In accordance with the military-political goals of the further conduct of the war, in the early spring of 1942, when the active armed struggle on the Soviet-German front almost ceased, both belligerents began to develop strategic plans for military operations.

The development by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff of the strategic plan of action of the Soviet Armed Forces for the next stage of the war and the carrying out of measures to prepare a new military campaign had a number of characteristic features. They were determined by the peculiar conditions of the military-political and strategic situation that had developed by the spring of 1942. Firstly, there was no firm confidence that the second front would be opened on time that met the common interests of the struggle of the anti-fascist coalition, that is, in 1942. At the same time, the Nazi leadership was aware that there would be no second front in the near future. Therefore, it could use the maximum of forces and means to deploy new active operations on the Eastern Front. Secondly, the allies did not fully fulfill their obligations to deliver military materials to the USSR under Lend-Lease. Therefore, the Soviet Union had to rely only on itself.

The Soviet command took into account measures for a significant organizational restructuring and technical re-equipment of the Soviet Army, as well as the creation of large reserves, which could not be completed until the summer of 1942. Meanwhile, numerous data indicated that a new major enemy offensive on the Soviet-German front would begin already in the spring of 1942.

On March 18, 1942, military intelligence reported to the General Staff: “Preparation for the spring offensive is confirmed by the transfer of German troops and materials. During the period from January 1 to March 10, up to 35 divisions 1 were transferred, and human reinforcements to the active armies are continuously going on. Intensive work is underway to restore the railway network in the occupied territory of the USSR, and there is an intensified importation of military and transport vehicles, ammunition, and artillery. It is possible that a decisive German offensive on the Eastern Front will be accompanied by a simultaneous action by Japan against the USSR and pressure from the Germans on Turkey in order to force it to let German troops into the Caucasus ... The Germans, not being able to carry out an appropriate regrouping of forces on the front, did not will be able to repeat the offensive on a broad front. They are concentrating all their efforts on the preparation of successive operations: first with the aim of capturing the Caucasus and the Murmansk (Kirovskaya - Ed.) Railway, then spreading operations to the north with the task of capturing the cities of Moscow and Leningrad. The solution of these tasks would achieve "the main strategic goal - isolating the USSR from the allies, depriving it of oil, and if not defeating it, then reducing it to the point where it loses all significance. This is the main idea of ​​the German command.

1 In fact, fewer were transferred - about 20 divisions.

The center of gravity of the spring offensive will be shifted to the southern sector of the front with an auxiliary strike in the north, while simultaneously demonstrating on the central front against Moscow ... "1 And as a conclusion, the report noted: "Germany is preparing for a decisive offensive on the Eastern Front, which will first unfold on southern sector and spread further to the north. For the spring offensive, Germany, together with the allies, will put up to 65 new divisions ... The most likely date for the spring offensive is mid-April or early May 1942. ”

On March 23, 1942, the state security agencies reported to the State Defense Committee: “The main blow will be delivered in the southern sector with the task of breaking through Rostov to Stalingrad and the North Caucasus, and from there towards the Caspian Sea. In this way the Germans hope to reach the sources of Caucasian oil. In the event of a successful operation with access to the Volga near Stalingrad, the Germans planned to launch an offensive north along the Volga. The Germans this summer will strive not only to reach the Volga and the Caspian Sea, but will also undertake major operations against Moscow and Leningrad, since their capture is a matter of prestige for the German command.

Such forecasts of strategic intelligence could not but influence the assessment of the situation by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and its decision to continue the armed struggle at the new stage of the war.

In the spring of 1942, the Stavka did not have sufficient forces and means at its disposal to conduct a large-scale offensive, but it was impossible to postpone active operations for a long time. In this situation, writes Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky, “the fronts went over to the defensive. Before us was the question of a plan of military action for the next six months. It was thoroughly discussed at the General Staff. None of us had any doubts that the enemy would again take serious active actions no later than the summer in order to again seize the initiative and defeat us. We critically analyzed the results of the winter. Now the Headquarters, the General Staff and the entire leadership of the Armed Forces tried to more accurately reveal the enemy's plans for the spring and summer periods of 1942, to determine as clearly as possible the strategic directions in which the main events were destined to play out. At the same time, we all perfectly understood that the further development of the entire world war, the behavior of Japan, Turkey, etc., and perhaps the outcome of the war as a whole, would largely depend on the results of the summer campaign of 1942.

1 IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 5, ll. 296-297.

2 IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 6083, l. 6.

3 A. Vasilevsky. The work of a lifetime. M., 1975, p. 203.

The strategic plan of action of the Soviet Armed Forces for a longer period was to provide for the ultimate political goal of the war for 1942 - the defeat of the enemy and the liberation of all occupied Soviet territory. This was the basis for the development of the solution, launched by the Headquarters and the General Staff after the end of the winter offensive campaign.

Assessing the situation that had developed by the spring of 1942, the Supreme Commander II. V. Stalin assumed that the Nazi command in the summer of 1942 would be able to conduct large-scale offensive operations simultaneously in two strategic directions - Moscow and in the south of the country. He attached particular importance to the Moscow direction, where the enemy had more than 70 divisions.

JV Stalin believed that the Soviet Armed Forces did not yet have sufficient forces and means to launch large offensive operations in the spring of 1942 in the absence of a second front in Europe. Therefore, he considered it expedient for the near future to confine himself to active defense on the entire Soviet-German front, while simultaneously conducting private front-line offensive operations in its individual sectors.

The General Staff, in particular its chief, Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov and his deputy, General A. M. Vasilevsky, basically adhered to the same opinion as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov was firmly committed to limiting himself to active defense at the first stage of strategic actions, to withstand the blow of the enemy, to exhaust and bleed him at the beginning of summer, and then, having accumulated reserves, to move on to broad counteroffensive actions.

The State Defense Committee envisaged as the main immediate task: to create powerful trained reserves by May - June 1942, accumulate weapons, ammunition, tanks, aircraft and other military equipment, as well as the necessary material resources to provide troops in the subsequent offensive. All justifications and calculations according to the plan of strategic actions for 1942 were completed by the General Staff by mid-March. The main idea of ​​the plan: active defense, the accumulation of reserves, and then the transition to a decisive offensive. However, work on the plan continued in connection with the proposal of the command of the South-Western direction to conduct a large offensive operation in May with the forces of the Bryansk, South-Western and Southern fronts.

The final version of the action plan of the Soviet Armed Forces was considered and approved at the end of March at a joint meeting of the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. At this meeting, Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov once again expressed the opinion of the General Staff on the advisability of the transition of the entire army to a temporary active defense and the concentration of the main strategic reserves in the western direction and partly in the Voronezh region, where the main events could play out in the summer. This opinion was justified mainly by the numerical superiority of the enemy forces and the absence of a second front in Europe. B. M. Shaposhnikov did not agree with the proposal of Marshal S. K. Timoshenko on the possibility of conducting a major offensive operation in the spring by the forces of the Bryansk, South-Western and Southern fronts, motivating his disagreement with the difficulties of organizing such an operation and the lack of necessary reserves. However, the arguments of the General Staff were not fully taken into account. The meeting ended with an instruction from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to prepare and carry out in the near future offensive operations in the Kharkov area, in the Crimea and in other areas.

1 See G. Zhukov. Memories and reflections. T. 2. M., 1974, pp. 64-65. See ibid.

Thus, the strategic plan of the Stavka for 1942, on the whole, corresponded to the military-political goal of the Soviet state for the next stage of the war and, in its essence, was of an active nature. The first part of this plan, which dealt with the planned actions of the Soviet Armed Forces in the spring and early summer of 1942 (April - June), was developed in the most detailed way. During this period, the Soviet Army was to remain in a temporary strategic defense with the task of completing the reorganization of the troops and re-equipping them with new equipment, as well as accumulating reserves in order to launch a new offensive from the summer of 1942. In order to give the defense an active character, the plan also provided for a number of offensive operations in separate directions of the front from the Barents to the Black Sea with the common task of consolidating the successes of the past winter campaign, improving the position of troops in certain areas and disrupting the enemy’s preparations for a summer offensive with preemptive strikes.

The second part of the plan outlined the transition of the Soviet Armed Forces from the summer of 1942 to a decisive offensive on most of the Soviet-German front, with the main blow on the southern wing. It was developed in the most general terms, since detailed planning of major offensive operations could only be carried out taking into account the results of military operations in the spring of 1942.

In accordance with the decision taken, in April-early May, the Stavka assigned specific combat missions to the fronts of the active army for the next spring stage of the struggle.

On April 20, the troops of the Bryansk Front were ordered to conduct an operation with the forces of two armies and a tank corps in the Kursk-Lgov direction in early May in order to capture Kursk and cut the Kursk-Lgov 1 railway.

The Southwestern Front received permission to conduct the Kharkov operation with the assistance of part of the forces of the Southern Front. According to the plan, approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western direction on April 10, the purpose of the operation was to forestall the enemy in launching offensive operations in the Kharkov direction and to retain the initiative. The Southwestern Front was supposed to, using bridgeheads on the right bank of the Seversky Donets, northeast and southeast of Kharkov, deliver two blows in converging directions to Kharkov, defeat the enemy’s Kharkov grouping and capture Kharkov, an important stronghold of enemy defense.

The southern front was supposed to defend the occupied lines, covering the Rostov and Voroshilovgrad directions and the area of ​​​​Lozovaya, Barvenkovo, Izyum. It was assumed that the Southwestern and Southern fronts would create the necessary conditions for the deployment of a major joint offensive operation in the summer in order to liberate the Donbass and reach the Dnieper line.

In order to facilitate command and control of troops on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front in the upcoming offensive in the summer of 1942, the Headquarters considered it necessary to create the North Caucasus direction on April 21. It included the Crimean Front, the Sevastopol Defensive Region, the North Caucasian Military District, the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla. Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny was appointed commander-in-chief of the troops of the North Caucasus direction, P.I. Seleznev, secretary of the Krasnodar Territory Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, was appointed a member of the Military Council, Admiral I.S. chief of staff - General G. F. Zakharov.

1 This offensive was subsequently canceled by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

The troops of the North Caucasian direction were to completely clear the Crimea of ​​the enemy and prevent the landing of amphibious assaults on the coast of the Azores and the Black Seas in the Rostov, Tuapse sector, as well as airborne assaults on the Kerch Peninsula and on the territory of the North Caucasian Military District. In the event of enemy attempts to launch an offensive in the Rostov direction, these troops, in cooperation with the troops of the Southern Front, were to firmly hold the line of the Don River, preventing the enemy from advancing into the North Caucasus.

Active offensive tasks were assigned to the fronts of the army in other directions of the Soviet-German front.

The troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts were ordered to complete the operations begun in the winter to defeat the Rzhev-Vyazma grouping of the enemy with the subsequent development of an offensive against Smolensk. At the same time, the commander of the Western Front received the task of carrying out an air transport operation in order to strengthen the cavalry group of General P. A. Belov, operating behind enemy lines, with personnel, weapons and logistics 1. These troops were supposed to hold and expand the occupied by them area, as well as strike at communications, railways and enemy bases in the areas of Smolensk, Yartsev, Vyazma, Pochinka 2. The duration of the operation was determined from May 10 to May 25. According to the directive of the Headquarters, 120 aircraft were involved in the operation, which were to be allocated by the commander of the Air Force, the commander of long-range aviation and the commander of the Western Front. The commander of the Air Defense Forces of the country was entrusted with the task of covering the airfields for loading heavy aircraft. The return flights of the aircraft were supposed to evacuate the wounded from Belov's group.

From the troops of the North-Western Front, the Stavka demanded to complete the liquidation of the enemy's Demyansk grouping, which had deeply wedged itself into the disposition of Soviet troops at the junction of the North-Western and Kalinin fronts.

The troops of the Karelian Front were to prepare and conduct private operations in the Murmansk, Kandalaksha, Kestenga directions and reach the state border 3, and the troops of the 7th separate army were to completely clear the left bank of the Svir River from Finnish troops and seize bridgeheads on its right bank 4.

In the strategic plan of the Headquarters, the Navy was taken into account mainly as a force carrying out independent combat operations in the Northern and Black Sea theaters. It was planned to use the Baltic Fleet to a limited extent, since it was blockaded in Kronstadt and Leningrad. The Northern Fleet was given the task of protecting sea lanes in the Barents and White Seas, as well as on the Northern Sea Route. It was also entrusted with the task of disrupting the enemy’s maritime communications, but the organization and conduct of special operations were especially important, which were supposed to ensure the safety of convoys heading to the northern ports of the Soviet Union. In addition, the forces of this fleet were involved in joint operations with the 14th Army of the Karelian Front, which was conducting an operation in the Murmansk direction. The Black Sea Fleet, together with the Fighters of the Primorsky Army, was supposed not only to actively participate in the defense of Sevastopol, but also to ensure the combat operations of the Crimean Front on the Kerch Peninsula, supply troops, strike at enemy communications and repel attacks by enemy torpedo boats and aircraft on their bases and ships .

1 The group of P. A. Belov included the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps in separate parts of the 4th Airborne Corps.

2 Archive of Moscow Region, f. 132a, op. 2642, d. 41 pp. 130-131

3 Archive of Moscow Region, f. 132a, op. 2642, d. 31, ll. 173-175.

4 Ibid., ll. 178-179.

While aiming the Navy at solving independent tasks, the Headquarters also drew attention to the shortcomings in the use of the forces of the fleets in joint operations with the troops of the fronts in coastal areas. The directive of the Chief of the General Staff gave specific instructions on the use of naval artillery, the improvement of the organization of interaction between the ground forces and fleets, the organization of reconnaissance, and other issues.

The fronts operating in the western and southwestern directions simultaneously with offensive tasks received instructions to create reserves and build military defensive lines: on some sectors of our common front with smaller forces in order to group the liberated forces and equipment in the army and front reserves and prepare them for participation in our upcoming offensive operations, as well as for counterattacks in case of an unexpected enemy offensive.

In these types, the Headquarters considers it necessary that ... the front urgently build a military defensive line along the entire front, which should make it possible to release part of the troops to form shock fists "1.

In the instructions of the Headquarters on strengthening the defense of the fronts, it was ordered to bring the depth of the main defense line to 10-12 km. Along with this, the Headquarters carried out significant measures to strengthen the old and build new rear defensive lines to a considerable depth, reaching a total of 600 km (to the Volga River).

In the southwestern direction, the construction of a frontier along the Voronezh, Starobelsk, Rostov-on-Don line was unfolding; the old defensive lines along the Don River were improved and defensive contours were built around such large cities as Voronezh, Rostov, Saratov, Stalingrad. In the western direction, the Mozhaisk line of defense was erected and the defense around Moscow and the old lines along the Oka and Volga rivers were strengthened. For the defense of the Caucasian direction, at the end of 1941, the construction of a field fortified line along the Lower Don from the village of Nizhnechirskaya to Azov with a total length of 700 km, as well as lines along the Kuma and Manych rivers, began. However, by the spring of 1942, all of them were poorly developed in depth in the main directions. In addition, due to an unsuccessfully chosen place for the defensive structures, some of them were flooded during the spring flood.

In May 1942, the construction of defensive lines between the Don and Kuban, along the Terek River and bypasses around Tikhoretsk, Voroshilovsk, Grozny, Mineralnye Vody, and Krasnodar began.

The Headquarters also paid great attention to strengthening the defense of Leningrad. The evacuation of the city's population continued.

Navigation was being prepared on Lake Ladoga. A second route was created through the Shlisselburg Bay, about 30 km long. For this purpose, the Kobono-Korej port was built on the eastern shore of the lake.

1 Archive of Moscow Region, f. 132a, op. 2642, d. 32, ll. 89-95, 185-187, 190-195.

The ship fleet was replenished: metal barges were built in Leningrad, wooden ones - at a shipyard on the Syas River. Small ships and barges were transferred to Ladoga from the Volga, Severo-Kama and other shipping companies.

By a resolution dated April 9, 1942, the State Defense Committee assigned responsibility for organizing transportation across the lake to the Ladoga military flotilla, commanded by Captain 1st Rank V.S. Cherokov. The North-Western River Shipping Company was operationally subordinate to the commander of the Ladoga military flotilla. Measures were taken to strengthen the air defense of the Ladoga highway.

As an important factor in the strategic plan of the Stavka, the partisan movement was also taken into account, the forces of which were to be used on a large scale to disorganize the enemy rear.

Thus, all the fronts deployed from the Arctic to the Crimea received not only instructions to improve the defense in their zones, but also offensive tasks with limited goals. They had to solve these tasks in conditions of temporary defense until the summer of 1942, that is, before the start of a new strategic offensive with decisive goals - the defeat of the main enemy groupings and the liberation of Soviet territory. The general goal of all spring offensive actions was to improve the operational and strategic position of the Soviet Armed Forces in the main directions, to reveal the intentions of the opposing enemy, to defeat his groupings, to disrupt the plan of the Ghggler command to launch a new major offensive on the Soviet-German front with preemptive strikes, thereby giving the strategic defense of the Soviet troops an active character. When delivering preemptive strikes, the greatest importance was attached to the Kharkov region - the most important strategic object in the southwestern direction. All this was supposed to create favorable conditions for the deployment of large-scale offensive operations in the summer on a huge front from the Baltic to the Black Sea in order to defeat the main enemy groupings and create a decisive turning point in the war in favor of the USSR, which began near Moscow in the winter of 1941/42.

Taking into account the timing of the readiness of the reserves and the degree of reorganization of the Air Force and armored forces, the summer offensive of the Soviet Army could begin only in the second half of July 1942.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command arranged its reserves so that they could be used, depending on the prevailing situation, both in the southwestern direction - to repel the expected enemy strike and go on a decisive offensive, and in the western direction - to reliably secure the Moscow region. Therefore, the main forces of the reserves were concentrated in the areas of Tula, Voronezh, Stalingrad, Saratov, from where they could be quickly advanced to one or another threatened direction. Between these two directions were distributed and all the marching reinforcements of the army in the field.

The basis of the new offensive plan in 1942, the Nazi leadership laid the desire to achieve the political goals of the war against the USSR, which fascist Germany failed to achieve in 1941. The strategic concept of the Wehrmacht's supreme command defined the Soviet-German front as the main front of the struggle. It was here, the leaders of fascist Germany believed, that the key to winning victory over the anti-fascist coalition, to solving the problem of gaining world domination, lay. The general strategic plan was to deliver a powerful blow with concentrated forces in one strategic direction - the southern wing of the front - and to consistently expand the offensive zone to the north.

In a conversation with the Japanese ambassador Oshima on January 3, 1942, after the defeat of the Nazi troops near Moscow, Hitler confidentially informed him: “The Soviets will be defeated already next summer ... Summer is the decisive stage of the military dispute. The Bolsheviks will be thrown back so far that they can never touch the cultural soil of Europe. Developing and concretizing his adventurist plans, he continued: “I intend for the time being to carry out no more offensive operations in the center of the front. My goal will be to attack on the southern front. I decided, as soon as the weather improved, to again attack in the direction of the Caucasus.

This direction is the most important. We need to go to oil, to Iran and Iraq. If we go there, then, I hope, the liberation movement of the Arab world 1 could also help our breakthrough. Of course, in addition, I will see to it that Moscow and Leningrad are destroyed...

If England loses India, the whole world will collapse. India is the nucleus of the British empire. It is necessary that Germany and Japan consult on joint plans for 1942 and 1943. Both allies must under no circumstances stop halfway. I am sure that England can be destroyed. How to eliminate the USA, I don't know yet" 2.

The question of draft plans for a new offensive campaign first arose in February 1942, when the situation on the Soviet-German front had somewhat stabilized. A new offensive in the East was planned to begin immediately after the spring thaw. On February 20, General A. Heusinger, Chief of the Operations Department of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, had already submitted to General F. Halder the first draft of the offensive plan. This plan provided for two stages of the struggle: spring and summer-autumn. In the spring of 1942, it was meant to capture the Kerch Peninsula and Sevastopol with the forces of Army Group South, as well as liquidate Soviet troops in the front ledge in the Barvenkovo ​​area, which should have created the necessary conditions for the deployment in the summer of that year of the main operation on the southern wing of the Soviet German front. The very plan of the summer offensive provided for a single strike by large Wehrmacht forces on the southern wing in order to break through to the Caucasus.

At the end of February 1942, Ribbentrop, in a conversation with the Japanese ambassador in Germany, said: “Plans for the campaign are now being developed by the General Staff. In general terms, the plan is the one that Hitler outlined at the end of January: in all operations against the USSR, the southern sector should have the greatest importance - the offensive will begin there, and the battles will gradually turn to the north ... In any case, if it is possible to cut off the USSR from external assistance and expand the capture in the south, including the entire Donbass and the Caucasus, then even if it is not possible to completely break the Soviet regime, the USSR will still lose all significance and strength ... Operations against the Middle East will follow after operations against the Caucasus.

During March, the General Staff of the Ground Forces was systematically developing a plan for a new offensive in the East under the code name of Operation Siegfried. On March 28, 1942, at a meeting at the headquarters of the Wehrmacht, a detailed plan for the summer offensive was considered. The deputy chief of staff of the Wehrmacht's operational leadership, General V. Warlimont, who was present at the meeting, subsequently wrote down:

1 This refers to the anti-British elements in the Arab countries, on which the Nazis intended to rely in the struggle against the British.

2 N. Jacobsen. 1939-1945. Der zweite Weltkrieg in Chronik und Dokumenten. Darmstadt, 1961, S. 288.

“... Hitler, despite the failures that befell the Germans, again returned to his main idea, which he adhered to in December 1940 and in the summer of 1941. He again wanted to concentrate his main efforts on the extreme flanks of a widely stretched front. The only difference was that the heavy losses suffered by the land army and which could not be fully replenished forced him to set himself successively one goal after another, starting from the southern sector, from the Caucasus. Moscow as the goal of the offensive ... so far has completely disappeared" 1.

Noteworthy is the testimony of Keitel, who, during an interrogation on June 17, 1945, testified: “As a result of the 1941 campaign, it became clear that there was a moment of a certain balance of power between the German and Soviet troops. The Russian counter-offensive, which was completely unexpected for the high command, showed that we had grossly miscalculated in assessing the reserves of the Red Army. It was all the more clear that the Red Army was making maximum use of the winter stabilization of the front for further reinforcement, replenishment and training of new reserves. It was not possible to win the war with lightning speed. However, this in no way took away our hope of achieving a military victory by a new offensive.

In drawing up the plan for the 1942 campaign, we were guided by the following guidelines:

a) the troops of the Eastern Front are no longer able to advance along the entire length of the front, as it was in 1941;
b) the offensive should be limited to one section of the front, namely the southern one;
c) the purpose of the offensive: to completely exclude the Donbass from the military-economic balance of Russia, cut off the supply of oil along the Volga and capture the main oil supply bases, which, according to our assessment, were located in Maikop and Grozny. The exit to the Volga was not planned immediately in a wide area, it was supposed to go out in one of the places in order to then capture the strategically important center - Stalingrad. In the future, in the event of success and the isolation of Moscow from the south, it was supposed to take a turn with large forces to the north (provided that our allies would take over the Don River). I am at a loss to name any terms for carrying out this operation. The entire operation in the southern sector was to end with a large encirclement of the entire southwestern and southern groups of the Red Army, which were covered by our army groups "A" and "B" ... "2

Historians have at their disposal documentary materials on the plans of the fascist political leadership and military command for the summer of 1942. In the final form, the goal and concept of a new offensive campaign in the East were formulated in OKW directive No. 41 of April 5, 1942, and then specified in directives No. 44 and 45 signed in July.

The military-political goal of the new offensive of the fascist Wehrmacht on the Soviet-German front was to regain the strategic initiative and destroy the "remaining" forces of the Soviet Army, capture the maximum number of the most important political, economic and military centers of the Soviet Union.

The strategic plan of the Nazi command was to "... while maintaining a position in the central sector, take Leningrad in the north and establish contact on land with the Finns, and make a breakthrough to the Caucasus on the southern flank of the front" 3.

1 W. Warlimoiit. Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht. 1939-1945. Frankfurt a/M., 1962, S. 242.

2 Quot. Quoted from: Military Historical Journal, 1961, No. 9, pp. 83-84.

3 Hitlers Weisungen fur die Kriegfuhruug 1939-1945. Dokumente des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht. Frankfurt a/M., 1962, S. 184.

The solution of these tasks was supposed to be carried out consistently "taking into account the situation created after the end of the winter campaign, the availability of forces and means, as well as transport capabilities." At first, the Nazi command needed to create conditions for conducting the so-called "main operation" in the south of the Eastern Front "with the aim of destroying the enemy west of the Don, in order to then capture the oil-bearing regions in the Caucasus and cross the Caucasian ridge" For this, the Nazi troops needed to improve their operational position, stabilize and strengthen the Eastern Front and rear front-line areas. Their specific tasks were to seize the Kerch Peninsula and Sevastopol during the spring, cut off the Barvenkovsky ledge of Soviet troops, eliminate their bridgehead northwest of Novgorod, and level the front line in the Moscow direction.

By the end of May, the fascist German command intended to complete the concentration of the main forces of the strike groups for the "main operation". The immediate goal of this operation was to deliver a series of successive, complementary strikes, which were to develop "from north to south in such a way that in each of these strikes in decisive directions as much as possible forces of both the land army and especially aviation."

The first blow was planned to be delivered from the area south of Orel to Voronezh. From here, mobile formations were to advance downstream of the Don towards the grouping, which was delivering a second blow from the Kharkov region to the east. Then it was supposed to unite in the area west of Stalingrad the troops advancing along the Don, and the troops striking east from the Taganrog, Artemovsk region. After that, a rapid development of success was planned directly to Stalingrad and the North Caucasus.

Operations in the north to capture Leningrad and the Kirov railway were planned to be carried out after the defeat of the Soviet troops in the south and the capture of the oil regions of the Caucasus, the richest agricultural regions of the Middle and Lower Don and the Kuban. In the western direction, where the Soviet troops had significant forces, the enemy planned containment actions and private offensive operations to improve his operational position.

Thus, according to the plan of the fascist command, the armed forces of Germany in the summer offensive of 1942 were to achieve the solution of the political goals set by the Barbarossa plan. The enemy intended to strike the main blow on the southern wing. The Wehrmacht was no longer capable of delivering simultaneous strikes in other strategic directions, as it was in 1941.

Having concentrated all their reserves in the south of the Eastern Front, the rulers of the "Third Reich" counted on the fact that the loss of the Donbass and Caucasian oil would weaken the Soviet Union and provide Germany with the opportunity to successfully continue the war, and the withdrawal of German troops in the Transcaucasus would disrupt the connection of the USSR with foreign countries through the Caucasus and Iran. Moreover, the Nazis, not without reason, hoped that the breakthrough of the German troops in the Transcaucasus would allow them to draw Turkey into the war against the USSR.

The successful implementation of the initial tasks planned by the German strategists for May - June 1942 largely depended on the implementation of the military-political goals of the entire offensive of the Nazi army in the East in the summer of 1942.

In order to ensure the secrecy of the summer offensive of 1942, the fascist leadership carried out a number of disinformation measures.

In order to keep the direction of the main attack secret, the General Staff of the German Ground Forces decided to create the impression that the German troops would launch a powerful offensive in the western direction in order to defeat the central grouping of Soviet troops and capture Moscow. To this end, the headquarters of the Army Group "Center", at the direction of the OKH, developed a plan for a special operation under the code name "Kremlin". The calculation was made on the fact that her plan would become known to the command of the Soviet Army and it would be misled. This plan provided for the implementation of a whole range of various disinformation measures, which were closely linked in time with the preparation and implementation of the offensive in the south. However, the operation "Kremlin" did not achieve its goal.

So, in the spring of 1942, both belligerents developed strategic plans and were preparing for the next round of active operations on the Soviet-German front, which was caused by the urgent need to have a strategic initiative in their hands.

In accordance with the general plans for the forthcoming actions, groupings of forces of the active armies were created.

The Soviet active army included 9 front-line formations, a separate army and troops of the Moscow defense zone, 3 fleets with 3 flotillas operationally subordinate to them. By May 1942, there were still three main commands of the strategic directions - Western, South-Western and North Caucasian, headed by General G.K. Zhukov, Marshals S.K. Timoshenko and S.M. Budyonny, respectively. The forces of the active army included 10 strike aviation groups of the Stavka, formations and units of long-range aviation, as well as the Moscow Air Defense Front and the Leningrad Air Defense Army. In the strategic reserve of the Stavka were 2 combined arms armies (1st reserve and 58th) and about 80 separate formations and units. In total, the troops of the Soviet army in the field (excluding the Air Defense Forces of the country and the Navy) at that time had 5.1 million people, almost 3.9 thousand tanks, 44.9 thousand guns and mortars x, about 2.2 thousand .combat aircraft.

1 Without 50-mm mortars, of which there were 21.4 thousand pieces.
2 IVI. Documents and materials, Inv. No. 3, p. 364; f. 244, op. 287, d. 47, ll. 65-66.

The Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets had 140 warships of the main classes: 2 battleships, 6 cruisers, 32 destroyers and 100 submarines.

The fascist German armed forces had 3 army groups on the Soviet-German front, which included 9 field and 4 tank armies, 3 operational groups and 3 air fleets. The total number of enemy forces that opposed the Soviet army in May 1942 is shown in table 11.

Thus, the ratio of forces and means of the parties was: in people - 1: 1.2, in guns and mortars - 1: 1.3, in combat aircraft - 1: 1 in favor of the enemy; in tanks - 1.2: 1 and in warships - 2.2 M in favor of the Soviet troops and fleet main front.

Hitler's inner circle, including the leading figures of the main headquarters of the armed forces, could not fail to learn certain lessons from the failure of the "blitzkrieg" that occurred on the Eastern Front. The collapse of Operation Typhoon in the Battle of Moscow cost the Nazis especially heavy losses in people, weapons and military equipment. It was noted above that fascist Germany managed to make up for these losses, but the combat effectiveness of its army decreased. The certificate of the headquarters of the operational leadership of the OKW dated June 6, 1942 stated: “The combat effectiveness of the armed forces is generally lower than in the spring of 1941, which is due to the impossibility of fully ensuring their replenishment with people and materiel” ( "Top secret! Only for command!”: The strategy of Nazi Germany in the war against the USSR: Documents and materials. M., 1967. S. 367.). At the same time, the number and combat effectiveness of many formations of the Soviet Armed Forces increased.

With all their arrogance, the Nazi rulers and strategists were forced to take all this into account. Therefore, continuing to maintain confidence in the superiority of the forces of the German army and striving to achieve victory over the USSR, they no longer dared to conduct an offensive simultaneously along the entire length of the Soviet-German front.

What goals did the Nazis set for themselves for 1942, more precisely, for the spring and summer of this year, when it was planned to launch a new offensive? Despite the apparent clarity of the issue, it requires detailed consideration. Let us turn first of all to the testimonies of those who were close to the preparation of a new offensive, knew about it or even took a direct part in it.

Undoubtedly interesting in this regard are the statements of Colonel General Walter Warlimont, the former deputy chief of staff of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW). He reports in some detail about some of the facts of the planning of the campaign, the implementation of which led the Nazis to the catastrophe on the Volga. In his book “In the Supreme Headquarters of the Wehrmacht. 1939-1945" Warlimont ( Warlimont W. Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht, 1939-1945. Frankfurt am Main, 1962.), in particular, writes: “Even during the period of the greatest strain of forces in the struggle to repel the offensive of the Soviet troops at the headquarters of the German armed forces, the confidence did not weaken for a minute that in the East it would be possible to seize the initiative again, at least no later than the end of winter” ( Ibid. S. 238.). On January 3, 1942, Hitler, in a conversation with the Japanese ambassador, announced his firm decision, “as soon as the weather is favorable for this, to resume the offensive in the direction of the Caucasus. This direction is the most important. It is necessary to go to the oil fields, as well as to Iran and Iraq ... Of course, he, in addition, will do everything to destroy Moscow and Leningrad "( Ibid.).

Elsewhere, Warlimont notes that in January - March 1942, the plan for the summer campaign was in general terms ready. On March 20, Goebbels wrote in his diary: “The Fuhrer again has a completely clear plan for the spring and summer. His goal is the Caucasus, Leningrad and Moscow ... An offensive with devastating blows in certain areas ”( Ibid. S. 241.).

It is noteworthy that the Caucasus, Moscow and Leningrad appear in Warlimont's statements in both cases. But there is no evidence that in the process of discussing the concept of the campaign, it was originally planned to resume the offensive simultaneously in all three strategic directions, and only later - when calculating the available possibilities - did the specific contours of the plan begin to change their outlines significantly. It is quite obvious that the Nazis could no longer prepare the second edition of the Barbarossa plan. Despite this, Hitler announced on March 15 that during the summer of 1942 the Russian army would be completely destroyed ( Tippelskirch K. History of the Second World War. M., 1956. S. 229.). It can be assumed that such a statement was made for propaganda purposes, was demagogic and went beyond the real strategy. But there was something else here as well. Adventurist in its essence, Hitler's policy could not be based on deep foresight and calculation. All this fully affected the formation of the strategic plan, and then the development of a specific plan of operations in 1942. Difficult problems arose before the creators of the fascist strategy. The question of how to attack and even whether to attack at all on the Eastern Front became more and more difficult for the Nazi generals. Warlimont writes the following on this subject: “Halder ... for a long time studied the question of whether we should finally go on the defensive in the East, since a second offensive is beyond our strength. But it is absolutely impossible to talk about this with Hitler. And what can all this lead to? If we give the Russians a breather and the American threat intensifies, then we will give the initiative to the enemy and we will never be able to regain it. Thus, we have no choice but to once again attempt an offensive despite all doubts ”( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 239.).

So, there was no longer confidence in the success of the offensive - the miscalculation of the Barbarossa plan in relation to the assessment of the forces of the Soviet Union was obvious. Nevertheless, the need for a new offensive was recognized by both Hitler and the German generals. The Wehrmacht command continued to strive for the main goal - to defeat the Red Army before the Anglo-American troops began hostilities on the European continent. The Nazis had no doubt that the second front, at least in 1942, would not be opened. And although the prospects for a war against the USSR were looming for some people completely differently than a year ago, the time factor could not be overlooked. There was complete unanimity in this.

“In the spring of 1942,” writes G. Guderian, “the question arose before the German high command in what form to continue the war: to attack or defend. Going on the defensive would be an admission of our own defeat in the 1941 campaign and would deprive us of the chances of successfully continuing and ending the war in the East and West. 1942 was the last year in which, without fear of immediate intervention by the Western powers, the main forces of the German army could be used in an offensive on the Eastern Front. It remained to be decided what should be done on a front of 3,000 kilometers long in order to ensure the success of an offensive carried out by relatively small forces. It was clear that on most of the front the troops had to go on the defensive" ( Results of the Second World War. M., 1957. S. 126.).

The offensive operations of the summer campaign of 1942, according to the testimony of General Halder, were foreseen as early as the winter of 1941/42. and disrupt their communications along the Volga" ( Military-ist. magazine 1961. No. 1. S. 35.). The OKW directive of December 8, 1941, spoke of creating the prerequisites for conducting an "offensive operation against the Caucasus" ( There.). In that memorable winter for the Germans, Hitler forbade the withdrawal of troops beyond the Dnieper and demanded at all costs to hold positions near Leningrad, in the areas of Demyansk, Rzhev and Vyazma, Orel, Kursk and in the Donbass.

The specific content of the plan for the summer campaign of 1942 at a certain stage and to some extent was the subject of discussion among the Nazi generals. The commander of Army Group North, Field Marshal Küchler, initially proposed to carry out an offensive on the northern sector of the Soviet-German front with the aim of capturing Leningrad. Halder ultimately also stood for the resumption of the offensive, but, as before, he continued to consider the central direction decisive and recommended that the main attack on Moscow be carried out by the forces of Army Group Center. Halder believed that the defeat of the Soviet troops in the western direction would ensure the success of the campaign and the war as a whole.

Hitler, unconditionally supported by Keitel and Jodl (OKW), ordered the main efforts of the German troops in the summer of 1942 to be sent south to seize the Caucasus. Due to the limited number of forces, it was planned to postpone the operation to capture Leningrad until the moment when the troops in the south were released.

The fascist German high command decided to launch a new offensive on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, counting on successive operations to defeat the Soviet troops here piece by piece. Thus, although when planning the 1942 campaign, Hitler's strategists for the first time began to waver, nevertheless, as before, the top military and political leadership of the Third Reich came to a single point of view.

On March 28, 1942, a secret meeting was held at Hitler's headquarters, to which only a very limited circle of people from the highest headquarters were invited. General Halder reported in detail the plan for the deployment of troops for the summer offensive, based on the instructions given to him by the Fuhrer.

Warlimont paints a picture of this meeting this way: “No one raised any objections. But, despite this, the displeasure of the chief of the general staff of the land army (Halder. - A.S.) was almost palpably felt, who even earlier had repeatedly spoken out both against the strange layer-by-layer introduction of forces at the beginning of the offensive, and against delivering the main blows during the offensive in divergent directions, and especially against the excessive scale of operations along the front and in depth "( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 242.).

Colonel-General Jodl of the Design Bureau, who was not indifferent to the development of Hitler's operational plans, a few weeks after the aforementioned meeting, told Lieutenant-Colonel Scherf, a General Staff officer devoted to him, whom Hitler appointed authorized to write military history, that Operation Siegfried ( Hitler, after the winter defeat of 1941/42, became wary of assigning big names to plans for military operations and on April 5 crossed out the original code name "Siegfried". On June 30, the new code name "Blau" ("Blue") was changed to "Braunschweig" out of fear that the former name could become known to the Soviet side.) due to the lack of forces of Army Group Center and Army Group North will be at great risk if the Russians launch a decisive attack on Smolensk. However, Jodl, like Hitler, seemed doubtful whether the Soviet side had the strength and courage to do so; they believed that with the start of the German offensive in the southern sector of the front, the Russians would automatically begin the transfer of troops to the south ( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 242-243.).

Jodl instructed his deputy and responsible officers of the headquarters of the operational leadership of the armed forces to draw up in the form of a directive of the OKW the plans for the command of the ground forces, proposed on March 28 and approved by Hitler. The headquarters decided to limit the content of the directive to only the formulation of "tasks", without linking the main command of the ground forces with any details. However, Hitler, during the report of the "draft" on April 4 by General Jodl, announced that he himself would rework the directive. The next day, his "historiographer" wrote: "The Fuhrer substantially revised the draft directive No. 41 and supplemented it with important points formulated by himself ... First of all, he re-formulated that part of the draft, which refers to the main operation." The result of these efforts was a document dated April 5, which contained "multiple repetitions and long lengths, confusion of operational directives with well-known principles of troop leadership, vague wording of the most significant issues and a detailed explanation of minor details" ( Ibid. S. 243-244.).

It is easy to see that the former Nazi generals are in every possible way fenced off from Hitler, whose associates and like-minded people they have been for so long. This is done in a different historical setting and at least two decades after the events they describe. In his book, Warlimont also follows this trend, as can be seen from the citations. Wehrmacht generals did not put forward any fundamentally new proposals as opposed to Hitler's plans. The atmosphere of servility to the "Fuhrer", which reigned supreme among the German generals, eliminated any possibility of this. The hidden discontent of the chief of the general staff of the ground forces, Halder, did not change anything. His alleged independence of judgment is clearly exaggerated in post-war West German literature. In hindsight, after the end of the war, Halder began to assert that at that time they were offered to throw the main forces of the German troops to capture Stalingrad in order to avoid simultaneous attacks on Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The attack on the Caucasus, in his opinion, should have been of secondary importance for securing the southern flank of the Stalingrad group. It is easy to see that, if this was the case, then such a proposal did not contain anything radically different from Hitler's plan. No wonder in his diary, referring to the meeting at the headquarters of the Wehrmacht on March 28, 1942, Halder writes down such a significant phrase: "The outcome of the war is decided in the East" ( Halder F. Military diary. M.. 1970. Vol. 3, book. 2. S. 220.).

All this shows quite clearly that the summer-autumn campaign of 1942 was planned by the German generals, who stood for the continuation of the aggressive and adventurous war against the USSR. Hitler only detailed and refined this plan, made the final decision regarding the choice of the direction of offensive operations. The majority of Hitler's generals showed a complete inability to understand the criminal nature of the war unleashed by the Nazis after the defeat of Germany in World War II. Thus, Warlimont in his memoirs puts forward his own plan for the continuation of the war in relation to the situation of 1942.

“Without speculation,” he writes, “it will obviously be appropriate here to speak of the prospects that a generous reconciliation with France could still bring. These prospects must have been of particular importance, considering that Germany was now dealing with two major maritime powers. If a devastating blow had been delivered to the enemy's sea lanes and fleet from bases located on the territory of the French state, using a large number of submarines and all air formations suitable for this, then it would have been possible - in accordance with some then and today's estimates - according to at the very least, to delay the landing of the Western allies on the European continent and in North Africa, and thereby create serious obstacles for the enemy in achieving air superiority over the continent. At the same time, the Red Army in the East, which was largely dependent on allied imports by sea, would obviously have been deprived of the opportunity to conduct major operations for a long time as a result of shifting the main efforts to the sea and air war in the Atlantic, especially if to involve the Japanese in the joint conduct of the war, at least at sea" ( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 239-240.). This plan, conceived many years after the war, does not deserve serious consideration. Suffice it to say that the combat power of the Red Army - contrary to Warlimont's assumptions - was not determined at all by the supplies of the Western Allies. In addition, the transfer of funds to the creation of a more powerful submarine fleet of fascist Germany was bound to lead to a decrease in the equipment of the Wehrmacht ground forces. The landing of Anglo-American troops on the European continent, as is known, was already delayed until the summer of 1944. As for the actions of the allies in Africa, they were of a local nature. Finally, "generous reconciliation" with France depended not only on the desire of the Nazis. All this suggests that Hitler and the German General Staff - contrary to Warlimont's opinion - more correctly than he defined the main theater of the war. But they did not understand the inevitability of the catastrophe that awaited them.

The idea of ​​the Wehrmacht command for 1942 is most fully set out in Directive No. 41 (see Appendix 14), which was of particular importance: stubborn attempts to implement it determined the actions of the enemy on the Soviet-German front until late autumn and the beginning of winter 1942.

Directive No. 41 largely reveals the essence of the policy of the Third Reich in the second year of the war against the Soviet Union. It is quite obvious that in preparing for a new offensive on the Eastern Front, the enemy by no means abandoned the military-political goals formulated a year and a half earlier in the Barbarossa plan - to defeat Soviet Russia. In general form, this task remains in Directive No. 41. “The goal is,” it says there, “to finally destroy the forces still at the disposal of the Soviets and deprive them, as far as possible, of the most important military-economic centers” ( See: App. 14. S. 567-571.). Hitler spoke about the same on April 3, 1942, in a conversation with Antonescu. “This summer,” he declared, “I decided to continue the pursuit as deeply as possible for the final destruction of the Russians. American and British assistance will be ineffective, as new Russian defeats will lead to a loss of contact with the outside world. They have lost the best soldiers and equipment, and now they are only improvising" ( Military-ist. magazine 1961. No. 1. S. 34.).

It should be noted that some authors in the FRG are trying to retroactively narrow down the tasks of the Nazi plan for the summer campaign of 1942. For example, former Hitler General Mellenthin writes: in the bend of the Don River between Rostov and Voronezh, in order to create a springboard for the subsequent offensive on Stalingrad and the oil regions of the Caucasus. The offensive against Stalingrad and the Caucasus was planned to begin much later, perhaps not earlier than 1943. Mellenthin F. Tank battles 1939-1945. M., 1957. S. 142.).

The absurdity of such statements is refuted by the Nazi generals themselves. K. Zeitzler, who after F. Halder became chief of the general staff of the ground forces, testifies: “Planning the summer offensive of 1942, Hitler intended, first of all, to capture Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The implementation of these intentions, of course, would be of great importance if the German army could cross the Volga in the Stalingrad region and thus cut the main Russian communication line running from north to south, and if the Caucasian oil went to meet the military needs of Germany, then the situation in the East would be radically changed, and our hopes for a favorable outcome of the war would be greatly increased. Such was Hitler's train of thought. Having achieved these goals, he wanted to send highly mobile formations to India through the Caucasus or in another way ”( Fatal decisions. M., 1958. S. 153.).

An objective assessment of the plans of the German High Command for the summer of 1942 is incompatible with the unreasonable narrowing of their actual scope and goals. In the document under consideration, as is clear from its text, in addition to the main operation on the southern wing of the front, the Wehrmacht troops were also tasked with “taking Leningrad in the north” and carrying out the operations necessary “to level the front line in its central and northern sections” . Ignoring this part of Directive No. 41 on the part of individual representatives of bourgeois historiography, especially West German, can only be explained by a conscious desire to belittle the scale of the victory of the Red Army and the entire Soviet people in the battle on the Volga. At the same time, one must also see significant differences between Directive No. 41 and the Barbarossa plan.

The ultimate military-political goals of Nazi Germany's aggressive war against the Soviet Union, in connection with the changed situation on the Eastern Front in the winter of 1941/42, seemed unattainable even to the most rabid Nazis within the framework of the next campaign. This led to the well-known inconsistency of the document under consideration and the vagueness of setting in it the main goal of the strategic offensive of 1942. In a general form (without indicating the terms), it sets out the intention to crush the Red Army, and at the same time it also contains an indication that the defensive positions created along the right bank of the Don to ensure the north-eastern flank of the strike group of German troops, should be equipped "taking into account their possible use in winter conditions." The capture of the region of the Lower Volga and the Caucasus, for all its great strategic importance, could not yet lead to the defeat of the USSR. The most powerful grouping of the Red Army was located in the central industrial region. In this regard, we should recall the testimony of Field Marshal Keitel. He said that the German high command, after the capture of Stalingrad by the Nazi army and the isolation of Moscow from the south, intended to carry out a turn with large forces to the north. “I find it difficult to give any time frame for this operation,” added Keitel ( Military-ist. magazine 1961. No. 1. S. 41.).

Thus, the main goal of the enemy offensive on the Eastern Front, according to the above Directive No. 41, was to win victory over the Soviet Union. However, unlike the Barbarossa plan, the achievement of this political goal was no longer based on the strategy of "blitzkrieg". That is why Directive No. 41 does not establish a chronological framework for the completion of the campaign in the East. But on the other hand, it says that, while maintaining positions in the central sector, to defeat and destroy Soviet troops in the Voronezh region and west of the Don, to seize the southern regions of the USSR rich in strategic raw materials. To solve this problem, it was planned to carry out a series of successive operations: in the Crimea, south of Kharkov, and only after that in the Voronezh, Stalingrad and Caucasian directions. The operation to capture Leningrad and establish ground communications with the Finns was made dependent on the solution of the main task in the southern sector of the front. Army Group Center during this period was supposed to improve its operational position through private operations.

Preparing the conditions for the final defeat of the Soviet Union, the enemy decided first of all to seize the Caucasus with its powerful sources of oil and the fertile agricultural regions of the Don, Kuban and the North Caucasus. The offensive in the Stalingrad direction was supposed to ensure, according to the enemy’s plan, the successful conduct of the main operation to conquer the Caucasus “in the first place”. In this strategic plan of the enemy, the acute need of fascist Germany for fuel was very strongly reflected.

Speaking on June 1, 1942 at a meeting of the commanders of Army Group South in the Poltava region, Hitler stated that if he did not receive oil from Maykop and Grozny, he would have to end this war ( See the testimony of Paulus to the International Military Tribunal on February 11, 1946 // Nuremberg trial, M., 1954. T. 1. S. 378; see also: Voen.-ist. magazine 1960. No. 2. S. 81-82.). At the same time, Hitler based his calculations on the fact that the loss of oil by the USSR would undermine the strength of Soviet resistance. "It was a delicate calculation that was closer to its goal than is commonly believed after its final catastrophic failure" ( Liddell Hart BG Strategy of indirect actions. pp. 347-348.).

The choice of the south for the offensive was also determined by a number of other considerations, including those of a specifically military nature.

The enemy troops on the central sector of the front penetrated deeply into Soviet territory and were under the threat of flank attacks by the Red Army. At the same time, the Nazi troops occupied an overhanging position in relation to the southern grouping of Soviet troops. The Red Army had no less forces here than in the western direction. However, the open terrain - the steppe expanses of the Don, the Volga region and the North Caucasus - created the most favorable opportunities for the enemy to use armored formations and aviation. Of certain importance was the fact that in the south it was easier for the Nazis to concentrate the troops of their allies: Romanians, Hungarians and Italians.

The capture of the Caucasus pursued, in addition to the above, other important goals: according to the plans of the enemy, this brought the Nazi troops closer to Turkey and accelerated the decision of its rulers about armed aggression against the USSR; With the loss of the Caucasus, the Soviet Union was deprived of ties with the outside world through Iran; the capture of the Black Sea bases doomed the Soviet Black Sea Fleet to death. Finally, the Nazis hoped, in the event of a successful implementation of the planned offensive, to open their way to the Middle East.

In preparation for carrying out the planned operations, the Nazi leadership carried out a number of preparatory measures. In search of the forces and means necessary for the offensive, the allies of the Third Reich were not forgotten either. Warlimont writes that a few weeks before the final decision on the plan for the 1942 summer campaign was made, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command, General Keitel, visited, on Hitler's instructions, the capitals of Germany's European allies, who were to contribute "every available force" to the operation. As a result, the Nazis managed to get a promise from the rulers of Italy and Hungary to allocate one reinforced army each. In Romania, I. Antonescu placed at the disposal of the German command another 26 divisions in addition to the Romanian troops already operating in the East ( Lebedev N. I. The collapse of fascism in Romania. M., 1976. S. 347.). “Hitler, who in this case refused personal correspondence with the heads of state and government, subsequently limited himself to only demanding that the contingents of the Allied troops be part of the armies under their own command. In addition, already in the directive of April 5, when determining the zones for the offensive of the allied forces, it was stipulated, albeit in veiled terms, that the Hungarians and Romanians, who were allies of Germany, but were at enmity with each other, should be separated from each other by a considerable distance, introducing in between are Italian connections. All these troops were assigned defensive tasks, for which they had to be reinforced with German reserves, and above all with anti-tank weapons" ( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 244.).

Among the activities of the Hitlerite command aimed at preparing an offensive on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, the plan for the fictitious operation "Kremlin" occupied not the last place. Its purpose is to misinform the Soviet command regarding German plans for the 1942 summer campaign.

Operation "Kremlin" was developed at the direction of the OKH and Hitler by the headquarters of the army group "Center". In the “Order on the offensive against Moscow”, signed on May 29 by the commander of Field Marshal Kluge and the chief of staff, General Wehler, the troops of the Army Group Center were tasked with: “To defeat the enemy troops located in the area west and south of the enemy’s capital, Moscow, surrounding the city, and thereby deprive the enemy of the possibility of operational use of this area "( Dashichev V.P. Bankruptcy of the strategy of German fascism. M., 1973. T. 2. S. 312.). To achieve this goal, the order set specific tasks for the 2nd, 3rd tank, 4th, 9th armies and the 59th army corps. The beginning of both operations ("Kremlin" and "Blau") coincided in time.

The enemy did everything, including radio disinformation, so that the plan of Operation "Kremlin" became known to the command of the Red Army. To some extent, this trick succeeded the enemy.

By the spring of 1942, the Soviet Supreme High Command and the General Staff were faced with the need to develop a new strategic plan - for the next stage of the war. The impossibility of continuing the broad offensive of the Red Army, which remained unfinished, became obvious. A. M. Vasilevsky, who was then deputy, and then chief of the General Staff ( In May 1942, A. M. Vasilevsky was admitted to the duties of Chief of the General Staff, and on June 26 he was approved in this position.), wrote in his memoirs that the winter offensive in April 1942 died out due to the lack of the necessary forces and means to continue it. The troops of the fronts were ordered to go on the defensive.

From the way events unfolded at the front, it was clear that the enemy had begun to recover from the blows inflicted on him and was preparing for active operations. The Soviet leadership had no doubt that with the onset of summer or even spring, the enemy would try to seize the strategic initiative again. The absence of a second front allowed the Nazis to transfer troops from the European countries they occupied to the Eastern Front. All this had to be taken into account when analyzing the situation.

In what direction will the new major offensive of the enemy begin? “Now the Headquarters, the General Staff and the entire leadership of the Armed Forces,” recalled Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, “tried to more accurately reveal the enemy’s plans for the spring and summer periods of 1942, to determine as clearly as possible the strategic directions in which the main events were destined to play out. At the same time, we all perfectly understood that the further development of the entire Second World War, the behavior of Japan, Turkey, etc., and perhaps the outcome of the war as a whole, would largely depend on the results of the summer campaign of 1942 ”( Vasilevsky A. M. The matter of a lifetime. 2nd ed. M.. 1975. S. 203.).

Military intelligence reported to the General Staff: “Germany is preparing for a decisive offensive on the Eastern Front, which will unfold first in the southern sector and subsequently spread to the north ... The most likely date for the spring offensive is mid-April or early May 1942.” ( History of the Second World War. 1939-1945. M., 1975. T. 5. S. 112.).

On March 23, the state security agencies reported the same to the GKO: “The main blow will be delivered in the southern sector with the task of breaking through Rostov to Stalingrad and the North Caucasus, and from there towards the Caspian Sea. In this way the Germans hope to reach the sources of Caucasian oil" ( There.).

However, intelligence data was not fully taken into account. The Headquarters and the General Staff proceeded from the fact that the strongest grouping of the Wehrmacht, consisting of 70 divisions, continued to be located on the central sector of the Soviet-German front, still threatening the capital. Therefore, it seemed most likely that the enemy would strike the main blow in the Moscow direction. “This opinion, as I am well aware, was shared by the command of most fronts” ( Vasilevsky A. M. The matter of a lifetime. 2nd ed. S. 206.), - testifies A. M. Vasilevsky.

According to Marshal G.K. Zhukov, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief believed that in the summer of 1942 the enemy would be able to attack simultaneously in two strategic directions - the western and the south of the country. But Stalin also feared most of all for the Moscow direction ( Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. 2nd ed. add. M., 1974. Book. 2. S. 64.). Later it turned out that this conclusion was not confirmed by the development of events.

An assessment of the situation showed that the immediate task should be an active strategic defense of the Soviet troops, the accumulation of powerful trained reserves, military equipment and all the necessary materiel, followed by a transition to a decisive offensive. These considerations were reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief B. M. Shaposhnikov in the middle of March in the presence of A. M. Vasilevsky. After that, work on the summer campaign plan continued.

The General Staff correctly considered that, while organizing a temporary strategic defense, the Soviet side should not, at the same time, conduct offensive operations on a large scale. Stalin, who was poorly versed in matters of military art, did not agree with this opinion. G.K. Zhukov supported B.M. Shaposhnikov, but believed, however, that at the beginning of summer in the western direction, the Rzhev-Vyazma grouping, which held a vast bridgehead relatively close to Moscow, should be defeated ( There. S. 65.).

At the end of March, the Headquarters again discussed the issue of a strategic plan for the summer of 1942. This was when considering the plan submitted by the command of the South-Western Direction for a large offensive operation in May by the forces of the Bryansk, South-Western and Southern fronts. “The Supreme Commander-in-Chief agreed with the conclusions and proposals of the Chief of the General Staff,” writes A. M. Vasilevsky, “but ordered, simultaneously with the transition to strategic defense, to provide for the conduct of private offensive operations in a number of areas: on some - in order to improve the operational situation, on others - to preempting the enemy in the deployment of offensive operations. As a result of these instructions, it was planned to carry out private offensive operations near Leningrad, in the Demyansk region, in the Smolensk, Lugovsko-Kursk directions, in the Kharkov region and in the Crimea.

How can one regard the fact that such an authoritative military leader as B. M. Shaposhnikov, who headed the country's highest military institution, did not try to defend his proposals on a question on the correct solution of which so much depended? A. M. Vasilevsky explains this as follows: “Many who are not aware of the difficult conditions in which the General Staff had to work during the past war can rightly accuse its leadership of failing to prove to the Supreme Commander the negative consequences of the decision to defend and come on at the same time. In those conditions when there was an extremely acute shortage of trained reserves and material and technical means, the conduct of private offensive operations was an unacceptable waste of energy. The events that unfolded in the summer of 1942 showed with their own eyes that only a transition to temporary strategic defense along the entire Soviet-German front, the refusal to conduct offensive operations, such as Kharkov, for example, would save the country and its armed forces from serious defeats, would allow we will go over to active offensive operations much earlier and recapture the initiative in our own hands.

The miscalculations made by the Headquarters and the General Staff when planning hostilities for the summer of 1942 were taken into account in the future, especially in the summer of 1943, when a decision was made on the nature of hostilities on the Kursk Bulge "( Vasilevsky A. M. Memories of the historical battle // Stalingrad epic. M., 1968. S. 75.).

Historians of the past war have not yet exhausted their study of the problem of planning the summer campaign of 1942; it needs further in-depth research. At the same time, one should also take into account the general situation that the failures of the Soviet troops in the spring and summer of 1942 were not inevitable ( Vasilevsky A. M. The matter of a lifetime. 2nd ed. S. 207.).

By the beginning of the second year of the war, the Red Army and the rear of the country, which ensured its struggle, had forces and means, if not in everything sufficient, then in the main, to prevent a new deep penetration of the Nazi troops into the vital regions of the Soviet Union. After the successes of the winter offensive of the Red Army, the Soviet people gained confidence in the inevitability of the defeat of Nazi Germany. On the eve of the summer-autumn campaign of 1942, there was no negative impact on the struggle of the Red Army and the entire people of the factor of surprise, which took place at the beginning of the war. Temporary factors gradually lost their effectiveness, while permanent factors exerted a growing influence in all spheres of the struggle. The experience of the participation of Soviet troops in the modern big war has acquired an ever more prominent role. Its first year was a serious test for the entire command and political staff, most of which acquired both hardening and the skill that comes only with practice. In the fire of war, knowledge was improved, the abilities and talents of those who led the combat operations of the troops were tested. The names of many military leaders and political workers became known throughout the country. On the battlefields, the combat and moral might of the Soviet Armed Forces was tested, which, under difficult conditions, thwarted the plan for a "blitzkrieg" war of fascist Germany against the USSR. The mass heroism of Soviet soldiers became the norm for their actions in the Great Patriotic War.

At the same time, by the spring of 1942, the Red Army lacked trained reserves, and the formation of new formations and associations was significantly limited by the level of production of the latest types of weapons. Under these conditions, the most expedient use of available forces and means acquired special significance, since the enemy had greater opportunities to continue the aggressive war. In this regard, the Soviet side received a very real idea of ​​the strength and professional qualities of the Wehrmacht troops, of the features of their actions in offensive and defensive operations.

The Soviet Supreme High Command correctly assessed the overall balance of forces in the USSR's war against fascist Germany, but the immediate prospects for the development of armed struggle depended on the adoption of correct strategic decisions. Expecting that the enemy would deliver the main blow in the central direction, the Headquarters concentrated strategic reserves in the areas of Kalinin, Tula, Tambov, Bori-soglebsk, Vologda, Gorky, Stalingrad, Saratov, believing that, depending on the development of events at the front, they could be used both southwest and west History of the Second World War. 1939-1945. T. 5. S. 143.). However, the actual development of events did not fully justify these calculations.

Thus, the Headquarters planned for the spring and summer of 1942, along with the transition to the defense, offensive operations in the Leningrad region, near Demyansk, in the Oryol direction, in the Kharkov region, in the Donbass and Crimea. The successful conduct of these operations could lead to the release of Leningrad, the defeat of the Demyansk, Kharkov and other groupings of enemy troops. This was due to the desire to bring as close as possible the timing of the expulsion of the fascist invaders from Soviet soil. However, at that time there were not yet sufficient prerequisites for this, and the decision taken by the Headquarters was erroneous.

The ability to solve the practical problems of military strategy, taking into account all the factors that determined accurate and correct foresight, was developed at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command gradually, as experience in warfare was accumulated.

On October 1, 1942, as a result of a counterattack by units of the 51st Army of the Stalingrad Front, a number of enemy documents were captured, among which was one curious scheme. According to A.I. Eremenko, her “the content ... went far beyond not only the army scale, but even the scale of the army group and concerned, in essence, the entire Soviet-German front. It was a diagram drawn in pencil on a plain sheet of paper and graphically representing the plan of the Nazis for the summer of 1942 (see Diagram 14). In part, the data of this scheme coincided with the corresponding directives of Hitler, now made public. Dates were also indicated on the diagram, which, apparently, meant the timing of the capture of certain points by fascist troops..

This scheme, apparently, was transferred to Moscow and on November 6-7, 1942, the whole country learned about its content. Comrade Stalin, in his report on the 25th anniversary of the VOSR, said: “Recently, a German officer of the German General Staff fell into the hands of our people. This officer found a map with the designation of the plan for the advancement of German troops in terms of time. This document shows that the Germans intended to be in Borisoglebsk on July 10 of this year, in Stalingrad on July 25, in Saratov on August 10, in Kuibyshev on August 15, in Arzamas on September 10, in Baku on September 25.

This document fully confirms our data that the main goal of the German summer offensive was to bypass Moscow from the east and strike at Moscow, while the southward advance had as its goal, among other things, the diversion of our reserves away from Moscow and the weakening of the Moscow front so that it would be easier to strike at Moscow.

In short, the main goal of the German summer offensive was to encircle Moscow and end the war this year.

From that moment on, all Soviet military historiography, describing German plans for the summer of 1942, focused exclusively on this report. Even in secret works like "Collection of materials on the study of the experience of war No. 6 (April-May 1943)" they wrote (p. 9): “October 1, 1942, on the Stalingrad front in the Sadovoye region, a map with a schematic plan of the enemy’s offensive was plotted on it was seized from a murdered German officer of the general staff. This document confirms the predictions of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army regarding the German planning of the summer campaign of 1942 (Scheme 1).”

What can we say about more accessible works (Zamiatin N.M. and others. The Battle of Stalingrad. M., 1944; Samsonov A. At the walls of Stalingrad. M., 1952; Telpukhovsky B.S. The Great Victory of the Soviet Army at Stalingrad. M ., 1953, etc.). The article "The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945" of the new, second edition of the "Great Soviet Encyclopedia" (V. 7. P. 172) also presented this version with a colorful map.

In the meantime, works began to appear in the West that described real German plans for the summer of 1942. Some of them were reviewed in the semi-secret journal "Military Thought" (then published with the stamp "Only for generals, admirals and officers of the Soviet army and navy") and, of course, this moment was declared a falsification. Here, in particular, is an excerpt from a review of the book by B. Liddell Garth "The Other Side of the Hill" (VM. 1950. No. 6. S. 92-93): “Describing the plans for operations in 1942, the author of the book evaluates them as “masterful planning by General Halder” (p. 63). But these plans, according to the author, failed because Hitler divided the forces of the German army, setting two tasks for it: to occupy Stalingrad and seize the oil of the Caucasus (p. 208) ... Speaking about the fact that Hitler sought to provide Germany with Caucasian oil, the author tries to deny the fact that the German high command in 1942 pursued the goal of bypassing Moscow, and argues that the Germans needed Stalingrad only in order "to secure their flank when attacking the Caucasus" (p. 208). However, it has long been known that the main goal of the German offensive in 1942 was to bypass Moscow from the east, cut it off from the Volga and the Urals and then occupy it.

Approximately the same thing was written in a review of the book by Walter Görlitz “The Second World War. 1939-1945", published in two volumes in 1951-1952. (VM. 1955. No. 5. P. 92).

But the inertia of the Stalinist report (especially after the death of the speaker himself) could not last forever, and the first bell about the upcoming revision of views on German plans in 1942 sounded in the same issue of Military Thought, in which the review of Görlitz was published. In the article by Colonel-General P. Kurochkin “The Victory of Soviet military art in the Great Patriotic War”, in an excerpt about the armed struggle in the summer of 1942, perhaps for the first time, the version about bypassing Moscow was not voiced (p. 22): “The summer campaign of 1942 began with an almost simultaneous offensive by the Soviet troops in the Kharkov region, and by the Nazi troops in the Crimea, in the Rzhev region and south of Leningrad. The enemy managed in May-June to liquidate our bridgeheads on the Kerch Peninsula and near Sevastopol, to encircle part of the advancing troops near Kharkov. Having achieved these successes, and also taking advantage of the absence of a second front, the Nazi command concentrated large forces on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front and launched a new offensive in the southeast direction. Lacking sufficient forces for an offensive in several directions, as was the case in 1941, the enemy was still able to concentrate large forces on one sector of the front and achieve new serious successes. The Soviet Army again found itself forced to conduct heavy defensive battles with superior enemy strongmen, now in the Stalingrad and North Caucasian directions.

However, the final blow was dealt by the release in 1956 of the collection of articles "The most important operations of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945." edited by d.h.s. Colonel P.A. Zhilina. In the article “The Battle of Stalingrad” (written by Colonels A.V. Karatyshkin and K.A. Cheryomukhin, p. 110), Directive No. 41 of April 5, 1942 was quoted with the plans of the German command for the upcoming campaign. Moreover, you should not associate the contents of the collection with the well-known report of N.S. Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. The imprint of the book shows that it was handed over to the set on 07/11/55, and signed for printing on 01/30/56.

The journal "Military Thought" also had a hand in changing the situation. First, in the 10th issue of the magazine for 1956, an article by Colonel N. Pavlenko “The Struggle for the Strategic Initiative in the Great Patriotic War” was published, where both the summer-autumn campaign of 1942 and the plans of the parties in it were briefly reviewed. Then, in the next, 11th issue, an article by Colonel-General A. Tarasov "On the question of the plan for the summer campaign of the Nazi command on the Soviet-German front in 1942" is published. Its beginning already sets in a revelatory mood (p. 64): “In our literature, the opinion has been established that the main goal of the offensive of the Nazi troops on the Soviet-German front in 1942 was Moscow, with the mastery of which the end of the war in the East was also associated. In works devoted to the Great Patriotic War, in particular, it is argued that the Nazi command sought to achieve this strategic task by delivering the main blow in the Stalingrad direction. With access to the Volga and the capture of Stalingrad, the enemy troops allegedly had to develop their attack to the north with the aim of deep bypassing Moscow from the east, isolating Moscow from the Volga and Ural rear and subsequently capturing it. The offensive of the enemy in the south towards the Caucasus was considered as an auxiliary one, aimed at diverting the reserves of the Soviet Army from Moscow and thereby weakening the defense of the Moscow direction. Further, the article outlined the history of the seizure of the document (it was specified that it was taken from a Romanian, and not a German officer), its content and comparison with both German documents and memoirs, and even Paulus’s testimonies (p. 69): “In a conversation with the author of this article, Paulus stated: “Believe me that until the very day of my surrender to the Soviet troops, I never heard from anyone that the goal of our offensive in 1942, even if distant, was Moscow. I learned about this only in captivity, according to Soviet materials, with which I completely disagree.

Of course, all the historical works that touch on this moment could not change instantly. In the same 1956, the brochure “Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)” was published. Resources for Political Studies,” where on page 25 was an outdated version. But in the 40th volume of the TSB, published in the same year, the latest data was used in the article “The Battle of Stalingrad 1942-1943”.

The last time the Stalinist version was mentioned in domestic historical works was in an article by Colonel I. Parotkin “On the Plan for the Summer Campaign of the Nazi Command on the Soviet-German Front in 1942” (Military Historical Journal. 1961. No. 1). In addition to a detailed story about the contents of the captured document, an image of the scheme was also given. I also note that Comrade. Parotkin, then still in the rank of lieutenant colonel, was part of the team of authors of one of the first works on the Battle of Stalingrad - “The Battle of Stalingrad. Brief essay "(M .: Military-historical department of the General Staff of the KA, 1944).

G.K. Zhukov said that after a search at his dacha and the seizure of documents and materials stored there in a safe in 1946, Stalin called him and said the following: "Are you going to write history? Don't. Let historians do this when we die.".

For the summer of 1942, Hitler planned to regain the initiative on the Soviet-German front in order to destroy the vital sources of Soviet power, the most important military and economic centers. The strategic goals of the summer campaign of 1942 were the conquest of the fertile southern lands of Russia (bread), the possession of Donbass coal and the oil of the Caucasus, the transformation of Turkey from a neutral into an ally, and the blocking of the Iranian and Volga lend-lease routes. Initially, the invasion of the grandiose area between the Black and Caspian Seas was called "Siegfried", but, as it was developed and detailed, the plan was called "Blau" ("Blue").

To achieve these goals, it was planned, in addition to the armed forces of Germany, to involve the armed forces of the allies as much as possible.

The plan for the summer campaign of the German army on the Soviet-German front was set out in OKW directive No. 41 of 04/05/1942. (Appendix 2.1)

The main task set by Hitler, while maintaining the position in the central sector, is to take Leningrad in the north and establish contact on land with the Finns, and on the southern flank of the front to make a breakthrough to the Caucasus. This task was planned to be accomplished by dividing it into several stages, taking into account the situation created after the end of the winter campaign, the availability of forces and means, as well as transport capabilities.

First of all, all available forces were concentrated to carry out the main operation in the southern sector with the aim of destroying Soviet troops west of the Don, in order to then capture the oil-bearing regions in the Caucasus and cross the Caucasian ridge.

The capture of Leningrad was postponed until a change in the situation around the city or the release of other forces sufficient for this would create appropriate opportunities.

The primary task of the ground forces and aviation after the end of the thaw period was to stabilize and strengthen the entire Eastern Front and rear areas with the task of freeing up as many forces as possible for the main operation, while at the same time being able to repel the enemy offensive with small forces on the remaining fronts. For this purpose, it was planned to carry out offensive operations of a limited scale, concentrating offensive means of ground forces and aviation in order to achieve quick and decisive successes with superior forces.

Before the start of the main offensive in the south, it was planned to capture the Kerch Peninsula and Sevastopol to clear the entire Crimea from Soviet troops, providing routes for the supply of allied troops, ammunition and fuel through the ports of Crimea. Block the Soviet navy in the ports of the Caucasus. Destroy the Barvenkovsky bridgehead of the Soviet troops, wedged on both sides of Izyum.

The main operation on the Eastern Front. Its goal is to defeat and destroy the Russian troops located in the Voronezh region, to the south of it, as well as to the west and north of the river. Don.

Due to the scale of the operation, the grouping of the Nazi troops and their allies had to build up gradually, and therefore, the operation was proposed to be divided into a series of successive, but interconnected attacks, complementing each other and distributed in time from north to south with such a calculation so that in each of these strikes, as many forces as possible, both of the land army and, in particular, of aviation, are concentrated in decisive directions.

Assessing the resilience of the Soviet troops during encirclement battles, Hitler proposed to carry out deep breakthroughs of mechanized units in order to encircle and tightly block the Soviet troops with approaching infantry units. The plan also required that tank and motorized troops provide direct assistance to the German infantry by delivering blows to the rear of the enemy, taken in pincers, with the aim of completely destroying him.

The main operation was to begin with an enveloping offensive from the area south of Orel in the direction of Voronezh towards the Moscow line of defense. The purpose of this breakthrough is to capture the city of Voronezh, and to hide from the Soviet command the true direction of the main direction of attack to the Caucasus (the distance from Voronezh to Moscow is 512 km, Saratov is 511 km, Stalingrad is 582 km, Krasnodar is 847 km).

At the second stage of the implementation of the plan, part of the infantry divisions advancing behind the tank and motorized formations was to immediately equip a powerful defensive line from the initial offensive area in the Orel region in the direction of Voronezh, and the mechanized formations were to continue the offensive with their left flank from Voronezh along the river. Don to the south to interact with troops making a breakthrough from about Kharkov to the east. With this, the enemy expected to encircle and defeat the Soviet troops in the Voronezh direction, reach the Don in the sector from Voronezh to Novaya Kalitva (40 km south of Pavlovsk) in the rear of the main forces of the Southwestern Front and seize a bridgehead on the left bank of the Don. Of the two groupings of armored and motorized troops intended for an enveloping maneuver, the northern must be stronger than the southern.

At the third stage of this operation, the forces striking downstream of the Don River were to join in the Stalingrad region with the forces advancing from the Taganrog, Artemovsk region between the lower reaches of the Don River and Voroshilovgrad through the Seversky Donets River to the east. The plan was to reach Stalingrad, or at least expose it to heavy weapons, so that it would lose its importance as a center of military industry and a hub of communications.

To continue the operations planned for the subsequent period, it was planned either to capture the bridges in Rostov itself that were not destroyed, or to firmly seize the bridgeheads south of the Don River.

Before the start of the offensive, it was planned to reinforce the Taganrog grouping with tanks and motorized units in order to prevent most of the Soviet troops defending north of the Don River from going south across the river.

The directive demanded not only to protect the northeastern flank of the advancing troops, but also to immediately begin equipping positions on the Don River, with the creation of a powerful anti-tank defense and the preparation of defensive positions for the winter and providing them with all the necessary means for this.

To occupy positions on the front being created along the Don River, which will increase as operations are deployed, it was supposed to allocate allied formations in order to use the released German divisions as a mobile reserve behind the front line on the Don River.

The directive provided for the distribution of allied troops in such a way that the Hungarians were located in the northernmost sectors, then the Italians, and the Romanians furthest to the southeast. Since the Hungarians and Romanians were fiercely at enmity, the Italian army was placed between them.

Hitler assumed that the Soviet troops would be surrounded and destroyed north of the Don and, therefore, after overcoming the Don line, he demanded that the troops move south beyond the Don as quickly as possible, since this was forced by the short duration of the favorable season. Thus, the Nazi strategists were preparing to create a gigantic encirclement of the Soviet troops in a vast area that was extremely inconvenient for their defense. And further on, on the waterless, scorched by the southern sun, smooth as a table, steppe expanses would begin to dominate the tank and aviation fists of the enemy.

To carry out an offensive in the Caucasus, already on April 22, 1942, an order was issued by the head of the armaments department of the land army and the head of reinforcements on the creation of the command of Army Group "A" with the combat readiness of the headquarters by 20.5.42. Field Marshal List was appointed commander of the army group. Lieutenant General von Greifenberg was appointed Chief of Staff of the Army Group, and Colonel of the General Staff von Gildenfeldt was appointed the first officer of the General Staff. During the formation, for the purpose of disguise, the headquarters is called "Anton headquarters".

The planning of the operation and the preparatory work for them are carried out by Army Group South, the corresponding instructions and orders are transmitted to the future command of Army Group A during their development at the headquarters of Army Group South.

On May 23, the working headquarters arrives in Poltava and, under the code name "Coastal Headquarters of Azov", is placed under the command of Field Marshal von Bock, Commander of Army Group South, whose headquarters previously led military operations on the entire southern sector of the eastern front and was also in Poltava.

On June 1, Hitler leaves for Poltava, accompanied by Field Marshal Keitel. The chief of the "Coastal Headquarters of Azov" takes part in the discussion of the situation at the front by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group "South", the Chief of Staff of the Army Group "South" and the commanders of the armies. An order is issued on the tasks of command during operations and preparation for them. Over time, the "coastal headquarters of Azov" is included in the affairs of the armies, later passing under its command.

On June 10, 1942, the operational department of the General Staff of the Supreme Command of the Ground Forces issues an order on the command of Crimea after the fall of Sevastopol, according to which all ground forces operating in the Crimea are commanded by the commander of 42AK, who, after the transfer of command, is subordinate to the "Azov Coastal Headquarters". On July 11, an order was issued on the order for the introduction of troops arriving in the second line for the 11th and 17th armies into battle, and on July 5, the operational department of the General Staff reported on the procedure for the transfer of troops from the Crimea to areas 17A and 1TA. First of all, the infantry of the 73rd and 125th infantry divisions should be transferred, in the second place the infantry of the 9th infantry division and in the third place the infantry of the security division. To protect the Crimean region, one German division is left in Sevastopol and Simferopol, the third battalion of the 204th tank regiment of the 22nd tank division, and a sufficient number of Romanian formations.

On July 5, at 14.45, the "Coastal Headquarters of Azov" receives by telephone from the General Staff of the Supreme Command of the Ground Forces the final order to take command. On July 7, the "Coastal Headquarters of Azov" at 0.00 in encrypted form takes over the command of 11A, 17A, with the Wietersheim (57TK) group subordinate to it, 1TA, Romanian formations, the Italian 8th Army (upon its arrival - to the unloading area).

In total, by June 28, 1942, on the Soviet-German front, the enemy had 11 field and 4 tank armies, 3 operational groups, in which there were 230 divisions and 16 brigades - 5,655 thousand people, more than 49 thousand guns and mortars, 3, 7 thousand tanks and assault guns. These forces were supported from the air by the aviation of three air fleets, the Vostok aviation group, as well as the aviation of Finland and Romania, which included about 3.2 thousand combat aircraft.

The largest grouping of Wehrmacht forces, Army Group South, which accounted for 37 percent of infantry and cavalry and 53 percent of tank and motorized formations, was deployed by the last decade of June 1942 on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. It consisted of 97 divisions, including 76 infantry, 10 tank, 8 motorized and 3 cavalry. (History of the Second World War v.5, p.145)

As a result of the strategic deployment of troops for the summer offensive of 1942 on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, the total number of armies in Army Group South increased to eight; in addition, the 3rd Romanian army followed the march order to Ukraine.

The enemy held the operational-strategic initiative in his hands. Under the circumstances, this was an extremely great advantage, providing the Hitlerite command with the freedom to choose the direction of attack and the opportunity to create a decisive superiority of forces and means in this direction.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff of the Red Army recognized the possibility of a summer offensive by the German army in the south, but believed that the enemy, who kept a large grouping of his troops in close proximity to Moscow, would most likely deliver the main blow not towards Stalingrad and the Caucasus, but into the flank of the central grouping of the Red Army in order to capture Moscow and the central industrial region, so the Headquarters continued to strengthen the central sector of the front and strengthen the Bryansk Front, the bulk of whose troops were grouped on the right wing, covering the direction to Moscow through Tula.

The Supreme Commander had no doubt that the main task of the Wehrmacht remained the same - the capture of Moscow. With this in mind, the General Staff in July 1942 analyzed the general operational-strategic situation and events on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. It was necessary to decide which of the two directions - to the Caucasus or to Stalingrad - was the main thing. The distribution of troops and materiel, the use of strategic reserves, the forms of interaction between fronts, the nature of preparatory measures, and much more depended on this decision.

The General Staff took into account that the Caucasian direction is associated for the enemy with the need to overcome a powerful mountain barrier with a relatively poorly developed network of convenient roads. A breakthrough of our defense in the mountains required large available forces, and in the future a significant replenishment of troops with people and equipment. The main striking means of the enemy - numerous tanks could roam only on the fields of the Kuban, and in mountainous conditions they lost a significant proportion of their combat capabilities. The position of the Nazi troops in the Caucasus would also be seriously complicated by the fact that under favorable conditions their flank and rear could be threatened by our Stalingrad front and the troops concentrated in the area south of Voronezh.

On the whole, the General Staff considered it unlikely that the Nazi troops would deploy their main operations in the Caucasus. According to the General Staff officers, the Stalingrad direction was more promising for the enemy. Here the terrain favored the conduct of extensive hostilities by all types of troops, and there were no major water barriers up to the Volga itself, except for the Don. With the entry of the enemy to the Volga, the position of the Soviet fronts would become very difficult, and the country would be cut off from sources of oil in the Caucasus. The lines along which the allies supplied us through Iran would also be broken. (Shtemenko S.M. General Staff during the war years, Military Publishing House 1981, vol. 1, p. 87)

With this in mind, the bulk of the strategic reserves were located in the western, as well as in the south-western direction, which subsequently allowed the Headquarters to use them where the Nazi command delivered the main blow. Hitler's intelligence could not reveal either the size of the reserves of the Soviet Supreme High Command, or their location.

Due to the underestimation of the southern direction, the Stavka reserves were not deployed there - the main means of influence of the strategic leadership on the course of important operations. The options for the actions of the Soviet troops in the event of a sharp change in the situation were not worked out either. In turn, the underestimation of the role of the southern direction led to tolerance for the mistakes of the command of the Southwestern and partly the Southern fronts.

As a result of the unsuccessful actions of the Southwestern and Southern fronts during the May offensive in the Kharkov direction, the situation and the balance of forces in the south changed dramatically in favor of the enemy. Having eliminated the Barvenkovsky ledge, the German troops significantly improved their operational position and took advantageous starting positions for a further offensive in the east. (diagram of Operation Wilhelm and Friedrich 1)

The Soviet troops, having suffered significant losses, entrenched themselves by mid-June at the turn of Belgorod, Kupyansk, Krasny Liman and put themselves in order. Going on the defensive, they did not have time, as it should, to gain a foothold on new lines. The reserves available in the southwestern direction were used up.

Summer campaign 1942

On instructions from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, in the spring of 1942, the General Staff began planning the upcoming summer campaign. The main attention was paid to determining the direction of the main attack of the Germans.

The report of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army (GRU) dated March 18, 1942 stated that “the center of gravity of the German spring offensive will be shifted to the southern sector of the front with an auxiliary strike in the north while simultaneously demonstrating on the central front against Moscow. The most likely date of occurrence is mid-April or early May.”

On March 23, 1942, the USSR state security organs reported to the GKO (State Defense Committee): “The main blow will be delivered in the southern sector with the task of breaking through Rostov to Stalingrad and the North Caucasus, and from there towards the Caspian Sea. By this the Germans hope to reach the sources of Caucasian oil. In the event of a successful operation with access to the Volga near Stalingrad, the Germans planned to launch an offensive north along the Volga ... and undertake major operations against Moscow and Leningrad, since capturing them is a matter of prestige for the German command.

Based on a study of the situation on the entire Soviet-German front, we came to the conclusion that with the start of the summer campaign, the Nazi command will probably undertake its main operation in the Moscow direction, again try to capture Moscow in order to create the most favorable conditions for the further continuation of the war. . This circumstance induces us in the time remaining until the summer to thoroughly prepare for the disruption of the enemy's intentions.

Stalin believed that in order to conduct an offensive along almost the entire Soviet-German front (from Leningrad to Voronezh, Donbass and Rostov), ​​the Red Army had the necessary forces and means by the spring of 1942: more than 400 divisions, almost 11 million people, over 10 thousand tanks, more than 11 thousand aircraft. At the same time, apparently, it was not properly taken into account that more than half of the replenishment was not trained, the units were not put together, understaffed, and lacked weapons and ammunition.

As in the winter campaign, Stalin overestimated our capabilities and underestimated the strength of the enemy.

Marshal Zhukov did not agree with the plan to deploy several offensive operations at the same time, but his opinion was not taken into account.

Subsequent events showed that the adventurism of Stalin's summer plan led to a new catastrophe.

At the same time, on March 28, 1942, a special meeting was held at Hitler's Headquarters, at which the Wehrmacht's summer offensive plan was finally adopted. Hitler returned to his basic idea, which he held in December 1940 and summer 1941, to concentrate his main efforts on the flanks of a wide-spread front, starting in the Caucasus. Moscow as the target of the offensive has so far fallen away.

“...First of all, all available forces should be concentrated to carry out the main operation in the southern sector with the aim of destroying the enemy west of the Don, in order to then capture the oil regions in the Caucasus and cross the Caucasian ridge.”

Hitler decided to carry out here the task of a large strategic scale with far-reaching goals.

By the beginning of the spring-summer campaign, the Nazis concentrated their main grouping against the southern wing of our troops to deploy a major strategic operation with the aim of invading the Caucasus and reaching the lower reaches of the Volga in the region of Stalingrad.

The result of the implementation of Stalin's plan was: the tragedy of the 2nd shock army in the swamps near Leningrad, the death of troops in the Crimea, the breakthrough of our front near Kharkov, from where the 6th army of Paulus then moved to Stalingrad.

The defeat of the Soviet troops south of Kharkov in May 1942 was especially difficult, when 240 thousand people were captured because of Stalin's stubbornness, who did not allow the withdrawal of troops to the east, although the command of the South-Western Front insisted on this.

In the same month, the Kerch operation ended in failure, costing us only 149,000 prisoners. Military experts believe that incompetent, gross interference in command and control of the representative of the Headquarters of Mekhlis, who was there, led her to such a result.

As a result of these failures, and then the defeat of our troops near Voronezh, the enemy seized the strategic initiative and launched a swift offensive towards the Volga and the Caucasus. In this regard, it took incredible efforts to delay the advance of the Nazis in the foothills of the Main Caucasian Range and on the banks of the Volga and Don.

More than 80 million people turned out to be in the territory occupied by the Germans. The country lost its largest industrial and agricultural areas, which produced over 70% of cast iron, 58% of steel, 63% of coal, 42% of electricity, 47% of all sown areas. This meant that our country could only use half of its economic potential.

The main reason for the failure of the summer campaign of 1942 was the erroneous, incompetent determination by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the main direction of the German offensive, as well as his desire to “hang” numerous private offensive operations on all fronts from the strategic defense. This led to the dispersion of forces, the premature expenditure of strategic reserves, which obviously doomed the Stalinist plan to failure.

Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky noted: “The events that unfolded in the summer of 1942 showed with their own eyes that only the transition to temporary strategic defense along the entire Soviet-German front, the refusal to conduct offensive operations, such as Kharkov, would save the country and its Armed Forces from serious defeats would allow us to switch to active offensive operations much earlier and recapture the initiative in our own hands. (Marshal THEM. Bagramyan. "My memories", 1979)

From the book of the Generalissimo. Book 2. author Karpov Vladimir Vasilievich

Winter Campaign of 1942 During the first six months of the war, both armies were exhausted: the German one in the offensive from the border to Moscow, ours in defensive battles in the same area. On June 22, 1941, Field Marshal von Bock set foot on our land at the head of a mighty army group

From the book The Last Soldier of the Third Reich. Diary of an ordinary Wehrmacht. 1942–1945 author Sayer Guy

Part Two "Grossdeutschland" Division Spring/Summer Campaign,

author Glantz David M

WINTER CAMPAIGN: DECEMBER 1941 TO APRIL 1942 On December 7, 1941, the United States, after the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, lost the bulk of its fleet and on December 8 declared war on the Empire of Japan. Germany declared war on the United States

From the book Soviet military miracle 1941-1943 [Revival of the Red Army] author Glantz David M

AUTUMN-SUMMER CAMPAIGN: MAY-NOVEMBER 1942 In June 1942, the British Army was still in relentless retreat in North Africa, the Battle of the Atlantic raged on, and the United States reversed the Japanese advance at the Battle of Midway Atoll. The US Army numbered 520,000

From the book Soviet military miracle 1941-1943 [Revival of the Red Army] author Glantz David M

From the book World War II author Utkin Anatoly Ivanovich

Summer Campaign Hitler, in anticipation of the final victory over Russia, shifts his headquarters from the swampy foggy Wolfschanze to the sunny Ukrainian Vinnitsa. When Hitler and his inner circle reached the Rastenburg airfield on July 16, 1942, sixteen transport

author Krom Mikhail Markovich

Chapter 3 THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. THE AUTUMN CAMPAIGN OF 1534 AND THE CAMPAIGN OF THE RUSSIAN VOIVODES TO LITHUANIA IN THE WINTER OF 1535 Lithuania started the war, counting, firstly, on long-term strife in Moscow, and secondly, on the assistance of its ally, Khan Sahib Giray. These calculations, however, turned out to be in vain.

From the book Starodub War (1534-1537). From the history of Russian-Lithuanian relations author Krom Mikhail Markovich

Chapter 4 THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN OF 1535 The winter campaign of the Russian governors made a strong impression in Lithuania and Poland. Polish statesmen hurried to express their condolences to the Lithuanian nobles267. The traces of the February devastation made themselves felt for many more months.

From the book My memories of the war. The First World War in the notes of the German commander. 1914-1918 author Ludendorff Erich

Summer campaign of 1915 against Russia The offensive planned for January 1915 by General von Konrad did not bring success. Very soon, the Russians launched a powerful counterattack in the Carpathians. Without German military assistance, the situation would not have been saved. The most difficult

From the book Komdiv. From the Sinyavino Heights to the Elbe author Vladimirov Boris Alexandrovich

On the defensive near Novo-Kirishy Autumn 1942 - spring 1943 In the first days of October, we were happy to return to our native 54th Army, the command of which greeted us very cordially. For more than a month, the brigade fought as part of the 8th Army, but we did not see anyone from the authorities: not

From the book Napoleon. Father of the European Union author Lavisse Ernest

II. Summer Campaign; truce; congress Battles of Lutzen and Bautzen. In the German campaign of 1813, Napoleon displayed the same genius, his troops, the same dedication as before. The first period of the war, when Napoleon had to fight only with the united

From the book Wars of Rome in Spain. 154-133 AD BC e. by Simon Helmut

§ 9. Scipio's summer campaign, the siege and capture of Numantia The activities that Scipio carried out during his campaign allow us to draw conclusions regarding the situation that he found in Spain. The deployment of these operations, as it seems, is not in full

From the book About myself. Memories, thoughts and conclusions. 1904-1921 author Semenov Grigory Mikhailovich

Chapter 5 Summer Campaign of 1915 Fighting qualities of the chief. Decisiveness and perseverance. The influence of technology and new means of combat. Ore and Zhuramin. Rivalry in intelligence. Individual properties of fighters. Major General A.M. Krymov. His fighting qualities and weaknesses.

From the book The Defeat of Fascism. USSR and Anglo-American allies in World War II author Olshtynsky Lennor Ivanovich

2.1. The transition of the Red Army to a strategic offensive in the winter of 1942 Roosevelt's demarche regarding the opening of a second front in 1942 The first strategic offensive of the Red ArmyThe success of the counteroffensive near Moscow in December 1941 Stalin decided to complete the achievement

From the book The defeat of Denikin 1919 author Egorov Alexander Ilyich

Chapter eight. Summer Campaign In view of the situation at the front, the high command decides to refuse to assign active missions to the Southern Front and at first restricts itself to pointing out the need to preserve the armies of the front, and on June 13, directive No. 2637 orders

From the book Provincial "counter-revolution" [White movement and civil war in the Russian North] author Novikova Ludmila Gennadievna

The Summer Military Campaign of 1919 and the End of the Allied Intervention The rules of the front-line Civil War in the Arkhangelsk province were dictated by northern nature. Frosty and snowy winters and spring-autumn thaws limited the period of active military operations to short