Tskhinvali (data withheld).

The second, Winston Fraserly, was wounded and left by the Georgians on the streets of Tskhinvali, introduced himself as a journalist.

According to the losses of the Americans, a year later it did not become clearer.

And here are the most curious revelations of Israeli military advisers.

08.08 in the morning, the 4th infantry enters Tskhinvali in a slender crowd, they go along Geroev Street

www.youtube.com/v/6Cme25yYBcg?version=3
no fun here

First day of the war in Tskhinvali
www.youtube.com/v/fUQ4DHvPGnQ?version=3
the assault was repulsed, the Georgians had already retreated, around 17.00

Hit with dots
www.youtube.com/v/F8XN0lPmg-A?version=3

This is Gori 10.08. at the end, you can see the explosion at the tank base http://mreporter.ru/reports/2108

Morning 08.08 Ossetian shooting of the city http://mreporter.ru/reports/2559

09.08 strike at 14.00 by our artillery brigade against Georgian batteries on the Prissky Heights http://mreporter.ru/reports/2522

Video of the "upper town" of MS, a broken barracks in which they held the defense.
www.youtube.com/v/85nD_kevQ-0?version=3
and
www.youtube.com/v/F8hZyjZtwBg?version=3
bombing of the "Upper Town" shooting from Eredvi.

Here, the fighters from the position remove the burning car park of the upper town.
www.youtube.com/v/E8tMXQJIC1o?version=3

Amateur video, they are driving along the street of Heroes
www.youtube.com/v/iEFDrXTcR38?version=3

The corpses of the killed Georgian tankers and soldiers of the 4th Infantry Brigade.

The first day of the war, the 42nd battalion in the "oak grove", the 41st is bombed, then everyone will run.
www.youtube.com/v/uXASj0U_xPA?version=3

Still unable to escape
www.youtube.com/v/N5lUELciC0o?version=3

Video, "oak grove", corpses.
www.youtube.com/v/I8LG5aiL2Mc?version=3
All 22 died after being hit by stormtroopers on 08.08.08

This one was more fortunate, was captured by the Ossetians
www.youtube.com/watch?v=DhZberA3o6A

This, too, they are sitting in the Ossetian KGB
www.youtube.com/v/wBE54oks2AU?version=3

After hitting Gori
www.youtube.com/v/iP8utJiO80k?version=3

Wounded Sladkov and Khrulev
www.youtube.com/v/T5r1BBBsnjU?version=3

Marneuli airfield, rocket debris
www.youtube.com/v/OI5F8A3eDAA?version=3

Some more video:

The data is taken mainly from here, partly from Wikipedia and the rest of the Internet.

The Georgian-Ossetian conflict has its roots in the twenties of the last century, at the time when South Ossetia was forcibly incorporated into Georgia. The confrontation was brewing, and someday it had to develop into a large-scale action.

And this is despite the fact that in 1922 the All-Russian Central Executive Committee by its decree decided to create autonomy in this republic, which, however, according to historians, had a nominal character. The leadership of Georgia pursued a policy of assimilation: forced the indigenous population to change their nationality in the passport, new geographical names appeared, etc.

The Georgian-Ossetian conflict escalated in 1989, when the Council of People's Deputies, convened then in the South Ossetian region, adopted a resolution to transform it into an autonomous republic, which, nevertheless, remained part of Georgia. Numerous rallies began in the city of Tskhinval, which demanded that official Tbilisi cancel this decision. Armed clashes began, as a result of which there were human casualties.

The Georgian-Ossetian conflict was also fueled by the fact that Georgia chose a path independent of the USSR, and its autonomy decided to remain within the Union. The situation was aggravated also because of the nationalist slogans of the leaders of the Georgian movement.

The active phase of the contradictions falls on the beginning of the nineties, when the real armed confrontation begins. And already in May 1992, the supreme power of the autonomy adopted an Act proclaiming its independence.

Being typically ethnic in nature, born of the desire of a national minority to exercise its right to self-determination, the Ossetian conflict in August 2008 escalated into a real war. had to pay dearly for the adventures of their politicians from Tbilisi, and the autonomies almost exactly repeated the fate of the Georgians of Abkhazia.

The Georgian-Ossetian conflict entered an explosive phase after official Tbilisi's decision to revise the balance of power in Ossetia, which was facilitated by Saakashvili's victory in the elections. In the speeches of the Georgian president, calls for the reunification of Georgia, for the need to cancel peaceful formats for a settlement, began to sound more and more often.

Negotiations ended in 2008...

And on the night of August 8, the Georgian side launched an assault on Tskhinvali, shelling nearby areas with artillery shells, as a result of which many human lives were cut short. According to the Georgian official version, this was a response to the violation of the ceasefire regime by the autonomy. On the same day, Russian peacekeeping troops joined the conflict. A military operation began, the purpose of which was to force the Georgian authorities to peace.

Neither the Georgian authorities nor Western observers expected such a harsh response from Russia.

The Georgian-Ossetian conflict of 2008 was prepared by the entire logic of the previous stages, when the confrontation was “unfrozen”. This explains the direct intervention of Russian peacekeepers.

Today, no one, neither experts nor politicians, can name the exact number of those killed as a result of the five-day military events of August 2008.

These five days turned into a disaster for Tbilisi itself. The “United Georgia” project almost completely failed. And new rounds of violence on his part made it impossible to integrate on a peaceful basis.

Over the past 17 years, Tskhinvali, which has seen three wars, is unlikely to take seriously any proposals from Tbilisi. In addition to having survived the "Rose Revolution", she herself received a "gift" - about twenty thousand refugees.