Before the general offensive of the Red Army, the 4th and 6th Soviet armies are created and the Southern Front is formed, headed by M.V. Frunze. Frunze's offensive plan was to encircle and destroy the Russian Army in Northern Tavria, preventing it from leaving for the Crimea through the isthmuses of Perekop and Chongar. The 6th, 13th and 4th armies, the 1st cavalry army of Budyonny, the 2nd cavalry army of Guy and the Makhno gang took part in the general offensive against the Crimea.

The commander of the 6th Army, Comrade Kork (1887-1937), an Estonian by birth, graduated from the Chuguev Infantry School in 1908, and in 1914 from the Academy of the General Staff and in the Imperial Army had the rank of lieutenant colonel. After the occupation of the Crimea, Comrade Kork was commander of the 15th Infantry Division and later head of the Frunze Academy of the General Staff. In gratitude for his exploits for the glory of the dictatorship of the world proletariat, he was shot by Stalin, after whose death he was rehabilitated.

To attack Perekop, the 51st Blucher Rifle Division, already known to us, is assigned, which for this is reinforced by a strike and fire brigade, a separate cavalry brigade, cavalry regiments of the 15th and Latvian divisions and an armored group.

October 26/November 7. Frunze ordered to take the Perekop rampart. To do this, Blucher, who united the entire shock group on Perekop, divides it: 1) the shock-fire and 152nd rifle brigades to storm the Turkish shaft; 2) he allocates the 153rd rifle and two cavalry brigades to the strike group for an offensive through the Sivashi to the Lithuanian Peninsula and to reach the rear of the Perekop fortifications.

To prepare for the assault on Perekop, 55 guns and 8 escort guns fired. The operation began on November 7 at 22:00.

October 27/November 8. In the morning, the enemy spent three hours from twenty batteries of various calibers in real preparation for the assault on the rampart. Our old trenches were not only not improved, but partly already fell apart, or they have now been smashed by the Reds. The line of trenches went along the very crest of the rampart, and the shelters were on our slope of it, so the enemy shells hit the slope of the rampart facing him or flew over the rampart and burst behind the rampart, which saved us. But the trouble was with the delivery - dozens of horses were torn to shreds. From ten o'clock, as far as the eye could see, twelve chains of red infantry covered the entire field in front of us - the assault began.

The temporary commander of the division, General Peshnya, arrived at the site and gave the order not to shoot until the Reds approached to the very ditch. The Perekop fortifications consisted of a huge, massive old Turkish rampart and a deep ditch in front of it, once filled with water from the bay, but now dry, reinforced with barbed wire along both of its slopes and located to the north of the rampart, that is, towards the enemy. With the approach of the Red infantry, their artillery transfers all the force of their fire to our rear. Using this, the strikers fill the trenches along the crest of the rampart and bring ammunition. The Reds, apparently, were confident in the strength of their artillery fire and quickly rolled on us. Their apparent overwhelming superiority in strength and our retreat encouraged them. Perhaps our deathly silence gave them the illusion that we had already been killed, and therefore they “perlied” cheerfully, with warlike cries. I even saw with a simple eye that the first chains were in zipuns, pulled up and, as those who remained on our wire later said, this was some kind of the best division named after Comrade Frunze. The first chain was already at a distance of 300 paces from us, the machine gunners' hands were already itching, but there was no order to fire. The Reds became completely bolder, and some ran up to the moat. Although we were confident in ourselves, nevertheless, the nerves were very tense and the first to break our silence was the division chief, General Peshnya, who knew the machine gun very well and took up it himself. The effect of the fire of at least 60 machine guns and four battalions, this only in the sector of the 2nd regiment, was amazing: the fallen fell, the rear chains pressed in and thus cheered up the remnants of the forward chains, which in places reached the moat. Our advantage, despite our small numbers, was that the Red artillery could not hit us because of the proximity of their shooters to us, and the enemy machine guns could hit us perfectly, but for some reason they only pulled them, and did not shoot over their heads. Maybe they had no experience in this kind of use of their weapons? We were also fortunate in that, with the approach of the Reds closer to the ditch and the rampart, they clearly realized the full significance for them of such an obstacle, which, as they were convinced, even their numerous artillery could not destroy. A quarter of an hour later, the entire attacking mass mixed up and lay down. It was impossible to think of a worse position for the Reds even on purpose: for us, from the height of the rampart, they presented excellent targets, without the possibility of hiding anywhere, and it was here that they suffered the greatest losses. Our artillery also hit them, but not in the same way as always. It turns out that, in addition to damage from enemy artillery fire, it was partially withdrawn to the right, to the sector of the Drozdov division, where the Reds broke through the estuary. Until evening, this whole mass did not move under our fire, filling the air with the cries of the wounded. I happened to read in the history of the Civil War published in the USSR a description of the attacks on the Crimea, where it was reported that their losses at that time were up to 25 thousand people and that they stormed the Perekop shaft and destroyed our brother with bombs in reinforced concrete shelters, which we did not have there , but we had simple dugouts covered with boards with earth. But despite this, the whole field was covered with dead and wounded in the name of the international of the proletarian revolution of Lenin and Trotsky, but our situation was getting worse.

In the book "Blucher" this offensive is described as follows:

“November 6 of the new style, on the eve of the celebration of the third anniversary of the great proletarian revolution, we were ready to storm. The 15th and 52nd Rifle Divisions were moving up to the battlefield. Together with the 153rd Rifle Brigade and a separate cavalry brigade of the Perekop group, they were planned to strike through the Sivash on the Lithuanian Peninsula, on the flank and rear of the Perekop position. The 152nd rifle and fire strike brigades were preparing for a frontal attack on the Turkish Wall. M. V. Frunze came to the headquarters of the 51st Rifle Division, located in Chaplinka, to personally supervise the operation. Wrangel concentrated the best units on the defense of Perekop. On the night of November 8, when the country was celebrating the third anniversary of October, the 15th and 52nd rifle divisions and the 153rd and a separate brigade of the 51st rifle division in the bitter cold, drowning in the swamps of the Sivash, being shot by artillery and machine-gun fire, dragging on themselves machine guns and guns, went on the attack on the Lithuanian peninsula. Early in the morning of November 8, they reached the White trenches and, breaking through the wire, drove out the troops of General Fostikov with bayonets (it was a detachment of Kuban with two machine guns).

Silence reigned in the artillery positions under the Turkish Wall. Thick fog covered the Turkish Wall. The tension grew. Continuous inquiries from the Lithuanian peninsula: "What's the matter?"

At nine o'clock the fog slowly cleared and all our 65 guns opened rapid fire. From the Turkish Wall, the whites bombarded us with fire. The seven-kilometer space under the rampart and on the rampart turned into a continuous sea of ​​craters. At about 12 o'clock the shock regiments and the 152nd brigades with the 453rd regiment rushed to the assault. Bearing huge losses, they approached the Turkish Wall faster and closer. On the Lithuanian Peninsula, the Whites attack the 13th and 34th divisions (I remind you that the divisions of the Russian Army were three regiments, and the Reds had nine regiments, with one cavalry regiment per division. By this time, these two of our divisions were no more than two battalions ). At about 18:00 we attack the Turkish Wall again. Armored cars are in the forefront. At the very ditch, unexpectedly encountering a wire, the infantry stopped again. A whole day of unparalleled combat had not yet brought victory, but the goal was already close. About 200 white guns and up to 400 machine guns hit our units.

(The number of guns in our sector is ten times exaggerated, and the number of machine guns is four times exaggerated. The Perekop shaft was occupied only by two Kornilov shock regiments, and the third regiment stood facing east, towards the Sivash, to protect against a strike from there).

During the battle on October 26 / November 8, the 2nd Kornilov Shock Regiment lost 8 people killed and 40 wounded. 35 horses were killed. All wounds were from artillery fire.

October 27/November 9. The Kornilov Shock Division left the Perekop rampart by one o'clock and retreated to the Yushun positions. The night was dark and starless. The battalion of Colonel Troshin was left in the rearguard of the division, which also left the Perekop rampart by one o'clock. This is how it is written in the book “Kornilovsky Shock Regiment”: “In the evening of October 26, Art. Art. Colonel Levitov summoned Colonel Troshin and told him that with the onset of darkness the entire Kornilov Shock Division was ordered to withdraw to the Yushun positions, and his 2nd battalion was assigned to the rearguard. In order not to reveal your retreat in front of the enemy, it is necessary to shoot from rifles until the last moment. The impregnable Perekop shaft began to empty. Machine guns are taken away, companies leave one after another. Colonel Troshin stretched his battalion through the trenches. The ominous silence was occasionally broken by a single shot. Finally, the 2nd Battalion withdrew. Without a single spark of cigarettes, the Kornilovites passed through the Armenian Bazaar and, late at night, were drawn into the first line of the Yushun fortifications.

The combat logs of all three regiments of the Kornilov Shock Division noted that these fortifications were poorly adapted for defense.

Let's see how this assault on the Perekop positions illuminates Blucher's headquarters: “At night, at about 24 hours (October 26/November 8), Frunze orders the attack to be resumed and demands that the rampart be captured at all costs. Again, we throw the exhausted units on the assault, and at about 3 o'clock on October 27 / November 9, impregnable Perekop fell.

In fact, Perekop was abandoned by the Kornilovites without a fight and even before the Reds approached, according to the order of October 26, November, at 24 o'clock.

It is interesting what Blucher wrote in his reports to the commander of the 6th Soviet Army about the reasons for the failure of the assault on the Perekop fortifications: “It was not possible to take the Perekop fortified position by raid. The enemy provided himself, although with a small garrison, but equipped with a colossal materiel. The positions are adapted to the tactical conditions of the terrain. This makes the isthmus almost impregnable.”

In one chicly published history of the USSR, I read the same fabrication about the storming of the Perekop fortifications, where the Reds allegedly smoked out officers with bombs and flamethrowers from concrete fortifications, which in fact did not exist on the Perekop shaft, just as there was no “LEGENDARY STORM OF PEREKOPSKY VALA RED" at 3 o'clock on October 27/November 9.

28 of October. At dawn, the enemy with large forces, supported by strong artillery fire, went over to the offensive on the front of the division. Despite the small number of the regiment and the fatigue of people from long and difficult transitions, accompanied by continuous and overwhelming battles, the regiment with courage held back the onslaught. However, the right-flank 1st regiment was driven out of the first line by the attack of the Reds from the side of the Drozdov Rifle Division, the 3rd regiment was under threat of a strike from the rear. At this time, the temporary commander of the division, General Peshnya, took an armored car from the 2nd regiment and ordered by phone the 3rd and 2nd regiments to go over to the counterattack. I, the commander of the 2nd Regiment, dared to point out the danger of a penalty for the weak 3rd Regiment, and then the 2nd Regiment would be pressed against the bay, but at that time I was informed that the 3rd Regiment was already moving beyond the wire to attack.

I then considered the attack unnecessary and risky, but the inappropriate haste of the commander of the 3rd regiment made it necessary to expose his regiment to the bullets of the Reds, and not to throw them back again with the force of his fire. When the 2nd regiment went beyond the wire, the 3rd regiment in a thin chain, led by its regiment commander, Colonel Shcheglov, on horseback, was already moving towards the trenches of the enemy's red machine guns. The futility of the counterattack under the conditions that had been created for us weighed heavily on me. Shells and bullets also rained down on the 2nd Regiment, which calmly and unanimously went on the counterattack. Busy with the fate of my regiment, I did not pay attention to the actions of the 3rd regiment, but when I looked at its sector, I saw a sad picture of its retreat, now without the regiment commander, who was wounded in this sortie. Here I also ordered to retreat under the cover of machine guns to my trenches.

Passing through the barbed wire, I stopped to take another look at the situation in the sector of the 3rd Regiment, but here my command of the valiant 2nd Kornilov Shock Regiment came to an end. The bullet hit me in the left groin, piercing through a thick bag of cards, and stopped in the spine of the spine. She knocked me off my horse, paralyzing both legs almost instantly. After 8 years, in Bulgaria, Dr. Berzin performed an operation on me and presented me with a Russian pointed bullet with a bent end as a memory of the Motherland, which inflicted the thirteenth wound on me in the struggle for the honor and dignity of national RUSSIA. Simultaneously with me, my assistant Colonel Lysan, Anton Evtikhievich, was also wounded, also in the groin, but right through. Colonel Troshin took command of the regiment, Captain Vozovik became his assistant.

In this battle, among the officers, the following were wounded: General Peshnya, who temporarily commanded the division, and the commander of the Kornilov artillery brigade, General Erogin, took temporary command of the division; the commander of the 1st Kornilov Shock Regiment, Colonel Gordeenko, and the regiment was received by Lieutenant Colonel Shirkovskiy; the commander of the 3rd Kornilov Shock Regiment, Colonel Shcheglov and his assistant Colonel Pooh, and the regiment was received by Colonel Minervin.

Despite the failure, the division still held on to its sector.

In the book: “Markovites in battles and campaigns for RUSSIA”, p. 345, they paint a picture of their approach to the right flank of our division to replace us and incorrectly indicate the distribution of regiments that actually occupied the sectors as follows: on the right flank of the division, up to Lake Salt, stood the 1st regiment, to the left - the 3rd regiment, and on the very left flank stood the 2nd regiment, to the very Perekop Bay.

On October 28, General Wrangel gathered representatives of the Russian and foreign press and informed them of the situation, saying: “The army that fought not only for the honor and freedom of the Motherland, but also for the common cause of world culture and civilization, the army that had just stopped the bloody the hand of the Moscow executioners, abandoned by the whole world, bled to death. A handful of naked, hungry, exhausted heroes continue to defend the last inch of their native land. Their forces are coming to an end, and not today, so tomorrow they can be thrown into the sea. They will hold out to the end, saving those who seek protection behind their bayonets. I have taken all measures to take out in case of misfortune all those who are threatened with bloody reprisals. I have the right to hope that those states for whose common cause my Army fought will show hospitality to the unfortunate exiles.

29th of October at dawn, under strong pressure from the enemy, the Kornilov Shock Division, according to the order, began to retreat to Yushun. From there, due to the complicated situation, the division retreats further south, along the Yushun-Simferopol-Sevastopol road.

* * *

After describing the last battles for Perekop and leaving the Crimea by us according to our data, we should also be interested in the view of our enemy on this, which I take from the Russian Thought newspaper of December 7, 1965, set out in an article by D. Prokopenko.

CAPTURE OF PEREKOP

For the forty-fifth anniversary.

The 6th Soviet Army, which stormed the Perekop-Yushun positions of the Whites in November 1920, was commanded by Cork (1887-1937). An Estonian by birth, he graduated from the Chuguev military school in 1908, and in 1914 from the Academy of the General Staff. In the old Army, he had the rank of lieutenant colonel (I insert: in 1937 he was shot for his service in the Red Army. Now, probably, he has been recorded in the synodic of the red commanders-in-chief: “repressed”, “rehabilitated”). On the capture of Perekop and the Yushun positions, Kork made a report at the Yekaterinoslav garrison military-scientific audience on November 1, 1921 (“Stages of the Long Way”, military publishing house of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Moscow, 1963),

“The troops of the 6th Army approached Perekop on the evening of October 29th. The 1st and 2nd cavalry, the 4th and the 13th armies poured into the 4th army approached the area of ​​​​the Chongar Peninsula a few days later. The positions of the whites were divided into three groups: the Turkish Wall (the main fortifications), then a number of Yushun positions (their strength is in depth), and to the east - the Sivash positions, along the southern coast of the Sivash (Rotten Sea), these fortifications were weak. The White command did not mean that the northwestern part of the Sivash was dry. The summer and autumn of 1920 were dry, there were almost no winds from the east, and the water therefore went to the southeast. Information about this state of the sea began to arrive at the red headquarters only after October 29.

Side forces. In total, Wrangel had up to 13,500 infantry fighters, up to 6,000 cavalry fighters, about 750 machine guns, 160 guns and 43 armored cars on the Perekop Isthmus (I ask the reader to pay attention to the fact that Perekop at that time was occupied by only two regiments of the Kornilovskaya The shock division, the 3rd regiment was in reserve, with a ledge back to the south, and the front to the Sivash, to protect our rear, and plus, all three regiments suffered huge losses during the retreat from the Dnieper and decreased by 2/3 of their small strength , that is, in total, the division had no more than 1.200 bayonets.The machine guns in three regiments could not be more than STA, and as for our Kornilov artillery brigade, from its composition in three divisions in the last battle for Perekop, some of them were taken to repel attacks there were no cavalry at Perekop, not even our regimental cavalry squadrons.In general, the commander of the 6th Red Army greatly exaggerated our forces at Perekop with the specific goal of increasing our merits of our army, when in fact our fate was then decided by Pilsudski with the support of France by making peace, as during the Battle of Orel, when Pilsudski concluded a truce with Lenin, and the Red Army crushed us with its colossal superiority. Colonel Levitov).

Red forces: 34,833 infantry, 4,352 cavalry, 965 machine guns, 165 guns, 3 tanks, 14 armored cars and 7 aircraft.

If we compare the forces of the parties, Kork reports, then our numerical superiority over Wrangel immediately catches the eye: we outnumbered him more than twice in infantry, while Wrangel had more cavalry, but here we must take into account the presence of the 1st and 2nd and cavalry armies, which could be transferred at any time to the Perekop Isthmus in order to force it and advance to the Crimea. As for the artillery, in total the enemy seemed to have superiority, but his artillery was extremely scattered. If we compare the number of artillery in the strike directions, then the superiority in artillery was on our side.

So, comparing the number of parties, it should be recognized that a huge superiority was on our side.

The high red command believed that the struggle for Perekop would be positional, as in an "imperialist" war. But, having learned that the northwestern part of the Sivash was passable, the commander of the 6th decided to deliver the main blow through the Sivash and the Lithuanian Peninsula to Armyansk. Preparation for the operation was as follows; 2 brigades of the 51st Infantry Division were to strike at the Turkish Wall, and the other two brigades from the 1st Cavalry would advance around the right flank of the Whites occupying the Perekop Isthmus. The 52nd and 15th divisions were to go behind enemy lines through the Sivash and the Lithuanian Peninsula. The Latvian division was left in the army reserve.

Hostilities began on the night of November 7-8. Due to fog, the 51st Division began artillery preparation along the Turkish Wall at 10 o'clock in the morning, and at 2 o'clock the attackers began to cut the wire, but were repulsed by concentrated white fire. In the renewed attack at 18 o'clock, the Reds suffered heavy losses and retreated. The White counterattack overturned the Red Brigade (153rd), which bypassed their right flank.

On the night of November 7-8, other red units begin an offensive on the Lithuanian Peninsula and move deeper into it, despite vigorous counterattacks by white infantry with armored vehicles.

So, by 18 o'clock on November 8, the Reds had no success either in front of the Turkish cash, or on the Lithuanian peninsula, since the Whites went over to counterattacks all the time. But the exit of two rifle divisions to the flank and rear of the Whites, who occupied the Turkish Wall, created a critical situation for them. The Red Command gives the order to storm the shaft with two brigades, and the rest of the units - to strike in the direction of Armyansk. The assault on the rampart began at 2 am (152nd rifle and fire brigades), but only the rearguards of the whites remained on it, who had already begun their retreat ... The Turkish rampart was taken without heavy losses (no losses at all).

On the morning of November 9, stubborn battles began everywhere, but the reserves of the Whites (with Barbovich's cavalry) could not delay the advance of the Reds. The 51st division on the evening of November 9 approached the first line of the Yushun positions ... Breakthrough of the Yushun positions on November 10 and 11. Here begins a series of decisive battles on which the fate of the Crimea depends. In his order, General Barbovich says: "There cannot be a single step back, this is unacceptable according to the general situation, we must die, but not retreat." Taking part in the breakthrough: the 51st, 52nd and 15th rifle divisions, and then the Latvian. Kork, in view of the severe frosts and the lack of fresh water in this zone, orders all the Yushun police to pass in one day, regardless of losses. The task was not completed completely, but nevertheless, on November 10, the 51st division broke through three lines, here the white defenders were supported by artillery from ships (as the commander of the 2nd Kornilov Shock Regiment, which occupied the leftmost flank of the white positions, to the very Perekop Bay, I testify, that the shooting of our ships in these battles I did not see and did not hear about it. Colonel Levitov),

On the left flank, they were able to capture only the first fortified line. On the morning of November 11, the Latvian and 51st rifle divisions attacked the last line and broke through it. A series of White attacks failed to stop the movement, and the Reds occupied the Yushun railway station around 9:00 am. On the left flank of the Reds, the Whites were preparing a decisive blow to eliminate the offensive. Furious attacks alternated on both sides. At about 11 o'clock, the white units, with the support of the officers (which then no longer existed) of the Kornilov and Drozdov divisions, resumed counterattacks and pressed the reds. Then Cork orders two brigades to hit the rear. The resistance of the whites was broken and they began a gradual retreat ... "- The operation to capture the Perekop-Yushun positions by the evening of November 11 was completed," says Kork, "and at the same time the fate of the Wrangel army was decided." Further movement deep into the Crimea went without fighting.

According to Cork, the losses of the Reds are 45 officers and 605 Red Army soldiers. He explains such small losses by combining maneuver with an attack and the swiftness of the offensive, which did not allow the enemy to put his units in order. The general goal - the destruction of the enemy - was not achieved, since the cavalry did not break through in time Kork this could not be, and the Soviet Marshal Blucher seemed to have a different opinion about the same battles.In the book "Marshal Blucher", p. 199, in the order for the 51st Moscow Division of November 9, 1920 No. , the village of Chaplinka, § 4, about the losses during the capture of Perekop, it says this: "The brigade commanders act decisively, the main obstacles are in our hands. Remember that the energy is in the pursuit REWARD FOR HEAVY LOSSES, suffered in the battles for the impregnable positions of the Turkish Wall. Signed: Division Commander of the 51st Blucher, Commander of the General Staff Dadyak. So, according to the Reds, they stormed the Perekop shaft in THREE hours November 9, knocking us out of concrete fortifications, when we didn’t have any at all, and there was no one to knock out, since the last battalion of Colonel Troshin left the rampart by order at 24:00 on 8 November. I also dare, even in my modest position as commander of the 2nd Kornilov Shock Regiment, which then defended the left side of the Perekop rampart, to assure Comrade Kork that the losses just in front of the rampart should be ten times greater. It would not be worth it to especially regret Kork that they did not exterminate us, but they saved the prepared gas cylinders in case General Wrangel did not appreciate the hopelessness of our situation and would not prepare ships for the patriots of RUSSIA who want to leave their homeland. And yet one has to believe that retribution exists: the famous Soviet heroes of these battles Kork and Blucher deservedly received from their leader a bullet in the back of the head for treason to their homeland. Colonel Levitov).

“The decisive battle in Northern Tavria is over. The enemy took possession of the entire territory captured from him during the summer. He got a lot of military booty: 5 armored trains, 18 guns, about 100 wagons with shells, 10 million rounds of ammunition, 25 steam locomotives, trains with food and commissariat property, and about two million poods of bread in Melitopol and Genichesk. Our units suffered severe losses in killed, wounded and frostbite. A significant number were left behind as prisoners and stragglers, mainly from among the former Red Army soldiers who were put into operation at different times. There were isolated cases of mass surrenders. So one of the battalions of the Drozdov division surrendered entirely. However, the army remained intact and our units, in turn, captured 15 guns, about 2000 prisoners, a lot of weapons and machine guns.

The army remained intact, but its combat effectiveness was not the same. Could this army, relying on a fortified position, withstand the blows of the enemy. For six months of hard work, fortifications were created that made it extremely difficult for the enemy to enter the Crimea: trenches were dug, wire was woven, heavy guns were installed, and machine-gun nests were built. All technical means of the Sevastopol fortress were used. The completed railway line to Yushun made it possible to fire at the approaches with armored trains. Only dugouts, shelters and dugouts for troops were not completed. The lack of workers and the lack of timber materials hampered the work. The frosts that came unusually early created especially unfavorable conditions, since the line of defense lay in a sparsely populated area and the housing problem for the troops became especially acute.

Even in the first days after the conclusion of peace with the Poles, having decided to accept the battle in Northern Tavria, I took into account the possibility of its unfavorable outcome for us and the fact that the enemy, having won, would break into the Crimea on the shoulders of our troops. No matter how strong the position is, it will inevitably fall if the spirit of the troops defending it is undermined.

I then ordered General Shatilov to check the evacuation plan drawn up by the headquarters, together with the commander of the fleet. The latter was designed to evacuate 60,000 people. I gave orders that calculations be made for 75,000; ordered the urgent delivery of the missing supply of coal and oil from Constantinople.

As soon as the inevitability of our withdrawal to the Crimea became clear, I ordered the urgent preparation of ships in the ports of Kerch, Feodosia and Yalta for 13,000 people and 4,000 horses. The task was explained by the alleged landing in the Odessa region to establish contact with the Russian units operating in Ukraine. In order to more fully hide my assumptions, all measures were taken to believe in the version of the preparation of ships for a future landing operation. So, the headquarters was ordered to spread rumors that the landing was planned for the Kuban. The size of the detachment itself was planned in accordance with the total number of troops, so that it could not arouse any particular doubt in those who were even aware of the size of the army. The ships were ordered to load food supplies and combat.

Thus, having a certain amount of free tonnage in the port of Sevastopol, in the event of an accident, I could quickly load 40-50 thousand people in the main ports - Sevastopol, Yalta, Feodosia and Kerch and, under the cover of retreating troops, save those under their protection women, children, the wounded and the sick, ”this is how Wrangel assessed the situation that had developed by the time the Reds left for Perekop.

As early as September 21, 1920, by order of the Revolutionary Military Council, the Southern Front was formed, headed by M.V. Frunze. The new front included the 6th (formed from the Right Bank Group), the 13th and 2nd cavalry armies. At the same time, the 12th and 1st cavalry armies were transferred to the Southwestern Front, and the latter was preparing to be transferred to the Southern Front.

In October 1920, the Reds concluded the Starobelsky agreement with Nestor Makhno. Makhno received "some internal autonomy" and the right to recruit into his army on the territory of Soviet Russia. All parts of the Makhnovist army were operationally subordinate to the Southern Front. Now a number of incompetent authors have reached the point of asserting that it was the Makhnovists who took Perekop and liberated the Crimea. In fact, by the beginning of 1920, Makhno had about four thousand bayonets and a thousand sabers, as well as a thousand non-combatants. They had 12 cannons and 250 machine guns.

Wrangel chose Dzhankoy for his bet. On October 22 (November 4), the baron gave the troops a directive:

“The defense of the Crimea was entrusted to General Kutepov, in whose hands the troops united; from the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov to the Chuvash Peninsula inclusive, the 3rd Don Division was located, until it was replaced in this sector by the 34th Infantry Division, which in turn was subject to change on the right sector of the Perekop shaft by the 1st brigade of the 2nd Kuban division on October 24th;

The 1st and 2nd Don divisions were to concentrate in reserve in the area north of Bohemka; the 3rd Don division was to be drawn to the same sector after the change;

the middle section of the Sivash was defended by the Don officer regiment, the Ataman cadet school and dismounted rifle squadrons of the cavalry corps;

the cavalry corps with the Kuban division was ordered to concentrate in reserve in the area south of Chirik;

The Kornilov division by October 26th was supposed to replace the 13th infantry division on the left section of the Perekop rampart; the latter temporarily, until the approach of the Markov division, remained in the reserve of the 1st army corps in the Voinka area; The Drozdov division was to concentrate by October 26th at the Armenian Bazaar;

The Markov division, which retreated along the Arbat Spit to Akmanai, was to be transported by rail to the Yushun region.

Upon completion of the regrouping of all parts of the 1st Army by October 29th, the right combat sector from the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov to the Chuvash Peninsula inclusive was to be defended by parts of the 2nd Army Corps of General Vitkovsky; the left section, from the Chuvash Peninsula to the Perekop Bay, was transferred to the 1st Army Corps of General Pisarev.

And on the same night, the baron, just in case, went to Sevastopol. As Slashchev quipped: "Closer to the water."

October 25 (November 7) Wrangel declared the Crimea under a state of siege. In the Notes, the baron paints a rosy picture:

“The measures taken managed to dispel the beginning anxiety. The rear remained calm, believing in the impregnability of the Perekop strongholds. On October 26, a congress of representatives of cities opened in Simferopol, in its resolution welcoming the policy of the government of the South of Russia and expressing readiness to help the government with all its might. On October 30, a congress of representatives of the press was being prepared in Sevastopol. Life went on as usual. Shops traded briskly. Theaters and cinemas were full.

On October 25, the Kornilov Union organized a charity concert and evening. Stifling the agonizing anxiety in my heart, I accepted the invitation. My absence from the evening hosted by the union of the regiment in whose lists I was, could give food for disturbing explanations. I stayed at the party until 11 o’clock, listening and not hearing musical numbers, straining every effort to find a kind word for the wounded officer, courtesy of the lady manager ... "

In mid-October, Wrangel, having examined the Perekop fortifications, smugly declared to the foreign representatives who were with him: "Much has been done, much remains to be done, but the Crimea is already impregnable for the enemy."

Alas, the baron wishful thinking. The construction of fortifications at the Perekop-Sivash position was led by General Ya.D. Yuzefovich. Then he was replaced by General Makeev, who was the head of the work on the fortifications of the Perekop Isthmus. Back in July 1920, Makeev, in a report addressed to Wrangel's assistant, General P.N. Shatilova reported that almost all the capital work to strengthen Perekop is carried out mainly on paper, since building materials come "in pharmaceutical doses." There were practically no dugouts or dugouts where troops could hide in the autumn-winter period on the isthmus.

The head of the French military mission, General A. Brousseau, who examined the Chongar fortifications from November 6 to 11 (NS), wrote in a report to the French Minister of War: “... the program allowed me to visit the location of the Cossack division in Taganash and three batteries located near the railway bridge through the Sivash. These are the following batteries:

- two 10-inch guns east of the railway;

- two old-style field guns on the very bank of the Sivash;

- guns with a caliber of 152 mm Kanet, a little behind the previous ones.

These batteries seemed to me to be very well equipped, but not very suitable, with the exception of field guns, for the role that the troops were to play in the upcoming battles. The 10-inch battery had concrete shelters and consisted of at least 15 officers among the personnel. Her fire was well prepared and could adequately fit into the whole organization of artillery fire, in which the defense of positions at close range would be carried out by field guns. But these weapons were not enough! The infantry fire support was also poorly organized. On the banks of the Sivash, close to the stone embankment of the railway, there were approximately up to a company of personnel; the nearest military units were located five versts from there, in Taganash. To a remark I made, I was told that the lack of equipped positions forced the troops to be withdrawn to places where they could get shelter from the cold.

It must be admitted that the temperature remained very low in early December, that the soldiers were very poorly dressed, that there was not enough firewood in the area.

The terrain, otherwise, facilitated the defense, despite the poor disposition of troops. From this point of view, Crimea communicates with the continent only through a dam and a railway bridge (the bridge has been blown up). Of course, there are fords across the Sivash, but the coast is a clayey mountain with peaks from 10 to 20 meters high, absolutely insurmountable.

In the division that I saw in Taganash, there was no confidence in victory. The commander-in-chief told me that the Cossacks were not suitable for this positional warfare and that it would be better to withdraw them to the rear and reorganize into more serious units. The personnel of the division had as many fighters in the rear as in the front line.

In the meantime, I crossed three lines of defense, equipped in the rear of the Sivash; the first two of them were a negligible network of fortifications, the third line was a little more serious, but they were all located in one line, without flank positions, on the slopes facing the enemy, or on the very crest of the hill, too close to one another (from 500 to 800 m) and did not have any trenches in depth.

Soviet military historians greatly exaggerated the power of the enemy's fortifications. However, I think it's worth giving their opinion as well. Moreover, the question of the possibilities of defense on the isthmus is very important, and not so much for the Civil War as for the Great Patriotic War.

“The main line of defense of the Perekop positions was created on an artificially filled ancient Turkish rampart, which had a width at the base of more than 15 m and a height of 8 m and crossed the isthmus from southwest to northeast. The length of the shaft reached 11 km. Strong shelters, trenches, machine-gun nests, as well as firing positions for light guns for direct fire were equipped on the rampart. In front of the rampart there was a ditch 20-30 m wide and 10 m deep. A wire fence of 5-6 rows of stakes was installed along the entire length in front of the fortified position. All approaches to the barbed wire and the ditch were flanked by machine-gun fire.

The second line of fortifications on the Perekop Isthmus ran northwest of Ishun, 20-25 km southeast and south of the Turkish Wall. At this position, 4-6 lines of trenches were built with wire fences and long-term defensive structures.

Behind the Ishun positions was located long-range artillery of the enemy, capable of keeping the entire depth of defense under fire. The density of artillery at the Perekop positions was 6-7 guns per 1 km of the front. There were about 170 guns in the Ishun positions, which were reinforced by artillery fire from 20 ships from the sea.

The positions of the Lithuanian peninsula were not completely completed by construction. They consisted of trenches and had barbed wire in some areas.

The Chongar fortifications were even more impregnable, since the Chongar Peninsula itself is connected to the Crimea by a narrow dam a few meters wide, and the Sivash railway and Chongar highway bridges were destroyed by the Whites.

On the Taganash Peninsula, the enemy created two fortified lines, and on Tyup-Dzhankoy - six fortified lines. All fortified lines consisted of a system of trenches (in a number of sections connected into continuous trenches), machine-gun nests and dugouts for sheltering manpower. Wire fences were built at all sites. On the Arabat Spit, the enemy prepared six fortified lines that crossed the arrow along the front. The Chongar Isthmus and the Arabat Spit had an insignificant width, which made it difficult for the advancing troops to maneuver and created advantages for the defenders. Chongar positions were reinforced with a large number of artillery, armored trains and other equipment.

Indeed, white armored trains played an important role in the defense of the Crimea. By 1914, only one railway line Salkovo - Dzhankoy, which passed through the Chongar Peninsula and Sivash, led to the Crimea. In 1916, the line Sarabuz - Evpatoria was put into operation. And in 1920, the Whites completed the Dzhankoy - Armyansk branch in order to be able to deliver equipment and troops to Perekop. It is clear that this was not enough. It was necessary to build several rocky railways near the isthmus for the transfer of troops and the actions of armored trains.

How many guns were exactly at the Perekop-Sivash position, there is no data in the historical literature, I could not find them in the archives either. True, I found a file on the removal of heavy white guns from the Perekop positions at the end of 1924. It dealt with three 203mm English howitzers MK VI, eight 152/45mm Canet guns, two 152mm fortress guns of 190 pounds and four 127mm English guns.

I will outline the Reds’ plan for mastering the Crimean Isthmus according to the Soviet official closed publication “History of Russian Artillery”: “Planning the operation to defeat Wrangel in the Crimea, M.V. Frunze laid the foundation for its historical example. Using it, he planned to bypass the Chongar positions of the enemy along the Arabat arrow with the crossing of the Sivash at the mouth of the Salgir River. “This maneuver is to the side,” wrote M.V. Frunze, - in 1737 was done by Field Marshal Lassi. The armies of Lassi, having deceived the Crimean Khan, who was standing with his main forces at Perekop, moved along the Arabat Spit and, crossing the peninsula at the mouth of the Salgir, went to the rear of the Khan’s troops and quickly captured the Crimea.

Preliminary reconnaissance showed that the enemy had a relatively weak defense on the Arabat Spit, and the eastern coast of the peninsula was guarded only by horse patrols.

For the safe movement of troops along the Arabat Spit, it was necessary to ensure the operation from the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov, where a flotilla of small enemy ships operated. This task was assigned to the Azov flotilla, located in Taganrog. However, the Azov flotilla was unable to arrive in the Genichesk area due to the ice that bound the Taganrog Bay in early November. Therefore, Frunze abandoned the original plan of using the Arabat arrow for the main attack and adopted a new decision. New decision by M.V. Frunze concluded that the 6th Army should no later than November 8, by the forces of the 15th and 52nd rifle divisions, the 153rd brigade of the 51st division and a separate cavalry brigade, cross the Sivash in the Vladimirovka, Stroganovka, Cape Kugaran sector and strike at the rear of the enemy occupying the Perekop fortifications . At the same time, the 51st division was to attack the Perekop positions from the front. To develop success in the Perekop direction, the 1st and 2nd Cavalry armies were pulled up. The start of the operation was scheduled for the night of November 7-8.

The troops of the 4th Army were to break through the Chongar fortifications.

Thus, the troops of the Southern Front struck in two directions with a concentration of forces on the right wing of the front, where the main task of the operation was solved ...

In the shock group of the 6th Army, which was intended to force the Sivash and act around the Perekop fortifications, 36 light guns of the 52nd division were concentrated. This gave a triple superiority over the artillery of the Kuban-Astrakhan brigade of General Fostikov, who occupied the Lithuanian Peninsula and had only 12 guns.

For direct artillery support of the first echelon of troops that were supposed to force the Sivash, two escort platoons were allocated from the 1st and 2nd divisions of the 52nd rifle division. These platoons, to assist them in moving through the Sivash, received half a company of riflemen each. The rest of the strike group artillery occupied firing positions in the Vladimirovka and Stroganovka area with the task of supporting the infantry offensive with battery fire from the northern bank of the Sivash. After capturing the strike group of the 1st line of fortifications of the Lithuanian Peninsula, it was planned to move the 1st and 2nd divisions to the peninsula: the 3rd division was supposed to support the infantry offensive from the previous positions and cover the withdrawal of the strike group in case of forcing failure.

The 51st Rifle Division, which operated against the Perekop positions, was reinforced by the artillery of the 15th Division and had 55 guns, which were combined in the hands of the head of artillery of the 51st division, V.A. Budilovich and summarized in four groups: right, middle, left and anti-battery.

The first group, consisting of twelve light and three heavy guns, under the command of the commander of the 2nd division of the 51st division, had the task of ensuring a breakthrough by the 152nd brigade of the 51st division of the Perekop fortifications.

The middle group, consisting of ten light and four heavy guns, also had the task of ensuring a breakthrough by the 152nd brigade of the Perekop fortifications, and therefore it was subordinate to the commander of the right artillery group. Consequently, the right and middle groups actually constituted one group of 29 guns, which had a single task and a common command.

The left group, consisting of twelve light and seven heavy guns, had the task of ensuring the breakthrough of the Perekop positions by the strike and fire brigade of the 51st division.

The anti-battery group consisted of seven guns (42mm - two and 120mm - five) and had the task of fighting artillery and suppressing enemy reserves.

From these very unconvincing quotes, it follows that the Reds had seventy 76mm field guns for the assault. In addition, Frunze had as many as twenty-one "heavy guns". Of the latter, the most powerful were 107mm guns mod. 1910, 120mm French guns mod. 1878 and 152mm howitzers mod. 1909 and 1910

107mm guns and 152mm howitzers under the tsar-father were considered heavy field artillery and were intended to destroy light field (earth) fortifications. The French cannons were more of a museum value than a combat one.

The Southern Front did not have more powerful guns. In the deep rear of the Reds, several guns of large and special power, inherited from the tsarist TAON (corps of heavy artillery for special purposes), were stored in warehouses. But by November 1920, they were in a deplorable technical condition, there were no trained crews and traction equipment for them. Only by March 24, 1923 did the Reds with difficulty manage to introduce eight 280mm Schneider howitzers and three 305mm howitzers mod. 1915

With the available artillery, Frunze could still win a battle in an open field against the Wrangels or the Poles. But the assault on well-fortified positions was doomed to failure in advance. After 19 years, the Red Army stormed the relatively well-defended Mannerheim Line and suffered huge losses due to the disdainful attitude of mediocre strategists like Tukhachevsky and Pavlunovsky to artillery of special power.

On the Karelian Isthmus, even the powerful 203mm B-4 howitzers could not penetrate the Finnish pillboxes. Four years later, in the summer of 1944, 305mm howitzers did an excellent job with them.

So what happens? "Red Eagles" accomplished an inhuman feat, having mastered the Crimean Isthmus? Yes, indeed, many heroic deeds were committed on both sides. But in general, the Reds fought with an enemy programmed to flee, and most importantly, the “Wrangel Line” turned out to be a “Potemkin village”. Our baron's classmate and drinking buddy, Baron Mannerheim, turned out to be much smarter. But in the "Notes" Wrangel will shamelessly lie, talking about the struggle at Perekop: "The Reds concentrated colossal artillery, which provided powerful support to their units." By this time, the Soviet "Agitprom" began fabricating legends and myths about the storming of Perekop.

So how did the assault on Perekop go?

On the night of November 8, in difficult weather conditions - with strong winds and frost of 11-12 degrees - the shock group of the 6th Army (153rd, 52nd and 15th rifle divisions) crossed the seven-kilometer water barrier - Sivash. On the afternoon of November 8, the 51st Division, which attacked the Turkish Wall in the forehead, was driven back with heavy losses.

The next day, the Reds resumed their assault on the Turkish Wall, and at the same time the shock group of the 6th Army captured the Lithuanian Peninsula. The defense of the whites was finally broken through.

In the battles for the Crimea, I wanted to dwell in particular on the actions of the fleet and armored trains. The 3rd detachment of the Black Sea Fleet was introduced into the Kartinitsky Bay. The detachment included: minelayer "Bug", on which the detachment commander captain of the 2nd rank V.V. Vilken, gunboat Alma, messenger ship Ataman Kaledin (former tugboat Gorgipiya) and four floating batteries.

Floating batteries (former barges), armed with five 130-152mm guns, took up positions near the Kara-Kazak to support the troops in the Ishun positions. Already at the first attempt of the Reds to break into the Crimea, the B-4 floating battery, with its quick fire, contributed to repelling their attacks. On the night of November 8, 1920, the red units crossed the Sivash and approached the Ishun positions. On November 9 and 10, the floating batteries and the Alma gunboat, receiving target designations and adjustments by telephone, fired intensely at the advancing enemy. The movement of ships and partly the shooting was hindered by a northeast storm, and the bay was covered with a 12-centimeter layer of ice. Despite the unfavorable conditions, the fire of the ships was real, and units of the Red 6th Army suffered losses from flanking shelling from Karkinitsky Bay.

On the night of November 11, the Yishun positions were left white, but the ships remained in their positions and bombarded the Yishun station in the morning. On the afternoon of November 11, a detachment of ships received an order to go to Evpatoria, but because of the dense ice, the floating batteries could no longer withdraw from their positions.

The next morning, November 12, the detachment entered a dense fog, and by mistake in the calculation at 0940 hours. four miles from the Ak-Meschet, the minelayer Bug ran aground. It was not possible to pull the minzag afloat with the help of tugboats, and on the night of November 13, the team was removed from it, and the ship itself was rendered unusable.

An important role in the struggle for the Crimea was played by armored trains. By October 1920, the Reds at Perekop had 17 armored trains, but only a fraction of them were used. Armored trains plied around the Salkovo station, since the bridge over the Sivash was blown up by the Whites, and the tracks were dismantled. So the armored trains of the Reds did not manage to break into the Crimea.

Nevertheless, the heavy armored trains of the Reds provided significant support to the units advancing on the Chongar Peninsula. The most powerful armored train of the Reds was the armored train No. 84, built in late 1919 - early 1920 in Sormovo. It consisted of two armored platforms with 203mm naval guns, created on the basis of 16-axle and 12-axle platforms. The armored train No. 4 Kommunar was also active, which included 4 armored platforms. On one of them was a 152mm howitzer, and on the others - one 107mm cannon mod. 1910

White armored trains were much more active. The light armored train "St. George the Victorious" (formed on July 27, 1919 in Yekaterinodar) from October 12 to October 26, 1920 was on the Ishunskaya branch (line Dzhankoy - Armyansk). The armored train "Dmitry Donskoy" arrived on October 26 to the Ishun position under the command of Colonel Podoprigor and fought against the advancing Reds, together with units of the Markov and Drozdov divisions.

At dawn on October 27, the armored train "St. George the Victorious" withdrew to Armyansk, north of Ishun, already occupied by the Reds. There he was among the advancing units of the red cavalry. The cavalrymen, supported by artillery fire and armored cars, attacked the armored train with several lavas and surrounded it. The armored train hit the attackers with artillery and machine-gun fire point-blank. The Red Army suffered heavy losses, but did not stop the attacks. The red cavalry tried to blow up the railway track on the retreat path of the armored train, but was destroyed by machine-gun fire from the armored train. At this time, "St. George the Victorious" came under fire from a three-inch Soviet battery. As a result of a shell hit, the locomotive's boiler was damaged and an officer and a mechanic were shell-shocked.

With the engine fading, the armored train slowly moved back, without stopping the battle with the battery and the Red cavalry. On the northern arrows of the siding, the wrecked locomotive died out. Before dark, the armored train, not being able to maneuver, still threw off the attacking enemy with its fire. In the evening, a serviceable steam locomotive approached and took the combat train of the armored train to the Yishun station.

During the battle on October 27 on the armored train "Dmitry Donskoy" the main gun was broken, one officer was wounded and one volunteer was killed.

On October 28, the armored train "St. George the Victorious" entered the position with an unarmored locomotive. The Reds advanced in large numbers, occupying two lines of trenches and pursuing the retreating White units. The armored train suddenly crashed into the dense chains of the Reds and shot them with machine-gun and grapeshot fire from a distance of up to 50 steps. The Reds showered bullets on the white armored train and attacked it with unprecedented persistence, but, having suffered huge losses, they began to retreat, and the St. George the Victorious pursued them. This allowed the white infantry to launch a counterattack.

Meanwhile, the armored train that had advanced forward was again attacked by fresh infantry forces. The chain of reds lay down at the railroad tracks. On the armored train, 4 soldiers and a mechanic were wounded and the only serviceable injector on the locomotive was killed, as a result of which the water supply to the boiler stopped. But the armored train nevertheless threw back the chains of the Reds with its fire, inflicting heavy losses on them. After the arrival of the white armored car "Gundorovets", "St. George the Victorious" managed to withdraw with an extinct engine to the station Yishun.

Meanwhile, the White command became aware that the Reds were preparing an invasion of Crimea by their other troops from the northeast, along the main line of the railway, laid along the dam near the Sivash station. The heavy armored train "United Russia" (new, built in the Crimea) was on October 28 near the Sivashsky bridge in the area of ​​​​the 134th Feodosia Infantry Regiment and fired with Red units.

Light armored train "Officer" arrived on the morning of October 28 at the junction station Dzhankoy. By order of the chief of staff of the 1st corps, he went from there to the Taganash station, about 20 miles from the Dzhankoy station, to participate in the defense of the Sivash positions.

On October 29 at 9 o'clock in the morning, the "Officer" entered the Sivash dam as part of one armored platform with two 3-inch guns, one platform with a 75mm cannon and an unarmored locomotive. Despite the fire of the Red batteries standing in the shelter on the opposite bank, the "Officer" moved towards the bridge. When the armored train was 320 meters from the bridge, a land mine exploded under its second safety platform. The explosion ripped out a piece of rail about 60 cm long. By inertia, one armored platform and a steam locomotive tender passed through the blown up place. The stopped armored train with buckshot and machine-gun fire partly interrupted, partly dispersed the Reds, who were near the blown up bridge. Then the "Officer" opened fire on the positions of the Red artillery, which continued to shell it.

Despite the damaged paths, the "Officer" managed to return to his trenches. There he remained until one in the afternoon, maneuvering under the fire of enemy guns. After that, on the orders of the head of the armored train group, Colonel Lebedev, the "Officer" withdrew to the Taganash station.

At this time, units of the Reds broke through the Chongar Peninsula and attacked from the east, bypassing the Taganash station. The armored train "Officer" fired at their columns advancing from the direction of the village of Abaz-kirk. By the fire of white armored trains (including the heavy armored train "United Russia"), as well as positional and field artillery, the Reds, who attacked with large forces, were stopped by the evening south of the village of Tyup-Dzhankoy. Until dark, the armored train "Officer" remained at the Taganash station.

On the evening of October 29, the "Officer" again went to the Sivash dam, but soon returned and met with the armored train "United Russia". Then both armored trains moved to the dam. "United Russia" walked behind the "Officer" at a distance of just over 200 meters. Before reaching 500 meters to the line of advanced trenches of the Whites, Captain Labovich stopped the armored train "Officer", as he received a warning from the officer of the Feodosiya regiment, who was passing along the railway at that time, that the Reds, apparently, were preparing to undermine the path, as they were heard pickaxe strikes on rails. The "officer" began to slowly move away in order to find the place of the dig.

Suddenly, there was an explosion from behind. The explosion occurred under the safety platforms of the United Russia armored train following behind. Two safety pads flew into the air. "United Russia" was thrown back along the rails for a distance of about half a verst. The rear platform with the 75mm cannon of the armored train “Officer” fell into the hole formed from the explosion, which did not have time to slow down. The officer stopped. Then, in complete darkness, the Reds opened fire from seven machine guns, which were mainly located on the left side of the railway track.

Armored train "United Russia" returned fire. On the armored train "Officer" two guns could not fire: the rear 75mm gun could not fire due to the inclined position of the combat platform, which fell into the pit, and the average three-inch gun did not have enough calculation numbers. Thus, the "Officer" opened fire with only one head three-inch gun and all machine guns.

A few minutes later, the Reds, and these were the fighters of the 264th regiment of the 30th division, went on the attack on the armored trains. With cries of "Hurrah" they began to throw grenades at the armored platform of the "Officer". However, there the team had already fled to the United Russia armored train, which went to the rear to the Taganash station.

On the same day, October 29, from 7 o'clock in the morning, the armored trains "Dmitry Donskoy" and "Saint George the Victorious" who were on the Ishun branch, engaged in battle with the advancing Soviet units and held back the advance of the enemy from Karpova Balka. Around noon, the armored train "Dmitry Donskoy" was hit. Its armored platforms were so seriously damaged that the armored train could not continue the battle and retreated towards the Dzhankoy junction station.

The armored train "St. George the Victorious" was left alone. However, he managed to hold back the advance of the Red units until the retreating White troops reached the big Simferopol road. Then "St. George the Victorious" withdrew to the Yishun station and from there repelled the attacks of the red cavalry, which tried to start pursuing the white units.

When the armored train "Saint George the Victorious" departed, one of its safety platforms derailed. Late in the evening, about two versts from the Dzhankoy junction station, a collision took place between the armored trains St. George the Victorious and Dmitry Donskoy. The armored platforms were not damaged at the same time, and only the reserve car of the St. George the Victorious armored train and three workshop cars, which were attached to the Dmitry Donskoy armored train, derailed.

Apparently, on the same night, the armored train "Ioann Kalita" passed through the station Dzhankoy to Kerch, with the task of covering the retreat towards Kerch of parts of the Don Corps.

On the morning of October 30, the armored train "St. George the Victorious", having attached to itself one combat platform of the armored train "United Russia", moved along with the reserve from the Dzhankoy station towards Simferopol. Approximately 5 miles south of Dzhankoy, the composition of the armored train reserve was abandoned, as it turned out that its engine did not have time to receive supplies.

The armored train "United Russia" was the last to leave the Taganash station. When United Russia approached the Dzhankoy station, it had to stop and wait for the damaged track to be repaired. United Russia moved on when part of the city of Dzhankoy was already occupied by the Reds. At the siding south of the Dzhankoy station, the armored trains "Saint George the Victorious" and "United Russia" joined and went on as a united train.

Around 2 p.m. on October 30, the armored trains approached the Kurman-Kemelchi station, which is 25 versts south of the Dzhankoy station. At this time, the red cavalry suddenly appeared, which came from the Ishun positions, bypassing the retreating white troops. United white armored trains opened fire on the advancing cavalry, threw it back and made it possible for the white units to retreat further in order.

On further movement to Simferopol, the connected armored trains of the Whites were blocked by an obstacle from stones and sleepers piled on the rails. A four-gun battery of the Reds opened fire on the armored trains, and their cavalry was a thousand paces from the railway track.

The Red cavalry moved to attack the white armored trains, but were driven back with heavy losses. With a further withdrawal, the teams of white armored trains had to clear the path several times from the sleepers and stones that the reds had time to throw in order to cause a crash. By nightfall, the armored train "Dmitry Donskoy" and the composition of the reserve of the armored train "Officer" arrived at the Simferopol station. Later, the combined armored trains "Saint George the Victorious" and "United Russia" came to Simferopol.

At 11 o'clock on October 31, the armored train "Saint George the Victorious" departed from the Simferopol station last. Upon arrival at the Bakhchisarai station, a steam locomotive was launched on its northern arrows. Then, on the orders of the commander of the 1st Army, General Kutepov, the railway bridge across the Alma River was blown up and the bridge on the highway was burned. At night, an order was received to withdraw to Sevastopol for loading onto ships.

At dawn on October 31, the armored train "Dmitry Donskoy" and the reserve of the armored train "Officer" approached the Sevastopol station and stopped near the first piers. It was impossible to move further, since the combat platform of the Dmitry Donskoy derailed at the turn and the track needed to be repaired.

In the meantime, information was received that troops were already being loaded onto the Saratov steamer at a nearby pier. The command of the armored train "Grozny" was accepted on this ship, which, before landing, rendered the guns just received from repair unusable and threw the locks into the sea.

Around 9 am on November 1, the armored trains "St. George the Victorious" and "United Russia" reached Sevastopol, in the Kilen Bay area. On the way, the material part of the armored platforms was damaged. At about 10 o'clock, a crash was made so that the armored trains would not go to the red as a whole. The combat trains of the armored trains "Saint George the Victorious" and "United Russia" were launched as quickly as possible towards each other.

The team of the armored train "Saint George the Victorious" with six machine guns boarded the ship "Beshtau". The team of the armored train "United Russia", which arrived on the combat unit, was also loaded onto the steamer "Beshtau". Part of the team, which was part of the reserve, was loaded earlier on the Kherson steamer.

The heavy armored train "John Kalita" arrived in Kerch on November 1, covering the brigade under the command of General Fitskhelaurov, which was marching in the rear guard of the Don Corps. Since it was not allowed to blow up the combat train of the armored train, its materiel was rendered unusable without an explosion. On the night of November 2, the team of the armored train "John Kalita" was loaded onto the floating craft "Mayak number 5".

The armored train "Dmitry Donskoy" arrived on November 2 in Kerch, where the light armored train "Wolf" was already located. The teams of these two armored trains removed the locks from the guns and spoiled the materiel on the battlefields, after which they boarded the ships.

Here I paid much attention to the actions of armored trains. In my opinion, they are very interesting, but their activity is not typical for the retreating Russian army.

General Slashchev claimed: “On November 11, on the orders of Wrangel, I was at the front to see and report on his condition. The units were in complete retreat, that is, rather, they were not units, but separate small groups; so, for example, in the Perekop direction, 228 people and 28 guns retreated to Simferopol, the rest was already near the ports.

The Reds did not press at all, and the withdrawal in this direction took place in peacetime conditions.

I note that this was written when Yakov Aleksandrovich was already in the service of the Reds and the participants in the battles for the Crimea could easily catch him in a lie.

In exile, a number of officers spoke of Red and White horse columns, which for a long time walked parallel across the steppe at a distance of several kilometers from each other and did not try to attack.

Personally, I am sure that the French and Soviet commands for the second time in the Crimea (the first time - in April 1919) concluded a secret agreement: "... we are leaving, you do not touch us." Naturally, the text of the agreement is still unprofitable to publish neither the USSR (Russia) nor France.

The rebels struck at the rear of the Wrangelites in the Ishuni area. They also cut off the Simferopol-Feodosia highway to the retreating Cossack units. On November 10, the underground revolutionary committee raises an uprising, the rebels capture Simferopol - three days before the arrival of the Red Army. In addition, the fighters of the Crimean Insurgent Army captured the cities of Feodosia and Karasubazar (now Belogorsk). I note that the French destroyer Senegal was firing at the rebels who occupied Feodosia.

Several motor boats came to the aid of the partisans from Novorossiysk to the Crimea. The new landing was commanded by Ivan Papanin, already known to us. In the autumn of 1920, he was taken to the mainland with secret documents seized from the Whites, and now he is back in the Crimean Insurgent Army.

It is curious that 20 years later, in the autumn of 1941, Mokrousov again led the partisan movement in the Crimea, and Makarov, “His Excellency’s adjutant,” became his closest assistant. The German invaders knew about Makarov's past adventures and distributed among the population a leaflet specially dedicated to him with the eloquent title "Chameleon". Papanin in the Crimea in 1941-1944 did not partisan, at that time he served as the "head of the Arctic."

Crimean campaign

Minich, leaving the Don army near Azov, by April 7 (18), 1736, reached Tsaritsynka, where he discovered that the troops were not yet ready to march on the Crimea. However, the war, too, had not yet been declared, and the battles near Azov were formally started by powers that were not at war with each other. Even when news of the siege of the Azov fortress reached Constantinople in early April, the Russian envoy Veshnyakov continued to be treated politely and, contrary to custom, they were not thrown into the Seven-Tower Castle. The reason for such "politeness" was the extremely unpleasant situation for the Ottomans on the Persian front. There, Turkey continued to suffer defeats, and the warlike and energetic Kuli Khan officially became the head of Persia, who finally removed both Shah Tahmasp and his infant son Abbas from power, and began to rule under the name of Nadir Shah.

Veshnyakov, seeing the weakness of the Ottoman Empire, continued to encourage St. Petersburg to act decisively. “I will boldly and truly convey,” he wrote to the capital, “that in Turkey there are neither political leaders nor military leaders .... Everything is in terrible disorder and, at the slightest disaster, will be on the edge of the abyss. Fear of the Turks rests on one legend, for now the Turks are completely different than they were before: how much they were previously inspired by the spirit of glory and ferocity, they are now so cowardly and timid, everyone seems to foresee the end of their illegal power .... The Tatars, knowing everything it is now, as they say here, that the loyalty of the Porte is beginning to waver. As for the Christian subjects, the Turks fear that everyone will revolt as soon as the Russian troops approach the borders. The local Greeks of Constantinople are mostly idlers, having neither faith nor law, their main interest is money, and they hate us more than the Turks themselves, but the Greeks of the region and even more Bulgarians, Volokhi, Moldavians and others care so much about getting rid of their Turkish tyranny and so strongly devoted to Russia that at the first chance of life they will not spare Your Imperial Majesty as a trusted savior. The Turks know all this.”

In early April, Minich sent a small detachment of infantry from Tsarichanka to the Samara River, led by Lieutenant Bolotov, to reconnoiter the area. The cavalry detachment of Colonel Lesevitsky received the same order. The reconnaissance detachments also had to establish "flying mail posts" and constantly report to Tsarichanka about possible enemy movements. Hurrying with the start of the campaign, the field marshal decided to lead the troops to Samara in five columns, sending them as soon as they were ready. The time factor played a big role, it was impossible to let the enemy strengthen his positions and transfer reinforcements to the Crimea.

On April 11 (22), the first column under the command of Major General Spiegel set out from Tsarichanka, it included four infantry and two dragoon regiments. The next day, on April 12 (23), 1736, Osterman sent a letter to the Turkish vizier, which read: the security of the state and subjects, are forced to move their troops against the Turks. War was finally declared.

On April 13, the Devitz column began to move with one infantry and three dragoon regiments. On April 14, a column of Lieutenant General Leontiev set off on a campaign: six regular regiments and 10 thousand people of the Land Militia. On April 17, the column of the Prince of Hesse-Homburg launched an offensive: one infantry, three dragoon regiments, field artillery, Chuguev and Little Russian Cossacks. On April 19, a column of Major General Repnin set out: four infantry and one dragoon regiments. All other regiments of the Dnieper army also had to be drawn to Tsarichanka, they were entrusted with the protection of communications and transports with provisions and other supplies. The regiments stationed on the Don and Donets were ordered to go independently to the Samara River. Four thousand Don Cossacks going on a campaign also went from the Don separately from other troops, with whom they were supposed to meet already at Kamenny Zaton.

On April 14 (25), Spiegel's vanguard went to the Samara River and built two wooden and two pontoon bridges across it. Having crossed the river, two days later, the detachment stopped, and the soldiers began the construction of two strongholds. One of them was erected at the confluence of Samara with the Dnieper, and the other - on Samara itself, on the site of the ancient Bogoroditskaya fortress. For the construction of the first, Ust-Samarsk fortification, an older fortress located here was used. It was surrounded by an extensive earthen fence, under the protection of which the barracks, officers' apartments and the infirmary were located. Two more fortifications on a height to the east of the fortress. This entire defensive system, from the Samara River to the Dnieper, which was open to enemy cavalry, had additional protection in the form of a line of slingshots and a palisade. Colonel Chicherin was appointed commandant of the Ust-Samarsk fortification. The Bogoroditsky fortress was surrounded on all sides by a high earthen rampart, and rows of slingshots were placed on the old rampart proper.

On April 19, Spiegel's column went on, and to replace it, Leontiev's columns and, a day later, the Prince of Hesse-Homburg arrived in Samara. On April 22, Repnin's column approached the river. So the columns succeeded each other and moved forward in a coordinated manner, creating strongholds and warehouses-shops along the way. With the passage through Samara, the Dnieper army entered enemy territory, so Minich stepped up his precautions. Each column had the opportunity to support the neighboring one; slingshots were always set up at the halts or a Wagenburg was built from wagons. However, initially there was no news of the enemy. The main concern of the soldiers was marching and building fortifications. Major General Spiegel reported on April 20: “And as in considerable marches, it is very difficult for people in work and crossings, because during the day they march, but at night they work and have such work that people can hardly walk even in infantry regiments.”

On April 26, 1736, Munnich personally arrived at Spiegel's vanguard, which was three days' journey from Kamenny Zaton. Gradually, other groups were drawn up. By May 4, under the command of the field marshal, 10 dragoon and 15 infantry regiments (more than 28 thousand people), 10 thousand people of the Land Militia, 3 thousand Zaporizhzhya Cossacks, 13 thousand Little Russian Cossacks, hussars, Sloboda and Chuguev Cossacks gathered on the right bank of the Belozerka River . In total, over 58 thousand people. A military council was held in Kamenny Zaton, which was supposed to decide which way to go to the Crimea: directly across the steppe or along the banks of the Dnieper through Kyzy-Kermen. We chose the second option.

On May 4 (15), the vanguard of the Russian army set out from the Belozerka River on a further campaign. General Spiegel was still in command of the vanguard. The next day, the main forces under the command of the Prince of Hesse-Homburg moved forward. Field Marshal Munnich rode with them. In addition, a rearguard under the command of Major General Hein was allocated to protect the rear. A convoy was formed to deliver supplies to the army, and a large detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Frint was assigned to protect it.

On May 7 (18) the Russian avant-garde reached Kyzy-Kermen. A strong stronghold was also erected here. The soldiers built a powerful retrashement, reinforced from the side of the steppe by six redoubts, which stretched for 33 km. Ten more redoubts were built between Belozersky and Kyzy-Kermen strongholds. Each redoubt housed a small garrison of 40-50 people from sick and weakened soldiers and Cossacks who were unable to march. On the way to Kyzy-Kermen, small Tatar detachments began to appear, but they still did not join the battle. For reconnaissance of the area, Spiegel singled out from his forces a cavalry detachment under the command of Colonel Krechetnikov (400 dragoons, 150 hussars, one hundred Cossacks of the Izyum Sloboda Regiment, 500 Little Russian and "all good" Zaporozhye Cossacks). Another detachment, Colonels Witten (1200 people) and Tyutchev (1400 people), were sent to reconnaissance by Leontiev and the Prince of Hesse-Homburg. For communication between the reconnaissance detachments, two separate, small detachments were allocated under the overall command of Lieutenant Colonel Fermor.

Crimean Tatar archer

Witten's scouts defeated a detachment of Nogai Tatars. The captives reported that twenty miles away, near the Chernaya Dolina tract, there was a 100,000-strong Tatar army led by the khan himself. Notifying the commander, Witten connected all the reconnaissance detachments together and continued to move forward to check the words "tongues". In total, he had 3,800 cavalrymen and Cossacks at his disposal.

On the morning of May 8 (19), Witten's cavalry detachment went to a large Tatar camp. These were the advanced forces of the Crimean army under the command of the heir to the khan's throne, the kalgi-sultan. Seeing the Russians, the Tatar cavalry immediately rushed to the attack. Russian commanders began to quickly build dragoons in a square, and the Zaporozhye and Little Russian Cossacks were ordered to cover their flanks. However, at the first onslaught of the enemy, the Cossacks fled. The Tatars fell upon the unfinished square. The dragoons had a hard time: in a hurry, only one line of soldiers managed to put on the rear front of the square. Moving to help Witten with a detachment of cavalry, Spiegel was stopped by a 15,000-strong Tatar army and he himself almost got surrounded.

Seeing that a big battle was beginning, Minich rushed to Spiegel with a small convoy. He made his way to the column, which stood in a square. Then, having studied the situation, he, accompanied by only eighty dragoons and hundreds of Cossacks, rode back to the main forces. On the way, the convoy Minich was attacked by a Tatar detachment, and narrowly escaped death. The Tatar cavalry pressed on all day, trying to overturn the Russians. In the evening Leontiev's detachment approached and opened artillery fire. The Tatars, having heard the roar of the cannonade, immediately retreated, leaving more than two hundred people killed on the battlefield. Russian losses amounted to about 50 people killed and wounded, General Spiegel and Colonel Weisbach were injured.

The first clash with the Crimean horde showed the effectiveness of the dragoon regiments, their stamina and good training. The whole day they held back the onslaught of the superior forces of the Tatar cavalry. Minich showed personal courage, but showed disbelief in the abilities of his commanders, preferring to do everything himself. The Little Russian Cossacks who fled from the battlefield were put on trial.

The captured Tatars told the commander that the main forces of the Crimean horde were eighty miles from the battlefield. In addition, the Cossacks captured several Turkish messengers and found letters from them, from which they found out that the Turks would not send troops to help the khan. Therefore, the army continued the march. On May 11 (22), the army continued its journey, and, in view of the proximity of the Tatar cavalry, all the detachments lined up in one common square. The sides (faces) of the gigantic rectangle formed regular regiments that stood in four lines. The dragoons walked on foot, giving their horses to the Cossacks, who formed the fifth (inner) rank. Artillery was placed in front and at the corners of the square, and irregular troops in the center. The movement of the square required a clear coordination of actions of all military units, and was very tiring for the soldiers and officers, but this did not bother Munnich.

On May 14 (25), Minich's army approached the Kalanchik River, where they again built a fortification. Here 4,000 men joined the army. detachment of Don Cossacks. The next day, the Russian army was attacked by the Tatars. Kare met the enemy with heavy artillery and rifle fire. Minich ordered to bring carts inside the square and place Cossacks on them, who fired rifles over the heads of the soldiers standing in the ranks. A. Bayov wrote: “Tatars with wild cries and drawn sabers attacked the army from all sides. As soon as they approached, they were met with strong rifle and grape fire. The repulsed attack was repeated several more times within two hours. To put an end to these attacks, Minich moved his army forward, after which the Tatars retreated, leaving a significant number of dead in place. The Russians had no losses." Thus, the Russian army broke the resistance of the enemy. The Tatar cavalry withdrew behind the fortifications of Perekop.

Fortifications of Perekop

On May 17 (28), Minich's army approached Perekop and camped on the shores of the Rotten Sea (Sivash). For the first time since the time of Vasily Golitsyn, Russian regiments came close to the gates of the Crimean Khanate. The Perekop isthmus, which connects the Crimean peninsula with the mainland, has been of strategic importance for centuries, and therefore was equipped with a powerful system of defensive structures. It consisted of an 8-kilometer shaft about 20 meters high, stretching from the Black Sea to Lake Sivash. There was a wide ditch in front of the rampart. All around the rampart stood seven stone towers armed with artillery. They served as additional defense nodes and were capable of flanking fire along the moat. The only passage beyond the line was protected by stone gates, located three kilometers from Sivash and seven kilometers from the Black Sea coast. These gates were armed with artillery, and immediately behind them stood the fortress of Op-Kap. It looked like an oblong quadrangle with stone walls and loopholes at the outgoing corners of the bastions. The garrison of the fortress consisted of four thousand janissaries and sipahis. In front of the gate there was a small village, covered by another low rampart. 84 guns were placed along the fortified line, concentrated mainly in towers and fortresses. The Turkish garrison was supported by numerous Tatar cavalry.

Approaching Perekop, Minich demanded that the Crimean leadership capitulate and recognize the dominion of the empress. Khan, in response, began to play for time, referring to peace with Russia and assuring that all the raids were made not by the Crimean, but by the Nogai Tatars. Not wanting to delay, the Russian field marshal began to prepare for the attack. Already on the day the army arrived, a redoubt with five cannons and one mortar was erected opposite the Op-Kap fortress, which at dawn on May 18 opened fire on the gates and the fortress itself.

The assault was scheduled for May 20. For its implementation, Minich divided the troops into three large columns (each of five plutong columns) under the command of Generals Leontiev, Shpigel and Izmailov. They were supposed to strike in the gap between the Op-Kap fortress and the Black Sea. At the same time, the Cossacks were to make a distracting attack on the fortress itself. The dragoons dismounted and joined the infantry regiments. In each attacking column, the soldiers of the third pluthong carried with them axes and horn spears. All soldiers were given 30 rounds of ammunition, and the grenadiers, in addition, two hand grenades. Minich also ordered that part of the Fusiliers be supplied with grenades (one grenade per person). Artillery, both regimental and field, was ordered to follow in columns, and the cannons mounted on redoubts were ordered to cover the offensive with their fire. In total, 15 infantry and 11 dragoon regiments with a total number of about 30 thousand people were allocated for the assault.

On May 19, General Shtofeln made a reconnaissance of that section of the fortifications that was to be attacked. In the evening of the same day, Russian troops began to advance to their original positions. On May 20 (June 1), 1736, the assault began. On a signal, the field artillery opened fire. Then the front column fired a volley of rifles and rushed forward. The soldiers descended into the ditch, and then began to climb the rampart. At the same time, slingshots were very useful to them, which the soldiers stuck into the slope and climbed up them. Bayonets also came into play. Soon, the infantrymen not only climbed the crest of the rampart, but also pulled several cannons behind them on ropes. The Tatars, who did not expect the appearance of the Russians at all in this sector of defense, panicked and fled. The steppes did not expect that such a deep and wide ditch could be crossed so quickly and at night. Already half an hour after the start of the assault, the Russian flag fluttered over Perekop.

After that, the Russian troops began to storm the towers, which housed the Turkish garrisons. The tower closest to the Russian army opened artillery fire. Minich ordered a team of sixty infantrymen, led by the captain of the Petersburg Infantry Regiment, Manstein, to attack the tower. After a fierce battle, part of the garrison was killed, part surrendered. After that, the defenders of all other towers hastily capitulated.

But the next two years of the civil war did not advance the first holder of the Order of the Red Banner. While the red marshals became famous - Tukhachevsky in the Urals "Soviet Marne", Voroshilov on the Don with the defense of the "Red Verdun", Kotovsky in the battles near St. glory did not come.

Commanding the 30th division, he fought against the Czechs on the Volga, at the head of the 51st against Kolchak in Siberia; these are secondary roles, in which Blucher showed himself to be a decisive commander. But only at the end of the civil war, when the Kremlin was left with the only internal front - the Crimea - Blucher made a noise, linking his name with the epic assault on the Perekop positions.

This was the last battle of the enemies. The main masses of the Whites have already been thrown into the Black Sea; the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the South of Russia, General Denikin, sailed across the Mediterranean to England; in Constantinople, the monarchists shot dead his chief of staff, General Romanovsky. All devastated Russia stood in red fire. And only in the Crimea did General Baron Wrangel settle down.

All on Wrangel! All to the Crimea! - and 100 thousand red bayonets and sabers moved across the steppes of Tavria.

Deprived of the support of the Entente, Baron Pyotr Wrangel feverishly fortified the narrow Perekop Isthmus - the entrance to the Crimea - making it impregnable to the enemy. For six months they dug here one line of trenches after another, installed heavy artillery, wove wire, built machine-gun nests so that there were 50 machine guns per thousand fighters; used all the technical means of the Sevastopol fortress. And when the Reds approached the Crimea, Baron Wrangel already considered Perekop impregnable.

Behind the fortification lines were the best troops - the 1st Army of General Kutepov, the 2nd General of Abramov, the Don Cossacks; the best cavalry masses drew up.

In August 1920, in the autumn steppes of Tavria, the first battles began to capture the Kakhovka bridgehead.

At the head of the 51st division, carrying out the most important task of the offensive, Blucher went on the attack at Chaplinka and Kakhovka. On a broad front, at full height, without dashes, under destructive shrapnel and rifle-machine-gun fire, dressed in red shirts, were the Blucherites; on the fly they took possession of the height at the Kulikovsky farm. Stunned by such an attack, White surrendered the high ground, but, having recovered, rushed to the counterattack. It was a terrible fight. Several times the height passed from the Blucherites to the Whites. Both the red Blucher and the white Kutepov fully appreciated each other - at night both retreated to their original positions.

It was September. Frosts have begun. It snowed. In desperate battles, the Whites surrendered position after position to the Reds who had piled on, and at the end of the month the defense of the Kakhovka bridgehead collapsed. Now the Whites offered their last resistance on the narrow Isthmus of Perekop, in terribly fortified positions.

Frosts went unprecedented, in November they were already at 20 degrees. Half-torn reds and whites wrapped themselves in all sorts of rags, warming themselves by stuffing straw under their shirts. But behind the Reds was already - northern Tavria, and breakdown and despair crept into the whites.

The Lithuanian peninsula stood out as a dark stripe from the dark waters. Here at Perekop further military glory awaited Blucher. On the 8th, on the outskirts of the Lithuanian Peninsula, the battle for the Perekop Isthmus began. Gloomy, steep Turkish rampart, rising above the plane of the sea, like a wall blocking the entrance to the Crimea. After mastering the approaches, the Reds rushed into a frontal assault on the Turkish Wall. The Reds went on attack after attack, but all attacks ended in failure.

Since dawn there was an incessant rumble of artillery. Verse in the evening. But the denouement has not yet come. The Whites pulled together everything they could, even the personal convoy of the commander-in-chief went into battle.

Night rolled over the sea, over the Sivash, over the fields strewn with corpses, over the fortifications of the isthmus. That night, Blucher moved with three divisions, machine guns, artillery along the bottom of the Sivash - to the flank and rear of the enemy.

In the cold, the Red Army men in only their tunics shivered; no fire was ordered, and the troops marched in the dark on this madness-like operation.

Blucher's troops broke away from the shore for seven miles. In the seven-verst space there is not a fold, nothing that would allow the artillery to hide or get into a closed position. You can't dig trenches on a wet bottom. Common sense said: if the troops were late, did not approach the enemy before dawn, the whites would lay down everyone at the bottom of the Sivash with machine guns. But Blucher was not only worried about the dawn.

I'm not afraid of Kutepov, - he said to the chief of staff Triandafilov. - I'm afraid of Sivash. When the water begins to rise, what then? ..

Then Wrangel will spend the winter in the Crimea, - answered the chief of staff.

When the last 459th regiment of the Blucher group set out from Vladimirovka, Blucher rode out on horseback in pursuit of the troops. Troops bogged down, hurried along the bottom, with a quick march, in order to go behind enemy lines before the matinee.

Sivash dried up, blown by the winds. There was no water yesterday or the day before. But not only Blucher, all the hurrying Red Army men, when they were already halfway, noticed that the wind had changed, it was blowing from the east. On the left flank of the parts passing the Sivash, the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov tilted - water appeared. The water was coming. The elements were against the Reds. Blucher hurried parts. Water already filled the ruts to the wheels of the guns, the wheels bogged down to the axles. And when the last infantry, having entered the peninsula, rushed to the assault, the sea stood behind the Reds.

White fire raged ahead with fiery explosions. It was the fiercest battle in the entire civil war. Seeing the Blucherites cut off by the sea, the Reds rushed from the front to the Turkish Wall, head-on. And no matter how the whites resisted, Blucher decided the battle.

In the attacks, one after another, the lines of white fell. Crimea opened. White began a hasty retreat. And the Reds, with Blucher warheads, rushed into the open defeated peninsula.

Blucher received the second Order of the Red Banner. Glory came to Blucher for the second time.

In July 1919, the Southern Front was declared the main one by the Bolsheviks. Fresh units were transferred to him, party mobilization was carried out. V. Egoriev (a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Front - ) became the commander of the front, and S. Kamenev was appointed commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The slogan "Proletarian, on the horse!" was put forward, after which the Red cavalry corps appeared, and then the cavalry armies. This made it possible to nullify the advantage of whites in the cavalry. For some time the Whites were still advancing, but by the end of October there was a turning point in the course of the campaign. The shock corps of Generals Kutepov, Mamontov and Shkuro were defeated, which was the beginning of the end of Denikin's entire army.

The cavalry corps of S. Budyonny, then deployed to the 1st Cavalry Army, struck at Voronezh and moved towards the Donbass. The Denikinites, cut in two by him, retreated to Odessa and Rostov-on-Don. In January 1920, the troops of the Southwestern Front under the command of A. Yegorov and the Southern Front under the command of V. Shorin recaptured Ukraine, the Donbass, the Don and the North Caucasus. Only uncoordinated actions near Novorossiysk by M. Tukhachevsky and S. Budyonny allowed the remnants of the Volunteer Army (about 50 thousand people) to evacuate to the Crimea, held by the small formations of General Ya. Slashchev. Denikin handed over the general command of the white forces in the south to General Baron P. Wrangel.

In June-August 1920, Wrangel's troops, leaving the Crimea, occupied Northern Tavria to the Dnieper and the west of Donbass. Thus, they provided great assistance to the Polish troops. Wrangel suggested leaving the landowner's land to the peasants and cooperation to the Ukrainian and Polish nationalists, but these measures were belated and did not meet with confidence.

The end of hostilities with Poland allowed the Red Army to concentrate its main forces in the Crimean direction. In September 1920, the Southern Front (M. Frunze) was formed, outnumbering the enemy. In late September - early November, Wrangel made the last attempt to attack the Donbass and Right-Bank Ukraine. Fights began for Kakhovka. Parts of V. Blucher repulsed all the attacks of the Whites and went on the counteroffensive. Only in Northern Tavria, the Reds captured about 20 thousand people. Wrangel was locked up in the Crimea. The entrance to it lay through the Perekop Isthmus, where the main line of defense passed along the Turkish shaft 8 meters high, in front of which there was a deep ditch. Dozens of guns and machine guns guarded all approaches to it. The Lithuanian peninsula of Crimea was close to the mainland, but it could only be reached by crossing the Sivash (Rotten Sea).

On the night of November 8, 1920, several divisions of the Red Army forded the Sivash, which diverted the White reserves. At the same time, other forces (parts of Blucher and detachments of Makhno) attacked the Turkish Wall. With heavy fighting and thousands of losses, the positions of the Whites at Perekop were broken through, their attempts to organize resistance were unsuccessful. The Wrangelites rapidly retreated, succeeding in evacuating about 150 thousand military and civilians on French ships to Turkey and withdrawing the remnants of the Black Sea military and merchant fleet. The last commander-in-chief of the White movement left Sevastopol on November 14. On November 15-17, the Red Army entered Sevastopol, Feodosia, Kerch and Yalta. Hundreds of officers who did not have time to evacuate were shot.

The capture of the Crimea and the defeat of Wrangel meant the end of the civil war, for the most part, although it continued in the Far East until 1922.

M. V. FRUNZE. IN MEMORY OF PEREKOP AND CHONGAR

The armies of the Southern Front, having successfully completed the initial task set by them - the defeat of the living forces of the enemy north of the isthmuses, by the evening of November 3, they stood close to the coast of Sivash, starting from Genichesk and ending with the Khord region.

A vigorous, feverish work began to prepare for the crossing of the Chongar and Perekop isthmuses and the capture of the Crimea.

Since, due to the rapid advance of our armies forward and the lack of new communication lines, command and control of troops from the location of the front headquarters (Kharkov) was impossible, I, with the field headquarters and members of the Revolutionary Military Council, com. Vladimirov and Smilga went to the front on November 3. Melitopol was chosen by me as the location of the field headquarters, where we set the task of reaching in the shortest possible time ...

As you know, Crimea is connected to the mainland by 3 points: 1) the Perekop isthmus, which is about 8 km wide, 2) the Salkovsky and Chongarsky bridges (the first railway), which are strings of bridge structures erected partly on a dam, up to 8 m wide and stretching up to 5 km, and 3) the so-called Arabat Spit, coming from Genichesk and having a length of up to 120 km with a width of 1/2 km to 3 km.

The Perekop and Chongar isthmuses and the southern bank of the Sivash connecting them were one common network of fortified positions erected in advance, reinforced by natural and artificial obstacles and barriers. Started by construction back in the period of Denikin's Volunteer Army, these positions were improved by Wrangel with special attention and care. Both Russians and, according to our intelligence, also French military engineers took part in their construction, using all the experience of the imperialist war in the construction. Concrete gun barriers in several rows, flanking buildings and trenches located in close fire connection - all this in one common system created a fortified zone, inaccessible, it would seem, for an attack by open force ...

On the Perekop Isthmus, even before October 30, our units of the 6th Army, building on the success achieved in the battles north of the isthmuses, captured two fortified defense lines and the city of Perekop from a raid, but could not advance further and lingered in front of the third, most heavily fortified line the so-called Turkish Wall (an earthen rampart several sazhens high, built back in the days of Turkish rule and closing the isthmus in its narrowest point).

By the way, in the rear of this position, at a distance of 15-20 km to the south, another fortification line was erected, known as the Yushun positions.

On Chongar, having mastered all the fortifications of the Chongar Peninsula, we stood close to the blown up Salkovsky railway bridge and the burnt Chongarsky one.

Thus, when determining the direction of the main attack, it was necessary to choose between Chongar and Perekop. Since Perekop, due to its large width, opened up wider opportunities in terms of deploying troops and generally offered more convenience for maneuvering, then, naturally, our decisive blow was aimed here.

But since, on the other side, we had very strong enemy fortifications in front of us, and, naturally, his best units should have been concentrated here, the attention of the front command was turned to finding ways to overcome the enemy’s line of resistance with a blow from our left flank.

In these views, I planned to bypass the Chongar positions along the Arabatskaya spit with a crossing to the peninsula at the mouth of the river. Salgir, which is 30 kilometers south of Genichesk.

This maneuver to the side in 1732 was carried out by Field Marshal Lassi. The armies of Lassi, having deceived the Crimean Khan, who was standing with his main forces at Perekop, moved along the Arabat Spit and, crossing the peninsula at the mouth of the Salgir, went to the rear of the Khan's troops and quickly captured the Crimea.

Our preliminary reconnaissance in the direction south of Genichesk showed that here the enemy had only weak guards from cavalry units ...

November 7 and 8 we spent at the location of units of the 6th Army. 8th about 4 o'clock. day, taking with us the commander of the 6th army, Comrade Kork, we arrived at the headquarters of the 51st division, which was entrusted with the task of assaulting the Perekop shaft in the forehead. The headquarters was in Chaplinka. The mood at the headquarters and among the commander Comrade Blucher was upbeat and at the same time somewhat nervous. Everyone recognized the absolute necessity of attempting an assault, and at the same time a clear account was given that such an attempt would cost no small sacrifice. In this regard, the command of the division felt some hesitation regarding the feasibility of the order for a night assault on the coming night. In the presence of the commander, I was directly ordered in the most categorical form to the division commander to carry out an assault ...

The fire from the enemy intensifies, some shells hit the area of ​​the road running along the northern bank of the Sivash, along which we are driving. Ahead and somewhat to the left of us, a strong fire breaks out ...

Developing its offensive further to the flank and rear of the enemy's Perekop positions, the division, after the first successes, ran into stubborn resistance in the Karadzhanay region of the enemy, who threw one of his best divisions, Drozdovskaya, backed up by a detachment of armored vehicles, into a counterattack ...

A very favorable circumstance for us, which greatly facilitated the task of forcing the Sivash, was a strong drop in the water level in the western part of the Sivash. Thanks to the winds blowing from the west, the entire mass of water was driven to the east, and as a result, fords formed in a number of places, though very muddy and viscous, but still allowed the movement of not only infantry, but also cavalry, and in some places even artillery. On the other hand, this moment completely fell out of the calculations of the White command, which considered the Sivash impassable and therefore kept relatively insignificant and, moreover, little fired units, mainly from among the newly formed, on the sections of our crossings.

As a result of the first battles, the entire Kuban brigade of Gen. Fostikov, who had just arrived from Feodosia...

I can’t forget the following fact: when at the headquarters of the 4th Army I told the head of the 30th division, comrade Gryaznov, and one of the brigade commanders who was with him, that Blucher (he, by the way, was formerly Gryaznov’s chief on the Eastern Front) took Perekop, both turned pale. A few minutes later I look, Gryaznov and his brigade commander are gone, they drove off to the position. A few hours later, the famous night assault by the regiments of the 30th division of the Chongar positions of the enemy began. On the morning of November 11, after a bloody battle, parts of the division were already on the other side and, having overturned the enemy, were rapidly advancing on Dzhankoy.

Thus the fate of the Crimea was decided, and with it the fate of the entire South Russian counter-revolution.

The victory, and a brilliant victory, was won along the whole line. But we got it at a high price. With the blood of 10,000 of their best sons, the working class and the peasantry paid for their last, mortal blow of the counter-revolution. The revolutionary impulse turned out to be stronger than the combined efforts of nature, technology and deadly fire.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE STAFF OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY. No. 661.

Having made peace with Poland and thus freed their troops, the Bolsheviks concentrated five armies against us, placing them in three groups near Kakhovka, Nikopol and Polog. By the beginning of the offensive, their total number had reached over a hundred thousand fighters, of which a quarter of the composition was cavalry.

Pinning down our army from the north and northeast, the red command decided to attack our left flank with the main forces and throw a mass of cavalry from Kakhovka in the direction of Gromovka and Salkovo in order to cut off the Russian army from the isthmuses, pressing it to the Sea of ​​Azov and opening up a free access to the Crimea.

Taking into account the created situation, the Russian army made an appropriate regrouping. The main cavalry mass of the enemy, the 1st cavalry army with Latvian and other infantry units, numbering more than 10,000 sabers and 10,000 bayonets, fell from the Kakhov bridgehead to the east and southeast, sending up to 6,000 cavalry to Salkovo. Having shielded ourselves from the north with part of the forces, we concentrated the shock group and, having fallen on the erupted Red cavalry, pressed it to Sivash. At the same time, two regiments of the Latvian division were completely destroyed by the glorious units of General Kutepov, 216 guns and a lot of machine guns were captured, and four regiments were captured by the Dons and 15 guns, many weapons and machine guns were captured. However, the overwhelming superiority of forces, especially the cavalry, pulled up by the enemy to the battlefield in the amount of up to 25,000 horses, attacking the army from three sides for five days, forced the Commander-in-Chief to decide to withdraw the army to the fortified Sivash-Perekop position in advance, which gives all the benefits of defense . The continuous blows inflicted by our army in the past battles, accompanied by the destruction of a significant part of Budyonny's cavalry that had broken through to our rear, gave the army the opportunity to retreat to a fortified position almost without loss.

ORDER OF THE RULER OF THE SOUTH OF RUSSIA AND THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY

Russian people. Left alone in the fight against the rapists, the Russian army is waging an unequal battle, defending the last piece of Russian land where law and truth exist. In the consciousness of the responsibility lying on me, I am obliged to foresee all accidents in advance. By my order, the evacuation and boarding of ships in the ports of Crimea has already begun for all those who shared the path of the Cross with the army, the families of military personnel, officials of the civil department, with their families, and individuals who could be in danger in the event of the arrival of the enemy. The army will cover the landing, bearing in mind that the ships necessary for its evacuation are also in full readiness in ports, according to the established schedule. To fulfill the duty to the army and the population, everything has been done within the limits of human strength. Our further paths are full of uncertainty. We have no other land except Crimea. There is no state treasury. Frankly, as always, I warn everyone of what awaits them.

May the Lord send strength and wisdom to all to overcome and survive the Russian hard times.

General Wrangel.

FROM THE MEMORIES OF P.N. WRANGEL

I went to the boat. Handkerchiefs were waved in the crowd, many were crying. Here comes a young girl. She pressed her handkerchief to her lips, sobbing.

“God bless you, Your Excellency. Lord keep you.

“Thank you, and why are you staying?”

— Yes, my mother is sick, I can't leave her.

- May God bless you too.

A group of city officials approached; I was surprised to recognize some of the most prominent representatives of the opposition community.

“You have said correctly, Your Excellency, you can walk with your head held high, in the consciousness of a duty accomplished. Let me wish you a happy journey.

I shook hands, thanked...

Suddenly, the head of the American mission, Admiral McColley, who was present right there, approached. He shook my hand for a long time.

“I have always been a fan of your cause, and more than ever I am today.

The outposts sank. At 2:40 my boat left the pier and headed for the General Kornilov cruiser, on which my flag was hoisted. “Hurrah” rushed from the loaded ships.

"General Kornilov" weighed anchor.

Ships, one after another, went out to sea. Everything that only more or less floated on the water left the shores of the Crimea. Several unusable ships remained in Sevastopol, two old gunboats "Terets" and "Kubanets", the old transport "Danube", steam schooners "Altai" and "Volga" blown up by mines in the Sea of ​​Azov and old warships with damaged mechanisms, even unusable to transport people. Everything else has been used. We anchored at Streletskaya Bay and remained here until two and a half in the morning, waiting for the last people to be loaded in Streletskaya Bay and all ships to go to sea, after which, having weighed anchor, we went to Yalta, where we arrived on November 2 at nine o'clock morning.

Around noon, the transports with the troops withdrew. Vessels covered with people were passing by, “Hurrah” thundered. Great is the Russian spirit and immense is the Russian soul... At two o'clock in the afternoon we took off and went to Feodosia. We were followed by Admiral Dumesnil in the cruiser Waldeck-Rousseau, accompanied by a destroyer. Soon we met a huge transport "Don", from there came "cheers". Hats flickered. On the transport was General Fostikov with his Kuban. I ordered the boat to be lowered and went to the Don. In Feodosia, loading was less successful. According to General Fostikov, the tonnage was not enough and the 1st Kuban division of General Deinega, without having time to sink, went to Kerch. The report of General Fostikov inspired doubts about the orderliness he had shown. Returning to the cruiser General Kornilov, I sent a radio telegram to General Abramov in Kerch, ordering him to wait at all costs and load the Kuban.

At two o'clock in the afternoon, the Waldeck-Rousseau weighed anchor, firing a salute of 21 shots - the last salute to the Russian flag in Russian waters ... "General Kornilov" answered.

Soon a radio was received from the captain of the 1st rank Mashukov: “The landing is completed, everyone is taken to the last soldier. For a report to the commander-in-chief, I'm taking General Kusonsky. I'm going to join. Nashtaflot. - At 3 hours 40 minutes "Gaydamak" returned. The landing went brilliantly. Troops from the barges were reloaded on the "Russia". The ships went to sea. (On 126 ships, 145,693 people were taken out, not counting ship crews. With the exception of the destroyer Zhivoi, who died from the storm, all the ships arrived safely in Tsargrad).

The night has fallen. The stars shone brightly in the dark sky, the sea sparkled.

The single lights of the native shore dimmed and died. Here is the last one gone...