German Intelligence Service. Military intelligence in the German army

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to take a single complex of buildings specially built for him in Cheltenham, called the "donut" for the corresponding architecture.

GCHQ, like SIS, is directly related to the formation of the US intelligence agencies, in particular the NSA, which was created with the direct participation of GCHQ specialists. Not surprisingly, GCHQ and NSA are closely cooperating, forming a single system of electronic and electronic intelligence (the so-called "Echelon").

Special services of Germany

The German special services engaged in intelligence activities include the following institutions, bodies and subdivisions of the executive branch.

Intelligence agencies subordinate to the administration of the Federal Chancellor.

Federal Intelligence Service (BND - Bundesnachrichtendienstes). The main intelligence service of Germany, engaged in foreign intelligence. In Russian-language literature, the transliteration of the German abbreviation is used to designate it

Special services subordinate to the Minister of the Interior.

Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV - Bundesamt for Verfassungsschutz). The main secret service of Germany, engaged in counterintelligence. In Russian-language literature, the transliteration of the German abbreviation - BFF is used to designate it.

Land Offices for the Protection of the Constitution (LfV - Landesamt for Verfassungsschutz). The Federal Law on the Protection of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany determines the creation of both a federal body for the protection of the Constitution and bodies operating within the subjects of the federation - the lands. The Land Offices for the Protection of the Constitution perform the same functions as the BFF, provided that the cases they deal with do not go beyond the regional level. The BFF has exclusive jurisdiction over federal affairs, as well as all cases related to espionage against the FRG.

Federal Office for Information Technology Security (BSI - Bundesamt for Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik). Designed to provide security

secure government communications, develop standards and regulations in the field of information security, conduct certification of information systems and components, provide support to the Federal Office and the Land Offices for the protection of the Constitution in the investigation of illegal and other activities that use information technology.

Intelligence agencies subordinate to the Minister of Defense.

Intelligence Directorate of the Bundeswehr (ANBw - Amt for Nachrichten-wesen der Bundeswehr). The main military intelligence body responsible for collecting and evaluating information on the state of foreign armed forces.

Special services of Germany 91

Bundeswehr Radio Monitoring Office (AFMBw - Amt for Fernmeldwesen Bundeswehr). The main body of military radio intelligence.

Military Security Service (MAD - Militärischer Abschirmdienst). Military counterintelligence. It is, along with the BND and the BFF, the third main special service of Germany. In Russian-language literature, the transliteration of the German abbreviation - MAD is used to designate it.

Unlike most other special services of the leading countries of the world, the German special services, for obvious reasons, were actually created anew after the Second World War and for a long time worked under the control of the CIA.

The BND is entrusted with the task of conducting foreign intelligence. By creating this service, the German government deliberately combined military and political intelligence abroad in one department in order to exclude any kind of rivalry.

The BND is headed by the president, who is assisted in the operational management of the service by the vice president and the quality management apparatus. The structure of the BND includes eight departments.

Branch 1 - operational intelligence (Operative Aufklärung). Engaged in undercover intelligence (HUMINT).

Branch 2 - technical intelligence (Technische Beschaffung). Engaged in obtaining information from communication channels using technical means (SIGINT), as well as the disclosure of ciphers.

Department 3 - evaluation (Auswertung). An analytical unit that forms tasks for obtaining information for departments 1, 2 and 5 and processes the received data with the provision of reports, certificates and summaries to political, military and law enforcement structures.

Branch 4 - administration and general services (Steuerung und zentrale Dienstleistung).

Supports key business units by providing human resources, development, finance and legal services.

Branch 5 - Operational Intelligence and Evaluation for Organized Crime and International Terrorism Mining and analytical unit, designed to quickly obtain information about organized criminal communities involved in international terrorism, international drug trafficking, money laundering and illegal migration. Represents the BND in international organizations involved in combating related threats.

Department 6 - technical support (Technische Unterstützung). Provision of all departments of BND with the necessary equipment and technologies. All BND data processing systems are managed by this department. In addition, engineers and technicians

92 Chapter 3. Special services of the leading countries of the world and the former USSR

departments develop all the special equipment necessary for operational units to solve their problems.

Department 7 - BND school (Schule des BND). Closed educational institution for advanced training and retraining of BND employees.

Branch 8 - internal security and counterintelligence (Sicherheit, Geheimschutz und Spionageabwehr). This department is entrusted with control over ensuring the safety of state and official secrets by BND employees, as well as responsibility for conducting counterintelligence activities.

BND is one of the best intelligence agencies in the world. To some extent, this is due to the experience accumulated before 1945. It is no secret that after the announcement of the Cold War course, many professional intelligence officers who had previously been in the service of the Third Reich were recruited to work in the intelligence agencies of the FRG, for example, General Reinhard Gehlen, who headed the analytical department of the German General Staff during the war. By the way, today it is already known that to a large extent this experience was Soviet - before the aggravation of relations with Germany, the NKVD, as well as other "power" departments of the USSR, provided Hitler's special services with a tangible methodical (and, apparently, not only methodical) help. After the war, the BND worked for a long time under the vigilant tutelage of the CIA, and its main opponent was the intelligence of the Ministry of State Security (“Stasi”), which did not miss a single chance to obtain information on the territory of the FRG. And, of course, the BND had to face, as they say, “face to face” with such Soviet special services as the KGB and the GRU. Thus, both the BND and East German intelligence were "at the forefront" of the confrontation between East and West, which could not but affect their professionalism.

The unification of Germany, when the German secret services gained access to the Stasi archives, also contributed to the strengthening of the BND, since counterintelligence was able to identify many embedded intelligence officers of the GDR and the USSR (although perhaps not the most important ones - much could remain in the hands of the CIA), and also thanks to access to materials revealing the methods of conducting operational work of the best intelligence services in the world.

Thus, the BND and other special services of the FRG absorbed all the best that had been accumulated by the German, Soviet, American, British and East German special services. This is even evident from the BND structure - it is simple and at the same time close to optimal. We can say that such a structure is a model of the structure of the intelligence service of a democratic European state, comparable in size to Germany, for example, Ukraine.

The British MI5 had the greatest influence on the development and formation of the BFF, so these two special services are quite similar (for example, BFF officers cannot carry out arrests and detentions, they do not have the right to carry and use weapons, etc.). In addition, the BFF, for obvious reasons, could not use specific

Collection by Germany of reconnaissance against the USSR

In order to implement the strategic plans for an armed attack on neighboring countries, Hitler told his entourage about them as early as November 5, 1937 - fascist Germany, naturally, needed extensive and reliable information that would reveal all aspects of the life of future victims of aggression, and especially information on the basis of which it would be to draw a conclusion about their defense potential. By supplying government bodies and the high command of the Wehrmacht with such information, the "total espionage" services actively contributed to the preparation of the country for war. Intelligence information was obtained in different ways, using a variety of methods and means.

The Second World War, unleashed by Nazi Germany on September 1, 1939, began with the invasion of German troops into Poland. But Hitler considered the defeat of the Soviet Union, the conquest of a new "living space" in the East up to the Urals, to the achievement of which all state bodies of the country, and primarily the Wehrmacht and intelligence, were oriented. The Soviet-German non-aggression treaty signed on August 23, 1939, as well as the Friendship and Border Treaty concluded on September 28 of the same year, were supposed to serve as camouflage. Moreover, the opportunities opened up as a result of this were used to increase activity in the intelligence work against the USSR that was carried out throughout the entire pre-war period. Hitler constantly demanded from Canaris and Heydrich new information about the measures taken by the Soviet authorities to organize a rebuff to armed aggression.

As already noted, in the first years after the establishment of the fascist dictatorship in Germany, the Soviet Union was viewed primarily as a political enemy. Therefore, everything that related to him was within the competence of the security service. But this arrangement did not last long. Soon, in accordance with the criminal plans of the Nazi elite and the German military command, all the services of "total espionage" were involved in a secret war against the world's first country of socialism. Speaking about the direction of the espionage and sabotage activities of Nazi Germany at that time, Schellenberg wrote in his memoirs: “The decisive and decisive action of all secret services against Russia was considered the first and most important task.”

The intensity of these actions increased markedly from the autumn of 1939, especially after the victory over France, when the Abwehr and SD were able to release their significant forces occupied in this region and use them in the eastern direction. The secret services, as is clear from archival documents, were then given a specific task: to clarify and supplement the available information about the economic and political situation of the Soviet Union, to ensure the regular flow of information about its defense capability and future theaters of military operations. They were also instructed to develop a detailed plan for organizing sabotage and terrorist actions on the territory of the USSR, timed to coincide with the time of the first offensive operations of the Nazi troops. In addition, they were called upon, as has already been said in detail, to guarantee the secrecy of the invasion and to launch a wide campaign of misinformation of world public opinion. This was how the program of actions of Hitler's intelligence against the USSR was determined, in which the leading place, for obvious reasons, was given to espionage.

Archival materials and other quite reliable sources contain a lot of evidence that an intense secret war against the Soviet Union began long before June 1941.

Zally Headquarters

By the time of the attack on the USSR, the activity of the Abwehr - this leader among the Nazi secret services in the field of espionage and sabotage - had reached its climax. In June 1941, the "Zalli Headquarters" was created, designed to provide leadership in all types of espionage and sabotage directed against the Soviet Union. The Valley Headquarters directly coordinated the actions of teams and groups attached to army groups for conducting reconnaissance and sabotage operations. It was then stationed near Warsaw, in the town of Sulejuwek, and was led by an experienced intelligence officer, Schmalschleger.

Here is some evidence of how events unfolded.

One of the prominent employees of German military intelligence, Stolze, during interrogation on December 25, 1945, testified that the head of the Abwehr II, Colonel Lahousen, having informed him in April 1941 of the date of the German attack on the USSR, demanded to urgently study all the materials at the disposal of the Abwehr regarding Soviet Union. It was necessary to find out the possibility of inflicting a powerful blow on the most important Soviet military-industrial facilities in order to completely or partially disable them. At the same time, a top-secret division was created within the framework of the Abwehr II, headed by Stolze. For reasons of secrecy, it had the running name "Group A". His duties included the planning and preparation of large-scale sabotage operations. They were undertaken, as Lahousen emphasized, in the hope that they would be able to disorganize the rear of the Red Army, sow panic among the local population, and thereby facilitate the advance of the Nazi troops.

Lahousen acquainted Stolze with the order of the headquarters of the operational leadership, signed by Field Marshal Keitel, which outlined in general terms the directive of the Wehrmacht Supreme High Command to deploy sabotage activities on Soviet territory after the start of the Barbarossa plan. The Abwehr was supposed to start carrying out actions aimed at inciting national hatred between the peoples of the USSR, to which the Nazi elite attached particular importance. Guided by the directive of the supreme command, Stolze conspired with the leaders of the Ukrainian nationalists Melnik and Bendera that they would immediately begin organizing in Ukraine the actions of nationalist elements hostile to Soviet power, timing them to coincide with the moment of the invasion of the Nazi troops. At the same time, the Abwehr II began to send its agents from among the Ukrainian nationalists to the territory of Ukraine, some of whom had the task of compiling or clarifying lists of local party and Soviet assets to be destroyed. Subversive actions involving nationalists of all stripes were also carried out in other regions of the USSR.

Actions of ABWER against the USSR

Abwehr II, according to Stolze's testimony, formed and armed "special detachments" for operations (in violation of international rules of warfare) in the Soviet Baltic states, tested back in the initial period of World War II. One of these detachments, whose soldiers and officers were dressed in Soviet military uniforms, had the task of seizing the railway tunnel and bridges near Vilnius. Until May 1941, 75 Abwehr and SD intelligence groups were neutralized on the territory of Lithuania, which, as documented, launched active espionage and sabotage activities here on the eve of Nazi Germany's attack on the USSR.

How great was the attention of the high command of the Wehrmacht to the deployment of sabotage operations in the rear of the Soviet troops, shows the fact that the "special detachments" and "special teams" of the Abwehr were in all army groups and armies concentrated on the eastern borders of Germany.

According to Stolze's testimony, the Abwehr branches in Koenigsberg, Warsaw and Krakow had a directive from Canaris in connection with the preparation of an attack on the USSR to intensify espionage and sabotage activities to the maximum. The task was to provide the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht with detailed and most accurate data on the system of targets on the territory of the USSR, primarily on roads and railways, bridges, power plants and other objects, the destruction of which could lead to a serious disorganization of the Soviet rear and in in the end would have paralyzed his forces and broken the resistance of the Red Army. The Abwehr was supposed to extend its tentacles to the most important communications, military-industrial facilities, as well as large administrative and political centers of the USSR - in any case, it was planned.

Summing up some of the work carried out by the Abwehr by the time the German invasion of the USSR began, Canaris wrote in a memorandum that numerous groups of agents from the indigenous population, that is, from Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Poles, Balts, Finns, etc., were sent to the headquarters of the German armies. n. Each group consisted of 25 (or more) people. These groups were led by German officers. They were supposed to penetrate into the Soviet rear to a depth of 50,300 kilometers behind the front line in order to report by radio the results of their observations, paying special attention to collecting information about Soviet reserves, the state of railways and other roads, as well as about all activities carried out by the enemy. .

In the prewar years, the German embassy in Moscow and the German consulates in Leningrad, Kharkov, Tbilisi, Kyiv, Odessa, Novosibirsk and Vladivostok served as the center for organizing espionage, the main base for the strongholds of Hitler's intelligence. In those years, a large group of career German intelligence officers, the most experienced professionals, representing all parts of the Nazi “total espionage” system, and especially the Abwehr and the SD, worked in the diplomatic field in the USSR in those years. Despite the obstacles put up by the Chekist authorities, they, shamelessly using their diplomatic immunity, developed a high activity here, striving, first of all, as archival materials of those years indicate, to test the defense power of our country.

Erich Köstring

The Abwehr residency in Moscow was headed at that time by General Erich Köstring, who until 1941 was known in German intelligence circles as "the most knowledgeable specialist on the Soviet Union." He was born and lived for some time in Moscow, so he was fluent in Russian and was familiar with the way of life in Russia. During the First World War, he fought against the tsarist army, then in the 1920s he worked in a special center that studied the Red Army. From 1931 to 1933, in the final period of Soviet-German military cooperation, he acted as an observer from the Reichswehr in the USSR. He again ended up in Moscow in October 1935 as a military and aviation attache in Germany and stayed until 1941. He had a wide circle of acquaintances in the Soviet Union, whom he sought to use to obtain information of interest to him.

However, of the many questions that Köstring received from Germany six months after his arrival in Moscow, he was able to answer only a few. In his letter to the head of the intelligence department for the armies of the East, he explained this as follows: “The experience of several months of work here has shown that there can be no question of the possibility of obtaining military intelligence information, even remotely related to the military industry, even on the most harmless issues. . Visits to military units have been suspended. One gets the impression that the Russians are supplying all attachés with a set of false information.” The letter ended with an assurance that he nevertheless hoped that he would be able to draw up "a mosaic picture reflecting the further development and organizational structure of the Red Army."

After the German consulates were closed in 1938, the military attaches of other countries were deprived of the opportunity to attend military parades for two years, and, in addition, restrictions were placed on foreigners establishing contacts with Soviet citizens. Köstring, in his words, was forced to return to using three "meager sources of information": traveling around the territory of the USSR and traveling by car to various regions of the Moscow region, using the open Soviet press, and, finally, exchanging information with military attaches of other countries.

In one of his reports, he draws the following conclusion about the state of affairs in the Red Army: “As a result of the liquidation of the main part of the senior officers, who mastered the military art quite well in the process of ten years of practical training and theoretical training, the operational capabilities of the Red Army have decreased. The lack of military order and the lack of experienced commanders will have a negative effect for some time on the training and education of troops. The irresponsibility that is already manifesting itself in military affairs will lead to even more serious negative consequences in the future. The army is deprived of commanders of the highest qualification. Nevertheless, there are no grounds for concluding that the offensive capabilities of the mass of soldiers have declined to such an extent as not to recognize the Red Army as a very important factor in the event of a military conflict.

In a message to Berlin by Lieutenant Colonel Hans Krebs, who replaced the ill Köstring, dated April 22, 1941, it was said: “The Soviet ground forces, of course, have not yet reached the maximum number according to the combat schedule for wartime, determined by us at 200 infantry rifle divisions. This information was recently confirmed by the military attachés of Finland and Japan in a conversation with me.

A few weeks later, Köstring and Krebs made a special trip to Berlin to personally inform Hitler that there were no significant changes for the better in the Red Army.

The employees of the Abwehr and SD, who used diplomatic and other official cover in the USSR, were tasked, along with strictly oriented information, to collect information on a wide range of military-economic problems. This information had a very specific purpose - it was supposed to enable the strategic planning bodies of the Wehrmacht to get an idea of ​​​​the conditions in which the Nazi troops would have to operate on the territory of the USSR, and in particular when capturing Moscow, Leningrad, Kyiv and other large cities. The coordinates of the objects of future bombardments were clarified. Even then, a network of underground radio stations was being created to transmit the collected information, caches were set up in public and other suitable places where instructions from Nazi intelligence centers and items of sabotage equipment could be stored so that agents sent and located on the territory of the USSR could use them at the right time.

Using trade relations between Germany and the USSR for intelligence

For the purpose of espionage, cadres, secret agents and proxies of the Abwehr and the SD were systematically sent to the Soviet Union, for the penetration of which into our country the intensively developing economic, trade, economic and cultural ties between the USSR and Germany in those years were used. With their help, such important tasks were solved as collecting information about the military and economic potential of the USSR, in particular about the defense industry (capacity, zoning, bottlenecks), about the industry as a whole, its individual large centers, energy systems, communication routes, sources of industrial raw materials, etc. Representatives of business circles were especially active, who often, along with the collection of intelligence information, carried out instructions to establish communications on Soviet territory with agents whom German intelligence managed to recruit during the period of active functioning of German concerns and firms in our country.

Attaching great importance to the use of legal possibilities in intelligence work against the USSR and in every possible way seeking to expand them, both the Abwehr and the SD, at the same time, proceeded from the fact that the information obtained in this way, in its predominant part, is not capable of serving as a sufficient basis for developing specific plans, adopting correct decisions in the military-political field. And besides, based only on such information, they believed, it is difficult to form a reliable and somewhat complete picture of tomorrow's military enemy, his forces and reserves. To fill the gap, the Abwehr and the SD, as confirmed by many documents, are making attempts to intensify work against our country by illegal means, seeking to acquire secret sources within the country or send secret agents from beyond the cordon, counting on their settling in the USSR. This, in particular, is evidenced by the following fact: the head of the Abwehr intelligence group in the United States, officer G. Rumrich, at the beginning of 1938, had instructions from his center to obtain blank forms of American passports for agents thrown into Russia.

“Can you get at least fifty of them?” Rumrich was asked in a cipher telegram from Berlin. Abwehr was ready to pay a thousand dollars for each blank American passport - they were so necessary.

Long before the start of the war against the USSR, documentary specialists from the secret services of Nazi Germany scrupulously followed all the changes in the procedure for issuing and issuing personal documents of Soviet citizens. They showed an increased interest in clarifying the system for protecting military documents from forgery, trying to establish the procedure for the use of conditional secret signs.

In addition to agents illegally sent to the Soviet Union, the Abwehr and the SD used their official employees, embedded in the commission to determine the line of the German-Soviet border and the resettlement of Germans living in the western regions of Ukraine, Belarus, as well as the Baltic states, to obtain information of interest to them. territory of Germany.

Already at the end of 1939, Hitler's intelligence began to systematically send agents to the USSR from the territory of occupied Poland to conduct military espionage. They were usually professionals. It is known, for example, that one of these agents, who underwent 15 months of training in the Berlin Abwehr school in 1938-1939, managed to illegally enter the USSR three times in 1940. Having made several long one-and-a-half to two-month trips to the regions of the Central Urals, Moscow and the North Caucasus, the agent returned safely to Germany.

Starting around April 1941, the Abwehr shifted mainly to dropping agents in groups led by experienced officers. All of them had the necessary espionage and sabotage equipment, including radio stations for receiving direct radio broadcasts from Berlin. They had to send response messages to a fictitious address in cryptography.

In the Minsk, Leningrad and Kiev directions, the depth of undercover intelligence reached 300-400 kilometers or more. Part of the agents, having reached certain points, had to settle there for some time and immediately begin to carry out the task received. Most of the agents (usually they did not have radio stations) had to return to the intelligence center no later than June 15-18, 1941, so that the information they obtained could be quickly used by the command.

What primarily interested the Abwehr and SD? The tasks for either group of agents, as a rule, differed little and boiled down to finding out the concentration of Soviet troops in the border areas, the deployment of headquarters, formations and units of the Red Army, points and areas where radio stations were located, the presence of ground and underground airfields, the number and types of aircraft based on them, the location of ammunition depots, explosives, fuel.

Some agents sent to the USSR were instructed by the intelligence center to refrain from specific practical actions until the start of the war. The goal is clear - the leaders of the Abwehr hoped in this way to keep their agent cells until the moment when the need for them would be especially great.

Sending German agents to the USSR in 1941

The activity of preparing agents for being sent to the Soviet Union is evidenced by such data, gleaned from the archives of the Abwehr. In mid-May 1941, about 100 people destined for deportation to the USSR were trained in the intelligence school of the department of Admiral Kanarys near Koenigsberg (in the town of Grossmichel).

Who was betting on? They come from the families of Russian emigrants who settled in Berlin after the October Revolution, the sons of former officers of the tsarist army who fought against Soviet Russia, and after the defeat they fled abroad, members of the nationalist organizations of Western Ukraine, the Baltic states, Poland, the Balkan countries, as a rule, who spoke Russian language.

Among the means used by Hitler's intelligence in violation of the generally accepted norms of international law was also aerial espionage, which was put at the service of the latest technical achievements. In the system of the Ministry of the Air Force of Nazi Germany, there was even a special unit - a special-purpose squadron, which, together with the secret service of this department, carried out reconnaissance work against the countries of interest to the Abwehr. During the flights, all structures important for the conduct of the war were photographed: ports, bridges, airfields, military facilities, industrial enterprises, etc. Thus, the Wehrmacht military cartographic service received in advance from the Abwehr the information necessary to compile good maps. Everything related to these flights was kept in the strictest confidence, and only the direct executors and those from a very limited circle of employees of the Abwehr I air group, whose duties included processing and analyzing data obtained through aerial reconnaissance, knew about them. Aerial photography materials were presented in the form of photographs, as a rule, to Canaris himself, in rare cases - to one of his deputies, and then transferred to the destination. It is known that the command of the special squadron of the Rovel Air Force, stationed in Staaken, already in 1937 began reconnaissance of the territory of the USSR using Hein-Kel-111 disguised as transport aircraft.

Air reconnaissance of Germany before the start of the war

An idea of ​​the intensity of aerial reconnaissance is given by the following generalized data: from October 1939 to June 22, 1941, German aircraft invaded the airspace of the Soviet Union more than 500 times. Many cases are known when civil aviation aircraft flying along the Berlin-Moscow route on the basis of agreements between Aeroflot and Lufthansa often deliberately strayed off course and ended up over military installations. Two weeks before the start of the war, the Germans also flew around the areas where the Soviet troops were located. Every day they photographed the location of our divisions, corps, armies, pinpointed the location of military radio transmitters that were not camouflaged.

A few months before the attack of fascist Germany on the USSR, aerial photographs of the Soviet territory were carried out at full speed. According to information received by our intelligence through agents from the referent of the German aviation headquarters, German aircraft flew to the Soviet side from airfields in Bucharest, Koenigsberg and Kirkenes (Northern Norway) and photographed from a height of 6 thousand meters. In the period from April 1 to April 19, 1941 alone, German planes violated the state border 43 times, making reconnaissance flights over our territory to a depth of 200 kilometers.

As established by the Nuremberg trials of the main war criminals, the materials obtained with the help of aerial photographic reconnaissance, carried out in 1939, even before the start of the invasion of Nazi troops in Poland, were used as a guide in the subsequent planning of military and sabotage operations against the USSR. Reconnaissance flights, which were carried out first over the territory of Poland, then the Soviet Union (to Chernigov) and the countries of South-Eastern Europe, some time later were transferred to Leningrad, to which, as an object of air espionage, the main attention was riveted. It is known from archival documents that on February 13, 1940, Canaris' report “On new results of aerial reconnaissance against the SSSL received by the Rovel special squadron” was heard from General Jodl at the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht Supreme High Command. Since that time, the scale of air espionage has increased dramatically. His main task was to obtain information necessary for compiling geographical maps of the USSR. At the same time, special attention was paid to naval military bases and other strategically important objects (for example, the Shostka gunpowder plant) and, especially, oil production centers, oil refineries, and oil pipelines. Future objects for bombing were also determined.

An important channel for obtaining espionage information about the USSR and its armed forces was the regular exchange of information with the intelligence agencies of the allied countries of Nazi Germany - Japan, Italy, Finland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. In addition, the Abwehr maintained working contacts with the military intelligence services of the countries neighboring the Soviet Union - Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Schellenberg even set himself the task of developing the secret services of countries friendly to Germany and rallying them into a kind of “intelligence community” that would work for one common center and supply the countries included in it with the necessary information (a goal that was generally achieved after war in NATO in the form of informal cooperation between various secret services under the auspices of the CIA).

Denmark, for example, in whose secret service Schellenberg, with the support of the leadership of the local National Socialist Party, managed to take a leading position and where there was already a good “operational reserve”, was “used as a“ base ”in intelligence work against England and Russia. According to Schellenberg, he managed to infiltrate the Soviet intelligence network. As a result, he writes, after some time a well-established connection with Russia was established, and we began to receive important information of a political nature.

The wider the preparations for the invasion of the USSR, the more vigorously Canaris tried to include his allies and satellites of Nazi Germany in intelligence activities, to put their agents into action. Through the Abwehr, the centers of Nazi military intelligence in the countries of South-Eastern Europe were ordered to intensify their work against the Soviet Union. The Abwehr has long maintained the closest contacts with the intelligence service of Horthy Hungary. According to P. Leverkün, the results of the actions of the Hungarian intelligence service in the Balkans were a valuable addition to the work of the Abwehr. An Abwehr liaison officer was constantly in Budapest, who exchanged information obtained. There was also a representative office of the SD, consisting of six people, headed by Hoettl. Their duty was to maintain contact with the Hungarian secret service and the German national minority, which served as a source of recruiting agents. The representative office had practically unlimited funds in stamps to pay for the services of agents. At first it was focused on solving political problems, but with the outbreak of war, its activities increasingly acquired a military orientation. In January 1940, Canaris set about organizing a powerful Abwehr center in Sofia in order to turn Bulgaria into one of the strongholds of his agent network. Contacts with Romanian intelligence were just as close. With the consent of the chief of Romanian intelligence, Morutsov, and with the assistance of oil firms that were dependent on German capital, Abwehr people were sent to the territory of Romania in the oil regions. The scouts acted under the guise of employees of firms - "mountain masters", and the soldiers of the sabotage regiment "Brandenburg" - local guards. Thus, the Abwehr managed to establish itself in the oil heart of Romania, and from here it began to spread its spy networks further to the east.

The Nazi services of "total espionage" in the struggle against the USSR even in the years preceding the war, had an ally in the face of the intelligence of militaristic Japan, whose ruling circles also made far-reaching plans for our country, the practical implementation of which they associated with the capture of Moscow by the Germans. And although there were never joint military plans between Germany and Japan, each of them pursued its own policy of aggression, sometimes trying to benefit at the expense of the other, nevertheless, both countries were interested in partnership and cooperation between themselves and therefore acted as a united front in the intelligence field . This, in particular, is eloquently evidenced by the activities in those years of the Japanese military attaché in Berlin, General Oshima. It is known that he coordinated the actions of Japanese intelligence residencies in European countries, where he established fairly close ties in political and business circles and maintained contacts with the leaders of the SD and the Abwehr. Through it, a regular exchange of intelligence data about the USSR was carried out. Oshima kept his ally informed about the concrete measures of Japanese intelligence in relation to our country and, in turn, was aware of the covert operations launched against it by fascist Germany. If necessary, he provided the undercover and other operational capabilities at his disposal and, on a mutual basis, willingly supplied intelligence information. Another key figure in Japanese intelligence in Europe was the Japanese envoy in Stockholm, Onodera.

In the plans of the Abwehr and the SD directed against the Soviet Union, an important place, for obvious reasons, was assigned to its neighboring states - the Baltic States, Finland, Poland.

The Nazis showed particular interest in Estonia, considering it as a purely “neutral” country, the territory of which could serve as a convenient springboard for deploying intelligence operations against the USSR. This was decisively facilitated by the fact that already in the second half of 1935, after a group of pro-fascist officers led by Colonel Maazing, head of the intelligence department of the General Staff, gained the upper hand at the headquarters of the Estonian army, there was a complete reorientation of the country's military command to Nazi Germany . In the spring of 1936, Maasing, and after him the chief of staff of the army, General Reek, willingly accepted the invitation of the leaders of the Wehrmacht to visit Berlin. During their time there, they struck up a business relationship with Canaris and his closest aides. An agreement was reached on mutual information on the intelligence line. The Germans undertook to equip Estonian intelligence with operational and technical means. As it turned out later, it was then that the Abwehr secured the official consent of Reek and Maazing to use the territory of Estonia to work against the USSR. At the disposal of Estonian intelligence were provided photographic equipment for the production of photographs of warships from the lighthouses of the Gulf of Finland, as well as radio interception devices, which were then installed along the entire Soviet-Estonian border. To provide technical assistance, specialists from the decryption department of the Wehrmacht high command were sent to Tallinn.

General Laidoner, commander-in-chief of the Estonian bourgeois army, assessed the results of these negotiations as follows: “We were mainly interested in information about the deployment of Soviet military forces in the region of our border and about the movements taking place there. All this information, insofar as they had it, the Germans willingly communicated to us. As for our intelligence department, it supplied the Germans with all the data we had on the Soviet rear and the internal situation in the SSSL.

General Pickenbrock, one of Canaris's closest aides, during interrogation on February 25, 1946, in particular, testified: “Estonian intelligence maintained very close ties with us. We constantly provided her with financial and technical support. Its activities were directed exclusively against the Soviet Union. The head of intelligence, Colonel Maazing, visited Berlin every year, and our representatives, as necessary, traveled to Estonia themselves. Captain Cellarius often visited there, who was entrusted with the task of monitoring the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, its position and maneuvers. An employee of Estonian intelligence, Captain Pigert, constantly cooperated with him. Before the Soviet troops entered Estonia, we left numerous agents there in advance, with whom we maintained regular contact and through which we received information of interest to us. When Soviet power arose there, our agents intensified their activities and, until the very moment of the occupation of the country, supplied us with the necessary information, thereby contributing to a significant extent to the success of the German troops. For some time, Estonia and Finland were the main sources of intelligence information about the Soviet armed forces.

In April 1939, General Reek was again invited to Germany, which was widely celebrating Hitler's birthday, whose visit, as expected in Berlin, was supposed to deepen interaction between the German and Estonian military intelligence services. With the assistance of the latter, the Abwehr managed to carry out in 1939 and 1940 the transfer of several groups of spies and saboteurs to the USSR. All this time, four radio stations were functioning along the Soviet-Estonian border, intercepting radiograms, and simultaneously monitoring the work of radio stations on the territory of the USSR was carried out from different points. The information obtained in this way was passed on to the Abwehr, from which the Estonian intelligence had no secrets, especially with regard to the Soviet Union.

The Baltic countries in intelligence against the USSR

Abwehr leaders regularly traveled to Estonia once a year to exchange information. The heads of the intelligence services of these countries, in turn, visited Berlin every year. Thus, the exchange of accumulated secret information took place every six months. In addition, special couriers were periodically sent from both sides when it was necessary to urgently deliver the necessary information to the center; sometimes military attachés at the Estonian and German embassies were authorized for this purpose. The information transmitted by Estonian intelligence mainly contained data on the state of the armed forces and the military-industrial potential of the Soviet Union.

The Abwehr archives contain materials about the stay of Canaris and Pikenbrock in Estonia in 1937, 1938 and June 1939. In all cases, these trips were caused by the need to improve the coordination of actions against the USSR and the exchange of intelligence information. Here is what General Laidoner, already mentioned above, writes: “The head of German intelligence, Kanaris, visited Estonia for the first time in 1936. After that, he visited here twice or thrice. I took it personally. Negotiations on issues of intelligence work were conducted with him by the head of the army headquarters and the head of the 2nd department. Then it was established more specifically what information was required for both countries and what we could give each other. The last time Canaris visited Estonia was in June 1939. It was mainly about intelligence activities. I spoke with Canaris at some length about our position in the event of a clash between Germany and England and between Germany and the USSR. He was interested in the question of how long it would take the Soviet Union to fully mobilize its armed forces and what was the condition of its means of transport (railway, road and road). On this visit, together with Canaris and Pikenbrock, there was the head of the Abwehr III department, Frans Bentivegni, whose trip was connected with checking the work of a group subordinate to him, which carried out extra-cordon counterintelligence activities in Tallinn. In order to avoid the “inept interference” of the Gestapo in the affairs of the counterintelligence of the Abwehr, at the insistence of Canaris, an agreement was reached between him and Heydrich that in all cases when the security police would carry out any activities on Estonian territory, the Abwehr must first be informed . For his part, Heydrich put forward a demand - the SD should have an independent residency in Estonia. Realizing that in the event of an open quarrel with the influential chief of the imperial security service, it would be difficult for the Abwehr to count on Hitler's support, Canaris agreed to "make room" and accepted Heydrich's demand. At the same time, they agreed that all the activities of the SD in the field of recruiting agents in Estonia and transferring them to the Soviet Union would be coordinated with the Abwehr. The Abwehr retained the right to concentrate in their hands and evaluate all intelligence information regarding the Red Army and Navy, which the Nazis received through Estonia, as, indeed, through other Baltic countries and Finland. Canaris strongly objected to the attempts of the SD employees to act together with the Estonian fascists, bypassing the Abwehr and sending unverified information to Berlin, which often came to Hitler through Himmler.

According to Laidoner's report to Estonian President Päts, the last time Canaris was in Tallinn was in the autumn of 1939 under a false name. In this regard, his meeting with Laidoner and Päts was arranged according to all the rules of conspiracy.

In the report of the Schellenberg department, preserved in the archives of the RSHA, it was reported that the operational situation for intelligence work through the SD in the pre-war period in both Estonia and Latvia was similar. At the head of the residency in each of these countries was an official employee of the SD, who was in an illegal position. All the information collected by the residency flowed to him, which he forwarded to the center by mail using cryptography, through couriers on German ships or through embassy channels. The practical activities of the SD intelligence residencies in the Baltic states were assessed positively by Berlin, especially in terms of acquiring sources of information in political circles. The SD was greatly assisted by immigrants from Germany who lived here. But, as noted in the above-mentioned report of the VI Department of the RSHA, “after the entry of the Russians, the operational capabilities of the SD underwent serious changes. The leading figures of the country left the political arena, and maintaining contact with them became more difficult. There was an urgent need to find new channels for transmitting intelligence information to the center. It became impossible to send it on ships, since the ships were carefully searched by the authorities, and the members of the crews who went ashore were constantly monitored. I also had to refuse to send information through the free port of Memel (now Klaipeda, Lithuanian SSR. - Ed.) via overland communication. It was also risky to use sympathetic ink. I had to resolutely take up the laying of new communication channels, as well as the search for fresh sources of information. The SD resident in Estonia, who spoke in official correspondence under the code number 6513, nevertheless managed to make contact with newly recruited agents and use old sources of information. Maintaining regular contact with his agents was a very dangerous business, requiring exceptional caution and dexterity. Resident 6513, however, was able to very quickly understand the situation and, despite all the difficulties, obtain the necessary information. In January 1940, he received a diplomatic passport and began working under the guise of an assistant at the German embassy in Tallinn.

As for Finland, according to the archival materials of the Wehrmacht, a “Military Organization” was actively operating on its territory, conditionally called the “Cellarius Bureau” (after its leader, the German military intelligence officer Cellarius). It was created by the Abwehr with the consent of the Finnish military authorities in mid-1939. Since 1936, Canaris and his closest assistants Pikenbrock and Bentivegni have repeatedly met in Finland and Germany with the head of Finnish intelligence, Colonel Swenson, and then with Colonel Melander, who replaced him. At these meetings, they exchanged intelligence information and worked out plans for joint action against the Soviet Union. The Cellarius Bureau constantly kept in view the Baltic Fleet, the troops of the Leningrad Military District, as well as units stationed in Estonia. His active assistants in Helsinki were Dobrovolsky, a former general of the tsarist army, and former tsarist officers Pushkarev, Alekseev, Sokolov, Batuev, Baltic Germans Meisner, Mansdorf, Estonian bourgeois nationalists Weller, Kurg, Horn, Kristyan and others. On the territory of Finland, Cellarius had a fairly wide network of agents among various segments of the country's population, recruited spies and saboteurs among the Russian White émigrés who had settled there, the nationalists who fled from Estonia, and the Baltic Germans.

Pickenbrock, during interrogation on February 25, 1946, gave detailed testimony about the activities of the Cellarius Bureau, saying that Captain First Rank Cellarius carried out intelligence work against the Soviet Union under the cover of the German embassy in Finland. “We have had close cooperation with Finnish intelligence for a long time, even before I joined the Abwehr in 1936. In order to exchange intelligence data, we systematically received information from the Finns about the deployment and strength of the Red Army.

As follows from Pickenbrock's testimony, he first visited Helsinki with Canaris and Major Stolz, head of the Abwehr department I of the Ost ground forces headquarters, in June 1937. Together with representatives of Finnish intelligence, they compared and exchanged intelligence information about the Soviet Union. At the same time, a questionnaire was handed over to the Finns, which they were to be guided in the future when collecting intelligence information. The Abwehr was primarily interested in the deployment of Red Army units, military industry facilities, especially in the Leningrad region. During this visit, they had business meetings and conversations with the German ambassador to Finland, von Blucher, and the military attaché, Major General Rossing. In June 1938, Canaris and Pickenbrock again visited Finland. On this visit, they were received by the Finnish Minister of War, who expressed satisfaction with the way Canaris's cooperation with the head of Finnish intelligence, Colonel Swenson, was developing. The third time they were in Finland was in June 1939. The head of Finnish intelligence at that time was Melander. The negotiations proceeded within the same framework as the previous ones. Informed in advance by the leaders of the Abwehr about the upcoming attack on the Soviet Union, Finnish military intelligence in early June 1941 put at their disposal the information it had in relation to the Soviet Union. At the same time, with the knowledge of the local authorities, the Abwehr began to carry out Operation Erna, which involved the transfer of Estonian counter-revolutionaries from Finland to the Baltic region as spies, radio agents and saboteurs.

The last time Canaris and Pickenbrock visited Finland was in the winter of 1941/42. Together with them was the chief of counterintelligence (Abwehr III) Bentivegni, who traveled to inspect and provide practical assistance to the "military organization", as well as to resolve issues of cooperation between this organization and Finnish intelligence. Together with Melander, they determined the boundaries of Cellarius' activities: he received the right to independently recruit agents on Finnish territory and transfer them across the front line. After the negotiations, Canaris and Pikenbrock, accompanied by Melander, went to the city of Mikkeli, to the headquarters of Marshal Mannerheim, who expressed a desire to personally meet with the chief of the German Abwehr. They were joined by the head of the German military mission in Finland, General Erfurt.

Cooperation with the intelligence services of the allied and occupied countries in the fight against the USSR undoubtedly brought certain results, but the Nazis expected more from him.

The results of the activities of German intelligence on the eve of the Great Patriotic War

“On the eve of the war, the Abwehr,” writes O. Reile, “was unable to cover the Soviet Union with a well-functioning intelligence network from well-located secret strongholds in other countries - Turkey, Afghanistan, Japan or Finland.” Created in peacetime strongholds in neutral countries - "military organizations" were either disguised as economic firms or included in German missions abroad. When the war began, Germany was cut off from many sources of information, and the importance of "military organizations" greatly increased. Until the middle of 1941, the Abwehr carried out systematic work on the border with the USSR in order to create its own strongholds and plant agents. Along the German-Soviet border, a wide network of technical reconnaissance equipment was deployed, with the help of which interception of radio communications was carried out.

In connection with Hitler's installation on the all-out deployment of the activities of all German secret services against the Soviet Union, the question of coordination became acute, especially after an agreement was concluded between the RSHA and the General Staff of the German Ground Forces to assign to each army special detachments of the SD, called "Einsatzgruppen" and "Einsatzkommando".

In the first half of June 1941, Heydrich and Canaris convened a meeting of Abwehr officers and commanders of police and SD units (Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommando). In addition to separate special reports, reports were made at it that covered in general terms the operational plans for the upcoming invasion of the USSR. The ground forces were represented at this meeting by the quartermaster general, who, regarding the technical side of cooperation between the secret services, relied on a draft order worked out in agreement with the chief of the SD. Canaris and Heydrich, in their speeches, touched upon the issues of interaction, "feeling of the elbow" between parts of the security police, the SD and the Abwehr. A few days after this meeting, both of them were received by the Reichsführer SS Himmler to discuss their proposed plan of action to counter Soviet intelligence.

Evidence of the scope that the activities of the "total espionage" services against the USSR on the eve of the war can serve as such generalizing data: only in 1940 and the first quarter of 1941 in the western regions of our country, 66 residencies of German fascist intelligence were discovered and more than 1300 of its agents were neutralized .

As a result of the activation of the “total espionage” services, the volume of information they collected about the Soviet Union, which required analysis and appropriate processing, constantly increased, and intelligence, as the Nazis wanted, became more and more comprehensive. There was a need to involve relevant research organizations in the process of studying and evaluating intelligence materials. One of these institutes, widely used by intelligence, located in Wanjie, was the largest collection of various Soviet literature, including reference books. The special value of this unique collection was that it contained an extensive selection of specialized literature on all branches of science and economics, published in the original language. The staff, which included well-known scientists from various universities, including immigrants from Russia, was headed by one Sovietologist professor, Georgian by origin. The impersonal secret information obtained by intelligence was transferred to the Institute, which he had to subject to careful study and generalization using the available reference literature, and return to Schellenberg's apparatus with his own expert assessment and comments.

Another research organization that also worked closely with intelligence was the Institute of Geopolitics. He carefully analyzed the collected information and, together with the Abwehr and the Department of Economics and Armaments of the Headquarters of the Wehrmacht High Command, compiled various reviews and reference materials on their basis. The nature of his interests can be judged at least from such documents prepared by him before the attack on the Soviet Union: “Military-geographical data on the European part of Russia”, “Geographical and ethnographic information about Belarus”, “Industry of Soviet Russia”, “Railway transport of the SSSL, "Baltic countries (with city plans)".

In the Reich, in total, there were about 400 research organizations dealing with socio-political, economic, scientific, technical, geographical and other problems of foreign states; all of them, as a rule, were staffed by highly qualified specialists who knew all aspects of the relevant problems, and were subsidized by the state according to a free budget. There was a procedure according to which all requests from Hitler - when he, for example, demanded information on any particular issue - were sent to several different organizations for execution. However, the reports and certificates prepared by them often did not satisfy the Fuhrer due to their academic nature. In response to the task received, the institutions issued "a set of general provisions, perhaps correct, but untimely and not clear enough."

In order to eliminate fragmentation and inconsistency in the work of research organizations, to increase their competence, and most importantly, their return, and also to ensure proper control over the quality of their conclusions and expert assessments based on intelligence materials, Schellenberg would later come to the conclusion that it was necessary to create an autonomous groups of specialists with higher education. Based on the materials placed at their disposal, in particular on the Soviet Union, and with the involvement of relevant research organizations, this group will organize the study of complex problems and, on this basis, develop in-depth recommendations and forecasts for the political and military leadership of the country.

The "Department of Foreign Armies of the East" of the General Staff of the Ground Forces was engaged in similar work. He concentrated materials coming from all intelligence and other sources and periodically compiled "reviews" for the highest military authorities, in which special attention was paid to the strength of the Red Army, the morale of the troops, the level of command personnel, the nature of combat training, etc.

Such is the place of the Nazi secret services as a whole in the military machine of Nazi Germany and the scope of their participation in the preparation of aggression against the USSR, in intelligence support for future offensive operations.

The three German secret services are the Federal Intelligence Service of the BND (operating abroad), the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution of the BFF (operating at home) and the Military Counterintelligence Service of the MAD (operating in the Bundeswehr). In addition to them, there are other institutions that partially use reconnaissance means and methods. The police are among them. Intelligence activities, to be effective, must be hidden from the public. But to avoid abuse, the legislature uses wide-ranging control mechanisms.

The commandment of the division of competencies is the achievement of the Germans.

In Germany, there is a precept for the division of competences between the secret services and the police authorities (especially the state security departments of the federal and state police services). In contrast to the German intelligence services, the German police, in order to carry out their tasks, investigate crimes and prevent risks, has the so-called coercive powers. She can arrest a person, search, summon for interrogation, interrogate, identify, search a home, confiscate objects. The German secret services do not have such powers. The commandment of separation prohibits the connection of members of the secret services to the police authorities and does not give them powers of coercion. Unlike the police, which act as a law enforcement agency on the principle of legality, that is, they are obliged to monitor, investigate, disclose and prevent offenses, the German intelligence services operate on the principle of expediency. This means that the intelligence agencies are not required to solve every crime and can have ample room for maneuver in the subsequent transfer of data on important offenses to the police services.

But the trend towards the transformation of the German police into an organization increasingly using the methods of the secret services is already evident. The commandment of separation of competencies is partly eroded by the legalization of intelligence methods for the police and the increased exchange of information between the police and intelligence agencies. The key concept in this case is “preventive fight against crime”, in which the police combine both the disclosure of offenses and protection from possible danger. What is behind this? In the "preventive fight against crime" for the actions of law enforcement agencies, neither the suspicion of a crime nor the danger to the police is necessary. But with the possible "investigations prior to a possible crime" on this basis, a problem arises: how can one determine in advance for sure whether there is a reason for police intervention or not?

With the expansion of the scope of surveillance, the use of covert investigative techniques by the police also increased. The police today already use quite a large set of tools from the intelligence field. This includes not only undercover detectives, unofficially investigating police officers and agents, but also the use of technical means for eavesdropping and surveillance inside and outside homes, interception of telephone conversations, mobile phones and e-mails, direction finding of electronic transmitters, the use of video surveillance and even requirements for surveillance from the air or from satellites as part of "interagency assistance".

The essence of the separation commandment is now being criticized more and more sharply in Germany in connection with the new dangers to internal security. Germany's European and international partners do not know such a commandment.

Three German secret services

Federal Intelligence Service (BND).

The task of the BND is foreign intelligence abroad. There are two broad areas of activity:

Obtaining political and economic information about foreign states (actors, structures, processes, developments, "know-how") that are of political or economic importance for Germany.

Analysis and evaluation of this received information in order to provide decision makers with the final results with information about the processes taking place abroad.

The BND keeps the government up to date on developments in other countries. Where are the conflicts? How is German export used? Is it being used for possibly "improper purposes"? Is there any reason for concern? Whom are international terrorism, money laundering, illegal trade in arms or drugs aimed at? The answers to these questions are important to policy makers, as the Federal Republic exports its goods all over the world, has many global contacts, and can therefore be vulnerable in the event of conflict or tension.

Eight departments report to the President of the BND, among them:

Department 1 - Operational Intelligence - is engaged in obtaining secret information from "human sources" - that is, from agents (HUMINT). We are talking about the knowledge of informants who have good contacts and access opportunities in the country of interest. In the recruitment of such agents, the foreign representations of the BND - residencies - play an important role. Obtaining information by technical methods rarely gives a voluminous complete picture. With the help of informants, information about crisis processes and dangers, such as ethnic and religious conflicts, instability, social and environmental problems, as well as, for example, new advances in technology, medicine, etc., can be obtained in a timely manner.

Department 2 - Technical intelligence - is engaged in obtaining information using technical means. At the same time, in particular, purposeful filtering of international communication flows is carried out.

Department 3 - Analysis - is both the initial and the final link in the chain of intelligence work. The needs of the Federal Government are transformed here into intelligence missions. Materials obtained openly or secretly in the same department are brought together and analyzed. This creates a situation report that is shared with the Federal Government and other government agencies.

Division 5 - Operational intelligence/analysis of organized crime and international terrorism. This department of the BND is a response to the increased need for information on organized crime and international terrorism. Section 5 works in close international cooperation with other intelligence, security agencies and academic institutions.

Department 6 - Technical Support - provides all departments of the BND with a wide range of technical services. To cope with this task, the department must follow the latest technical developments and innovations around the world, for example, in such areas as "communication technology", "data processing", "telecommunications" or "chemical and physical research". Numerous computer programs for use in the BND, for example, are largely developed by this department and have become part of the intradepartmental programs for research and development of intelligence equipment.

Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BFF)

The BFF is Germany's internal intelligence agency. Its tasks, among other things, include the collection and analysis of information about actions and intentions directed against the constitutional order of Germany. This also includes ensuring the security of federal institutions and preventing activities that threaten the security of the country, including intelligence activities in favor of "foreign powers." These may be, for example, the extremist actions of parties and groups, both German and foreign. In addition, the BFF is trying to expose foreign spies operating in Germany.

A new phenomenon was the expansion of the powers of the BFF to the alleged terrorist associations within the so-called. the second security package, after September 11, 2001. This package included new laws that gave the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) as the federal police and the German secret services additional rights to obtain information to better monitor terrorist groups and repel their possible attacks .

The BFF consists of a central administrative department (Department Z) and six specialized departments:.

Division I Basic Constitutional Protection, Accountability, Data Protection, Surveillance and Intelligence Technology.

Section II Right-wing extremism and terrorism.

Section III Left extremism and terrorism.

Section IV Counterintelligence, protection of state secrets, protection against acts of sabotage.

Section V Threatening security and extremist actions and intentions of foreigners living in Germany, as well as the same aspirations emanating from abroad.

Section VI Islamic extremism / Islamic terrorism.

The BFF uses the full range of reconnaissance means and methods. The areas of supervision correspond to the tasks of the specialized departments. Additionally, the sect of "Scientologists" ("Hubbardists") is also being monitored. The BFF closely cooperates with the departments for the protection of the constitution of the federal states (LFF), since extremists pay little attention to whether the goal of their actions falls within federal or state competence.

Military counterintelligence service (MAD).

MAD is part of the armed forces. This is an internal secret service operating within the Bundeswehr and performing the same tasks that are performed in the civilian sphere by the civilian internal intelligence services (BFF and LFF). It has the same powers and is subject to the same restrictions and controls as they do. Everything that the departments for the protection of the constitution at the federal and state levels are doing is handled by the MAD, but only in the Bundeswehr.

The MAD, among other things, collects information (information, messages and documents) about extremist actions and aspirations that threaten the country's security, as well as intelligence activities in favor of "foreign powers" emanating from the Bundeswehr military personnel and directed against it. It assesses information about extremist and security-threatening aspirations and espionage against the Bundeswehr and reports this to the political and military leadership.

The competence of the MAD in the future, in connection with the use of German troops abroad, will no longer be limited to the territory of Germany. In the future, in certain cases, she will have to act in foreign places of deployment of the Bundeswehr. In mid-September 2003, the federal government passed an amendment to the law, as a result of which the MAD is allowed to collect information abroad in those places "where military units and installations of troops are located." So, there she can now also engage in her intelligence activities. Information tasks also include, for example, checking the safety of the local workforce working in the places of deployment of parts of the Bundeswehr. Outside the Bundeswehr camps, the BND will continue to collect information. But even in this case, the MAD receives extended rights to use and analyze the information collected by the BND. The analysis can also be extended to individuals or groups who may pose a threat to German soldiers stationed in foreign countries.

The MAD obtains its information from open sources, through open investigations and interrogations, from reports coming from the troops, and also by obtaining information from other security agencies. When countering espionage and extremism, it also uses intelligence means, but does not have an intelligence network in the Bundeswehr.

6 departments are subordinated to the President of the MAD:.

Division of Central Tasks (ZA) general questions of military service and administration.

Department I Central Special Tasks.

Section II Combating extremism.

Section III Counterintelligence.

Section IV Protection of personnel / material protection.

Department V Technical support.

In addition, 14 MAD branches are deployed throughout Germany in the cities of Kiel, Hannover, Wilhelmshaven, Dusseldorf, Munster, Mainz, Koblenz, Stuttgart, Karlsruhe, Munich, Amberg, Leipzig, Geltow and Rostock.

The three special services, although they are independent institutions, each of them is subordinate to its own government body. The BND reports to the Office of the Federal Chancellor, the BFF - to the Federal Minister of the Interior. In some federal states, the state departments for the protection of the constitution are also departments of the respective state ministries of the interior. BFF and LFF are bodies of the same level. Employees of the Federal Office cannot give instructions to employees of land LFFs, but are required by law to cooperate with them. In principle, regional extremist aspirations are under the supervision of the departments for the protection of the constitution of the respective federal states. If the actions of suspicious organizations are not limited to the territory of one land, the BFF may intervene. The BFF is responsible for counterintelligence. The MAD is subordinate to the Federal Minister of Defense and is part of the central military administration of the Bundeswehr. The Minister of State or the Secretary of State of the Federal Chancellery assumes the responsibility of being in charge of the work of the secret services in order to coordinate it.

In addition to these three services, there are other institutions and authorities in Germany, which, although they are not intelligence services in the narrow sense of the word, nevertheless, partially use intelligence methods. We are talking in particular about the Intelligence Center of the Bundeswehr (CNBv) and the Federal Office for the Security of Information Technology (BSI). (For more on them, see the appendix "A Concise Dictionary of the Secret Services.")

What are the rights of the German secret services?

The collection of information from open and publicly available sources does not require any legal permissions. But where it is necessary to use "reconnaissance means" to obtain information, the situation is different. The tasks and areas of activity of the German secret services are primarily defined and limited by the relevant laws (Law on the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Law on the BND, Law on the MAD). But in principle, they have at their disposal the whole palette of reconnaissance capabilities.

GENERAL RIGHTS.

The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution may collect, process and use all information necessary for the performance of its tasks, including personal data. It can use methods, means and tools to secretly collect information, including agents (proxys), surveillance, sound and video recording, secret writing, false documents and “camouflage” license plates. Where are these BFF-granted rights subject to restriction? The BFF, for example, is required to correct personal data if it is incorrect and delete it if it is no longer needed. The Länder constitutional protection authorities collect information in accordance with similar laws on Länder constitutional protection authorities, evaluate it and transmit it to the BFF or other Länder authorities, if the latter need it to fulfill their tasks. The BND and MAD also have similar common law powers to obtain intelligence information. In "their" laws there are references to the Law on the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution.

SPECIAL RIGHTS.

BFF and BND are authorized in isolated cases to demand information from financial and credit institutions, banks, financial enterprises, i.e. information about bank accounts, their owners and other authorized persons in matters of investment and money transfers. Thus, they get the opportunity to assess the financial resources and the danger, for example, of terrorist groups. In addition, knowledge about money transfers can be evidence of the preparation and planning of terrorist attacks.

The BFF has the right to receive from postal services (German Federal Post, UPS, German Parcel, DHL) information about the names and addresses of postal items. Postal services are required to provide such information only if there are strong grounds for suspecting that a crime is being prepared, planned or has already been committed.

Timely collected and comprehensive information on the movement of suspicious persons should enable the BFF to analyze in time the location and movements of international terrorist groups and other persons caught in the BFF's field of observation, identify their places of rest, preparation and planning, as well as possible targets for terrorist attacks. Therefore, the BFF has the right to receive information from airlines about the names and directions of passengers' flights. Additional data obtained from telecommunications and the use of telephone services provide important information about a person's social circle. Who did the suspect call? Data on the connection time and numbers of subscribers allows you to identify participants in terrorist networks and more accurately conduct investigations. Data on calls from mobile phones allows you to establish the location of the caller at a specified time without external surveillance. In addition, the location of the device and the profile of communications from a particular mobile phone provide important information about the nature of the observed person or organization. Therefore, the BFF has the right to demand such data. MAD and BND also have similar rights.

Some of the data on telecommunications connections and services of telephone services that are subject to mandatory reporting, if required, are:

Data on the status of telephone accounts, card numbers, determining the location or called number of the subscriber, or identifying numbers from and to which they called, or the end device.

The date and time of the start and end of the connection.

Data about the client who used the services of telecommunications and telephone services.

End points of permanent connections, date and time of their beginning and end.

To request a phone tap, you need to provide a phone number. But recently, members of terrorist groups are increasingly using mobile phones, the origin of which is unknown to the special services. Therefore, the numbers of such telephones cannot be established even with the help of the owner of the telephone network. But if you know the card number, then, as a rule, it is not difficult to find out the corresponding phone number. Therefore, the BFF received permission in principle to use a device called IMSI-Catcher to find out card and phone numbers and, based on this information, to find out the location of the device. IMSI-Catcher allows you to find out the identification (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) of the included mobile phone in the network coverage area. The IMSI identification is fixed on the SIM card module (Subscriber Identity Module), which the mobile subscriber receives when concluding a contract for communication services. With the help of IMSI, you can not only identify the identity of the subscriber, but also determine the number of his mobile phone. In order to find out the IMSI, the IMSI-Catcher simulates the base station of a "radio cell" cell of a mobile communication network. Enabled mobile phones within the scope of this simulated base station with the SIM of the simulated network owner are automatically self-registered on the IMSI-Catcher.

According to Article 10 of the Basic Law (Constitution), the secrecy of postal correspondence, as well as telephone conversations and other communications, is inviolable. Restrictions on this immunity can, of course, only be imposed by law. This happened with the help of the so-called. Law G-10 (named after the article number of the Basic Law). It states for what purposes the secret services have the right to conduct eavesdropping activities. If an activity is directed against an individual suspect and involves his circle of contacts, it is defined as “restriction in an individual case” or “individual control”. Restriction of the fundamental rights of an individual provides for the existence of strong suspicions that this person is planning, committing or has already committed one of the crimes specified in the "catalogue of crimes" contained in the law G-10.

In addition, "strategic restrictions" on the secrecy of postal and telephone communications are possible. Strategic control means that not the mail and telephone conversations of an individual are controlled, but communication lines in general. From a huge number of intercepted conversations, individual ones are caught on the basis of specific features, such as keywords, and analyzed. In his "regulation" the Federal Minister of the Interior determines in which areas monitoring can take place and to which areas of telephone and other long-distance communications it is limited. This regulation must be approved by the control commission of the Bundestag. Within the limits permitted by this commission, the federal minister may order an interception. The decision on the necessity and permissibility of this order, including the use of search criteria, is made by the G-10 committee of the Parliament.

Consider the legal status and procedure for such a fictitious example. German intelligence services suggest that al-Qaeda extremists, trained and ready to use violence, have been staying in Germany for a long time.

For disguise, they use a suitable social circle similar to them in culture and lifestyle, but people from this circle (for example, mosques and cultural institutions in areas of the city with a large proportion of Muslim immigrants) themselves have nothing to do with the preparation of acts of violence. Perhaps the local mosque is funded by Saudi Arabia And Saudi Arabia is known for its reactionary fundamentalist version of Islam - Wahhabism. Around such centers, local structures similar to the commune along Marienstrasse 11 in Hamburg, where the future participants in the September 11 attacks were engaged in their preparation and planning, may arise.

Through a trusted person in the Muslim cultural club, the German secret services received a "tip" on "Ibrahim" from Frankfurt. He made speeches full of hatred against "Jews and Christians" and wrote essays of similar content, posting them on his Internet page. The BFF and the LFF of the Land of Hesse decide to put Ibrahim under surveillance. This is done not only by trusted persons in the circle of the mosque, which he regularly visits. In addition, control of his mail, phone calls and movements begins. IMSI-Catcher is used to intercept calls from his foreign mobile phone of unknown origin. As a result of observation, it turns out that "Ibrahim" regularly receives letters calling for Jihad, presumably from Pakistani sources, and exchanges thoughts among his associates about the need for a "Holy War in Germany". Among his friends there are certain "Abdallah" and "Mohammed". Both had already come to the attention of the authorities because one after the other in February 2001 claimed to have lost their passports, raising suspicion that both had done so to cover up their stay at an al-Qaeda terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. "Ibrahim" and his acquaintances often traveled abroad. When checking their flights, it turned out that they flew to Istanbul and Tehran (which is known as a transfer point on the way to Pakistan), as well as to southern France, where they maintain contacts with "brothers in faith." The BFF is now monitoring Abdullah and Mohammed as well, and is introducing strategic telecommunications controls and keyword filtering that provides information on other members of the Jihadist movement in Germany. The BFF forwards the collected data to the police (Federal Criminal Police Office - BKA), which conducts law enforcement activities (search of apartments, arrests). General results of observation of mail, telephone communications and movements: it was established that "Abdallah" and "Mohammed" are fighters of Al-Qaeda. Weapons and plans for an attack on the banking district of Frankfurt am Main were found in their apartments. They were supported by "Ayman" from Berlin and "Khalid" from Munich. A check of the bank accounts of these people shows that they regularly received money from a single source in Kuwait, then withdrew large amounts of cash from their accounts and handed it over to Abdallah. All four were firmly integrated into the structures of al-Qaeda.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

The German secret services not only receive information themselves, but also try to prevent espionage operations of foreign intelligence services on German territory. Offices for the protection of the constitution at the federal and Länder levels have received legal powers to collect and evaluate information about the security threats and intelligence (espionage) activities of foreign intelligence services. This includes the proliferation of (nuclear) weapons (proliferation). In addition, they must reveal the structures, methods of work and goals of the secret services of foreign states active in Germany. Due to the geographical location and great economic potential of Germany, German organizations, government bodies, enterprises and research institutions are under the constant sight of foreign spy organizations. But the objects of foreign espionage are the German secret services themselves, which was proved by the elicitation of information from one of the BND employees during his conversations with a Bulgarian agent during 1999-2003. The internal counterintelligence of the BND exposed this betrayal of secrets.

The espionage activities of foreign intelligence services are perceived differently by the official authorities. In the reports of the departments for the protection of the constitution, as before, they mainly emphasize the activities of the Russian special services - in full accordance with the old "image of the enemy", as well as some exotic intelligence services. If such reports are to be believed, the "partner services" in Germany do not spy at all. This, of course, is not true. "Espionage by friends" makes up a large share of intelligence activities on German soil, in the field of both technical and operational (undercover) intelligence. A high-profile example, among many, was the NSA spying against a North German wind farm manufacturer.

The German intelligence services, despite the official information policy, are quite familiar with this problem. Therefore, the German counterintelligence operates, avoiding high-profile scandals, usually through diplomatic channels. As a rule, the German intelligence services are well informed about the residencies and agents of foreign intelligence services. If they are being too cheeky, you can put them in their place, avoiding diplomatic complications, with the help of trusted journalists. These journalists publish James Bond-style stories in major newspapers, such as "Infiltration of 12 CIA agents with a license to kill." "Friendly" intelligence agencies, analyzing open sources, then understand: "we need to slightly reduce our activity in the near future." But, nevertheless, it seems that the German counterintelligence really sees much better with the “Eastern” eye than with the “Western”.

Control over intelligence agencies

In order to, if not completely avoid, then at least hinder the appearance of abuses by the German secret services, the latter are subject to strict and extensive control. There are four levels of control:

Supervision by the competent minister, the Court of Auditors and the data protection officer.

Parliamentary oversight by the Parliamentary Control Commission (PCC).

Judicial control (only partially possible due to the specifics of the activities of the special services) as well.

Control of the public, for example, by critical journalists and citizens, reports, reports, articles and books.

CONTROL OF THE PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL COMMISSION (PCCG).

The Parliamentary Control Commission, made up of deputies of the federal parliament (Bundestag), has the widest possible control. She is always ready to critically evaluate the activities of the special services. The law formulates its meaning in the following way: "The federal government is subject to control by the Parliamentary Control Commission in matters of the activities of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the Military Counterintelligence Service and the Federal Intelligence Service." Control includes the right to receive comprehensive information on specific cases, the right to interview intelligence officers, access to dossiers and file cabinets, and the ability to conduct targeted investigations.

As a rule, deputies elected to the PCG are experienced members of all factions of the Bundestag (depending on the size of the faction, without an overwhelming majority of members of one faction), versed in parliamentary procedures and competent in matters of internal and external security.

CONTROL OF THE COMMISSION G-10

The restriction of the right to secrecy of postal correspondence, telephone and other communications in accordance with the G-10 law is controlled by a special commission of the Bundestag - the G-10 Commission, which has the right to follow-up inspections. This commission does not consist of parliamentarians, but of persons who enjoy the confidence of the Bundestag factions. Members of the Parliamentary Control Commission retain their powers for the current elective term.

The G-10 Commission has the right to receive answers to all its questions and the right to access all documents and data stored in computers in connection with interference with fundamental civil rights. Members of the commission have the right of unhindered access to all office premises of the special services. Members of the commission not only decide before the start of the action whether eavesdropping is allowed and necessary in a particular case, but they can also stop an operation already underway, for example, on the basis of a complaint filed.

CONTROL OF THE TRUST COMMISSION.

Intelligence needs a lot of money. But the government cannot dispose of finances without the consent of parliament, since only the Bundestag has the right to adopt a budget. The draft budget for all phases is available to every citizen. But the public budget gives only the total amount allocated for the needs of the secret services. Details are signed in secret applications. But the Bundestag at three levels ensures its right to decide on budgetary issues:

Firstly, the use of funds is monitored by a department of the Federal Accounts Chamber, which is obliged to keep secrets.

Secondly, the Parliamentary Control Commission submits its budget proposals based on the experience gained and sends a representative to discuss the details.

Thirdly, the budget committee of the Bundestag creates a Trust Commission responsible for the financial affairs of the secret services, which ensures the supremacy of the parliament in matters of these expenses, down to the details. In order to be fully informed about the affairs of the secret services, the members of the Trust Commission may take part in the meetings of the Parliamentary Control Commission. These meetings are secret and only take place in eavesdropped rooms.

CONTROL OF AUTHORIZED DATA PROTECTION.

The doors of the secret services are also open to scrutiny by data protection officers. The Bundestag appoints the Federal Data Protection Commissioner every 5 years, who, together with the state data protection commissioners (appointed by the state parliaments - Landtags), examines whether the rights of citizens to the so-called. information self-determination. This right of the individual was expanded by a ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court in 1983 and extended to new possibilities for electronic data processing. The Constitutional Court has established clear boundaries where, on the basis of various data banks, it is possible to create an increasingly voluminous picture of a person's life in all aspects, imperceptibly to himself. At the same time, this person cannot sufficiently control the correctness of these data and the legality of their use. Thus, data protection here collides with the basis of the activities of the secret services - the collection of personalized data important for intelligence. But the right to informational self-determination is not unlimited, as was also established by the Constitutional Court. There are cases where the public interest is more important. But according to court orders, in this case, it is necessary to clearly define and indicate the purpose of obtaining data and prove the direct connection of the collected data with this purpose ... Therefore, the data protection commissioner monitors the intelligence services so that they do not collect data “just like that” and that, for example, the collected information not related to the purpose of the operation being performed was erased.

The Bundestag reinforced the importance of data protection for the BND, BFF and MAD by granting data protection officers the right to receive information and access, among other things, to those documents that are subject to special secrecy. The Commissioner can file a formal complaint about a breach of data protection and request an audit from the relevant ministry. He can also include all cases of violations in his official report, which he submits every 2 years to the Bundestag.

Intelligence services are required to provide a person with a certificate free of charge about the data they have collected about him. As a basis, this person must point to specific material and prove his special interest in obtaining this information. But intelligence agencies may refuse to issue a certificate if such information would harm the performance of their mission, endanger the life of the source, or help the enemy to learn the state of knowledge and methods of intelligence work, harm public safety, damage the Federation and states, or violate the rights of third parties. But, having refused the certificate, the intelligence agencies should advise the person to contact the Federal Data Protection Commissioner. Intelligence can give him all the information that it refused to give to the affected person.

Joint Intelligence Storage System NADIS

To store data in the event of a request, the internal secret services use the "Unified Intelligence Storage System", abbreviated as NADIS. NADIS is a link between the databases of the BFF, the Land LFF and the Department of State Security of the Federal Criminal Police of the BKA. This system allows all connected participants to directly maintain and search for data on-line. BND and MAD also participate in the use of the NADIS system. The database includes persons with "aspirations directed against the foundations of a free democratic social order", or - in the case of MAD - personalized data of those liable for military service.

NADIS is a case file link system, the heart of the system is a central personal data file (PDC) that collects personal data and links to relevant files. NADIS is not a system that contains important information on the cases themselves, but an automated aid for finding the right cases (link file). It shows the case number of the relevant dossiers that are available and for better orientation contains personalized data of the person for whom the request is given - name, surname, date and place of birth, citizenship and address. Although this makes it easier to find information, if one of the NADIS participants needs the information from the dossier itself, which goes beyond the personal data entered into computers, he will have to go in the most common way - to submit a written request through official channels to the institution that maintains and stores the file. Therefore, the system only helps in a limited way in investigations. It cannot help in evaluating the collected data.

If a person's data is stored in the NADIS system, this does not mean at all that he is an extremist, a terrorist or an enemy spy. Most of the data is about people who have been threatened by violent organizations that may be of particular interest to foreign intelligence agencies and individuals who have passed security checks to obtain any kind of security clearance. The unpleasant feelings that the existence of this information system causes in the public can be understood to some extent, but they are largely unjustified. NADIS is not a file of suspicious persons. If a person is entered into its database, this does not entail any discriminatory consequences. In fact, by its very concept and composition, NADIS can neither make a person “transparent” nor guarantee “control over citizens”.

At the beginning of 2003, NADIs held 942,350 personal data. Of these, 520,390 files entered (52.2%) were data on persons who passed security checks for admission to state institutions at the federal and state levels related to security issues. At the beginning of 2002, the system held data on 925,650 people.

Notes:

"Confidant" (Vertrauensperson, V-Person) - the traditionally accepted name in Germany for an agent of the special services who is not their staff member. It was first used in Kaiser Germany, then it was used in the Third Reich in the Ausland / Abwehr system. At present, the term "trustee" is used almost exclusively by the Länder and federal constitutional protection authorities, and not by the BND or MAD. (hereinafter - approx. transl.)

It must be said that the structure of the BND given here by the author differs somewhat, for example, from that described by Dr. Udo Ulfkotte in the book Top Secret: BND (1997) or from the Encyclopedia of the Secret Services of the 20th Century by Helmut Röwer, Stefan Schäfer and Matthias Ulya (2003). In both of these books, in particular, only six, and not eight departments are named. By the way, Department 4, not mentioned by Hirschmann, is administrative and deals with all supply issues, financial, personnel, construction, transport and others. And the 5th department has always been entrusted with issues of security and internal security, including internal counterintelligence of the Service. It is possible that the tasks of combating organized crime and terrorism were entrusted to this department relatively recently, so this was not reflected in the above-mentioned books.

The already mentioned “Encyclopedia of the Secret Services of the 20th Century”, describing the structure of the BFF, does not say anything about the Sixth (“Islamic”) Department. Apparently, this is also a very recent innovation; before that, the Fifth Department dealt with issues of countering Islamic terrorism.

A position corresponding to a deputy federal minister.

From the German word Grundgesetz - Basic law, constitution, Article 10.

German: Parlamentarisches Kontrollgremium, PKGr.

NADIS - Nachrichtendienstliches Informationssystem.

  1. I came across an interesting document, which also mentions the Smolensk region.
    Many posts mention German intelligence and counterintelligence agencies.
    I propose in this thread purposefully spread interesting facts on them.

    TOP SECRET
    TO THE MINISTERS OF STATE SECURITY OF THE UNION AND AUTONOMOUS REPUBLICS
    TO THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS OF THE MGB OF TERRITORIES AND REGIONS
    TO THE HEADS OF COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENTS OF THE MGB MILITARY DISTRICT, TROOP GROUPS, FLEET AND FLEET
    TO THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND SECURITY DEPARTMENTS OF THE MGB FOR RAILWAY AND WATER TRANSPORT
    At the same time, a "Collection of reference materials on the German intelligence agencies operating against the USSR during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" is sent.
    The collection includes verified data on the structure and activities of the central apparatus of the "Abwehr" and the Main Directorate of Imperial Security of Germany - RSHA, their bodies operating against the USSR from the territory of neighboring countries, on the East German front and on the territory of the Soviet Union temporarily occupied by the Germans.
    ... Use the materials of the collection in undercover development of persons suspected of belonging to German intelligence agents, and in exposing arrested German spies during the investigation.
    Minister of State Security of the USSR
    S.IGNATIEV
    October 25, 1952 mountains Moscow
    (from directive)
    In preparing an adventure unprecedented in its dimensions, Hitlerite Germany attached particular importance to the organization of a powerful intelligence service.
    Soon after seizing power in Germany, the Nazis created a secret state police - the Gestapo, which, along with the terrorist suppression of opponents of the Nazi regime inside the country, organized political intelligence abroad. The leadership of the Gestapo was carried out by Heinrich Himmler, the imperial leader of the guard detachments (SS) of the fascist party.
    The scale of espionage and provocative activities within the country and abroad by the intelligence of the fascist party - the so-called. the security service (SD) of the guard detachments, which henceforth became the main intelligence organization in Germany.
    The German military intelligence and counterintelligence "Abwehr" significantly intensified its work, for the leadership of which in 1938 the "Abwehr-Abroad" Directorate of the General Staff of the German Army was created.
    In 1939, the Gestapo and the SD were merged into the Imperial Security Main Directorate (RSHA), which in 1944 also included military intelligence and counterintelligence "Abwehr".
    The Gestapo, the SD and the Abwehr, as well as the foreign department of the fascist party and the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched active subversive and espionage activities against the countries designated as targets of attack by fascist Germany, and primarily against the Soviet Union.
    German intelligence played a significant role in the capture of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Belgium, France, Yugoslavia, Greece and the fascistization of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Relying on its agents and accomplices from the ruling bourgeois circles, using bribery, blackmail and political assassinations, German intelligence helped to paralyze the resistance of the peoples of these countries to German aggression.
    In 1941, having started an aggressive war against the Soviet Union, the leaders of fascist Germany set the task for German intelligence: to launch espionage and sabotage and terrorist activities at the front and in the Soviet rear, as well as mercilessly suppress the resistance of the Soviet people to the fascist invaders in the temporarily occupied territory.
    For these purposes, together with the troops of the Nazi army, a significant number of specially created German reconnaissance, sabotage and counterintelligence agencies were sent to Soviet territory - operational groups and special commands of the SD, as well as the Abwehr.
    CENTRAL APPARATUS "ABWERA"
    The German military intelligence and counterintelligence body "Abwehr" (translated as "Otpor", "Protection", "Defense") was organized in 1919 as a department of the German War Ministry and was officially listed as the counterintelligence body of the Reichswehr. In reality, from the very beginning, Abwehr conducted active intelligence work against the Soviet Union, France, England, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries. This work was carried out through the Abverstelle - the Abwehr units - at the headquarters of the border military districts in the cities of Koenigsberg, Breslavl, Poznan, Stettin, Munich, Stuttgart and others, official German diplomatic missions and trading companies abroad. Abverstelle of the internal military districts carried out only counterintelligence work.
    Abwehr was headed by: Major General Temp (from 1919 to 1927), Colonel Schvantes (1928-1929), Colonel Bredov (1929-1932), Vice Admiral Patzig (1932-1934), Admiral Canaris (1935-1943) and from January to July 1944 Colonel Hansen.
    In connection with the transition of fascist Germany to open preparations for an aggressive war, in 1938 the Abwehr was reorganized, on the basis of which the Abwehr-Abroads Directorate was created at the headquarters of the High Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW). This department was given the task of organizing extensive intelligence and subversive work against the countries that fascist Germany was preparing to attack, especially against the Soviet Union.
    In accordance with these tasks, departments were created in the Abwehr-Abroad Administration:
    "Abwehr 1" - intelligence;
    "Abwehr 2" - sabotage, sabotage, terror, uprisings, decomposition of the enemy;
    "Abwehr 3" - counterintelligence;
    "Ausland" - foreign department;
    "CA" - the central department.
    _______WALLY HQ_______
    In June 1941, to organize reconnaissance, sabotage and counterintelligence activities against the Soviet Union and to manage this activity, a special body of the Abwehr-Abroad Management on the Soviet-German front was created, conventionally called the Wally headquarters, field mail N57219.
    In accordance with the structure of the Central Directorate of "Abwehr-Abroad", the headquarters of "Valli" consisted of the following units:
    Department "Valley 1" - leadership of military and economic intelligence on the Soviet-German front. Chief - major, later lieutenant colonel, Bown (surrendered to the Americans, used by them to organize intelligence activities against the USSR).
    The section consisted of abstracts:
    1 X - reconnaissance of ground forces;
    1 L - reconnaissance of the air force;
    1 Wi - economic intelligence;
    1 D - production of fictitious documents;
    1 I - providing radio equipment, ciphers, codes
    Personnel department.
    Secretariat.
    Under the control of "Valley 1" were reconnaissance teams and groups attached to the headquarters of army groups and armies to conduct reconnaissance work in the relevant sectors of the front, as well as economic intelligence teams and groups that collected intelligence data in prisoner of war camps.
    To provide agents deployed to the rear of the Soviet troops with fictitious documents, a special team of 1 G was located at Valley 1. It consisted of 4-5 German engravers and graphic artists and several prisoners of war recruited by the Germans who knew office work in the Soviet Army and Soviet institutions.
    Team 1 G was engaged in the collection, study and production of various Soviet documents, award signs, stamps and seals of Soviet military units, institutions and enterprises. The team received forms of difficult-to-execute documents (passports, party cards) and orders from Berlin.
    The 1 G team supplied the Abwehr teams, which also had their own 1 G groups, with prepared documents, and instructed them regarding changes in the procedure for issuing and processing documents on the territory of the Soviet Union.
    To provide the deployed agents with military uniforms, equipment and civilian clothing, Wally 1 had warehouses of captured Soviet uniforms and equipment, a tailor's and shoe workshops.
    Since 1942, Wally 1 was directly subordinate to the special agency Son der Staff Russia, which carried out undercover work to identify partisan detachments, anti-fascist organizations and groups in the rear of the German armies.
    "Valli 1" was always located in the immediate vicinity of the department of foreign armies of the headquarters of the high command of the German army on the Eastern Front.
    The "Valli 2" department led the Abwehr teams and Abwehr groups to carry out sabotage and terrorist activities in units and in the rear of the Soviet Army.
    The head of the department at first was Major Zeliger, later Oberleutnant Müller, then Captain Becker.
    From June 1941 until the end of July 1944, the Wally 2 department was stationed in places. Sulejuwek, from where, during the offensive of the Soviet troops, he left deep into Germany.
    At the disposal of "Wally 2" in seats. Sulejuwek had warehouses of weapons, explosives and various sabotage materials to supply the Abwehrkommandos.
    The Wally 3 department supervised all counterintelligence activities of the Abwehrkommandos and Abwehrgroups subordinate to it in the fight against Soviet intelligence officers, the partisan movement and the anti-fascist underground on the occupied Soviet territory in the zone of front, army, corps and divisional rear areas.
    Even on the eve of the attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union, in the spring of 1941, all the army groups of the German army were assigned one reconnaissance, sabotage and counterintelligence command of the Abwehr, and the armies were given Abwehr groups subordinate to these commands.
    Abwehrkommandos and Abwehrgroups with their subordinate schools were the main bodies of German military intelligence and counterintelligence operating on the Soviet-German front.
    In addition to the Abwehrkommandos, the Wally headquarters was directly subordinate to: the Warsaw School for the Training of Intelligence Officers and Radio Operators, which was then transferred to East Prussia, in places. Neuhof; reconnaissance school in places. Niedersee (East Prussia) with a branch in the mountains. Arise, organized in 1943 to train scouts and radio operators left in the rear of the advancing Soviet troops.
    In some periods, the headquarters of the "Valli" was attached to a special aviation detachment of Major Gartenfeld, which had from 4 to 6 aircraft for being thrown into the Soviet rear of agents.
    ABWERKOMAND 103
    Abwehrkommando 103 (before July 1943 it was called Abwehrkommando 1B) was attached to the German army group "Mitte". Field mail N 09358 B, call sign of the radio station - "Saturn".
    The head of Abwehrkommando 103 until May 1944 was Lieutenant Colonel Gerlitz Felix, then Captain Beverbrook or Bernbruch, and from March 1945 until disbanded, Lieutenant Bormann.
    In August 1941, the team was stationed in Minsk on Lenina street, in a three-story building; in late September - early October 1941 - in tents on the banks of the river. Berezina, 7 km from Borisov; then relocated to places. Krasny Bor (6-7 km from Smolensk) and housed in the former. dachas of the Smolensk Regional Executive Committee. In Smolensk on the street. Fortress, d. 14 was the headquarters (office), the head of which was Captain Sieg.
    In September 1943, due to the retreat of the German troops, the team moved to the area of ​​vil. Dubrovka (near Orsha), and in early October - to Minsk, where she was until the end of June 1944, located along Communist Street, opposite the building of the Academy of Sciences.
    In August 1944, the team was in the field. Lekmanen 3 km from the mountains. Ortelsburg (East Prussia), having crossing points in the places of Gross Shimanen (9 km south of Ortelsburg), Zeedranken and Budne Soventa (20 km northwest of Ostrolenka, Poland); in the first half of January 1945, the team was stationed in places. Bazin (6 km from the city of Wormditta), in late January - early February 1945 - in places. Garnekopf (30 km east of Berlin). In February 1945 in the mountains. Pasewalk on Markshtrasse, house 25, there was a collection point for agents.
    In March 1945, the team was in the mountains. Zerpste (Germany), from where she moved to Schwerin, and then through a number of cities at the end of April 1945 arrived in places. Lenggris, where on May 5, 1945, the entire official staff dispersed in different directions.
    The Abwehrkommando carried out active reconnaissance work against the Western, Kalinin, Bryansk, Central, Baltic and Belorussian fronts; conducted reconnaissance of the deep rear of the Soviet Union, sending agents to Moscow and Saratov.
    In the first period of its activity, the Abwehrkommando recruited agents from among Russian White émigrés.
    and members of Ukrainian and Belarusian nationalist organizations. Since the autumn of 1941, agents were recruited mainly in prisoner-of-war camps in Borisov, Smolensk, Minsk, and Frankfurt am Main. Since 1944, the recruitment of agents was carried out mainly from the police and personnel of the "Cossack units" formed by the Germans and other traitors and traitors to the Motherland who fled with the Germans.
    The agents were recruited by recruiters known under the nicknames "Roganov Nikolai", "Potemkin Grigory" and a number of others, the official employees of the team - Zharkov, aka Stefan, Dmitrienko.
    In the autumn of 1941, the Borisov intelligence school was created under the Abwehr command, in which most of the recruited agents were trained. From the school, the agents were sent to the transit and crossing points, known as the S-camps and the state bureau, where they received additional instructions on the merits of the assignment received, equipped according to the legend, supplied with documents, weapons, after which they were transferred to the subordinate bodies of the Abwehr command.
    ABWERKTEAM NBO
    Naval intelligence Abwehrkommando, conditionally named "Nahrichtenbeobachter" (abbreviated as NBO), was formed in late 1941 - early 1942 in Berlin, then sent to Simferopol, where it was located until October 1943 on the street. Sevastopolskaya, d. 6. In operational terms, it was directly subordinate to the Abwehr-Abroad Administration and was attached to the headquarters of Admiral Schuster, who commanded the German naval forces of the southeastern basin. Until the end of 1943, the team and its units had a common field mail N 47585, from January 1944 -19330. The call sign of the radio station is "Tatar".
    Until July 1942, the captain of the naval service, Bode, was the head of the team, and from July 1942, the corvette captain Rikgoff.
    The team collected intelligence data on the Soviet Union's navy in the Black and Azov Seas and on the river fleets of the Black Sea basin. At the same time, the team conducted reconnaissance and sabotage work against the North Caucasian and 3rd Ukrainian fronts, and during their stay in the Crimea, they fought against partisans.
    The team collected intelligence data through agents thrown into the rear of the Soviet Army, as well as by interviewing prisoners of war, mostly former servicemen of the Soviet navy and local residents who had anything to do with the navy and merchant fleet.
    Agents from among the traitors to the Motherland underwent preliminary training in special camps in places. Tavel, Simeize and places. Rage. Part of the agents for deeper training was sent to the Warsaw intelligence school.
    The transfer of agents to the rear of the Soviet Army was carried out on planes, motor boats and boats. Scouts were left as part of residencies in settlements liberated by Soviet troops. Agents, as a rule, were transferred in groups of 2-3 people. The group was assigned a radio operator. Radio stations in Kerch, Simferopol and Anapa kept in touch with the agents.
    Later, the NBO agents, who were in special camps, were transferred to the so-called. "Legion of the Black Sea" and other armed detachments for punitive operations against the partisans of the Crimea and carrying out garrison and guard duty.
    At the end of October 1943, the NBO team relocated to Kherson, then to Nikolaev, from there in November 1943 to Odessa - the village. Big Fountains.
    In April 1944, the team moved to the mountains. Brailov (Romania), in August 1944 - in the vicinity of Vienna.
    Reconnaissance operations in the areas of the front line were carried out by the following Einsatzkommandos and forward detachments of the NBO:
    "Marine Abwehr Einsatzkommando" (naval front-line intelligence team) Lieutenant Commander Neumann began operations in May 1942 and operated on the Kerch sector of the front, then near Sevastopol (July 1942), in Kerch (August), Temryuk (August-September), Taman and Anapa (September-October), Krasnodar, where it was located on Komsomolskaya st., 44 and st. Sedina, d. 8 (from October 1942 to mid-January 1943), in the village of Slavyanskaya and mountains. Temryuk (February 1943).
    Advancing with the advanced units of the German army, the Neumann team collected documents from surviving and sunken ships, in the institutions of the Soviet fleet and interviewed prisoners of war, obtained intelligence data through agents thrown into the Soviet rear.
    At the end of February 1943, the Einsatzkommando, leaving in the mountains. Temryuk head post, moved to Kerch and located on the 1st Mitridatskaya street. In mid-March 1943, another post was created in Anapa, headed first by sergeant major Schmalz, later by Sonderführer Harnack, and from August to September 1943 by Sonderführer Kellermann.
    In October 1943, in connection with the retreat of the German troops, the Einsatzkommando and its subordinate posts moved to Kherson.
    "Marine Abwehr Einsatzkommando" (naval front-line intelligence team). Until September 1942, it was headed by Lieutenant Baron Girard de Sucanton, later Oberleutnant Cirque.
    In January - February 1942, the team was in Taganrog, then moved to Mariupol and settled in the buildings of the rest house of the plant named after Ilyich, in the so-called. "White cottages".
    During the second half of 1942, the team "processed" prisoners of war in the Bakhchisaray camp "Tolle" (July 1942), in Mariupol (August 1942) and Rostov (end of 1942) camps.
    From Mariupol, the team transferred agents to the rear of the Soviet Army units operating on the coast of the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov and in the Kuban. The training of scouts was carried out in Tavelskaya and other schools of the NBO. In addition, the team independently trained agents in safe houses.
    Of these apartments in Mariupol identified: st. Artema, d. 28; st. L. Tolstoy, 157 and 161; Donetskskaya st., 166; Fontannaya st., 62; 4th Slobodka, 136; Transportnaya st., 166.
    Individual agents were instructed to infiltrate Soviet intelligence agencies and then seek to be transferred to the German rear.
    In September 1943, the team left Mariupol, proceeded through Osipenko, Melitopol and Kherson, and in October 1943 stopped in the mountains. Nikolaev - Alekseevskaya st., 11,13,16,18 and Odessa st., 2. In November 1943, the team moved to Odessa, st. Schmidta (Arnautskaya), 125. In March-April 1944, through Odessa - Belgrade, she left for Galati, where she was located along the Main Street, 18. During this period, the team had in the mountains. Reni on Dunayskaya street, 99, the main communication post, which threw agents into the rear of the Soviet Army.
    During their stay in Galați, the team was known as the Whiteland intelligence agency.
    sabotage and reconnaissance teams and groups
    The sabotage and reconnaissance teams and the Abwehr 2 groups were engaged in the recruitment, training and transfer of agents with tasks of a sabotage-terrorist, insurgent, propaganda and intelligence nature.
    At the same time, teams and groups created from traitors to the Motherland special fighter units (jagdkommandos), various national formations and Cossack hundreds to capture and hold strategically important objects in the rear of the Soviet troops until the approach of the main forces of the German army. The same units were sometimes used for military reconnaissance of the front line of defense of the Soviet troops, the capture of "tongues", and the undermining of individual fortified points.
    During operations, the personnel of the units were equipped in the uniform of the military personnel of the Soviet Armies.
    During the retreat, the agents of the teams, groups and their units were used as torchbearers and demolition workers to set fire to settlements, destroy bridges and other structures.
    Agents of reconnaissance and sabotage teams and groups were thrown into the rear of the Soviet Army in order to decompose and induce military personnel to treason. Distributed anti-Soviet leaflets, conducted verbal agitation at the forefront of defense with the help of radio installations. During the retreat, she left anti-Soviet literature in the settlements. Special agents were recruited to distribute it.
    Along with subversive activities in the rear of the Soviet troops, teams and groups at their place of deployment actively fought against the partisan movement.
    The main contingent of agents was trained in schools or courses with teams and groups. Individual training of agents was practiced by employees of the intelligence agency.
    The transfer of sabotage agents to the rear of the Soviet troops was carried out with the help of aircraft and on foot in groups of 2-5 people. (one is a radio operator).
    The agents were equipped and supplied with fictitious documents in accordance with the developed legend. Received tasks to organize the undermining of trains, railroad tracks, bridges and other structures on the railways going to the front; destroy fortifications, military and food depots and strategically important facilities; commit terrorist acts against officers and generals of the Soviet Army, party and Soviet leaders.
    Agents-saboteurs were also given reconnaissance missions. The deadline for completing the task was from 3 to 5 or more days, after which the password agents returned to the side of the Germans. Agents with missions of a propaganda nature were transferred without specifying a return date.
    Reports of agents about acts of sabotage carried out by them were checked.
    In the last period of the war, the teams began to prepare sabotage and terrorist groups to leave behind the lines of the Soviet troops.
    To this end, bases and storage facilities with weapons, explosives, food and clothing were laid in advance, which were to be used by sabotage groups.
    6 sabotage teams operated on the Soviet-German front. Each Abwehrkommando was subordinate to 2 to 6 Abwehrgroups.
    KOITREVIDATIVE TEAMS AND GROUPS
    The counterintelligence teams and Abwehr 3 groups operating on the Soviet-German front in the rear of the German army groups and armies to which they were assigned carried out active undercover work to identify Soviet intelligence officers, partisans and underground workers, and also collected and processed captured documents.
    Counterintelligence teams and groups re-recruited some of the detained Soviet intelligence agents, through whom they conducted radio games in order to misinform the Soviet intelligence agencies. Counterintelligence teams and groups threw some of the recruited agents into the Soviet rear in order to infiltrate the MGB and intelligence departments of the Soviet Army in order to study the working methods of these bodies and identify Soviet intelligence officers trained and thrown into the rear of the German troops.
    Each counterintelligence team and group had full-time or permanent agents recruited from traitors who had proven themselves in practical work. These agents moved along with teams and groups and infiltrated the established German administrative institutions and enterprises.
    In addition, at the place of deployment, teams and groups created an agent network of local residents. When the German troops retreated, these agents were placed at the disposal of the reconnaissance Abwehrgroups or remained in the rear of the Soviet troops with reconnaissance missions.
    Provocation was one of the most common methods of undercover work of the German military counterintelligence. So, agents under the guise of Soviet intelligence officers or persons transferred to the rear of the German troops by the command of the Soviet Army with a special assignment settled with Soviet patriots, entered into their confidence, gave tasks directed against the Germans, organized groups to go over to the side of the Soviet troops. Then all these patriots were arrested.
    For the same purpose, false partisan detachments were created from agents and traitors to the Motherland.
    The counterintelligence teams and groups carried out their work in contact with the organs of the SD and the GUF. They conducted undercover development of suspicious, from the point of view of the Germans, persons, and the obtained data was transferred to the bodies of the SD and the GUF for implementation.
    On the Soviet-German front, there were 5 counterintelligence Abwehrkommandos. Each was subordinate to 3 to 8 Abwehrgroups, which were attached to the armies, as well as rear commandant's offices and security divisions.
    ABVERKOMAIDA 304
    It was formed shortly before the German attack on the USSR and attached to the Nord army group. Until July 1942, it was called "Abwehrkommando 3 Ts". Field mail N 10805. The call sign of the radio station is "Shperling" or "Shperber".
    The team leaders were majors Klyamrot (Cla-mort), Gesenregen.
    During the invasion of German troops into the depths of Soviet territory, the team was successively located in Kaunas and Riga, in September 1941 moved to the mountains. Pechory, Pskov region; in June 1942 - to Pskov, on Oktyabrskaya street, 49, and was there until February 1944.
    During the offensive of the Soviet troops, the team from Pskov was evacuated to places. White Lake, then - in the village. Turaido, near the mountains. Sigulda, Latvian SSR.
    From April to August 1944, there was a branch of the team in Riga, called "Renate"
    In September 1944, the team moved to Liepaja; in mid-February 1945 - in the mountains. Sweenemünde (Germany).
    During their stay on the territory of the Latvian SSR, the team did a lot of work on radio games with the Soviet intelligence agencies through radio stations with the call signs "Penguin", "Flamingo", "Reiger", "El-ster", "Eizvogel", "Vale", "Bakhshteltse" , "Hauben-Taucher" and "Stint".
    Before the war, German military intelligence carried out active intelligence work against the Soviet Union by sending in agents, trained mainly on an individual basis.
    A few months before the start of the war, Abverstelle Koninsberg, Abverstelle Stettin, Abverstelle Vienna and Abverstelle Krakow organized reconnaissance and sabotage schools for the mass training of agents.
    At first, these schools were staffed with cadres recruited from white émigré youth and members of various anti-Soviet nationalist organizations (Ukrainian, Polish, Belarusian, etc.). However, practice has shown that agents from the White emigrants were poorly oriented in Soviet reality.
    With the deployment of hostilities on the Soviet-German front, German intelligence began to expand the network of reconnaissance and sabotage schools for the training of qualified agents. Agents for training in schools were now recruited mainly from among prisoners of war, an anti-Soviet, treacherous and criminal element who had penetrated the ranks of the Soviet Army and defected to the Germans, and to a lesser extent from anti-Soviet citizens who remained in the temporarily occupied territory of the USSR.
    The Abwehr authorities believed that agents from prisoners of war could be quickly trained for intelligence work and easier to infiltrate in parts of the Soviet Army. The profession and personal qualities of the candidate were taken into account, with preference given to radio operators, signalmen, sappers and persons who had a sufficient general outlook.
    Agents from the civilian population were selected on the recommendation and with the assistance of German counterintelligence and police agencies and leaders of anti-Soviet organizations.
    The basis for recruiting agents in schools was also anti-Soviet armed formations: the ROA, various so-called Germans created from traitors. "national legions".
    Those who agreed to work for the Germans were isolated and, accompanied by German soldiers or the recruiters themselves, were sent to special test camps or directly to schools.
    When recruiting, methods of bribery, provocations and threats were also used. Those arrested for real or imaginary offenses were offered to atone for their guilt by working for the Germans. Usually, the recruits were previously tested in practical work as counterintelligence agents, punishers and policemen.
    The final registration of recruitment was carried out at the school or test camp. After that, a detailed questionnaire was filled out for each agent, a subscription was selected on a voluntary agreement to cooperate with German intelligence, the agent was assigned a nickname under which he was listed at school. In a number of cases, recruited agents were sworn in.
    At the same time, 50-300 agents were trained in intelligence schools, and 30-100 agents were trained in sabotage and terrorist schools.
    The training period for agents, depending on the nature of their future activities, was different: for scouts in the near rear - from two weeks to a month; deep rear scouts - from one to six months; saboteurs - from two weeks to two months; radio operators - from two to four months or more.
    In the deep rear of the Soviet Union, German agents acted under the guise of seconded military personnel and civilians, the wounded, discharged from hospitals and having exemptions from military service, evacuated from areas occupied by the Germans, etc. In the front line, the agents acted under the guise of sappers, carrying out mining or clearing the front line of defense, signalmen, engaged in wiring or correcting communication lines; snipers and reconnaissance officers of the Soviet Army performing special tasks of the command; the wounded heading to the hospital from the battlefield, etc.
    The most common fictitious documents with which the Germans supplied their agents were: identity cards of command personnel; various types of travel orders; settlement and clothing books of command personnel; food certificates; extracts from orders for transfer from one part to another; powers of attorney to receive various types of property from warehouses; certificates of medical examination with the conclusion of the medical commission; certificates of discharge from the hospital and permission to leave after injury; red army books; certificates of exemption from military service due to illness; passports with appropriate registration marks; work books; certificates of evacuation from settlements occupied by the Germans; party tickets and candidate cards of the CPSU(b); Komsomol tickets; award books and temporary certificates of awards.
    After completing the task, the agents had to return to the body that prepared them or transferred them. To cross the front line, they were provided with a special password.
    Those who returned from the mission were carefully checked through other agents and through repeated oral and written cross-examinations about dates, places
    location on the territory of the Soviet Union, the route to the place of the assignment and return. Exceptional attention was paid to finding out whether the agent was detained by the Soviet authorities. The returning agents isolated themselves from each other. Testimony and reports of internal agents were compared and carefully rechecked.
    BORISOV INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL
    The Borisov school was organized in August 1941 by the Abwehrkommando 103, at first it was located in the village. Furnaces, in the former military camp (6 km south of Borisov on the road to Minsk); field mail 09358 B. The head of the school was Captain Jung, then Captain Uthoff.
    In February 1942, the school was transferred to the village. Katyn (23 km west of Smolensk).
    In places. A preparatory department was created in the furnace, where the agents were checked and preliminary trained, and then sent to the places. Katyn for intelligence training. In April 1943, the school was transferred back to vil. Furnaces.
    The school trained intelligence agents and radio operators. It simultaneously trained about 150 people, including 50-60 radio operators. The term of training for scouts is 1-2 months, for radio operators 2-4 months.
    When enrolling in a school, each scout was given a nickname. It was strictly forbidden to give your real name and ask others about it.
    Trained agents were transferred to the rear of the Soviet Army, 2-3 people each. (one - a radio operator) and alone, mainly in the central sectors of the front, as well as in the Moscow, Kalinin, Ryazan and Tula regions. Some of the agents had the task of sneaking into Moscow and settling there.
    In addition, school-trained agents were sent to partisan detachments to identify their deployment and location of bases.
    The transfer was carried out by planes from the Minsk airfield and on foot from the settlements of Petrikovo, Mogilev, Pinsk, Luninets.
    In September 1943, the school was evacuated to the territory of East Prussia in the village. Rosenstein (100 km south of Koenigsberg) and was located there in the barracks of the former French prisoner of war camp.
    In December 1943, the school relocated to places. Malleten near vil. Neindorf (5 km south of Lykk), where she was until August 1944. Here the school organized its branch in the village. Flisdorf (25 km south of Lykk).
    Agents for the branch were recruited from prisoners of war of Polish nationality and trained for intelligence work in the rear of the Soviet Army.
    In August 1944, the school relocated to the mountains. Mewe (65 km south of Danzig), where it was located on the outskirts of the city, on the banks of the Vistula, in the building of the former. German school of officers, and was encrypted as a newly formed military unit. Together with the school he was transferred to the village. Grossweide (5 km from Mewe) and the Flisdorf branch.
    At the beginning of 1945, in connection with the offensive of the Soviet Army, the school was evacuated to the mountains. Bismarck, where it was disbanded in April 1945. Part of the staff of the school went to the mountains. Arenburg (on the Elbe River), and some agents, dressed in civilian clothes, crossed into the territory occupied by units of the Soviet Army.
    OFFICIAL COMPOSITION
    Jung is a captain, head of the organ. 50-55 years old, medium height, stout, gray-haired, bald.
    Uthoff Hans - captain, head of the organ since 1943. Born in 1895, medium height, stout, bald.
    Bronikovsky Erwin, also known as Gerasimovich Tadeusz - captain, deputy head of the body, in November 1943 he was transferred to the newly organized school of resident radio operators in places. Niedersee as Deputy Head of School.
    Pichch - non-commissioned officer, radio instructor. Estonian resident. Speaks Russian. 23-24 years old, tall, thin, light brown-haired, gray eyes.
    Matyushin Ivan Ivanovich, nickname "Frolov" - teacher of radio engineering, former military engineer of the 1st rank, born in 1898, a native of the mountains. Tetyushi of the Tatar ASSR.
    Rikhva Yaroslav Mikhailovich - translator and head. clothing warehouse. Born in 1911, a native of the mountains. Kamenka Bugskaya, Lviv region.
    Lonkin Nikolai Pavlovich, nicknamed "Lebedev" - teacher of undercover intelligence, graduated from the intelligence school in Warsaw. Former soldier of the Soviet border troops. Born in 1911, a native of the village of Strakhovo, Ivanovsky District, Tula Region.
    Kozlov Alexander Danilovich, nickname "Menshikov" - intelligence teacher. Born in 1920, a native of the village of Aleksandrovka, Stavropol Territory.
    Andreev, aka Mokritsa, aka Antonov Vladimir Mikhailovich, nickname "Worm", nickname "Voldemar" - teacher of radio engineering. Born in 1924, native of Moscow.
    Simavin, nickname "Petrov" - an employee of the body, a former lieutenant of the Soviet Army. 30-35 years old, average height, thin, dark-haired, face long, thin.
    Jacques is the house manager. 30-32 years old, average height, scar on the nose.
    Shinkarenko Dmitry Zakharovich, nickname "Petrov" - head of the office, also engaged in the manufacture of fictitious documents, a former colonel of the Soviet Army. Born in 1910, a native of the Krasnodar Territory.
    Panchak Ivan Timofeevich - sergeant major, foreman and translator.
    Vlasov Vladimir Alexandrovich - captain, head of the training unit, teacher and recruiter in December 1943.
    Berdnikov Vasily Mikhailovich, aka Bobkov Vladimir - foreman and translator. Born in 1918, a native of the village. Trumna, Oryol region.
    Donchenko Ignat Evseevich, nickname "Dove" - ​​head. warehouse, born in 1899, a native of the village of Rachki, Vinnitsa region.
    Pavlogradsky Ivan Vasilyevich, nickname "Kozin" - an employee of the intelligence point in Minsk. Born in 1910, a native of the village of Leningradskaya, Krasnodar Territory.
    Kulikov Alexey Grigorievich, nickname "Monks" - teacher. Born in 1920, a native of the village of N.-Kryazhin, Kuznetsk district, Kuibyshev region.
    Krasnoper Vasily, possibly Fedor Vasilyevich, aka Anatoly, Alexander Nikolaevich or Ivanovich, nickname "Viktorov" (possibly a surname), nickname "Wheat" - a teacher.
    Kravchenko Boris Mikhailovich, nickname "Doronin" - captain, teacher of topography. Born in 1922, native of Moscow.
    Zharkov, onzhe Sharkov, Stefan, Stefanen, Degrees, Stefan Ivan or Stepan Ivanovich, possibly Semenovich-lieutenant, teacher until January 1944, then head of the S-camp of the Abwehrkommando 103.
    Popinako Nikolai Nikiforovich, nickname "Titorenko" - physical training teacher. Born in 1911, a native of the village of Kulnovo, Klintsovsky district, Bryansk region.
    SECRET FIELD POLICE (SFP)
    The secret field police - "Geheimfeldpolizei" (GFP) - was the police executive body of military counterintelligence in the army. In peacetime, the GUF bodies did not operate.
    The directives of the GUF units were received from the Abwehr Abroad Directorate, which included a special report of the FPdV (field police of the armed forces), headed by police colonel Krichbaum.
    The GFP units on the Soviet-German front were represented by groups at the headquarters of army groups, armies and field commandant's offices, as well as in the form of commissariats and commands - at corps, divisions and individual local commandant's offices.
    The GFP groups under the armies and field commandant's offices were headed by field police commissars, subordinate to the head of the field police of the corresponding army group and at the same time to the Abwehr officer of the 1st Department of the Army or field commandant's office. The group consisted of 80 to 100 employees and soldiers. Each group had from 2 to 5 commissariats, or the so-called. "Outdoor teams" (Aussenkommando) and "Outdoor squads" (Aussenstelle), the number of which varied depending on the situation.
    The secret field police performed the functions of the Gestapo in the combat zone, as well as in the near army and front rear areas.
    Its task was mainly to make arrests at the direction of military counterintelligence, conduct investigations into cases of treason, treason, espionage, sabotage, anti-fascist propaganda among the German army, as well as reprisals against partisans and other Soviet patriots who fought against the fascist invaders.
    In addition, the current instructions assigned to the subdivisions of the GUF:
    Organization of counterintelligence measures to protect the headquarters of the serviced formations. Personal protection of the unit commander and representatives of the main headquarters.
    Observation of war correspondents, artists, photographers who were at the command instances.
    Control over the postal, telegraph and telephone communications of the civilian population.
    Facilitating censorship in the supervision of field postal communications.
    Control and monitoring of the press, meetings, lectures, reports.
    The search for the soldiers of the Soviet Army remaining in the occupied territory. Preventing the civilian population from leaving the occupied territory behind the front line, especially those of military age.
    Interrogation and observation of persons who appeared in the combat zone.
    The GUF bodies carried out counterintelligence and punitive activities in the occupied areas, close to the front line. To identify Soviet agents, partisans and Soviet patriots associated with them, the secret field police planted agents among the civilian population.
    Under the units of the GUF there were groups of full-time agents, as well as small military units (squadrons, platoons) of traitors to the Motherland for punitive actions against partisans, conducting raids in settlements, guarding and escorting those arrested.
    On the Soviet-German front, 23 HFP groups were identified.
    After the attack on the Soviet Union, the fascist leaders entrusted the bodies of the Main Directorate of Imperial Security of Germany with the task of physically exterminating Soviet patriots and ensuring the fascist regime in the occupied areas.
    For this purpose, a significant number of security police units and special forces were sent to the temporarily occupied Soviet territory.
    divisions of the RSHA: mobile operational groups and teams operating in the front line, and territorial bodies for the rear areas controlled by the civil administration.
    Mobile formations of the security police and the SD - operational groups (Einsatzgruppen) for punitive activities on Soviet territory - were created on the eve of the war, in May 1941. In total, four operational groups were created under the main groupings of the German army - A, B, C and D.
    The operational groups included units - special teams (Sonderkommando) for operations in the areas of the forward units of the army and operational teams (Einsatzkommando) - for operations in the rear of the army. The operational groups and teams were staffed by the most notorious thugs from the Gestapo and the criminal police, as well as SD employees.
    A few days before the outbreak of hostilities, Heydrich ordered the operational groups to take their starting points, from where they were to advance together with the German troops on Soviet territory.
    By this time, each group with teams and police units consisted of up to 600-700 people. commanders and rank and file. For greater mobility, all units were equipped with cars, trucks and special vehicles and motorcycles.
    Operational and special teams numbered from 120 to 170 people, of which 10-15 officers, 40-60 non-commissioned officers and 50-80 ordinary SS men.
    Tasks were assigned to operational groups, operational teams and special teams of the security police and SD:
    In the combat zone and near rear areas, seize and search office buildings and premises of party and Soviet bodies, military headquarters and departments, buildings of the state security bodies of the USSR and all other institutions and organizations where there could be important operational or secret documents, archives, file cabinets, etc. similar materials.
    Search for, arrest and physically destroy party and Soviet workers left in the German rear to fight the invaders, employees of intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, as well as captured commanders and political workers of the Soviet Army.
    To identify and repress communists, Komsomol members, leaders of local Soviet bodies, public and collective farm activists, employees and agents of Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence.
    Persecute and exterminate the entire Jewish population.
    In the rear areas to fight against all anti-fascist manifestations and illegal activities of the opponents of Germany, as well as to inform the commanders of the rear areas of the army about the political situation in the area under their jurisdiction.
    The operational organs of the security police and the SD planted among the civilian population agents recruited from the criminal and anti-Soviet element. Village elders, volost foremen, employees of administrative and other institutions created by the Germans, policemen, foresters, owners of buffets, snack bars, restaurants, etc. were used as such agents. Those of them who, before being recruited, held administrative positions (foremen, elders), were sometimes transferred to inconspicuous work: millers, accountants. The agency was obliged to monitor the appearance in cities and villages of suspicious and unfamiliar persons, partisans, Soviet paratroopers, to report on communists, Komsomol members, and former active public figures. Agents were reduced to residencies. The residents were traitors to the Motherland who had proven themselves to the invaders, who served in German institutions, city governments, land departments, construction organizations, etc.
    With the beginning of the offensive of the Soviet troops and the liberation of the temporarily occupied Soviet territories, part of the agents of the security police and the SD were left in the Soviet rear with reconnaissance, sabotage, insurgent and terrorist tasks. These agents were transferred to the military intelligence agencies for communication.
    "SPECIAL TEAM MOSCOW"
    Created in early July 1941, moved with the advanced units of the 4th Panzer Army.
    In the early days, the team was led by the head of the VII Department of the RSHA, SS Standartenführer Siks. When the German offensive failed, Ziks was recalled to Berlin. SS Obersturmführer Kerting was appointed chief, who in March 1942 became chief of the security police and SD of the “Stalino General District”.
    A special team advanced along the route Roslavl - Yukhnov - Medyn to Maloyaroslavets with the task of returning to Moscow with advanced units and capturing the objects of interest to the Germans.
    After the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, the team was taken to the mountains. Roslavl, where it was reorganized in 1942 and became known as the Special Team 7 C. In September 1943, the team was due to heavy losses in a collision with Soviet units in places. Kolotini-chi was disbanded.
    SPECIAL COMMAND 10 A
    A special team of 10 a (field mail N 47540 and 35583) acted jointly with the 17th German army, Colonel General Ruof.
    The team was led until mid-1942 by SS Obersturmbannführer Seetzen, then SS Sturmbannführer Christman.
    The team is widely known for their atrocities in Krasnodar. From the end of 1941 until the beginning of the German offensive in the Caucasian direction, the team was in Taganrog, and its detachments operated in the cities of Osipenko, Rostov, Mariupol and Simferopol.
    When the Germans advanced to the Caucasus, the team arrived in Krasnodar, and during this period its detachments operated on the territory of the region in the cities of Novorossiysk, Yeisk, Anapa, Temryuk, the villages of Varenikovskaya and Verkhne-Bakanskaya. At the trial in Krasnodar in June 1943, the facts of the monstrous atrocities of the team members were revealed: mockery of those arrested and burning of prisoners held in the Krasnodar prison; mass killings of patients in the city hospital, in the Berezansk medical colony and the children's regional hospital on the farm "Third River Kochety" in the Ust-Labinsk region; strangulation in cars - "gas chambers" of many thousands of Soviet people.
    The special team at that time consisted of about 200 people. The assistants to the head of Christman's team were employees Rabbe, Boos, Sargo, Salge, Hahn, Erich Meyer, Paschen, Vinz, Hans Münster; German military doctors Hertz and Schuster; translators Jacob Eicks, Sheterland.
    When the Germans retreated from the Caucasus, some of the team's official members were assigned to other security police and SD groups on the Soviet-German front.
    ________"ZEPPELIN"________
    In March 1942, the RSHA created a special reconnaissance and sabotage body under the code name "Unternemen Zeppelin" (Zeppelin Enterprise).
    In its activities, "Zeppelin" was guided by the so-called. "A plan of action for the political disintegration of the Soviet Union". The main tactical tasks of the Zeppelin were determined by this plan as follows:
    “... We must strive for tactics of the greatest possible variety. Special action groups should be formed, namely:
    1. Intelligence groups - to collect and transmit political information from the Soviet Union.
    2. Propaganda groups - for the dissemination of national, social and religious propaganda.
    3. Rebel groups - to organize and conduct uprisings.
    4. Subversive groups for political subversion and terror.
    The plan emphasized that political intelligence and sabotage activities in the Soviet rear were assigned to the Zeppelin. The Germans also wanted to create a separatist movement of bourgeois-nationalist elements, aimed at tearing away the union republics from the USSR and organizing puppet "states" under the protectorate of Nazi Germany.
    To this end, in the years 1941-1942, the RSHA, together with the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Regions, created a number of so-called. "national committees" (Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijani, Turkestan, North Caucasian, Volga-Tatar and Kalmyk).
    The listed "national committees" were chaired by:
    Georgian - Kedia Mikhail Mekievich and Gabliani Givi Ignatievich;
    Armenian - Abegyan Artashes, Baghdasaryan, he is also Simonyan, he is also Sargsyan Tigran and Sargsyan Vartan Mikhailovich;
    Azerbaijani - Fatalibekov, aka Fatalibey-li, aka Dudanginsky Abo Alievich and Israfil-Bey Israfailov Magomed Nabi Ogly;
    Turkestan - Valli-Kayum-Khan, aka Kayumov Vali, Khaitov Baimirza, aka Haiti Ogly Baimirza and Kanatbaev Karie Kusaevich
    North Caucasian - Magomaev Akhmed Nabi Idriso-vich and Kantemirov Alikhan Gadoevich;
    Volga-Tatar - Shafeev Abdrakhman Gibadullo-vich, he is Shafi Almas and Alkaev Shakir Ibragimovich;
    Kalmytsky - Balinov Shamba Khachinovich.
    At the end of 1942, in Berlin, the propaganda department of the headquarters of the German Army High Command (OKB), together with intelligence, created the so-called. "Russian Committee" headed by a traitor to the Motherland, former lieutenant general of the Soviet Army Vlasov.
    The "Russian Committee", as well as other "national committees", involved in the active struggle against the Soviet Union unstable prisoners of war and Soviet citizens who were taken to work in Germany, processed them in a fascist spirit and formed military units of the so-called. "Russian Liberation Army" (ROA).
    In November 1944, on the initiative of Himmler, the so-called. "Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia" (KONR), headed by the former head of the "Russian Committee" Vlasov.
    The KONR was tasked with uniting all anti-Soviet organizations and military formations from among the traitors to the Motherland and expanding their subversive activities against the Soviet Union.
    In its subversive work against the USSR, the Zeppelin acted in contact with the Abwehr and the main headquarters of the German army high command, as well as with the imperial ministry for the occupied eastern regions.
    Until the spring of 1943, the Zeppelin command center was located in Berlin, in the service building of the VI RSHA Directorate, in the Grunewald area, Berkaerst-Rasse, 32/35, and then in the Wannsee area - Potsdamer Strasse, 29.
    At first, the Zeppelin was led by SS-Sturmbannführer Kurek; he was soon replaced by SS-Sturmbannführer Raeder.
    At the end of 1942, the Zeppelin merged with abstracts VI Ts 1-3 (intelligence against the Soviet Union), and the head of the EI Ts group, SS Obersturmbannführer Dr. Grefe, began to lead it.
    In January 1944, after Graefe's death, the Zeppelin was led by SS-Sturmbannführer Dr. Hengelhaupt, and from the beginning of 1945 until the surrender of Germany, by SS-Obersturmbannführer Rapp.
    The management staff consisted of the office of the head of the body and three departments with subdivisions.
    The CET 1 department was in charge of staffing and operational management of grassroots bodies, supplying agents with equipment and equipment.
    The CET 1 department included five subdivisions:
    CET 1 A - leadership and monitoring of the activities of grassroots bodies, staffing.
    CET 1 B - management of camps and account of agents.
    CET 1 C - security and transfer of agents. The subdivision had escort teams at its disposal.
    CET 1 D - material support of agents.
    CET 1 E - car service.
    Department CET 2 - agent training. The department had four subdivisions:
    CET 2 A - selection and training of agents of Russian nationality.
    CET 2 B - selection and training of agents from the Cossacks.
    CET 2 C - selection and training of agents from among the nationalities of the Caucasus.
    CET 2 D - selection and training of agents from among the nationalities of Central Asia. The department had 16 employees.
    The CET 3 department processed all materials on the activities of special camps for front teams and agents deployed to the rear areas of the USSR.
    The structure of the department was the same as in the CET 2 department. The department had 17 employees.
    At the beginning of 1945, the Zeppelin headquarters, along with other departments of the VI Directorate of the RSHA, was evacuated to the south of Germany. Most of the leading employees of the Zeppelin central apparatus ended up in the zone of American troops after the end of the war.
    ZEPPELIN TEAMS ON THE SOVIET-GERMAN FRONT
    In the spring of 1942, Zeppelin sent four special teams (Sonderkommandos) to the Soviet-German front. They were given to the operational groups of the security police and the SD under the main army groups of the German army.
    Special Zeppelin teams were engaged in the selection of prisoners of war for the training of agents in training camps, collected intelligence information about the political and military-economic situation of the USSR by interviewing prisoners of war, collected uniforms for equipping agents, various military documents and other materials suitable for use in intelligence work.
    All materials, documents and equipment were sent to the commanding headquarters, and selected prisoners of war were sent to special Zeppelin camps.
    The teams also transferred trained agents across the front line on foot and by parachute from aircraft. Sometimes agents were trained right there on the spot, in small camps.
    The transfer of agents by aircraft was carried out from special Zeppelin crossing points: at the Vysokoye state farm near Smolensk, in Pskov and the resort town of Saki near Evpatoria.
    Special teams at first had a small staff: 2 SS officers, 2-3 junior SS commanders, 2-3 translators and several agents.
    In the spring of 1943, special teams were disbanded, and instead of them, two main teams were created on the Soviet-German front - Russland Mitte (later renamed Russland Nord) and Russland Süd (otherwise - Dr. Raeder's Headquarters). In order not to scatter forces along the entire front, these teams concentrated their actions only in the most important directions: northern and southern.
    The Zeppelin's main command, with its constituent services, was a powerful intelligence body and consisted of several hundred employees and agents.
    The team leader reported only to the Zeppelin headquarters in Berlin, and in practical work he had complete operational independence, organizing the selection, training and transfer of agents on the spot. His actions, he was in contact with other intelligence agencies and the military command.
    "BATTLE UNION OF RUSSIAN NATIONALISTS" (BSRN)
    It was created in March 1942 in the Suvalkovsky leger of prisoners of war. Initially, the BSRN had the name "National Party of the Russian People." Its organizer is Gil (Rodionov). The "Combat Union of Russian Nationalists" had its own program and charter.
    Everyone who joined the BSRN filled out a questionnaire, received a membership card and took a written oath of allegiance to the "principles" of this union. The grassroots organizations of the BSRN were called "combat squads".
    Soon the leadership of the union from the Suwalkowski camp was transferred to the Zeppelin preliminary camp, on the territory of the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. There, in April 1942, the BSRN center was created,
    The center was divided into four groups: military, special purpose (training of agents) and two training groups. Each group was led by a Zeppelin official. After some time, only one BSRN personnel training group remained in Sachsenhausen, and the rest left for other Zeppelin camps.
    The second training group of the BSRN began to be deployed in the mountains. Breslavl, where the "SS 20 Forest Camp" trained the leadership of special camps.
    The military group, headed by Gill, in the amount of 100 people. left for the mountains. Parcheva (Poland). There was created a special camp for the formation of "teams N 1".
    A special group dropped out in places. Yablon (Poland) and joined the Zeppelin reconnaissance school located there.
    In January 1943, a conference of organizations of the "Fighting Union of Russian Nationalists" was held in Breslavl, which was attended by 35 delegates. In the summer of 1943, part of the members of the BSRN joined the ROA.
    "RUSSIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY OF REFORMISTS" (RNPR)
    The "Russian People's Party of Reformists" (RNPR) was created in a prisoner of war camp in the mountains. Weimar in the spring of 1942 by the former major general of the Soviet Army, traitor to the Motherland Bessonov ("Katulsky").
    Initially, the RNPR was called the "People's Russian Party of Socialist Realists."
    By the autumn of 1942, the leading group of the "Russian People's Reformist Party" settled in the Zeppelin special camp, on the territory of the Buchenwald concentration camp, and formed the so-called. "Political Center for the Fight against Bolshevism" (PCB).
    The PCB published and distributed anti-Soviet magazines and newspapers among prisoners of war and developed a charter and program for its activities.
    Bessonov offered the leadership of Zeppelin his services in bringing an armed group into the northern regions of the USSR to carry out sabotage and organize uprisings.
    To develop a plan for this adventure and prepare an armed military formation of traitors to the Motherland, Bessonov's group was assigned a special camp in the former. monastery Leibus (near Breslavl). At the beginning of 1943, the camp was moved to places. Lindsdorf.
    The leaders of the Central Bank visited prisoner-of-war camps to recruit traitors to Bessonov's group.
    Subsequently, a punitive detachment was created from the participants in the PCB to fight the partisans, which operated on the Soviet-German front in the mountains. Great Luke.
    MILITARY FORMATIONS ______ "ZEPPELIN" ______
    In the Zeppelin camps, during the preparation of agents, a significant number of "activists" were eliminated who, for various reasons, were not suitable for being sent to the rear areas of the USSR.
    The “activists” of Caucasian and Central Asian nationalities expelled from the camps were mostly transferred to anti-Soviet military formations (“Turkestan Legion”, etc.).
    From the expelled Russian "activists" "Zeppelin" in the spring of 1942 began to form two punitive detachments, called "teams". The Germans intended to create large selective armed groups to carry out subversive operations on a large scale in the Soviet rear.
    By June 1942, the first punitive detachment was formed - "squad N 1", numbering 500 people, under the command of Gill ("Rodionov").
    "Druzhina" was stationed in the mountains. Parchev, then moved to a specially created camp in the forest between the mountains. Parchev and Yablon. It was assigned to Operational Group B of the security police and the SD and, on its instructions, served for some time protecting communications, and then acted against partisans in Poland, Belarus and the Smolensk region.
    Somewhat later, in the special camp of the SS "Guides", near the mountains. Lublin, was formed "squad N 2" numbering 300 people. led by a traitor to the Motherland, former captain of the Soviet Army Blazhevich.
    At the beginning of 1943, both "teams" were united under the command of Hill into the "first regiment of the Russian people's army." A counterintelligence department was created in the regiment, headed by Blazhevich.
    The "First Regiment of the Russian People's Army" received a special zone on the territory of Belarus, centered in seats. Meadows of the Polotsk region, for independent military operations against partisans. A special military uniform and insignia was introduced for the regiment.
    In August 1943, most of the regiment, led by Gill, went over to the side of the partisans. During the transition, Blazhevich and German instructors were shot. Gill was subsequently killed in battle.
    "Zeppelin" gave the rest of the regiment to the main team "Rusland Nord" and later used it as a punitive detachment and a reserve base for acquiring agents.
    In total, more than 130 reconnaissance, sabotage and counterintelligence teams of the Abwehr and SD and about 60 schools that trained spies, saboteurs and terrorists operated on the Soviet-German front.
    The publication was prepared by V. BOLTROMEYUK
    Consultant V. VINOGRADOV
    Magazine "Security Service" No. 3-4 1995

  2. SPECIAL COMMUNICATION about the detention of German intelligence agents TAVRIMA and SHILOVA.
    September 5 p. in at o'clock in the morning the head of the Karmanovsky RO NKVD - Art. militia lieutenant VETROV in the village. German intelligence agents were detained in Karmanovo:
    1. TAVRIN Petr Ivanovich
    2. SHILOVA Lidia Yakovlevna. The arrest was made under the following circumstances:
    At 1 hour 50 min. On the night of September 5, the Head of the Gzhatsky RO of the NKVD - the captain of state security, comrade IVA-NOV, was informed by telephone from the post of the VNOS service that an enemy aircraft appeared in the direction of the city of Mozhaisk at an altitude of 2500 meters.
    At 3 o'clock in the morning from the air observation post for the second time it was reported by telephone that the enemy aircraft after shelling at the station. Kubinka, Mozhaisk - Uvarovka, Moscow region came back and began to land with a fire engine in the district of vil. Yakovleve - Zavrazhye, Karmanovsky district, Smolensk region about this The Gzhatsky RO of the NKVD informed the Karmanovsky RO of the NKVD and sent a task force to the indicated place of the plane crash.
    At 4 o'clock in the morning, the commander of the Zaprudkovskaya group for the protection of order, comrade. DIAMONDS by phone reported that an enemy aircraft had landed between vil. Zavrazhye and Yakovlevo. A man and a woman in the uniform of servicemen left the plane on a German-made motorcycle and stopped in the village. Yakovlevo, asked the way to the mountains. Rzhev and were interested in the location of the nearest regional centers. Teacher ALMAZOVA, living in the village. Almazovo, showed them the way to the regional center of Karmanovo and they left in the direction of the village. Samuylovo.
    For the detention of 2 servicemen who left the plane, the Head of the Gzhatsky RO of the NKVD, in addition to the exiled task force, informed the security groups at the s / councils and informed the Head of the Karmanovsky RO of the NKVD.
    Having received a message from the Head of the Gzhatsky RO of the NKVD, the head of the Karmanovsky RO - Art. militia lieutenant comrade VETROV with a group of workers of 5 people left to detain the indicated persons.
    2 kilometers from the village. Karma-novo in the direction of vil. Samuylovo early. RO NKVD comrade. VETROV noticed a motorcycle moving in the village. Karmanovo, and according to signs, he determined that those who were riding a motorcycle were those who left the landing plane, began to pursue them on a bicycle and overtook them in the village. Karmanovo.
    Riding on a motorcycle turned out to be: a man in a leather summer coat, with the shoulder straps of a major, had four orders and a gold star of the Hero of the Soviet Union.
    A woman in an overcoat with shoulder straps of a junior lieutenant.
    Having stopped the motorcycle and introduced himself as the head of the NKVD RO, comrade. VETROV demanded a document from a major riding a motorcycle, who presented an identity card in the name of Petr Ivanovich TAV-RIN - Deputy. Beginning OCD "Smersh" 39th Army of the 1st Baltic Front.
    At the suggestion of Comrade VETROV to follow to the RO NKVD, TAVRIN categorically refused, arguing that every minute is precious to him, as he arrived on an urgent call from the front.
    Only with the help of the arrived employees of the RO UNKVD, TAVRINA was delivered to the RO NKVD.
    In the district department of the NKVD, TAVRIN presented certificate No. 1284 dated 5/1X-44. with the stamp of the head of p.p. 26224 that he is sent to the mountains. Moscow, the Main Directorate of the NPO "Smersh" and a telegram of the Main Directorate of the KRO "Smersh" of the NPO of the USSR No. 01024 and a travel certificate of the same content.
    After checking the documents through the Head of the Gzhatsky RO NKVD comrade. IVANOV was requested by Moscow and it was established that TAVRIN was not called to the Main Directorate of the KRO "Smersh" by the NPO and that he did not appear at work in the KRO "Smersh" of the 39th army, he was disarmed and confessed that he was transferred by plane by German intelligence for sabotage and terror .
    During a personal search and in a motorcycle on which TAVRIN was following, 3 suitcases with various things, 4 order books, 5 orders, 2 medals, the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union and a guards badge, a number of documents addressed to TAVRIN, money in state signs 428.400 rubles, 116 mastic seals, 7 pistols, 2 center-fire hunting rifles, 5 grenades, 1 mine and lots of ammo.
    Detainees with things. evidence delivered to the NKVD of the USSR.
    P. p.
    7 DEP. OBB NKVD USSR
  3. Reconnaissance Battalion - Aufklarungsabtellung

    In peacetime, the Wehrmacht infantry divisions did not have reconnaissance battalions, their formation began only during the mobilization of 1939. The reconnaissance battalions were formed on the basis of thirteen cavalry regiments, united as part of the cavalry corps. By the end of the war, all cavalry regiments were divided into battalions, which were attached to divisions for reconnaissance. In addition, spare reconnaissance units stationed on the territory of the garrisons of individual divisions were formed from the cavalry regiments. Thus, the cavalry regiments ceased to exist, although towards the end of the war a new formation of cavalry regiments began. The reconnaissance battalions played the role of the "eyes" of the division. Scouts determined the tactical situation and protected the main forces of the division from unnecessary "surprises". Reconnaissance battalions were especially useful in a mobile war, when it was necessary to neutralize enemy reconnaissance and quickly detect the main enemy forces. In some situations, the reconnaissance battalion covered open flanks. During a fast offensive, scouts, along with sappers and tank destroyers, advanced in the forefront, forming a mobile group. The task of the mobile group was to quickly capture key objects: bridges, crossroads, dominant heights, etc. The reconnaissance units of infantry divisions were formed on the basis of cavalry regiments, so they retained the cavalry unit names. The reconnaissance battalions played a big role in the early years of the war. However, the need to solve a large number of tasks required appropriate competence from the commanders. It was especially difficult to coordinate the actions of the battalion due to the fact that it was partially motorized and its units had different mobility. Infantry divisions, formed later, no longer had cavalry units in their battalions, but received a separate cavalry squadron. Instead of motorcycles and cars, the scouts received armored cars.
    The reconnaissance battalion consisted of 19 officers, two officials, 90 non-commissioned officers and 512 soldiers - a total of 623 people. The reconnaissance battalion was armed with 25 light machine guns, 3 light grenade launchers, 2 heavy machine guns, 3 anti-tank guns and 3 armored vehicles. In addition, the battalion had 7 wagons, 29 cars, 20 trucks and 50 motorcycles (28 of them with sidecars). The staffing table called for 260 horses in the reconnaissance battalion, but in reality the battalion usually had more than 300 horses.
    The structure of the battalion was as follows:
    Battalion headquarters: commander, adjutant, deputy adjutant, intelligence chief, veterinarian, senior inspector (head of the repair detachment), senior treasurer and several staff members. The headquarters had horses and vehicles. The command vehicle was equipped with a 100-watt radio station.
    Department of couriers (5 cyclists and 5 motorcyclists).
    Communication platoon: 1 telephone department (motorized), radio communication department (motorized), 2 departments of portable radio stations type ”d” (on horseback), 1 telephone department (on horseback), 1 horse-drawn cart with signalmen's property. Total number: 1 officer, 29 non-commissioned officers and soldiers, 25 horses.
    Heavy weapons platoon: headquarters section (3 motorcycles with a sidecar), one section of heavy machine guns (two heavy machine guns and 8 motorcycles with a sidecar). The rear services and a bicycle platoon numbered 158 people.
    1. Cavalry squadron: 3 cavalry platoons, each with a headquarters section and three cavalry sections (each with 2 riflemen and one calculation of a light machine gun). Each squad has 1 non-commissioned officer and 12 cavalrymen. The armament of each cavalryman consisted of a rifle. In the Polish and French campaigns, cavalrymen of the reconnaissance battalions carried sabers, but in late 1940 and early 1941 sabers fell into disuse. The 1st and 3rd squads had an additional pack horse, which carried a light machine gun and boxes of ammunition. Each platoon consisted of one officer, 42 soldiers and non-commissioned officers, and 46 horses. However, the combat strength of the platoon was less, as it was necessary to leave the grooms who kept the horses.
    Convoy: one field kitchen, 3 HF1 horse-drawn carts, 4 HF2 horse-drawn carts (one of them housed a field forge), 35 horses, 1 motorcycle, 1 motorcycle with a sidecar, 28 non-commissioned officers and soldiers.
    2. Squadron of cyclists: 3 bicycle platoons: commander, 3 couriers, 3 squads (12 people and a light machine gun), one light mortar (2 motorcycles with a sidecar). 1 truck with spare parts and mobile workshop. The bicycle units of the Wehrmacht were equipped with an army bicycle of the 1938 model. The bicycle was equipped with a trunk, and the soldier's equipment was hung on the steering wheel. Boxes with machine gun cartridges were attached to the bicycle frame. Soldiers held rifles and machine guns behind their backs.
    3. Heavy weapons squadron: 1 cavalry battery (2 75 mm infantry guns, 6 horses), 1 tank destroyer platoon (3 37 mm anti-tank guns, motorized), 1 armored car platoon (3 light 4-wheeled armored vehicles (Panzerspaehwagen ), armed with machine guns, of which one armored car is radio-equipped (Funkwagen)).
    Convoy: camp kitchen (motorized), 1 truck with ammunition, 1 truck with spare parts and a camp workshop, 1 fuel truck, 1 motorcycle with a sidecar for transporting weapons and equipment. Non-commissioned officer and assistant gunsmith, food convoy (1 truck), convoy with property (1 truck), one motorcycle without a sidecar for the hauptfeldwebel and treasurer.
    The reconnaissance battalion usually operated 25-30 km ahead of the rest of the division's forces or took up positions on the flank. During the summer offensive of 1941, the cavalry squadron of the reconnaissance battalion was divided into three platoons and acted to the left and right of the offensive line, controlling a front up to 10 km wide. Cyclists operated close to the main forces, and armored vehicles covered the side roads. The rest of the battalion, along with all the heavy weapons, were kept ready to repel a possible enemy attack. By 1942, the reconnaissance battalion was being used more and more to reinforce the infantry. But for this task, the battalion was too small and poorly equipped. Despite this, the battalion was used as a last reserve, which plugged holes in the division's positions. After the Wehrmacht went on the defensive along the entire front in 1943, the reconnaissance battalions were practically not used for their intended purpose. All cavalry units were withdrawn from the battalions and merged into new cavalry regiments. From the remnants of the personnel, the so-called rifle battalions (such as light infantry) were formed, which were used to reinforce the bloodless infantry divisions.

  4. Chronology of sabotage and reconnaissance operations of the Abwehr (selectively, because there are many)
    1933 Abwehr began equipping foreign agents with portable shortwave radios
    Abwehr representatives hold regular meetings with the leadership of the Estonian special services in Tallinn. Abwehr is starting to create strongholds in Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, China and Japan to conduct sabotage and reconnaissance activities against the USSR
    1936 Wilhelm Canaris visits Estonia for the first time and conducts secret negotiations with the Chief of the General Staff of the Estonian Army and the head of the 2nd Department of Military Counterintelligence of the General Staff. An agreement was reached on the exchange of intelligence information on the USSR. Abwehr is starting to create an Estonian intelligence center, the so-called "Group 6513". The future Baron Andrey von Uexkul is appointed as a liaison officer between the "fifth column" of Estonia and the Abwehr
    1935. May. Abwehr receives official permission from the Estonian government to deploy sabotage and reconnaissance bases on Estonian territory along the border with the USSR and equips Estonian special services with cameras with telescopic lenses and radio interception equipment to organize covert surveillance of the territory of a potential enemy. Photographic equipment is also installed on the lighthouses of the Gulf of Finland to photograph warships of the Soviet military fleet (RKKF).
    December 21: The delimitation of powers and the division of spheres of influence between the Abwehr and the SD was recorded in an agreement signed by representatives of both departments. The so-called "10 principles" assumed: 1. Coordination of the actions of the Abwehr, Gestapo and SD within the Reich and abroad. 2. Military intelligence and counterintelligence are the exclusive prerogative of the Abwehr. 3. Political intelligence - the diocese of the SD. 4. The whole complex of measures aimed at preventing crimes against the state on the territory of the Reich (surveillance, arrest, investigation, etc.) is carried out by the Gestapo.
    1937. Pickenbrock and Canaris leave for Estonia in order to intensify and coordinate intelligence activities against the USSR. To conduct subversive activities against the Soviet Union, the Abwehr used the services of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The Rovel Special Purpose Squadron based in Staaken is starting reconnaissance flights over the territory of the USSR. Subsequently, Xe-111, disguised as transport workers, flew at high altitude to the Crimea and the foothills of the Caucasus.
    1938 Dismissed Oberst Maasing, former head of the 2nd Division of the Estonian General Staff (military counterintelligence), arrives in Germany. Under the leadership of the new head of the 2nd department, Oberst Willem Saarsen, the counterintelligence of the Estonian army is actually turning into a "foreign branch" of the Abwehr. Canaris and Pickenbrock fly to Estonia to coordinate sabotage and reconnaissance activities against the USSR. Until 1940, the Abwehr, together with the Estonian counterintelligence, threw sabotage and reconnaissance detachments into the territory of the USSR - among others, the “Gavrilov group” named after the leader. On the territory of the Reich, Abwehr-2 begins an active recruitment of agents among Ukrainian political emigrants. In the camp on Lake Chiemsee near Berlin-Tegel and in Quenzgut near Brandenburg, training centers are being opened to train saboteurs for actions in Russia and Poland.
    January. The Soviet government decides to close the diplomatic consulates of Germany in Leningrad, Kharkov, Tbilisi, Kyiv, Odessa, Novosibirsk and Vladivostok.
    As part of the Anti-Comintern Pact concluded in 1936 between the governments of Japan and Germany, the Japanese military attache in Berlin, Hiroshi Oshima and Wilhelm Canaris, signed an agreement in the Berlin Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the regular exchange of intelligence information about the USSR and the Red Army. The agreement provided for meetings at the level of heads of friendly counterintelligence organizations at least once a year to coordinate sabotage and intelligence operations of the Axis member countries.
    1939 During a visit to Estonia, Canaris expresses his wish to the Commander-in-Chief of the Estonian Armed Forces, General Laidoner, to orient the country's special services to collect information on the number and types of aircraft of the Soviet Air Force. Baron von Uexkül, a liaison officer of the Abwehr and the secret services of Estonia, moved to permanent residence in Germany, but until 1940 he repeatedly went on business trips to the Baltic states.
    March 23: Germany annexes Memel (Klaipeda). March - April: The squadron of special purpose "Rovel" based in Budapest, secretly from the Hungarian authorities, makes reconnaissance flights over the territory of the USSR, in the region Kyiv - Dnepropetrovsk - Zhytomyr - Zaporozhye - Krivoy Rog - Odessa.
    July: Canaris and Pickenbrock went on a business trip to Estonia. The Rovel squadron commander gave Canaris aerial photographs of certain regions of Poland, the USSR and Great Britain.
    Within six months, only in Torun Voivodeship (Poland) 53 Abwehr agents were arrested.
    September 12: The leadership of the Abwehr takes the first concrete steps to prepare an anti-communist uprising in Ukraine with the help of OUN militants and its leader Melnyk. Abwehr-2 instructors train 250 Ukrainian volunteers at a training camp near Dachstein.
    October: On the new Soviet-German border until the middle of 1941, the Abwehr equips radio interception posts and activates undercover intelligence. Canaris appoints Major Horachek as head of the Warsaw branch of the Abwehr. To intensify counterintelligence operations against the USSR, branches of the Abwehr are being created in Radom, Ciechanow, Lublin, Terespol, Krakow and Suwalki.
    November: The head of the Abwehr regional office in Warsaw, Major Horachek, deploys additional surveillance and information collection services in Biala Podlaska, Wlodawa and Terespol, located opposite Brest on the other side of the Bug, in preparation for Operation Barbarossa. Estonian military counterintelligence seconded Hauptmann Lepp to Finland to collect intelligence information about the Red Army. The information received is forwarded to the Abwehr as agreed.
    The beginning of the Soviet-Finnish war (until March 12, 1940). Together with the Finnish counterintelligence VO "Finland", the Directorate of Ausland / Abwehr / OKW conduct active sabotage and reconnaissance activities on the front line. The Abwehr manages to obtain especially valuable intelligence information with the help of Finnish long-range patrols (the Kuismanen group - the Kola region, the Marttin group - the Kumu region and the Paatsalo group from Lapland).
    December. Abwehr carries out a massive recruitment of agents in Byala Podlaska and Vlodava and throws OUN saboteurs into the border zone of the USSR, most of which are neutralized by employees of the NKVD of the USSR.
    1940 On the instructions of the foreign department of the Abwehr, the Rovel special-purpose squadron increases the number of reconnaissance sorties over the territory of the USSR, using the runways of airfields in occupied Czechoslovakia and Poland, air bases in Finland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. The purpose of aerial reconnaissance is to collect information about the location of Soviet industrial facilities, compiling navigational charts for a network of roads and rail tracks (bridges, railway junctions, sea and river ports), obtaining information about the deployment of Soviet armed forces and the construction of airfields, border fortifications and long-term air defense positions , barracks, depots and defense industry enterprises. As part of Operation Oldenburg, the Design Bureau proposes to "make an inventory of sources of raw materials and centers for their processing in the West of the USSR (Ukraine, Belarus), in the Moscow and Leningrad regions, and in the oil production areas of Baku."
    To create a "fifth column" in the rear of the Red Army, the Abwehr forms the "Strelitz Regiment of Special Purpose" in Krakow (2,000 people), in Warsaw - the "Ukrainian Legion" and the battalion "Ukrainian Warriors" - in Lukenwald. As part of Operation Felix (occupation of the Strait of Gibraltar), the Abwehr is creating an operational center in Spain to collect information.
    February 13: At the headquarters of the Design Bureau, Canaris reports to General Yodl on the results of aerial reconnaissance over the territory of the USSR of the Rovel Special Purpose Squadron.
    February 22: Hauptmann of the Abwehr Leverkün with the passport of the Reichs diplomat leaves for Tabriz / Iran via Moscow to find out the possibilities for the operational-strategic deployment of an expeditionary army (army group) in the Asian region with the aim of invading the oil production areas of the Soviet Transcaucasia as part of the Barbarossa plan.
    March 10: The "insurgent headquarters" of the OUN sends sabotage groups to Lviv and the Volyn region to organize sabotage and civil disobedience.
    April 28: From the Bordufos airfield in Northern Norway, reconnaissance aircraft of the Rovel Special Purpose Squadron conduct aerial photography of the northern territories of the USSR (Murmansk and Arkhangelsk).
    May: Abwehr 2 liaison officer Klee flies to a secret meeting in Estonia.
    July: Until May 1941, the NKVD of the Lithuanian SSR neutralized 75 Abwehr sabotage and reconnaissance groups.
    July 21 - 22: The Operations Department begins developing plans for a military campaign in Russia. August: OKW instructs the Ausland/Abwehr Directorate to conduct appropriate preparations as part of an offensive operation against the USSR.
    August 8: At the request of the chief of staff of the German Air Force, experts from the foreign department of the OKW draw up an analytical review of the military-industrial potential of the USSR and the colonial possessions of Great Britain (except for Egypt and Gibraltar).
    From December 1940 to March 1941, the NKVD of the USSR liquidated 66 Abwehr strongholds and bases in the border areas. For 4 months, 1,596 agents-saboteurs were arrested (of which 1,338 were in the Baltic States, Belarus and Western Ukraine). In late 1940 and early 1941, Argentine counterintelligence discovered several warehouses with German weapons.
    On the eve of the invasion of the USSR, the foreign department of the Abwehr carries out a massive recruitment of agents among Armenian (Dashnaktsutyun), Azerbaijani (Mussavat) and Georgian (Shamil) political emigrants.
    From the Finnish air bases, the Rovel special-purpose squadron conducts active aerial reconnaissance in the industrial regions of the USSR (Kronstadt, Leningrad, Arkhangelsk and Murmansk)
    1941 January 31: The German High Command of the German Land Forces (OKH) signs the plan for the operational-strategic deployment of ground forces as part of Operation Barbarossa.
    February 15: Hitler orders the OKB to conduct a large-scale operation to disinform the leadership of the Red Army on the German-Soviet border from February 15 to April 16, 1941.
    . March: Admiral Canaris issues an order to the Directorate to speed up intelligence operations against the USSR.
    March 11: The German Foreign Ministry assures the USSR military attache in Berlin that "the rumors about the redeployment of German troops in the area of ​​the German-Soviet border are a malicious provocation and do not correspond to reality."
    March 21: Von Bentivegni reports to the OKB on carrying out special measures (Abwehr-3) to disguise the Wehrmacht's advance to its starting positions on the Romanian-Yugoslav and German-Soviet borders.
    Abwehr major Schulze-Holtus, aka Dr. Bruno Schulze, travels to the USSR under the guise of a tourist. The major collects intelligence information about military and industrial facilities, strategic bridges, etc., located along the Moscow-Kharkov-Rostov-on-Don-Grozny-Baku railway line. Returning to Moscow, Schulze-Holthus passes the collected information to the German military attaché.
    April-May: The NKVD registers the intensification of German intelligence activities on the territory of the USSR.
    April 30: Hitler sets the date for the attack on the USSR - June 22, 1941.
    May 7: The German military attache in the USSR, General Köstring, and his deputy, Oberst Krebs, report to Hitler on the military potential of the Soviet Union.
    May 15: Abwehr officers Tilike and Schulze-Holtus, undercover pseudonym "Zaba", conduct intensive reconnaissance of the border regions of the south of the USSR from the territory of Iran, using informant agents from among local residents. The son of the police chief of Tabriz and the staff officer of one of the Iranian divisions stationed in Tabriz were successfully recruited.
    May 25: The OKB issues "Directive No. 30", according to which the transfer of expeditionary troops to the zone of the British-Iraqi armed conflict (Iraq) is postponed indefinitely in connection with preparations for a campaign in the East. The OKB informs the General Staff of the Finnish Army about the timing of the attack on the USSR.
    June: SS Standartenführer Walter Schellenberg is appointed head of the 6th Directorate of the RSHA (SD Foreign Intelligence Service).
    After training in intelligence schools in Finland, the Abwehr-2 throws over 100 Estonian emigrants into the Baltic states (Operation Erna). Two groups of agents-saboteurs in the form of soldiers of the Red Army land on the island of Hiiumaa. The ship with the third Abwehr group is forced to leave the territorial waters of the USSR after a collision with Soviet border boats in the waters of the Gulf of Finland. A few days later, this sabotage and reconnaissance group parachuted into the coastal regions of Estonia. The commanders of the special units of the “front intelligence” of the Army Group “North” were tasked with collecting intelligence information about the strategic objects and fortifications of the Red Army in Estonia (especially in the Narva-Kohtla-Jarve-Rakvere-Tallinn region). The Abwehr sends agents from among Ukrainian emigrants to the USSR to compile and clarify "proscription lists" of Soviet citizens "to be destroyed in the first place" (communists, commissars, Jews ...).
    June 10: At a meeting of the top leadership of the Abwehr, the Sipo (security police) and the SD in Berlin, Admiral Canaris and SS Obergruppenführer Heydrich conclude an agreement on coordinating the actions of the Abwehrgroups, units of the security police and Einsatzgruppen (operational groups) of the SD on the territory of the USSR after the occupation. June 11: Sub-department "Abwehr-2" of the Krakow branch of Ausland / Abwehr / OKB throws 6 paratrooper agents into the territory of Ukraine with the task of blowing up sections of the Stolpu Novo - Kyiv railway line on the night of June 21-22. The operation is aborted. The Design Bureau issues Directive No. 32 - 1. “On measures after the operation Barbarossa. 2. "On the support of the Arab liberation movement by all military, political and propaganda means with the formation of the "Sonderstab F (elmi)" at the headquarters of the commander-in-chief of the occupation forces in Greece (South-East)". June 14: The OKB sends the last directives before the attack on the USSR to the main headquarters of the invading armies. June 14 - 19: According to the order of the leadership, Schulze-Holthus drops agents from the territory of Northern Iran to the Kirovabad/Azerbaijan region to collect intelligence information about Soviet civilian and military airfields in this region. When crossing the border, an Abwehrgroup of 6 people collides with a border detachment and returns to the base. During the fire contact, all 6 agents receive severe gunshot wounds.
    June 18: Germany and Turkey sign the Mutual Cooperation and Non-Aggression Pact. Divisions of the 1st echelon of the Wehrmacht entered the area of ​​operational deployment on the Soviet-German border. The battalion of Ukrainian saboteurs "Nightingale" advances to the German-Soviet border in the Pantalovice area. June 19: The Abwehr branch in Bucharest reports to Berlin about the successful recruitment of about 100 Georgian emigrants in Romania. The Georgian diaspora in Iran is being effectively developed. June 21: The Ausland/Abwehr/OKW Directorate announces "readiness No. 1" to the departments of military counterintelligence at the headquarters of the fronts - "Headquarters of Valli-1, Valli-2 and Valli-3". The commanders of the special units of the "frontal intelligence" of the army groups "North", "Center" and "South" report to the leadership of the Abwehr about the advance to their original positions near the German-Soviet border. Each of the three Abwehrgroups includes from 25 to 30 saboteurs from among the local population (Russians, Poles, Ukrainians, Cossacks, Finns, Estonians ...) under the command of a German officer. After being thrown into the rear (from 50 to 300 km from the front line), soldiers and officers of the Red Army, dressed in military uniforms, commandos of the “front intelligence” units carry out acts of sabotage and sabotage. The “Brandenburgers” of Lieutenant Katwitz penetrate 20 km deep into the territory of the USSR, capture the strategic bridge across the Beaver (the left tributary of the Berezina) near Lipsk and hold it until the approach of the Wehrmacht tank reconnaissance company. The company of the battalion "Nightingale" seeps into the Radimno area. June 22: Beginning of Operation Barbarossa - attack on the USSR. Around midnight, on the site of the 123rd Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht, brandenburg-800 saboteurs dressed in the uniform of German customs officers ruthlessly shoot at the squad of Soviet border guards, ensuring a breakthrough of the border fortifications. At dawn, Abwehr sabotage groups strike in the area of ​​​​Avgustov - Grodno - Golynka - Rudavka - Suwalki and capture 10 strategic bridges (Veyseyai - Porechye - Sopotskin - Grodno - Lunno - Bridges). The consolidated company of the 1st battalion "Brandenburg-800", reinforced by the company of the battalion "Nightingale", capture the city of Przemysl, cross the San and capture the bridgehead near Valava. Abwehr-3 "front intelligence" special units prevent the evacuation and destruction of secret documents of Soviet military and civilian institutions (Brest-Litovsk). The Ausland / Abwehr / OKW Directorate instructs Major Schulze-Holtus, Abwehr resident in Tabriz / Iran, to intensify the collection of intelligence information about the Baku oil industrial region, lines of communication and communication in the Caucasus - Persian Gulf region. June 24: With the help of the German ambassador in Kabul, Lahousen-Wivremont organizes anti-British sabotage actions on the Afghan-Indian border. The Ausland/Abwehr/OKW administration plans to raise a massive anti-British uprising on the eve of the landing of the Wehrmacht expeditionary army in this region. Oberleutnant Roser, authorized by the "commission for the conclusion of a truce", at the head of an intelligence unit, returns from Syria to Turkey. Brandenburg-800 saboteurs make night landings from an ultra-low altitude (50 m) between Lida and Pervomaisky. The "Brandenburgers" capture and hold for two days the railway bridge on the Lida - Molodechno line until the approach of the German tank division. During fierce fighting, the unit suffers severe losses. Reinforced company of the battalion "Nightingale" is redeployed near Lvov. June 26: Finland declares war on the USSR. Subversive units of "long-range intelligence" penetrate into the Soviet rear through gaps in the lines of defense. The Finnish intelligence services are transmitting the received intelligence reports to Berlin for systematization and examination.
    WAR.
    To be continued.
  5. 1941

    June 28: Saboteurs of the 8th company "Brandenburg-800" in the Red Army uniform seize and clear the bridge prepared for the explosion by the retreating Soviet troops across the Daugava near Daugavpils. During fierce battles, the company commander, Oberleutnant Knak, was killed, but still the company holds the bridge until the forward units of the North Army Group, which is rushing into Latvia, approach. June 29 - 30: During a lightning operation, the 1st battalion "Brandenburg-800" and reinforced companies of the battalion "Nightingale" occupy Lvov and take control of strategic objects and transport hubs. According to the "proscription lists" compiled by agents of the Krakow branch of the Abwehr, the Einsatzkommandos of the SD, together with the Nightingale battalion, begin mass executions of the Jewish population of Lvov.
    As part of Operation Xenophon (the redeployment of German and Romanian divisions from the Crimea through the Kerch Strait to the Taman Peninsula), a platoon of Brandenburgers under Lieutenant Katwitz attacks the stronghold of the Red Army anti-aircraft searchlights at Cape Peklu.
    Von Lahousen-Wivremont, General Reinecke and SS-Obergruppenführer Müller (Gestapo) hold a meeting in connection with a change in the procedure for keeping Soviet prisoners of war in accordance with the “Order on Commissars” signed by Keitel and the order “On the implementation of a racial program in Russia”. Abwehr-3 begins to conduct police raids and anti-partisan intimidation actions in the occupied territory of the USSR.
    July 1 - 8: During the attack on Vinnitsa/Ukraine, the Nightingale Battalion punishers carry out mass executions of civilians in Sataniv, Yusvin, Solochev and Ternopil. July 12: Great Britain and the USSR sign an agreement on mutual assistance in Moscow. July 15-17: Dressed in Red Army uniforms, the commandos of the Nightingale Battalion and the 1st Brandenburg-800 Battalion attack the headquarters of one of the units of the Red Army in the forest near Vinnitsa. The attack bogged down on the move - the saboteurs suffered heavy losses. The remnants of the Nightingale Battalion were disbanded.
    August: Within 2 weeks, Abwehr agents carried out 7 major railway sabotage (Army Group Center).
    Autumn: By agreement with the OKL, a group of Abwehr agents was sent to the Leningrad Region to collect intelligence information about the location of strategic military facilities (airfields, arsenals) and the deployment of military units.
    September 11: Von Ribbentrop signs an order stating that “the institutions and organizations of the German Foreign Ministry are prohibited from employing active agents-executors of the Ausland/Abwehr/OKW. The ban does not apply to employees of military intelligence and counterintelligence who are not directly involved in sabotage operations or who organize sabotage actions through third parties ... ".
    September 16: In Afghanistan, the reconnaissance group of Oberleutnant Witzel, aka Patan, is preparing to be dropped into the border region in the south of the USSR.
    September 25: Abwehr Major Shenk holds a meeting with the leaders of the Uzbek emigration in Afghanistan. October: The 9th company of the 3rd battalion "Brandenburg-800" parachutes in the area of ​​the Istra reservoir, which supplies water to Moscow. During the mining of the dam, employees of the NKVD discovered and neutralized the saboteurs.
    Late 1941: After the failure of the blitzkrieg plans on the Eastern Front, the Ausland/Abwehr/OKW Department pays special attention to the actions of agents in the deep rear of the Red Army (in the Transcaucasian, Volga, Ural and Central Asian regions). The number of each special unit of the "front intelligence" of the Ausland / Abwehr / OKW Directorate on the Soviet-German front was increased to 55 - 60 people. In a forest camp near Ravaniemi, the 15th Brandenburg-800 company completed preparations for special operations on the Eastern Front. The saboteurs were given the task of organizing sabotage on the Murmansk-Leningrad railway line, the main communication artery of the northern grouping of Soviet troops, and interrupting the food supply to besieged Leningrad. "Headquarters Valley-3" begins to introduce agents into the Soviet partisan detachments.

  6. 1942 Finnish radio monitoring posts and radio interception services decipher the contents of radio messages from the Red Army High Command, which allows the Wehrmacht to carry out several successful naval operations to intercept Soviet convoys. By personal order of Hitler, the Ausland / Abwehr / OKW Directorate equips the signal troops of the Finnish army with the latest direction finders and radio transmitters. Finnish army coders, together with Abwehr experts, are trying to establish the places of permanent (temporary) deployment of military units of the Red Army by field mail numbers. Gerhard Buschmann, a former professional sports pilot, is appointed sector leader of the Abwehr branch in Reval. VO "Bulgaria" forms a special unit for the fight against partisans under the command of Sonderführer Kleinhampel. The "Baltic company" of the 1st battalion "Brandenburg-800" of Lieutenant Baron von Fölkersam is thrown into the rear of the Red Army. Commandos dressed in Red Army uniforms attack the divisional headquarters of the Red Army. The "Brandenburgers" capture the strategic bridge near Pyatigorsk/USSR and hold it until the approach of the Wehrmacht tank battalion. Before the assault on Demyansk, 200 Brandenburg-800 saboteurs parachute in the area of ​​the Bologoye transport hub. "Brandenburgers" undermine sections of the railway track on the lines Bologoe - Toropets and Bologoe - Staraya Russa. Two days later, the NKVD units manage to partially liquidate the sabotage Abwehr group.
    January: Headquarters Valli-1 begins recruiting Russian agents in POW filtration camps.
    January - November: NKVD officers neutralize 170 Abwehr-1 and Abwehr-2 agents operating in the North Caucasus/USSR.
    March: Abwehr-3 anti-terrorist units take an active part in the suppression of the partisan movement in the occupied territory. The 9th company of the 3rd battalion "Brandenburg-800" begins to "clean up the area" near Dorogobuzh - Smolensk. After completing the combat mission, the 9th company is transferred to Vyazma.
    Special forces "Brandenburg-800" are trying to capture and destroy the strongholds and arsenals of the Red Army near Alakvetti in the Murmansk direction. Commandos meet fierce resistance and suffer heavy losses in battles with Red Army units and NKVD units.
    May 23: 350 Abwehr-2 commandos in Red Army uniform are involved in Operation Gray Head on the Eastern Front (Army Group Center). In the course of protracted battles, units of the Red Army destroy 2/3 of the personnel of the Abwehrgroup. The remnants of the special forces with fighting break through the front line.
    June: Finnish counterintelligence begins sending copies of intercepted radio messages from the Red Army and the Red Army Fleet to Berlin on a regular basis.
    End of June: The "Brandenburg-800 coast guard fighter company" was tasked with cutting the supply lines of the Red Army in the Kerch region on the Taman Peninsula / USSR.
    July 24 - 25: As a result of a lightning-fast landing operation, the reinforced Brandenburg-800 company of Hauptmann Grabert takes possession of the six-kilometer hydraulic structures (railway embankments, earthen dams, bridges) between Rostov-on-Don and Bataysk in the Don floodplain.
    July 25 - December 1942: Wehrmacht summer offensive in the North Caucasus/USSR. 30 commandos of the 2nd battalion "Brandenburg-800" in Red Army uniforms parachute in the area of ​​the North Caucasian Mineralnye Vody. Saboteurs mine and blow up the railway bridge on the Mineralnye Vody - Pyatigorsk branch. 4 Abwehr agents carry out terrorist acts against the commanders of the 46th Infantry and 76th Caucasian divisions of the Red Army, stationed near Kirovograd. August: The 8th Brandenburg-800 company is ordered to capture the bridges near Bataysk, south of Rostov-on-Don, and hold them until the approach of the Wehrmacht tank divisions. The Abwehrgroup of Lieutenant Baron von Felkersam in the form of NKGB fighters is thrown into the deep rear of the Soviet army in order to capture the oil production areas near Maykop. 25 Brandenburg commandos of Oberleutnant Lange are parachuted into the Grozny region with the task of capturing oil refineries and an oil pipeline. The Red Army soldiers of the security company shoot the sabotage group while still in the air. Having lost up to 60% of their personnel, the "Brandenburgers" are fighting their way through the Soviet-German front line. The 8th company of the 2nd battalion "Brandenburg-800" captures the bridge across the Belaya River near Maikop and prevents the redeployment of Red Army units. In the ensuing battle, the company commander, Lieutenant Prochazka, was killed. The Abwehrkommando of the 6th company "Brandenburg-800" in the Red Army uniform captures the road bridge and cuts the Maikop-Tuapse highway on the Black Sea. During fierce battles, the Red Army units almost completely destroy the Abwehr saboteurs. Dedicated Brandenburg-800 units, together with SD Einsatzkommandos, take part in anti-partisan raids between Nevelemi Vitebsk / Belarus.
    August 20: The Ausland/Abwehr/OKW Directorate deploys the "German-Arab Training Unit" (GAUP) from Cape Sounion/Greece to Stalino (now Donetsk/Ukraine) to participate in OKB sabotage and reconnaissance operations. August 28 - 29: "Brandenburg-800 long-range reconnaissance" patrols in Red Army uniforms go to the Murmansk railway and lay mines equipped with pressure and delayed fuses, as well as vibrating fuses. Autumn: Shtarkman, a career intelligence officer of the Abwehr, is thrown into the besieged Leningrad.
    Bodies of the NKGB arrest 26 paratroopers of the Abwehr in the Stalingrad region.
    October 1942 - September 1943: "Abwehrkommando 104" throws into the rear of the Red Army about 150 reconnaissance groups, from 3 to 10 agents each. Only two return across the front line!
    November 1: The "Special Purpose Training Regiment Brandenburg-800" was reorganized into the "Sonder Unit (Special Purpose Brigade) Brandenburg-800". November 2: Soldiers of the 5th Brandenburg Company in Red Army uniforms capture the bridge across the Terek near Darg-Koh. Parts of the NKGB liquidate saboteurs.
    End of 1942: The 16th company of the "Brandenburgers" was transferred to Leningrad. For three months, the commandos of the "Bergman" ("Highlander") regiment, together with the Einsatzkommandos of the SD, take part in punitive operations in the North Caucasus / USSR (mass executions of the civilian population and anti-partisan raids).
    40 Abwehr radio operators of the “radio interception and surveillance centers” of the Far East Military District in Beijing and Canton daily decode about 100 intercepted radio messages from Soviet, British and American military radio stations. Late December 1942 - 1944: Together with the 6th Directorate of the RSHA (foreign intelligence service SD - Ausland / SD), Abwehr-1 and Abwehr-2 conduct anti-Soviet and anti-British activities in Iran.
  7. I would not want the members of the forum to have a misconception about the "Brandenburg" and, in general, about German intelligence. Therefore, I recommend that you familiarize yourself with the Abwehr combat log in its entirety. (Abr cited an excerpt from him). You can do this in Julius Mader's book "Abwehr: Shield and Sword of the Third Reich" Phoenix 1999 (Rostov-on-Don). it follows from the magazine that the Abwehr did not always act so famously, including against the USSR. By the way, the level of work of the Abwehr is visible from the case with Tavrin. The description is generally funny, to catch up with a motorcycle at a distance of 2 km on a bike, you need to be able to do it. Although, considering WHAT the motorcycle was carrying, it would probably have been possible to catch up with it on foot ... without two hunting rifles with cartridges, the agent could not do it. Yes, and 7 pistols for two ... it's impressive. Taurina is apparently 4, and the woman, as a weaker creature, 2. Or maybe they were thrown into our rear to hunt. 5 grenades and only 1 mine. There is no radio station, but there is a lot of cartridges. money just right, but 116 seals (a separate suitcase, not otherwise) - this is also impressive. And not a word about the crew of the aircraft, although it may simply not have been mentioned. They throw it along with their own motorcycle, and at the same time, the landing area in the very thick of the air defense is chosen (or the crew is such that they brought it to the wrong place). In general, a pro and nothing more.
    Such prompt detention of the spies is explained by the fact that the air defense systems of the Moscow region spotted the plane on which they arrived at about two in the morning in the Kubinka region. He was fired upon and, having received damage, lay down on the return course. But in the Smolensk region he made an emergency landing right in a field near the village of Yakovlevo. This did not go unnoticed by Almazov, the commander of the local public order group, who organized observation and soon informed the NKVD regional department by phone that a man and a woman in Soviet military uniforms had left the enemy plane on a motorcycle in the direction of Karmanovo. A task force was sent to detain the fascist crew, and the head of the NKVD district department decided to arrest the suspicious couple personally. He was very lucky: for some reason, the spies did not offer the slightest resistance, although seven pistols, two center-fire hunting rifles, and five grenades were seized from them. Later, a special device called "Panzerknake" was found in the plane - for firing miniature armor-piercing incendiary projectiles.

    Runaway gambler

    The beginning of this story can be traced back to 1932, when an inspector of the city council, Pyotr Shilo, was arrested in Saratov. He lost a large sum in cards and paid with state money. Soon the crime was solved, and the unfortunate gambler faced a long sentence. But Shilo managed to escape from the bathhouse of the pre-trial detention center, and then, using false certificates, received a passport in the name of Pyotr Tavrin and even graduated from junior command staff courses before the war. In 1942, the false Tavrin was already a company commander and had good prospects. But special officers sat on his tail. On May 29, 1942, Tavrin was summoned for a conversation by an authorized representative of the special department of the regiment and bluntly asked if he had previously had the name Shilo? The fugitive gambler, of course, refused, but he realized that sooner or later he would be brought to clean water. That same night, Tavrin fled to the Germans.

    For several months he was transferred from one concentration camp to another. Once, an assistant to General Vlasov, the former secretary of the district committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Moscow, Georgy Zhilenkov, arrived in the “zone” to recruit prisoners for service in the ROA. Tavrin managed to take a liking to him and soon became a cadet of the Abwehr intelligence school. Communication with Zhilenkov continued here as well. It was this defrocked secretary who suggested to Tavrin the idea of ​​a terrorist attack against Stalin. She was very much to the liking of the German command. In September 1943, Tavrin was placed at the disposal of the head of the Zeppelin special reconnaissance and sabotage team, Otto Kraus, who personally supervised the preparation of the agent for an important special mission.

    The scenario of the attack assumed the following. Tavrin, with the documents of Colonel SMERSH, Hero of the Soviet Union, a war invalid, enters the territory of Moscow, settles there in a private apartment, contacts the leaders of the anti-Soviet organization "Union of Russian Officers" General Zagladin from the personnel department of the People's Commissariat of Defense and Major Palkin from the headquarters of the reserve officer regiment. Together they are looking for the possibility of Tavrin's penetration into any solemn meeting in the Kremlin, which would be attended by Stalin. There, the agent must shoot the leader with a poisoned bullet. Stalin's death would be the signal for a large landing on the outskirts of Moscow, which would capture the "demoralized Kremlin" and put in power the "Russian cabinet" headed by General Vlasov.

    In the event that Tavrin failed to infiltrate the Kremlin, he was to ambush the vehicle carrying Stalin and blow it up with a Panzerknake capable of penetrating 45 millimeters of armor.

    In order to ensure the authenticity of the legend about the disability of “Colonel SMERSH Tavrin”, he underwent surgery on his stomach and legs, disfiguring them with jagged scars. A few weeks before the transfer of the agent across the front line, he was personally instructed twice by General Vlasov and three times by the well-known fascist saboteur Otto Skorzeny.

    female character

    From the very beginning, it was assumed that Tavrin should carry out the operation alone. But at the end of 1943, he met Lydia Shilova in Pskov, and this left an unexpected imprint on the further scenario of the operation.

    Lydia, a young beautiful woman, worked as an accountant in the housing office before the war. During the occupation, like thousands of others, she worked according to the order of the German commandant. At first she was sent to the officer's laundry, then to the sewing workshop. There was a conflict with one of the officers. He tried to persuade the woman to cohabitation, but she could not overcome the disgust. The fascist, in retaliation, ensured that Lydia was sent to logging. Fragile and unprepared for work, she was melting before our eyes. And then the case brought her to Tavrin. In private conversations, he scolded the Germans, promised to help free Lydia from hard work. In the end, he proposed to marry him. At that time, she did not know that Peter was a German spy, and later he confessed this to her and proposed such a plan. She takes courses for radio operators and crosses the front line with him, and on Soviet territory they get lost and cut off all contact with the Germans. The war is coming to an end, and the Nazis will not be up to taking revenge on the fugitive agents. Lydia agreed. Later, during the investigation, it was established that she was completely unaware of the terrorist assignment for Tavrin and was sure that he was not going to work for the Germans on Soviet territory.

    Judging by the investigative and judicial materials, this seems to be true. How else can one explain the fact that Tavrin, armed to the teeth, offered no resistance during the arrest, and besides, he left the Panzerknack, a walkie-talkie, and many other spy accessories on the plane? So most likely there was no threat to Stalin's life in September 1944. Of course, it was beneficial for the Chekists to describe the Panzerknake operation that they had stopped in the most sinister colors. This allowed Beria to once again appear before Stalin in the role of the savior of the leader.

    Pay

    After the arrest of Tavrin and Shilova, a radio game was developed, codenamed "Fog". Shilova regularly maintained two-way radio communications with the German intelligence center. With these radiograms, the Chekists "foggy" the brains of German intelligence officers. Among the many meaningless telegrams was the following: “I met a woman doctor, has acquaintances in the Kremlin hospital. Processing." There were also telegrams informing about the failure of the batteries for the radio station and the impossibility of getting them in Moscow. They asked for help and support. In response, the Germans thanked the agents for their service and offered to unite with another group located in our rear. Naturally, this group was soon neutralized ... The last message sent by Shilova went to the intelligence center on April 9, 1945, but no answer was received: the end of the war was approaching. In peaceful days, it was assumed that one of the surviving former employees of German intelligence could go to the safe house of Tavrin and Shilova. But no one ever came.
    1943 in the area of ​​Plavsk to commit subversive actions.

The BND is the only German intelligence agency operating abroad.

German Federal Intelligence Service(Bundesnachrichtendienst - BND) - one of the three special services operating in the country (there are also the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and military counterintelligence). The BND is the only German intelligence service operating abroad, therefore, foreign intelligence activities of the military are also in its competence. The BND is prohibited from conducting intelligence activities within its own country. At the same time, it is not forbidden to collect intelligence information about foreign states on its territory.

According to the "BND Law" of December 20, 1990, her duties include the collection and analysis of data on foreign countries necessary for the federal government to make decisions in the field of foreign policy and security policy.

The secret service began its work on April 1, 1956 as an integral part of the department of the Federal Chancellor. Its first leader was Reinhard Gehlen. He headed it until May 1, 1968. The BND was created on the basis of the so-called "Organization Helena". Since 1946, this organization, the backbone of which was made up of former employees of the Wehrmacht's Office of the Land Forces of the East, worked for the American intelligence services in the eastern direction. At the end of 1947, the Gehlen Organization was transferred to Pullach, near Munich, where Until today, its legal successor, the BND, is located, including the central office.

BND structure

The BND is headed by the president. Currently they are August Hannig. There are five departments in the structure of the special services. 1st department - headquarters, 2nd - technical support, 3rd - analysis, 4th - law, central services and educational institutions, 6th - technical support. The special service has a commissioner for the quality of the activities of the BND. Its task includes auditing the quality of activities, conducting internal audits, inspections, as well as controlling costs. There is also a commissioner for own security of the BND. It is within its competence to check the reliability of both employees of the service and candidates for admission to the BND. He is responsible for the safety of information, its storage and transmission. In total, about 6 thousand people work in the special service on a full-time basis. They represent almost all professional groups of the population and operate both on the territory of the country and abroad as officials, military personnel, employees and workers.

The fundamental requirement for a candidate for the position of an intelligence officer, along with the presence of a fundamental education, is an interest in foreign policy issues and the cultures of foreign countries. The candidate is also required to have knowledge of foreign languages ​​and mobility.

Tasks of the BND and its intelligence activities

The German government demands from the BND as accurate, reliable and comprehensive information as possible on the development of the situation in the states of the world. This is primarily about information from the field of politics and security policy. According to the German leadership, nothing has changed in this area since the end of the Cold War, and the national interests of states, which in the past were often subordinate to the interests of the respective bloc, are increasingly coming to the fore in the current multipolar world. For this reason, the world has become less transparent, less predictable, and this, in turn, causes the need for additional information flows. This is also required by Germany's current status as a unified German state.

The goals and objectives of the intelligence activities of the BND are determined by the federal government. His greatest attention, in terms of the possible participation of German military personnel in international peacekeeping missions, is focused on regions prone to conflict situations. For example, the Near and Middle East, as well as North Africa. Other areas of intelligence focus are the illegal export of technology, international terrorism, international organized crime, the international arms trade, and illegal migration. The BND as a whole and its employees are prohibited from exercising political influence on the territory of foreign states, conducting disinformation campaigns, organizing acts of sabotage and sabotage.

Recently, the BND has been establishing contacts with its counterparts in Russia. In particular, the President's visit to Chechnya in April this year was a sensation. It was reported that German agents were there to collect and transfer information to the Russian side about the connections and sources of funding for the militants. Official fact of the trip Hanning to Chechnya was not confirmed, but the BND representatives were forced to explain that German intelligence did not take any action in support of the military campaign of the Russian federal troops in Chechnya, but only collected information for their government in the interests of ensuring Germany's internal and external security. BND Coordinator Ernst Urlau admitted at the time that Russian and German intelligence services exchanged information in the field of international terrorism, organized crime and "money laundering."

Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution

The federal agency performs the functions of protecting the state system of the country. Organizationally, it is part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Its headquarters is located in Cologne. Each of the federal states (administrative-territorial formations of Germany) have their own bodies of this kind, but they are not subordinate to the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Here, the Germans strictly follow the letter of the Basic Law, which regulates that the protection of the state system is the task of the federal authorities, which is implemented jointly with the state institutions of power. The federal agency is guided in its actions by the provisions of a special federal law on the protection of the Constitution.

In organizational terms, it includes six departments, including department "Z", which is in charge of personnel, financial and legal issues. This is followed by the department for the development of major problems, the preparation of reports and the protection of information; department of right-wing extremism and terrorism; department of left-wing extremism and terrorism; department for combating espionage, protecting state secrets and combating sabotage; department for the study of sentiments that threaten the security of the country among foreign citizens. The head of the department is the president. At present it is Heinz Fromm.

The tasks of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution include the collection of information about extremist sentiments among citizens, which may pose a threat to the security of the country. We are talking about politically motivated sentiments, as well as actions directed against the existing legal order or threatening the security of the federation or the security of any of the states, including terrorism.

The competence of the department also includes the suppression of intelligence activities in the interests of foreign states, the adoption of measures, including preventive ones, to preserve state secrets. In the latter case, we are talking about secret materials and materials of a confidential nature, which also affect economic interests.

Most of the information employees of the department draw from open and accessible sources. For example, from newspapers, from various kinds of leaflets, programs. They attend public events, interview individuals who can provide useful information on a voluntary basis. The department, of course, does not renounce intelligence methods in their actions. This includes the infiltration of its employees into extremist circles, and in certain cases, with the approval of Parliament, also the perusal of mail correspondence and wiretapping of telephone conversations.

Military counterintelligence(Militaerischer Abschirmdienst - MAD)

MAD - works on the territory of its country in the interests of the armed forces of Germany - the Bundeswehr. It has the same powers as the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Its headquarters is in Cologne. MAD has its offices in 14 cities of the country (Cologne, Dusseldorf, Hannover, Wilhelmshaven, Münster, Mainz, Koblenz, Stuttgart, Karlsruhe, Munich, Amberg, Leipzig, Geltow, Rostock). The total number of employees is about 1.3 thousand people, both military personnel and civilians.

In its work, the MAD is guided by the provisions of the "Law on Military Counterintelligence" of December 20, 1990. Most of them are a repetition of the provisions of the "Law on the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution". The MAD is forbidden to have a network of informers in the Bundeswehr, it has no right to use coercive measures that other power structures can resort to.

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