The war with fascist Germany is one of the most tragic periods in the history of our country and the whole world. Hitler's strategy to seize and enslave peoples gave different results in the countries of Europe, and the war on the territory of the Soviet Union turned out to be completely different from what the fascist invaders imagined it to be, even at its first stage. Everyone who is familiar with should be able to describe the Barbarossa plan briefly, know why it got such a name, as well as the reasons for the failure of the plan.

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Blitzkrieg

So what was Barbarossa's plan? Its other name is blitzkrieg, "lightning war". The attack on the USSR, planned for June 22, 1941, was supposed to be sudden and quick.

To confuse the enemy and deprive him of the possibility of protection, the attack was planned simultaneously on all fronts: first the air force, then in several directions on the ground. Having quickly defeated the enemy, the fascist army was to head for Moscow and completely subjugate the country within two months.

Important! Do you know why the plan is named that way? Barbarossa, Frederick I of Hohenstaufen, King of Germany and Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, the legendary ruler, became a classic of medieval military art.

Why was Hitler so confident in the success of the operation? He considered the Red Army weak and ill-prepared. German technology, according to his information, won both in quantitative and qualitative composition. In addition, the "blitzkrieg" has already become proven strategy, thanks to which many European countries admitted their defeat in the shortest possible time, and the map of the occupied territories was constantly replenished.

The essence of the plan was simple. The gradual capture of our country was to take place as follows:

• Attack the USSR in the border zone. The main attack was planned on the territory of Belarus, where the main forces were concentrated. Open the way for traffic to Moscow.
• Depriving the enemy of the opportunity to resist, move towards Ukraine, where the main goal was Kyiv and the sea routes. If the operation is successful, Russia will be cut off from the Dnieper, and the path to the southern regions of the country will open.
• In parallel, send armed forces to Murmansk from the countries of Northern Europe. Thus opened the way to the northern capital - Leningrad.
• Continue the offensive from the north and west, advancing towards Moscow without meeting sufficient resistance.
• Capture Moscow within 2 months.

These were the main steps of Operation Barbarossa, and the German command was confident in its success. Why did she fail?

The essence of the Barbarossa plan

Operation progress

The lightning attack on the Soviet Union, which is called Barbarossa, was launched on June 22, 1941 at about 4 am in several directions.

Start of the invasion

After a sudden artillery attack, the effect of which was achieved - the population of the country and troops were taken by surprise- launched a front of attack on the border areas with a length of 3000 kilometers.

• Northern direction - tank groups were advancing on the North-Western Front in the direction of Leningrad and Lithuania. In a few days, the Germans occupied the Western Dvina, Libau, Riga, Vilnius.
• Central - the offensive on the Western Front, the attack on Grodno, Brest, Vitebsk, Polotsk. In this direction, during the beginning of the invasion, Soviet troops could not hold back the attack, but held the line much longer than it was supposed according to the plan of "blitzkrieg".
• South - attack by air force and navy. As a result of the attack, Berdichev, Zhytomyr, and Prut were captured. Fascist troops managed to reach the Dniester.

Important! The Germans considered the first phase of Operation Barbarossa successful: they managed to surprise the enemy and deprive him of his main military forces. Many cities held out longer than expected, but, according to forecasts, no serious obstacles to the capture of Moscow were foreseen in the future.

The first part of the German plan was successful

Offensive

The German offensive against the Soviet Union continued on several fronts and continued throughout July and August 1941.

• North direction. During July, the German offensive continued, the goal of which was Leningrad and Tallinn. In connection with the counterattacks, the movement inland was slower than planned, and only by August did the Germans approach the Narva River and then the Gulf of Finland. On August 19, Novgorod was captured, but the Nazis were stopped near the Voronka River for almost a week. Then the opponents nevertheless went to the Neva, and a series of attacks on Leningrad began. The war ceased to be lightning fast, the northern capital could not be subdued from the first attack. With the advent of autumn, one of the most difficult and difficult periods of the war begins - the blockade of Leningrad.
• Central direction. This is a movement to capture Moscow, which also did not go as expected. It took the German troops a month to reach Smolensk. Also, for a whole month, battles were fought for Velikiye Luki. When trying to take Bobruisk, most of the divisions were attacked by Soviet soldiers. Thus, the movement of the Center group from the offensive was forced to turn into a defensive one, and Moscow turned out to be not such an easy prey. The capture of Gomel was a major victory for the fascist army in this direction, and the movement towards Moscow was continued.
• Southern. The first major victory in this direction was the capture of Chisinau, but then the siege of Odessa followed for more than two months. Kyiv was not taken, which meant the failure of the movement to the south. The "Center" armies were forced to provide assistance, and as a result of the interaction of the two armies, the Crimea was cut off from the rest of the territory, and Ukraine, on the eastern side of the Dnieper, was in the hands of the Germans. Odessa surrendered in mid-October. By the beginning of November, the Crimea was completely occupied by the fascist invaders, and Sevastopol was cut off from the rest of the world.

Important! Barbarossa was brought to life, but it was very difficult to call what was happening a "blitzkrieg". Soviet cities did not give up without a long, exhausting defense on both sides or repulsed an offensive. According to the plan of the German command, Moscow was to fall before the end of August. But in fact, by mid-November, the German troops had not yet even managed to approach the capital. A harsh Russian winter was approaching...

The German offensive against the Soviet Union continued in several directions

The failure of the operation

Already at the end of July, it became clear that the Barbarossa plan would not be able to be briefly implemented, the deadlines that were given for its implementation had long passed. Only in the northern direction, the real offensive almost did not differ from the plan, while in the central and southern directions there were delays, operations unfolded much slower than planned by the German command.

As a result of such a slow advance inland, at the end of July, Hitler changed the plan: not the capture of Moscow, but the capture of the Crimea and blocking communication with the Caucasus in the near future became the goal of the German army.

It was not possible to capture Moscow, the situation of which was very difficult, within 2 months, as planned. Autumn has come. Weather conditions and the serious resistance of the Soviet army caused the failure of the Barbarossa plan and the plight of the German army on the eve of winter. The movement to Moscow was stopped.

The serious resistance of the Soviet army is one of the reasons for the failure of the plan

Reasons for failure

The German command could not even imagine that such a well-thought-out Barbarossa plan, which gave excellent results in European countries, could not be implemented in the Soviet Union. The cities offered heroic resistance. It took a little more than a day for Germany to take France. And about the same amount - to move from one street to another in a besieged Soviet city.

Why did Hitler's Barbarossa plan fail?

• The level of training of the Soviet army actually turned out to be much better than the German command assumed. Yes, the quality of technology and its novelty were inferior, but ability to fight, competently distribute forces, to think over a strategy - this, of course, paid off.
• Excellent awareness. Due to the heroic work of the intelligence officers, the Soviet command knew or could predict every step of the German army. Thanks to this, it was possible to give a worthy "response" to the attacks and attacks of the enemy.
• natural and weather conditions. Barbarossa's plan was supposed to be implemented during the favorable summer months. But the operation was delayed, and the weather began to play into the hands of the Soviet soldiers. Impenetrable, wooded and mountainous territories, inclement weather, and then severe cold - all this disoriented the German army, while the Soviet soldiers perfectly fought under familiar conditions.
• Loss of control over the course of the war. If at first all the actions of the fascist army were offensive, then after a short period they turned into defensive ones, and the German command was no longer able to control events.

Thus, the incarnation of Barbarossa in the USSR met with serious obstacles, and the operation was not carried out. Moscow was not taken within 2 months, as planned. The "lightning war" brought the Soviet army out of the rut only for a short time, after which the offensive movement of the Germans was stopped. Russian soldiers fought in their native land, which they knew very well. Cold, slush, mud, winds, downpours - all this was familiar to the defenders, but created significant obstacles for the German army.

Plan "Barbarossa"

Russians in World War II Utkin Anatoly Ivanovich

Chapter 5 PLAN "BARBAROSSA"

PLAN "BARBAROSSA"

Hitler signed a non-aggression pact with us. Germany is up to its neck in the war in the West," and I believe that Hitler will not risk opening a second front by attacking the Soviet Union. Hitler is not so stupid as to see Poland in the Soviet Union.

I. V. Stalin, mid-June 1941

Today I handed the fate of our state and our people into the hands of our soldiers.

Hitler's decision

The conclusion of the pact with the USSR in no way changed Hitler's attitude towards Russia as a zone of future colonization, an object of German expansion. Despite the flurry of pleasantries that followed the fall of Poland, the general thrust of Hitler's strategic thinking remained unchanged: "Drang nach Osten."

Less than two months after the signing of the Soviet-German treaty, Hitler ordered the army command to consider the occupied Polish territory as a concentration zone for future German operations.

However, the nightmare of the former war on two fronts continued to haunt him. Pushing his generals to speed up the planning of operations in the west, Hitler made clear what was on his mind: "We can only move against Russia after our hands are free in the west." He repeatedly promised his generals not to repeat the mistakes of the Kaiser.

In the summer of 1940, Central and Western Europe became a German zone of influence. Admiring the Alpine peaks, Hitler summoned the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, von Brauchitsch, and surprised him by putting the English topic aside. Brauchitsch remained in the memoirs of his contemporaries as a competent military leader, but his character had a defect that was fatal for Germany. The general did not know how to behave in the presence of the Fuhrer. His professional qualities lost all value when the former corporal with boundless ambitions entered the premises. Perhaps Hitler even took pleasure in seeing the suffering of a classic member of the Prussian military caste, not knowing how to control himself in the presence of an unknown force.

Hitler spoke with Brauchitsch about Eastern Europe. The conversation was nothing like a staff discussion. In the historical perspective, Hitler saw the formation of new states dependent on Germany in Ukraine, Belarus, the formation of the Baltic Federation and the expansion of the territorial boundaries of Finland. The achievement of these goals was possible only under one condition: the dismemberment of the Soviet Union.

The next day, Brauchitsch's subordinate, the chief of staff of the ground forces, General Halder, listed in his diary the goals set by Hitler:

“England hopes for Russia and the United States. If Russia's hopes are not justified, then America will also remain on the sidelines, because the destruction of Russia will enormously increase the power of Japan in the Far East ... Russia is the factor on which England relies most ... When Russia is crushed, England's last hope will crumble to dust. Then Germany will become master of Europe and the Balkans. Solution: The destruction of Russia must be part of this struggle. Spring 41st. The sooner Russia is crushed, the better. An attack can only achieve its goal if the roots of the Russian state are undermined in one blow. The capture of part of the country does not give anything ... If we start in May 1941, we will have five months to finish everything. It would be best to finish everything in the current year, but at this time it is impossible to carry out coordinated actions. Defeat the Russian army, occupy as much Russian territory as possible, protect Berlin and the Silesian industrial region from possible air attacks. It is desirable to move our positions so far to the east that our own air forces can destroy the most important areas of Russia.

The commander of the ground forces and his staff already had their outlines. In their opinion, the campaign against the USSR should last no more than four or, in extreme cases, six weeks. Brauchitsch believed that 80 to 100 German divisions would be needed to achieve this objective, with 50 to 75 "good" divisions facing them on the Soviet side. (Note that none of the German generals even made a hypothetical suggestion that the USSR could act preventively against Germany.)

The fateful decision about the impending attack on the USSR was announced to the German generals at the Berghof on July 31, 1940. General Halder reported, he also recorded Hitler's remarks.

The Fuhrer declared at the Berghof that the operation should only be started if Russia could be crushed with one blow. He was not interested in capturing territory: “Destroy Russia's very will to live. That is our goal!” In one of his ecstatic states, Hitler painted a picture of the future battle in broad strokes: Russia would be crushed with two blows. One in the south, in the direction of Kyiv, the second in the north, in the direction of Leningrad. Having reached their goal, both groups turn to each other and close the ring, while the northern group takes Moscow. Hitler also spoke about the possibility of a side additional operation to capture Baku. He already knew what to do with the future conquered country. Ukraine, Belarus and the three Baltic republics will directly enter the Reich. The territory up to the White Sea will go to Finland. Leaving 60 divisions in the west, the Fuhrer threw 120 divisions against Russia.

The planned operation was developed at three levels. General Warlimont was in charge of planning at the Operational Headquarters of the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKH), General Thomas was in charge of the Economics Department of the OKW, Halder was in charge of planning at the Headquarters of the Land Forces (OKH).

The date of the upcoming offensive was indicated by Hitler's order to Goering: deliveries to the USSR should be carried out only until the spring of 1941. Thomas's institution meticulously determined the value of individual regions of the USSR, the location of oil production centers. With calm confidence, it was preparing not only to take over the Soviet economy, but also to manage it.

Halder had to instruct the direct (at this stage) author of the plan for the new operation - the chief of staff of the eighteenth army, General Marx, who arrived at the main headquarters of the ground forces (OKH). General Marx on August 5 presented his views on the conduct of the campaign in the East. This grandiose operation, Marx believed, should be aimed at carrying out "the defeat of the Soviet armed forces in order to make it impossible for the revival of Russia as an enemy of Germany in the foreseeable future." The centers of industrial power of the Soviet Union are in Ukraine, in the Donets Basin, Moscow and Leningrad, and the industrial zone to the east of these regions "is of no particular importance." Marx's plan set the task of seizing the territory along the line of the Northern Dvina, the Middle Volga and the Lower Don - the cities of Arkhangelsk, Gorky and Rostov. It should be noted that the views of Marx largely determined the course of hostilities in the east.

From now on - and constantly - it was about reaching the above geographical line, about defeating Soviet troops in the border territories. There was no thought of destroying the entire military power of a great country and the possibility of its complete occupation. The theoretical heirs of Clausewitz, Moltke and Schlieffen proceeded from the assumption that a powerful blow would crush all the internal structures of the Soviet Union.

The idea of ​​the possibility of a decisive short-term lightning strike blinded the German theorists, they lacked the intellectual courage to look further: what would happen if Russia made the first strike. Hitler, who prided himself on the non-conformity of his military thinking, in this case was completely captivated by the academic military science of monocle-wearing generals. Developed in the dazzling months after the victory over France, the ideas of war with Russia acquired inertia that captured both the military and politicians.

The German military leadership these days has one more important consideration. The Reich was sure that the Soviet troops in the Baltic republics would strike at the flank of the German troops if they immediately rushed from the border to Moscow. From this assumption it followed that forces should be allocated to counter the Soviet troops in the Baltic states. In addition, the German headquarters clearly overestimated the power of Soviet bomber aviation, wherever possible, setting the task of capturing the territory so deep that Soviet bombers could not bomb German cities.

Why did the Arkhangelsk-Rostov (later Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan) line seem "sufficient" to Hitler and his military entourage? We have already spoken about the belief of the Germans in the crushingness of the first blow. But still, why weren't plans developed to advance to the Far East? This is all the more strange because the German generals believed in the collapse of the enemy. Why did the German troops have to stop? What did the headquarters of the Wehrmacht high command think about the fate of the rest of Russia, the one that extended beyond the zone of occupation desired by Germany? Part of the military hinted dully at the power of German bomber aircraft, but it is clear that it was then impossible to destroy Russia from the air, and the German air force did not have sufficient power.

The German generals dared to ask questions. So, Field Marshal von Bock (who was to command Army Group Center) asked Hitler what would happen if the German troops reached the planned line, and the central government of Soviet Russia still existed? Hitler said that after suffering a defeat of this magnitude, the Communists would ask for terms of surrender. More vaguely, the Fuhrer hinted that if the Russian government did not do this, the Wehrmacht would reach the Urals. Hitler in this conversation showed absolute determination to oppose Russia: let those around him not bother to look for options for a different, non-forceful solution to the Russian question.

According to von Losberg, who was commissioned by General Jodl in July 1940 to prepare materials for planning the eastern campaign, Hitler believed that the sixty million living across the Volga were not a danger to Germany. This specialist also captures Hitler's absolute conviction that a terrible first blow would dispel faith in the Bolshevik ideology, cause interracial and interethnic contradictions, and show the whole world that big Russia is an artificial formation. As for the ultimate fate of this country, then "the Slavic reptile must be kept under the supervision of the master race." To ensure the solution of this problem, it was necessary to deprive the conquered territories of the system of economic ties, to liquidate the communist intelligentsia and Jews, and to subordinate the entire mass of the population to the direct command of the High Commissioners of the Reich. The Russians themselves, the Great Russians, should have been subjected to the most cruel treatment.

It took the High Command of the Ground Forces only a few days to create the first version of the Wehrmacht's operation against the Soviet Union. Staff officers looked at the map and saw a natural barrier - the Pripyat swamps. The offensive had to be carried out either to the north (to Leningrad or Moscow), or to the south - against Ukraine. In the first case, East Prussia and occupied Poland were the springboard for the strike, in the second - Southern Poland and Romania. Captured by the opening prospect, representatives of the middle officer rank initially chose the southern direction, Ukraine, as their target. But actions almost on the periphery did not find approval from General Halder, and he demanded that the planned operations be redirected to the north. Having received the appropriate instructions, General Marx outlined Orsha as the primary reference point, he provided for the creation of an offensive springboard to Moscow in the Orsha area. The left flank of the advancing troops was to cut through the Baltic republics and reach Leningrad. Marx did not forget about the possibilities in the south - there the offensive movement was to take place south of Kyiv with a reference point to Baku.

Thus arose the main outlines of the plan, which Germany began to implement a year later. Nobody particularly rushed the military, their imagination and scope were encouraged, it was a time when the top generals of the Wehrmacht received field marshal's batons and they had a feeling of omnipotence.

However, the euphoria did not soften the tough intra-staff struggle. The High Command of the Land Forces (OKH) (von Brauchitsch and Halder) sought to implement their strategic ideas without the knowledge of Generals Jodl and Warlimont of the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW). But Jodl understood that not participating in the preparation of such a large-scale enterprise would weaken his position, and instructed General Warlimont to prepare his own project, revised by Jodl in September 1940. Jodl was closer to Hitler than the arrogant guardians of caste traditions Brauchitsch and Halder, so his project had a special influence on Hitler's thought process, inaccessible to anyone. Jodl's variant suggested the creation of three army groups, two of which were to the north of the Pripyat marshes, and one to the south. It is important to note the following clause of the Jodl plan: since the ultimate goal of the offensive is Moscow, it is supposed to capture Moscow's "foreground" in the Smolensk region. Further advance on the capital will depend on the degree of success of the neighbors on the left and right. This idea became quite firmly established in Hitler's mind, and he repeatedly turned to it later.

The third version of the preliminary plan was created by the end of October 1940 by the new Assistant Chief of the Operational Staff (in the OKH), General Paulus. In this version, two German groupings, northern and central, were to be used north of the Pripyat marshes, and one in the south. It is necessary to defeat the Red Army near the borders, to think about the destruction of enemy troops, and not about the seizure of this or that territory. To do this, it was necessary to prevent by any means the systematic withdrawal of the Red Army into the depths of its territory. The Baltics, where, according to German sources, there were only 30 Soviet divisions, little attention was paid to the Paulus plan. In this case, it was chained to Belarus (60 divisions) and Ukraine (70 divisions). Paulus believed that after the defeat of the enemy troops, all forces should have been thrown into capturing his capital - namely the capital, and not industrial centers and strategically advantageous bridgeheads.

Paulus had a very low opinion of the leadership of the Red Army, but emphasized the difficulty of determining the fighting qualities of a Russian soldier. Ethnic tensions in the USSR and in its army were called a favorable element. For the first time, it is Paulus, an Austrian, who moves away from the Prussian rampant arrogance and discusses the significance of the problem of the numerical superiority of the Soviet troops. Halder was satisfied with the analysis and planning of his favorite, in the future, the echoes of some of the doubts first expressed by Paulus will be reflected in Halder's reasoning.

On the table of the German military leadership lay three versions of the plan for the invasion of the USSR. In Directive No. 18 of November 18, 1940, Hitler wrote: “Political discussions were held in order to clarify the position of Russia. Regardless of the outcome of these discussions, all the preparations for the East that I spoke about orally must be continued. Instructions will follow as the army's operational plans are submitted to me for approval." Options for attacking the USSR were listed, but the main one was not singled out among them. The new was felt in the special attention paid to Finland and the Balkan countries. Hitler began supplying weapons to Finland at the end of July; in September, Germany received the right to pass its troops to Norway through Finland.

Now it was possible to conduct a generalized "brainstorming" of the problem. Between November 28 and December 3, the leadership of the German armed forces held a series of war games. The battle over the maps was led by Paulus. The basic principles (creation of three groupings, striking from three bridgeheads) have already become generally accepted initial data. The leaders of the three army groups were given the task of mentally conducting operations independently of their neighbors. All three of the best commanders of the Wehrmacht felt the breathtaking scale of the upcoming battles; They also noted such a feature of the front: as it moved to the east, it became more and more grandiose. The initial length of the front - 2 thousand km - quickly increased to 3 thousand km.

It followed from this that if the German armed forces did not destroy the Red Army in the space between the border and the Minsk-Kyiv line, then Germany's opportunities for active operations and control over the territory of the battles would decrease.

The common problem of the three commanders was the roads. The task was somewhat easier in this regard near the northern grouping (the roads of the Baltic states), but the army groups "Center" and "South" had to experience all the difficulties of moving three and a half million soldiers off-road. The problem for the Germans was also the Soviet railway gauge, which was wider than in Europe. The alarm sounded in the statement of the commander of the reserve Fromm: he had only about half a million soldiers at his disposal - this is all that could compensate for the losses in the summer campaign. There was a shortage of freight transport, especially trucks. At the disposal of the German command was a three-month supply of oil and a one-month supply of diesel fuel. Truly, one had to have boundless faith in one's fortune, starting a deadly fight with the enemy with such equipment. Deficiency of a smaller value - tires. The numbers of military production are striking - only 250 tanks and self-propelled guns per year by the beginning of 1941. For a country capable of producing a million motors, this was unforgivable dashing. This dashing turned into arrogance: imports from the Soviet Union served as one of the main sources for solving the problems of raw materials on the eve of the war.

But the main thing that worried the German generals was the question of whether it was possible to start a war in the east without solving the British problem. We see such doubts about the correctness of Hitler's strategy, first of all, in Brauchitsch. At an important meeting of the generals with the Fuhrer on December 5, 1940, he pointed out the shortage, first of all, of aircraft, if some of them were occupied in the skies of England. Hitler interrupted the commander of the ground forces and uttered a phrase that everyone present remembered: Germany can wage war against two opponents at once if the eastern campaign does not drag out.

On the eve of this meeting, Hitler had a long conversation with Göring and Jodl, who noted the Führer's obvious desire to be tough with representatives of the old Prussian school. In particular, he was very critical of Halder's proposal - an unconditional concentration of forces for an attack in one direction - against Moscow. Halder believed that the fortified flanks of this powerful grouping would not allow Soviet troops to launch side attacks from the south and north, from the Baltic and Ukraine. Hitler objected: the economic goals of the war are as important as the others. The Soviet leadership will strive with all its might to protect its industrial centers in the Ukraine and the Baltic states; it needs Baltic ports and Ukrainian industry. Moreover: "the capture of Moscow is not so important." Army Group Center must retain the ability to turn north and south.

Brauchitsch agreed with Halder, pointing out the importance of the Smolensk-Moscow line. In the end, in the minds of Russians, this is the most important vital road. In response, Hitler said that only a ossified mind could hold on to such old ideas. As a result of the meeting, it was decided to keep Smolensk and Orsha in mind as a potential foothold in Central Russia and not fantasize about operations beyond this line. A fatal decision... The German army will pay dearly for it.

Ultimately, the high command of the ground forces abandoned the "dangerous" attempts to firmly determine the main goal of the upcoming military operations. The professionals submitted to Hitler. Perhaps the best team of military theorists in the world now consciously made the “ultimate goal nothing”, relying on the fact that in the course of the unfolding hostilities they would be able to find the optimal choice between time and space, between the task of defeating enemy troops and chasing his territory. The strategists in officer uniforms now pinned their hopes that the demands of wartime would force Hitler to get down to earth and assess the situation realistically.

On August 9, 1940, General Warlimont gave the first orders to deploy troops on the outskirts of the USSR. According to the Aufbau Ost plan, on August 26, two motorized divisions were moved to Poland. They were followed by ten infantry divisions. According to Hitler's plan, the tank divisions were to be concentrated in the south of Poland in order to quickly reach the Romanian oil fields.

The movement of large masses of troops could not go unnoticed. Therefore, the German military attache in Moscow, E. Koestring, was authorized to notify the Soviet General Staff that it was a mass replacement of skilled workers with younger soldiers. All the main methods of camouflage and disinformation were contained in the instructions given on September 6 to Yodl: "These regroupings must not give the impression in Russia that we are preparing for an offensive in the East."

Soviet intelligence

At the end of 1940, the new head of the Soviet military intelligence GRU, Philip Golikov, reviewed the most important links in the intelligence network.

Of all the Soviet residencies, the Berlin one was perhaps the most important. There were the largest number of agents here, and they had unique information. The military attache of the Soviet embassy, ​​Major General Vasily Tupikov (code name Arnold), led the residency. The direct assistants were Air Force Attache Colonel N.D. Skornyakov ("Meteor"), Khlopov, Bazhanov, Zaitsev. The latter was responsible for contacts with Alta (Ilse Stöbe) and Aryan. "Aryan" worked in the information section of the German Foreign Office.

Before Hitler had time to make a decision to attack the Soviet Union, the "Aryan" on September 29, 1940 reported on the deterioration of relations between Germany and the USSR. "Hitler intends to solve the problems in the east in the spring of 1941." As a source, he named Karl Schnurre, head of the Russian sector of the economic department of the Foreign Ministry. And on December 29, 1940, the "Aryan" reported from "the most senior circles" that Hitler gave the order to prepare a war against the USSR. "War will be declared in March 1941." Golikov painted this message to People's Commissar Tymoshenko and the Chief of the General Staff. Stalin received two copies, and the Chief of the General Staff, Kiril Meretskov, was also notified. Voices were raised: who is the source?

According to the request, "Aryan" reported on January 4, 1941 that "he received this information from a friend in military circles. Moreover, it is based not on hearsay, but on a special order from Hitler, extremely secret and known only to a very few people. On February 28, 1941, "Aryan" sent a report on German preparations for a war against the USSR: "People involved in the project confirm that the war against the USSR will begin this year (1941)." Three army groups are organized under Field Marshals von Bock, von Rundstedt and von Leeb to attack Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv. The start of the advance is tentatively May 20. Forces of 120 German divisions are concentrated in the Pinsk region. In the course of preparatory measures, persons who speak Russian are appointed commanders. Trains with a wide gauge, as in Russia, have been prepared.”

From a person close to Goering, the “Aryan” heard that “Hitler intends to take three million slaves out of Russia to use them in industry - to increase its power.

Golikov and a number of heads of departments of the GRU were newcomers, and they did not attach due importance to the reports of the "Aryan".

IN AND. Tupikov arrived in Berlin in December 1940 as a military attaché. At the end of April 1941, having looked around in Berlin and having studied the reports of agents (including the "Aryan"), Tupikov wrote an unusual personal letter to Golikov:

"one. The current German plans involve war against the USSR as the next enemy.

2. The conflict will happen this year.” Golikov circulated Tulikov's report to the proper addressees (including Zhukov), but omitted Tulikov's conclusions quoted above. But they fully confirmed the conclusions of the Aryan. On May 9, Tupikov sent letters personally to Zhukov and Timoshenko, describing the German plans. "The defeat of the Red Army will be achieved within one and a half months - with the Germans reaching the meridian of Moscow."

The GRU resident in Helsinki was Colonel I.V. Smirnov (“Ostwald”), his assistant Major Yermolov. In reports dated June 15 and 17, 1941, they talk about the military preparations of the Finnish side, about mobilization, about the evacuation of children and women from big cities, about anti-aircraft guns arriving in Helsinki.

The GRU recruited the head of Czech military intelligence, Colonel Frantisek Moravec. In France, Leopold Trepert (aka Jean Gilbert) informed Resident General Susloparov on June 21, 1941 that "the Wehrmacht command has completed the transfer of troops to the Soviet borders and tomorrow, June 22, they will launch a surprise attack against the Soviet Union." Stalin read this report and wrote in the margin: “This information is an English provocation. Find the author and punish him."

From Switzerland, the head of the intelligence network, Alexander Rado (“Dora”), on February 21, 1941, sent a report to Moscow based on data from the Swiss General Staff: “Germany has 150 divisions in the east ... The German offensive will begin at the end of May.” One gets the impression that Golikov knew for sure that Stalin was skeptical about warnings about an attack in 1941 and therefore did not publish reports that contradicted the views of the leader. April 6, 1941 Dora reports that all German motorized divisions are in the east. The message of June 2 is of interest: “All German motorized divisions are on the border of the USSR in a state of constant readiness ... In contrast to the period of April-May, preparations along the Russian border are carried out less defiantly, but with greater intensity.”

The first report of Richard Sorge came to Moscow on November 18, 1940 - about German preparations for a war against the Soviet Union. On December 28, he reports that the Germans have created a reserve army consisting of 40 divisions in the Leipzig area. 80 German divisions were stationed on the Soviet border with Romania.

On May 1, 1941, Sorge reports that twenty German divisions have left France for the Soviet borders. On May 5, 1941, Sorge handed over a microfilm of Ribbentrop's telegram to the German ambassador to Japan, Ott, which states that "Germany will start a war against Russia in mid-June 1941." June 13: "I repeat: nine armies with a total strength of 150 divisions will begin the offensive on the morning of June 22." Ambassador Ott told Sorge on June 20 that "war between Germany and the USSR is inevitable." Stalin's notes on the margins of Sorge's reports do not suggest that he believed his best intelligence officer. Proskurov at one time demanded an award to Sorge, and Golikov halved his monthly subsidies.

(In the early 1960s, when the French-German film “Who are you, Dr. Sorge?” was shown to leading military leaders, an angry Zhukov approached Golikov. “Why didn’t you, Philip Ivanovich, show me his reports? Do not report such information to the chief General Staff?” Golikov replied: “And what should I report to you if Sorge was a double agent - both ours and theirs”).

With the outbreak of the war, the Soviet leadership was interested in one - the main question: what would be the behavior of Japan during the Soviet-German war?

Diplomatic preparations

Hitler showed the closest interest in the Balkans - after the second Vienna arbitration, Romania, which had significantly decreased in territory, asked Berlin for guarantees. Germany (and after it Italy) gave guarantees to the new Romania, which entered the zone of influence of the Axis countries. According to a secret directive of September 20, 1940, Hitler ordered military missions to be sent to Romania. “For the outside world, their task will be to help friendly Romania in the organization and management of its armed forces. The real task, which should not be known to either the Romanians or our own troops, will be the defense of the oil fields ... preparing the deployment of German and Romanian troops from the Romanian bases in the event of a war with Soviet Russia.

Romania's guarantees raised serious concerns in the Kremlin. Ribbentrop tried in lengthy dispatches to explain the meaning and results of the Vienna Arbitration; Ambassador Schulenburg had soothing conversations with Molotov, but in vain. Schulenburg reported that Molotov, "unlike previous contacts, was closed." Moreover, a verbal protest followed from the Soviet side, in which the German government was accused of violating Article 3 of the Soviet-German treaty, which provided for bilateral Soviet-German consultations in such cases. In the incident with Romania, the Soviet Union was presented with a fait accompli.

Ribbentrop refused to acknowledge Germany's violation of the August Treaty. On September 3, 1940, he "went over to the counteroffensive", accusing the USSR of arbitrary actions against the Baltic states and the Romanian provinces. The answer of the Soviet leadership on September 21 was written in harsh language. It pointed out that Germany had violated the treaty and that the Soviet Union was interested in Romania for many reasons. An absolutely new note was the not without sarcasm proposal to cancel or change the clause on mutual consultations "if it contains certain inconveniences" for the German side.

The second area of ​​conflict of interests was found in the North. The Soviet leadership was informed of the appearance of German troops in Finland. As explained, they were heading to Norway, but the fact remains: German units appeared on the territory of a country that had a huge common border with the USSR (which was just recently the front line). The German embassy reported to Berlin: "The Soviet embassy wishes to receive the text of the agreement on the passage of troops through Finland, including its secret paragraphs ... to receive information about the purpose of the agreement, against whom it is directed, what purposes it serves."

The third reason for the disagreement arose after a telegram sent to the German embassy on September 25, marked with the highest secrecy stamp: Germany, Japan and Italy intend to sign an agreement on a military alliance in Berlin. “This alliance is directed exclusively against American warmongers. Of course, as usual, this is not expressly stated in the treaty, but such a conclusion follows unmistakably from its terms ... Its sole purpose is to bring to life those elements that are fighting for America's entry into the war by demonstrating that, in the event of their intervention in the current conflict they will automatically deal with the three great powers as adversaries.”

On the wave of victories in the west, Hitler decided to strengthen ties with Italy and Japan. In September 1940, Hitler concluded that such an alliance would strengthen the German position both in the east and in the west. Ribbentrop pointed out that the pact would increase the isolation of America in the West and would have an impact on Russia - the policy of friendship with her should have clearly defined boundaries. Hitler's decision led to Mussolini's invitation to the Brenner Pass in early October 1940. An eyewitness - Ciano - wrote in his diary: “Rarely have I seen a Duce in such a good mood. The conversation was cordial and definitely the most interesting I have ever heard. Hitler laid out at least a few of his cards on the table and shared with us his plans for the future... Hitler was energetic and again took an extremely anti-Bolshevik stance. "Bolshevism," he said, "is the doctrine of people who stand on the lowest rung of civilization."

Germany's alliance with Italy and Japan created a bloc that opposed the British Empire. A significant question arose: what is the position of the USSR in the new alignment of forces? On the one hand, Germany was already planning an attack on the Soviet Union; on the other hand, she tried to find ways to peacefully include it in the German orbit. The time for determining the priority of this or that trend was November 1940.

Hitler dictated a letter to Ribbentrop in Moscow: the tripartite pact signed on September 27 by Germany, Italy and Japan was directed purely against Britain and the United States. Stalin was invited to join him.

Stalin answered with restraint:

"I got your letter. I am sincerely grateful for the trust, as well as for the instructive analysis of recent events ... V.M. Molotov considers himself obligated to make a return visit to Berlin ... As for the discussion of certain problems with the participation of the Japanese and Italians, I am of the opinion (without rejecting this idea in principle) that this issue should be submitted for preliminary consideration. On the day of Molotov's arrival, Hitler's top-secret directive was issued: "Regardless of the results of these discussions, all preparations related to the East, about which verbal orders have already been made, must continue."

Molotov's visit

A number of potentially contentious issues have accumulated between the two countries. Hitler watched without any approval as the USSR restored the "pre-Versailles" position in Eastern Europe, while Germany canceled out the results of Versailles in the West. The USSR and Germany were now simply obliged to draw a line of demarcation for their actions in the Balkans.

The American journalist Shearer wrote in his diary on November 12, 1940: “A dark rainy day, Molotov arrived, he was received extremely dryly and formally. Driving along Unter den Linden to the Soviet embassy, ​​he seemed to me like a chained provincial schoolteacher... The Germans talk frivolously about letting Moscow fulfill the old Russian dream of taking over the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles while they take over the rest of the Balkans: Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria." Throughout the distance from the border with the USSR to Berlin, a guard of honor stood along the canvas.

German records even contain a description of the clothes of those present. Molotov was wearing an unremarkable civilian suit, and Ribbentrop was wearing a blue-green uniform, high boots and a high-crowned cap (which he himself had cut). The first meeting was held at a round table in the former presidential palace, recently received by the Reich Minister. Molotov himself recalls Hitler's huge, tall office, where everyone except the owner allowed himself only remarks. Goering's study, hung with paintings and tapestries, also made an impression. In the Central Committee of the NSDAP, the premises were much simpler. Hess, who was in charge there, sat in a modest office at all. Molotov was impressed by Hitler's interpreter Hilger, who was born in Odessa and spoke fluent Russian. Ambassador Schulenburg spoke only a little Russian. Leaving Moscow with Molotov, he forgot his embassy uniform at his embassy - he was forced to return by train and catch up with the train by car. After his conversations with Hitler and Ribbentrop, Molotov sent long telegrams to Stalin every evening.

Ribbentrop also began by declaring the end of the British Empire. The British hope only for help from America, but “the entry of the United States into the war will have no consequences for Germany. Germany and Italy will never allow the Anglo-Saxons to land on the European continent ... The Axis countries are now thinking not about how to win the war, but about how to end the war already won. The time has come for Russia, Germany, Italy and Japan to define their spheres of influence. The Führer believes that all four powers should turn their eyes to the south. Japan to South Asia, Italy to Africa. Germany, having established a "new order" in Western Europe, will take care of Central Africa. Ribbentrop was interested to know whether Russia would also turn in the direction of the southern seas, "whether she would turn south to gain access to the open sea, which is so important to her."

The picture painted by Ribbentrop, contrary to expectations, did not arouse enthusiasm. Molotov interrupted the Reich Minister: "Which sea?" Ribbentrop's stream of eloquence suddenly dried up. He was unable to directly answer the question. Beating around the bush, the Reichsminister kept talking about the great changes in the world. Only when Molotov repeated his question did Ribbentrop allow greater clarity: "The most advantageous outlet to the sea for Russia could be found in the direction of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea." According to the notes of Schmidt's interpreter, Molotov commented with an impenetrable face on these words of Ribbentrop: "Clearness and caution are necessary in defining areas of interest."

After dinner, an attempt to turn the head of the extremely grounded Molotov was made by Hitler in the Reich Chancellery. The Fuhrer greeted Molotov with a Nazi salute and shook hands with all members of the Soviet delegation. Representatives of both sides were seated in a pompous reception room at a low table. Hitler began the conversation in the most grandiloquent tone: “An attempt should be made to determine the course of development of nations for a long period of time in the future, and, if this turns out to be possible, it should be done so as to avoid friction and elements of conflict, as far as humanly possible. This is especially important to keep in mind when two nations, Germany and Russia, are under the leadership of people who have sufficient power to determine the direction of development of their countries.

Hitler tried to divert attention from the Balkans and Finland. He suggested taking the discussion of German-Soviet relations to the highest - global - level, "above all petty considerations" and for a long time period. The build-up of American power, which has stronger foundations of power than Britain, must be anticipated in advance. The European powers must coordinate their policies to keep the Anglo-Saxons out of Europe. Hitler promised that as the weather improved, with the help of aviation, "England would be dealt the final blow." America will present a problem, but the United States "will not be able to threaten the freedom of other nations until 1970 or 1980 ... They don't care about Europe or Africa or Asia."

Molotov managed to underestimate the pathos of this geopolitician: “The statements of the Fuhrer are of a general nature. He (Molotov), ​​for his part, is ready to state the ideas of Stalin, who gave him clear instructions. Translator Schmidt recalled: "No foreign visitor spoke to the Fuhrer in this way." Molotov's questions dispelled the aura of Hitler as the creator of the new European order. Molotov was interested in the meaning of the tripartite pact, what the Germans were doing in Finland, what Hitler saw as the future situation in Asia. The conversation quickly moved on to the main topic: the Balkans. The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs stated bluntly that he was interested in "clarifying issues relating to the Balkan and Black Sea interests of Russia in relation to Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey." Hitler offered to divide the British inheritance, he pushed Russia into Asia. Stalin was interested in what was happening in the Balkans.

Perhaps for the first time, Hitler took the air raid alert over Berlin with relief. He suggested that the discussion be postponed until the next day.

In the morning Molotov repeated his questions to Hitler. It was Europe, not Asia, that became the subject of detailed discussions. Hitler disputed Molotov's claim that Finland was occupied by German troops. They are there in transit on their way to Norway. For his part, the Fuhrer insisted that the USSR was preparing for war with Finland, and asked when this war would begin. A new Soviet-Finnish conflict could lead to far-reaching consequences. Molotov started up: what does the Fuhrer mean? He then remarked, "This statement introduces a new factor into the discussion." The oppressive silence was interrupted by Ribbentrop, frightened by the course of the conversation: the Finnish question should not be dramatized, the tension that had arisen was caused by a misunderstanding. This intervention allowed Hitler to collect his thoughts and abruptly change the subject of conversation:

“Let's turn to more important issues. After the conquest of England, the British Empire will be a gigantic, world-wide, bankrupt estate of forty million square kilometers. Russia will have access to a non-freezing and truly open ocean. Until now, a minority of forty-five million Englishmen have ruled over six hundred million inhabitants of the British Empire. The day is not far off when he (Hitler) will crush this minority... The prospects of a global scale are emerging... All countries that are interested in a bankrupt possession should stop bickering among themselves and focus solely on the division of the British Empire.

Molotov replied that Hitler's arguments were undoubtedly of interest, but first of all, clarity should be brought to German-Soviet relations. He discovered the lack of enthusiasm on the German side when he asked to direct the discussion closer to the problems of Europe - Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania. "The Soviet government is of the view that the German guarantees to Rumania are directed against the interests of the Soviet Union." Germany must cancel its guarantees. What would be the reaction of Germany if the USSR provided guarantees to Bulgaria on the same terms as Germany and Italy to Romania?

Hitler darkened upon hearing this question. Did Bulgaria ask for such guarantees? He had not heard of such a request. In any case, he must first consult with Mussolini. After that, Hitler, famous for his unrestrained verbiage, fell silent for a long time, then drew the guest's attention to the late hour.

Hitler did not go to the banquet at the Soviet embassy. At the moment when Ribbentrop got up to pronounce a toast in return, an air raid alert was announced. In the bomb shelter, Ribbentrop, notorious for his tactlessness, pulled out of his pocket a draft agreement that would turn a three-party pact into a four-party one. Under Article Two, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union pledged to "respect each other's natural spheres of influence" by resolving conflicts among themselves in a "friendly manner." Ribbentrop intended to announce the fact of concluding an agreement with the USSR, but to keep secret the secret protocol, according to which the Soviet Union was asked to concentrate its troops in a southerly direction in the Indian Ocean. The desire to redirect the USSR to the south is transparently visible. For this, Ribbentrop promised to ensure that Moscow signed a non-aggression pact with Japan, to achieve recognition by Japan of Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang, which were in the sphere of Soviet interests.

For the third time, Molotov refused to discuss the Asian direction. The Baltic, the Balkans and the Black Sea straits - that's what he cared about in the first place. “Issues of interest to the Soviet Union concern not only Turkey, but also Bulgaria ... The fate of Romania and Hungary is also of interest to the USSR, and under no circumstances will their fate be indifferent to it. The Soviet government would also like to know what the Axis plans are for Yugoslavia and Greece, and what Germany intends to do with Poland... The Soviet government is interested in Swedish neutrality... In addition, there is the question of getting out of the Baltic Sea. Tossed about, Ribbentrop asked not to ask him point-blank questions. He repeated over and over that "the main issue is the readiness of the Soviet Union to take part in the forthcoming division of the British Empire." In response, Molotov allowed himself a cruel joke: “If Britain is finished, then why are we in this bomb shelter and whose bombs are falling on the city?” He said that he was invited to discuss "the great problems of tomorrow" and that he was most interested in current problems.

No one can say with complete certainty how the USSR's joining the trilateral pact (and agreeing to the "Indian direction") would have affected Hitler's plans to start a war. His absolute determination is evident from the documents, from the orders already issued for the deployment of the German military machine to the east. Perhaps only the servility of the USSR could push Hitler to "solve the British question" in the beginning. But even this hypothesis has no solid grounds. Molotov's ruthlessness did not slow down (and perhaps even hastened) Hitler's preparations for the eastern campaign. Obviously, the last doubts were cast aside. Stalin from Berlin was seen as ready for defensive measures, interested in the fate of Finland, Sweden, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Turkey - the entire belt of countries between the USSR and Germany. It was not possible to make Russia a satellite through promises of admission to the division of the British Empire.

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The fascist aggression against the Soviet Union, named after the Roman emperor "Plan Barbarossa", was a fleeting military campaign, pursuing one single goal: to defeat and destroy the USSR. The final date for the completion of hostilities was supposed to be the autumn of 1941.

A year before in December 1941, late in the evening, the Fuhrer signed the directive under the serial number 21. It was printed in nine copies and was kept in the strictest confidence.

The directive received a code name - the Barbarossa plan. It provided for the end of the campaign to defeat the USSR even before the end of the war against Great Britain.

What was this document and what goals did the Barbarossa Plan pursue - this is a carefully designed aggression directed against the Soviet Union. With it, Hitler, intending to achieve world domination, had to remove one of the main obstacles to his imperial goals.

Moscow, Leningrad, Donbass and the Central Industrial Region were indicated as the main strategic objects. At the same time, a special place was assigned to the capital, its capture was considered decisive for the victorious outcome of this war.

To destroy the USSR, Hitler planned to use all German ground forces, with the exception of only those that were supposed to remain in the occupied territories.

Barbarossa's plan provided for the release of the forces of the fascist air force to assist the ground forces of this eastern operation, so that the ground part of the campaign could be completed as quickly as possible. At the same time, the directive ordered by any means to minimize the destruction of eastern Germany by enemy aircraft.

Naval combat operations against the Northern, Black Sea and Baltic Soviet fleets were to be carried out by ships of the Reich Navy together with the naval forces of Romania and Finland.

For a lightning attack on the USSR, the Barbarossa plan considered the participation of 152 divisions, including tank and motorized, two brigades. Romania and Finland intended to field 16 brigades and 29 land divisions in this campaign.

The armed forces of the satellite countries of the Reich were to operate under a single German command. The task of Finland was to cover the northern troops, who were supposed to attack from Norwegian territory, as well as the destruction of Soviet troops on the Hanko Peninsula. At the same time, Romania was supposed to bind the actions of the Soviet troops, helping the Germans from the rear areas.

Barbarossa's plan set certain goals, which were based on pronounced class contradictions. It was the idea of ​​starting a war, which turned into the destruction of entire nations with unlimited use of violent methods.

Unlike the military invasion of France, Poland and the Balkans, the blitz campaign against the Soviet Union was prepared very meticulously. The Hitlerite leadership spent enough time and effort to develop the Barbarossa plan, so defeat was ruled out.

But the creators could not accurately assess the strength and strength of the Soviet state and, based on the exaggeration of the economic, political and military potentials of the fascist empire, they underestimated the power of the USSR, the combat capability and morale of its people.

Hitler's "machine" was gaining momentum for victory, which seemed to the leaders of the Reich very easy and close. That is why the fighting had to be a blitzkrieg, and the offensive - a continuous advance deep into the USSR, and at a very high speed. Short breaks were provided only for pulling up the rear.

At the same time, the Barbarossa plan completely ruled out any delays due to the resistance of the Soviet Army. The reason for the failure of this seemingly victorious plan was excessive self-confidence, which, as history has shown, destroyed the plans of the fascist generals.

The Barbarossa plan is a program developed by Hitler for the conquest of the USSR.

She is considered the most important miscalculation of the Fuhrer, who, four years after the start of the plan, led Germany to defeat.

Prerequisites

From the very moment they came to power in 1933, the Nazis promoted a policy of occupying the eastern territories. Such propaganda was very convenient: it allowed the Nazis to gain the support of the people, who were led to believe that all of Germany's problems arose from the loss in the First World War and the loss of territories.

Germany must regain its former power, the Nazis declared, and be reborn as a great empire. In turn, the promise of imperial greatness allowed the oligarchs, whose proteges were the Nazis, not to deal with social and economic problems in the country and keep their capital for themselves.

The plan to attack the USSR was given the code name "Barbarossa" in honor of Frederick I Barbarossa, a 12th-century German ruler who was also trying to revive Charlemagne's empire. The authors of the concept, as it were, hinted that what Friedrich could not do to the end, Adolf Hitler would do. At the same time, the inevitability of war with the Soviet Union was also promoted.

In 1939, Germany concluded a non-aggression pact with the USSR in order to secure itself from the east, and in September of the same year, both countries attacked Poland almost simultaneously: the USSR appropriated the eastern regions (Western Ukraine and Western Belarus), and the rest went to the Germans, established the Polish General Government.

And why was it necessary to attack the USSR?

In the conquest of world domination, Hitler's Germany had a serious rival - Great Britain. And she hoped for the help of two other superpowers - the USSR and the USA. To overcome their main enemy, the Nazis developed a plan for a phased takeover of the world:

• The defeat of the USSR will lead to the strengthening of the ally of the Nazis - Japan;
• Japan, with the support of Germany, will defeat the United States.
• Having lost both allies, England will leave Europe and Germany will remain dominating it.

Before coming up with such a plan, the Nazi government made a series of negotiations with several countries, including the Soviet Union. In 1940, the Berlin Pact was initiated to rally new allies around Germany against England. The USSR replied that it was ready to join the treaty only under a number of certain conditions that the German side could not accept.

Thus, the USSR was declared a serious enemy of Germany and the "last frontier" on the Nazi path to dominance in Europe.

Strike from multiple sides

The German government was confident that "Russia" (as they called the Soviet Union) could be conquered with one lightning attack. To do this, the blow had to be carried out from several sides:

• North - from the Baltic;
• South - from the side of Ukraine;
• Later, an attack on Baku was planned as a separate operation.

The Nazis set a tough task - to conquer the Soviet Union by the spring of 1941. Moscow was considered an important point - the largest and most developed city in the country, its capital and the most important railway junction. The Nazi government believed that the Red Army would devote all its forces to the defense of Moscow, weakening other strategically important areas.

Plans were also prepared for the division of the USSR. The European part of the country was planned to be decentralized and divided into several economic zones, which were to become an agrarian and raw material appendage of the Reich. Modern industrial equipment had to be taken to the Reich. In the future, these zones were planned to be reorganized into separate states controlled by Germany.

Hitler's miscalculations

Barbarossa's plan was only good on paper. The Nazis underestimated the capabilities of the Soviet defense and clearly overestimated their own strength. Instead of a lightning strike, they received many years of protracted war, which ended with the capture of Berlin by Soviet troops and the fall of the fascist regime.

Meanwhile, at first it was not noticeable: Soviet troops were defeated in border battles, as well as at the first stage of the Great Patriotic War, when Germany quickly conquered the territories of Ukraine and Belarus.

The defeats of the Soviet army were due to several reasons, including:

• Mass Stalinist repressions, including against the high command;
• The new commanders who took their post instead of the repressed ones were not distinguished by professionalism and proper training;
• Insufficient interaction between various branches of the armed forces, their poor preparation for a big war;
• The Soviet army leadership hoped for the offensive nature of the war and did not work out enough defensive operations.

On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany and its allies launched a major operation to invade the territory of the Soviet Union, which they called the "Plan Barbarossa" - about 4.5 million soldiers crossed the borders of the USSR without warning from Poland, Finland and Romania. Hitler had his own plans for the resources of the USSR, despite the fact that Germany and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact in 1939. Both sides had long suspected each other, and the treaty simply gave them some time to prepare for a possible war. The Soviet Union was unprepared for a surprise attack on the border of almost 2900 km and suffered terrible losses. In one week, German forces advanced 321 km deep into the USSR, destroyed almost 4,000 aircraft and killed, captured or wounded about 600,000 Red Army soldiers. By December 1941, Germany approached Moscow and laid siege to the city, but the infamous harsh Russian winter set in and the German advance stalled. As a result of one of the largest and worst military operations in history, Germany lost 775,000 soldiers, more than 800,000 Soviet soldiers were killed, and another 6 million were wounded or captured. But Operation Barbarossa was thwarted despite a successful start, Gilter's plan for a blitzkrieg in the USSR failed, which was a turning point in World War II.

(Total 45 photos)

1. A German soldier and the corpse of a Soviet soldier lying on the ground next to a burning BT-7 tank in 1941, during the first days of Operation Barbarossa. (Deutsches Bundesarchiv/German Federal Archive)

2. Soviet guards mortars firing at the enemy. (AFP/Getty Images)

3. A German tank regiment prepares to attack on July 21, 1941 somewhere on the Eastern Front during a successful German attempt to invade the USSR. (AP Photo)

4. German radio operator in an armored personnel carrier on the territory of the USSR in August 1941. (Deutsches Bundesarchiv/German Federal Archive)

5. German infantrymen monitor the movement of the enemy from a trench on the territory of the USSR on July 10, 1941. (AP Photo)

6. German dive bombers "Shtuka" on the way to the target over the territory between the Dnieper and the Crimea on November 6, 1941. (AP Photo)

7. German soldiers cross the Don River while moving towards the Caucasus. (AP Photo)

8. German soldiers push a cart on a log deck in October 1941 near Salla, on the Kola Peninsula, Finland. (AP Photo)

9. German sentry, against the backdrop of a burning bridge across the Dnieper, in the recently captured Kyiv, in 1941. (Deutsches Bundesarchiv/German Federal Archive)

10. Machine-gun crew of the Far Eastern Red Army of the USSR in 1941. (LOC)

11. A burning German bomber crashes at an unknown location in November 1941. (AP Photo)

12. Nazi troops in positions during the battle on the outskirts of Kyiv. (AP Photo)

13. Traces of Soviet resistance on the streets of Rostov at the end of 1941. (AP Photo)

14. Soviet prisoners and the Nazi column on July 2, 1941, at the beginning of a fierce battle between Germany and the USSR. (AP Photo)

15. Civilians save their modest belongings during the implementation of the scorched earth tactics in the Leningrad region on October 21, 1941. (AP Photo)

16. Reindeer graze at an air base in Finland on July 26, 1941 against the backdrop of a German plane taking off. (AP Photo)

17. Heinrich Himmler (left with glasses), head of the Gestapo and SS troops with a prisoner of war in a camp in Russia. (National Archives)

18. Photo taken by a German photojournalist to prove great success in the Moscow direction. 650 thousand soldiers of the Red Army who were captured in boilers near Bryansk and Vyazma. They are to be transported to a POW camp on November 2, 1941. (AP Photo)

19. Adolf Hitler (center) with General Field Marshal Walther von Brauchach (left) and Commander-in-Chief Franz Halder on August 7, 1941. (AP Photo)

20. German motorized infantry advances through a burning Russian village on June 26, 1941. (AP Photo)

22. In addition to regular troops, the rapidly advancing German forces met partisan resistance on their way. In this photo - partisans in position armed with rifles and a DP machine gun. (LOC)

25. Partisans before execution near Velizh in the Smolensk region in September 1941. (LOC)

26. Finnish train passes through the section of the railway restored after the explosion on October 19, 1941. (AP Photo)

27. Burning houses, ruins and debris testify to the brutal nature of the fighting in front of the entrance to the industrial center of Rostov on November 22, 1941. (AP Photo)

28. General Guderian communicates with representatives of a tank formation on the Russian front on September 3, 1941. (AP Photo)

29. German soldiers remove communist symbols while moving through the territory of the USSR on July 18, 1941. (AP Photo)

30. A man with his wife and child after being evacuated from Minsk, which was invaded by German troops on August 9, 1941. (AP Photo)

31. German authorities claimed that this photo was a distant view of Leningrad taken from German positions on October 1, 1941. The dark silhouettes in the sky are Soviet balloons. The Germans besieged the city for two years, but were never able to conquer it. (AP Photo)

33. German Colonel General Ernst Busch inspects an anti-aircraft gun somewhere in Germany on September 3, 1941. (AP Photo)

34. Finnish soldiers storming the Soviet defensive structure on August 10, 1941. On the left is one of the surrendered. (AP Photo)

35. German troops are advancing on the suburbs of Leningrad on November 24, 1941. (AP Photo)38. German motorized infantry in Staritsa on November 21, 1941 while advancing towards Kyiv. The scorched buildings in the background are the result of a scorched earth tactic. (AP Photo)

39. A German soldier knocks out the front door of the house from which sniper fire was fired on September 1, 1941 with a butt. (AP Photo)

40. Two Soviet soldiers, now prisoners of war, inspect a fallen and broken statue of Lenin somewhere in the USSR on August 9, 1941. Pay attention to the rope around the neck of the statue - this is a typical way of the German "dismantling" of Soviet monuments. (AP Photo)

41. German sources state that the officer on the right is a captured Soviet colonel who is being interrogated by Nazi officers on October 24, 1941. (AP Photo)

42. Advance units of German troops entering the burning Smolensk during the advance towards Moscow in August 1941. (AP Photo)

43. Echelon transporting Soviet prisoners of war to Germany on October 3, 1941. Several million Soviet soldiers ended up in German concentration camps. Many of them died in captivity. (AP Photo)

44. Soviet snipers leave their shelter in the hemp thickets somewhere in the USSR on August 27, 1941. In the foreground is a blown up Soviet tank. (AP Photo)

45. German infantry in winter uniforms next to the convoy on the approaches to Moscow in November 1941. The onset of cold weather disrupted an already poor food line and hindered the German advance, leading to Soviet counterattacks and heavy casualties on both sides. (AP Photo)