Polubotko captain of the Russian-Japanese partisans. Japanese invasion of Sakhalin


[...] If the Russian people, who found themselves in the south of Sakhalin in 1945, were surprised by Japanese life, then, in turn, the Japanese were quite surprised by the Russians. The first thing that caused genuine astonishment was the opportunity not to bow to the authorities and the fact that the Soviet "governor" Dmitry Kryukov freely moves around cities and villages without any retinue. It was not the lack of security that surprised the Japanese, but the very fact that the highest boss walks like mere mortals. Previously, any governor of Karafuto Prefecture lived like a celestial, surrounded by almost medieval ceremonies. True, Dmitry Kryukov himself in his personal diary will soon note the unexpected consequences of the abolition of obligatory bows and corporal punishment: “Earlier, the headman forced them to do everything and beat them for disobedience, and when they saw that the Russians were not beating, their fear disappeared, and this affected on the general discipline of the Japanese population…”

Simple lieutenant Nikolai Kozlov in his memoirs will describe the reaction of the Sakhalin Japanese to the closure of brothels: “I learned that there are seven houses of love in the city of Toyohara. Our authorities have become an order to close them. The owners were worried, but there was nothing they could do. In appearance, these were inconspicuous houses, differing only in paper lanterns. In the waiting room there is a sculptural image of a toad, photographs on the walls. If the girl is busy, the photo is turned inside. These houses in the city were closed without noise. The girls were employed.

But with the house of love at the Kawakami mine (South-Sakhalinskaya) there was a misfire. After the closure, the Japanese miners went on a sit-in. Coal was no longer supplied to the city. The mayor of the city Yegorov had to go there. All his arguments had no effect on the Japanese. I had to give in ... ”And yet the Soviet authorities quite actively and successfully integrated the Sakhalin Japanese into the life of the USSR. Just five months after the surrender of the Empire of Japan, on February 2, 1946, a decree of the highest authorities of the Soviet Union appeared: “To form the South Sakhalin Region with the center in the city of Toyohara with its inclusion in the Khabarovsk Territory of the RSFSR on the territory of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands.”

On March 1, 1946, Soviet labor legislation was officially introduced in the new Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk region. The Japanese and Korean workers and employees of the new region were covered by all the benefits provided for persons working in the regions of the Far North. It is easy to imagine the reaction of ordinary inhabitants of the former "Karafuto Prefecture" - earlier their working day lasted 11-12 hours, women officially received a salary half as much as male workers of the same specialties.

The salaries of Koreans in South Sakhalin, also according to the previous laws of the samurai empire, were 10% less than Japanese, the working day of local Koreans was 14-16 hours. The Soviet government introduced uniform wage rates for men and women of all nations, an 8-hour working day and doubled the number of days off - there were four of them per month, instead of the previous two. For the first time, the retention of the payment of part of the salary during the illness of the employee was also introduced.

In the same February 1946, a local monetary reform was also carried out in South Sakhalin. For ten days, they seized all the old Japanese currency, exchanging it for rubles at the rate of 5 yen for one Soviet ruble. It is curious that the head of the "Civil Administration" Dmitry Kryukov managed to make this exchange a very profitable financial operation - but beneficial not for himself, but for the entire population of the southern part of Sakhalin. With millions of banknotes handed over by residents, an entire plane was filled and sent to Chinese Manchuria, where yen was still readily accepted in the markets. As a result, the money canceled on Sakhalin turned into several dozen ships loaded with large amounts of rice, soybeans and millet. “These were reserves for the Japanese population for two years,” Kryukov later recalled.

But about the integration of the Japanese population into the Stalinist USSR:

[...] The study of documents and materials about that time is surprising - so quickly the Japanese were integrated into the life of the Stalinist USSR. Already on May 1, 1946, former subjects of the emperor celebrated the Soviet holiday with mass demonstrations under portraits of Lenin and Stalin. Moreover, the Japanese were not only extras carrying slogans in two languages, but also actively spoke from the stands.

[...] Naturally, living together side by side often led people to Russian-Japanese novels. But at that time, the Stalinist government of the USSR banned marriages with foreign citizens - this was done because of the catastrophic losses of the male population during the terrible world war and the presence of millions of men, young and unmarried, in the army outside the country. Although South Sakhalin was officially declared part of the Soviet Union, the status of the local Japanese remained unclear and uncertain in the early years - being considered “free citizens” and living according to Soviet laws, they did not have official citizenship of the USSR. Therefore, the new authorities of South Sakhalin did not register Russian-Japanese marriages, and close relations with Japanese women were expressly prohibited for the military.

All this gave rise to many personal dramas. Even the memoirs of the “head of the Civil Administration” Kryukov, set out in a very dry and far from literary language, convey all the intensity of passions decades later. “No matter how we forbade soldiers and officers, and even the civilian population, to have intimate relationships with Japanese girls, the power of love is still stronger than an order,” Kryukov recalled. - Somehow in the evening, Purkaev and I (commander of the Far Eastern Military District - DV) were driving a car. We look, on a bench under the window of a Japanese house, our fighter sits with a Japanese girl, closely clinging to each other. She hugged him so sweetly, and he strokes her hands ... ".

The commander of the district, Maxim Purkaev, was going to punish the soldier, but the civil leader of South Sakhalin persuaded the general to turn a blind eye to such a violation of the order. “Another case,” recalls Dmitry Kryukov, “was at the Uglegorsk mine. A wonderful guy, a communist, came there from the Donbass. Soon he became a Stakhanovite, one of the best miners. Then the brigade nominated him as a foreman. He did not leave the Hall of Fame. And so, as they say, he fell head over heels in love with a very beautiful Japanese girl who worked at the same mine, and they secretly got married. Upon learning that a Japanese woman had moved in with him, the local party organization suggested that he cut off contact and disperse. He and she said: we will die, but we will not part. Then he was expelled from the party.

I had to approve this decision and take away his membership card. I called him and the secretary. I learned that he works even better, the girl also became one of the foremost workers. He teaches her Russian, and she teaches him Japanese. He said: “Do whatever you want, but I will not part with her. All the joy of life is in her, she is our person to the board, but they would know what a hardworking, what a good housewife! ”I look at him and think:“ After all, they will have beautiful children too. But I explain why meetings and marriages with Japanese girls are prohibited. Nevertheless, we did not begin to expel him from the party, advised: let her write a petition for admission to Soviet citizenship, and he will attach his application. We understood: there is little hope ... "

Further there is a lot about the economy and the construction of socialism among the Sakhalin Japanese.
And, finally, the finale: a large Soviet-American operation to deport the Japanese population to the so-called. The main Islands, which were under the control of the American army under the leadership of General MacArthur.

[...] Probably, when in January 1946, at a meeting with the leader of South Sakhalin, Stalin spoke about “friendship” with the Japanese (“Be more loyal - perhaps we will be friends with them ...”), the Kremlin considered the possibility of preserving the Japanese enclave on the island. But during the same year, as the Cold War between the USSR and the US intensified, the top leadership of the Soviet Union decided not to experiment with new national autonomy on the Far Eastern borders.

At the same time, the US authorities, who then controlled the metropolis of the former samurai empire, advocated the deportation of all subjects of the Land of the Rising Sun back to Japan. The American occupation authorities were concerned about the spread of communist ideas among the Japanese and did not want to see a successful example of "Japanese socialism" on neighboring Sakhalin nearby. Therefore, already at the end of 1946, the US and Soviet authorities quickly agreed on the deportation of the Sakhalin Japanese to their homeland - even the flaring Cold War did not prevent the former allies from reaching an agreement in this matter.

The Soviet authorities agreed to send the Japanese population, and the Americans provided ships to transport them from Sakhalin to Hokkaido. So big geopolitics again abruptly changed the fate of the Sakhalin Japanese, who had already completely taken root under Stalin's socialism. On January 2, 1947, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the "Japanese" South Sakhalin Region was merged with the Sakhalin Region (which had long existed in the north of the island). At the same time, the capital of the new united region was transferred to Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, the former Japanese city of Toyohara. Thousands of immigrants from Russia and other republics of the USSR came to the island. The Japanese population was ordered to prepare for repatriation to their historical homeland.

[...] The Japanese did not want to leave the finally established relative prosperity and were afraid to return to their native islands, where post-war devastation, inflation and unemployment then raged. Many were attracted by the conditions of Stalinist socialism compared to the almost medieval mores of the old Japan. Left alone with two children after the war, a Japanese woman named Kudo brought a statement to the Russian authorities: “In Japan, for a long time, a woman has no rights, but here I receive a salary on an equal basis with men, and I have a great desire to stay and live with you ...”

But big politics was inexorable. Mass repatriation began in the spring of 1947, and by August 1, 124,308 people had forcibly left Sakhalin - almost half of the local Japanese. All those leaving were allowed to take with them up to 100 kg of personal belongings and up to 1000 rubles.

* * *
Here is such an interesting story about post-war Sakhalin.
As a result, they did not begin to create Japanese autonomy, and probably rightly so.

Among other powers, Japan landed its troops in Vladivostok in 1918, and on April 21, 1920, the Japanese occupied Northern Sakhalin (I recall that Southern Sakhalin was ceded to Japan after Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War). On Sakhalin, they were primarily interested in coal, fish and oil. True, the Japanese did not manage to extract oil on a large scale at that time - during the 5 years of occupation, about 20-25 thousand tons were exported from the island.

You can read a brief excursion into the foreign occupation of the Far East on our website:.

The Japanese were also interested in fur-bearing animals. During the years of occupation on Sakhalin, valuable fur animals were completely exterminated: sable, otter, fox, the number of squirrels was sharply reduced. The invaders systematically scattered baits poisoned with strychnine over vast areas of the taiga, senselessly destroying a huge number of animals.

On October 25, 1922, Vladivostok was taken by units of the NRA (People's Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic), and on the same day, the evacuation of Japanese troops from Vladivostok was completed, a decision on which was made back in the summer of 1922.

However, Northern Sakhalin remained occupied. The young Soviet state did not yet have military opportunities to expel the Japanese from there.

In the collection "Russian Kuriles: history and modernity. A collection of documents on the history of the formation of the Russian-Japanese and Soviet-Japanese border." (Moscow, 1995) it is reported that immediately after the occupation, the effect of Russian laws was canceled and Japanese military-civil administration was introduced. All institutions on the island were to turn over the affairs of the new Japanese administration. The streets were renamed in Japanese fashion, and the birthday of the Japanese emperor became a mandatory holiday for everyone.

To squeeze the Japanese out of Northern Sakhalin, it was decided to involve the United States.
On May 14, 1921, the government of the Far Eastern Republic and a representative of the American oil company Sinclair Oil signed a preliminary agreement on a concession for oil production in Northern Sakhalin. On May 31, U.S. Secretary of State Charles Huseau, in a note to the Mikado government, firmly stated that the United States "cannot consent to the adoption by the Japanese government of any measure that would violate ... the territorial integrity of Russia." Northern Sakhalin was not directly named, but clearly implied.

In accordance with the concession agreement, an American company received a concession for two sites with a total area of ​​​​about 1000 square meters. km for oil and gas production for a period of 36 years. Sinclair Oil, in turn, pledged to spend at least $200,000 on exploration and production, launch one drilling rig at the end of the second year, and another one by the end of the fifth. The rent was fixed in the traditional form: 5% of the annual gross production, but not less than 50 thousand dollars. As security for future payments, the company immediately deposited 100 thousand dollars and a letter of guarantee for 400 thousand rubles to the State Bank of the Far East.

However, contrary to expectations, the American government did not take any steps to put pressure on Japan and ensure the interests of Sinclair Oil in Northern Sakhalin.

At the beginning of 1923, Adolf Ioffe, who represented the RSFSR and the Far East in negotiations with the Japanese, informed the Politburo and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of Tokyo's very interesting proposal, from his point of view: to sell Northern Sakhalin to Japan and thereby cut the Gordian knot of problems associated with this "controversial" territory.

The Politburo, unable to immediately reject this idea (Ioffe openly supported Trotsky), acted purely bureaucratically. On May 5, 1923, a commission was formed to determine the economic and strategic value of Sakhalin Island, whose members unanimously decided that Northern Sakhalin must be kept by the USSR at any cost.

It is not known what the Americans were counting on, but on February 7, 1924, two Sinclair Oil engineers, McCulloch and McLaughlin, landed on the western coast of Sakhalin, near the village of Pogibi, where they were immediately arrested by the Japanese and, after being locked up for several days, they were expelled. However, this incident did not cause any reaction from the American government.
On May 14, 1924, official Soviet-Japanese negotiations began in Beijing, which resulted in the signing on January 20, 1925 of the Soviet-Japanese convention on the basic principles of relations. According to the convention, Japan undertook to withdraw its troops from the territory of Northern Sakhalin by May 15, 1925, which immediately after that, on the basis of protocol "A", passed under the sovereignty of the USSR.

The stay of the Japanese was not in vain for the island. In addition to the already mentioned extermination of animals, under unclear circumstances, the most valuable collections of the Sakhalin Museum of Local Lore on Aboriginal culture, paleontological samples and other exhibits were irretrievably lost. It is likely that some of them were taken to Japan.

However, the Japanese did not agree to leave Northern Sakhalin just like that. On their part, a condition was put forward for them to lease all or at least 60% of oil wells into concession. As a result of many months of negotiations, on December 14, 1925, a concession agreement was signed, according to which Japan was allocated 50% of the area of ​​oil and coal deposits for a period of 40 to 50 years.

As a payment for the concession, the Japanese were obliged to deduct to the Soviet government from 5 to 45% of the gross income. In addition, the concessionaire paid local and state taxes, as well as rent. The Japanese side was given the right to import labor from Japan in the ratio: 25% unskilled and 50% skilled labor. To exploit oil fields, Japanese entrepreneurs created in 1926 the Joint Stock Company of North Sakhalin Oil Entrepreneurs (Kita Karafuto Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha).

Well, Sinclair Oil was left with nothing. On March 24, 1925, the Moscow Provincial Court ruled on the termination of the contract with the Sinclair Oil Company, recognizing it as invalid. The court also recognized that the letter of guarantee submitted by the company had also become invalid, and the money contributed to ensure the execution of the contract was not subject to circulation in the income of the USSR.

Oil production at concessions grew and by the mid-1930s it had stabilized at the level of 160-180 thousand tons per year. Disagreements constantly arose between the Soviet authorities and the concessionaire, there were cases of violation of the contract, and by both parties. With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War (1937), the concessions began to decline in oil production, associated with a sharp deterioration in Soviet-Japanese relations (Khasan, Khalkhin-Gol) and the constant demands of the Soviet government to liquidate the concessions. Let me also remind you that the USSR provided military assistance to China to protect against Japanese aggression.

Japan returned to the issue of belonging to Northern Sakhalin during negotiations with the USSR on signing a neutrality treaty in 1940-41. Japan offered to sell Northern Sakhalin.

Further I quote an excerpt from Anatoly Koshkin's book “Russia and Japan. Knots of Contradictions, where he describes negotiations in April 1941 in Moscow with Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka.


“Having rejected Japan’s claims to Northern Sakhalin, he [Stalin] declared his desire to return to the territory of the Soviet Union the southern part of this island, torn away from Russia as a result of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Matsuoka objected, referring to the fact that the southern part of Sakhalin was inhabited by the Japanese and Russia would be better off paying attention to expanding its territories at the expense of the Arab countries, instead of claiming territories adjacent to the Japanese metropolis.
It was Matsuoka's "home-made". In preparation for negotiations with the Soviet Union, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs developed a program for concluding a non-aggression pact with the USSR. One of the points of this program provided: "At the right moment, include in the sphere of influence of Japan (as a result of the purchase or exchange of territories) Northern Sakhalin and Primorye." In order to encourage the Soviet government to reconsider its policy towards the Sino-Japanese war, the document planned to propose to the Soviet Union the following: “The USSR recognizes the interests of Japan in Inner Mongolia and in the three provinces of North China. Japan recognizes the traditional interests of the Soviet Union in Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang. The USSR agrees to Japan's advance towards French Indochina and the Dutch Indies. Japan agrees with the future advance of the Soviet Union in the direction of Afghanistan, Persia (subsequently, India is included here).
Matsuoka's attempt to present this "plan" to Stalin evoked no reaction from the latter. It was clear that the purpose of involving the Soviet Union in such a conspiracy was to prevent its rapprochement with the countries of the West and still try to involve it in cooperation with the participants in the Tripartite Pact.
Ignoring the geopolitical projections of Matsuoka, Stalin put on the table a draft Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact, which consisted of four articles. Article 1 provided for the obligation of both parties to maintain peaceful and friendly relations between themselves and to mutually respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the other contracting party. Article 2 stated that in the event that one of the contracting parties was the object of hostilities by one or more third powers, the other contracting party would remain neutral throughout the entire conflict. Article 3 provided that the pact would remain in force for five years.
The variant of the agreement proposed by Stalin did not require any concessions from Tokyo, except for agreeing to the liquidation on acceptable terms of the concessions in Northern Sakhalin. In addition, Stalin's frankness and conciliatory friendly tone convinced Matsuoka that the Soviet leader was sincerely striving to avoid new conflicts with Japan for a long time.
Having contacted Tokyo, Matsuoka received consent to sign the document proposed by the Soviet side. At the same time, the instructions of the Japanese government emphasized that "the Tripartite Pact must not be weakened."


Japanese Foreign Minister Y. Matsuoka signs a neutrality pact between the USSR and Japan in the presence of Stalin and Molotov. April 13, 1941

On April 13, 1941, the Neutrality Pact between Japan and the Soviet Union was signed in the Kremlin. At the same time, the Declaration on Mutual Respect for the Territorial Integrity and Inviolability of the Borders of the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchukuo was signed. An agreement was also reached to resolve within a few months the question of the liquidation of Japanese concessions in Northern Sakhalin. However, at the request of the Japanese side, this agreement was not reported in the press.

However, the German attack on the USSR delayed the decision on the closure of Japanese concessions. Considering that in the conditions of waging war in the West, the USSR would not want to risk opening a second front in the Far East and expelling the Japanese from Northern Sakhalin by force, the Japanese concessions continued to operate in violation of the neutrality pact. At that time, their calculation turned out to be correct.

After the defeat of Germany in the Battle of Stalingrad, the Japanese government realized that Germany would be defeated in this war, which means that the USSR would be able to transfer its troops to the Far East to fight against Japan.
In an effort to prevent the USSR from withdrawing from the neutrality treaty, on June 19, 1943, the coordinating council of the Japanese government and the imperial headquarters made a decision in principle to liquidate the concessions. Negotiations proceeded slowly and continued until March 1944.

During a conversation with US Ambassador Harriman on February 2, 1944, Stalin noted that "the Japanese are very frightened, they are very worried about the future." He said: “We have a neutrality treaty with the Japanese, which was concluded about three years ago. This agreement has been published. But in addition to this agreement, an exchange of letters took place, which the Japanese asked us not to publish. These letters dealt with the fact that the Japanese undertake to give up their concessions on Sakhalin before the end of the term: from coal and from oil ... We are especially interested in oil concessions, since there is a lot of oil on Sakhalin. During the exchange of letters, the Japanese undertook to renounce the concessions within six months, that is, until October 1941. But they have not done so until now, despite the fact that we have put this question before them several times. And now the Japanese themselves have turned to us and say that they would like to settle this matter.

On March 30, 1944, a protocol was signed in Moscow, according to which Japanese oil and coal concessions were transferred to the ownership of the USSR. In compensation, the USSR paid Japan 5 million rubles and promised to sell Japan 50,000 tons of crude oil from the Okha wells within 5 years "after the end of the real war." At the same time, a decision was made to close the Consulate General in Aleksandrovsk and the Vice Consulate in Okha.

After the victory of the USSR over Japan, South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands were returned to the Soviet Union.

warships of the world

Guerrilla warfare on Sakhalin.

At the end of 1904, the situation in the theater of operations deteriorated sharply: on December 20, 1904, Port Arthur capitulated, and the Japanese began to prepare for a landing on Sakhalin. The troops of Lieutenant General Haraguchi stationed in Hokkaido, intended for this purpose, numbered 14 thousand people with artillery, and Vice Admiral Kataoka's flotilla of 20 transports with warships was assigned to transport them. Only 1200 people, divided into several detachments and armed with ten guns and four machine guns, could repulse such a landing on South Sakhalin.

On March 5, 1905, midshipman Maximov sent a telegraph request to the General Staff: “What should be done with the Novik cruiser, which, if Sakhalin is occupied by the Japanese, can easily be raised in two to three months?” Soon the answer came: "Prepare for the explosion and destroy the possession at the first danger." There was nothing to blow up the ship, and A.P. Maksimov immediately sent a telegram to the commander of the Vladivostok port, Rear Admiral N.R. Greve, in which he asked to send four mines to blow up the cruiser, as well as 50 mines to mine the bay, 120- and 47-mm cartridges. But Vladivostok did not answer. Then Maksimov decided to use the Japanese mines that had been on the cruiser since August 1904. However, at first they were not required - during the winter, the Novik hull went into the ground for more than two meters. The defenders of Sakhalin continued to prepare for the defense of the island. Along the coast of Aniva Bay, they installed seven signal stations for 36 miles, replaced the caretaker of the Crillon lighthouse, who was negligent in his duties, with a sailor of the 1st article Stepan Burov from the Novik team. On the Emma transport, the sailors received from Vladivostok clothes and provisions, machine-gun belts and two hundred 47-mm cartridges filled with black powder.

Russo-Japanese War. capture

Vavilova Nadezhda,

department of management and law,

specialty: Law and organization of social security, II course

Supervisor: ,

Lecturer in History and Law, Sakhalin College of Business and Informatics, Sakhalin State University

Relevance for today.

The aggravation of the tension in the situation around the Kuriles and Sakhalin raises the question of a possible armed conflict situation between Japan and the Great Russian Federation. The prospect of an armed clash over the Kuriles and Sakhalin is becoming quite real: the fourth (after 1904-1905, 1938-1939 and 1945) Russian-Japanese war.

This time, the United States openly supported Tokyo's claim to our islands. They took the side of Japan, which sharply inflames the situation and that's what we think about this ...

As expected, the United States and Japan have a common interest in relation to our land, in the conflict over the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin Island, both Tokyo and Washington are now paradoxically interested.

America's interest in creating hotbeds of conflicts, instability and wars in the Old World, which Maxim Kalashnikov personally wrote about in the book "Global Trouble Crisis". Entering the deepest socio-economic crisis, they see their salvation in plunging the rest of the world into chaos, with which to put it, they could take a “breather” and, in which case, act as the main judge in resolving this conflict, so that after wars and political explosions, present itself as a more or less stable country, buy time by dumping the crisis into the outside world.

The Kuril and Sakhalin variants were not foreseen, it even seemed that Japan had become a friendly country and learned from past mistakes, but we would not quench its appetite, more wars were expected between India and Pakistan, the catastrophic collapse of Pakistan and bloody porridge in Afpak, with the fire spreading to Central Asia , we expected a conflict between the "Islamists" and "Kemalists" in Turkey, chaos in Iraq, after the withdrawal of American troops and the clash of interests of several countries on Iraqi territory at once, the Turks resisted, the Indians did not fight with the Pakistanis, and then America relied on provoking a new Russo-Japanese war, this would be a logical continuation of US policy. Their calculation is quite obvious, but as Napoleon Bonaparte and Adolf Hitler did, they will not be able to crank out this system, maybe they were able to penetrate Russia, creating Internet technologies and hotbeds of tension and unrest, but this is not enough to break Russia. I wanted to say a little about nuclear weapons that they should not be used, this will give a signal to the United States, so you need to cope on your own in the Far East, defeat in the war for Sakhalin and the Kuriles will mean an acute crisis in the Russian Federation and possibly even a change of regime, because the first Russo-Japanese ended with the revolution of 1905-1907. Under the noise, they can try to bring Western democrats to power in the Russian Federation. The loss of Sakhalin and the islands is unacceptable from a psychological point of view, it will mean the loss of the remnants of Russian self-respect, and will provoke the final disintegration of Russians as a people.

In the event of war, the United States will act as the main “guarantor of world peace”, and at the same time, the process of revising the results of World War II will be launched, which is also beneficial in terms of creating hotbeds of conflict in Eurasia.

To reveal the reason for the defeat of the Russian troops in the Russo-Japanese War and to conclude why Russia was not fully prepared for this war and why she decided to stop it.

Tasks of the Russo-Japanese War:

1. An undesirable but inevitable milestone in the development of Russia's fundamental interests in the Far East.

2.Strengthening Russian positions in the Far East.

3. Access to ice-free ports in Asia, including the Tatar Strait.

4. Status in the international arena.

5. A distraction from the pressing problems of the people, including possibly from the impending revolution.

6. Interest also in the agricultural colonization of Primorye and access to Port Arthur, and to Manchuria.

Introduction

In the war of 1904-1905, Russia and Japan fought for dominance in Northeast China and Korea. Japan started the war. In 1904, the Japanese fleet attacked Port Arthur. The defense of the city continued until the beginning of 1905. During the war, Russia was defeated in battles on the Yalu River, near Liaoyang, on the Shahe River. In 1905, the Japanese defeated the Russian army in a general battle at Mukden, and the Russian fleet at Tsushima. The war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905. Under the terms of the agreement, Russia recognized Korea as a sphere of influence of Japan, ceded South Sakhalin and the rights to the Liaodong Peninsula with the cities of Port Arthur and Dalny to Japan. The defeat of the Russian army in the war was one of the prerequisites for the revolution of 1905-1907.

Since taking office, the operation has been lobbied by Japanese Deputy Chief of Staff Nagaoka Gaishi. However, in 1904, a veto was vetoed on his plan to capture Sakhalin, and in 1905, during a meeting at headquarters dedicated to preparing a campaign against Sakhalin, Nagaoka could not overcome the resistance of the sailors opposing him.

Exhausted by the war, Japan sought to establish peace with Russia. On May 5, 1905, after the victory in the Battle of Tsushima, Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro sent an instruction to Takahira Kogoro, Ambassador to America, in which he indicated to ask Theodore Roosevelt for assistance in concluding a peace treaty with Russia. On June 1, Takahira handed it over to the President of the United States. The United States of America turned to the warring parties with a proposal to convene a peace conference, which Nicholas II accepted the next day. The Russian emperor wanted to make peace before the Japanese had time to occupy Sakhalin.

Part of the Japanese leadership reacted negatively to the idea of ​​the occupation of Sakhalin, so Nagaoka Gaishi asked for help from the head of the Manchurian front, General Kodama Gentaro, and in 1905, on behalf of Kodama, they sent a telegram advising them to support the occupation of Sakhalin in order to be at peace negotiations in more favorable conditions. the plan for the invasion of Sakhalin was approved by the high command. On June 17, he was approved by Emperor Meiji, who also ordered a separate thirteenth division to prepare for the offensive.

Course of the War

Sakhalin Island (in Japanese - Karafuto, "island of Chinese people") became the scene of hostilities. The huge island had a coastline of 2,000 kilometers, and its population was only 30,000 people, mostly exiles. Its administrative centers in the north were the post of Aleksandrovsky, in the south - the post of Korsakov. The island did not play any strategic role in the Far Eastern theater of operations, and for this reason the headquarters of the Amur Military District recognized the defense of Sakhalin as unbearable for the troops available in the Amur region.

However, the Minister of War of Russia, who visited Sakhalin in May 1903, the infantry general, instructed to take measures to defend this island territory of the state. Mobilization was announced on the island: the recruitment of combatants from among hunters, exiled peasants and even convicts (with the permission of the authorities) into the army began, for which the sentence was reduced. The resulting squads turned out to be weakly combat-ready: officers arrived for their training only in April 1905, before that they were engaged in by former heads of prisons and other non-professional persons.

This was also insisted on by the Governor-General of the Amur Territory. The following measures were planned for the defense of the island:

1. Concentrate the entire defense of Sakhalin in two centers: in the post of Aleksandrovsky and in the post of Korsakov.

2. From among the local military teams, Alexandrovskaya, Duyskaya and Tymovskaya with a total number of 1160 people should be located in the northern part of the island, and Korsakovskaya, consisting of 330 people, in the southern part of the island. (The total number of military teams was slightly more than an infantry battalion.)

3. From among the free civilian population, exiled settlers and exile convicts, form 14 militia squads (200 people each) with a total number of about 3 thousand people. Of these, 8 squads should be used to protect the Aleksandrovsky and Tymovsky districts, and 6 - in the Korsakov administrative district. However, it was not possible to start military training for the exiled convicts, since they were busy working on the prison. However, these people eagerly signed up for squads, hoping for a royal decree to reduce their time in Sakhalin penal servitude. Most of the combatants also turned out to be elderly people. Berdan rifles were put into service with the combatants. The squads were commanded by prison officials, who, naturally, did not evoke sympathy from most of their subordinates.

4. To build a number of strongholds with the labor of convicts. Of the guns available on Sakhalin, 4 were given to the Korsakov post, and 2 to the Aleksandrov post. It was planned to deliver to the island some more small-caliber guns from the Vladivostok fortress. Batteries were planned to be erected in the most convenient ships for entry. 8 guns and 12 machine guns were delivered to the island, eight of which were given to the defenders of the northern part of the island.

5. The supply of the defenders of Sakhalin with ammunition, military equipment and food was planned from Vladivostok, since local supplies could not be counted on.

The main forces of Sakhalin were exiles, in which the command of the island did not have confidence, and, therefore, Lyapunov had to rely only on commands. At the same time, a number of projects for the fortifications of Sakhalin were drawn up, but before the start of the war, none of them was implemented due to the protracted correspondence between the Amur Governor-General Linevich, the governor Alekseev and the Minister of War Kuropatkin.

Japan was preparing to capture the island of Sakhalin in the most serious way. The expeditionary force consisted of the newly formed 15th Infantry Division of General Haraguchi (12 infantry battalions, a cavalry squadron, 18 field guns and a machine gun squad - a total of 14 thousand people). The transport fleet, which consisted of 10 ships, was accompanied by the 3rd squadron of Admiral Kataoka. The proximity to Sakhalin of the Japanese island of Hokkaido made it possible to ensure the surprise of the landing operation.

Naturally, Sakhalin Island simply could not be well protected. Therefore, the headquarters of the Amur Military District decided to carry out the defense of the southern part of the island with the forces of partisan detachments. In the spring of 1905, a group of army officers arrived in Sakhalin from Manchuria and replaced prison officials in command positions. However, it was not possible to inspire the exiled settlers and exiles with patriotic feelings to protect the island as part of the Russian Fatherland - Sakhalin, which had become a prison for them, was hated by them.

In total, five partisan detachments were created, which were assigned areas of operation and allocated food supplies for 2-3 months. The 1st detachment of 415 people, 8 guns and 3 machine guns was commanded by Colonel Artsishchevsky. The main force of his detachment were 60 sailors, among whom were many gunners led by Lieutenant Maximov from the command of the Novik cruiser, which, after the battle with the Japanese cruiser, was flooded by the crew at the Korsakovsky post, they fought with amazing heroism, defending their native land, not despite the numerical superiority.

The 2nd detachment of staff captain Grotto-Slepikovsky consisted of 178 people and was armed with one machine gun. He was to operate in the area of ​​​​the village of Chepisan and Lake Tunaichi, the 3rd detachment under the command of Captain Polubotko consisted of 157 people and was based near the village of Sevastyanovka. The 4th detachment was commanded by staff captain Dairsky, it consisted of 184 people. He was to act in the valley of the Lutoga River. Captain Bykov was at the head of the 5th detachment, numbering 226 people. The area of ​​​​his actions was the valley of the Naiba River. Warehouses with food of all partisan detachments were hidden in the taiga.

The Japanese launched a landing operation on Sakhalin in 1905. A squadron of 53 ships, including 12 transports, approached the southern part of the island from Hakodate. On board was the infantry division of General Haraguchi. In the morning, the landing began to land on the shore of Aniva Bay near the village of Mereya under the cover of artillery fire from ships.

To make it possible to burn the warehouses of the Korsakov post, the battery of Lieutenant Maksimov took up a position near the village of Paroantomari. When 4 Japanese destroyers appeared from behind Cape Endum, gunners from the Novik cruiser opened fire on them from their four guns. The Japanese responded with rapid fire and disappeared behind the cape. After 15 minutes, 7 destroyers came out from behind the cape, which concentrated their fire on the Russian battery. One of the enemy ships was damaged and stopped firing.

After that, Lieutenant Maksimov's battery fired at the place of the Japanese landing. Soon one 120 mm gun failed, and the other three 47 mm guns began to run out of shells. Having shot the ammunition, the battery commander ordered the guns to be blown up and joined the partisan detachment of Colonel Artsishchevsky at the Solovyovskaya position.

The partisan detachment of Colonel Artsishchevsky had to retreat from the sea coast and retreat to the village of Khomutovka, and then to the village of Dalnee. Three kilometers to the north, his detachment dug in. Before that, the retreating partisans withstood the battle with the Japanese infantry, which began to pursue them. A new battle took place near Dalniy, in which the enemy field battery turned out to be decisive. When the Japanese infantry, up to two regiments strong, began to cover the flanks of the detachment, Artsishchevsky took him to the mountains. The loss of the Japanese since the beginning of the landing amounted to about 70 people.

After that, the 1st partisan detachment took refuge in the taiga and fought several battles with the Japanese, who tried to surround the detachment and defeat it. During the clashes, the partisans suffered heavy losses, and after negotiations with the enemy command, its remnants - 135 people laid down their arms. A group of partisans of 22 fighters under the command of Captain Sterligov managed to cross from Sakhalin to the mainland.

The first battle was also fought by the 2nd partisan detachment of staff captain Grotto-Slepikovsky, who retreated to one of his taiga warehouses. The attack of the Japanese detachment of 400 people was successfully repulsed, but the partisans lost 24 people during the skirmish. After that, the enemy infantry, under the cover of artillery fire, began to surround the detachment from three sides. Its commander was killed by a shell fragment. Gorevsky, who took over command, ensign Gorevsky was forced to stop resisting. The Japanese buried the Russian officer with military honors, paying tribute to his courage and heroism. The 2nd partisan detachment held out for 38 days.

The 3rd partisan detachment of Polubotko during the "debate" to fight or not to fight was surrounded by the Japanese and, together with the commander, was captured. But part of the combatants (49 people) took refuge in the taiga and subsequently joined the detachment of Captain Bykov.

The 4th detachment of staff captain Dairsky, after long wanderings along the taiga roads, was surrounded by the Japanese and, after a shootout with them, laid down their arms. There is evidence that the commander and combatants of his detachment after the surrender were killed by the Japanese with bayonets.

The 5th partisan detachment of Captain Bykov, after joining the vigilantes from the Polubotko detachment, ambushed the Japanese near the village of Romanovskoye and forced them to retreat. The Japanese sent Bykov two letters with a proposal to surrender with the detachment, but received a decisive refusal, this is where the real patriotism of ordinary Russian soldiers lies. After that, the enemy did not disturb the partisans of the 5th detachment.

Then Captain Bykov decided to make his way to the north of Sakhalin. On the way to the mouth of the Otosan River, a small detachment of Japanese was destroyed. Soon he received news that Lieutenant General Lyapunov, who was in charge of the defense of the Alexander Post, had surrendered with his detachment, and the company sent to help Bykov had also surrendered to the Japanese. Going first through the taiga, then along the seashore, the partisans reached the village of Tikhmenevo, from where they went along the Sakhalin coast in kungas. In the 20th of August, the partisans, who lost 54 people during the campaign, were transported to the port city of Nikolaevsk-on-Amur.

In the north of Sakhalin, the defense was held by more significant forces, consolidated into 4 detachments. Near the coastal village of Arkovo, a detachment under the command of Colonel Boldyrev held the defense with a force of 1320 people with 4 guns. The Alexander detachment (2413 people, 4 guns, 6 machine guns) was commanded by Colonel Tarasenko. The Duya detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Domnitsky numbered 1120 people. The reserve detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Danilov consisted of 150 people. Lieutenant General Lyapunov, who commanded the defense of the northern part of the island, had 5176 people in four detachments.

The Japanese appeared in the waters of northern Sakhalin. Detachments of their destroyers fired at the Arkov Valley, the posts of Due and De-Kast-ri. The next day, a squadron of 70 ships approached the coast, including two cruisers - Nissin and Kasagi, 30 destroyers, several gunboats, 30 transports. The enemy squadron deployed on a wide front from the village of Mgachi to the post of Aleksandrovsky and, under the cover of artillery fire, began to land troops north of the Arkovskaya valley. However, here the Japanese were met with rifle fire and gave a decisive rebuff.

The Arkov detachment with losses had to move away from the coastline. The Alexander detachment was driven back by the Japanese infantry to the Zhonkierov Heights. Lieutenant-General Lyapunov was in charge of the battle. The Alexander detachment began to retreat to the Pilenga pass, where the Duya detachment also approached. Near the village of Mikhailovka, the Russians were blocked by an infantry battalion and an enemy cavalry detachment. Through this barrier, the retreating managed to break through only with the help of machine-gun fire.

Large forces of the Japanese infantry launched an offensive from the village of Derbinskoye to the village of Rykovskoye in order to prevent the connection of the Aleksandrovsky detachment with the Arkovsky colonel Boldyrev. The next day, the Russians attacked the village of Rykovskoye from two sides and drove out the Japanese cavalrymen from there, recapturing 96 prisoners from the Tymovsky detachment, captured by them the day before, without leaving their comrades in trouble.

Two Russian detachments, united, began to retreat to the village of Paleevo. Along the way, there were several skirmishes with Japanese patrols. At the Sergievsky bench, the detachment settled down for the night, and the Japanese were able to quietly get close to the location of the Russians through the forest. At about one in the morning, the sleeping detachment was fired upon from the forest and lost about 60 people killed. In the ensuing panic, about 500 combatants fled.

The next day, at 10 o'clock in the morning, the Japanese repeated the attack, opening frequent rifle fire at the village of Onora. Panic began again, but thanks to the efforts of the officers, it quickly subsided and the Japanese had to retreat. In the evening, a local prison guard arrived at the location of the Russian detachment from the village of Rykovsky, seeing no other choice but to surrender with the most reluctant desire, with the proposal of the commander of the Japanese troops on the island of Karafuto, General Haraguchi, to lay down his arms, he agreed.

After a military council, Lieutenant General Lyapunov decided to surrender to the enemy. In making this decision, he referred to the lack of food. In total, 64 officers, lower ranks and combatants, 3819 people, surrendered to combatant servicemen. The Japanese got 2 field guns, 5 machine guns and 281 horses as trophies.

After these events, several disparate groups of combatants from among the exiles who roamed the Sakhalin taiga surrendered to the Japanese. Several of these "parties" decided to avoid captivity and managed to cross from the island to the mainland: these were the detachments of the acting military prosecutor on Sakhalin, Colonel Novoselsky, the commander of the 2nd squad, Captain Filimonov, and artillery staff captain Blagoveshchensky.

Conclusion: In the course of the analysis of this work, we were able to identify the reason for the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, many factors served as a defeat, such as: lack of military resources against the Japanese, low morale of the troops, lack of training, unpreparedness of Russia for this war, as well as internal unrest in the country and strife, which led to the end of the war, with the undermining of Russia's influence in the Far East, due to these factors, the war was lost by the signing of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, which, in our opinion, affects the situation and claims of Japan and the United States at the moment , in relation to Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands.

Bibliography:

1. History of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. G.

2. Essays on the diplomatic history of the Russian-Japanese war.

3. History of the USSR from ancient times to the present day.

4. Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 G.

5. International relations in the Far East. On the history of foreign policy in the Far East in the 19th century, in the journal Questions of History, 1974.

6. Lenin complete collection of works.

1.http://www. uhlib. ru/military_istorija/neizvestnye_stranicy_russko_japonskoi_voiny_1904_1905_gg/p21.php

2. http://sakhalin-war. /2325.html

3. http://www. diary. en/~Samuray-08/p160814861.htm? oam

It was pointless to continue fighting alone. Bykov decided to withdraw the surviving warriors from the island. The guerrillas, with great difficulty, fought their way to the village of Tikhmenevo. Here they destroyed the Japanese division and broke through to the coast. Frightened Japanese fishermen fled in all directions, leaving nine kungas. From here, on the kungas, the detachment went along the coast. The partisans hoped to go around the island from the north and moor to the mainland, but the storm forced them to land back on the coast of Sakhalin in the area of ​​the Nyisky Bay. In the area of ​​​​Cape Perish, the detachment was noticed by a Russian destroyer on duty in the strait. With her help, they managed to cross to the other side. In the 20th of August, the partisans, having lost 54 people in battles and hardships, reached the port of Nikolaevsk-on-Amur. Bykov's detachment is the only one of the five that was not destroyed by the Japanese and did not surrender to the enemy. In the partisan detachments, people of different nationalities, religions and classes fought shoulder to shoulder. The commander of the second detachment, Bronislav Vladislavovich Grotto-Slepikovsky, is a Pole. Nobleman, Catholic. Born in the Pskov province. He graduated from the Vologda real school and the Vilna infantry cadet school. The commander of the fourth detachment, Ilyas-Devlet Dairsky, is a Crimean Tatar, born Mirza (nobleman), Mohammedan. Graduated from the Odessa Infantry Junker School. Crossed out from the list of those awarded (all the awards were received mainly by the surrendered administration), Vasily Petrovich Bykov was awarded two orders posthumously. Under the command of officers, mostly convicts, exiled settlers and even their wives, who came to Sakhalin to their husbands, fought. There were few military people in the detachments, including sailors from the crew of the heroic cruiser Novik. These selfless people fought on an island whose governor had already capitulated. The names of most of the Heroes are unknown. Someone probably snorted indifferently: what do I care about Sakhalin, and the people there died completely in vain. However, at all times, the Defenders of the Fatherland, giving their lives in battle, reasoned differently. They did not want to cede to the enemy a single inch of their native land - be it Sakhalin, the Urals or the Moscow region. Because this land is Russian. Unfortunately, not even all Sakhalin residents know about the feat of the partisans. And yet the feat of 1905 is not forgotten. The Pathfinder Historical Club of Pokrovskaya Secondary School investigated the place where Dairsky's detachment died. At the initiative of the head of the club, a memorial was opened here. The monument to the commander himself was brought to Sakhalin by his fellow Crimeans and helped to put it in place. The creator of the monument is the architect Ilmi Ametov. The Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk local public organization "Youth Search Association" Frantirer "regularly explores the places of past battles using natural science methods. Volunteers of the MPO "Frantirer" reburied the remains of the second detachment, commanded by Grotto-Slepikovsky, on the shore of Lake Tunaycha. A memorial complex was erected at this place The graves are monitored by the Korsakov Sea Commercial Port, and local residents come here and also take care of the monument.