The first mass use of airborne assaults in world history was carried out by the Germans at the very beginning of World War II. The experience of these amphibious operations still causes much controversy. Were they really effective, and to what extent was their subsequent evaluation influenced by the propaganda of both belligerents?
German airborne troops at the beginning of the war
Due to the limited number of transport aircraft, the main operational unit of the Wehrmacht's airborne forces was the parachute battalion, which had the following organization:
- headquarters with a communications platoon;
- three rifle companies - three platoons of three squads each (18 light machine guns, 3 light 50-mm mortars and 3 anti-tank rifles);
- a company of heavy infantry weapons (12 heavy machine guns and 6 medium 81-mm mortars).
The main transport vehicle of the German airborne troops was the three-engine Junkers Ju.52, which has been produced since the beginning of the 30s. The carrying capacity of this aircraft was 1.5-2 tons (with a payload of up to 4.5 tons in overload), it could take on board one squad of paratroopers - 13 soldiers and a commander. Thus, for the transfer of one battalion, 40 aircraft were required, and a minimum supply of equipment and supplies required a dozen more aircraft.
German paratrooper with RZ.1 parachute
Source - Fallschirmjager: German Paratroopers from Glory to Defeat 1939–1945. Concord Publications, 2001 (Concord 6505)
A parachute drop required special training for fighters, including the ability to navigate unfamiliar terrain and quickly make independent decisions in a constantly changing environment. Finally, there were problems with personal weapons - it was inconvenient to jump with a heavy carbine, so by the beginning of World War II, the tactics of German paratroopers involved dropping weapons in a separate container, and paratroopers carried only pistols (usually automatic Sauer 38 (H) ).
Transport aircraft "Junkers" Ju.52
Source - waralbum.ru
Therefore, there were few paratroopers in the German Airborne Forces before the war - they made up the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 2nd airborne regiment. Paratroopers were supposed to be used, first of all, to capture airfields or places convenient for landing aircraft (for example, flat and straight sections of the highway). The main part of the landing troops landed by landing method (from landing aircraft), which made it possible to improve the control of the landing, but fraught with the risk of the death of valuable transport vehicles from accidents or enemy fire.
Landing gliders, which were not a pity to lose, became a partial solution to the problem; in addition, a large glider could theoretically lift much more than a transport aircraft - for example, the Me.321 "Giant", produced since the beginning of 1941, could accommodate up to 200 paratroopers or one medium tank. The main German landing glider DFS.230, which was in service by 1940, had much more modest characteristics: 1200 kg of cargo or 10 paratroopers and 270 kg of equipment for them. However, such a glider cost only DM 7,500 - the equivalent of ten standard RZI6 parachutes. By the spring of 1940, the 1st regiment of the 1st airborne squadron was formed from DFS.230 vehicles.
Landing glider DFS.230
Source - aviastar.org
Thus, the effectiveness of the landing depended on the number of aircraft involved and the ability to use each of them several times. It was obvious that in large-scale hostilities it was desirable to use landing forces not to capture territory as such, but to occupy individual points, control over which would help the advancement of friendly troops and complicate the actions of the enemy.
Preparing for Operation Weserübung
The first airborne assault of World War II was the landing of German paratroopers in Denmark and Norway. The basis of Operation Weserübung was a chain of amphibious assaults in the main ports of Norway, but it was decided to use paratroopers to support landings from the sea and, above all, to capture enemy airfields. For the first strike, the German command allocated relatively small forces - the 1st battalion of the 1st airborne regiment (I / FJR1) under the command of Major Erich Walter (a total of five companies).
In Denmark, the paratroopers of the 4th company of Captain Walter Gerike were supposed to take possession of the Aalborg airfield, preventing the enemy from using it. Further, the company was ordered to take bridges across the Storstremmen Strait between the islands of Falster and Zeeland, along which the road from Gesser to Copenhagen passes, as well as the island of Masnedo lying in this strait, where coastal batteries were located.
Operation "Weserübung" - the capture by the Germans of Denmark and Norway
In Norway, the 3rd company of Lieutenant von Brandis was supposed to capture the Sola airfield near Stavanger - the only air base on the entire western coast of Norway. At the same time, the headquarters and 2nd companies under the command of Major Walter parachuted into the Forneby airfield near Oslo and prepared it to receive landing troops. The 1st company of Lieutenant Herbert Schmidt remained in reserve.
In total, by the beginning of the operation, the Luftwaffe had 571 Ju.52 vehicles. The first wave of landings on April 9, 1940 involved ten air transport groups and four squadrons, which transferred one battalion and two companies of paratroopers. Another airborne battalion and three conventional infantry battalions were to be landed, along with six airfield service companies, an air force headquarters and an infantry regiment headquarters. It was supposed to immediately transfer fighters to the captured airfields, so 168 tons of fuel were unloaded for them in advance.
April 9, 1940: Sola airfield
The landing in Denmark took place without complications and was more like a maneuver - the Danish troops preferred not to resist even before receiving the surrender order. The bridges over Storstremmen were quickly captured by paratroopers, landing troops immediately landed at the Aalborg airfield.
But in Norway, the Germans immediately stumbled upon stiff resistance. The detachment that attacked the Sola airfield had troubles on approach. The landing force (a company of paratroopers, the 1st battalion of the 193rd infantry regiment and an anti-aircraft artillery unit, about 800 people in total) were supposed to land two groups of transport vehicles from the 7th squadron of the 1st special air squadron under the cover of twin-engine Messerschmitt vehicles » Bf.110 from the 3rd Squadron of the 76th Heavy Fighter Squadron. But due to dense low clouds, one of the groups with the landing force turned back, and soon the fighters did the same (after two of them collided with each other in the fog and crashed into the water).
As a result, at 09:50 (according to other sources - at 09:20), only twelve Ju.52s reached the target under the cover of a pair of fighters that did not notice the signal from their commander to return. In total, about 150 paratroopers were dropped under the command of Lieutenant von Brandis, but the wind carried part of the paratroopers away from the runway. The defenders of the airfield, under the command of Lieutenant Tur Tangval, resisted fiercely, their firing points were suppressed only by the attack of both heavy fighters. As a result, the losses of the landing force turned out to be relatively small - three killed and about a dozen wounded. Soon the airfield was captured, although some of the strongholds continued to resist.
The airfield team landed together with the landing party prepared the airfield for receiving aircraft in 4 hours, after which the transfer of reinforcements and anti-aircraft artillery began here. In total, 180 transport vehicles landed in Sola on the first day of the operation, two battalions of the 193rd Infantry Regiment, a supply of fuel, ground personnel of the 1st Squadron of the 1st Dive Bomber Group, as well as personnel of the 4th Battery of the 33rd anti-aircraft regiment with 20 mm anti-aircraft guns.
Having occupied the airfield, the paratroopers moved towards Stavanger and captured the city and port without any problems. Soon three German transports entered here, delivering reinforcements and ammunition (including the materiel of three anti-aircraft batteries); the anti-aircraft gunners themselves were deployed a little earlier with the help of seaplanes. Another transport (“Roda”) was intercepted and sunk by the Norwegian destroyer “Aegir” in the morning, after which the destroyer itself was destroyed in Stavanger by an attack by German bombers. A more serious loss for the Germans was the death of the tanker Posidonia, which was on its way here, torpedoed by the British submarine Triton the night before.
By the evening of April 9, 22 Ju.87 dive bombers, as well as 4 long-range Bf.110 fighters, arrived in Sola; 15 He.115 float bombers from the 106th coastal air group splashed down in the harbor of Stavanger. In the shortest possible time, a powerful air group was created here, capable of supporting the amphibious assault forces landed to the north.
April 9: Forneby airfield - a series of surprises
The Norwegian capital Oslo and the Horten naval base, located closer to the mouth of the Oslo Fjord, were to be captured by a combined attack from the sea and from the air. Simultaneously with the landing of the amphibious assault, two parachute companies were thrown out to the airfield of Forneby near Oslo, after which two battalions from the 169th Infantry Division landed here by landing method.
Large forces of the Norwegian army were located in this area - the 1st and 2nd infantry divisions, in full strength numbering about 17,000 soldiers and officers. However, by the beginning of the German invasion, the troops had not yet been mobilized, so their combat power turned out to be much less. But the coastal defense of the Oslo Fjord proved to be very effective - at Drebak, in the narrowest point of the fjord, it sank the heavy cruiser Blucher, which was marching with part of the amphibious assault. Due to the loss of the ship, the naval landing in Oslo was temporarily delayed, and the airborne assault suddenly became the main one.
The actions of the German fleet in the Oslo Fjord on April 9, 1940
Source - A.M. Noskov. Scandinavian foothold in World War II. Moscow: Nauka, 1977
Due to the cloudiness and fog that stood over Northern Germany, 29 Ju.52 transports took off from the Schleswig airfield with a very long delay. On the approach to the Oslo Fjord, one of the cars lagged behind the group and was shot down by Norwegian fighters - the entire crew and 12 paratroopers were killed. At the moment when, according to the plan, the paratroopers were supposed to be thrown out, the commander of the 2nd group of the 1st air squadron for special purposes (the first wave of landing), Lieutenant Colonel Drewes, ordered his cars to turn back. The clock was 8:20. Drewes decided not to risk throwing out paratroopers in the fog, but to land them in the Danish Aalborg, already captured by the Germans, and reported this to the command of the 10th Air Corps in Hamburg.
A furious argument flared up in the headquarters of the corps. The commander of the air corps, Lieutenant General Hans Geisler, demanded that an order be given for the return of the second landing wave of the landing force (it started 20 minutes after the first). At the same time, the commander of the army transport aviation, Colonel Karl-August von Gablenz, believed that the operation should be continued: with a sudden landing, even on an airfield that was not occupied by paratroopers, the landing party had a chance of success. In addition, the Aalborg airfield was already packed to capacity, and the landing of new aircraft here could lead to trouble.
After a message came from the Vidder reconnaissance ship in the harbor of Oslo that there was also fog over the Norwegian capital, Goering intervened in the dispute, who personally ordered the return of all the planes. But here the “human factor” came into play. The commander of the 103rd Special Purpose Air Group, Captain Richard Wagner, who led the transport aircraft of the second wave, decided ... to ignore the order. Later, he stated that since he was subordinate to the head of the army transport aviation, he took the order on behalf of the 10th Air Corps for enemy disinformation. The planes were on course, experienced pilots did not lose their bearings, and Wagner decided that his group would cope with the task. The decision turned out to be unexpectedly correct: soon the fog began to dissipate, and then disappeared altogether.
Heavy fighter "Messerschmitt" Bf.110
Source: John Vasco, Fernando Estanislau. The Messerschmitt Bf.110 in color profile. 1939–1945 Schiffer Military History, 2005
Another accident was that the eight Bf.110 heavy fighters from the 1st Squadron of the 76th Fighter Squadron under the command of Lieutenant Werner Hansen, who accompanied the second wave, also did not turn off the route and reached Forneby. The airfield was outside the radius of their flight, so the cars could only wait for its capture and land here - the Messerschmitts could no longer return home.
A fighter squadron of the Norwegian Army Aviation was based at the Forneby airfield - seven combat-ready Gladiator biplanes. Having received information about the approach of a large group of enemy aircraft to the capital, five of them took to the air and at 8:37 clashed with Lieutenant Hansen's Messerschmitts. The Norwegians managed to shoot down two "Messerschmitts" and one transport "Junkers", losing only one aircraft in battle. The fact that the German pilots could not conduct a maneuverable battle due to a lack of fuel also played a role. Having reached the airfield of Forneby, they managed to storm it once, destroying two fighters stationed here (one of them had just landed after an air battle), after which they went to land.
Almost simultaneously with the fighters, at 9:05 (instead of 8:45 according to plan), transport vehicles began to land on the airfield. The air defense of the airfield was partially suppressed, but still the anti-aircraft machine guns opened fire. His only victim was Captain Wagner, who was flying in the lead aircraft. The Norwegians hurriedly tried to barricade the runway with motor vehicles, but all German transport planes were able to land, although three of them were damaged.
Killed German paratrooper at Forneby airfield
On the ground, resistance was weak, the paratroopers quickly occupied the airfield, the positions of anti-aircraft guns and the mission control center. Soon, the German air attaché, Captain Eberhard Spiller, arrived here from Oslo. By radio, he sent a signal about the occupation of the airfield and readiness to receive the rest of the landing echelons. By noon, about five infantry companies had already landed here - though without heavy weapons, except for captured anti-aircraft guns and machine guns. If the Norwegians had organized a counterattack, they could have caused the Germans big trouble. But the airfield garrison under the command of Captain Munte-Dal retreated to the Akershus fortress and did not show any more initiative.
The command of the Norwegian army and the leadership of the country were demoralized by the news of the landing of the Germans at several points at once. At 09:30, the government and the royal family left the capital, going by car to the center of the country; the gold of the National Bank was also taken here. Around noon on April 9, the first German soldiers appeared on the streets of Oslo, and at 15:30, troops of the invaders, up to a battalion in number, entered here with an orchestra. The Norwegian troops, demoralized by the flight of command and the lack of orders, offered no resistance: in Oslo, the Germans took about 1,300 prisoners, most of whom did not even have weapons (only 300 rifles were captured).
Meanwhile, the Kriegsmarine was still trying to occupy the Norwegian fortifications on the islands and along the shores of the Oslo Fjord. This succeeded only in the evening, after the commander of the fortified area of the Oslo Fjord gave the order to surrender. German ships entered the harbor of Oslo only at 11:45 the next day - more than a day later than it was supposed to be in the operation plan ...
German soldiers on the streets of Oslo, April 1940
Source - History of the Second World War. In 12 volumes. Volume 3. M .: Military Publishing House, 1974
The landings on the airfields of Sola and Forneby were successful and had a serious impact on the general situation in Norway, although relatively small forces were landed from the air - about 2000 soldiers. However, it is easy to see that their success was largely the result of chance, as well as the determination of the German commanders and the apathy of the Norwegian commanders. The total losses of German aircraft in the first day of the Norwegian campaign amounted to 20 vehicles of all types - mainly from accidents and fire from the ground.
April 14: Landing in Dombos
However, the Norwegian operation did not end with the capture of the capital. The government that fled from Oslo offered unexpected and effective resistance to the Germans. On April 11, King Haakon VII removed the commander of the ground forces, Major General Christian Locke, and appointed Inspector General of the Infantry, Colonel Otto Rüge, who was promoted to major general on this occasion, in his place. Rüge had already distinguished himself on the night of April 9-10 by organizing the cover of the road leading from Oslo to Hamar (the Norwegian government went there). It was he who, having gathered scattered groups of soldiers, near Midtskog gave the Germans the first successful battle, during which the German air force aviation attache Spiller, who led the vanguard of the paratroopers, died. And on April 14, the landing of Anglo-French troops (up to 40,000 people) began in Namsus and Harstad, after which the Allies got the impression that Norway could be held. On April 17–19, two British divisions were landed in the Ondalsnes area, on August 29 the allied landing took place in Bodø, and on May 4 in Mu.
In order to separate the Norwegian troops and cut off their grouping, located north of Oslo, from the rest of the forces, the German command decided to land an airborne assault in Dombos. This town lay 250 km from the German positions, halfway from Hamar to Trondheim, where highways and railways from Trondheim, Oslo and Åndalsnes connected. The capture of such an important communications center would have disrupted the coherence of the entire newly created Norwegian defense.
On April 14, at 17:15, fifteen transport "Junkers" from the 2nd group of the 1st special air squadron of Lieutenant Colonel Drewes took off from the Forneby airfield, having on board 168 paratroopers from the 1st company of the 1st parachute regiment under the command of Oberleutnant Herbert Schmidt. But due to bad weather, some of the vehicles could not find landmarks for dropping, in addition, another part of them came under anti-aircraft fire. As a result, one plane was shot down, two crashed during an emergency landing, seven returned to Forneby, three more landed in Trondheim, and one sat down in Sweden due to damage. Only six vehicles were able to drop the paratroopers, but in the wrong place eight kilometers south of the city.
Haakon VII, King of Norway from 1905 to 1957. Photo from 1915
Source - flickr.com
In the dark forest, covered with snow, it was very difficult for paratroopers to find each other. By the morning of April 15, only 63 people had gathered, including two officers (one of them was Lieutenant Schmidt). The rest of the paratroopers got lost, some of them were captured. Schmidt's detachment saddled the highway five kilometers from Dombos and blew up the railway track leading to Lillehammer and further to Oslo. He could no longer do anything more, although it was here that incredible luck could smile at the paratroopers. The fact is that it was on April 14 that King Haakon VII and the commander-in-chief, Major General Ryge, for security reasons, decided to relocate from Hamar to Åndalsnes, where the allied landing was being prepared. The royal convoy miraculously did not fall into the hands of the enemy: just a few kilometers from the landing site of the Germans, the king was warned by local children who reported that they saw parachutes in the sky, and people in an unfamiliar uniform on the highway.
The Norwegians threw the 2nd Battalion of the 11th Infantry Regiment against the paratroopers. Despite the multiple superiority in forces and the presence of mortars, he acted extremely indecisively. The Germans retreated step by step to the south, leaving the blows, and on April 18 they were even able to receive ammunition and supplies dropped from the air. Only on April 19 did the Norwegians finally manage to surround them in a mountain hollow, after which the surviving 34 paratroopers, led by the seriously wounded Schmidt, laid down their arms.
May: paratroopers in the battles for Narvik
More in this campaign, the Germans did not land airborne assaults, although such plans existed. On May 30, Hitler ordered the dispatch to Northern Norway of parts of the 7th Airborne Division, which had been released after the end of hostilities in Holland. Now it was supposed to be used in a new operation to capture Narvik, left on May 28 under the onslaught of British troops. The operation received the code designation "Naumburg". For its implementation, two parachute battalions and about a thousand mountain shooters who underwent airborne training were allocated. However, the need for the operation soon disappeared due to the withdrawal of the allies from Narvik (June 8).
Transport "Junkers" drops paratroopers near Narvik, May 30, 1940
Source: Chris McNab. Fallschirmjager. Nemecti vysadkari
Nevertheless, the airborne paratroopers nevertheless took part in the battles for Narvik - as reinforcements to the mountain rangers of Lieutenant General Dietl who fought here. The German troops, who landed in Narvik from destroyers on April 9, were blocked by the Allied landing and found themselves in a desperate situation. Five thousand soldiers, loudly referred to as the "Narvik" group of troops, were actually surrounded, communication with them was maintained only by air. To reinforce the Dietl group, it was decided to use paratroopers sent on transport Junkers and seaplanes. On April 13, one seaplane delivered ammunition to Dietl's people, and three Ju.52s that landed on the ice of Lake Hartwig delivered a battery of mountain artillery.
German paratroopers in the mountains near Narvik
Source: Chris McNab. Fallschirmjager. Nemecti vysadkari
On May 8, two flying boats that landed in Rumbaks Fjord delivered 36 reinforcements. On May 14, 60 paratroopers were dropped off Narvik, on May 15, another 22, on May 17, another 60. On May 20, 12 soldiers and 2 officers were delivered to Rumbaks Fjord by seaplanes. On May 22, an entire airborne company jumped out with parachutes near Narvik, the next day - a company of mountain rangers who had specially completed a course of parachute training. From May 24 to May 30, the parachute battalion of Captain Walter was landed here, and another mountain gun was delivered (on a flying boat).
Operation results
For the entire Norwegian campaign, transport Ju.52s made 3018 sorties, transported 29,280 people, 1,177 tons of fuel and 2,376 tons of other cargo to Norway. At the same time, only a small part of people and cargo was intended for dropping with parachutes. In general, the airborne troops proved to be a kind of "surgical tool" - an effective, dangerous, but very fragile and unreliable tool. The niche of their application in practice turned out to be quite narrow, and success each time depended on a huge number of accidents and the determination of individuals - from a general to a soldier.
Sources and literature:
- S. V. Patyanin. Blitzkrieg in Western Europe: Norway, Denmark. M.: AST, 2004
- A. Gove. Attention skydivers! M.: Publishing house of foreign literature, 1957
- B. Quarry, M. Chappel. German paratroopers, 1939-1945. M.: AST, Astrel, 2003
- Marine Atlas. Volume III. Part two. Descriptions for cards. General Staff of the Navy, 1966
- Wings of the Luftwaffe. Warplanes of the Third Reich. Part one: Arado - Dornier (Series: History of aviation technology. Supplement to the technical information bulletin, issue No. 4). M.: TsAGI, 1994
- Chris McNab. Fallschirmjager. Nemecti vysadkari. Prague: Svojtla & Co, 2003
- I. M. Baxter, R. Volstad. Fallschirmjuger. German Paratroopers from Glory to Defeat 1939–1945. Concord Publishing, 2001 (Concord 6505)
- Chris Ailsby. Hitler's Sky Warriors. German Paratroopers in Action 1939–1945. London: Brown Partworks Ltd, 2000
As a result of the experience of the Second World War, views on the offensive value of large airborne operations became more realistic. “The parachute is no longer a life-saving device, it has become an offensive weapon of the future,” wrote one of the Soviet military commentators in 1930, when the first units of the parachute troops were formed in the USSR. For five years, only in the Soviet Union, experimental work was carried out on the training and formation of paratrooper cadres. In 1935, the first major maneuvers of the airborne troops took place in Kyiv, where military representatives of foreign states were present, in front of which an airborne assault of over 1,000 people with weapons was demonstrated. In the same year, one Soviet division with all weapons and light tanks was airlifted from Moscow to Vladivostok over a distance of more than 6,400 km. Shortly after this spectacular demonstration, the end of the Soviet monopoly came when Goering created the first paratrooper units in Germany from the selected soldiers of the Hermann Goering Regiment. In other countries, they were in no hurry to organize airborne troops. The United States, Japan and Italy were far behind in this respect. In England, too, this matter proceeded extremely slowly. It was not until June 1940 that Winston Churchill moved the issue of airborne troops forward. "We must have an airborne force of at least 5,000 men...please send me a memorandum from the War Department on this matter." So he wrote to the committee of chiefs of staff, and about a month later the issue was resolved.
By this time, the airborne troops had already had some success, although they had to deal with a weak and small enemy. Even before the outbreak of World War II, airborne troops were used to seize bridgeheads, important bridges and road junctions. It was in 1939 when Germany occupied part of Czechoslovakia and when the USSR annexed Bessarabia that same year. These operations were only slightly more serious than maneuvers and did not test the fighting qualities of the airborne troops. When the Second World War began, the first important tactical success of the airborne troops was in the Norwegian campaign. The Germans dropped paratroopers near the airfields of Stavanger and Oslo. The purpose of these landings was to capture the airfields necessary for the landing of airborne troops and the operations of German Air Force units. This goal was achieved, and in about a day, fuel, bombs, airfield equipment, and anti-aircraft guns were airlifted to these airfields. German aviation began its operations from both airfields. However, many skydivers landed outside the drop zones and were injured. During this operation, there were great difficulties with the collection of troops on the ground and with the organization of communications; the Germans were just lucky that the Norwegians in the area offered almost no resistance.
Airborne operations in Norway did not answer the main questions. What is the actual striking force of the airborne troops? What is the best amount to use? For how long are they able to resist a strong and weak enemy? How decisive can be their actions in attack or offensive? A study of the major airborne operations carried out during the Second World War does not provide a clear answer to all these questions; but it does help clarify some of the advantages and disadvantages of airborne troops.
When the Germans planned a major airborne landing on the Dutch airfield Walhaven near Rotterdam, as a prelude to the attack on Belgium, France and Holland on May 10, 1940, they did not expect the Dutch to cease resistance within less than one week, and the Belgians would follow them. It was important for the German Air Force during this period to capture forward air bases as soon as possible in order to ensure the invasion of France, since their close air support aircraft - Messerschmit-109 fighters and Junkers-87 dive bombers - had a range of only 175 km. This meant that the air units had to move forward quickly, following the advance of their panzer divisions. What did the paratroopers and airborne troops mentioned above achieve when they landed near Rotterdam with the aim of capturing the Walhaven airfield, which was assigned an important role in the German plan? The 2,000 paratroopers involved in the operation saw how vulnerable they were to attacks by ground troops. At one point, the Dutch infantry managed to recapture this airfield from the Germans. The Germans suffered heavy casualties, and although the Allied forces were retreating at the time, over 100 German prisoners were captured and taken to England for interrogation. Considering this airborne operation as a whole, it is difficult to justify its conduct. If the Allies had resisted to the best of their ability, the airborne troops would not have been able to keep the airfield in their hands. But the resistance of the Allied ground forces was so weak that the Germans would have captured the airfield in any case within two or three days.
It is important to note that during the subsequent rapid advance of the Germans in France in 1940, in Russia in 1941 or in Africa in 1942, airborne troops were never used to capture airfields a short distance ahead of the advancing troops. It is only natural that when the parachute troops were still an experimental branch of the military, such an authority figure as General Student, the commander of the German paratroopers, wanted to infiltrate his troops into the German army as soon as possible.
It is difficult to imagine how the airborne troops would have coped in the future with such a task as the capture of Walhaven in May 1940.
The Italian airborne troops also made an unsuccessful attack on an airfield in Libya in 1942, but this was based on a desire to show off their airborne troops rather than to use them as an auxiliary force in the overall military plan. The use of airborne troops to capture any island on which an important air base is or could be established is, of course, an entirely different task. It may become the main combat mission of the airborne troops in the future.
Yet the first major operation of its kind, carried out during the Second World War, raised great doubts when its results were analyzed from a military point of view. The German airborne assault on Crete can be seen as a strategic mistake. The German military campaign in the Balkans in the spring of 1941 was lightning fast. With air bases on the islands of Sardinia and Sicily, in Italy and Greece on about. Rhodes and, of course, in North Africa, the German air and naval forces could establish dominance in the Mediterranean without capturing Crete. They lacked air power, not air bases, to capture Malta and support Rommel's corps in Africa. Before landing an airborne assault on Crete, on April 26, 1941, the Germans for the first time used large forces of landing troops on gliders to capture the Isthmus of Corinth and the city of Corinth. Landing troops on gliders for experimental purposes were also used in the summer of 1940 to capture the Belgian fortress of Eben-Emael. But during the capture of Corinth, as well as later during the capture of Crete, there were many accidents among the landing troops delivered by gliders. It is quite understandable that after the summer of 1941, the Germans used gliders only for the transport of goods.
Airborne on Jim's Island
The landing of an airborne assault on Crete did not give the Germans much strategic advantage. When the Axis sent their convoys to support the Cretan operation, the latter were effectively destroyed by the English fleet. Therefore, the landing of an airborne assault was necessary to capture the island. But if the Germans had left Crete in the hands of the Allies, would not the British fleet and air force have to carry out additional tasks of defense and supply, which would lead to an increase in the losses of England and the countries of the British Commonwealth of Nations in the Mediterranean theater of operations? The British navy would have had to fight a difficult battle with a large air force based in the Athens area, as was shown by the large losses of the fleet during the operation to capture the island. Crete.
Perhaps even more important was the Cretan operation for the implementation of the "Plan Barbarossa" - the German attack on the USSR. The landing operation in Crete for several months fettered about 500 German transport aircraft, which were essential for the transfer of troops during an attack on the USSR. Moreover, some parts of the transport aviation during the capture of Crete suffered heavy losses, so that in June 1941 they were understaffed and insufficiently ready for action. This took place just at a time when the German Air Force needed maximum mobility. Moreover, about one third of the fighter and bomber aviation units intended for use against Russia, the Germans were forced to use in the capture of Crete. Instead of resting them and preparing them for an attack on Russia, they had to be transferred to air bases in Poland and East Prussia. This happened a few weeks before the attack began. Many of the aircrew involved in the intensive operations to capture Crete were exhausted and the squadrons were at low combat readiness. The operation to capture Crete not only delayed the German attack on the USSR, but significantly reduced the strike power of the German Air Force, which was the vanguard of its armed forces.
If the strategic value of the airborne operation to capture Crete was doubtful, then from an operational point of view, despite the victory of the Germans, the operation proved disastrous. Theoretically, the conditions for conducting an airborne operation were almost ideal.
Aviation opposition was suppressed, air defense was weak, the defenders had only a few light tanks. They had poor communications and few means of transport. The Germans dropped two or three thousand paratroopers in the zones of three airfields - Maleme, Rethymo and Heraklion. In two drop zones, paratroopers were destroyed after landing. Even at Maleme airfield they were nearly defeated by two battalions of New Zealand troops; but they managed to hold out in the area, and since nothing prevented the Germans from bringing in reinforcements by air, the victory of the airborne troops was assured. But the victory was not easy for the Germans: they suffered heavy losses in manpower and aircraft. Germany never again conducted major airborne operations, although there were many moments when the Germans were well placed to carry them out. The Germans did not carry out an airborne landing operation in Malta, they also did not use airborne troops against the USSR. There is no doubt that in 1940 and 1941 the Germans realized how inexpedient it was to use large airborne troops, as they were very vulnerable and suffered heavy losses, especially in transport aircraft. Not surprisingly, Hitler wanted to expand the production of transport aircraft, even at the cost of reducing the production of fighters. Since the main goal of the German strategy in the spring of 1941 was the defeat of Russia, it is difficult to judge what effect the landing of an airborne assault on Crete had on the success of the Germans. The island of Crete was not a decisive stronghold for the actions of the Axis in the Mediterranean, since the British naval forces in this area could be increased to the maximum size.
The strategic background of the Allied airborne landing at Arnhem in September 1944 was, of course, quite different. This time, the airborne troops played an important role in the Anglo-American military plans, which provided for the end of the war as soon as possible. In August 1944, the German army retreated to Flanders and through France to the "Siegfried Line" at a pace that it had not advanced westward in the summer of 1940.
The task of the Anglo-Americans was to ensure a rapid advance to the Meuse and the Rhine, but due to the difficulties in delivering fuel, food, ammunition and other supplies for the advancing troops from the landing sites in Normandy, the number of forward units decreased, and they turned into small tank patrols. An important role in these conditions could be played by the rapid crossing of the Rhine. General Montgomery's plan was to seize the crossings of the lower Rhine with the help of airborne troops and, with the help of his northern army group, develop an offensive across the North German Plain to Berlin. To accomplish this task, it was necessary to put at his disposal most of the available vehicles and equipment, which meant dooming the American forces west of the Rhine to inactivity. However, Eisenhower refused to consider this plan. The Allied plan of action for this decisive phase of the war was adopted in Brussels on 10 September. The airborne troops were to seize bridgehead positions on the rivers Meuse, Waal and Rhine, and then, instead of advancing into Germany, Montgomery was to liberate Antwerp by capturing Fr. Walcheren and the destruction of German troops on the banks of the Scheldt.
But even this plan turned out to be too ambitious. The detailed plan worked out by the First Allied Airborne Army at Airborne Headquarters was also not very successful. General Brereton's officers hurriedly assembled at headquarters near Ascot Racecourse in southern England. During the first two or three weeks of its existence, the headquarters drew up a plan to drop parachute and landing units on the other side of the Seine and Somme rivers, but this plan was disrupted by the rapid advance of the troops. General Eisenhower made the belated decision to support Montgomery's plan to cross the lower Rhine, the Meuse, and the Waal using the bridgeheads captured by the airborne troops. There was little time left for intensive reconnaissance of drop zones, and there was not enough time for detailed planning, which is a necessary condition for conducting a major airborne operation. The Germans had planned the amphibious landings on Crete many months in advance. Allied Airborne Headquarters postponed detailed plans until the last week before the start of the operation. In mid-September, three airborne divisions, two American and one British, with the support of the Polish brigade, were to be dropped along the line passing through the territory of Holland from Eindhoven to Arnhem.
On September 17, about 750 transport aircraft and gliders took off, and from the very beginning the landing was successful. Aircraft gunners almost 100 percent completed their task. Anti-aircraft artillery and enemy fighters shot down less than 2 percent of aircraft and gliders. In the Eindhoven area, near the advancing British troops, an American airborne division jumped out, which a few hours later connected with the ground forces. It is highly doubtful whether it was necessary to drop an entire airborne division in the area. Perhaps one battalion would be enough. The rest of the division would have been better used to carry out diversionary operations near the German borders in Nijmegen or Arnhem. The US 2nd Airborne Division secured a strong foothold at Nijmegen, but an important bridge across the river. The Vaal remained in German hands for two decisive days, which delayed the reunion of the landing force with the troops at Arnhem. The plan was not carried out for reasons that are common to all major airborne operations. Intelligence was badly staged. Both British and American intelligence underestimated the ability of the Germans to reorganize their badly battered tank units in a timely manner. The Allied airborne troops suddenly found themselves in front of the main body of two panzer divisions, which had more tanks than expected. Can't this mistake be repeated in major airborne operations? Thus, a small group of enemy tanks can easily break the forward echelon of an airborne assault. It is true that modern transport aircraft make it possible to drop heavier tanks and guns than during the Second World War, but the difficulty of supplying ammunition and fuel, as well as organizing radio communications in the first twenty-four hours after the landing, will almost always allow the defending tanks to maintain a local tactical advantage. Under the conditions of modern mobile warfare, it will be almost impossible to accurately determine in advance the number of enemy tanks in the areas of drop zones.
Bad weather hampered the delivery of supplies and also delayed the arrival of the Polish brigade in Arnhem for reinforcements. In other areas and at other times of the year, three or four days with good weather could be chosen. But good weather favors the actions of enemy artillery and aircraft, exposing targets to them in the landing zones. There was bad weather at the time of the landing at Arnhem; in northwestern Europe, it is rare to expect good flying weather for three consecutive days in September. A more important issue is the organization of communication. During the decisive period of the fighting, the headquarters of the allied airborne army, located in southern England, had no connection with the British airborne division thrown out near Arnhem. Communications is almost always a weak point in major airborne operations. How can signals units be expected to operate successfully during the initial landing period after the first losses, when there is general confusion, when men and equipment are scattered in the drop zones? The Germans encountered this difficulty during the airborne assault on Crete. The Russians also, as a result of the landings of small landings up to a battalion in the Don basin and in the Crimea in 1943 and 1944, found this problem virtually insoluble.
General Gingan, one of the main contributors to the plan to capture Arnhem, in his book Operation Victory, pointed out that, due to the lack of aircraft, it was impossible to completely airlift the 1st Airborne Division in less than two days. Therefore, on the first day, the Germans were able to detect the Allies and attack them at a time when only half the landing force was dropped. It can be doubted that it will ever be possible in the future to collect a sufficient number of transport aircraft for a major airborne operation. In the age of the atomic and hydrogen bomb, more transport aircraft and helicopters will be needed than before to fight submarines, in the civil defense system, to support the army and as a reserve vehicle for urgent military transcontinental transport. One sometimes reads of the vast numbers of airborne troops in the USSR and in the countries of its allies, numbering many hundreds of thousands of fighters, but the Communists, having vast areas, many of which have an underdeveloped railway network, apparently will never be able to allocate 1,000 or even 500 aircraft for a major airborne operation. Most likely they will be limited to the landing of small airborne assault forces up to a battalion. The Russians will also drop partisans and saboteurs who successfully operated against the Germans on the Eastern Front during the Second World War. The actions of the partisans against the airfields in the occupied territory were so successful that the German command was forced to strengthen their protection. This was at a time when the German army no longer had enough soldiers. In the event of war, the Communists would be able to carry out similar operations against airfields and possibly against the main bomb stores.
In the light of the already known vulnerability of the landing force and the uncertainty about the outcome of large airborne operations, the Arnhem operation seems too pretentious. According to the plan, the advance detachment of paratroopers was supposed to hold Arnhem for about three days, until the English second army, advancing from Antwerp through Eindhoven, Grave, Nijmegen, came into contact with the paratroopers. Three airborne divisions were to capture and hold three important bridges. The troops in Arnhem were held for more than a week, although the failure of the operation was obvious by the end of the third day. Due to the disruption of communications, only 10 percent of the supplies dropped from the aircraft fell into the hands of their troops. Such failures are possible in the future, but not with such a catastrophic outcome.
The reasons for the failure of the airborne operation in Arnhem will be mentioned again and again in the military annals. They lie in poor intelligence, poor communications, lack of vehicles and the general vulnerability of the airborne troops. It would be unfair to the Red Devils, who were part of the British airborne troops, to treat their exceptional heroism and courage with purely military dogmatism. For nine terrible days after September 17, 1944, they had to endure enemy fire, thirst, hunger and uncertainty, positions. The troops were accompanied by doctors who shared with them all the hardships of front-line life: wounds, death and captivity. The Dutch population did their best to feed the paratroopers and give shelter to the dying. The paratroopers were people capable of carrying out the most audacious plan, but too much was demanded of them.
It should be noted that the next major Allied airborne operation in Europe was more modest in scope and carried out more carefully. In the spring of 1945, two airborne divisions were used to cross the Rhine at Wesel. It was on the morning of March 24, 1945. This time, using the British 6th and US 17th Airborne Divisions, Montgomery employed a new but more conservative tactic. At Normandy and at Arnhem, the airborne troops were thrown out, as usual, before the advance of the troops. During this operation, they did the opposite. The night before, the advancing troops crossed the Rhine on special ships, and tanks were transported with them in the first echelons. At 10 a.m. the next day, paratroopers were dropped in an area directly outside the firing range of their artillery. Thus, the main forces were able to provide immediate support to the airborne troops before the Germans could bring up their forces. Within twenty-four hours, the strip separating the airborne troops from the main body was impregnable, and all the main objects in the drop zone were captured and held. The operation at Wesel, although significant in scale, was tactically modest. The enemy was able to offer only minor resistance in the air, and the airborne troops could quickly link up with the main forces.
A similar general tactical situation developed in almost all airborne operations in the Pacific theater of operations. In the war between America and Japan, there were no airborne operations similar to those in Crete or in the Arnhem region. The geographical position of the Pacific theater of operations and the conditions of logistics there were, of course, completely different, not comparable with the European theater. For example, during the New Guinea campaign in 1943, American airborne troops were successful, but they were used on a limited scale and with very little opposition from Japanese aircraft and ground forces. In September 1943, an American airborne regiment, along with a small detachment of Australian paratroopers, was thrown into Nazdab. They were closely supported by a battalion of Australian ground forces, which had already crossed the Markham River and was within cannon-shot of the ejected paratroopers. The latter, with a strength of about 1,700 people, was essentially a reconnaissance landing force, since it did not capture any important objects or bridgeheads and was mainly engaged in reconnaissance. On another occasion during the same campaign, some 1,400 American paratroopers participated in part of the plan to capture Salamoa and Lae. The airborne assault had to be dropped on the airfield. This succeeded, although many paratroopers were injured; enemy resistance here was so weak that one battalion of airborne troops, which was planned to be dropped with parachutes, landed at the airfield after the plane landed. In both of these operations, conducted in 1943 in New Guinea, the airborne troops were used for local reinforcement, and not as a forward detachment in the offensive. In the future, such actions will probably be one of the most important tasks of the airborne troops.
There is no doubt that the airborne troops played a decisive role in the victory of the Soviet troops at Stalingrad. In the summer of 1942, the General Staff of the Soviet Army completely incorrectly determined the direction of the main German attack. The Russians believed that the main blow would be directed against Moscow, and instead an offensive was launched on Voronezh and Stalingrad. At that time, Soviet airborne divisions were concentrated east of Moscow. At the beginning of 1942, they participated in the battles near Leningrad and Smolensk, as well as in the Donets basin. In August 1942, Stalin was forced to radically revise his plan and make organizational changes, as the Germans threatened Stalingrad, the city that bore his name. He reorganized the airborne troops into infantry, artillery and armored guard divisions and sent them south to stop the advancing German army. A large force of long-range bomber aircraft and as many air transport units as possible were involved in the transfer of the former airborne troops, who still wore their old insignia. They were ruthlessly thrown into the battle of Stalingrad, and this brought success; they played a decisive role in the glorious victory that went down in world history.
Of course, long before the Battle of Stalingrad, the German high command used the airborne troops of General Student (7th Aviation Corps) to eliminate the crisis on the Soviet-German front. During the Battle of Stalingrad, the parachute units of General Ramke were engaged in battles in North Africa, covering Rommel's retreat from El Alamein at the end of 1942. Later, the airborne units of General Ramke continued to successfully participate in the actions of the ground forces in Sicily, Italy and France in 1943 and 1944. It is necessary to note the stubbornness of these units during the defense of the Brest fortress in 1944.
After the Battle of Stalingrad, a large number of former Soviet airborne troops acted as infantry in the ground forces, participating in battles in the north - at Demyansk and Staraya Russa, in the center - near Kursk and Orel, and in the south - in major battles of the Soviet Army, in during which the Donbass and most of Ukraine were returned. By the end of 1943, the situation on the Soviet-German front for the use of airborne troops in order to support the offensive of the Soviet Army was ideal. It was clear to the Soviet high command that the enemy could no longer launch a serious and major counteroffensive. Ahead were rivers and German lines of communication, beckoning Soviet paratroopers. Along the banks of the Volkhov, Lovat and Dnieper, and later the Oder, Prut, Bug, Dniester, Berezina, Vistula and other rivers, German troops held very fragile positions. They removed more and more fighters and anti-aircraft artillery units from their Eastern Front for the defense of Germany, which could withstand the slow speed of the transport-amphibious aircraft and gliders. But almost all of the former airborne troops of the Soviet Army continued to operate as part of the ground forces. Indeed, if you look at the full statistics of the Second World War, you would find that at least 3/4 of all the battles fought by units of the airborne troops of Germany, Russia, Japan, Italy, England and America were conventional ground combat and that, in most cases, airborne troops were not airlifted into combat areas.
However, the Soviet command in the combined landing operation in the Crimea in April 1944 used parachute troops in moderate numbers. The use of airborne troops as a forward echelon, with the aim of capturing or holding a foothold on the enemy's coast, will remain in the future the main type of combat operations of airborne troops. Sometimes meteorological conditions make airborne operations very difficult; for example, gliders and airplanes when flying through water spaces can meet with great difficulties due to strong winds. A similar case was in February 1945, during the airborne assault by the Americans on about. Corregidor. Approximately 2,000 American paratroopers were dropped into a small coastal area in support of the amphibious assault at San José in the Philippines. This operation was extremely risky, as strong winds were blowing and dangerous rocks were located in the territory of the drop zone. However, losses amounted to only 10 percent, that is, half of the expected losses. The airborne troops bypassed the Japanese fortifications at the most crucial moment of the campaign. General MacArthur, pleased with the success of the airborne troops, declared: “The operation to capture Fr. Corregidor is clear proof that the days of permanent fortresses are over." This bold statement may have been partly influenced by the initial success of the American airborne troops in the same campaign in the Philippines, which was of great personal importance to General MacArthur. During the American offensive in the southern part of about. Luzon, a month before the landings on the coast of Corregidor, troops from the US 11th Airborne Division captured an important crossroads. However, this landing was small - up to a regiment. The commander, realizing the difficulties of the operation, did not want his regiment to be thrown out at a distance of more than a day's march from the main forces. His predictions of difficulties came true. The signaling that provided the release was broken, and more than half of the paratroopers landed outside the intended zone. But important objects were still captured, and this operation contributed to the rapid advance of troops to the capital of the Philippines, Manila.
The airborne landings in Sicily in July 1943 to support an Anglo-American invasion showed that strong high-altitude winds and other unforeseen bad weather could disrupt a major airborne operation involving paratroopers and gliders. The inexperience of the tow and glider pilots also had a negative effect on the execution of this operation. A strong southeast wind, sometimes turning into a storm, knocked most of the planes and gliders off course. Several gliders uncoupled from the towing aircraft ahead of time, and more than 50 gliders landed in the sea five or six kilometers from the coast. Some gliders and paratroopers landed within 60 km of the intended drop zone. The American and British paratroopers were scattered in small groups between Licata and Noto and were forced to fight almost on their own. But despite this, an important local success was achieved. A group of paratroopers, delivered by gliders, captured one of the important objects - the Ponte Grande Bridge, which was the key to advancing troops to the port of Syracuse.
Airborne troops on about. Sicily met with the usual difficulties associated with this type of operation: difficulties in embarking, collecting after disembarking, and retrieving dropped equipment. They suffered not only from the wind and other weather conditions, but also from the fire of their anti-aircraft artillery. Anti-aircraft fire caused casualties and disabled many planes and gliders, which strayed off course in the darkness. Shortly before the Allied landings, the Germans also dropped paratroopers in some areas to reinforce their garrisons. This further complicated the situation. In the dark, unexpected curious clashes took place between the paratroopers of both sides.
The failure of the airborne troops over the dusty olive orchards of Sicily in July 1943, and over the fields of Algiers and Tunisia in November 1942, was not to be repeated in the summer of 1944 on the day of the Normandy invasion, when the airborne troops led Operation Overlord. . The lessons of previous failures were taken into account. The troops were airlifted to exactly the designated areas, the losses were insignificant, and all the main tasks assigned to the airborne troops were completed. Particularly successful was the glider landing, which had the task of capturing bridges across the river. Orne and the Canal. The bridges were captured quickly and without damage and were held for several hours before the landing and approach of the amphibious assault forces.
Both British and American airborne troops had great success in helping the troops establish a foothold in Normandy during the early days of the invasion. They fought snipers, artillery, tanks and repelled local counterattacks. The American airborne troops suffered heavy casualties while closing the gap between the two sections of the American beachhead, although the losses during the actual landing were very few. The results achieved on the day of the invasion fully confirmed the expediency of the massive use of airborne troops in the general plan of the amphibious landing operation. These actions will serve as a model for airborne landings in the future. But, despite the great success of these operations, after reading the official data on the fighting, it is difficult to get rid of the feeling that even in this case the chances of success or failure were about the same. Some confusion after an airborne landing seems inevitable, and the strength of enemy resistance in the airborne landing areas cannot be predetermined.
One of the most original plans for the use of airborne troops was General Wingate's plan during the fighting in Burma in the spring of 1944. The so-called "long-range penetration groups" had previously operated behind the front line with the aim of disrupting Japanese communications in Burma. But in the spring of 1944, a special air group was formed, which was supposed to carry out the tasks of dropping, supplying and evacuating General Wingate's paratroopers. This group had over 200 gliders, several helicopters, fighters, medium bombers, reconnaissance aircraft and about 25 transport aircraft. Despite the fact that in the end about 10,000 selected fighters were airlifted to areas west and north of Mandalay with the task of harassing a Japanese division fighting Chinese and American troops, during the operation itself there was a lot of turmoil and confusion. Troops, pack mules, artillery pieces, bulldozers, vehicles and other equipment were successfully delivered to the airstrips figuratively named Broadway, Blackpool and Aberdeen. When landing at one of the sites, a serious accident could have occurred if at the last minute, using aerial photography, it was not possible to establish that the site was littered with trees. The point was that in order to ensure the secrecy of the preparations for the operation, General Wingate forbade aerial reconnaissance over the landing areas and was ready to proceed with the operation, not knowing what condition the airfields planned for landing were in. Airborne operations without intensive preliminary reconnaissance are fraught with serious consequences.
As the gliders took off for the Broadway airstrip, the towing cables of several of the gliders broke and they made emergency landings, some of them in enemy territory. The gliders that landed in the landing area first damaged the landing gear, as there were ditches and pits filled with water on the landing site. Damaged gliders could not be removed, and gliders landing later crashed on impact. Almost all the gliders that managed to fly to the Broadway site were broken or damaged. However, more than 500 soldiers and 300 tons of important cargo were brought here unharmed; within 24 hours, one airstrip was put in order, and for the next five days it was used by transport aircraft, which transferred troops, animals and supplies here. The rest of the sites were ready at the end of March. In one month, transport aircraft and gliders made over a thousand sorties, which ensured the transfer of about 10 thousand soldiers to carry out harassing operations against the Japanese division from the deep rear. But this task force did not fully fulfill its assigned task, namely, it did not completely isolate the Japanese 18th division. The interruption of the supply of the Japanese through actions on their communications was compensated for by the British warehouses captured by the Japanese during the attack near Imphal, just at the moment of the air landing of the troops of the Wingate group. General Wingate's special troops were evacuated by air in August; part of the personnel of the group participated in the battles for almost six months. This operation in Burma demonstrated a new way of using airborne troops, suitable for many parts of Asia and Africa, where communications are stretched, and the defending troops and aircraft are widely dispersed. Under such conditions, airborne troops can conduct harassment operations behind enemy lines on a large scale, as well as interact with guerrillas. In the future, they will even be able to destroy and capture enemy units. The operations of the airborne troops in Burma, planned and executed according to local conditions and in unusual ways, set a new direction in the use of airborne troops in the future.
The use of paratroopers by the Germans during the counter-offensive in the Ardennes in December 1944 was perhaps the most remarkable use of airborne troops during the Second World War. In addition to performing the usual tasks of capturing bridges and road junctions, German paratrooper units were tasked with disorganizing the rear of American troops. Prepared for special tasks, the tank brigade was subordinate to Skorzeny, who led the group of German paratroopers that saved Mussolini in September 1943. While operating in the Ardennes, these saboteurs and terrorists were dressed in uniforms captured from the Americans; they spoke English with a good American accent, they knew the organization, regulations and insignia of the American army very well. However, few of these paratroopers had to participate in hostilities. Of the 106 German aircraft that were assigned to transport these paratroopers, only 35 reached the intended drop area. Strong winds contributed greatly to the disruption of aircraft formation, which was already unstable due to poor navigation. Many paratroopers were injured during the landing, as the area in the Ardennes is covered with pine forests. This group of saboteurs traveled on American Jeeps and carried out sabotage missions aimed at disrupting traffic, spreading false rumors about the advance of the Germans, and causing disorganization in the rear of the Allied troops. The Americans reacted quickly. They began to ask each other questions about things known only to their fellow countrymen, about the composition of baseball and football teams, about the geographical features of certain areas of the United States. The Germans in American uniforms could not stand such a test and were soon captured or killed. Despite the fact that sabotage actions were in conflict with international laws of warfare, they introduced a new element to the use of paratroopers, who aimed not at capturing certain objects, but at creating panic among enemy troops and undermining their morale. It was a kind of guerrilla warfare in the rear, aimed at breaking the enemy's resistance in the area. It is very likely that this tactic will be used more frequently in the future. If the Anglo-American ground forces in eastern France had been supported by such actions in the summer of 1944, perhaps victory in the West would have been won more quickly.
The unusual nature of airborne operations dictated the development of the necessary specialized equipment, which in turn led to the expansion of the possibilities of military art in general.
The operations of the German paratroopers in World War II presented contradictory requirements for weapons and equipment. On the one hand, paratroopers needed high firepower, which they could demonstrate in battle in order to act decisively and with maximum efficiency, but, on the other hand, the arsenal available to them
was limited by the extremely low carrying capacity of landing equipment - both aircraft, parachutes and gliders.
During the landing operation, the paratrooper jumped from the plane practically unarmed, except for a pistol and additional bandoliers. When the paratroopers were introduced into battle by glider landing, the capacity and aerodynamic characteristics of the Gotha DFS-230 gliders dictated their limitations - the aircraft could accommodate 10 people and 275 kg of equipment.
This contradiction has never been overcome, especially in the part that concerns field artillery pieces and anti-aircraft guns. However, German companies with powerful technical resources, such as the Rheinmetall and Krupp concerns, found many innovative solutions to the problems associated with the mobility and shock firepower of parachute units. On the ground, it was often difficult to distinguish the equipment of paratroopers from that adopted in the ground forces of the Wehrmacht, however, specialized weapons did appear, and it not only increased the combat potential of paratroopers, but also influenced the development of military equipment and weapons in the coming half of the 20th century.
Outfit
Protective clothing is very important for someone who is skydiving, and for skydivers it began with high, ankle-covering boots. They had thick rubber soles that were very comfortable, though not suitable for long marches on foot, and provided good traction on the floor inside the aircraft fuselage (as they did not use the large shoe nails commonly found on the kind of shoes supplied to soldiers of other branches of the military). Initially, the lacing was on the sides to avoid snagging with parachute lines, but it was gradually figured out that this was not necessary, and after operations in Crete in 1941, manufacturers began to supply paratroopers with boots with traditional lacing.
On top of the combat uniform, the paratroopers wore a waterproof tarpaulin overalls up to the hips. It has undergone various improvements and was designed to provide additional protection against moisture when jumping, and was also more suitable for putting on a suspension system.
Since landing has always been one of the most risky stages of a skydiver's jump, his uniform was supplied with special knee and elbow pads. The trousers of the combat uniform set had small slits on the sides at the level of the knees, into which tarpaulin thickenings lined with vegetable fluff were inserted. Additional protection was given by external "shock absorbers" made of leather-covered porous rubber, which were fixed with straps or ties. (Both the thickenings and the jumpsuit itself were usually disposed of after landing, although the overalls were sometimes left to be worn over it with a harness.) The trousers had a small pocket just above the level of the knees, in which a strop cutter knife, important for the paratrooper, was placed.
Sling cutter Fliegerkappmesser - FKM
1 - Helmet M38
2 - Jumping blouse with a "comminuted" pattern with sleeve insignia
3 - Trousers M-37
4 - Gas mask M-38 in canvas bag
5 - 9 mm MP-40 SMG
6 - Magazine pouches for MP-40 on the belt
7 - Flask
8 - Bread bag M-31
9 - Folding shovel
10 - Binoculars Ziess 6x30
11 - Boots
As the war picked up pace, paratrooper uniforms took on more and more distinctive features of the uniforms of ground forces soldiers. This well-worn soldier, however, still wears his special paratrooper helmet, by which the paratroopers were easily recognized among other German units.
Probably the most important piece of protective equipment. indispensable for both jumping and combat was a specific landing helmet. In general, it was an ordinary helmet of a German infantryman. but without a visor and falling down fields that protected the ears and neck, equipped with a shock-absorbing balaclava and firmly fixing it on the fighter's head with a chin strap.
German airborne helmet
Parachute helmet liner
Scheme of the device of the German landing helmet
Since in most cases paratroopers had to fight for quite a long time without being able to get supplies, the ability to carry a large amount of additional ammunition was considered important for them.
German paratrooper with bandolier
The paratrooper bandolier of a special design had 12 pockets connected in the center with a canvas strap that was thrown over the neck, and the bandolier itself hung over the chest so that the fighter had access to the pockets on both sides. The bandolier allowed the paratrooper to carry about 100 cartridges for the Kag-98k rifle, which should have been enough for him until the next drop of equipment or the arrival of reinforcements. Later in the course of the war, bandoliers appeared with four large pockets, which contained up to four magazines for the FG-42 rifle.
Parachutes
The first parachute that entered service with the German paratroopers was the RZ-1 forced-opening backpack parachute. Commissioned by the Department of Technical Equipment of the Ministry of Aviation in 1937, the RZ-1 had a dome with a diameter of 8.5 m and an area of 56 square meters. meters. When developing this means of landing, the Italian Salvatore model was taken as the basis, in which the strands of the parachute converged at one point and from it were attached to the belt at the waist of the paratrooper with two half rings with a V-shaped braid. An unfortunate consequence of this design was that the parachutist was hanging from the lines in an absurdly inclined position facing the ground - this also led to the technique of making a head-first jump from the aircraft in order to reduce the impact of the jerk when opening the parachute. The design was noticeably inferior to the Irwin parachute, which was used by Allied paratroopers and Luftwaffe pilots and which allowed a person to be in an upright position, being supported by four vertical straps. Among other things, such a parachute could be controlled by pulling up the supporting lines of the suspension system, which made it possible to turn into the wind and control the direction of descent. Unlike the paratroopers of most other countries, the German paratrooper could not have any influence on the behavior of the parachute, since he could not even reach the straps behind him.
Another drawback of the RZ-1 was the four buckles that the paratrooper had to unfasten in order to free himself from the parachute, which, unlike similar Allied products, was not equipped with a quick release system. In practice, this meant that the skydiver was often dragged along the ground by the wind while he made desperate efforts to quickly unfasten the buckles. In such situations, it would be easier to cut the parachute lines. To this end, since 1937, every paratrooper had a "kappmesser" (knife-strop cutter), which was stored in a special pocket of combat uniform trousers. The blade was hidden in the handle and opened by simply turning it down and pressing the latch, after which the blade would fall into place under the influence of gravity. This meant that the knife could be used with one hand, making it an essential item in a paratrooper kit.
Following the RZ-1, the RZ-16 came in 1940, featuring a somewhat improved suspension system and hauling technique. Meanwhile, the RZ-20, which entered service in 1941, remained the main parachute until the end of the war. One of its main advantages was a simpler buckle system, which at the same time was based on the same problematic Salvatore design.
Quick release buckle system on a German parachute RZ20
German parachute RZ-36
Later, another parachute was produced, the RZ-36, which, however, found only limited use during the operation in the Ardennes. The triangular shape of the RZ-36 helped control the "pendulum swing" typical of previous parachutes.
The imperfection of the RZ series parachutes could not but slip into the effectiveness of landing operations carried out with their use, especially with regard to injuries received during landing, as a result of which the number of fighters capable of taking part in hostilities after landing was reduced.
German landing containers
German container for landing equipment
During airborne operations, almost all weapons and supplies were dropped in containers. Prior to Operation Mercury, there were three sizes of containers, with the smaller ones used to transport heavier military supplies, such as, say, ammunition, and the larger ones for larger, but lighter ones. After Crete, these containers were standardized - length 4.6 m, diameter 0.4 m and cargo weight 118 kg. To protect the contents of the container, it had a corrugated iron bottom, which collapsed on impact and acted as a shock absorber. In addition, the loads were laid with rubber or felt, and the containers themselves were supported in a predetermined position by suspension or placed inside other containers.
Dug out of the ground landing containers
A platoon of 43 people needed 14 containers. If there was no need to open the container immediately, it could be carried by the handles (four in total) or rolled on a trolley with rubber wheels that was included with each container. One version was a bomb-shaped container, used for light cargo that was difficult to damage. They were dropped from aircraft like conventional bombs and, although equipped with a drag parachute, did not have a shock absorber system.
German landing equipment container found in the river by black diggers
Initially, paratrooper units were created in the Wehrmacht, but later they were transferred to the Luftwaffe.
In the German army there were parachute landing (Fallschirmtruppen) and air landing (Luftlandentruppen) divisions.
The personnel of the paratrooper division landed with parachutes or gliders. The divisions of the air landing division were delivered by transport aircraft, such as Ju-52 / Зm directly to the landing site, by landing method.
In German military sources, parachute troops are officially referred to as "parachute chasseurs" (Fallschirmjager).
The color of the German paratroopers (Waffenfarbe) was golden yellow - golden yellow buttonholes and a border on shoulder straps of the same color.
The background of shoulder straps is bluish-gray.
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| general of the parachute troops (General der Fallschirmtruppe) | ||
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| Lieutenant General (Generalleutnant) | ||
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| major general (Generalmajor) | ||
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| Oberst (Oberst) | ||
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| Oberst Lieutenant(Oberstleutnant) | ||
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| Major | ||
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| hauptmann (Hauptmann) | ||
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| Oberleutnant (Oberleutnant) | ||
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| Lieutenant (Leutnant) | ||
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| staff sergeant major (Stabsfeldwebel) | ||
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| chief sergeant major (Oberfeldwebel) | ||
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| sergeant major (Feldwebel) | ||
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| non-commissioned officer (unterfeldwebel) | ||
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| non-commissioned officer | ||
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| staff corporal (Stabsgefreiter) | ||
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| Corporal (Hauptgefreiter) | ||
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| chief corporal (Obergefreiter) | ||
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| Corporal (Gefreiter) | ||
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| Private | ||
The German paratroopers wore the uniform adopted by the Luftwaffe. They were supposed to wear white dress and gray-blue or sand-colored (tropical) casual uniforms.
A yellow neckerchief, which first appeared in North Africa, became a distinctive symbol of the German paratrooper. However, these shawls or scarves did not always have the color of yellow gold, but always bright.
The jackets of the German paratroopers were also standard for the Luftwaffe. The paratroopers also wore quilted flight jackets or casual uniforms with four pockets.
The uniforms were tied with a belt, all paratroopers, regardless of rank, were armed with pistols, knives and hand grenades.
A jumpsuit (Fallschirmkittel) was worn over the uniform - practical clothing made of thick cotton.
Hinged to the bottom, with a concealed button closure, and later with a zip, the field gray jump suit with a low stand-up collar was nicknamed the "bone bag".
At first there were no pockets on the upper part of the chest and on the trousers shortened to the middle of the thighs. Then horizontal welt pockets with zippers appeared on the hips, and two vertical chest pockets slanted to the shoulders had leaflets covering the zippers.
The sleeves were fastened with buttoned cuffs.
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Non-commissioned officer of the 1st Airborne Regiment, Belgium, 1940. |
With overalls worn over field uniforms, straight-cut field gray trousers were worn. On the side seams at the knees there were pockets with flaps not three buttons, intended for a knife, dressing material and other essentials.
Quadrangular kapka shock absorbers were sewn into the knee parts of the trousers, and when landing, in order to avoid injuries, they put on thick kapka or rubber knee pads, stitched with rollers, with long ribbons and buckles.
Both the knee pads and the jumpsuit itself were usually disposed of after landing, although the overalls were sometimes left to be worn over it with a harness.
Until 1940, on the overalls of the paratroopers, an army eagle was sewn on the chest, or nothing was sewn on. In the future, it became mandatory to use the Air Force emblem, embroidered on a blue, and later on a green or plain gray background.
Insignia - chevrons of corporals, flaps with wings - were sewn over the elbows.
In a number of cases, the collar of the fleece blouse worn under it was laid out on the collar of the overalls, which had become a turn-down, so that the buttonholes were visible in order.
Early model overalls were easy to put on and take off thanks to the cropped legs. After landing, the parachutist was first released from
tethered parachute system, then dumped overalls.
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Oberleutnant from 1st Battalion, 1st Parachute Regiment, Western Europe, 1940. |
Later versions of the overalls had a more practical design, two large pockets, and the floors wrapped around the legs and fastened before the jump.
These clothes were sewn from a fabric with a two-tone green or sandy-brown camouflage pattern. Later, trousers were also sewn from the same material.
In 1942, after paratroopers were no longer used for their intended purpose, Fallschirmtruppen personnel began to wear single-breasted field jackets (Kampfjacke), which were sewn from viscose-cotton fabric with a camouflage pattern.
Similar jackets were worn by the personnel of the Luftwaffe airfield divisions.
A minimum of symbolism was worn on the field uniform - the breast emblem adopted in the Luftwaffe in the form of an eagle and buttonholes, insignia were attached to the buttonholes.
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For most of the Second World War, German paratroopers wore solid gray-green wide trousers, darker than the jumpsuits of the early versions. Wide trousers did not hamper the movements of the paratrooper.
The trousers had two side and two hip pockets with small flaps on the buttons, and they were tied with ribbons at the ankles.
A knife was attached to the right thigh, which opened thanks to a weighted blade, under the influence of gravity.
In North Africa, German paratroopers wore heavy cotton trousers or shorts. Pants were made somewhat baggy to better ventilate the body and prevent sweating.
There were three pockets in the trousers: two regular ones, the third one on the left thigh was intended for storing a topographic map.
The German parachutist relied on gloves and jump boots.
Parachutists' gloves had elongated wrists with lingering elastic bands. Shock-absorbing glove pads protected the back and palm sides of the hands.
Gloves were made of black leather, although the lower ranks could also have textile ones.
Jumping boots, under which woolen socks were worn, were made of black leather with rubber soles, which had developed lugs.
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Paratrooper of the 7th Airborne Division, Crete, May 1941. |
The high ankle boots had thick rubber soles, very comfortable, although not suitable for long marches on foot, and provided good traction on the floor inside the fuselage of the aircraft (because they did not use the large boot nails that are usually characteristic of this kind of shoes supplied to soldiers of other military branches).
The lacing of these boots was located on the side, then it was mistakenly believed that the side lacing kept the shoes on the foot better than the traditional one.
There were samples with ordinary lacing.
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Parachutist of the Air Landing Assault Regiment, May 1941. |
| Information: Kverri, Chappel "German paratroopers 1939-1945" |
The lows of the legs and the tops of the boots were grasped by swing leggings made of gray canvas with leather overlays and fasteners on straps with buckles.
In parades and field conditions, German paratroopers wore ordinary military-style boots.
The field equipment of the paratrooper corresponded to the field equipment of the infantryman, only, at first, paratroopers used bags to store gas masks, and not metal cylindrical containers, since a metal container could cause injury when jumping from an airplane or landing.
In addition, a special harness was developed for the Fallschirtruppen.
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Private of the 7th Airborne Division, 1941. |
| Info: Darman "World War II Uniform" |
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Feldwebel of the 7th Air Division, May 1941. |
| Information: Kverri, Chappel "German paratroopers 1939-1945" |
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German paratrooper, 1940. 2 - headgear - a Fallschirmjager helmet of gray-blue color adopted in the Luftwaffe, on one side of which the national tricolor is depicted - on the other an eagle. |
| Information: "German paratroopers 1935-1945" ("New Soldier #4") |
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Ober-lieutenant, Russia, 1942-1943. |
| Information: Kverri, Chappel "German paratroopers 1939-1945" |
After the first winter campaign in the USSR, another type of field uniform appeared - quilted insulated trousers and a jacket, white on one side and gray on the other. They could be worn in any color outside, depending on the dominant color of the surrounding area.
However, such a uniform was sewn in limited quantities.
Insulated clothing was not worn over jumpsuits.
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Chief Sergeant Major of the 1st Airborne Division, Italy, 1943. |
| Information: McNab "Military uniform of the XX century" |
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"Father of the parachute troops" of Germany, Colonel-General Kurt Student, 1944. |
| Information: Kverri, Chappel "German paratroopers 1939-1945" |
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Non-commissioned officer, Italy, 1944. The black leather jump boots have twelve eyelet lacing at the front. |
| Info: Lagarde "Serman soldiers of World War Two" |
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Lieutenant, Ardennes, 1944. |
| Information: "German paratroopers 1935-1945" ("New Soldier #4") |
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Jaeger of the 5th Parachute Division, Ardennes, December 1944. |
| Information: Kverri, Chappel "German paratroopers 1939-1945" |
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Major from the 1st Parachute Division, Berlin, 1944. |
| Information: Kverri, Chappel "German paratroopers 1939-1945" |
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Major of the Parachute Regiment in a leather coat, 1944. |
| Information: Davis "German Uniforms of the Third Reich 1933-1945" |
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German paratrooper, Italy, 1944. |
| Information: Kverri, Chappel "German paratroopers 1939-1945" |
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Ober-lieutenant (left) and sergeant major (right), Apennines, Italy, 1944. |
| Information: "German paratroopers 1935-1945" ("New Soldier #4") |
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The uniform of the German paratroopers during the Second World War included a gray-blue Luftwaffe uniform, field gray trousers, high-top jump boots, airborne overalls and a helmet without flanging. |
| Information: "German paratroopers 1935-1945" ("New Soldier #4") |
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Paratrooper of the 1st Airborne Division, Italy, 1944. |
| Information: "German paratroopers 1935-1945" ("New Soldier #4") |
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Non-commissioned officer of the 9th Parachute Division, Eastern Front, 1945. |
| Information: Kverri, Chappel "German paratroopers 1939-1945" |
The landing helmet - Fallschirmhelme - was developed on the basis of the steel helmet of the Wehrmacht by simply removing the rims that slowed down the airflow in free burning.
In addition, a torn helmet could get tangled in the lines or crush the canopy.
 
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Initially, the landing helmet was painted in the gray-blue color of the Luftwaffe, and the national tricolor and the image of the Luftwaffe eagle were applied on the sides.
However, combat experience forced these helmets to be painted green or dull yellow (Italy, North Africa) colors, and beautiful emblems were abandoned.
In winter, helmets were painted white with improvised materials.
There were several camouflage paint schemes. Very often, the paratroopers wound handicraft nets around their helmets for attaching branches and other camouflage.
The helmet was produced in three sizes, its weight was 1000 grams.
After 1941, there was a transition to the steel helmet of the Wehrmacht.
Also, the German paratroopers had the following headgear:
Fligermutze caps common to the Luftwaffe;
kepi with lapels Einheitsmutze;
officer's caps of both samples (Schirmutze) bluish-gray or tropical sand colors.
In winter, especially on the Eastern Front, they wore knitted hats that completely covered the head and neck with a cutout for the face.
Mountain rifle caps were also popular among paratroopers.
Presumably, the Luftwaffe camouflage pattern first appeared in 1941, when Knochensack paratrooper jackets began to be sewn from camouflage fabric. "Cretan" photographs of German paratroopers in such camouflage are well known, while at the same time there is not a single photograph of this type of camouflage dated 1940.
Camouflage clothing of the Luftwaffe-Splittermuster type is limited to two basic types: paratrooper jackets and jackets for personnel of the Luftwaffe aviation divisions.
There were at least two types of paratrooper jackets, made from camouflage fabric in the Luftwaffe-Splittermuster pattern. The rarest is the earliest type with sewn-in shoulders.
The second type of cut was not much different from a regular jacket, but the floors could wrap around the legs and be fixed for the convenience of making a parachute jump.
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Badge of a paratrooper of the ground forces. |
| Information: Shunkov "Wehrmacht" |
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Luftwaffe paratrooper badge. |
| Information: site Wikipedia |
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Sleeve ribbon "Crete". |
| Information: Shunkov "Wehrmacht" |
Information sources:
1. Information: "German paratroopers 1935-1945." ("New Soldier #4")
2. McNab "Military uniform of the XX century"
3. Davis "German Uniforms of the Third Reich 1933-1945"
4. Darman "Uniform of the Second World War"
5. McNab "Fallschirmjager: Paratroopers of the III Reich"
6. Kverri, Chappel "German paratroopers 1939-1945"
7. Radovic "German helmets of the Second world war"
8. Lagarde "Serman soldiers of World War Two"
9. "Zielone Diaably" (Militaria 05)
10. “Wehrmacht camouflage uniform in color photographs” (“Soldier at the Front No. 16”)
11. Shunkov "Wehrmacht"
12. Kurylev “Army of the Third Reich 1933-1945. Illustrated Atlas»
13. Lipatov "Luftwaffe"
The Second World War showed that the use of airborne troops on the basis of the principle from the sky directly into battle is a rather risky and not always justified way of using these elite and truly well-trained troops. The first to experience this were the paratroopers of the German Wehrmacht in the battle for Crete, which took place in May 1941. The operation was aimed at destroying the British garrison on the island of Crete in order to establish strategic control over the Mediterranean basin. What were the results of the Cretan landing - one of the largest operations of the landing troops? Yes, the Germans managed to fulfill the task conceived by their high command, but this fulfillment went to the Germans at a high price: 3022 killed in the 7th division and the Assault Regiment, 652 in the 5th division and 126 people from air support. In addition to them, 3400 wounded. Of the 520 Yu52 transport aircraft, only 185 units remained in service. After the completion of the operation, the 7th division was sent for reorganization and rest, as it had completely lost its combat capability.
The losses suffered by the German paratroopers were so heavy that Hitler forbade any further large-scale landings. In one of his conversations with Kurt Student, the creator of the German landing troops, Hitler said: "Crete showed that the days of paratroopers are over." As a result, the elite troops were out of work and fought as elite infantry until the end of the war.
In the USSR, the Airborne Forces were the first to be created in world military history, however, the use of these troops as airborne assault forces during the Second World War was not so frequent, so during the entire war the Soviet command used more than 40 airborne assault forces, mainly of tactical importance. Of operational importance were: an airborne assault as part of the 4th airborne corps in the Vyazma region in the winter of 1942 and the dropping of the 3rd and 5th airborne brigades in the Kanev region during the crossing of the Dnieper in September - October 1943. And both of these operations ended with heavy losses, the goals of the landing were not achieved. The Soviet Marshal Voronov, recalling the war, wrote in his memoirs: "It must be said with great regret that we, the pioneers of the airborne assault, did not have reasonable plans for its use." Vyazemskaya and other operations showed that only small sabotage units have a chance of success when landing behind enemy lines. The larger the landing, the more difficult it is for him to solve operational-tactical tasks. Probably in connection with these failures, back in the summer of 1942, 10 airborne corps were transformed into guards rifle divisions.
The conduct of the Dnieper airborne operation was very negatively assessed even by I.V. Stalin himself, and by his order, he removed the remaining one and a half airborne brigades from the subordination of the Voronezh Front and transferred them to the Stavka reserve.
The largest airborne operation in their history by parachute and glider landings was carried out by the Anglo-Americans in September 1944, the so-called Dutch airborne operation "Operation Market Garden" (Operation Market Garden) Losses: 3542 killed and missing missing (captured). That is, the losses of the allies are practically comparable to the losses of the Germans on the island of Crete, although the number of troops from the Anglo-Americans was much larger. And unlike the German landing operation, the goals of such a large-scale Allied landing were not achieved, since the British 1st Airborne Division was not able to capture and hold the bridges near the Dutch city of Arnhem. As a result, most of the forces of this airborne division of the British (about 7,000 paratroopers) were captured by the Germans.
The Dutch airborne operation was the largest airborne operation in the world. The main objective of the operation was to capture and hold strategically important bridges across the main water barriers in the territory of southern Holland occupied by Nazi troops.
In total, 34,600 paratroopers were involved in the Dutch airborne operation (14,589 were landed by landing from gliders, 20,011 by parachute). A large number of military transport aircraft were involved in the operation: 1438 aircraft, 321 converted bombers and 2160 gliders. The failure of this airborne operation, according to some military historians, even became the reason for the failure of the entire further campaign in the northwestern direction of the Western Front in 1944. As a result of Operation Market Garden, the elite airborne units suffered very serious losses.
Thus, the Second World War showed that the massive use of formations and units of the airborne troops during combat operations by landing personnel on parachutes and gliders were extremely unsuccessful operations, which ultimately led to heavy losses both in people and in aviation equipment. . One of the last combat operations with mass parachute landings was carried out by the French airborne troops in the war in Indo-China in 1954. near Dien Bien Phu and it also ended in failure.
The experience of using airborne troops in World War II was taken into account in all the main armies of the world, not every country can afford to have such troops as airborne troops, these are very combat-ready, highly effective and at the same time very costly troops. In the post-war period, in many armed conflicts that took place in various regions of the world, the Airborne Forces were practically used as airborne assault units, that is, their delivery to the place of hostilities was mainly carried out using helicopters, the largest airborne assault combat operations were carried out by the Americans in Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Army in Afghanistan and very successful, compared with the amphibious operations of the Second World War. As before, only two armies in the world have entire formations (divisions) of airborne troops: Russian and American. The state of combat readiness, training and combat capabilities of the airborne troops of any country are a standard and an example for all its Armed Forces as a whole.
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