It was the forts that, according to the creators, were supposed to become that impregnable wall, designed to hold back the advance of the enemy army until the French army pulled up to the border. Forts were located along the French border near strategically important roads or settlements at a distance of a couple of tens of kilometers from each other. The space between them was covered by bunkers, as well as anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. Forts were divided into two types: small forts (Petit Ouvrage) and large forts (Gros Ouvrage). Today I will introduce the reader to the device of the small fort of the Maginot line using the example of the fort Petit Ouvrage de Rohrbach (hereinafter simply PO Rohrbach). PO Rohrbach is ideal for illustrating the construction of the small fort because of its excellent state of preservation. The fort has been completely restored to its original pre-war state and all its mechanisms, units and tools are fully operational. Today, the fort is maintained by a group of military history enthusiasts and is open to visitors every year on certain days of the week. You can wander through the dungeons of the fort only with a guide, as in almost all museum forts of the Maginot Line. This, of course, is a minus, but the guide reacts very understandingly to the lag of a person with a camera from the group, so no one interferes with taking photos without people in the frame. The entrance to the fort is through the combat block number 2, which is shown in the photo. Tours are conducted in German and French, each group with its own guide respectively. The duration of the tour is more than two hours.
Before proceeding to the description of the internal structure of the fort, at the beginning there is traditionally a bit of history. Fort Rohrbach is a second generation fort, its construction began in 1934 and ended in 1938. The construction of the fort required 6,000 cubic meters of concrete and 500 tons of steel. Initially, it was planned to build a large fort on this site, consisting of 13 warheads, but later, due to the crisis and lack of money, these plans were greatly reduced, and as a result, at the time of completion in 1938, the fort consisted of three warheads. In this form, it has been preserved to this day.
Workers pose against the backdrop of the second unit under construction.
On September 1, 1939, Germany attacks Poland and on September 3, France declares war on Germany, from that day on, mobilization is carried out and the fort is filled with soldiers who will leave it only in June 1940 after the surrender of France. Until May 10, 1940, the period of the "strange war" lasts, during which both sides: Germany and France sit behind their lines of fortifications and large-scale hostilities are not conducted. After the Germans break through the Maginot Line in the region of the Saar region, hostilities begin in this region, but despite powerful German attacks with artillery support, the fort was never captured and it remained undefeated. After the capitulation of France on June 25, 1940, the soldiers of the fort were forced to surrender on honorable terms by order of the French High Command. A few days later, Fort PO Rohrbach was handed over to the Germans, and its defenders were sent to one of the POW camps. German soldiers near the second block in 1940.
The second block in our time. A hole with a grate in the foreground is the air intake of the ventilation system, iron fittings with a wire stretched between them are radio antennas. Near the entrance of the machine gun embrasure, which was supposed to prevent the enemy from approaching close to the block. In front of the walls of the block there is a so-called diamond ditch, the main purpose of which was to receive fragments of concrete from the walls and roof in the event of an air bombardment of the fort. Thus, the blockage of the exit from the fort by concrete debris was avoided. The bridge thrown over the diamond moat was retracted inside when the fort was closed. This door is the only entrance to the fort, except for the emergency exit adit.
The German army did not use the fort either in 1940 or in the fight against the allied forces in 1944-45. Thanks to this, the fort was not damaged and was perfectly preserved almost in its original condition. In 1951, many forts of the Maginot Line, including Fort Rohrbach, were modernized and put on alert in connection with the emergence of a new potential enemy - the Warsaw Pact. But after the creation by the French of their nuclear weapons, the defenses of the Maginot Line finally lost their relevance and in 1970 Fort Rohrbach was withdrawn from the army. In 1987, local activists, with the support of the city of Rohrbach-les-Bitche, set about restoring the fort, and in 1989 the "Fort Casso" association was formed, with the aim of restoring the fort to its pre-war state and opening it to the public. American troops near the second block in 1944.
That's all about the history of the fort. Now a few words about the structure of the fort. All forts of the Maginot Line have the same structure and consist of a certain number of combat blocks (3-4 blocks for small forts and up to two dozen blocks for the largest forts of the defensive line), interconnected by underground tunnels (posters). In addition, there are barracks for personnel accommodation, a kitchen, a power plant, a hospital, a command post, signalmen's premises, warehouses for provisions, fuel and ammunition located underground. In fact, the fort was a small underground city, capable of holding defense for two months, remaining completely autonomous. The depth of the underground part of Fort Rohrbach is 25 meters. This is a safe depth to which it was impossible to break through with an explosive method, even if they bombed in the same place. The fact is that the most powerful bomb of the time when the Maginot Line was being built left a funnel six meters deep. The second bomb, dropped into the funnel from the first, made its way not six meters, but much less. Thus, it was impossible to break through to a depth of 25 meters with the help of weapons of that time. The drawing below, although not related to this fort, gives an excellent idea of ​​​​how the Maginot line fort's combat block and its underground system look like.
The scheme of the small fort PO Rohrbach is shown in the figure below. As can be seen from the diagram, the fort consists of three combat blocks interconnected by posterns, several hundred meters long. The fort has one main entrance located in the second block. In addition to the main one, there is also an emergency exit, which is located at the end of the adit, which originates near the third block. The length of this adit can be several hundred meters, and maybe a kilometer or even more. The entire underground part of the fort (barracks, kitchen, warehouses, power plant) is concentrated near the second entrance block. In total, 182 people served in the fort PO Rohrbach: 6 officers and 176 ordinary soldiers. Well, let's now go inside and see how it all looks in reality.
Machine gunner's station with a MAC 24/29 machine gun built into the embrasure guarding the entrance to the fort. In the event that the entrance armored door is blown up and the enemy starts storming the fort, the first thing he will stumble upon is the muzzle of a machine gun.
In the next room there is a filter-ventilation unit. On the filters you can see the year when they were installed in the fort - 1939.
The second block is equipped with two armored domes: the first GFM dome, I wrote about this type of domes in previous posts devoted to the structures of the Maginot Line. The second dome type AM (Arme Mixte). This is how they look from the outside (AM in the foreground, GFM in the back):
An observation armored cap of the GFM type could be equipped with optics for observation; if necessary, a MAC 24/29 light machine gun or a 50-mm caponier mortar was built into the embrasure. The thickness of the hood armor is 300 mm, the weight of the GFM armored hood is 26 tons.
And this is the shaft of the armored cap type AM. Here the equipment looks more impressive.
The armored hood of the AM type was equipped with a combined weapon consisting of a machine gun and a 25-mm anti-tank gun. This is the most impressive type of armored caps used on the objects of the Maginot Line. The weight of the armored cap reached up to 50 tons.
The combined weapon from this armored cap is exhibited side by side for clarity.
Behind another armored door there is an elevator shaft and a spiral staircase going around it. Only officers or other high-ranking visitors to the fort had the right to use the elevator, the soldiers walked. In addition to the officers, the elevator transported food and ammunition to the lower level. This is the only elevator in the fort. The elevator cabin accommodated eight people or a ton of cargo and was equipped with a stopper in the event of a break in the carrier cable.
We go down underground along the stairs that go around the elevator shaft fenced with a grate. 145 steps lead underground.
The underground level of the PO Rohrbach fort lies at a depth of 25 meters in limestone soil - this is approximately the height of a nine-story building.
Numerous communications between the underground part of the fort and the surface.
So we reached a depth of 25 meters, from this place my acquaintance with the fascinating underground world begins.
Directly opposite the elevator is a small pantry with various household small things. This room served as an intermediate warehouse, where it was possible to quickly unload the elevator and send it for a new batch of cargo. During the hostilities, the building also served as a mortuary. But in the entire history of the fort, only one soldier died here, patrolling the area around the fort and stumbled upon a German reconnaissance squad.
To get shots without people, I walked at the very end of the tour, so some of the photos turned out looking back. Behind the door in the photo is the lifting mechanism of the elevator.
Let's go back to the scheme of the fort. With a red oval, I circled the part of the fort that I will show in this post. Immediately next to the stairs and the elevator is the kitchen, opposite it is the energy center, which includes transformers for converting high-voltage current received from the outside through the power cable, as well as an autonomous power plant consisting of two diesel generators. Next are the barracks of the soldiers and the rooms of the officers, the infirmary, the command center and the warehouse part of the fort, which houses a small museum with various weapons and equipment of the fort. The diagram also shows the appendix of an unfinished postern, which was supposed to lead to another combat block, but due to cuts in funding, this block was never built, and the postern was filled up before the war. And now let's examine the entire underground part of the fort in the listed sequence. The closest room to the elevator shaft is the kitchen. Where people are visible in the photo - this is the exit from where we started the underground walk. That is, the photo was taken with his back to the rubble leading further inside the fort.
Living for months in the confined space of a bunker is psychologically very difficult. Therefore, in order to maintain the morale and vigor of the personnel, a special role was assigned to the nutrition of the soldiers. In the bunkers of the Maginot Line, the food was much better than on the surface. The best cooks were involved in the bunker and the kitchen was equipped with the latest technology of that time. Much of the kitchen equipment installed in the forts of the Maginot Line did not appear in ordinary apartments until decades later.
All equipment in the kitchen, including stoves, was electric. The large silver box on the right side of the photo is a coffee maker.
And this amazing device peeled potatoes. Thus, the soldiers were relieved of the order to peel potatoes. Everything in this fort was designed to make life underground as easy as possible.
Such is the kitchen hi-tech of the mid-30s.
Behind the kitchen there are several closets, in one of them there are hooks for meat carcasses.
In the other - equipment, the purpose of which could not be established. Maybe some kind of refrigeration unit.
A window for issuing food to soldiers.
A characteristic feature of the forts of the Maginot Line was the absence of canteens. Each soldier received his own food and ate it either on his bed, or at tables like these, set right in the fort's posterns. In the photo below, the tables are located right next to the kitchen.
And this is a postern going to two other warheads. Here we also see tables with benches along the underground passage.
Directly opposite the kitchen is a power plant with backup diesel generators. Let's look there.
Stylish diesel punk is everywhere. The door in the center of the frame leads to a room with huge fuel tanks.
In case of damage to the power cable supplying the fort, a local power plant was built in one of the premises, consisting of two SMIM (Paris) engines.
Both engines are four-cylinder, developing 100 hp. at 600 rpm. Thanks to low-speed operation, the engines were very reliable.
Shield of electrical appliances.
In this corner of the power plant, there is a well under the floor, 250 meters deep, from which the entire fort is supplied with water by means of an electric pump located under the floor. The photo on the right shows part of the pumping equipment for transporting water from the well to the fort's reservoirs.
This is how the whole room of the power plant looks like.
The engines are quite impressive in their appearance and size.
In the corner of the power plant hall is a small workshop, which had everything you need to fix minor malfunctions in the operation of equipment.
Tool.
Workshop.
Each of the engines was connected to an alternating electric current generator. Huge engines were started by compressed air, which was supplied to two of the four cylinders in order to drive a driveshaft with a huge and heavy flywheel. After acceleration of the engine, the stationary mode of operation with fuel injection was switched on. The compressed air tanks needed to run the diesels are visible in the photo on the left.
At the outlet is another single-cylinder engine with a small generator, possibly a backup. Inspection of the power plant is over and we return to the main tunnel.
The room next to the power plant is the transformer room. Let's look there too.
As I already mentioned, the fort was powered through a power cable from the outside. The transformer current received from the outside was converted into 110 volts of the fort's internal network. This is what transformers and related electrical equipment look like. All this is still working.
Behind the transformer room is a room with huge reservoirs. They contain water to cool the equipment of the power plant.
Photographing them is very difficult, as they occupy most of the volume of the room. On the net I found an excellent plan of the part of the fort we examined. Everything is very clearly shown here. And we go further to the barracks of the fort.
Behind the end of the technical zone, the postern makes a slight bend, which can be seen in the picture above.
The armored doors on the left side of the photo lead to the barracks of the fort, the postern on the right side of the fort leads to two other combat units.
The scale of the underground labyrinths is quite impressive.
Bathroom. All lighting in the fort was duplicated with ordinary candles or gas lamps in case the electricity failed. On the left in the photo you can see a candle. The closed door in the photo is a toilet for officers and command, toilets with half-open doors are for ordinary soldiers.
Sewage was collected in special tanks with chemical solvents - the prototypes of modern dry closets. The tanks were located under the toilets, there was no classical sewage system in the fort.
Next to the toilets is a small room with washbasins.
Shower rooms nearby. Of the three showers, one was designed to disinfect victims of poisonous gases, the other two were ordinary showers. Every soldier had the right to take a shower once a week.
Filtering and ventilation unit designed for disinfection of victims of a gas attack.
Twenty meters from the showers and toilets are the barracks themselves.
One of the two rooms with iron beds for ten people was intended for professional workers of the fort: mechanics, orderlies, cooks, electrical engineers.

Ordinary soldiers slept in hammocks, which were hung on two levels. This room contained 26 hammocks. A feature of such a room was that the metal structures were easily collapsible, which made it possible to turn the room into a festive hall in a very short time. In 1939, the soldiers of the fort celebrated Christmas here with songs, fun and wine.
Nearby is another room with hammocks, but smaller.
Double room for non-commissioned officers.
Fort commander's room, the only single room in the fort.
The room where the lieutenants lived.
The fort also had a small medical unit, consisting of a dressing room...
...and rooms for two patients.
This completes the inspection of the barracks, we move to the next location, located next to the barracks - the command center, from where the fort was controlled.
The command center is located behind the next turn (pictured left).
The main hall of the command center. Pay attention to the heating battery. The fort was heated by heaters that supplied warm air to all rooms of the fort. Installation of central water heating was in the process of installation but the work was interrupted by the outbreak of war. Therefore, in different rooms of the fort, you can find heating radiators that have never worked.
The command center received information about the situation outside and inside the fort. An analysis of the situation was immediately carried out and from here orders were given to various combat units and communication was carried out with neighboring forts.
The main sources of information were the fort's five observation armored caps, information from which was reported by telephone to the command center. Also, thanks to telephone communication with neighboring forts, the command of the fort was well informed about the situation in tens of kilometers around.
Appeal of General de Gaulle to the French nation.
Telephone cables between the forts were laid at a depth of three meters in the vicinity of the fort and at a depth of two meters in the fields. In addition to direct telephone communication between the forts, each of the forts was connected to a single telephone network, laid a kilometer from the potential front line. In case of failure of the telephone line, there was a backup option for communication between the forts by means of flares.
Telephone station. Closest to the command center in the fort were settled officers and telephone operators. Thus, when an alarm was declared, the command center began to function almost immediately. The telephone operators recorded all the information received from the outside in special documents, which were immediately studied by the officers, maps of the area were analyzed and decisions were made about firing, which were transferred from here to the combat casemates of the fort. The downside of the forts of the Maginot Line was that they went blind at nightfall or in heavy fog. After all, the aiming of all guns was at that time exclusively visual.
On this we leave the command center and move to the last underground location of the fort - a warehouse.
On the territory of the warehouse, in order to fill the empty warehouses, a small museum has been organized with a good collection of various equipment used in the forts of the Maginot Line, from weapons to the periscopes of observation armored domes and various electrical devices.
Machine telegraph, similar to the ship. With the help of these devices, commands were sent from the fort's command center to the warheads and confirmation of their execution came back.

A twin caponier machine gun mount, which was usually installed in the embrasures of the fort's warheads. If necessary, this machine-gun mount was removed to the side and a 47-mm anti-tank gun became in its place.
And this is an installation with a combined weapon, which was located inside the armored dome of the AM type, which was mentioned above (photo 10, 12, 13). The combined weapon was two weapons in one: a machine gun and a 25 mm anti-tank gun. The armored hood of the AM type was equipped with a system for removing powder gases and ventilation, a system for supplying ammunition and water to the hood to cool the weapon.
Despite the fact that the armored dome itself was not rotatable, with the help of supporting brackets, a heavy gun could be quickly reinstalled in one of the two embrasures of the armored cap. All adjustments and settings of the gun were carried out by rotating the handles, which greatly simplified its operation.
On the way to the first combat block, there is such an appendix of a packed postern (see the map at the beginning of the post). During the construction of the fort, a much larger number of warheads was planned, but after the reduction in funding, construction had to be limited to three blocks. By that time, they had already managed to pass the turn to the proposed fourth block, which was soon blocked. How far the packed postern goes is still unknown. The workers of the museum fort erected a monument to Andre Maginot, the Minister of War of France, who was the initiator of the construction of a line of armed fortifications on the border with Germany.
Another small room next to the stuffed porch. Initially, this room was a vertical shaft through which excavation was carried out during the excavation of underground tunnels. When the construction work was completed, the shaft was covered from above, and thus another additional room was formed in the fort. Without thinking twice, another barracks for soldiers was made here.

The Mannerheim line and the Maginot line, the Molotov line and the Eastern Wall, the Stalin line and the Siegfried line, Soviet and Japanese fortified areas in the Far East, etc., etc. - in this book you will find comprehensive information about all the “Chinese walls of the 20th century » and professional analysis of their effectiveness.

Why in 1939-1945. did not repeat the "positional impasse" of the First World War? Is it possible in principle to create an "irresistible" line of defense? Are the colossal costs of building fortified areas justified? And how exactly did the assault groups manage to break through the most powerful defensive systems?

After the unsuccessful war with Germany in 1870-1871, France faced the acute question of covering its new borders. The fortresses built in Vauban's time were by that time obsolete, with the result that resistance to their enemy was measured in a few days, and only the walled city of Belfort lasted about three and a half months.

French engineers did not have to look for new forms for the construction of border fortifications for a long time: they were proposed during the Napoleonic Wars by the French General Rolle. In his opinion, the fortresses should have been strengthened by a ring system of separate fortified forts, remote from 2 to 5 kilometers and interconnected by various field barriers.

To finally resolve this issue, a special commission was formed in 1874, which within two years drew up a plan for strengthening the eastern border of France with a system of fortresses. But since there was no new plan for the deployment of the French army near the border, the plan for its strengthening had to be drawn up on the basis of theoretical provisions arising from the experience of the war that had just ended.

According to the newly developed plan, the main section of the border from Luxembourg to Switzerland was closed with two curtains: one along the Meuse - Verdun - Toul and the second along the Vosges - Epinal - Belfort line. The gaps between these main strongholds of defense were filled with separate fortifications blocking the roads. The length of each curtain was about 60 kilometers, on this front there were 6-7 intermediate forts.

Thus, a kind of unified system of border engineering defensive structures was created, based on forts. At the same time, the fire connection between the forts was weak, since their task was only to prevent enemy columns from moving along the roads. The so-called Sharm passage was left between the curtains - also about 60 kilometers. It was assumed that, not daring to storm the fortified curtains, the main enemy forces would rush to the Sharm Pass, where they would be detained by the army from the front and subjected to attacks from the military groups located under the cover of the curtains from both flanks.

The flanks of this system of fortifications were also vulnerable, which rested on the borders of neutral states - Belgium and Switzerland. If the neutrality of Switzerland was ensured to some extent by difficult terrain, then the border with Belgium was completely open. At the same time, the important fact is that, by its nature, the terrain on the border with Belgium was not very suitable for defense, since it did not have any natural boundaries. Therefore, according to the plan, it was envisaged to cover the border here with two large fortresses - Maubeuge and Lille, as well as separate outpost forts - Montmedy, Zhivier, Mezieres, Girson, etc.

Considering that the defense should have depth, according to the plan, two groups of fortresses of the second line were outlined behind the flanks of the curtains: on the right flank - Langres, Besancon and Dijon, on the left - Reims, Laon and La Fère. Finally, a large fortress, Paris, was created as the main center of the entire strategic defense of the eastern border.

The plan was adopted in general terms. However, the head of the commission that drew up this plan, a certain Séret de Riviere, heard many reproaches in the sense that according to his plan too many fortifications were created, requiring huge funds for their periodic modernization. This led to new scientific discussions and limited funds. Therefore, by the beginning of the First World War, only the main fortresses - Verdun and Belfort - were at the modern level. The fortresses of Toul, Epinal and Maubeuge are clearly outdated. Separate fortifications of the curtains were also outdated, which was clearly confirmed by the attack by the Germans on September 23, 1915, of one of the strong forts of the Verdun curtain - Toul - Camp de Romain. Then the German artillery opened fire on the fort, and after 20 minutes the fort fell silent. The general attack on the fort lasted only three hours and ended with its capture. At the same time, the losses of the defending French reached 180 people and the advancing Germans - 96 people.

On the basis of this battle, the German military specialist Yustrov in his work "The Commander and Technology" sharply criticized the Schlieffen plan, which was built on a quick, deep strategic coverage of the French army and its defeat. The fact is that Schlieffen, having learned about the presence of the so-called Verdun curtain, even began to doubt the reality of his plan, fearing that the enemy’s border fortified zone would significantly delay the advancing in its breakthrough. Yustrov, who during the First World War commanded a heavy battery of 420 mm howitzers, the so-called thick Berts, who crushed the fortresses of Liege, Namur and Maubeuge in a short time, believed that before it began, the German General Staff, including Schlieffen himself, was too small were interested in new military equipment and underestimated its capabilities. He argued that in the presence of super-powerful artillery it was possible to force the Verdun-Toul curtain in a short time and develop strikes deep into France.

Another military specialist, Kuhlman, also believed that the French fortresses were very outdated by the beginning of the First World War and could not provide sufficient resistance to the German army. But at the same time, he advocated not so much for powerful artillery fire, but for roundabout actions after suppressing the resistance of the flank forts.

And he had reason to. The French fortress of Lille was so outdated that just before the start of the war, it was abolished as a military unit. The secondary fortresses of La Fère, Laon, Reims, Langres, Besancon and Dijon were in the same condition. Meanwhile, these fortresses had heavy artillery, which the French army so needed.

The more modern Belgian fortresses of Liege, Namur and Antwerp and the French fortress of Maubeuge did not justify themselves either. Their rapid fall showed that the isolated fortress could not stand on its own for a long time. So, the entire stock of medium-strength shells at that time was about 700 thousand rounds, and, for example, the artillery of the Verdun fortress during the battles of 1916 consumed an average of up to 100 thousand shells daily. Thus, all the reserves of Verdun as a fortress would only be enough for 7 days of battle. Meanwhile, the successful defense of Verdun lasted quite a long time and rested not so much on the strength of its fortifications, but on the strong barrage of French artillery and on the counterattacks of systematically changing troops.

Not believing in the strength of fortresses and in need of heavy artillery, General J. Joffre obtained from the French government a corresponding decree, on the basis of which on December 5, 1914, all French fortresses were abolished. On their basis, three fortified regions were created as strongholds of the army front: Belfort, Verdun and Dunkirk. The subsequent events of the fighting on the Western Front showed the correctness of this measure. The successful defense of Verdun brilliantly proved the strength of the resistance of the fortified area of ​​the same name, which is part of the front line and has an open rear.

The First World War showed that the "sore" place of France is the proximity to its borders of the most important centers of industry. From the first days of the war until its end, the German army occupied the 10 richest provinces of France, which produced 60% of iron and steel products, 94% of copper, and 76.5% of zinc from the total production. As a result, the border departments of France occupied by the German army provided 95% of the total national production of this state. This dealt a huge blow to the economic base of the French army.

The proximity of industrial centers to the frontiers placed the question of the defense of France in completely unique conditions. This required either the transfer of hostilities to the territory of the enemy, or the creation of a system of powerful fortifications, relying on which the army could hold on to the border. Experts believed that such an arrangement of industry riveted the French army to the border and deprived it of the possibility of a strategic maneuver with a retreat into the interior of the country. It was this circumstance that caused the construction of a powerful defensive line on the northeastern border of France, called the Maginot Line.

For various reasons, the description of this line in the domestic literature is practically absent. I managed to get some information from an article at that time by a senior lecturer in the department of tactics of higher formations of the Academy of the General Staff, Divisional Commander D.M. Karbyshev, published in the journal "Military Thought" at the end of 1939. In addition, in separate works devoted to the beginning of the Second World War, there is a fragmentary mention of this line.

The Maginot Line was understood as a system of French defensive fortifications located on the borders of Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany, the total length of which is about 750 kilometers, including with Belgium - 350 kilometers, with Luxembourg - 40 kilometers and with Germany - 360 kilometers.

When creating this system, the experience of the First World War was taken into account, which irrefutably proved that the fortress forms of defense had already completely become obsolete and a radical change was required in the representation of both the fortress as a whole and the basis of their defense - forts. The issue of new forms of long-term fortification was widely discussed both in the literature and in special government commissions. Based on this scientific discussion, a large number of proposals have been developed.

So, the military engineer Trigo proposed to build a scheme of his fortified front according to the type of the former fortress position of the so-called fort belt. The defensive system according to his project consisted of a number of forts located at intervals of one kilometer. At the same time, all the main elements of the old fort were preserved in them, but they were scattered over a large area of ​​400x400 meters. The most threatened approaches to the forts, in his opinion, could be covered by sections of ditches and wire networks, but for the purpose of camouflage, their direction and location were not at all connected with the fort's defensive structure. Thus, the fort, at the suggestion of Trigo, according to D.M. Karbyshev, "partly resembled a small French ensemble of the Maginot line."

The gaps between the main forts were filled in by smaller groups. Directly behind the line of forts was a series of concrete tank shelters designed to support counterattacks. Artillery positions are widely equipped with various kinds of long-term structures. The defense garrison reached 6 fighters per one meter of the front. The original were underground casemates for mortars.

Another military engineer, Leveque, proposed in 1922 to create a defensive system from a number of fortified areas, each of which was supposed to have a length of 25-30 kilometers with intervals of 5-10 kilometers between them. For the stability of the defense, citadels were located behind the main line of resistance in the form of circular positions with a diameter of 6 kilometers. Each fortified area of ​​the defensive zone, at the suggestion of Leveque, was to consist of groups of armored towers. For the defense of these towers, concrete above-ground shelters with armored domes for machine gunners were to be arranged in close proximity to them, which greatly hampered the actions of blocking groups.

The third military engineer, Norman, put forward the idea of ​​​​creating continuous lines of trenches and communication passages, erected already in wartime. In peacetime, concrete two-story caponiers, armed with machine guns, cannons and howitzers, were to be erected on the line of future trenches every 500 meters, the main task of which was to flank the nearest approaches to the trenches. In the rear of the defensive zone, defensive barracks were to be built, around which in wartime it was supposed to equip some centers of resistance. Essentially, Norman's idea was an improved outline of the position at the end of the First World War.

Another military engineer, a certain Shovino, proposed building a fortified front from the main resistance zone and separate strongholds. These strongholds in the form of large concrete massifs were to be located in front of the main resistance band at a distance of 300 to 2500 meters and connected to the rear by a special underground gallery up to 3 kilometers long. In peacetime, shelters for reserves were to be built on the main line of resistance, for half a company each. Subsequently, approximately according to such a system, fortified strips were built on secondary directions on the Maginot Line.

Each of the numerous proposals contained new ideas, but none of them as a whole could be fully applied in strengthening the borders in the new conditions of the situation. This happened because in the liberal government circles of France at that time more was said about saving money than about the real defense of the country in the event of aggression. There were also voices that completely denied the strip of permanent structures. Their authors referred to the weak resistance of the fortresses during the First World War and to the stubborn defense of field positions by the troops, which were erected by their own forces already in the course of hostilities. “Such views, of course, were wrong,” concluded D.M. Karbyshev. - Concrete and armor with honor withstood the competition with the largest artillery shells. Therefore, it was necessary to change the forms of structures.

More deeply developed and substantiated forms of fortified areas were put forward by the military engineer Kuhlmann, who studied the scientific literature available at that time and, above all, the works of General Pétain, on this issue in sufficient depth. In addition, the results of the work of the special commissions in 1922-1923 and 1925-1926 were taken into account. And if the first commission only studied the problem as a whole, then the second one was already specifically working on drafting fortifications.

Direct work to strengthen the borders began in 1929. All work was supervised by a special commission, subordinate to the Minister of War of France, Maginot, whose name the line of fortifications received.

Each fortified area was a continuous front of great extent, formed by a system of small long-term buildings. The flanks of fortified areas should be provided with deep folds, natural barriers or barrier zones. The length of the fortified areas of the Maginot Line reached 150 kilometers, which corresponded to the front of the army's defense. Basically, the task assigned to the fortified areas of this line was to cover the concentration and deployment of armies together with cover units and aviation.

French military experts believed that the defense of the fortified area should be continuous. According to the nature and strength of the development of fortifications, they distinguished fortified areas, fortified sectors and defensive sites. At the same time, fortified areas were most carefully prepared for defense, fortified sectors - somewhat weaker, in the form of fortified zones, and, finally, defensive sectors could only be prepared for fortification in wartime.

The fortified areas consisted of a number of fortified strips up to 10 kilometers deep. Along the front and rear edges of the main defensive strip, which is 4–5 kilometers deep and occupied by regiments of the first echelon, only “intermediate fortifications” were to be built. They usually consisted of a large triangular-shaped concrete mass with its base turned towards the enemy. An intermediate fortification of medium strength could be armed with up to 15 machine guns and up to 7 guns. Of these, one machine gun and one gun were to be located on the surface of the array in domes and rotating towers, solving self-defense tasks. The rest of the weapons were to be in casemates located on the flanks in ledges, on the basis that 3 guns and 6 machine guns were firing in each direction. True, in reality, the strength and armament of intermediate fortifications depended on their tactical purpose and on the nature of the surrounding area.

According to the requirements of the French leadership, the thickness of the coating of the defensive structure of the fortified area, protecting from one hit by a 155-mm projectile, should have been about 0.8 meters, from a 210-mm projectile - a meter from 380-mm - 1.5 meters and from 420-mm - 1.75 meters. Therefore, the intermediate fortifications had walls and coatings up to 3 meters thick, which should have ensured their survivability even when hit by two shells of a 420-mm howitzer (safety factor-2).

The fortification itself was deeply lowered into the ground and had several floors, usually three. The upper floor contained the main gallery serving towers, casemates, an observation post, etc. The middle floor of the intermediate fortification was occupied by kitchens, pantries, cars, and part of the ammunition was also placed there. On the lower floor there were residential casemates, tanks with water and fuel, and powder magazines.

Depending on the purpose and armament, the size of such a fortification ranged from 75 to 100 meters along the front and from 40 to 50 meters in depth. Its garrison had a strength of up to 40 people. According to Soviet military experts, the cost of building such a fortification ranged from 500,000 to 1 million rubles.

Intermediate fortifications were located along the front and rear edges of the main defensive strip in a checkerboard pattern, at intervals of 4-5 kilometers. Each fortification was connected to the rear to a depth of 1–2 kilometers by an underground gallery and surrounded by a moat, fired from wardrobe trunks behind a counterscarp. In the intervals between the intermediate fortifications, machine-gun points (casemates) were located in several rows.

Each firing point (casemate) was armed with 2–4 machine guns firing sideways. As a rule, they were located on the reverse slopes, hidden from the eyes of the enemy. The thickness of the walls and coating of such a point was within 1.75 meters, which ensured its survivability when hit by one 420 mm caliber projectile. The size of the point for 4 machine guns - along the front - 25 meters and in depth - 10 meters; semi-caponier for 2 machine guns - along the front - 13 meters and in depth - 10 meters. As a rule, each point was two-storeyed. Soviet experts calculated that the cost of such a semi-caponier could be 75 thousand rubles, and caponier - 150 thousand rubles.

In general, intermediate fortifications and casemates formed a defensive zone 4–5 kilometers deep. At the same time, no special centers of resistance and strongholds were created. But at the same time, it was required that the structure of the fire be at least four layers.

In the rear of the main line of defense of the fortified area, heavy artillery was located, which was supposed to be located on a railway installation. For its movement, a special narrow-gauge railway was laid. Due to this, the total depth of the main line of defense could be increased to 10 kilometers.

The so-called fortified sectors were created in the secondary areas of defense, within which fortified zones were arranged. Each fortified zone consisted of one line of intermediate fortifications and casemates between them. Intermediate fortifications were connected with the rear by underground galleries up to 2 kilometers long.

In the rear of the line of concrete structures, at a distance of 1 kilometer, a field defensive strip was arranged, prepared by the troops in wartime. In peacetime, only shelters for personnel with a capacity of about half a company of infantry were equipped there. For the equipment of the field strip, all the materials were prepared in peacetime.

The backbone of the field strip consisted of a number of small reinforced concrete blockhouses and semi-caponiers for machine guns, averaging 5x5 meters in size. True, this position was to be equipped with troops already in wartime. All the necessary tools, means of mechanization of work and materials had to be carried in special army engineering parks, which were supposed to deliver them to the troops to the place of work.

In the intervals between the fortified areas and to secure their flanks, zones of barriers, destruction and flooding were created. To speed up flooding in these areas, ponds with a supply of water were created in advance.

For the defense of the most important strongholds within the boundaries of fortified areas, so-called ensembles were created - a special group of structures. Within the "ensemble" on the surface of the earth were located: machine guns in the tower and bombers to defend the entrance to the "ensemble"; machine-gun turrets, machine-gun and gun caponiers and semi-caponiers; anti-tank guns in turrets, machine-gun batteries on reverse slopes;

Under the ground in the "ensemble" ammunition depots, housing for the garrison and all service premises were equipped. These rooms were located at different levels, forming ledges. The total depth of the "ensemble" reached 30 meters. All of its structures were connected by a network of underground galleries, and the entrances to the "ensemble" were carefully disguised. To hinder the spread of the enemy who penetrated the "ensemble", a network of armored doors was arranged at the entrance and in the depths, which closed automatically. The total area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe "ensemble" reached 1 sq. kilometers.

The Maginot Line itself consisted of several fortified areas. The strongest of them was the Lorraine, or Metz, fortified area, which occupied 120 kilometers along the front. Its leading edge was removed from the border by 10–15 kilometers.

A particularly strong and perfect fortification structure of the Lorraine fortified area is the "ensemble" Hackenberg, located east of Diedengofen. The northern sector of the Lorraine fortified area included the fortifications of the former German small fortress of Didengofen, or Thionville. The crossing of the river Meuse was controlled by the former fortress of Metz, located on the right bank. The fortifications of the fortress of Metz themselves constituted the second line of defense of this fortified area, covering the most important industrial region of Brie.

On the section of the border between the rivers Saar and the Rhine was the Alsatian fortified region, which had a front of 80 kilometers and a depth of up to 20 kilometers. It was developed somewhat weaker than the Lorraine fortified area and included the "ensembles" Hochwald and Beach. Otherwise, the structure of the Alsatian UR did not differ significantly from the forms of the Lorraine UR.

Between the Alsace and Lorraine fortified regions there was a zone of flooding and barriers, along the front 30 and to a depth of 50 kilometers. The presence in this territory of a large number of rivers, lakes, canals and swamps greatly facilitated the organization of floods. Water was collected in special pools, from which, through locks, it could be used for flooding.

On the section of the Franco-German border from Switzerland to Karlsruhe, the line was built on the basis that the Rhine River was a serious obstacle to forcing its troops. In addition, the Rhine-Rola Canal, 120 meters wide and up to 6 meters deep, ran parallel to the Rhine. Behind the canal, also parallel to the Rhine, the river Ill flowed, which has many branches and shoals. To the west of these barriers was the Vosges mountain range, all passages in which were blocked by groups of fortifications. From the east, the approaches to the Rhine were also covered by the Black Forest. For the defense of the Rhine, blockhouses were built along its banks in a checkerboard pattern. Based on all this, French military experts believed that the section of the French border from Karlsruhe to Switzerland was difficult to access for the offensive of large enemy troops.

The eastern border of Belgium was covered by small fortifications. In the depths, on the line Neufchâteau - Liege, a defensive strip was prepared, and the fortresses of Liege, Namur and Antwerp were modernized. Blockhouses were built along the Albert Canal, flanking obstacles that were supposed to protect the river from a blow from Holland. On the Franco-Belgian border in the Ardennes, barriers were set up, and the section from Maubeuge to Lille was covered with small fortifications. But in general, the Belgian border was prepared for defense very poorly.

On the border of France with Italy, all mountain passes were closed by groups of fortifications.

Thus, the French military experts believed that their country was sufficiently reliably protected with the help of the fortifications of the Maginot Line from Germany, Luxembourg, and partly from Belgium. The cover of the northeastern border was explained by the fact that it was from this side that German troops attacked France during the First World War. At the same time, the most powerful fortified areas were built on the border with Germany and Luxembourg.

The weak point of the Maginot Line was the system of anti-tank obstacles. According to the views of that time, it was believed that in tank-prone areas it was necessary to have up to 5 kilometers of various anti-tank obstacles for every kilometer of the defense front. Their basis was to be anti-tank ditches up to 3 meters deep, which were planned to be in front of the "ensembles" and in front of all large intermediate fortifications. These ditches were supposed to be shot through with fire from rapid-fire cannons, which were installed in special trunks. For self-defense of wardrobe trunks, machine-gun towers were installed on them. The fire of these machine guns was also supposed to prevent the enemy sappers and infantry from approaching the ditch in order to make passages in them. From the front, anti-tank ditches were to be covered by a wide strip of anti-personnel obstacles.

However, due to their high cost, there were few such anti-tank ditches. Instead, on a number of directions of the Maginot Line, obstacles of a lighter type were arranged. They were rails dug into the ground and tilted towards the enemy, lined up in 5 rows. The total width of such an obstacle course reached 4 meters. It was believed that it would become a serious obstacle in the way of not only light, but also heavy enemy tanks.

Obstacles were erected against the infantry in the form of a wire net on wooden or iron stakes, through which, if necessary, an electric current could be passed.

The second drawback of the Maginot Line was the almost complete insecurity of the left flank of the Lorraine fortified region, despite the fact that it was it that was intended to cover the richest Eastern industrial region of France. In addition, the northern industrial region of the country (Lille - Maubeuge) was practically not covered.

The third drawback of the Maginot Line can be considered the lack of its operational depth, prepared in advance by fortifications. A section of this line adjoining the Rhine River had a certain depth. At the same time, the Lorraine and especially the Alsatian fortified regions did not have operationally prepared depth. True, French military experts believed that the depth of the Lorraine fortified region could be made up of the fortifications of the old German fortress of Metz if it was occupied by troops and strengthened by artillery.

The first check of the combat readiness of the Maginot Line took place in March 1936, when the German army occupied the demilitarized Rhine zone. Then the fortified areas were occupied by the full strength of the garrisons (in peacetime they had only one third of the personnel) and put on full combat readiness.

For field filling directly to the border, cover units were advanced as part of six infantry divisions (11, 13, 14, 42, 43 and 2nd North African), which occupied strips whose front length reached 30 kilometers. At the same time, the regiments occupied areas up to 10 kilometers wide, and the battalion areas had a front up to 5 kilometers wide and up to 2 kilometers deep. It is noteworthy that these troops not only guarded, but also engaged in the improvement of the line of fortifications, primarily field filling facilities and the second line of defense, which was planned at a depth of 20-30 kilometers. Artillery regiments of the reserve of the High Command were also advanced there, which took up firing positions. But then, as you know, the German troops did not violate the French border.

This happened four years later. And this time, as in 1914, the German command, not wanting to test the strength of the main fortified areas of the Maginot Line, located on the eastern border of France, decided to strike the first blow against the territory of Belgium. German Field Marshal E. von Manstein writes in his memoirs that the idea of ​​an offensive in the west around the Maginot Line belonged entirely to A. Hitler. He notes: “Hitler established in advance how the offensive operation was to be carried out: bypassing the Maginot line, through Belgium and Holland. The commander of the ground forces could only technically carry out this operation, on which his opinion was not heard and regarding the decisive success of which he, at least in the autumn of 1939, was of a negative opinion.

France, England and Belgium were preparing to repel this blow. The Anglo-French allied command came to a common opinion about the need to meet the offensive of the German troops as far to the east as possible in order not to let them into the depths of France, primarily into the coal basins located on the Franco-Belgian border, as well as to the coast of the North Sea. In this regard, the allies decided to put forward a strong grouping of Anglo-French troops on the territory of Belgium and Holland with the start of hostilities. Further, having united with the armies of these countries, the Allied forces were to organize a joint defense of the border regions of Belgium and Holland along the Dil River and to the south. As a result of this, it was supposed to create a continuous front of defense, which was supposed to be a continuation of the Maginot Line. This plan was codenamed "Plan Deal". The French command had no doubts about the impregnability of the Maginot Line itself.

In accordance with the "Plan Deal" by May 1940, the allied command deployed forces. The French army deployed 106 divisions, of which 3 armored, 3 light mechanized and 5 cavalry. In addition, the French command had 40 separate tank battalions at its disposal, which were attached to infantry divisions. England sent an expeditionary force consisting of 15 divisions to France. The Belgian army deployed 20 divisions, the Dutch - 12 divisions, and two more divisions due to Polish emigration. In total, the Allies had 155 divisions, 4 thousand tanks and 2.7 thousand aircraft on the border with Germany.

For the attack on Belgium, Holland and France, the German command deployed 135 divisions, including 10 tank and 4 motorized. These forces included 2,580 tanks, and 3,800 aircraft were to provide their air cover.

Thus, the Allies outnumbered the Germans in every way. In addition, the defense of their troops relied on a system of long-term defensive structures. Despite this, the German troops, having launched an offensive on May 10, were able to achieve significant success almost immediately.

In particular, the fort of Liege - Eben-Emael - was captured in the following way. Before dawn on May 10, from an airfield located west of Cologne, a German landing battalion set off for the fort in gliders towed by bombers. The personnel of this battalion had been preparing for the assault on this fortification for several months at a special training ground, which accurately reproduced the fort's fortifications. The battalion was equipped with machine guns, light machine guns, a grenade, mines and shaped charges.

At a distance of 3-4 kilometers from the fort, the gliders unhooked from the tugs and silently in the pre-morning fog planned for the fort, the garrison of which was sleeping. The surprise of the attack ensured success. The main fortifications of the fort were blown up with the help of shaped charges within an hour and captured. The garrison of the fort, alerted, could not offer resistance. Subsequently, the paratroopers helped the German 4th Panzer Division cross the Meuse, which immediately rushed towards Brussels.

The Dutch army was unable to hold back the advance of the German troops. Its main defensive position was relatively easily broken through, and the 9th German Panzer Division of the 18th Army already on May 12 captured the Breda area, 50 kilometers from Rotterdam, and on May 14 occupied Rotterdam itself. After that, the Dutch government fled to London and the Dutch army capitulated.

As a result of the successful crossing of the Meuse River and the Albert Canal, formations of the 6th German Army began to rapidly move deep into Belgian territory. At the same time, the Allies on the morning of May 10, as soon as they became aware of the German invasion of Belgium, began advancing to a position along the River Deal. At the same time, the tank group of General E. von Kleist entered the territory of Luxembourg. The Ardennes, contrary to the calculations of the French and British command, did not become a serious obstacle to the rapid advance of all branches of the German troops, equipped with engineering support. On the highways of the Ardennes, almost without resistance, the German tank group advanced 100-130 kilometers within three days and by the morning of May 13 reached the area of ​​​​the Meuse River to Sedan.

The operation ended on June 27, 1940 with the exit of German troops to the Pas de Calais and the defeat of the allied forces. As a result of its implementation, Holland and Belgium capitulated, the British army was evacuated from the continent, having lost 62 thousand people and 23 thousand guns. The French during this operation lost about 20 infantry divisions, in connection with which the combat effectiveness of their army decreased significantly. The losses of the Germans in this operation were insignificant.

Regarding the results of the first operation of German troops in Belgium, E. von Manstein later wrote in his book “Lost Victories”: “If in reality in 1940, thanks to the skillful actions of Army Group B, the enemy was overturned in Belgium on a wide front and the Belgian and Dutch armies were forced to surrender, then this result (while paying tribute to both the German command and the strike force of our tank formations) still cannot be called the result of a pre-planned operation, the outcome of which was a foregone conclusion. The best leadership of the troops in the camp of our opponents could have prevented such an outcome.

It so happened that after the end of the first phase of the German offensive, both opponents again confronted each other on a solid front along the Maginot line to Carignan and further along the Aisne and the Lower Somme, and the Germans again had to storm this front. But now, in front of the main enemy forces, there were only separate forts and outposts, as well as a barrage, poorly developed in terms of engineering, behind which stood the remnants of a demoralized French army.

The second stage of the operation in the West began on the 5th and ended on June 18, 1940. By that time, part of the troops had been transferred to the north from the Maginot Line, which, together with the French troops withdrawn from Belgium and advanced from the reserve, made up the 3rd Army Group (6th, 7th and 10th). The 2nd Army Group (2nd and 4th) still defended the Maginot Line, fearing an enemy strike from the east.

For the attack on France, the German command concentrated a grouping of 124 divisions. At the same time, the German army "C" continued to stand against the Maginot line, threatening its breakthrough.

On the morning of June 5, General E. von Kleist's army group launched an offensive on the right wing of the German-French front. She held the defense of the French east of the city of Abbeville and punched a 30-kilometer gap in the defense front of the 10th French army.

On June 9, Army Group A launched an offensive, delivering the main blow to Reims. There, on June 11, the main forces of the tank group of General Guderian were introduced into the battle. The French defense was broken through and the German troops occupied Reims.

On June 12, the French command, in essence, had already abandoned attempts to offer any resistance to the advance of German troops inland, and Paris was surrendered without a fight. On June 22, the French government, terrified to death, hastened to conclude an armistice with Germany.

E. von Manstein wrote: “And if the second phase of the offensive of the German armies in such a short time led to the complete surrender of the enemy, it was only because he could not take up sufficient defense on a continuous front from the Swiss border to the sea, having suffered such heavy losses in Northern Belgium. The second reason was that the morale of the French army had already been dealt a decisive blow. There is no need to say that the enemy did not have troops equivalent to German operational tank formations.

Thus, the campaign, carried out by German troops in Belgium, Holland and Northern France, and lasting only 40 days, ended in the complete defeat of the Allies. The calculations of the French command on the Maginot Line did not justify themselves - the German troops abandoned the assault on its fortified areas, bypassing them from the northwest.

At the same time, the French troops, who were during the entire operation on the Maginot Line, were connected by the troops of the German Army Group C, commanded by Colonel General R. von Leeb. But this seemed not enough to the Germans, and they wanted to prove the inconsistency of the French in relation to the Maginot line. Therefore, on June 15-17, 1940, after the occupation of Paris, the German troops attacked the Rhine front with the forces of seven divisions of the 7th Army, equipped with a large number of amphibious assault vehicles in the area between Strasbourg and Neuf-Briesach (15 kilometers south of Markolmsheim). The purpose of this operation, which received the code name "Bear", was to refute the expression "The Rhine is an insurmountable natural border." In some areas of the offensive, the Germans had a sevenfold superiority in forces and means. Part of the garrisons of long-term defensive structures died, the other part surrendered.

Thus, General R. von Leeb successfully completed the task assigned to him. This promoted him to a number of prominent German military leaders, and on July 19, 1940, he was awarded the highest military rank of the Third Reich - he became a field marshal general.

One of the most famous lines of defensive fortifications is the Maginot Line, which protected the western border of France. Many believe that the French made a strategic miscalculation by not covering the northern section of the border, through which the Nazis made their way. But, there was no mistake, the task of the "Maginot Line" was to force the Germans to repeat the offensive of 1914 (according to the Schlieffen plan), that is, through the North - Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands. This gave the French and British a gain in time, allowed the Wehrmacht to impose a battle in Belgium.

In addition, the Maginot Line was also on the northern border, not as powerful as on the border with Germany, but it was, the Germans broke through it in the Ardennes.

Reference: "Maginot Line"- the system is a system of fortifications of the French border on the eastern border, with Germany. Named after French Minister of War André Maginot. It consisted of 5600 long-term defensive fortifications, 70 bunkers, 500 artillery and infantry units, 500 casemates, as well as dugouts and observation posts. The total number of troops on the line reached 300 thousand people. Built from 1929 to 1934, it was being improved until 1940.

Breakthrough of the Maginot Line

On May 17, 1940, 2-va 210-mm guns opened fire on the fortification of La Ferte (La Ferte), on the 18th, the garrisons of the two casemates retreated. On the 19th, the entire fortification was captured, the German assault groups began to capture one fortification after another. From May 20 to May 23, the Germans liquidated 4 fortifications.

After that, the Wehrmacht carried out operations "Tiger" and "Bear" - on June 14, the Wehrmacht broke through the Saar fortified area, and by the 21st they went to the rear of the Metz fortified area. In the Lauter fortified area, the Wehrmacht broke through between Bitsch and Lembak.

In addition, on June 15, the Germans began crossing the Rhine. The Rhine fortifications tried to repulse the advancing, but the old weak caponiers were unable to resist the fire of 88-mm anti-aircraft guns. Wehrmacht troops captured the first line of fortifications and went to the second. The French field units were ordered to withdraw. The Rhine fortifications fell.

Methods

They widely used heavy artillery, 420 mm, 280 mm siege mortars, 355 mm, 305 mm, 210 mm guns, even 88 mm anti-aircraft guns were successfully used.

Ground attack aircraft, dive bombers.

Assault groups, special sapper units.

Suddenness and fantasy, for example: on May 10, 1940, a German air assault group, on 40 gliders, landed on the roof of Fort Eben Emael (in Belgium) and forced the garrison to capitulate by blowing up shaped charges on the domes and towers of the fort.

The fortifications of the so-called. "Stalin lines" in the summer of 1941. Yes, and the "Mannerheim Line" the Red Army in Finland hacked.
The mechanism of the army of the 20th century crushed concrete fortifications without any problems. Forts, fortresses, casemates, pillboxes were not an obstacle to modern armies. The attack defeated the defense.

System of fortifications along the eastern border of France (length approx. 380 km); was considered the most fortified border line in Europe. The name is named after A. Maginot ...

- (“Maginot Line”), a system of French fortifications on the border with Germany from Belfort to Longuyon with a length of about 380 km. Built at the suggestion of the Minister of War A. Maginot (A. Maginot) in 1929 34, improved until 1940. ... ... Great Soviet Encyclopedia

- "MAGINO LINE", a system of French fortifications (built in 1929-34; improved until 1940) on the border with Germany from Belfort to Longuyon; OK. 400 km. Named after the Minister of War, General A. Maginot (A. Maginot). In 1940, the German ... ... encyclopedic Dictionary

And fortified areas on it (1939 1941) G.K. Zhukov about the Mol line ... Wikipedia

In the Bullecourt area, aerial view ... Wikipedia

The Maginot Line (fr. la Ligne Maginot) is a system of French fortifications on the border with Germany from Belfort to Longuyon. It was built in 1929 1934 (then improved until 1940). The length is about 400 km. Named after the military ... ... Wikipedia

Karelian isthmus. The borders between the USSR and Finland before ... Wikipedia

Franz. fortification strengthening the strategic destination on the border with Germany. Named after the soldier. Minister A. Maginot. It was a long-term system. fortified r new, lanes and sections with a length of St. 400 km. Erected in 1928 40 on the basis of ... ... Soviet historical encyclopedia

Bunker H4 near the village of Gaakht and the gateway through which the anti-tank ditch was supposed to be filled with Dil water ... Wikipedia

Maginot line- see Maginot Line... The fate of eponyms. Dictionary-reference

Books

• "Stalin's Line" in battle, Vinichenko M.V., Runov V.A. It is lauded as "the most powerful and extended defensive system" in history, surpassing in all respects the famous "Mannerheim Line" and "Maginot Line". She is called "impregnable ...
• All fortified areas and defensive lines of World War II, Valentin Runov. NEW book from the author of the bestselling book "Stalin's Line" in battle. The true history of all fortified areas and defensive zones of the Second World War and the fighting during their breakthrough. Mannerheim Line and… electronic book

"Inside the citadel of a static (static?) war.
One of the bastions of the mighty Maginot Line"
From publications in the English (American?) press for December 1939.

In principle, English signatures should not confuse people who are familiar with military affairs, but do not speak English - everything is obvious.

From Wikipedia:

Maginot Line(fr. la Ligne Maginot) - a system of French fortifications, on the border with Germany from Belfort to Longillon. It was built in 1929-1934 (then improved until 1940). The length is about 400 km. Named after Minister of War André Maginot.

It consisted of 39 long-term defensive fortifications, 75 bunkers, 500 artillery and infantry units, 500 casemates, as well as dugouts and observation posts.

The Maginot Line was built to fulfill several purposes:

• In order to avoid a surprise attack and give a signal for the start of defense measures.


• To protect Alsace and Lorraine (these territories were given to France in 1919) and their industrial potential.


• To be used as a strategic springboard for a counteroffensive.


• In order to hold back the advance of the enemy for the duration of the mobilization and as long as the bulk of the army could be brought to the line.

The French assumed that the Germans would act in the same way as in 1914 - they would bypass the French troops through Belgium from the northeast. Therefore, their defense plan involved repelling a German attack on the Dil River and passive defense on the fortified Maginot Line.

About 3 billion francs (1 billion dollars in the prices of those years) were spent on the construction of the Maginot Line. The total number of troops on the line reached 300 thousand people. The underground multi-level forts were equipped with living quarters for personnel, power stations, powerful ventilation systems, narrow-gauge railways, telephone exchanges, hospitals, rest rooms, inaccessible to shells and air bombs. In the upper ground floors there were gun casemates equipped with elevators. They were concrete "boxes" dug into the ground with walls and ceilings 3.5-4 meters thick. An armored turret protruded upward.

In front of the first line of defense, anti-tank ditches were dug and barriers of anti-tank hedgehogs were put up. Behind the first line of defense was a network of strongholds - concrete platforms for infantry, artillery, searchlights, etc. At these points, at a depth of about 50 meters underground, there were ammunition depots and equipment equipped with elevators. Even further away were the positions of long-range large-caliber guns on the railway track. The old one was also upgraded. defensive line, consisting of the forts of Belfort, Epinal, Verdun and others. The depth of defense of the Maginot Line was 90-100 km.

French military strategists considered the Maginot Line impregnable. After the entry of Wehrmacht troops into Poland in 1939, France and Great Britain decided that they could not help Poland quickly and instead began to plan a long war. In early September, France hesitantly moved its troops into the Saar region, but on October 4, after the defeat of Poland, they again withdrew them behind the Maginot Line (the so-called Strange War). In 1940, German troops quickly bypassed the Maginot Line from the north through the Ardennes. After the surrender of France, the Maginot Line garrison surrendered.

On June 14, 1940, the 1st and 7th Infantry Armies of Army Group C, Colonel General Wilhelm von Leeb (19 July 1940 promoted to Field Marshal) attacked the Maginot Line and broke through it. The defenses of the Maginot Line were broken through in a few hours as a result of an infantry offensive, even without tank support. The German infantry advanced with powerful air and artillery support, and smoke shells were widely used. It soon became clear that many of the French pillboxes could not withstand direct hits from artillery shells and air bombs. In addition, a large number of structures were not adapted for all-round defense, and they could easily be attacked from the rear and flank with grenades and flamethrowers.

Many historians believe that in the conditions of modern warfare, such high-cost fortifications are quite vulnerable and do not provide effective protection. However, in fairness, it should be noted that for the most part, the Maginot Line, as it was conceived by the creators in the 1920s, fulfilled its main task, which was to limit the scale of attacks on positions protected by the line. The main and well-built part of the line was built before 1936, when Belgium abandoned the allied pact with France, declaring neutrality, which forced the latter to hastily complete the line along the Belgian border to the Atlantic Ocean. This new part of the line was built in a hurry and was not brought up to the proper level of protection. Therefore, when it is said about the breakthrough of the Maginot Line, it means the breakthrough of new sections of the line built in marshland, where the construction of underground structures was very difficult. The defeat of France in 1940 was not the result of shortcomings in the central part of the line (which, despite numerous attempts by the German army, was broken through only in two places, which happened after the fall of Paris and the retreat of most of the French army), but was the result of numerous strategic miscalculations the government of the French Republic, which failed to take advantage of the advantages created by the existence of this powerful defensive line.

After the war, part of the buildings of the Maginot Line was transferred to warehouses for military equipment. A kind of video tour of the Maginot line in the 21st century can serve as a French film in 2004 "Crimson Rivers 2: Angels of the Apocalypse."