Initially, the Soviet Red Army, the creation of which took place against the backdrop of the beginning civil war, had utopian features. The Bolsheviks believed that under the socialist system, the army should be built on a voluntary basis. This project was in line with Marxist ideology. Such an army was opposed to the regular armies of Western countries. According to the theoretical doctrine, in society there could only be "universal armament of the people."

Creation of the Red Army

The first steps of the Bolsheviks showed that they really wanted to abandon the former tsarist system. On December 16, 1917, a decree was adopted abolishing officer ranks. Commanders were now elected by their own subordinates. According to the party's plan, on the day of the creation of the Red Army, the new army was to become truly democratic. Time has shown that these plans could not survive the trials of a bloody era.

The Bolsheviks managed to seize power in Petrograd with the help of a small Red Guard and separate revolutionary detachments of sailors and soldiers. The provisional government was paralyzed, which obscenely made the task easier for Lenin and his supporters. But outside the capital there was a huge country, most of which was not at all happy with the party of radicals, whose leaders arrived in Russia in a sealed wagon from enemy Germany.

By the beginning of a full-scale civil war, the Bolshevik armed forces were distinguished by poor military training and the absence of centralized effective control. Those who served in the Red Guard were guided by revolutionary chaos and their own political convictions, which could change at any moment. The position of the newly proclaimed Soviet power was more than precarious. She needed a fundamentally new Red Army. The creation of the armed forces became a matter of life and death for the people who were in Smolny.

What difficulties faced the Bolsheviks? The party could not form its own army on the old apparatus. The best cadres of the period of the monarchy and the Provisional Government hardly wanted to cooperate with the radical left. The second problem was that Russia had been waging war against Germany and its allies for several years. The soldiers were tired - they were demoralized. In order to replenish the ranks of the Red Army, its founders had to come up with a public incentive that would be a good reason to take up arms again.

The Bolsheviks did not have to go far for this. They made the principle of class struggle the main driving force of their troops. With the coming to power of the RSDLP (b) issued many decrees. According to the slogans, the peasants received land, and the workers - factories. Now they had to defend these gains of the revolution. Hatred for the old system (landlords, capitalists, etc.) was the foundation on which the Red Army was held. The creation of the Red Army took place on January 28, 1918. On this day, the new government, represented by the Council of People's Commissars, adopted a corresponding decree.

First successes

Vsevobuch was also established. This system was intended for universal military training of the inhabitants of the RSFSR, and then the USSR. Vsevobuch appeared on April 22, 1918, after the decision to create it was made at the VII Congress of the RCP (b) in March. The Bolsheviks hoped that the new system would help them quickly replenish the ranks of the Red Army.

The soviets at the local level were directly involved in the formation of armed detachments. In addition, for this purpose were established. At first, they enjoyed considerable independence from the central government. Who was the then Red Army? The creation of this armed structure led to an influx of various personnel. These were people who served in the old tsarist army, peasant militias, soldiers and sailors from among the Red Guards. The heterogeneity of the composition had a negative effect on the combat readiness of this army. In addition, the detachments often acted inconsistently due to the election of commanders, collective and rally management.

Despite all the shortcomings, the Red Army in the first months of the civil war was able to achieve important successes that became the key to its future unconditional victory. The Bolsheviks managed to keep Moscow and Yekaterinodar. Local uprisings were suppressed due to a noticeable numerical advantage, as well as wide popular support. The populist decrees of the Soviet government (especially in 1917-1918) did their job.

Trotsky at the head of the army

It was this man who stood at the origins of the October Revolution in Petrograd. The revolutionary led the capture of city communications and the Winter Palace from Smolny, where the headquarters of the Bolsheviks was located. At the first stage of the Civil War, the figure of Trotsky in terms of scale and importance of the decisions made was in no way inferior to the figure of Vladimir Lenin. Therefore, it is not surprising that Lev Davidovich was elected People's Commissar for Military Affairs. His organizational talent in all its glory manifested itself in this post. At the origins of the creation of the Red Army were the very first two people's commissars.

Tsarist officers in the Red Army

Theoretically, the Bolsheviks saw their army as meeting strict class requirements. However, the lack of experience among the majority of workers and peasants could be the reason for the defeat of the party. Therefore, the history of the creation of the Red Army took another turn when Trotsky proposed to staff its ranks with former tsarist officers. These professionals have considerable experience. All of them went through the First World War, and some remembered the Russo-Japanese War. Many of them were nobles by origin.

On the day the Red Army was created, the Bolsheviks proclaimed that it would be purged of landlords and other enemies of the proletariat. However, practical necessity gradually corrected the course of the Soviet government. In times of danger, she was quite flexible in her decisions. Lenin was a pragmatist much more than a dogmatist. Therefore, he agreed to a compromise on the issue with the royal officers.

The presence of a "counter-revolutionary contingent" in the Red Army has long been a headache for the Bolsheviks. Former tsarist officers raised uprisings more than once. One of these was the rebellion led by Mikhail Muravyov in July 1918. This Left Socialist-Revolutionary and former tsarist officer was appointed commander of the Eastern Front by the Bolsheviks when the two parties still formed a single coalition. He tried to seize power in Simbirsk, which at that time was located near the theater of operations. The rebellion was suppressed by Joseph Vareikis and Mikhail Tukhachevsky. The uprisings in the Red Army, as a rule, took place due to the harsh repressive measures of the command.

The emergence of commissioners

Actually, the date of the creation of the Red Army is not the only important mark on the calendar for the history of the formation of Soviet power in the expanses of the former Russian Empire. Since the composition of the armed forces gradually became more and more heterogeneous, and the propaganda of opponents became stronger, the Council of People's Commissars decided to establish the position of military commissars. They were supposed to carry out party propaganda among the soldiers and old specialists. The commissars made it possible to smooth out contradictions in the rank and file, which was diverse in terms of political views. Having received significant powers, these representatives of the party not only enlightened and educated the Red Army soldiers, but also reported to the top about the unreliability of individuals, discontent, etc.

Thus, the Bolsheviks planted dual power in the military units. On one side were the commanders, and on the other, the commissars. The history of the creation of the Red Army would have been completely different if not for their appearance. In an emergency, the commissar could become the sole leader, leaving the commander in the background. Military councils were created to manage divisions and larger formations. Each such body included one commander and two commissars. Only the most ideologically hardened Bolsheviks became them (as a rule, people who joined the party before the revolution). With the increase in the army, and hence the commissars, the authorities had to create a new educational infrastructure necessary for the operational training of propagandists and agitators.

Propaganda

In May 1918, the All-Russian General Staff was established, and in September - the Revolutionary Military Council. These dates and the date of the creation of the Red Army became key to the spread and strengthening of the power of the Bolsheviks. Immediately after the October Revolution, the party headed for the radicalization of the situation in the country. After the unsuccessful elections for the RSDLP(b), this institution (necessary to determine the Russian future on an elective basis) was dispersed. Now the opponents of the Bolsheviks were left without legal tools to defend their position. The white movement quickly sprang up in different regions of the country. It was possible to fight him only by military means - it was for this that the creation of the Red Army was needed.

Photos of the defenders of the communist future began to be published in a huge pile of propaganda newspapers. The Bolsheviks at first tried to secure an influx of recruits with catchy slogans: "The socialist fatherland is in danger!" etc. These measures had an effect, but it was not enough. By April, the size of the army had risen to 200,000, but that would not have been enough to subjugate the entire territory of the former Russian Empire to the party. We should not forget that Lenin dreamed of a world revolution. Russia for him was only the initial springboard for the offensive of the international proletariat. To strengthen propaganda in the Red Army, the Political Directorate was established.

In the year of the creation of the Red Army, they joined it not only for ideological reasons. In the country, exhausted by a long war with the Germans, there was a shortage of food for a long time. The danger of starvation was especially acute in the cities. In such bleak conditions, the poor sought to be in the service at any cost (regular rations were guaranteed there).

Introduction of universal conscription

Although the creation of the Red Army began in accordance with the decree of the Council of People's Commissars as early as January 1918, the accelerated pace of the organization of new armed forces came in May, when the Czechoslovak Corps revolted. These soldiers, captured during the First World War, took the side of the white movement and opposed the Bolsheviks. In a paralyzed and fragmented country, a relatively small 40,000-strong corps became the most combat-ready and professional army.

The news of the uprising excited Lenin and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. The Bolsheviks decided to go ahead of the curve. On May 29, 1918, a decree was issued, according to which forced recruitment into the army was introduced. It took the form of mobilization. In domestic policy, the Soviet government adopted the course of war communism. The peasants not only lost their crops, which went to the state, but also massively climbed into the troops. Party mobilizations to the front became commonplace. By the end of the Civil War, half of the members of the RSDLP (b) ended up in the army. At the same time, almost all Bolsheviks became commissars and political workers.

In the summer, Trotsky became the initiator The history of the creation of the Red Army, in short, overcame another important milestone. On July 29, 1918, all eligible men, who were between 18 and 40 years old, were registered. Even representatives of the enemy bourgeois class (former merchants, industrialists, etc.) were included in the rear militia. Such drastic measures have borne fruit. The creation of the Red Army by September 1918 made it possible to send more than 450 thousand people to the front (about 100 thousand more remained in the rear troops).

Trotsky, like Lenin, temporarily brushed aside Marxist ideology in order to increase the combat effectiveness of the armed forces. It was he, as People's Commissar, who initiated important reforms and transformations at the front. The army reinstated the death penalty for desertion and failure to follow orders. The insignia, the single uniform, the sole authority of the leadership, and many other signs of the tsarist era returned. On May 1, 1918, the first parade of the Red Army took place on the Khodynka field in Moscow. The Vsevobuch system has been operating at full capacity.

In September, Trotsky headed the newly formed Revolutionary Military Council. This state body became the top of the administrative pyramid that led the army. Trotsky's right hand was Joachim Vatsetis. He was the first under Soviet rule to receive the post of commander in chief. In the same autumn, the fronts were formed - the Southern, Eastern and Northern. Each of them had its own headquarters. The first month of the creation of the Red Army was a time of uncertainty - the Bolsheviks were torn between ideology and practice. Now the course towards pragmatism has become the main one, and the Red Army began to take the forms that turned out to be its foundation over the next decades.

war communism

Without a doubt, the reasons for the creation of the Red Army were to protect the Bolshevik power. At first, she controlled a very small part of European Russia. At the same time, the RSFSR was under pressure from opponents from all sides. After the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed with Imperial Germany, the Entente forces invaded Russia. The intervention was insignificant (it covered only the north of the country). The European powers supported the whites mainly with the supply of weapons and money. For the Red Army, the attack by the French and British was only an additional reason for consolidating and strengthening propaganda among the rank and file. Now the creation of the Red Army could be briefly and intelligibly explained by the defense of Russia from foreign invasion. Such slogans allowed to increase the influx of recruits.

At the same time, throughout the Civil War, there was the problem of supplying the armed forces with all sorts of resources. The economy was paralyzed, strikes broke out frequently at factories, and famine became the norm in the countryside. It was against this background that the Soviet government began to pursue a policy of war communism.

Its essence was simple. The economy became radically centralized. The state took full control of the distribution of resources in the country. Industrial enterprises were nationalized immediately after the October Revolution. Now the Bolsheviks had to squeeze all the juice out of the countryside. Requisitioning, harvest taxes, individual terror of the peasants who did not want to share their grain with the state - all this was used in order to feed and finance the Red Army.

The fight against desertion

Trotsky personally went to the front in order to control the execution of his orders. On August 10, 1918, he arrived in Sviyazhsk, when battles for Kazan were going on not far from him. In a stubborn battle, one of the Red Army regiments faltered and fled. Then Trotsky publicly shot every tenth soldier in this formation. Such a massacre, more like a ritual, resembled the ancient Roman tradition - decimation.

By decision of the People's Commissar, they began to shoot not only deserters, but also simulators who asked for leave from the front due to an imaginary illness. The apogee of the fight against the fugitives was the creation of foreign detachments. During the offensive, specially selected military men stood up behind the main army, who shot the cowards right in the course of the battle. Thus, with the help of draconian measures and incredible cruelty, the Red Army became exemplarily disciplined. The Bolsheviks had the courage and pragmatic cynicism to do something that the commanders of Trotsky did not dare to do, who did not disdain any methods to spread Soviet power, they soon began to call the "demon of the revolution."

Unification of the armed forces

Gradually, the appearance of the Red Army also changed. At first, the Red Army did not provide for a uniform uniform. Soldiers, as a rule, wore out their old military uniforms or civilian clothes. Due to the huge influx of peasants shod in bast shoes, there were much more than those shod in familiar boots. Such anarchy lasted until the end of the unification of the armed forces.

At the beginning of 1919, according to the decision of the Revolutionary Military Council, sleeve insignia were introduced. At the same time, the Red Army soldiers received their own headdress, which became known among the people as Budyonovka. Tunics and overcoats got colored flaps. A recognizable symbol was a red star sewn onto a headdress.

The introduction of certain characteristic features of the former army into the Red Army led to the emergence of an opposition faction in the party. Its members advocated the rejection of ideological compromise. Lenin and Trotsky, having joined forces, in March 1919 at the VIII Congress were able to defend their course.

The fragmentation of the white movement, the powerful propaganda of the Bolsheviks, their determination to carry out repressions to rally their own ranks, and many other circumstances led to the fact that Soviet power was established on the territory of almost the entire former Russian Empire, except for Poland and Finland. The Red Army won the Civil War. At the final stage of the conflict, its number was already 5.5 million people.

Could the defeat in the summer of 1941 have been avoided?

There are enough reasons for the defeat to be able to list them point by point, but there were two main ones: 1. The Red Army was a huge, well-armed crowd of people who were not ready to fight. Stalin did everything possible to equip his army with the most modern and effective weapons, but did not take into account the human factor. During 1939 The attitude towards Germany changed to the exact opposite: until August (before the conclusion of the Pact) - fascist warmongers, from September (partition of Poland) - a friendly state. Relations between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army were even dubbed "brotherhood sealed with blood." The fighters and commanders of the Red Army were not required to delve into the intricacies of Stalin's foreign policy. At political classes, they were told that the Wehrmacht consisted of the same workers and peasants who did not want and would not fight against the USSR - the birthplace of the socialist revolution (but if the "reactionary forces" in Germany provoke a war, the Red Army will provide fraternal assistance to the German people in the struggle with "oppressors"). The official ideology proclaimed the Soviet Union the best friend of all peoples on the grounds that the power in the country belonged (supposedly) to the workers and peasants, and all the peoples of the world aspired to the same. The Soviet Union was thus the guiding star, the hope and support of all progressive mankind. That is why the official ideology recognized the right of the Soviet Union to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries if this was required by the interests of the workers and peasants of this country.

Since the interests of the working people of the Soviet Union could not but coincide with the interests of the working people of any other country, the conclusion somehow suggested itself: everything that is done in the interests of the Soviet Union is in the interests of the working people of the whole world. This conclusion is very convenient to use to justify an aggressive foreign policy, but not as a motivation for ordinary people who are the tool of such a policy. The official ideology was contrary to human nature.

During the war with Finland, the troops were explained that they were fighting with the "White Finns", i.e. those who do not want to give power to the Finnish workers and peasants. But what does an ordinary soldier care about the state structure of sovereign Finland? He has enough problems in his own country. And only rare enthusiasts (the mildest definition for them) are capable of giving their only life in the interests of the working people of a foreign country. Of course, there were professionals (as in any other army in the world) for whom the war provides an opportunity to show their abilities, but were there many of them?

Unfortunately, all regular commanders cannot be considered professionals just because they graduated from military schools. A professional differs from all others in that he does his job better than anyone else, does his job constantly, creatively, with interest. War is hard work, and not only for ordinary soldiers who are forced to carry dozens of kilograms of equipment, endure cold, thirst and hunger, but also for top commanders. Making a responsible decision in the shortest possible time, with a lack of information (information about the enemy is rarely complete and sufficient) is a big stress. It is one thing to pull the strap in peacetime, fulfilling the requirements of the charters and receiving the next rank for long service; and it is quite another thing to participate in hostilities. In peacetime, not those commanders who demonstrate excellent skills of their units are valued, but those who are ready to brighten up the harsh everyday life of senior commanders with a well-organized feast. It is their grateful bosses who encourage and promote them. If the peace period drags on, then such nominees occupy all leading positions in regiments, divisions, and armies. Competent commanders behave more independently than they create obstacles for themselves in promotion. Thus, from the beginning of the war, some time must pass so that careerists who are useless in the war find themselves in the rear (home or German), and their places are taken by commanders who meet the requirements of wartime. But even "excellent students in combat and political training" must be tested in combat.

The same problems arose with the Germans and the Allies. Here is what Hans von Luke writes: “I enriched my experience: once again I saw with my own eyes how officers and non-commissioned officers, who were excellent teachers and instructors in peacetime, who enjoyed the love of their superiors, the respect of comrades and students, lose their composure in a critical situation and were unable to cope with the situation. As General Pip Roberts told me later, he had to face exactly the same phenomenon. For the same reasons that I had to get rid of the battalion commander, he was forced to say goodbye to higher-level commanders - brigade and Moreover, experience has shown that it is necessary to remove from office immediately so that the confusion of the commander is not transmitted to the entire unit. No army in the world can be sure of its combat readiness until the war begins. Only war will show the readiness of any army.

Before reaching Moscow, von Luke took part in the fighting in Poland and France. This is how he describes his first battle (September, Poland): “Suddenly, a machine-gun burst cut off Private Ul very close to me. He died instantly, becoming the first killed in my squadron. Many soldiers saw how he died. We were all scared. Who will be next?" The maneuvers are over - the war has begun. "First and second platoons—forward!—I shouted. “Third—in reserve. Heavy weapons platoon—to provide cover fire.

Nobody moved. Everyone was afraid to be next. Me too. Anyone who says they didn't feel fear in the first fight is just lying. It was up to me, the commander, to set an example for my men. - All over me! - I yelled and rushed forward, brandishing a pistol. The difficult months of study and preparation were not in vain - all the soldiers followed me .... Days of rest gave us back strength. I had time to thank all the personnel of the squadron for their service. “It’s great that you taught us how to dig in quickly,” they told me. “Undoubtedly, the hardships of study saved the lives of many of us.” (Hans von Luke. At the tip of the tank wedge. .)

It is not enough to have an intelligent Field Manual, a well-planned campaign plan and modern weapons. Troops must be willing and able to use them. Infantrymen must first spend long weeks and months at the shooting range, pilots must fly hundreds of hours performing training tasks, tank crews must turn into teams where they understand each other perfectly. But in the Red Army, the individual training of each fighter was not given due attention. Basically, exercises were carried out with the participation of regiments and divisions, large-scale spectacles that delight the eyes of high authorities. Success in a real battle may depend on one machine gunner who has realized to take an advantageous position. It is clear that such training of the army requires huge resources, it is clear that saving resources on ordinary soldiers has always been a natural and self-explanatory matter, attention was paid mainly to political training, household chores and drill on the parade ground. The fighters had to learn military science "in a real way" (as the leader of the world proletariat comrade Lenin bequeathed) in a real battle, for hundreds of thousands of them it ended very deplorably. "From June to December 1941, the Armed Forces lost 3138 thousand people killed, died from wounds, were captured and missing, more than 6 million units of small arms, 20 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, 100 thousand were lost. guns and mortars, 10 thousand aircraft." (Who was who in the Great Patriotic War 1941 - 1945. Handbook edited by OA Rzheshevsky. M .: Republic, 2000).

The fact that the army was not ready for a big war, Stalin and the command was aware.

In the summer of 1938, events broke out in the region of Lake Khasan. "The results were summed up by the order of K.E. Voroshilov No. 0040 dated 09/04/38, which indicated that the combat training of the troops, headquarters and command staff was at an unacceptably low level. The troops marched to the border completely unprepared, the Soviet units were pulled apart and are incapacitated, their supply is not organized: "The heads of the front departments and the commanders of the units did not know what, where and in what condition weapons, ammunition and other combat equipment were available. In many cases, entire artillery batteries ended up at the front without shells, spare barrels for machine guns were not fitted in advance, rifles were issued unshot, and many fighters and even one of the rifle units of the 32nd division arrived at the front without rifles and gas masks. "All types of troops discovered complete inability to act in a real combat situation... The gunners did not know where to shoot, the tank units were used ineptly and suffered heavy losses... By the same order, Marshal Blucher was removed from command of the Far Eastern Front... The order did not mention that directly before the start of the battles, during the battles and at the end of them, brigade commanders and battalion commanders were arrested - the Chekists worked according to their own plan, they were engaged in the liquidation of the "military conspiracy", one of the defendants of which was the commander of the 15th Cavalry Division K.K. Rokossovsky. (Vladimir Beshanov. "We were not quite ready yet ...". Collection "The Great Patriotic Catastrophe ... M .: Yauza, Eksmo, 2007. P. 59-60).

"December 11, 1938 The political and moral state of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army is strong and stable. Commanders, commissars, political agencies and party organizations carried out work in 1938 to Bolshevize the Red Army and uproot the remnants of the enemies of the people from the Red Army .... ..The first successes have been achieved in training a fighter in the use of a hand grenade, a bayonet and a shovel ... ... But along with these achievements, there are still many very big shortcomings both in combat and political training, and in everyday life, in everyday life Red Army: 1) A completely unacceptable situation has arisen with regard to fire training... True, there are still individual soldiers in the troops who have served for a year, but have never fired a live cartridge. , one cannot expect success in close combat with the enemy... political workers and chiefs of a commanding nature and exactingness towards subordinate subunits, units and individuals, which inevitably leads, cannot but lead, to a decrease in the volitional qualities of these commanders, commissars and chiefs. A weak-willed commander, commissar, chief, as you know, cannot guarantee success in the combat training of troops, firm and qualified leadership of their entire life and activities in peaceful conditions, and even more so, will not be able to ensure victorious command on the battlefield of the troops entrusted to him. Such people, as well as drunkards, if they do not quickly improve and do not become worthy commanders, political workers and bosses, there is no place in the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army. All these shortcomings must be resolutely eliminated at the very beginning of the 1939 academic year. Only by eliminating the shortcomings in the work of the command, headquarters, units and subunits, one can be sure of further growth and fulfillment of the tasks assigned to the Red Army.

Tasks for the 1939 academic year: ... (absolutely correct tasks are listed). The further growth of the combat power of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army requires: ... (sensible measures are described in detail). In addition, by April 30, June 15 and October 1, organize in units a summing up of the results of combat and political training with a reading of this order to compare the results achieved with the tasks set by the order and a detailed discussion of measures to eliminate shortcomings and fulfill the order in full. People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov

(F. 4, op. 15, d. 17, l. 198 - 211)

"No. 39 ORDER ON THE FIGHT AGAINST DRINKING IN THE RKKA

December 28, 1938 Recently, drunkenness in the army has taken on truly menacing proportions. Especially this evil took root among the commanding staff. According to far from complete data, over 1,300 ugly cases of drunkenness were noted in the Belarusian Special Military District alone for 9 months of 1938, in parts of the Ural Military District over 1,000 cases over the same period, and approximately the same ugly picture in a number of other military districts . Here are some examples of the gravest crimes committed while drunk by people who, by misunderstanding, were dressed in military uniforms. On October 15, in Vladivostok, four lieutenants, drunk to the point of losing their human form, staged a brawl in a restaurant, opened fire and wounded two citizens. On September 18, two lieutenants of the railway regiment, under approximately the same circumstances in a restaurant, quarreled among themselves, shot themselves ... On November 8, in the city of Rechitsa, five drunken Red Army soldiers stabbed in the street and wounded three workers, and returning to the unit, raped a passing citizen, after what tried to kill her. On May 27 in Ashgabat, Captain Balakirev drunkenly met a woman unknown to him in a park, he blurted out a number of unpublished information in a restaurant, and the next morning he was found sleeping on the porch of someone else's house without a revolver, equipment and party card. Drunkenness has become a real scourge of the army. Notorious scoundrels and drunkards, in front of their excessively calm bosses, in front of the party and Komsomol organizations, undermine the foundations of military discipline and decompose military units. A significant part of all accidents, catastrophes and all other emergencies is a direct consequence of drunkenness and an unacceptable attitude towards this evil on the part of responsible bosses and commissars. Many cases of postponing and canceling classes and failure to fulfill the combat training plan are also the result of the corrupting effect of drunkenness. Finally, numerous examples show that drunkards often become the prey of foreign intelligence services, take the path of outright betrayal of their homeland and go over to the camp of the enemies of the Soviet people. All these immutable truths are well known to every thinking commander and political worker, and yet there is no real fight against drunkenness. Drunkenness flourishes, it has become a common everyday phenomenon, they put up with it, it is not subject to public condemnation. The incorrigible, unrestrained drunkard and loafer not only does not come under fire from Bolshevik criticism, is not only not expelled from a healthy comradely environment, which he compromises, but even sometimes enjoys the support of his comrades. They find some excuses for him, they patronize him, sympathize, he is surrounded by the halo of “his boyfriend”. With such an attitude towards drunkards, a drunken and worthless person is not only not ashamed of himself and his ugly deeds, but often flaunts them. Are there many cases when the public in command demanded that some incorrigible drunkard be removed from their midst? There are almost no such cases. This suggests that the tarnished honor of a soldier of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army and the honor of the military unit to which you belong are of little concern to us. Many do not understand that every commander and political worker, as well as a Red Army soldier, is to a certain extent responsible for the behavior of his comrade in service, that the unworthy behavior of some casts a shadow on the entire comradely team and on the entire military unit as a whole. There is no place for drunkards in the Red Army. The defense of the USSR with weapons in hand is entrusted to the best people of the country, patriots of their Fatherland, honest, brave, steadfast and sober sons of our Motherland. I order: ... (follows a list of necessary measures) People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov "(F. 4, op. 15, d. 19, l. 417-418.)

“Throughout the summer of 1939, on the banks of the Khalkhin-Gol River, the “unknown war” continued until now, because even today it is hidden under the headings of secrecy. During it, the first combat use of the Soviet tank formation took place. We are talking about the glorified K .Simonov, a valiant strike of the 11th tank brigade of M.P. Yakovlev, when, having overslept the crossing to the Mongolian coast of an entire Japanese division, G.K. Zhukov, commander of the Special Corps, from the march threw 182 tanks and 59 armored vehicles, in violation of all regulations - without preparation, without the support of infantry and artillery. Perhaps Georgy Konstantinovich assumed that the "amazed" Japanese would scatter in panic, but he himself was amazed at the effectiveness of the fire of enemy anti-tank guns. After the first attack, 77 tanks burned on the battlefield and 37 armored vehicles. It was possible to liquidate the bridgehead only on the third day with the approach of rifle units and heavy artillery ... The decision of the commander, contrary to all the provisions of the Ordinance ava, justify the need to immediately resolve the critical situation into which General Kamatsubara drove him with his maneuver. Quite possible. The only trouble is that in the future, Soviet commanders, planning "powerful counterattacks", regardless of the intentions of the enemy, regularly got into "critical situations". (Vladimir Beshanov. "We were not quite ready yet ..." Collection "The Great Patriotic Catastrophe ... M .: Yauza, Eksmo, 2007. P. 69-70).

On September 17, 1939, the Red Army set out on a "liberation campaign" in Poland. "The two Soviet fronts included about 600 thousand people, more than 2000 aircraft and about 4000 tanks ... According to the operational report of the chief of staff of the 32nd tank brigade, Major Bolotov, the brigade, having completed a 350-kilometer march-parade to the west, to In combat clashes, she irretrievably lost one T-26 tank, and 69 vehicles, more than a third of the composition, were abandoned on the road "due to technical defects. In total, the armored forces of the two fronts scattered almost five hundred faulty tanks along the roads." (S.73-74 ibid.).

Estimates of the results of the Soviet-Finnish war are given differently, but the country's leadership made the right conclusions.

In the order of the NPO dated May 16, 1940. summed up: "The experience of the war in the Karelian-Finnish theater revealed major shortcomings in combat training and education of the army. Military discipline was not up to the mark. In some cases, the state of discipline did not ensure the firm fulfillment of the assigned tasks by the troops. The troops were not prepared for combat actions in difficult conditions, in particular to positional warfare, to a breakthrough of SD, to actions in harsh winter conditions and in the forest. interaction between the branches of the armed forces was a poor knowledge of the command staff of the combat properties and capabilities of other branches of the armed forces.The infantry went to war the least prepared of all the branches of the armed forces: it did not know how to conduct close combat, fight in trenches, did not know how to use the results of artillery fire and provide its offensive with fire heavy machine guns, mortars, battalion and regimental artillery Artillery, tanks, etc. Other branches of the military also had a number of shortcomings in their combat training, especially in matters of interaction with the infantry and ensuring its success in battle. In the combat training of the air forces, the inability to interact with ground forces, unpreparedness for flights in difficult conditions and the poor quality of bombing, especially against narrow targets, were sharply revealed. The training of command personnel did not meet modern combat requirements. The commanders did not command their units, did not hold their subordinates firmly in their hands, getting lost in the general mass of fighters. The authority of the command staff in the middle and junior level is low. Demanding command staff is low. The commanders were sometimes criminally tolerant of violations of discipline, the wrangling of subordinates, and sometimes even direct non-execution of orders. The weakest link was the commanders of companies, platoons and squads, who, as a rule, did not have the necessary training, commanding skills and service experience. The senior and senior command staff poorly organized interaction, made poor use of headquarters, clumsily assigned tasks to artillery, tanks, and especially aviation. The commanders of the reserve were extremely poorly trained and often completely unable to fulfill their duties. In terms of their organization, recruitment and training of personnel, material and technical equipment, the headquarters did not meet the requirements for them: they worked in an unorganized, unplanned and lacking initiative, they used the means of communication poorly, and especially the radio. The information was bad. The reports were late, drawn up carelessly, and did not reflect the actual situation at the front. Sometimes in reports and reports there was a direct lie. Hidden control was neglected. The command posts were organized and served poorly, they moved clumsily from one place to another. Combat experience was not studied or used. The headquarters were poorly engaged in preparing troops for the upcoming actions. Troop control was characterized by haste, lack of thought, lack of study and analysis of the situation, foreseeing the subsequent development of events and preparation for them. Often there was excessive interference of senior bosses in the work of juniors. Senior commanders, carried away by individual episodes, lost control of a part or a formation as a whole. The intelligence service was organized and carried out extremely unsatisfactorily. The reconnaissance agencies of military headquarters, reconnaissance subdivisions of units and formations were poorly prepared. The troops ineptly conducted reconnaissance in the conditions of the forest, winter and the fortified zone of the enemy, they did not know how to take prisoners. In all branches of the armed forces, the surveillance service was especially poorly set up. The command and staffs of all levels were poorly organized and ineptly managed the work of the rear. There was no discipline in the rear. There was no order on the roads, especially in the rear of the army. The organization of assistance to the wounded was intolerably bad and untimely. The troops were not trained in railroad crossings. All these shortcomings in preparing the army for war were mainly the result of the wrong military education of the fighter and commander, who were oriented towards an easy victory over a weak enemy and an incorrect system of combat training that did not accustom the troops to the harsh conditions of modern warfare.

People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Timoshenko" (F. 4, op. 15, d. 30, l. 336-356)

In an order dated August 28, 1940: “From August 1 to August 10, 1940, 28 aviation regiments were checked by my deputies. The check covered the aviation units of the Baltic, Western, Kiev, Odessa, Transcaucasian, North Caucasian and Transbaikal military districts. The audit was carried out in order to find out the reasons for the unacceptably high accident rate in the Red Army Air Force units.It was established that the main causes of accidents are: of the Red Army, characterize the low state of discipline and give rise to accidents... ... Knowledge of the basics of navigation is poor. and technical staff. The pilots and some of the commanders have little knowledge of the data of their aircraft and engine ... ... The commanders of the units and divisions, not knowing the material part of the aircraft and the engine themselves, do not require and do not check the knowledge of the staff subordinate to them ... 5. A large number of breakdowns, accidents and disasters occur during takeoffs and landings of aircraft. This suggests that important elements of piloting technique, takeoff and landing, have not been worked out by young pilots ... ... Viewing flight books showed that errors noted during the verification of piloting techniques are not eliminated, but only fixed, i.e. consciously, the most outrageous disgrace occurs when a pilot with known and uncorrected mistakes continues to fly on a more difficult mission, does not cope with it, repeats mistakes, crashes the plane and dies himself ... ... Those who do not want to understand the need for discipline, fulfillment orders, charters and instructions should be withdrawn from the units of the Red Army Air Force. I command...

People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Timoshenko" (F. 4, op. 15, d. 30, l. 788-792). .

"October 2, 1940 Although the final approval of the defensive work of the current year was somewhat delayed, however, the districts had all the prerequisites in order to deploy both preparatory and basic work on defensive construction in a timely manner. Provision of labor, materials, mechanisms and Working capital with timely financing made it possible to carry out work at a wide pace.Meanwhile, checking the progress of the current year in the ZapOVO, KOVO, ZakVO shows that defensive construction is being carried out poorly, the percentage of fulfillment of the annual plan is low and reaches 24% as of September 1 in the KOVO and ZapOVO - 30% ... I order: 1. The military councils of the districts - a) immediately achieve a clear organization of work and production discipline in all parts of construction, the correct operation and use of vehicles and mechanisms. Take all measures to ensure that the construction plan for the current year was fully implemented; b) to organize daily monitoring of the progress with construction and quality of work performed. From now on, those guilty of violating production discipline, failure to fulfill the plan and low quality of work, will be held accountable; ... People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Timoshenko "(F. 4, op. 11, d. 54, l. 485 -489)

While the Wehrmacht was preparing for war with the USSR, the leadership of the Red Army was solving the following problems: “On December 18, 1940, according to a report from a member of the Military Council of the Trans-Baikal Military District, in the 10th construction battalion there was an unacceptable fact of perversion of the Disciplinary Regulations, expressed in assault on the part While cleaning the premises of the battalion, when two Red Army men met at the door with things, one Red Army man pushed the other out of the way. carrying things, before the formation, grabbed him by the chest and hit him twice in the face. In the same company, the foreman of the company, after giving the command "Become," demanded that one Red Army soldier throw a cigarette. The latter, having followed the order, expressed dissatisfaction. Instead of making a decisive and firm suggestion to a Red Army soldier, the foreman called him out of action and hit him in the face before formation. The indicated facts of perversion of the Disciplinary Regulations, unacceptable in the Red Army, occurred because the head of the political department of the special forces of the garrison, senior battalion commissar Grachev, at a meeting of unit commanders and their deputies for political affairs, without having himself read the new Disciplinary Regulations, gave a provocative explanation that when applying new Disciplinary Regulations, commanders have the right to beat the Red Army. Based on this explanation, the commanders and deputies for political affairs, also without reading the charter of the disciplinary service, instructed their subordinate commanders that they had the right to use a crowbar, an ax and everything that came to hand. All these facts of perversion of discipline became possible due to the lack of leadership in the matter of propaganda and clarification of the essence of the Disciplinary Regulations on the part of the Political Propaganda Department of the district. I order: 1. Senior battalion commissar Grachev for a provocative explanation of the new Disciplinary Regulations to be removed from his post and transferred to the court of the Military Tribunal. 2. Senior Lieutenant Shichkin, who allowed the perversion of the Disciplinary Regulations, by order of the commander of the district troops to be transferred to another unit with a reduction. 3. I reprimand Comrade Commissar Commissar Gaponovich of the Military Council of the ZabVO and Comrade Shmanenko, Head of the Political Propaganda Department of the Trans-Baikal Military District, Division Commissar for their failure to provide a correct explanation of the Disciplinary Regulations. 4. An order to announce to all the commanding staff of the Red Army, up to and including the platoon commander.

People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Timoshenko" (F. 4, op. 15, d. 27, l. 556)

In an order dated December 20, 1940. : "The inspection reviews of the Red Army troops conducted by me and my deputies showed that the training of communications units can be considered satisfactory only in terms of individual training of certain categories of specialists. As for the training of communications units as a whole to ensure control, they for the most part lag behind general operational-tactical growth of army units and formations. One of the main types of modern communications - radio is not used enough. The organization of radio communications with a massive saturation of radio stations, and especially radio communications of interaction between military branches, has not been mastered enough. There is no uniformity in the preparation of communications units. Insufficient practice Physical skills in working in difficult meteorological conditions and at night Poor training of specialists in working with high-speed equipment, in maintaining high-capacity switches, in identifying and eliminating damage to devices and on lines Lines are built poorly and carelessly Poorly worked out about duties of officials: duty officer, head of the communication center, heads of communication areas and others. The command staff of communications units, as a rule, breaks away from the tactical situation, doing their work blindly. The chiefs of staff of units and formations weakly supervise the preparation of communications units. There continues to be a large detachment of communication units for various kinds of work not related to their improvement in their specialty, and for guard duty.

In an order dated December 27, 1940. on camouflage of airfields: "Order NPO 1939 No. 0145 required mandatory camouflage of all newly built operational airfields. The Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force had to carry out these activities not only at operational airfields, but also on the entire airfield network of the Air Force. However, none of the districts I did not pay due attention to this order and did not carry it out.

Numerous instructions of the General Staff and NGOs could not be carried out for reasons understandable to any Russian person: laziness, carelessness, irresponsibility of specific executors.

“On June 19, 1941, the NPO issued an order on the dispersal and camouflage of aircraft in all border districts, which duplicated a similar order of the NPO dated 12/27/40: “Categorically prohibit the linear and crowded arrangement of aircraft; dispersed and camouflaged arrangement of aircraft to ensure their complete unobservability from the air. "However, both of these orders were never carried out." (Vladimir Beshanov. "We were not quite ready yet ..." Collection "The Great Patriotic Catastrophe ... M .: Yauza, Eksmo, 2007. P. 294).

09/18/41 were converted into guards 1,2,3 and 4th 100,161,127 and 153rd sd. On this occasion, another order was issued, the text of which makes sense to quote in full: "In numerous battles for our Soviet Motherland against the Nazi hordes of Nazi Germany, the 100th, 127th, 153rd and 161st rifle divisions showed examples of courage, courage, discipline and organization. In In the difficult conditions of the struggle, these divisions repeatedly inflicted cruel defeats on the fascist German troops, put them to flight, terrified them. Why did these our rifle divisions manage to beat the enemy and drive the vaunted German troops in front of them? they did not move forward blindly, not headlong, but only after careful reconnaissance, after serious preparation, after they had probed the enemy’s weak points and ensured the protection of their flanks.Secondly, because when breaking through the enemy’s front, they did not limit themselves to moving forward , but tried to expand the breakthrough with their actions along the nearest rear of the enemy, to the right and left of the breakthrough. thirdly, that, having captured territory from the enemy, they immediately consolidated what they had captured, dug in in a new place, organizing strong guards for the night and sending forward serious reconnaissance for a new probing of the retreating enemy. Because, fourthly, that, taking up a defensive position, they carried it out not as a passive defense, but as an active defense, combined with counterattacks. They did not wait for the moment when the enemy would hit them and push them back, but they themselves went over to counterattacks in order to probe the enemy’s weak points, improve their positions and at the same time temper their regiments in the process of counterattacks in order to prepare them for the offensive. Fifthly, because when pressed by the enemy, these divisions did not panic, did not throw down their weapons, did not scatter into the forest thickets, did not shout “we are surrounded”, but organizedly responded with a blow to the enemy’s blow, cruelly curbed the alarmists, mercilessly cracked down with cowards and deserters, thereby ensuring discipline and organization of their units. Because, finally, the commanders and commissars in these divisions behaved like courageous and demanding commanders, able to force their subordinates to obey orders and not afraid to punish violators of orders and discipline. Based on the foregoing and in accordance with the decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders: 1. For military exploits, for organization, discipline and approximate order, these divisions should be renamed into guards divisions, namely: the 100th rifle division - into the 1st guards division. Division Commander Major General Russiyanov. 127th Rifle Division - to the 2nd Guards Division. Division commander Colonel Akimenko. 153rd Rifle Division - to the 3rd Guards Division. Division Commander Colonel Hagen. 161st Rifle Division to 4th Guards Division. Division commander Colonel Moskvitin. 2. In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the specified divisions are to be given special guards banners. 3. To all commanding (higher, senior, middle and junior) composition from September of this year. g. in all four guards divisions to establish one and a half, and to the fighters a double salary of maintenance. 4. To the head of the rear of the Red Army, develop and submit by September 30 a draft of a special uniform for the guards divisions. 5. This order is to be announced in the active army and in the districts in all companies, squadrons, batteries, squadrons and commands. People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I. STALIN Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Marshal of the Soviet Union B. SHAPOSHNIKOV "(f. 4, op. 12, file 99, sheet PO - 112. Published in the Collection of Combat Documents of the Great Patriotic War. No. 5 M., 1947, pp. 5 - 6.) This order is more like a lecture for partisan commanders, purely civilian people who have never studied military affairs.

2. The Wehrmacht attacked first, forcing the commanders of the Red Army to make decisions quickly, independently, in accordance with the changing situation. The mere realization of this fact brought many to a state close to complete prostration. There was no defense plan, since Stalin did not even allow the thought of giving the initiative into the hands of the enemy. He was about to attack.

Could defeat have been avoided if the Red Army had attacked first? If we mean huge losses by defeat, then they were inevitable. Only professionals can fight with minimal losses. But it can be assumed that the territory of the USSR would not have been occupied, the huge stocks of ammunition concentrated at the borders would not have gone to the Germans, but were used for their intended purpose, i.e. against German troops. Defense factories would continue to produce products without leaving the place for evacuation. Perhaps the war would have continued for the same four years, but hundreds of cities would not have been destroyed, and millions of people (civilian population) would have remained alive.

In itself, the idea of ​​counterattacking the Germans from the first day of the war was correct (theoretically): the one who takes the initiative achieves success. But while the orders were passed from the top boss to the executor, the situation changed rapidly. The units indicated in the order, broken and demoralized, rolled back to the east. Those that remained combat-ready attacked without the support of their neighbors. Even if they managed to succeed, the Germans immediately transferred reinforcements to the threatened area (their communication worked perfectly).

The fact that the pre-war army, on whose armament huge funds were spent turned out to be incapable of combat, was also forced to admit to Stalin: new Soviet fighters and commanders, pilots, artillerymen, mortarmen, tankers, infantrymen, sailors were forged, who tomorrow will turn into a thunderstorm for the German army. (Report at the solemn meeting of the Moscow Council of Working People's Deputies with party and public organizations of Moscow on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. "I. Stalin on the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union", M .: Gospolitizdat, 1946.)

"300 Spartans"

"On June 24, the enemy surrounded the Libava (Liepaja) garrison, including the 5th and 4th commandant's offices with three outposts and the Libava checkpoint. The second part of the detachment - the 1st, 2nd and 3rd commandant's offices were pulled together in Ventspils and entered the disposal of the commander of the 114th Infantry Regiment.The border guards who remained in the Libau garrison joined the consolidated regiment, which, in addition to them, included groups of sailors, pilots, state security officers and police.The border guards were commanded by the head of the detachment, Major V.I. Yakushev. (Major General N.A. Dedaev was one of the leaders of the defense of the city.) The Libau garrison held firm for seven days. Despite the extremely difficult situation, the border guards not only skillfully defended, but even tried to mined valuable "tongues", blew up enemy firing points. One of these groups was headed by Lieutenant A.P. Zaporozhets. On the pickup truck, in which heavy machine guns were installed, they broke into the battle formations of the Nazis on the move, shot at them and pelted them with grenades. During one of these operations, Lieutenant Zaporozhets died. On June 25, border guards, operating in the suburbs of Libava, near Grobinsky Highway, captured a Nazi officer who was ordered to be the commandant of the city.

"At 8 a.m. on July 14, enemy tanks on the move attacked the positions of the 16th motorized rifle, and then the 94th border regiment. The battle lasted four hours. Having not achieved success with a blow from the front, the Germans began to bypass Popelnya from the west, where our defense was not ... Having assessed the situation, the front command came to the conclusion that it was impossible to restrain the further advance of the enemy on the outskirts of Popelna with available forces.Based on this, it was decided to withdraw troops to the Strokov area, where to organize a new defensive line. a man under the command of the commandant of the 1st commandant's office of the 94th border detachment, captain I.M. Sereda... There were still three kilometers to the village of Strokovo when fascist tanks and infantry appeared. tanks, destroyed the enemy with fire from machine guns and rifles. n blew up a Nazi tank, shot the enemy from a machine gun. The border guards fought to the death, but the forces were too unequal ... In this battle, the commandant of the section, captain I.M. Sereda, the military commissar of the commandant's office, P.P. Kolesnichenko, and more than 150 soldiers died. Only one participant in that hot battle - the border guard A.I. Kovalev survived. He received four wounds and lay unconscious: the Nazis considered him dead. Kovalev was found by a resident of the village of Paripasy T.M.Skakun. Risking her life, she hid a wounded soldier in her place, left him, and then escorted him to the partisans ... A monument has now been erected at the site of the heroic death of the border guards. An inscription is carved on it: "Comrade! Bow low to these fields. They are sprinkled with the blood of heroes. Here, on July 14, 1941, Captain Sereda, political instructor Kolesnichenko and 152 soldiers of the 94th border detachment died in an unequal battle with fascist tanks. Eternal glory to the heroes! " (pp. 164 - 165, ibid.).

"With heavy fighting, the border guards of the 92nd border detachment under the command of the chief of staff, Captain Kudryashov, retreated. They fought the crossing in Zarechye, and in the area of ​​​​the village of Voronki, Captain Kudryashev gathered up to 500 soldiers and commanders of various units, broke them into platoons and squads, appointed platoon commanders from among the commanders and political workers. A combat-ready and already quite numerous military unit managed to break through the front. In that battle, the Nazis lost the banner of the 437th SS regiment, five tanks, 11 vehicles, 6 motorcycles, 3 cannons, 3 mortars, a lot of small arms weapons." (p. 168, ibid.).

"A detachment of border guards, commanded by Major I.G. Starchak, fought heroically on the outskirts of Moscow. On October 4, this detachment, numbering a little more than 400 fighters, was tasked with covering the Varshavskoe highway in the area where the enemy managed to break through the front ... Seven the battle lasted for hours. The Nazis repeatedly went over to the attack, but each time, having met the furious fire of the border guards, they rolled back. " (p. 178, ibid.). (October 6, a detachment of cadets from the Podolsk military schools came to the rescue).

"The 26th border regiment, together with the soldiers of the Primorsky Army and the Black Sea Fleet, defended Odessa with militias. The regiment was formed on the basis of the Odessa border detachment, which became a kind of reserve for replenishing the command staff. More than 100 fighters were nominated for the positions of middle and senior command personnel of the Red Army military personnel... In October 1941, the 26th border regiment was evacuated to the Crimea by decision of the command of the Primorsky Army. The last group of border guards, commanded by Captain Sheikin, left the besieged Odessa. on the outskirts of Sevastopol, the Ochakov border commandant's office under the command of Major A.P. Izugenev joined the division.

Heavy defensive battles unfolded in November 1941. The enemy rushed to Kerch. The 184th division was completely surrounded. Some of its divisions with heavy fighting broke through to Sevastopol, others joined the partisans ... By the end of November, about a thousand fighters of the division came to Sevastopol, among them the commander of the 262nd regiment, Major G.A. Rubtsov, an officer of the headquarters of the border troops of the Black Sea District. From the border guards who left the encirclement, the 456th separate rifle border regiment was formed. Major Rubtsov was appointed its commander ... In early July 1942. the regiment completed the last combat mission: it ensured the withdrawal of the main forces and the evacuation of Sevastopol. In an unequal battle, G.A. Rubtsov died. The surviving border guards went into the partisans." (pp. 179 - 185, ibid.).

"... Another test was passed by the border guards of the 79th regiment in the battles for Stalingrad. In addition to it, the 2,91,92 and 98th border regiments and the 10th division of the NKVD, the basis of which were fighters and commanders of the border troops, also performed tasks here. .. When on September 13, 1942 the Nazis broke into the city center, the border guards of the 79th regiment held back the numerically superior enemy for two days before the reinforcements arrived, and did not allow him to reach the Volga coast in a defensive area.

The border guards of the 3rd battalion of the regiment fought heroically under the command of the military commissar of the battalion I. Dukin. On September 14, 1942, repulsing the fierce attacks of the Nazis, they managed to defend the crossing over the Volga and made it possible for the 13th Guards Division under the command of Colonel A.I. Rodimtsev to cross to the bleeding Stalingrad. Noting the great contribution of the personnel of the 79th border regiment to the defense of Stalingrad, the Military Council of the Southern Front on March 12, 1943. adopted a special resolution, which referred to the assignment of the 79th border regiment of the honorary name "79th Stalingrad border regiment of the NKVD troops." (p. 198, ibid.).

"From the first day of the creation of border troops, fighters - border guards were subject to increased requirements for mastering small arms .... In the states of border outposts there were snipers, whose training was given great importance ... During the hostilities, the sniper movement gained wide scope. Some of the first to open a battle account for the destroyed fascists, the fighters of the border troops of the Leningrad Front ... Along with the sniper teams in the border regiments, groups of machine gunners were created, who were sent to the forefront, where they participated in battles as part of the Red Army ... By 1943, the sniper movement in In 1942, 1,196 snipers were trained, and in 1943, another 760 were trained. (pp. 210 - 214, ibid.).

"In October 1942, 29 snipers under the command of Captain Korchagin, advancing on a height where an enemy company with firepower was defending, managed to seize the height and capture prisoners." (p. 216, ibid.).

There were also people in the Red Army who took the German invasion of Soviet territory as a personal insult. Panic and confusion did not spread to them. They assessed the flight of higher headquarters and commanders rather positively, as gaining freedom of action. They set themselves a very simple task - to destroy as many enemy soldiers as possible. The names and surnames of very many of them remained unknown, since there was no one to witness their struggle, except for the Germans. The unknown garrisons of pillboxes and bunkers, a few scattered groups and groups of fighters fought fiercely to the last bullet, which plunged the Germans into amazement: they had no chance to break through to their own, they did not have to count on rewards. It was beyond their power to stop the advance of the Wehrmacht, but the damage they inflicted forced the Germans to regroup their forces and slowed down their rapid advance.

August 29 p. in the N-skom sea basin (Baltic Sea) the large-capacity steamer “Kazakhstan” was subjected to an air attack by Nazi aviation, on which a fire broke out.

The vast majority of the ship's crew, together with Captain Kalitaev V.S. and pompolit Zheltov I.F., shamefully deserted from the ship in the face of the enemy.

Thanks to the selflessness and selfless devotion to the Motherland, the second mate of the captain Zagoruiko L.N., the chief mechanic Furs V.A., the boatswain Gainutdinov X.K., the machinists Slepner L.A. and Shishin A.P., the fireman Shumilo A.P. remained on the ship. P. and cook Monakhov P.N., despite the fact that enemy planes dropped more than 100 bombs, the fire was extinguished and the ship was brought under its own power to the place of permanent parking.

The feat of this small group of daredevils in the conditions of the treacherous behavior of the vast majority of the crew who shamefully deserted from the ship in the face of the enemy is worthy of a government award, for which I file a petition ...

People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I. STALIN (f. 4, op. 12, d. 99, l. 87 - 88.)

“Special mention should be made of Senior Lieutenant D.F. Lavrinenko. He participated in 28 battles. Three T-34 tanks on which he fought burned down. On the day of his death, December 17, 1941, near Volokolamsk, Lavrinenko knocked out the 52nd enemy tank and became the most productive Soviet tanker of the period of World War II. By the Decree of the President of the USSR of May 5, 1990. for the courage and heroism shown in battles with the Nazi invaders, Lavrinenko Dmitry Fedorovich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously. " (Mikhail Baryatinsky. T-34 in battle. M .: Yauza, Eksmo, 2008. P. 211-212).

The reader can himself give many such examples.

Soldiers of the Red Army on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War fought for the country and their families. It's not even discussed. However, they also had additional incentives that contributed to success in performing combat missions.

Money is not a hindrance to heroism

Probably, not everyone knows that Soviet soldiers in the Great Patriotic War received wages, and their exploits were encouraged not only by orders and medals, but also by cash prizes. However, this should in no way detract from the heroism of our soldiers, who have faced death more than once.

What was the monetary allowance (the so-called salary at the front) during the Great Patriotic War? The lowest official salary was for a private - 17 rubles a month, a platoon commander received 620 - 800 rubles, a company commander - 950 rubles, a battalion commander - 1100 rubles, an army commander - 3200 rubles, a front commander - 4000 rubles. In the guards units, officers could count on one and a half, and privates on a double salary. Even employees of the penal battalion were supposed to receive monetary allowance - 8.5 rubles per month. The soldiers who were in the hospital received the same amount.

It is curious that, contrary to popular belief, the sniper did not receive anything for the destroyed enemies, he could count on a salary in accordance with the rank. However, the sniper sergeant, who fought for three years, was entitled to a 200-ruble salary. However, given the high mortality among snipers, a rare lucky person could live to see a promotion.

The amount of salary did not always depend on the position held. For example, a pilot with the rank of Hero of the Soviet Union could receive more than the commander of his regiment - about 2,000 rubles. Significantly influenced the size of the allowance of various kinds of allowances - guards, front-line, and pilots - for each flight.

The German command, unlike the Soviet command, was stingy with the payment of monetary rewards to its military. For success in battles, Wehrmacht soldiers received only orders. Only at the end of the war could a fighter deserve an extraordinary vacation or a food parcel for an accomplished feat.

Soviet soldiers were paid money not only on the front line, but also in partisan detachments. Most often, this concerned the leadership of those formations that were part of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement. The commanders of various kinds of partisan units could receive from 500 to 750 rubles. Sometimes bonuses were paid for the decommissioning of German equipment, for example, trains with ammunition and people.

How did the financial motivation of the soldiers of the Red Army differ depending on the type of troops?

In the air

Pilots were the first to be affected by the system of monetary incentives. After the bombing of Berlin on the night of August 7-8, 1941, each member of the crew of the Soviet aircraft was given 2,000 rubles by order of Stalin, the same amount was received by the pilots who bombed Helsinki, Bucharest and Budapest.

From August 19, 1941, the financial reward extended to all the air forces of the USSR. At first, a single bonus of 1,000 rubles was relied on for a downed enemy aircraft, later payments were differentiated: 2,000 rubles were paid for a downed bomber, 1,500 rubles for a transport aircraft, 1,000 rubles for a fighter, a steam locomotive destroyed from the air was quoted cheaper - only 750 rubles.

The record for the most "highly paid" battle was set on May 4, 1945, when the pilot of the Baltic Fleet air group Mikhail Borisov successfully attacked the German battleship Schlesien, which was on the roadstead, after which the team was forced to flood the ship. Borisov was awarded a prize of 10,000 rubles.

On the land

After a successful experiment with aviation, the Soviet leadership decided to encourage ground forces with money. There was only one criterion here - a destroyed enemy tank. After the “Kharkov catastrophe”, Stalin needed to somehow stir up the army, and he issues order No. 0528 on the creation of anti-tank units, where it was said that “for each tank that was destroyed, the gun commander and gunner - 500 rubles each, the rest of the calculation - according to 200 rubles".

If a group of fighters participated in the destruction of an enemy tank, then the amount of the bonus rose to 1,500 rubles and was divided equally among all the soldiers. But in the event that a heavy German tank turned out to be knocked out, the amount of payments increased to 5,000 rubles.

Also, rewards were paid for the repair and evacuation of their own tanks. According to Stalin's order of February 25, 1942, 350 rubles were paid for quick and high-quality current repairs of a heavy KB tank, from 250 to 500 rubles for repairs of a medium T-34 tank, and from 100 to 200 rubles for repairs of light tanks. Usually, at least 70% of the total amount of payments was intended for bonuses to the working part.

In the summer of 1943, on the eve of the Battle of Kursk, adjustments were made to the payment system for the ground forces: “Set a bonus of 1,000 rubles. to each fighter and commander for personally knocked out or set fire to an enemy tank with the help of individual means of combat.

On the sea

The sailors had their own gradation in the payment of remuneration. For the destruction of a destroyer or submarine, the commander and navigator of a Soviet ship received 10,000 rubles each, and crew members received 2,500 rubles each. The sinking of a German transport ship was cheaper, respectively, 3 and 1 thousand rubles, a patrol ship - 2 thousand and 500 rubles, a tugboat - 1 thousand and 300 rubles.

The salaries of Soviet sailors varied in a similar way: the commander of a naval base earned 2400 rubles a month, the commander of a trawling brigade - 1900 rubles, the commander of a submarine - 2100 rubles, the commander of a boat division - 1500 rubles, the commander of the leader - from 1400 to 1500 rubles, commander of the operational unit of the Naval Communications Center of the intelligence department of the fleet headquarters - 1100 rubles, minesweeper commander - 1200 rubles, assistant minesweeper commander - 1050 rubles, battery commissar - 1300 rubles, boatswain on a patrol ship - 750 rubles.

Between rear and front

How could the participants in the war spend the money they earned? During the hostilities, Voentorg continued its work, bringing mobile shops to the front line. Soldiers and officers in makeshift markets could purchase many essential goods: shaving accessories, needles and threads, pencils and notebooks. Most often they bought food from the local population.

In comparison with the pre-war period, the cost of goods increased at least 10 times. In state stores, many goods were sold at pre-war prices, but it was almost impossible to buy anything here. The market is another matter. But the prices were different. So, half a liter of vodka cost from 300 to 800 rubles (in the state store, its price was only 30 rubles). The price for a loaf of bread ranged from 300 to 400 rubles, for a kilo of potatoes they gave 90 rubles, for a pack of Kazbek cigarettes - 75 rubles, for a glass of shag - 10 rubles. A kilogram of salted lard was sold for 1,500 rubles.

Voentorg, who worked at the front line, maintained pre-war prices. Many soldiers and officers, believing that their families had a harder time, sent the money they earned home. There were frequent cases when the money earned by blood did not reach those who were at the epicenter of the fighting.

“They received only two times from my salary at home, I did not receive anything at the front. When the war ended, five months later, no one received anything. And some commanders carried full bags of red thirty. While I was traveling to the Crimea by train after demobilization, I accidentally saw that our chief financial officer's things were scattered. He was drunk, I accidentally saw a full bag of money, then I thought in horror: “That's where our money is!” recalled nurse V. M. Vasilyeva.

Joy at the forefront

Although money was a good incentive for the successful completion of combat missions, one should not overestimate their importance. An equally important role in raising the morale of the military was played by musicians and actors who gave concerts on the front line more than once. They, too, as the famous song says, brought victory closer as best they could.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Andrey Eremenko recalled these artists with gratitude, “who raised the morale of the soldiers with fearlessness and selfless work, playing performances and concerts in the front line, sometimes right at the forefront. The artists knew how to ignite the hearts of the fighters, inspire them with will, sometimes they knew how to make them laugh.

And where without the legendary front hundred grams? War veteran Mikhail Zavorotny tells how the foreman came with a can and poured "some kind of muddy liquid" into the compartment. And then everyone was measured with a cap from a 76-mm projectile: it was 100 or 50 grams and no one knew what strength. I drank, “bite” on my sleeve, that’s all the “drinking”. But with such doping, it was easier and more fearless to fight.

According to the front-line soldier Nikolai Posysaev, military life was unthinkable without tobacco. Moreover, quite decent tobacco, pressed into briquettes, came into their unit. There were also German cigarettes, but most smokers believed that they were weak and did not have the same effect as native tobacco.

But perhaps the strongest emotional stimulus in the war was the fair sex. Beautiful and not very beautiful, but they brightened up the front-line leisure of comrades-in-arms and encouraged them to a feat. Nikolai Posysaev admits that, as a rule, women who got to the front soon became mistresses of officers. But everyone was afraid of female snipers, the front-line soldier jokingly remarked.

At the first stage of the Civil War of 1917 - 1922/23, two powerful opposing forces took shape - "red" and "white". The first represented the Bolshevik camp, whose goal was a radical change in the existing system and the construction of a socialist regime, the second - the anti-Bolshevik camp, striving to return the order of the pre-revolutionary period.

The period between the February and October revolutions is the time of the formation and development of the Bolshevik regime, the stage of accumulation of forces. The main tasks of the Bolsheviks before the outbreak of the Civil War were: the formation of a social support, transformations in the country that would allow them to gain a foothold at the top of power in the country, and protect the achievements of the February Revolution.

The methods of the Bolsheviks in strengthening power were effective. First of all, this concerns propaganda among the population - the slogans of the Bolsheviks were relevant and helped to quickly form the social support of the "Reds".

The first armed detachments of the "Reds" began to appear at the preparatory stage - from March to October 1917. The main driving force behind such detachments were workers from industrial regions - this was the main force of the Bolsheviks, which helped them come to power during the October Revolution. At the time of the revolutionary events, the detachment numbered about 200,000 people.

The stage of formation of the power of the Bolsheviks required the protection of what was achieved during the revolution - for this, at the end of December 1917, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission was created, headed by F. Dzerzhinsky. On January 15, 1918, the Cheka adopted a Decree on the creation of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, and on January 29, the Red Fleet was created.

Analyzing the actions of the Bolsheviks, historians do not come to a consensus about their goals and motivations:

The most common opinion is that the “Reds” initially planned a large-scale Civil War, which would be a logical continuation of the revolution. The fighting, the purpose of which was to promote the ideas of the revolution, would consolidate the power of the Bolsheviks and spread socialism throughout the world. During the war, the Bolsheviks planned to destroy the bourgeoisie as a class. Thus, based on this, the ultimate goal of the "Reds" is a world revolution.

One of the admirers of the second concept is V. Galin. This version is fundamentally different from the first - according to historians, the Bolsheviks had no intention of turning the revolution into a Civil War. The goal of the Bolsheviks was to seize power, which they succeeded in the course of the revolution. But the continuation of hostilities was not included in the plans. The arguments of the fans of this concept: the transformations planned by the "Reds" demanded peace in the country, at the first stage of the struggle, the "Reds" were tolerant of other political forces. A turning point regarding political opponents occurred when in 1918 there was a threat to lose power in the state. By 1918, the "Reds" had a strong, professionally trained enemy - the White Army. Its backbone was the military times of the Russian Empire. By 1918, the fight against this enemy became purposeful, the army of the "Reds" acquired a pronounced structure.

At the first stage of the war, the actions of the Red Army were not successful. Why?

Recruitment to the army was carried out on a voluntary basis, which led to decentralization and disunity. The army was created spontaneously, without a definite structure - this led to a low level of discipline, problems in managing a large number of volunteers. The chaotic army was not characterized by a high level of combat capability. Only since 1918, when the Bolshevik power was under threat, did the "Reds" decide to recruit troops according to the mobilization principle. From June 1918, they began to mobilize the military of the tsarist army.

The second reason is closely related to the first - against the chaotic, non-professional army of the "Reds" were organized, professional military, which at the time of the Civil War, participated in more than one battle. The "Whites" with a high level of patriotism were united not only by professionalism, but also by the idea - the White movement stood for a united and indivisible Russia, for order in the state.

The most characteristic feature of the Red Army is uniformity. First of all, it concerns the class origin. Unlike the "whites", whose army included professional soldiers, workers, and peasants, the "reds" accepted only proletarians and peasants into their ranks. The bourgeoisie was to be destroyed, so an important task was to prevent hostile elements from entering the Red Army.

In parallel with the hostilities, the Bolsheviks were implementing a political and economic program. The Bolsheviks pursued a policy of "red terror" against hostile social classes. In the economic sphere, "war communism" was introduced - a set of measures in the domestic policy of the Bolsheviks throughout the Civil War.

Biggest victories for the Reds:

• 1918 - 1919 - the establishment of Bolshevik power on the territory of Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia.
• The beginning of 1919 - the Red Army goes on the counteroffensive, defeating the "white" army of Krasnov.
• Spring-summer 1919 - Kolchak's troops fell under the blows of the "Reds".
• The beginning of 1920 - the "Reds" ousted the "Whites" from the northern cities of Russia.
• February-March 1920 - the defeat of the rest of the forces of Denikin's Volunteer Army.
• November 1920 - the "Reds" ousted the "Whites" from the Crimea.
• By the end of 1920, the "Reds" were opposed by scattered groups of the White Army. The civil war ended with the victory of the Bolsheviks.

N.M. Ivanov

Technical Literacy of Red Army Soldiers in the 1930s: Small Arms and Its Use

The article deals with the technical literacy of the soldiers of the Red Army on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. It is shown that a soldier with an ordinary rifle remained the fundamental combat unit of the Red Army, so the combat effectiveness largely depended on the soldier's ability to handle his rifle and provide it with proper care. It is concluded that for various reasons, the technical literacy of the Red Army soldier was insufficient, which was one of the reasons for the defeats of the Red Army in the Soviet-Finnish War and in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War.

Keywords: Red Army, weapons, small arms, rifle, re-equipment, technical literacy, Soviet-Finnish war.

One of the tasks of modern Russian historiography of the Great Patriotic War is to study the objective reasons for the failures of the Red Army in the initial period of the war. These, in our opinion, include the insufficient technical literacy of the soldiers of the Red Army. The army of the world's first socialist state existed at that time for almost twenty years, the best resources of the country, which had successfully passed the stage of industrialization, were invested in its development. However, despite technological progress, the fighter with the usual three-line rifle of the Russian engineer S.I. Mosin, a lot depended on his ability to handle his weapons and provide him with proper care. Technical training of fighters, their technical literacy,

© Ivanov N.M., 2017

as well as the system of functioning of small arms in the Red Army, as a whole can be studied on the basis of archival documents that are stored in the RGVA, RGASPI, VIMA and VIVS and which reflect the work of supply agencies, the operation of small arms and ammunition for it, checking the technical condition of weapons and technical training of personnel of the Red Army for the 1930s - 1940s.

In the 1920s-1930s, the Red Army was being built from scratch as a new model army, its foundation, structure and foundations of interaction were being formed. After the First World War, the concept of warfare changed, and now the infantry had to interact with tanks, more artillery and aircraft. In such a war, everyone - from generals to ordinary soldiers - must clearly understand their task, act quickly and smoothly.

Despite the advent of tanks and aircraft, the common infantryman with a rifle remained the most massive combat unit throughout the war. Much depended on his technical training, knowledge, skills and discipline, for the maintenance of which the commanding staff of the army was responsible. In the conditions of a fast, maneuverable battle in interaction with tanks, artillery and aircraft, it was discipline and a clear understanding of one's role on the battlefield that were the key to the success of any army.

Such tactical organization, in turn, is impossible without internal discipline, which begins with the simplest things. One of them is the ability of any fighter to competently handle personal weapons: to know its details and features, to be able to disassemble, clean, store and repair. This weapon in the Red Army was an ordinary rifle, which, despite the pace of progress in military thought and military equipment, remained the main type of small arms in the interwar period and in the initial period of World War II.

Despite the first successes in creating the Red Army as a new type of army, in the 1930s it became clear that creating a technically competent and disciplined army was a difficult task. Various tests show that it is not so easy to bring up a technically competent fighter1. The results of one of these checks were disappointingly summed up by the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR K.E. Voroshilov: “... the preservation of weapons, and the treatment of them in the Red Army continues to be ugly. The latest production inspections established the unacceptable state of weapons in general in a number of divisions. Worse

the situation is with the incessant growth of accidents from the careless and inept handling of military equipment.

Voroshilov saw the main reason for this state of the army in "the weakness of leadership and educational influence on the troops in establishing a firm internal order, clear and conscious combat discipline, exact observance of the technical rules for saving and handling military equipment"3.

In such a situation, Voroshilov urgently orders to take measures, including the opening of additional evening courses, the introduction of additional tests in military schools and academies for knowledge of weapons and care rules, and it was also recommended not to let students out "until they pass satisfactory tests" 4. The commander and commissar of the regiment, the commander of the company5 had to control the state of technical literacy of the fighters.

Starting from the second half of the 1930s, the Red Army gained experience by participating in military conflicts, as a result of which numerous reports and reports were compiled, including those regarding the use of small arms.

The most indicative conflict in this regard is the Soviet-Finnish war. Based on the report of the Deputy Head of the Department of Small Arms Danilin “On the work of supply agencies, the operation and operation of small arms and ammunition for it during the period of the struggle against the White Finns” of 1940, which is devoted to all the subtleties related to small arms (description of each sample, attitude of fighters to weapons, accounting, repairs, supplies, etc.), one can get a complete and accurate picture of the level at which the technical literacy of the Red Army soldiers was then in the use of small arms, including their main weapon, the three-line rifle.

Having described in detail individual samples of small arms, Danilin specifically notes that the attitude towards small arms on the part of fighters and commanders was “in some cases barbaric”6. For example, there were frequent cases when slightly wounded fighters could leave their weapons on the battlefield, and abandon automatic weapons if they failed to act. Machine guns were often left on the battlefield after attacks, and the soldiers were not punished for such actions7. As an example, he cites the case on Lake Suvanto-Jarvi, when, after the attack of the 49th Infantry Division, the commander of one of the regiments left 16 machine guns on the battlefield. The regimental commander was reprimanded for this, and on

the next night, his regiment managed to recapture and return 14 of the 16 left machine guns, and they were in good condition8.

The preparation of weapons for firing was carried out very poorly, the command staff did not do any checks, and often the command staff themselves did not know how to prepare weapons for firing and had little knowledge of their material part. This situation led to the fact that the weapon failed during combat use, and therefore rushed to the battlefield9.

In addition, the Red Army had problems with regard to weapons. The command staff of all ranks did not pay due attention to him; they did not report the departure and arrival of weapons with a unit to the headquarters of another military district. Only towards the end of 1940 did the high command achieve that the headquarters of the military districts began to report on the departure and arrival, and even then with a great delay.

Unsatisfactory, according to Danilin's assessments and remarks, was the attitude of the officers and their subordinate fighters towards weapons at the end of hostilities. After hostilities, weapons were surrendered without accounting, not put in order, without bayonets and magazines, and the command staff was often absent during the surrender. Some parts for delivery to the main artillery depot brought weapons "in cars in bulk": interspersed with weapons, cartridges, grenades, shells, helmets, telephones, chemical equipment, and so on. If the head of the warehouse did not want to accept the property, it simply fell down in the same place. Ammunition was brought in bulk in boxes and bags, etc., often with snow and ice, and all this was stored in the open air11.

Problems, according to Danilin's report, were also in the organization of weapons repair. Camping workshops were not equipped in the active units, which made repair work difficult. Vehicles for workshops and SPTA (“Spare Parts, Tools and Accessories”) were limited. Divisional artillery repair shops carried out repairs in military formations very successfully, but due to insufficient awareness of workers in the artillery supply system, some of them were overloaded, while others stood idle. The canvas tents in which they were located did not meet the winter conditions of work, and the power plant did not correspond to the volume of work of the workshop12. The most pressing issue remained personnel: “The lack of a staff of specialists in peacetime forced the staffing of workshops by randomly sent people - plasterers, shoemakers, hairdressers, people

with a triple conviction, etc., who had absolutely no even elementary concepts in the methods of repairing weapons”13.

There were also problems with the provision of spare parts and accessories14, supplies15 and staffing and organizational issues16.

Danilin sums up: the fighters and commanders did not feel personal responsibility for the safety of weapons, and elementary statutory requirements were not met17.

But the problem was larger: the entire system for the supply, repair, accounting of weapons was poorly thought out and worked out, and insufficient training was characteristic not only of the Red Army soldier, but also of repairmen and supply workers.

Similar assessments and conclusions can be found in the memos and reports on the battles near Lake Khasan and on the Khalkhin Gol River. In the report of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense G.I. Kulik dated July 26, 1939, there are very similar passages: “The 603rd regiment of the 32nd division is an armed crowd. Being on the defensive, they fled in a panic, leaving a lot of rifles, light and heavy machine guns, and suffered heavy losses.

Informative in this context are summary reports, reports and correspondence on the state of small arms in the Red Army units that did not take part in the war.

During 1939-1940. in the military districts, checks were carried out on the personnel of divisions of 15 military districts, more than 200 military units19. Information about the reviews in the form of reports was transferred to the Main Artillery Directorate. These documents are in the form of a report and consist of several points: the technical condition of small arms, quality condition, maintenance and saving, storage of weapons, workshops and repairs, accounting of weapons, staffing, knowledge of weapons by command personnel, execution of orders related to weapons.

The technical condition of small arms (the combat effectiveness of a rifle, whether it requires military repairs) and small arms devices in most cases is rated “poor” or “mediocre”20, in rare exceptions, such as in the Siberian or Central Asian military districts, the assessment was positive21. However, in almost all districts, the parameters “quality condition” and “care and saving” are rated “poor” or “mediocre”: weapons are poorly cleaned and stored, because soldiers do not know how or do not do this. This is due to the fact that, for various reasons, the command staff did not pay due attention to checking the condition of small arms, and often they themselves did not know the material part of the weapon themselves. Orders of the People's Commissar of Defense

the commanders of the units did not carry out the inspection and preservation of weapons, and therefore the channels of the barrels of small arms were covered with rust22.

For example, in parts of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army, weapons were inspected irregularly. The calculations of hours for combat and political training sent from the People's Commissariat of Defense did not provide for the time for inspecting weapons, which made it possible for the command staff not to conduct an inspection, since, according to the calculations of the hours, the command staff was busy with work on combat and political training all the time23. In many parts, the tables for cleaning weapons were not equipped and the cleaning was carried out in a hazing manner24.

A similar situation was with cartridges: some soldiers had cartridges with dented cartridge cases, which “is caused by soldiers lying on pouches, which results in loosening of bullets and dents in cartridge cases”25. Many fighters did not know how to distinguish cartridges by marking; cartridges with an ordinary bullet were mistaken by some commanders for cartridges with a heavy bullet26.

The main problems of the workshops were the lack of technical staff or their insufficient technical training27. Even if he was trained, he did not always have sufficient technical experience28. Often there was a lack of spare parts or tools29.

At the end of each county-specific report is a list of actions taken to correct identified deficiencies. For example, on April 10-15, in the Odessa Military District, meetings were held for chiefs of artillery supplies on issues of conservation, care and technical inspection, three orders were issued by the district commander to eliminate deficiencies with the imposition of penalties on those responsible for the poor state of weapons30. However, the five-day training camp could hardly reverse the whole trend that had developed in the Red Army.

The reasons for the complex problems of the Red Army in terms of small arms must be sought at the very origins of its creation. As mentioned above, due to the development of military equipment and the emergence of a new concept of war, the requirements for literacy of army personnel have increased dramatically. It was important for both a regular serviceman and a military reserve to be able to handle equipment and new models of automatic weapons. Germany towards the end of the 19th century became the first country in the world with universal literacy. That is why, presumably, Bismarck said that the war with France was won by an ordinary Prussian schoolteacher, and not by Krupp's guns. In the USSR, by 1937, according to the census,

almost 30 million people over the age of 15 were illiterate (that's 18.5% of the total population)31. In 1937, only 7.7% of the population of the USSR had an education of seven classes or more, and only 0.7% had a higher education. The situation with the male population aged 16-59 was better (respectively 15% and 1.7%), but even these figures were low32.

Before the war, two-thirds of the population of the USSR lived in rural areas, conscripts from villages and villages had no experience in handling equipment, as a result of which their technical literacy was very low33. For example, many of them saw a car for the first time in their lives.

Thus, only the fact that the Wehrmacht fighter was more literate and technically prepared gave the Wehrmacht a significant advantage over the Red Army. The Soviet leadership was aware of these problems and tried to correct the situation. Courses were organized like educational programs, and soldiers were taught to read and write along with military affairs. This can partly explain the popularity of the Red Army among young people who were literally eager to serve. Despite all efforts to eliminate the illiteracy of the soldiers of the Red Army, it was still far from the level of literacy of the German army. German superiority also grew due to higher discipline, individual training and a well-thought-out system of training, originating in the Reichswehr.

The situation was aggravated by the fact that there were no junior commanders in the Red Army, who were abolished in the period from 1917 to 1940. They were a kind of "backbone" of the army due to their combat effectiveness and discipline. To carry out their functions, officers had to be involved. Therefore, in the management of the Soviet rifle division before the war there were three times more officers than in the German infantry division, and the latter had 16% more personnel in the state.

Another factor that influenced the overall level of technical literacy of the soldiers was that the army was created virtually from scratch. Here we can mention the loss of command personnel in the First World War and the Civil War, and the emigration of officers in 1920, etc. The repressions of the command staff of the Red Army in the second half of the 1930s stand apart here. According to O.F. Suvenirova, in general, 65% of the highest command staff of the Red Army were repressed34. As a result, there was a rapid shift of both the upper and middle, and the lower command staff upwards by several ranks without prior preparation. Platoon commanders became battalion commanders, commanders

battalions - regimental commanders almost at the same time, while not taking into account that each higher position should correspond to a certain training, often taking several months. In addition, the general increase in the size of the army over several years could have an effect. By March 1932, the number of the Red Army was 604,300 people. By the beginning of the war, it had grown by about ten times and amounted to more than 5 million people. It is impossible to build an army of several million soldiers from scratch, taking into account the fact that literally ten years ago a whole generation of soldiers and officers was lost during the First World War and the Civil War. With little military experience and rapid growth in ranks, disadvantages such as poor handling of weapons may be quite logical.

As a result, despite the huge costs of designing new, technologically more complex automatic weapons (SVT, ABC, etc.), developing offensive operations doctrines, the soldiers of the Red Army not only did not know how to properly handle new models of small arms, such as automatic rifle, but they did not always cope with the care of a very simple Mosin rifle. The plans of the People's Commissariat of Defense did not always correlate sufficiently with reality, and this can be seen not only in the example of the path of small arms from the warehouse to the hands of a fighter.

Notes

VIMAIVIVS. F. 3r. Op. 1. D. 396. L. 319.

3 Ibid. L. 320.

6 RGVA. F. 20. Op. 28. D. 314. L. 29.

10 Ibid. L. 30.

11 Ibid. L. 32.

12 Ibid. L. 22.

13 Ibid. L. 23.

14 Ibid. L. 25.

15 Ibid. L. 27.

16 Ibid. L. 30.

18 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 14. D. 2648. L. 20.

There. F. 20. Op. 28. D. 316. L. 3; F. 33988. Op. 4. D. 12. L. 21.

20 Ibid. F. 20. Op. 28. D. 316. L. 3.

21 Ibid. L. 112.

22 Ibid. L. 3.

23 Ibid. L. 26.

25 Ibid. L. 25. Ibid.

27 Ibid. L. 112.

29 Ibid. L. 137.

30 Ibid. L. 6.

31 All-Union population census of 1937: General results: Sat. doc. and materials. M., 2007. S. 112-113. There. pp. 114-115.

33 Ibid. S. 76.

34 Souvenirs O.F. 1937: Tragedy of the Red Army. M., 2009. S. 58.