100 years ago, on January 7, 1918, the Volunteer Army was created in Novocherkassk to fight the Bolsheviks. Trouble in Russia was gaining momentum. Reds, whites, nationalists formed their troops, with might and main they were in charge of various gangs. The West was preparing for the dismemberment of the murdered Russian Empire.

The army received the official name of the Volunteer. This decision was made at the suggestion of General Lavr Kornilov, who became its first commander in chief. Political and financial leadership was entrusted to General Mikhail Alekseev. The army headquarters was headed by General Alexander Lukomsky. The official appeal of the headquarters, published two days later, stated: “The first immediate goal of the Volunteer Army is to resist an armed attack on the south and southeast of Russia. Hand in hand with the valiant Cossacks, at the first call of his Circle, his government and the military ataman, in alliance with the regions and peoples of Russia who rebelled against the German-Bolshevik yoke - all Russian people gathered in the south from all over our Motherland will defend to the last drop of blood, the independence of the regions that gave them shelter and are the last stronghold of Russian independence. At the first stage, about 3 thousand people signed up for the Volunteer Army, more than half of them were officers.

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In the conditions of the complete disintegration of the old army, General Mikhail Alekseev decided to try to form new units outside the composition of the former army on a voluntary basis. Alekseev was the largest military figure in Russia: during the Russo-Japanese War - Quartermaster General of the 3rd Manchurian Army; during the First World War - chief of staff of the armies of the Southwestern Front, commander in chief of the armies of the Northwestern Front, chief of staff of the Supreme Commander. During the February Revolution of 1917, he advocated the abdication of Nicholas II from the throne and by his actions largely contributed to the fall of the autocracy. That is, he was a prominent February revolutionary, and was responsible for the subsequent collapse of the army, the country and the beginning of unrest and civil war.

The right wing of the Februaryists-Westerners, having destroyed the "old Russia" - hoped to create a "new Russia"- the creation of a "democratic", bourgeois-liberal Russia with the dominance of the class of owners, capitalists, the bourgeoisie and large landowners - that is, development according to the Western matrix. They wanted to make Russia a part of an "enlightened Europe", similar to Holland, France or England. However, hopes for this quickly collapsed. The Februaryists themselves opened Pandora's box, destroying all the bonds (the autocracy, the army, the police, the old legislative, judicial and punitive system) that held back the contradictions and faults that had been building up in Russia for a long time. Events begin to develop according to a poorly predictable scenario of spontaneous rebellion, Russian unrest, with the strengthening of radical left forces demanding a new development project and fundamental changes. Then the Februaryists relied on a "firm hand" - a military dictatorship. However, the rebellion of General Kornilov failed. And the Kerensky regime finally buried all hopes for stabilization, in fact, doing everything so that the Bolsheviks simply took power, almost without resistance. However, the class of owners, the bourgeoisie, the capitalists, their political parties - the Cadets, the Octobrists, were not going to give up. They are began to create their own armed forces in order to return power by force and "calm down" Russia. At the same time, they hoped for the help of the Entente - France, England, the USA, Japan, etc.

Part of the generals, who had previously strongly opposed the regime of Nicholas II and the autocracy (Alekseev, Kornilov, Kolchak, etc.), and hoped to take leading positions in the "new Russia", was used to create the so-called. The White Army, which was supposed to return power to the former "masters of life." As a result, whites, separatist nationalists and interventionists ignited a terrible civil war in Russia that claimed millions of lives. Owners, the bourgeoisie, capitalists, landowners, their political superstructure - liberal-democratic, bourgeois parties and movements (only a few percent, together with the entourage and servants of the population of Russia) became "white". It is clear that the well-groomed rich, industrialists, bankers, lawyers and politicians themselves did not know how to fight and did not want to. They wanted to return "old Russia", without a tsar, but with their power - a rich and contented caste ("crunch of French rolls") over the poor and illiterate masses of the people. Professional military officers signed up to fight - officers who, after the collapse of the old army, wandered around the cities in masses doing nothing, Cossacks, simple-minded young men - cadets, cadets, students. After the expansion of the scale of the war, the forcible mobilization of former soldiers, workers, townspeople, and peasants has already begun.

There were also high hopes that "the West would help." And the masters of the West really "helped" - to kindle a terrible and bloody civil war in which Russians killed Russians. They actively threw “firewood” into the fire of a fratricidal war - made promises to the leaders of the white armies and governments, supplied ammunition and ammunition, provided advisers, etc. They themselves had already divided the skin of the “Russian bear” into spheres of influence and colonies and soon began to divide Russia, simultaneously carrying out its total plunder.

On December 10 (23), 1917, Georges Clemenceau, Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of War of France, and Robert Cecil, Deputy Foreign Minister of Great Britain, at a meeting in Paris, concluded a secret agreement on the division of Russia into spheres of influence. London and Paris agreed that from now on they would consider Russia not as an ally in the Entente, but as a territory for the implementation of their expansionist plans. The areas of alleged military operations were named. The English sphere of influence included the Caucasus, the Cossack regions of the Don and Kuban, and the French - Ukraine, Bessarabia and Crimea. Representatives of the United States did not formally participate in the meeting, but they were kept informed of the negotiations, while in the administration of President Woodrow Wilson at the same time a plan was ripe for expansion to the Far East and Eastern Siberia.

The leaders of the West rejoiced - Russia was lost, the "Russian question" was resolved once and for all! The West has got rid of a thousand-year-old enemy that prevents it from establishing full control over the planet. True, our enemies will once again miscalculate, Russia will survive and be able to recover. Russian communists will win and eventually create a new Russian empire - the USSR. They are implementing an alternative globalization project - the Soviet (Russian), again challenging the West and giving hope to humanity for a just world order.

Alekseevskaya organization

The right wing of the Western-Febralists (future Whites) and part of the generals decided to create a new army. It was supposed to create such an organization that, as an "organized military force ... could resist the impending anarchy and the German-Bolshevik invasion." Initially, they tried to create the core of such an organization in the capital. General Alekseev arrived in Petrograd on October 7, 1917 and began to prepare the creation of an organization in which it was supposed to unite officers of the spare parts, military schools and those who simply found themselves in the capital. At the right moment, the general planned to organize combat units from them.

According to V. V. Shulgin, who happened to be in Petrograd in October, he attended the meeting that took place at the apartment of Prince V. M. Volkonsky. In addition to the host and Shulgin, M. V. Rodzianko, P. B. Struve, D. N. Likhachev, N. N. Lvov, V. N. Kokovtsev, and V. M. Purishkevich were present. That is, prominent Februaryists who previously participated in the overthrow of Nicholas II and the destruction of the autocracy. The main issue in the business started rested on the complete lack of funds. Alekseev was “morally supported”, they sympathized with his cause, but they were in no hurry to share the money. By the time of the October Revolution, Alekseev's organization was supported by several thousand officers who either lived in Petrograd or ended up in the capital for one reason or another. But almost no one dared to give battle to the Bolsheviks in Petrograd.

Seeing that things were not going well in the capital and that the Bolsheviks could soon cover the organization, Alekseev on October 30 (November 12) ordered the transfer to the Don of “those who wanted to continue the fight”, supplying them with fake documents and money for travel. The general appealed to all officers and junkers with a call to stand up for the fight in Novocherkassk, where he arrived on November 2 (15), 1917. Alekseev (and the forces behind him) planned to create statehood and an army on part of the territory of Russia that would be able to resist Soviet power .

General of Infantry M. V. Alekseev

Alekseev went to the Ataman Palace to the hero of Brusilovsky, General A. M. Kaledin. In the summer of 1917, the Large military circle of the Don Cossack army, Alexei Kaledin, was elected Don military ataman. Kaledin became the first elected chieftain of the Don Cossacks after Peter I abolished the election in 1709. Kaledin was in conflict with the Provisional Government, as he opposed the collapse of the army. On September 1, Minister of War Verkhovsky even ordered the arrest of Kaledin, but the Military Government refused to comply with the order. On September 4, Kerensky canceled it on the condition that the Military Government would "guarantee" Kaledin.

The situation on the Don during this period was extremely difficult. The main cities were dominated by the “alien” population, alien to the indigenous Cossack population of the Don, both in terms of their composition, features of life, and political preferences. In Rostov and Taganrog, socialist parties, hostile to the Cossack authorities, dominated. The working population of the Taganrog district supported the Bolsheviks. In the northern part of the Taganrog district there were coal mines and mines of the southern ledge of Donbass. Rostov became the center of resistance to "Cossack dominance". At the same time, the left could count on the support of spare military units. The "out-of-town" peasantry was not satisfied with the concessions made to it (wide admission to the Cossacks, participation in stanitsa self-government, transfer of part of the landowners' lands), demanding a radical land reform. The Cossack front-line soldiers themselves were tired of the war and hated the "old regime". As a result, the Don regiments, which were returning from the front, did not want to go to a new war and defend the Don region from the Bolsheviks. The Cossacks went home. Many regiments handed over their weapons without resistance at the request of small red detachments, which stood as barriers on the railway lines leading to the Don region. Masses of ordinary Cossacks supported the first decrees of the Soviet government. Among the Cossacks-front-line soldiers, the idea of ​​\u200b\u200b"neutrality" in relation to the Soviet government was widely adopted. In turn, the Bolsheviks sought to win the "labor Cossacks" over to their side.

Kaledin called the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks criminal and declared that until the restoration of legitimate power in Russia, the military government assumes full power in the Don region. Kaledin from Novocherkassk introduced martial law in the coal-mining region of the region, deployed troops in a number of places, began the defeat of the Soviets and established contacts with the Cossacks of Orenburg, Kuban, Astrakhan and Terek. On October 27 (November 9), 1917, Kaledin declared martial law throughout the Region and invited members of the Provisional Government and the Provisional Council of the Russian Republic to Novocherkassk to organize the fight against the Bolsheviks. On October 31 (November 13), the delegates of the Don, who were returning from the Second Congress of Soviets, were arrested. During the following month, the Soviets in the cities of the Don region were liquidated.

Thus, Kaledin opposed the Soviet regime. The Don region became one of the centers of resistance. However, Kaledin, in conditions when the masses of ordinary Cossacks did not want to fight, wanted peace, and at first sympathized with the ideas of the Bolsheviks, could not decisively oppose the Soviet government. Therefore, he warmly received Alekseev as an old comrade-in-arms, but refused the request to “give shelter to the Russian officers”, that is, to take the future anti-Bolshevik army for the maintenance of the Don military government. He even asked Alekseev to remain incognito, “not to stay in Novocherkassk for more than a week” and to transfer the Alekseev formation outside the Don region.

Troop Ataman of the Don Cossack Region, Cavalry General Aleksey Maksimovich Kaledin

Despite such a cold reception, Alekseev immediately began to take practical steps. Already on November 2 (15), he published an appeal to the officers, urging them to "save the Motherland." On November 4 (17), a whole party of 45 people arrived, headed by staff captain V. D. Parfenov. On this day, General Alekseev laid the foundation for the first military unit - the Consolidated Officer Company. Staff Captain Parfenov became the commander. On November 15 (28), it was deployed to an officer company of 150-200 people under the command of Staff Captain Nekrashevich.

Alekseev, using his old connections with the Stavka generals, contacted the Stavka in Mogilev. He gave M.K. Dieterikhs an order to send officers and loyal units to the Don under the guise of their redeployment for further staffing, with the issuance of money for the officers to travel. He also asked to remove the decomposed "Sovietized" military units from the Don region by disbanding or sending them to the front without weapons. The question was raised about negotiations with the Czechoslovak corps, which, according to Alekseev, should have willingly joined the struggle for the "salvation of Russia." In addition, he asked to send shipments of weapons and uniforms to the Don under the guise of creating army stores here, to give orders to the main artillery department to send up to 30 thousand rifles to the Novocherkassk artillery depot, and in general to use every opportunity to transfer military equipment to the Don. However, the imminent fall of the Stavka and the general collapse of the railway transport prevented all these plans. As a result, weapons, ammunition and ammunition were bad at the beginning.

When the organization already had 600 volunteers, there were about a hundred rifles for everyone, and there were no machine guns at all. The military depots on the territory of the Don Army were full of weapons, but the Don authorities refused to issue them to volunteers, fearing the wrath of the front-line Cossacks. Weapons had to be obtained both by cunning and by force. Thus, on the outskirts of Novocherkassk, Khotunok, the 272nd and 373rd reserve regiments were quartered, which had already completely decomposed and were hostile to the Don authorities. Alekseev suggested using the forces of volunteers to disarm them. On the night of November 22, volunteers surrounded the regiments and disarmed them without firing a shot. The selected weapons went to volunteers. Artillery was also mined, as it turned out - one cannon was "borrowed" in the Donskoy reserve artillery division for the solemn funeral of one of the dead junker volunteers, and they "forgot" to return it after the funeral. Two more guns were taken away: completely decomposed units of the 39th Infantry Division arrived in the neighboring Stavropol province from the Caucasian front. Volunteers became aware that an artillery battery was located near the village of Lezhanka. It was decided to capture her guns. Under the command of naval officer E. N. Gerasimov, a detachment of 25 officers and cadets set off for Lezhanka. During the night, the detachment disarmed the sentries and stole two guns and four ammunition boxes. Four more guns and a supply of shells were bought for 5 thousand rubles from Don artillery units that returned from the front. All this shows the highest degree of decomposition of the then Russia, weapons, up to machine guns and guns, can be obtained or “acquired” in one way or another.

By November 15 (28), the Junker company was formed, which included cadets, cadets and students under the command of staff captain V. D. Parfenov. The 1st platoon consisted of cadets from infantry schools (mainly Pavlovsky), the 2nd from artillery, the 3rd from naval schools, and the 4th from cadets and students. By mid-November, the entire senior year of the Konstantinovsky Artillery School and several dozen cadets of Mikhailovsky, led by staff captain N. A. Shokoli, were able to get through from Petrograd in small groups. On November 19, after the arrival of the first 100 cadets, the 2nd platoon of the Junker company was deployed into a separate unit - the Consolidated Mikhailovsko-Konstantinovskaya battery (which served as the core of the future Markov battery and artillery brigade). The Junker Company itself turned into a battalion (two Junker and "Cadet" companies).

Thus, in the second half of November, the Alekseevskaya organization consisted of three formations: 1) a consolidated officer company (up to 200 people); 2) Junker battalion (over 150 people); 3) Consolidated Mikhailovsko-Konstantinovskaya battery (up to 250 people) under the command of Captain N. A. Shokoli). The Georgievsky company (50-60 people) was in the formation stage, and there was an entry into the student squad. The officers made up a third of the organization and 50% of the cadets (that is, the same element). Cadets, students of secular and religious schools made up 10%.

In November, Kaledin nevertheless decided to give the officers arriving to Alekseev a roof over their heads: in one of the infirmaries of the Don branch of the All-Russian Union of Cities, under the fictitious pretext that a "weak team, recovering, requiring care" would be placed here, volunteers were placed. As a result, a small infirmary No. 2 in house No. 36 on the outskirts of Barochnaya Street, which was a disguised hostel, became the cradle of the future Volunteer Army. Immediately after finding shelter, Alekseev sent conditional telegrams to loyal officers, meaning that the formation on the Don had begun and it was necessary to start sending volunteers here without delay. On November 15 (28), volunteer officers arrived from Mogilev, sent by the Headquarters. In the last days of November, the number of generals, officers, cadets and cadets who entered the Alekseevsky organization exceeded 500 people, and the "infirmary" on Barochnaya Street was overcrowded. Volunteers again, with the approval of Kaledin, was rescued by the Union of Cities by transferring Alekseev infirmary No. 23 on Grushevskaya Street. On December 6 (19), General L. G. Kornilov also reached Novocherkassk.

The big problem was the collection of funds for the core of the future army. One of the sources was the personal contribution of the participants in the movement. In particular, the first contribution to the "army cash desk" was 10 thousand rubles, brought by Alekseev with him from Petrograd. Kaledin allocated personal funds. Alekseev counted on the financial assistance of Moscow industrialists and bankers, who promised him support at one time, but they were very reluctant to respond to the requests of the general's couriers, and for all the time 360 ​​thousand rubles were received from Moscow. By agreement with the Don government, in December, a subscription was held in Rostov and Novocherkassk, the funds from which were supposed to be divided equally between the Don and Volunteer armies (DA). About 8.5 million rubles were collected, but, contrary to the agreements, 2 million were transferred to YES. Some volunteers were quite wealthy people. Under their personal guarantees, loans totaling 350 thousand rubles were received in the Rostov branch of the Russian-Asian Bank. An informal agreement was concluded with the bank's management that the debt would not be collected, and the loan would be counted as a gratuitous donation to the army (the bankers would later try to return the money). Alekseev hoped for the support of the Entente countries. But during this period, they still had doubts. Only at the beginning of 1918, after the truce concluded by the Bolsheviks on the Eastern Front, 305 thousand rubles were received from the military representative of France in Kyiv in three steps. In December, the Don government decided to leave 25% of the state fees collected in the region for the needs of the region. Half of the money collected in this way, about 12 million rubles, was placed at the disposal of the newly created DA.

The Volunteer Army is an operational-strategic association of the White Guard troops in southern Russia in 1917-1920 during the Civil War. It began to form on November 2 (15), 1917 in Novocherkassk of the General Staff by Infantry General M. V. Alekseev under the name "Alekseevskaya Organization"

From the beginning of December, Infantry General L. G. Kornilov, who arrived at the Don of the General Staff, joined in the creation of the army. At first, the Volunteer Army was recruited exclusively by volunteers (officers prevailed, there were also cadets, students, etc.), from the end of 1918 and in 1919 - through the mobilization of peasants (officers lose their numerical predominance), in 1920 recruitment was carried out at the expense of mobilized, as well as captured Red Army soldiers, who together make up the bulk of the military units of the army.

December 25, 1917 (January 7, 1918) received the official name "Volunteer Army". General of the Infantry Alekseev became its supreme leader, General of the Infantry Kornilov became the commander-in-chief of the General Staff, General A. S. Lukomsky became the chief of staff, and Lieutenant General A. I. Denikin became the chief of the 1st division of the General Staff. If Generals Alekseev, Kornilov and Denikin were the organizers and ideological inspirers of the young army, then the person remembered by the pioneers as a commander capable of leading the first volunteers directly on the battlefield was the “sword of General Kornilov” of the General Staff, Lieutenant General S. L Markov, who first served as chief of staff of the Commander-in-Chief, then chief of staff of the 1st division and commander of the 1st Officer Regiment, formed by him and received his personal patronage after Markov's death.

The leadership of the army initially focused on Russia's allies in the Entente.

Immediately after the creation of the Volunteer Army, numbering about 4 thousand people, entered into hostilities against the Red Army. In early January 1918, she acted on the Don together with units under the command of General A. M. Kaledin. At the end of February 1918, under the onslaught of the Red troops, the Dobrarmia units left Rostov and moved to the Kuban - the “First Kuban Ice Campaign” began. In the village of Shenzhiy, on March 26, 1918, a 3,000-strong detachment of the Kuban Rada under the command of General V. L. Pokrovsky joined the Volunteer Army. The total strength of the Volunteer Army increased to 6,000 soldiers.

By September 1918, the strength of the Volunteer Army had increased to 30-35 thousand, mainly due to the influx of Kuban Cossacks and opponents of Bolshevism who had fled to the North Caucasus.

Commanders of the Volunteer Army

• General Staff General of Infantry L. G. Kornilov (December 1917 - March 31 (April 13), 1918)
• General Staff Lieutenant General A. I. Denikin (April 1918 - January 1919)
• Lieutenant General Baron P. N. Wrangel (January - May 1919, December 1919 - January 1920)
• Lieutenant General V.Z. Mai-Maevsky (May - November 1919).

One of the largest military formations of the white movement in southern Russia. After the October Revolution of 1917, General M. Alekseev on November 2, 1917

arrived in the Don, controlled by the troops of A. Kaledin, to organize with his supporters ("Alekseevskaya organization") an armed struggle against the Soviet regime. On December 2, 1917, the Kaledinians and Alekseyevites took Rostov. On December 6, General L. Kornilov also arrived on the Don. The Volunteer Army was proclaimed on December 25, 1917. Alekseev became the supreme leader of the army, Kornilov became the commander, and A.

Lukomsky. The 1st combined officer regiment of the army was commanded by General S. Markov. The goals of the army at this stage were set out in the declaration of December 27, 1917 and the January (1918) program of the commander L. Kornilov (which, however, was not published due to fears of other leaders that the specification of the requirements of the white movement could lead to his split). After the victory over the Bolsheviks, it was supposed to convene a Constituent Assembly, which was supposed to determine the form of government and resolve the land issue.

At the end of January 1918, the resistance of the Kaledints and the Volunteer Army was broken by the Reds.

On February 23-25, 1918, the Reds occupied Novocherkassk and Rostov. A volunteer army of about 4,000 fighters (more than half - officers, cadets and cadets) retreated into the steppe. The Volunteer Army could not start a large-scale civil war due to the weakness of its social base. Despite the accession to it of the forces of the Kuban Rada, which doubled the size of the White army, until May 1918.

the army operated in a limited area, retreating under the onslaught of the Reds to the Kuban. A small army of whites walked across snow-covered fields, wade across rivers with icy water.

Many died not in battles, but from cold and disease.

Are you sure you're human?

The most difficult conditions of the campaign in terms of weather were in March (“Ice Campaign”). After the death of General L. Kornilov on April 13, 1918 during the assault on Yekaterinodar in 1918,

the demoralized white army was forced to retreat. The volunteer army was headed by A. Denikin. She managed to recover from defeat. In May 1918, the German occupiers allowed a detachment of M. Drozdovsky to join the Volunteer Army. On June 23, the Volunteer Army, with the assistance of the Don Army of P. Krasnov, launched an offensive in the Kuban. In August, mobilization into the army began, which already in September brought its number to more than 30 thousand soldiers, but began to change its composition, reducing the proportion of officers.

On August 17, 1918, the Whites occupied Ekaterinodar, defeated the 11th Red Army, and by the end of the year established control over the flat part of the North Caucasus.

On December 27, 1918, officers of the 8th Corps of Hetman P. Skoropadsky's army, led by General I. Vasilchenko, declared themselves part of the Volunteer Army, went to the Crimea, where they entrenched themselves.

The Volunteer Army, the forces of the All-Great Don Army, the Kuban Rada and other anti-Bolshevik formations united into the Armed Forces of the South of Russia (VSYUR), headed by Denikin. The Volunteer Army was renamed the Caucasian Volunteer Army (commander P. Wrangel) and on May 22 was divided into the Caucasian and Volunteer Army (commander V.

May-Maevsky).

The VSYUR received the support of the Entente, the army was re-equipped, well-equipped and launched an offensive of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia in 1919 against Moscow, which ended in the defeat of the Whites. The remnants of the Volunteer Army withdrew to the Kuban, at the beginning of 1920 they were reduced to a corps under the command of A. Kutepov. On March 26-27, 1920, the corps was evacuated through Novorossiysk to the Crimea and became part of Wrangel's Russian Army.

Historical sources:

Archive of the Russian Revolution.

Denikin A.I. Essays on Russian Troubles: The Armed Forces of the South of Russia. Minsk, 2002;

Wrangel P.N. Memories. In 2 volumes. M., 1992;

Directives of the command of the fronts of the Red Army (1917-1922). In 4 volumes. M., 1971;

Kakurin N.E., Vatsetis I.I. Civil War 1918-1921 St. Petersburg, 2002;

Literature

• Volkov S.V.

  The tragedy of Russian officers. M., 2002

• Grebenkin I.N. Volunteers and the Volunteer Army: on the Don and in the Ice Campaign. Ryazan, 2005
• Kirmel N.S.

  White guard special services in the Civil War 1918-1922. M., 2008

• Trukan G.A. Anti-Bolshevik governments in Russia. M., 2000

Article posted by

Shubin Alexander Vladlenovich

Doctor of Historical Sciences, Head of the Center for the History of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus of the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Volunteer army of the White movement on the Don

On December 26, the armed forces of the Alekseevskaya organization were officially renamed the Volunteer Army. On December 25, 1917, by secret order, General L. G. Kornilov was appointed commander of the Volunteer Army. At Christmas, a secret order was announced for the entry of the gene. Kornilov in command of the army, which from that day became officially known as the Volunteer. In an appeal (published in the newspaper on December 27), her political program was made public for the first time.

The Alekseevskaya Organization ceased to exist and became the basis of the Volunteer Army.

The role of the Entente countries and the United States in the emergence and development of the Volunteer Army deserves a separate study, let's dwell on some of its points.

L. G. Kornilov

After October in Petrograd, Russia's allies in World War I expected that the Soviet government would support the military obligations of tsarist Russia and continue the war against Germany and its allies.

But their expectations were not met. The Soviet government, relying in its policy on the thesis "peace without annexations and indemnities", turned to the German command with proposals for peace.

Therefore, the allies could not recognize the new government in Russia due to its revolutionary origin and unwillingness to continue the war. The beginning of negotiations with the Germans intensified the anti-Soviet activity of the allies. They began to search for forces capable of continuing the war until victory. Initially, the main stake was placed on the Cossacks. But already in December 1917, the allies realized the futility of trying to raise the Cossacks to fight the Soviets and concentrated their activities in the center, subsidizing B.

V. Savinkov and at the same time studying the situation on the ground.

The Whites, on the other hand, pinned the most optimistic hopes on the allies. General Alekseev and P. N. Milyukov, who communicated a lot with each other at that time, the main calculations after the "disappointment" in the Cossacks were made to help the allies. M. V. Alekseev proposed to the governments of the Entente countries “to finance a program for organizing an army that, after the defeat of the Bolsheviks, would continue the fight against Kaiser Germany.

And they got that funding.

General M. V. Alekseev did not hide the fact that the Volunteer Army receives money from the allies. His financial income documents indicate that funds were received from the French military mission for the needs of the Volunteer Army. On January 2, 1918, 25 thousand rubles were received, on January 3 - 100 thousand rubles, on January 19 - 180 thousand rubles. According to one of the Bolshevik leaders, Don A.

A. Frenkel, the Volunteer Army received 30 million rubles from the Americans.

“Later, we definitely established from the documents that ended up with us in Novocherkassk and the interrogation of the successor of Kaledin Nazarov,” Frenkel confirmed. At the same time, the associate of A.

I. Denikin, General B. I. Kazanovich argued that "only half a million was received from the allies before the speech from Rostov." It is possible that the amounts mentioned were deliberately either exaggerated or underestimated, depending on who announced them and for what purpose. This was done, most likely, for propaganda purposes in order to show the degree of dependence or, conversely, the degree of independence from the allies.

As a result of disagreements between the Volunteer Army and the Don, the army had to leave Novocherkassk, which was hostile to it.

At that time, there were no more than 4,000 people in it. The army headquarters was located in the fashionable palace of the Rostov industrialist N. E. Paramonov, and all reports and encrypted telegrams from the places of deployment of volunteer units were sent there.

According to V. Pronin, at the end of December 1917 - the beginning of January 1918, volunteers were formed: an officer battalion, a cavalry division, an engineering company and other units.

The Caucasian consolidated division consisted mainly of Kuban, Terek and Don Cossacks.

According to the memoirs of General Lukomsky, the organization of the army by that time was as follows: “By the end of December (beginning of January), the Kornilov regiment was replenished, which was transferred to the Don from the southwestern front by the regiment commander, captain Nezhentsev.

An officer, cadet and St. George battalions, four artillery batteries, an engineering company, an officer squadron and a company of guards officers were formed.

In mid-January, a small (only about five thousand people), but morally very strong Volunteer Army, turned out.

On February 22, 1918, units of the Red Army reached Rostov. The main forces of the Volunteer Army concentrated in the Lazaretny town. The headquarters of L. G. Kornilov was also transferred there. Since the promised help from Ataman A. M. Nazarov did not follow, it was decided to leave the city.

Rostov was occupied by the Red Army detachment of R. F. Sievers after a battle with volunteers on its outskirts only on February 23.

The next day, stopping at the village of Olginskaya, General Kornilov carried out the reorganization of the Volunteer Army, by reducing many small units into larger units. The composition of the army at that time was as follows:

- Officer regiment, under the command of General S. L. Markov

- from three officer battalions, the Caucasian division and a marine company;

- Junker battalion, under the command of General A.

A. Borovsky - from the former cadet battalion and the Rostov regiment;

- Kornilov shock regiment, under the command of Colonel Nezhentsev. The regiment included units of the former St. George Regiment and the partisan detachment of Colonel Simanovsky;

- Partisan regiment, under the command of General A.P. Bogaevsky - from foot soldiers of partisan detachments;

- Artillery battalion, under the command of Colonel Ikishev - out of four batteries, two guns each.

Commanders: Mionchinsky, Schmidt, Erogin, Tretyakov;

- Czechoslovak engineering battalion, under the "management" of civilian engineer Kral and under the command of Captain Nemetchik;

- Horse detachments: a) Colonel P.V. Glazenap - from the Don partisan detachments; b) Colonel Gerschelman - regular; c) Colonel Kornilov - from the former units of Colonel V.

M. Chernetsova.

The Don partisan detachments of Krasnyansky, Bokov, Lazarev and other partisans joined the army in the village of Olginskaya.

The composition of the headquarters of the Volunteer Army remained practically unchanged: L. G. Kornilov - commander in chief; General A. I. Denikin - "assistant commander of the army", Kornilov's successor in case of his death; general m.

V. Alekseev - chief treasurer of the army and head of its external relations; Lieutenant General A.

Test No. 1 The formation of the White Guard volunteer army began

S. Lukomsky - chief of staff of the army.

According to estimates, the strength of the Volunteer Army on February 9, 1918 was about 3,700 people. “Including approximately 2350 officers. Of this number, 500 were career officers, including 36 generals and 242 staff officers (24 of them were General Staff officers). And 1848 - wartime officers (not counting the captains, who until 1918 belonged to the personnel): staff captains - 251, lieutenants - 394, second lieutenants - 535, and ensigns - 668 (including those promoted to this rank from junkers) " .

Almost with this composition, the Volunteer Army moved to the Kuban, having been defeated in the battles for Yekaterinodar, returned to the Don.

The most significant event for the army was its connection with the Kuban detachment in March 1918. On March 17, representatives of the Kuban arrived at the disposal of the Volunteer Army (village of Kaluzhskaya) for a meeting on the connection of the armies. They were: chieftain Colonel A.P. Filimonov, commander of the Kuban detachment Colonel V.L. Pokrovsky, chairman of the legislative council N.

S. Ryabovol, comrade (deputy - V.K.) of the Chairman of the Sultan-Shahim-Girey and Chairman of the Government of Kuban L.L. Bych. During difficult negotiations, the following minutes of the meeting were adopted: “1. In view of the arrival of the Volunteer Army in the Kuban region and the implementation of the same tasks that were assigned to the Kuban government detachment, in order to combine all forces and means, it is recognized as necessary to transfer the Kuban government detachment to the complete subordination of General Kornilov, who is given the right to reorganize the detachment, as it is deemed necessary ... ".

After the disbandment of several units and the connection with the Kuban detachment, the army included: 1st brigade (General S.

L. Markov) 2nd Brigade (General A.P. Bogaevsky) Cavalry Brigade (General I.G. Erdeli) Circassian Regiment. The total strength of the army increased to 6,000 fighters. This was the first significant event that united the efforts of the two White Guard principles in the common cause of the fight against the Bolsheviks, the first step towards the creation of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia.

In the future, the organizational and staff structure of the army was improved.

For example, on July 1, 1919, the Volunteer Army included the following types of troops: infantry, artillery, cavalry, armored trains, armored cars, tanks, air units, engineering units, separate telegraph units, spare parts, radio units. The army consisted of the following units, formations and associations:

- 1st Army Corps (Major General A.P. Kutepov),

- 2nd Army Corps (Lieutenant General M. N. Promtov),

- 3rd Cavalry Corps (Lieutenant General A.

G. Shkuro),

- 2nd Terek plastun brigade,

- Taganrog garrison,

- Rostov garrison.

The Volunteer Army did not have a permanent staff. Depending on the tasks assigned, the army was strengthened by units that came under operational subordination to it for the period of combat missions. Technical units, artillery, tanks, armored trains and aviation reinforced the strike force and were used centrally.

Such a structure of troops made it possible to effectively carry out the assigned tasks, this was one of the reasons for the military successes of the white movement in the initial period.

Thus, the Volunteer Army did not have a permanent staff structure, units and formations were attached for the duration of combat missions.

Later, with the supply of equipment and weapons by the allies, an increase in the size of the army, technical units, armored train artillery and aviation strengthened the strike force and were used centrally.

The role of officers was great. The volunteer officers fought with exceptional courage and stubbornness, which those of their opponents who had to face them directly in battle were forced to fully admit.

The White movement was largely based on officer self-sacrifice. This factor mainly explains the fact that for three years the small Volunteer Army was able to withstand the pressure of the Red troops many times superior in numbers and weapons and even win brilliant victories over them, until this superiority became absolutely overwhelming.

The tragedy of the White Struggle was that, taking on the main blow, the officer units also suffered the greatest losses, which were difficult to make up for with equivalent material. They needed to be preserved, but, on the other hand, they were necessary in battle, and this fatal contradiction could not be overcome until the end of the civil war.

In general, the history of the Volunteer Army in the South of Russia can be divided into several stages, each of which, as a rule, corresponded to an organizational one: 1) the origin and first battles in the Don and Kuban, 2) the 1st Kuban campaign, 3) the 2nd Kuban campaign, 4) autumn-winter battles of 1918 in the Stavropol province and the liberation of the North Caucasus, 5) battles in the Coal Basin in the winter-spring of 1919, from the attack on Moscow to the evacuation of Novorossiysk (summer 1919 - March 1920), 6) struggle in Crimea.

Both its total number and the proportion of officers in its composition at each of these stages. naturally differed.

VOLUNTEER ARMY, one of the first armed formations of the White movement during the Civil War of 1917-22 in Russia. It began to form in November 1917 in Novocherkassk from volunteers (officers, cadets, senior cadets, students, etc.) by General of Infantry M. V. Alekseev (originally called "Alekseevskaya Organization"). Created on December 25, 1917 (January 7, 1918), headed by the supreme leader Alekseev, commander - infantry general L. G. Kornilov, chief of staff - lieutenant general A. S. Lukomsky. At the beginning of 1918, the Volunteer Army (about 2 thousand people), together with the Cossacks of the cavalry general A. M. Kaledin, fought with the Soviet troops in the Novocherkassk region, at the end of January it was transferred to Rostov-on-Don.

After the defeat of Kaledin, the performances of 1917-1918 by the Volunteer Army (about 3.7 thousand people) on February 22, 1918, set out in the 1st Kuban (“Ice”) campaign (see Kuban campaigns of the Volunteer Army) to the Kuban, where its leaders expected to create a bridgehead for the fight with the Soviet government. At the beginning of the campaign in the village of Olginskaya, the Volunteer Army, which consisted of 25 separate units, was reduced to 3 infantry regiments [Consolidated Officer (1st Officer; commander - Lieutenant General S. L. Markov), Kornilov shock (Colonel M. O Nezhentsev), Partisan (Major General A.P. Bogaevsky)] and 2 battalions [Special Junker (Major General A.A. Borovsky) and Czechoslovak Engineering (Captain I.F. Nemchek)], artillery battalion (Colonel S M. Ikishev) and 3 cavalry detachments under the command of Colonels V. S. Gerschelman, P. V. Glazenap and Lieutenant Colonel A. A. Kornilov. At the end of March, a detachment of the Kuban Rada under the command of Major General V. L. Pokrovsky (about 3 thousand people) joined the Volunteer Army, but the bulk of the Kuban Cossacks did not support the "volunteers".

When trying to capture Yekaterinodar (now Krasnodar) on April 9-13, L. G. Kornilov was killed, Lieutenant General A. I. Denikin took command of the army, who led parts of the Volunteer Army to the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe villages of Mechetinskaya and Yegorlytskaya Regions of the Don Army. Having replenished with personnel (including a 2,000-strong detachment of Colonel M. G. Drozdovsky), weapons and ammunition from the Don military ataman P. N. Krasnov, at the end of June, the Volunteer Army (10-12 thousand people), the core of which was 4 nominal regiment (Kornilovsky, Alekseevsky, Markovsky and Drozdovsky; later deployed in divisions), began the so-called 2nd Kuban campaign. Replenished at the expense of the Kuban Cossacks to 30-35 thousand people (September 1918), by the end of 1918 it occupied almost the entire North Caucasus. To assert the power of the Volunteer Army in the occupied territory, a Special Conference was created under the supreme leader of the Volunteer Army as the highest legislative body and body of civil administration. From the end of 1918, it began to be partially completed through mobilizations. The Entente countries provided material and technical assistance to the Volunteer Army. In January 1919, the Volunteer Army became part of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia and was renamed the Caucasian Volunteer Army (from May 22 again the Volunteer Army). In Denikin's Moscow campaign of 1919, the Volunteer Army (commander - Lieutenant General V.Z. Mai-Maevsky; over 50 thousand bayonets and sabers) dealt the main blow in the Kursk-Oryol direction and, having occupied Oryol (October 13), created a threat to Tula and Moscow . However, during the counter-offensive of the Southern Front in 1919, selected units of the “volunteers” were destroyed in fierce battles. Replenishment from the mobilized significantly reduced the combat capability of the Volunteer Army, and during the offensive of the Southern and Southeastern Fronts of 1919-20, Soviet troops cut it into 2 parts: the southeastern group (about 10 thousand people) retreated beyond the Don and in January 1920 in the Rostov region -on-Don was reduced to the Volunteer Corps (commander - Lieutenant General A.P. Kutepov; 5 thousand people), and the southwestern group (over 30 thousand people) withdrew to Northern Tavria and the Southern Bug River. After the defeat of Denikin's troops in the North Caucasus, the Volunteer Corps was evacuated to the Crimea at the end of March 1920, where it became part of the "Russian Army".

Lit .: Lukomsky A.S. The origin of the volunteer army //From the first person. M. 1990; Don and the Volunteer Army. M., 1992; Kuban and the Volunteer Army. M., 1992; Guide to the funds of the White Army. M., 1998; Ippolitov G. M. On the rise of the "white cause" // Armageddon. M., 2003.

In the autumn of 1917, Russia was slipping into a nationwide crisis: a peasant war broke out, the Russian army was decomposing. At this time, at the top of the military command, concerned about the outcome of the war with Germany, the idea arose to create an army of volunteers in the deep rear, which would support the collapsed front. On October 30, 1917, General M.V. Alekseev, the former Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (Tsar Nicholas II himself), the recognized leader of the "right non-party" generals, left Petrograd for the Don to form armed forces to fight simultaneously with the Germans and the Bolsheviks. Leaving, Alekseev knew that the Cossacks themselves would not go to restore order in Russia, but they would defend their territory from the Bolsheviks and thereby provide a base for the formation of a new army on the Don. On November 2, 1917, M. V. Alekseev arrived in Novocherkassk, and this day was subsequently marked by members of the white movement as the birthday of the Volunteer Army.

A. M. Kaledin, in response to Alekseev’s call to “give shelter to Russian officers,” expressed “principled sympathy,” but, prompted by the left, democratic wing of his associates, he hinted that it would be better to choose Stavropol or Kamyshin as the center of the new “Alekseev organization”. Nevertheless, General Alekseev and his entourage remained in Novocherkassk, hiding behind the principle "no extradition from the Don."

The transfer of cadet schools from Kyiv and Odessa began to the Don. The policy of the Soviet Power increased the influx of officers. The order of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee of October 25, 1917, stated that officers who "directly and openly" de join the revolution should be immediately arrested "as enemies", after which many officers from Petrograd and Moscow, singly and in groups, went to the Don .

The arrivals settled down in Novocherkassk, in the infirmary No. 2 on the corner of Barochnaya and Platovsky prospect. During November it was possible to assemble a detachment of officers and a company of cadets, cadets and midshipmen who arrived from Petrograd and Moscow. The evacuated Konstantinovsky and Mikhailovsky Artillery Schools were brought together into one battery. In addition, the remnants of the St. George Regiment arrived under the command of Colonel Kiriyenko, who were consolidated into one St. George company.

When, at the end of November 1917, the performance of workers and Red Guards began in Rostov, supported by the landing of the Black Sea sailors, the Don ataman A. M. Kaledin could not oppose him with real forces: the Cossack and soldier regiments kept neutrality. The only combat-ready unit turned out to be the "Alekseevskaya organization" - a consolidated officer company (up to 200 people), a cadet battalion (over 150 people), a Mikhailovsko-Konstantinovskaya battery (up to 250 people) and a Georgievskaya company (up to 60 people). Colonel Prince Khovansky led these units and led the guards into battle. From November 26 to December 1, battles went on with varying success, until the Military Circle gathered and forced the Cossack units to suppress the performance in Rostov, which was done on December 2, 1917.

A new stage began when General L. G. Kornilov, very popular among the officers, arrived on the Don on December 6, 1917. The influx of volunteers has increased. General A. I. Denikin later wrote: "Everyone who really sympathized with the idea of ​​\u200b\u200bstruggle and was able to endure its hardships went to our peculiar Zaporizhzhya Sich." Nevertheless, the social composition of the "volunteers" had its own characteristics. In 1921, M. Latsis described him: “Junkers, officers of the old time, teachers, students and all young students - after all, this is all, in its vast majority, a petty-bourgeois element, and it was they who made up the combat formations of our opponents, and it was from it that consisted of White Guard regiments. Officers played a particularly important role among these elements.

Before the First World War, the Russian officer corps was all-class. There was no caste, but there was isolation. During the war, the officer corps grew about five times. By 1917, career officers occupied posts no lower than the commander of a regiment or battalion, all lower levels were occupied by wartime officers, the vast majority of whom were peasants. A number of contemporaries believed that the quality of officers had improved. “While renegades from the secondary school used to come here, the war sent to schools a lawyer, an engineer, an agronomist, a student, a public teacher, an official, and even a former “lower rank” with St. George distinctions. The war united them all into one family, and the revolution gave breadth and scope to noble skills and sweeping, youthful energy. The specifics of the profession contributed to the selection of people with a protective, patriotic orientation for officer posts. Part of the officer corps, as you know, went over to the side of the Bolsheviks, but among those who rushed to the Don, 80% were monarchists in their political views. In general, according to the definition of A. I. Denikin, an independent "military-social movement" has matured and formed.

Formation was still slow. Calling front-line officers to leave the ranks of the old army for the sake of the Volunteer Army meant opening the front to the Germans. We had to rely on the rear, on vacationers, on the recovered wounded.

Meanwhile, in December 1917, the Kornilov shock regiment headed by Colonel M. O. Nezhentsev arrived from Kyiv to the Don. The officers assembled in Novocherkassk were consolidated into the 1st Novocherkassk battalion. In Rostov, General Cherepov created the 2nd Rostov officer battalion from officers; here, Colonel Gerschelman formed a cavalry division.

Officially, the creation of the Volunteer Army and the opening of entry into it was announced on December 24, 1917. On December 25, L. G. Kornilov took command of the army.

Created its own artillery. It consisted of three batteries. One battery was "stolen" from the 39th Infantry Division at the Torgovaya station, 2 guns were taken from a warehouse in Novocherkassk to pay tribute to those who died in the battles for Rostov and lost, and one battery was bought from the Cossacks for 5 thousand rubles ".

On January 14, 1918, due to the "left" of the Don government, the center for the formation of the Volunteer Army was moved to Rostov. Here, the formation of the 3rd Rostov officer battalion and the Rostov volunteer regiment, which consisted mainly of Rostov students, was already underway. The regiment was commanded by General Borovsky. In addition, the "death division" of the Caucasian cavalry division of Colonel Shiryaev and the cavalry detachment of Colonel Glazenap arrived.

Having not completed the formation, the army (if it could be called that) immediately after crossing into Rostov got involved in battles, covering the city from the west from the revolutionary units sent to suppress the "Kaledinshchina". The battles showed that "in the majority, highly valiant commanders crept up ...", and the rank and file was distinguished by stamina and ruthlessness.

In January-February 1918, it became clear that the Cossacks did not support the "volunteers" and were neutral at best. Local anti-Bolshevik detachments - "partisans" - consisted of Novocherkassk students, realists, high school students, seminarians and cadets. There were few Cossacks in them.

After the suicide of General A. M. Kaledin, the anti-Bolshevik forces on the Don were practically surrounded. Not having a specific plan of where to go, the army command slipped out of the ring by maneuver and withdrew the army.

In the village of Olginskaya, it was decided to move to the Kuban, where volunteer detachments were also being formed. Volunteer army moved to the legendary 1st Kuban or "Ice" campaign.

The army was never able to deploy at least to the size of a full-blooded division. "The people's militia did not come out ...", wrote A. I. Denikin, complaining that "the panels and cafes of Rostov and Novocherkassk were full of young and healthy officers who did not enter the army." There were a little more than 3800 bayonets and sabers. Three officer battalions were brought into an officer regiment under the command of General S. M. Markov, the "Georgievites" were poured into the Kornilov regiment, the unformed Rostov regiment into the cadet battalion. The Don partisans who joined the army formed a partisan regiment under the command of General A.P. Bogaevsky.

Naturally, it was impossible to overthrow the Bolshevik regime with such forces, and the "volunteers" set themselves the task of holding back the pressure of Bolshevism, which was still unorganized, and thereby giving time "to strengthen a healthy public and people's self-consciousness." The insight that the "volunteers" hoped for - alas! - It didn't come...

Small in number, but orderly regiments went to the Zadonsk steppes. Ahead was a campaign, each battle in which was a bet on life or death. Ahead was a desperate and bloody Cossack uprising, which gave the "volunteers" massive support, ahead was a campaign against Moscow, and there was a retreat to the Black Sea. Novorossiysk, Crimea, Tavria, emigration ... Ahead was the "white legend" and that ordinary march, when the column of the Officers' Regiment fell under the rain, and then under the icy wind and suddenly appeared before the comrades-in-arms clad in ice armor, which dazzlingly shone under the rays unexpectedly peeping sun...

LITERATURE

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4. Civil war and military intervention in the USSR: Encyclopedia. - M., 1983. - S. 31
5. Denikin A.I. Essays on Russian Troubles. - T. 2. - S. 205.
6. The triumph of accursed days (dialogue in quotes) / Publ. E. Atyakina, I. Khurina // Youth. - 1990. - No. 10. - S. 3
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8. Isaev E. Junker (in memory of the dead) // Priazov. edge. - 1917. - 23 Nov.
9. Ioffe G. Z. White business: General Kornilov. - M.: Nauka, 1989. - S. 232
10. Denikin A.I. Essays on Russian Troubles. - T. 2. - S. 196
11. Denikin A.I. Essays on Russian Troubles. - T. 2. - S. 201
12. Denikin A.I. Essays on Russian Troubles. - T. 2. - S. 204