The streets of Moscow, despite the fine day, were strikingly sparsely populated, but in the 2nd building of the NPO, in its courtyards, corridors, there were many people.
Army commissar 1st rank Shchadenko, of medium height, stout, no longer young, with a puffy face, after listening to the performance, pointed to a chair at the desk:
Sit down. How was your trip?
Thanks to. Well, comrade army commissar of the first rank!
Do you know why you were invited?
The People's Commissariat sends you to a new job - to the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, Comrade Colonel.
The work is big and important. Today you will receive an order and report to Comrade Ponomarenko.
He smiled and it dawned on me:
Clearly, comrade army commissar of the first rank! Special forces will be formed by the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement!
Shchadenko's wide eyebrows took the form of triangles:
What special forces?
For mining and destruction of enemy communications!
We looked at each other: I, beaming with a smile, Shchadenko, wrinkling my forehead and as if seeing me for the first time. Then the deputy commissar shrugged his shoulders:
I do not understand. Ponomarenko does not form any special forces and is not going to form them. Someone misinformed you, Comrade Colonel. There is already enough work at the Central Headquarters. See for yourself!
Apparently, the deputy people's commissar said whatever he wanted, because he lowered his eyes, moved his notebook and pressed the button, calling for an assistant. I continued to stand without asking permission to leave. The doors behind me opened, the assistant to the deputy people's commissar came in, but I still couldn't find the right words. What he heard did not fit in his head. Is it about to create the special units for which we so advocated, our brigade will be transformed, and I myself, it turns out, will be removed from the case?
Comrade army commissar of the first rank "The brigade I command, has just been formed, began to operate behind enemy lines ... - I heard my own voice settled down.
Shchadenko raised his head. I read bewilderment in his tired, iris-fading eyes.
Well, let it work! Shchadenko said. - Now you have another job. What is still not clear?
I didn't give up the brigade, comrade army commissar of the first rank! Let me stay in it!
Only in very great distress can one speak in this way with a senior in position and rank. But I was in complete despair!
How is it to "stay"? What does "didn't give up" mean? - with pauses, Shchadenko asked distinctly.
My team is special. It has a lot of Spaniards. I sought ... - I confusedly explained the situation. Shchadenko grew gloomy.
You have to work where they put you! - He raised his voice, - Where they put, and not where we would like! The issue of your transfer has been resolved, we will not revise it.
And looked over my shoulder at the assistant:
Prepare an order for Comrade Starinov!
The doors creaked, the assistant got out. Shchadenko shaking his head:
He is entrusted with a big party cause, and he - "stay"! And as for the Spanish comrades, think about it: the need arises - come in.
Half an hour later I went down to the lobby, where Bolotin was waiting. Alexey Ivanovich immediately guessed: something unforeseen and distressing had happened. Upon learning the news, wilted:
And the brigade? What about the special forces?
What can I answer, Alexei Ivanovich? Apparently, there is some urgent work at the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement. I don't know anything else.
That day we said goodbye to Bolotin for a long time. Our connection has not been interrupted. They wrote to each other, shared thoughts and news that could be entrusted to the field mail, consulted on a variety of issues, but the joy of common work and everyday friendly communication disappeared. What can you do? Until the end of the war, our paths never converged.
I did not return to the 5th engineering brigade, I no longer had to deal with the organization of special forces to disrupt the rear of the enemy, but I have no right to cut off the story about the brigade, about its people, leaving the reader at a loss as to how events unfolded in the future, even in my absence.
To begin with, the idea of \u200b\u200bcreating special units to disrupt the rear of opponents was partially realized: on August 17, 1942, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense in the Red Army, Separate Guards battalions of miners were created, as well as a Separate Guards Brigade of miners at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command "for mining and destruction communications behind enemy lines.
On the Kalinin front, the 10th separate guards battalion of miners was formed. From the composition of the 5th engineering brigade, an insignificant part of the fighters and an officer got into the guards battalion, but the 160th and 166th battalions of the 5th brigade continued to operate behind enemy lines. They showed particular activity in the period from April to August 1943, when Colonel A. A. Vinsky was appointed chief of staff of the engineering troops of the front - the same Vinsky with whom our operational-engineering group departed from Kharkov in the fall of the forty-first year. At the end of May 1943, the front commander even came to the 160th battalion to talk with miners, drew the attention of the brigade command to the need to strain all forces to strike at enemy communications, demanded that operations be clearly planned, linking them with the operations of the 10th Separate Guards Battalion of miners . Colonel Vinsky agreed with the command of the air army attached to the front, organized the training of miners in parachute jumps, and in July 43, not separate groups, but companies of miners were airlifted behind enemy lines on the Kalinin Front. Bravely, boldly, and successfully operated behind enemy lines, privates, sergeants, foremen and officers brought up in the 5th engineering brigade acted successfully. Seven of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union: Guards Senior Lieutenant N. V. Kolosov, Senior Sergeant V. P. Goryachev, Sergeant D. M. Yablochkin, Junior Sergeant V. B. Efimov, Private I. K. Bazalev, F. I. Bezrukov and M. V. Myagky. Hundreds of miners were awarded combat awards and medals. Among them are my Spanish friends.
And what about the young lieutenants Goncharov and Andrianov, whom I brought from Nakhabin?
Their fighting fate became bright. More than once they were transferred to the enemy rear, they undermined the fascist trains and cars of the group commanded by Mikhail Goncharov. At the end of the forty-third, Goncharov became a captain, had several high military awards. He finished the war as a major, studied at the Military Engineering Academy named after V.V. Kuibyshev, and with the rank of colonel taught for many years at the academy at the department of mine-blasting.
Pyotr Andrianov became famous among the miners of the front for his ability to boldly mine enemy railways in broad daylight. Distinguished by amazing composure, prudence and resourcefulness, Andrianov managed to lay mines with his own hands literally in front of the approaching enemy echelon. He was also known for leading Soviet people out of the enemy rear. At the end of August 1943, he brought out no less than six hundred people, among them women with children. In September, Andrianov's forty-third detachment, numbering twenty-five men, intercepted and captured eighty-eight enemy saboteurs, disguised as Red Army soldiers and armed to the teeth. At that time, Andrianov, who was awarded military orders, already had the rank of captain.
When performing one of the combat missions, Pyotr Andrianov got a cold in his legs and fell seriously ill. He was offered to go to staff work, but the young officer insisted on returning to his soldiers, continued to make military campaigns. In June 1944, the division of Captain Andrianov and a group of partisans were surrounded by large forces of Nazi punishers. The fight lasted all day. In the evening, Andrianov led people to a breakthrough, cleared the way for his comrades with grenades, and he himself fell, hit by an enemy bullet ...
If the reader of these lines visits the Volga, he can see a handsome ship, on the high side of which the golden letters "Peter Andrianov" shine. The motherland immortalized the memory of the young officer-miner.
Chapter 20
In a new position
From the People's Commissariat of Defense to the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSSHPD) it was a stone's throw, but I changed my mind a lot along this path. The significance of the Central Headquarters is clear: the centralization of the leadership of the partisan movement is extremely necessary, and the creation of the Central Staff is an event of extreme importance! It is only incomprehensible why it was necessary to recall me from the front and send me to the TsSHPD? True, I wrote several times to P.K. Ponomarenko, who was appointed head of the TsShPD, suggesting that brigades be created to disrupt the work of the enemy rear. Maybe these letters?
The central headquarters of the partisan movement worked in a spacious old building with a mezzanine and false columns in the courtyard of the mansion, which now houses the Museum of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. The yard was densely furnished with former stables and woodsheds, adapted for a garage and guard quarters.
Having presented the documents to the officer on duty, I climbed the stairs with a carpet to the second floor. Everything sparkled: the polished parquet, the copper of the well-polished doorknobs, the fresh paint of the baseboards and the walls. Adjutant Ponomarenko, reporting on me, lingered in the office of the chief of staff for about five minutes. Finally he showed up and invited me in.
Ponomarenko was sitting at a large polished table in a brand-new, brand-new tunic that tightly fitted his heavy figure. He got up to meet them, listened to the performance with a smile, offered to sit down, pushed the folder lying on the table towards him, tapped the papers with his index finger:
You see, I’m looking through your personal file and I can’t decide who to appoint you to!
How did you react to these words? Recalling me from the front, of course, they should have determined in advance the type of my activity, but maybe they changed their mind at the last moment or there are several vacancies in the headquarters?
I felt that I could help Ponomarenko:
Panteleimon Kondratievich, as far as I know, there are no partisan headquarters behind enemy lines yet.
So, perhaps, create such a headquarters behind enemy lines in the Western direction, in one of the partisan regions? At first, you can throw in the rear of the Nazis the task force of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement.
No. One thing is operational-engineering groups at the front, and another is the leadership of a guerrilla war behind enemy lines. There, the movement is led by party organs, and we must not replace them.
I didn't mean the political leadership, Panteleimon Kondratievich! The operational group of the headquarters would be engaged in the training of specialists in sabotage work, planning and coordinating the actions of partisan brigades and detachments.
No, Comrade Starinov, we don't need any task forces or additional headquarters behind enemy lines! Ponomarenko said firmly. - Absolutely not needed!
Then you can form a sabotage brigade. I can prepare her and fly with her behind enemy lines in two or three weeks!
Ponomarenko shook his head again.
Not that. Do you really think that I sought your transfer to the Central Headquarters in order to immediately send you behind the front line? I think it is necessary to organize something like a partisan academy. Let's say more modestly - the highest partisan school. In addition, the headquarters needs the head of the technical department. Here's what I think is the best place for you. And one more thing: is it possible to combine these two positions - the head of the technical department and the head of the higher school, and not to appoint you to such a position?
It's not for me to decide, Panteleimon Kondratievich.
You will be able to set up the production of various mines, you have a lot of experience in training saboteurs ...
Ponomarenko called the head of the personnel department of the headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Timoshenko:
Take care of the design of Comrade Starinov. He will head our technical department and the partisan school at the headquarters. Think over the structure of the school together, and Comrade Starinov will select the personnel for it himself. He knows people and knows where to turn.
Leaning his palms on the table, Ponomarenko got up and straightened up:
That's all for today, Comrade Starinov. Get down to business.
By the time I arrived at the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, work was already underway to identify and account for all partisan detachments, to establish radio communications with them, efforts were made to supply partisans with explosives, weapons and medicines, to organize treatment and evacuation of the seriously wounded and sick to the Soviet rear.
The general leadership of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSSHPD) was carried out from the GKO by K. E. Voroshilov. By the way, when discussing the question of the name of the headquarters in the State Defense Committee, Voroshilov proposed calling it, as it was under Lenin, the Main Headquarters of partisan detachments or partisan forces. However, a different point of view prevailed.
An old acquaintance, a comrade in battles in Spain, Khadzhi Dzhiorovich Mamsurov, told me about this. I met him, still slender, swarthy, handsome, in the headquarters corridor. It turned out that Colonel Mamsurov heads the local intelligence department.
I believe that Klementy Efremovich's proposal was more correct! - categorically remarked Mamsurov. - Headquarters is an organ for planning and developing operations conceived by the commander. But can there be a commander of the "movement"? Can not. Here is the Commander-in-Chief of the partisan forces - maybe! Okay, more on that later. There will be more time!
Mamsurov had a huge responsibility for the correctness of information about the enemy coming from the TsSHPD. Information from the partisans - albeit fragmentary and irregular - was received, but any intelligence information requires rechecking and confirmation, and timely. It was extremely difficult to obtain verified, confirmed data in the then state of communication. It was no easier than for Mamsurov for other staff members. For example, it was possible to supply partisans with explosives, mine equipment, weapons and ammunition only if there was a stable radio communication inaccessible to the enemy. But what could the head of the communications department of the headquarters, Colonel Ivan Nikolaevich Artemiev, although he was a major specialist in radio engineering, do if only a sixth of the partisan detachments and formations registered by the headquarters had reliable radios?!
Unhurried, restrained, Ivan Nikolaevich listened to the claims of Mamsurov and the head of the operational department, Colonel Vasily Fedorovich Sokolov, without showing his feelings, only turned pink. And then he quietly advised his interlocutors to contact the GKO, or even better - directly to the Commander-in-Chief, so that they would be given a sufficient number of walkie-talkies, and at the same time - aircraft for flying behind enemy lines ...
At that time, much had not yet been finally decided: the departments of the headquarters were just being staffed, the duties of some employees were still being specified, the forms of contacts with the General Staff, with the headquarters of various branches of the military, were just beginning to be established. However, the TsShPD was created only two months ago, and even a single opinion about the capabilities of the partisans, about the methods of leading partisan detachments and formations, about the most effective methods of waging a partisan war, did not yet exist in it.
By order of August 1, 1942, I was appointed the head of a new school at the Central School of Transportation. The creation of a new school, called the Higher Operational School for Special Purposes (VOSHON), began with the fact that they requested former employees of the OTC and Spanish comrades from the 5th brigade. The head of the engineering troops of the Kalinin Front, Colonel Kosarev, was angry at first, but then he entered into my position and satisfied the demand. True, the veterans of the partisan struggle did not express joy at the recall to Moscow. Then I sent a letter to the commander of the airborne troops, General Glazunov, asking him to send thirty paratroopers to the school. Soon they arrived: young, tall, physically strong. The Higher Military-Political Institute also responded to our request and sent graduates. They were also young, in brand new tunics with creaking sword belts, no, no, and they looked at the golden stars sewn on their sleeves and at the scarlet cubes pinned to their buttonholes. Many of these political workers had experience in party and Soviet work, good military training, but only Fadeev read about guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines.
I will mention their names more than once on the pages of this book. To a special category of the personnel of the school belonged the mine-blasting instructors familiar to the reader, who once worked in the educational center, then in Kharkov, Rostov and on the Kalinin front: Maria Stepanovna Belova, captain Semyon Petrovich Mineev, Captain Vladimir Pavlovich Chepiga and several other comrades. Teaching mine-blasting at VOSCHON. they themselves studied, mastering the tactics of action behind enemy lines. And, of course, the veteran saboteurs Campillo, Lorente, Konizares, Sanchez Coronado, Viesque, Fucimanya, Francisco Gullon, Angel Alberca, Benito Ustarres, Joaquin Gomez improved their knowledge and shared their experience with newcomers.
I ordered that administrative and economic workers of the school be involved in the training: at least let them know who, what and for what purposes they should provide. It was Captain A. S. Egorov, the head of the financial department of VOSCHON, who forced him to give such an order. Secretly, I hoped that Yegorov would get carried away with the mine-blasting business and become softer. Alas, this “sabotage” of mine was not successful: the nachfin studied the mine-blasting business and tactics of action behind enemy lines thoroughly, only a year later he became deputy for sabotage with the Hero of the Soviet Union A.F. Fedorov, but concessions to me and my assistants remained chief financial officer of the school, never did.
Among the staff of the school there were other comrades who became enthusiasts of mine-blasting, who boldly fought behind enemy lines. Among them is the head of the medical unit of the school, B. N. Kazakov.
The question of an interpreter for classes with Spanish cadets was simply resolved: I called my wife and children from the evacuation, and Anna, who had been known to the Spaniards from sorties near Jaen and Grenada, who herself knew well the mine-blasting business, was fluent in Spanish, again became my faithful assistant .
Chapter 21
change
In the leading article “Partisans, hit the enemy harder!”, published on August 13, Pravda calls for the destruction of enemy manpower and equipment primarily during rail transport: “Glorious partisans and partisans! Beat the enemy, destroy his weapons and equipment on the way, on his communications, on the way to the front, in the deep enemy rear! "
Trials, exercises...
Just on August 13, we begin testing various methods of sabotage on the railways. We undermine conventional charges and the so-called "cumulative" - cone-shaped, directional. We make crashes with the help of various mines, check the effectiveness of incendiary devices, shelling locomotives and tanks with rifles, machine guns and anti-tank rifles, looking for the most rational ways to place anti-train mines, allowing us to achieve results with the least expenditure of explosives: after all, for partisans, every thick checker was worth its weight in gold !
After listening to a report on the test results, Ponomarenko asks if it is possible to organize a demonstration of mine-blasting equipment for a group of partisans who arrived at the headquarters for a short time. I answer that I will agree with the head of military communications of the Red Army I.V. Kovalev, I will ask you to provide us with a railway test ring. We are allowed to use the test ring, set a date - August 18th.
"Sabotage groups" arrived at the scene close to midnight. The darkness is worth - if the eye! The cautious steps of the "patrols" guarding the railway tracks are heard. The "patrols" include partisans, who will be shown equipment. These people are attentive, cautious, but the "saboteurs" are not born with a bast. Morning. "Patrols" and "saboteurs" gathered together. Ponomarenko and staff members arrive. We invite them and the partisans to inspect the paths. The examiners look incredulously at the railway track, the ballast stones smeared with fuel oil, sleepers, even threads of rails, carefully take their first steps. Three partisans, before taking a step, try the ballast with probes: they understand that they could have been prepared for a surprise. Alas, soon there is a bang and smoke appears: the first “mine”, designed to destroy the “tentacle”, exploded. And here is the second and the third...
Nobody managed to find at least one mine and neutralize it. Then “a train was launched around the ring. And it started! Flash, smoke, flash, smoke, flash, smoke! The train went in the opposite direction - again "explosions"! This responds to "mines" of delayed action and "mine" - rapid,
So we were able to convince the partisan leaders of the advantages of some mines that are completely invisible to train drivers and require only 10-20 seconds to install, as well as the advantages of delayed-action mines that work reliably even when installed in ballast, out of contact with the rails and sleepers of the railway track . Then they showed how to assemble mines from parts that the partisans could mine or make on their own. The “dessert” was the non-removable mines shown by S. V. Gridnev. Unfortunately, we could not promise that these mines would soon go to partisan detachments ...
Problems, problems...
Every evening, after finishing school or testing at the training ground, I returned to the TsSHPD, where I stayed until late at night. Work was underway on various documents, and among them the most important - the draft order of the People's Commissar of Defense "On the tasks of the partisan movement."
The need to issue such an order was dictated, in particular, by the lack of a consensus on the capabilities of the partisans, on the tactics of the partisan armed forces, on the methods of fighting the enemy in his rear, on the need for operational leadership of the partisans and their material support from the Soviet rear.
Some military leaders, for example, Mekhlis, found that the partisans did not and could not have any special strategy and tactics; attack the enemy at the right moment and immediately hide, and the proposal to supply the partisans with weapons and explosives was called harmful chatter: they say, this will give rise to a dependent mood among them, will allow them to evade combat contact with the enemy!
The partisans have already sat up in the forests and swamps! - said the defenders of this point of view. - Let them climb out, let them attack the Nazis, arm themselves and be supplied at their expense, and not beg at the party and Soviet threshold!
However, life itself convinced: partisan detachments are growing faster and are more active precisely where they are provided with constant assistance from the Soviet rear. In Belarus, for example, Vitebsk partisans received such assistance. From March to September 1942, more than eleven thousand rifles, six thousand machine guns, a thousand machine guns, five hundred anti-tank rifles, a large amount of ammunition, grenades and explosives were shipped to them. And what? By the beginning of the forty-third year, the number of Vitebsk partisans was almost half the number of all Belarusian partisans, although the Vitebsk region occupies only a tenth of the territory of the USSR!
Voroshilov sharply opposed the views of Mekhlis and others who were little versed in matters of the partisan movement of people. Therefore, the draft order, in particular, clearly defined the main strategic task of the partisans - the destruction of enemy manpower and equipment on their way to the front by rail.
In late August - early September, the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, on behalf of the Central Committee of the party, held a meeting of representatives of the underground party bodies and commissars of large partisan formations in Ukraine, Belarus, Smolensk and Oryol regions. The meeting was attended by senior officials of the CSHPD.
Speaking with a report, the head of the TsShPD, Panteleimon Kondratievich Ponomarenko, urged the partisans not to wait until they were armed with any theory of guerrilla warfare, but to beat the German there, and with what they had, to more actively carry out the derailment of enemy trains.
The commanders and commissars of the partisan detachments unanimously pointed out the need for effective leadership of the armed forces of the partisans, suggested that the headquarters develop major operations against the enemy, and sharply raised the issue of supplying the partisans with weapons, explosives and radios.
The partisans wondered why, when they unleashed thousands of tons of explosives enclosed in air bombs on the enemy's railway junctions, the same explosives were dropped on the partisans only in tens of kilograms? The commanders of the partisan formations argued that the effect of undermining the enemy's railway echelons is always more significant than that of bombardments. After the war, Hero of the Soviet Union M. I. Duka recalled that dozens, hundreds of air bombs dropped on the Bryansk station caused only a four-hour break in the movement of fascist echelons, and said that with the same amount of explosives, if they got to the partisans, it was possible to paralyze all traffic on the section of the Bryansk railway junction, putting hundreds of steam locomotives, thousands of wagons, platforms and tanks out of action!
The commander of the raiding Ukrainian partisan unit S. A. Kovpak, asking to improve the supply of partisans, urged to give his unit, first of all, explosives, and not cartridges: having explosives, the unit will be able to send dozens of sabotage groups to enemy communications in different directions, inflict to the Nazis a lot of damage, sow panic in the camp of the enemy, disorientate the Nazis, and it does not matter if the partisans go on the raid a few days later.
The head of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement P.K. Ponomarenko promised to take into account the partisan wishes and requests.
On the night of September 1, the meeting participants were received in the Kremlin by the leaders of the party and government. Four days later, on September 5, I. V. Stalin signed the order "On the tasks of the partisan movement." And the next day, September 6, the post of Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement was introduced in the Red Army. K. E. Voroshilov was appointed to this position.
Similar information.
Intelligence School No. 005 Pyatnitsky Vladimir Iosifovich
Chapter 1 Development of the partisan movement at the beginning of the Patriotic War. Creation of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSSHPD)
The development of the partisan movement at the beginning of the Patriotic War. Creation of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSSHPD)
The situation in the southern direction of the Soviet-German front. Formation of the Astrakhan direction (July-September 1942)
In order to understand the essence of the material being presented, one should first give a few historical references regarding events about which the new generation probably knows little.
The Patriotic War of the Soviet people against the German invaders began on the night of June 21-22, 1941. From the very first days of the German army's invasion of our territory behind enemy lines, partisan detachments and underground resistance groups were created on the initiative of the party bodies and the NKVD bodies.
But the first partisan groups and detachments were poorly armed, they did not have enough weapons and the necessary equipment. After all, everything that was prepared in anticipation of an enemy attack on our country in the late 1920s and early 1930s: the command cadres of future partisan detachments, sabotage specialists, material supply bases, and so on, which ensured an effective fight in the rear of the expected enemy, the country's leadership in the second half of the 1930s declared the work of "enemies of the people". Secret bases (where weapons, ammunition, food, medicines were stored) were liquidated, trained personnel were mostly repressed. They removed from the libraries and destroyed those manuals on the partisan cause that were published before 1937.
Stalin put forward a new installation - "to beat the enemy on his territory, with a mighty blow, with little bloodshed." In pursuance of this instruction, a new military doctrine was urgently developed.
So, the country did not have a pre-prepared partisan organization by the beginning of World War II. Only on June 29, 1941, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, by a special directive, determined the program for the deployment of the partisan movement in the occupied territory. And almost a month later - on July 18 - the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks appealed to the Soviet people "to organize the struggle in the rear of the German troops."
It said, in particular, “that in the war against fascist Germany, which had seized part of the Soviet territory, the struggle in the rear of the German army was of exceptional importance. The task is to create unbearable conditions for the German interventionists, to disorganize their communications, transport and military units themselves, to disrupt their activities, to destroy the invaders and their accomplices, to help in every possible way to create cavalry and foot partisan detachments, sabotage and extermination groups, to develop a network of party underground organizations to lead all actions against the fascist occupiers
In order to give this struggle in the rear of the German troops the widest scope and combat activity, it is necessary to take up this matter on the ground by the leaders of the republics, regional, district, party and Soviet organizations themselves, who must personally lead this work in the areas occupied by the Germans, lead groups and detachments selfless fighters who are already fighting to disorganize enemy troops and destroy the invaders "...
From the very first days of the war, active combat operations of the partisans were deployed in the rear of the German Army Group "Center" in Belarus on the railway lines Brest - Minsk - Orsha, Minsk - Osipovichi - Gomel, in the region of Polesie, Vitebsk, Polotsk, in the territory of Bryansk, Smolensk, Orel , Leningrad and Moscow regions. Then the partisan struggle unfolded in the rear of the enemy army group "South" in the regions of Kiev, Sumy, Chernigov and Kharkov regions, and as the Germans moved further south, more and more centers of resistance were created in the rear.
By the spring of 1942, the partisans began to pose a rather serious danger to the communications of the German army. Therefore, in order to decisively fight the partisans, the German command had to draw large forces into the already occupied areas. And for large-scale operations in areas where the partisan movement assumed menacing proportions, as in Belarus, the Bryansk region and some other areas, the Nazi command was forced to withdraw individual military units from the front. According to the German command, the partisan war pulled over more than 12 German divisions, one mountain rifle corps, 11 infantry and cavalry brigades.
The centralized leadership of partisan operations behind enemy lines soon became apparent to the Wehrmacht command. During the preparation and conduct by the Germans in any areas of significant military operations, the actions of partisan formations immediately intensified there in order to disrupt the supply and communications between parts of the German army. These actions gradually became a heavy burden for the enemy.
A general assessment of the partisan war in the rear of the German army was given by the leadership of the armed forces of Nazi Germany itself. Thus, Colonel General Franz Halder (1884–1972), Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, wrote in his diary at the beginning of July 1941: “It is necessary to wait whether Stalin’s appeal, in which he called on “all working people for a people’s war against us".
Later, the doubts of General Halder were dispelled by the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Hans Günther von Kluge (1882–1944), who wrote in his diary on July 16, 1942 that the partisan movement in Russia had assumed such proportions that it inspires serious concern and calls for drastic action. That Stalin's order "to create unbearable conditions in the rear of the German army is not far from being fulfilled."
Colonel-General of the German Army Lothar Rendu-lich admitted in his post-war essay on the analysis of the actions of the partisans during the Second World War that "in no other theater of operations was there such close interaction between the partisans and the regular army as in Russia."
He is echoed by the head of military communications of the German Army Group Center, General G. Teske, who, after World War II, recalled:
“The first battle that the Wehrmacht lost was against the Soviet partisans in the winter of 1941-1942. Then followed further defeats in this struggle. Basically, they consisted in the fact that from the very beginning the initiative was with the partisans and remained with them until the end of the war.
A certain experience of partisan struggle against foreign invaders had already been accumulated during the Civil War. The terrorist regime implanted by the interventionists and the White Guards in the territories controlled by them aroused the resistance of a significant part of the population. As a result, a partisan movement spontaneously arose.
For the purposeful leadership of this movement, already in January 1918, the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSSHPO) was created under the Operations Department of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs. Later it was transformed into the Special Intelligence Branch of the Operations Department of the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the RSFSR.
This body was engaged in the organization of partisan formations and directed their combat operations.
At the end of 1918, the experience of guerrilla warfare was summarized and developed in the first part of the Field Manual of the Red Army, in the section "Maneuverable warfare, guerrilla operations."
For the military-political leadership of the partisan movement under the Central Committee of the RKGT (b), special party bodies were created: the Central Bureau, the Don, Siberian, Far Eastern Bureaus. Through the regional party committees, they controlled the partisan-insurgent movement and, admittedly, they did it very successfully. Later, front-line headquarters of the partisan movement were also created: Ukrainian, Belarusian, Don, North Caucasian, Ural, Northern, Siberian, Far Eastern.
Thanks to the actions of partisan detachments, entire districts of a number of provinces were liberated. In some places, even partisan fronts arose, for example, Gomel-Chernigov, Kuban-Black Sea, Stavropol, Derbent, Altai, East Transbaikal, Amur, Suchansky, Ussuri and others.
TsShPO created special schools where they trained demolition workers and other specialists for partisan detachments.
Attaching great importance to the strengthening of the resistance of the people of the German army and the disorganization of its rear, the State Defense Committee of the USSR (GKO) on May 30, 1942 decided to create the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSSHPD) at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK) of the Red Army. It also included representatives of the General Staff of the Red Army and the NKVD.
The secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Belarus Panteleymon Kondratievich Ponomarenko (1902-1984) was appointed head of the TsShPD. And in September 1942, Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks V.N. Malinin (documents Nos. 59 and 60). By the same decision, republican, regional and front headquarters of the partisan movement were created. Among them, Ukrainian - the leader T.A. Strokach, Belarusian (P.Z. Kalinin), Lithuanian (A.Yu. Snechkus), Latvian (A.K. Sirotis), Estonian (N.G. Korotkoy), Karelian-Finnish (S.Ya. Vershinin) , Leningrad (M.N. Nikitin), Orlovsky (A.P. Matveev), Smolensky (D.M. Popov), Stavropol (M.A. Suslov), Crimean (V.G. Bulatov), etc. Unfortunately, the documents on the development of the partisan movement do not say anything about the Southern Department of the TsSHPD, about the Astrakhan direction. This makes my story especially relevant.
On September 6, 1942, at the Military Council of the Kalinin Front, the headquarters of the partisan movement was created, which was instructed to create and manage the actions of partisan formations in the Kalinin (RSFSR), Vitebsk, Vileika regions (BSSR) and the Latvian SSR.
In October 1942, the headquarters of the partisan movement under the Military Council of the Western Front was transferred to the TsShPD for operational leadership of the partisan movement in the Mogilev, Minsk, Baranovichi, Brest and Belostok regions of the BSSR. And the headquarters of the partisan movement under the Military Council of the Bryansk Front was entrusted with the leadership and coordination of the actions of partisan formations in the Gomel, Polotsk, Pinsk (BSSR), Sumy and Chernihiv regions (Ukrainian SSR).
On September 6, 1942, the GKO created the High Command of the Partisan Movement and appointed Marshal K.E. Voroshilov (1881–1969). Stalin had just removed him from the leadership of the Leningrad Front for gross mistakes with grave consequences in the leadership of the troops, with a recommendation to use him in the future "in rear military work" (document No. 56). Such work for Voroshilov was the appointment of the Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement. But in November 1942, Stalin forgave his comrade-in-arms, and he was again appointed as a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, his position as Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement was abolished in November 1943, and the TsShPD was again subordinated directly to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.
The order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR (Stalin) dated September 5, 1942 "On the tasks of the partisan movement" (document No. 73) was important for summarizing more than a year of experience in partisan struggle.
Partisan formations, detachments and countless sabotage and reconnaissance groups inflicted significant damage on the enemy in supplying his troops. Partisan sabotage on communications took on such a serious scale that it began to affect the implementation of the operational plans of the Wehrmacht command, and also dispelled the hopes of the Nazi leadership to turn the occupied territories into a reliable source of raw materials, food and labor for Germany.
The main combat unit in the partisan movement was the detachment. Part of the partisan detachments were formed in the Soviet rear with their subsequent transfer beyond the front line.
Partisan struggle as a form of armed resistance had much in common with the fighting of regular troops. The partisan front, in fact, existed without flanks and rear, in conditions of constant enemy encirclement. And unlike the regular troops, he did not have a single organizational structure. Everything depended on the situation in which they had to operate, on the military experience of the commanding staff, on the available weapons and material equipment, and on the task assigned.
The creation of the High Command, TsSHPD and local headquarters of the partisan movement made it possible to significantly improve communication with partisan formations and their leadership. A network of special sabotage and reconnaissance (partisan) schools was also created to train organizers of the partisan movement, saboteurs, intelligence officers, demolition workers and radio operators. I know that by that time, four sabotage and reconnaissance schools had already been created and were functioning under the TsSHPD. Three of them were in Moscow and the Moscow region (Nos. 001, 002 and 003), another one in the Saratov region (No. 004).
At the beginning of 1942, the fourth, so-called "off-front" department, was created in the Central Office of the NKVD, which also began to create its own sabotage and reconnaissance schools, in which special personnel were trained to work behind enemy lines. Each study group of these schools consisted of 20-25 people. The head of the fourth department was Lieutenant of State Security Goryunov.
At the same time, special sabotage and reconnaissance schools were created under the Main Intelligence Directorate (Intelligence Directorate) of the General Staff of the Red Army.
Gradually, the material and technical supply of partisan formations and special groups operating on enemy communications in his rear improved.
Patriots of the Fatherland joined the partisan detachments voluntarily. This required great courage from them. There was a policy in the German troops, according to which any partisan who was taken prisoner and refused to cooperate was subject to immediate execution.
The organizational structure of the partisan formations and their numbers were different: from 15 to 500 people or more. There were partisan formations numbering up to several thousand fighters. This depended on many circumstances, including the area of their operations. Special sabotage and reconnaissance groups usually had a strength of 15 to 40 people.
In total, more than 6,500 partisan detachments and sabotage and reconnaissance groups participated in the partisan movement.
Summing up the successes of partisan operations in the Patriotic War, the head of the TsShPD P.K. Ponomarenko wrote that during the fighting, Soviet partisans destroyed, wounded and captured over 1 million 600 thousand soldiers and officers of the German army and its allies, as well as German officials, employees of military construction organizations, military railway workers, and colonists. They also destroyed about three thousand railway trains, 1191 tanks, 476 aircraft, 890 various warehouses and storage facilities.
In the middle of 1942, the situation in the southern direction of the Soviet-German front became more and more tense every day.
In mid-July 1942, the German Army Group South under the command of Field Marshal Walter Reichenau (1884–1942) was divided into two parts. The southern group "A" was led by Field Marshal Wilhelm von List (1880-1971), it set its sights on the Caucasus with the aim of capturing Baku and the Baku oil region. The Northern Army Group "B" was commanded by Field Marshal Fyodor von Bock (1880-1945), she rushed to Voronezh and Stalingrad.
The tank army of Colonel General Ewald von Kleist (1881-1954) captured the entire North Caucasus, but got stuck in the vicinity of Mozdok and south of Nalchik.
The 6th Army of Colonel-General Friedrich-Wilhelm von Paulus (1890–1957) launched an offensive in the Stalingrad direction, captured a bridgehead on the Kalach River, from which it broke through to the western outskirts of Stalingrad and, despite the extremely unfavorable situation for itself, surrounded the city from the north and the west. The assault on Stalingrad began.
And between the German army groups "A" and "B" there was a "no man's land" - the Kalmyk and Salsky steppes, through which a direct path opened to the lower reaches of the Volga and to the city of Astrakhan, which at that time became the main supply point for the North Caucasian and Stalingrad fronts . Both sides, ours and the Germans, realized this at the same time.
The way to Astrakhan ran through the capital of the Kalmyk Republic, the city of Elista. But our troops were not there. Two roads led to Elista, one - from the side of the Caucasian group of Germans passed through Voroshilovsk (now Stavropol) through the villages of Divnoye - Priyutnoye, the other - from the side of the Stalingrad group of the enemy passed through Salsk - Repairnoye. The advance of the Germans to Elista forced the command of the Stalingrad Front to nominate from the 51st Army, which covered the left flank of the Stalingrad Front from the Salsky steppes, a combined military group to cover Elista. But due to lack of time, forces and means, it was not possible to create a strong defense of the city. On August 10, the Germans occupied the regional center of the Kalmyk Republic, the village of Priyutnoye, located 75 kilometers southwest of Elista. A day later, German tanks with motorized infantry approached Elista from the village of Divnoye. On August 12, Soviet troops left Elista, who retreated in the direction of Astrakhan and Stalingrad.
The German command intended to use the capture of Elista to attack Astrakhan. To this end, the Germans introduced the 16th SS Motorized Rifle Division "Brown Bear" and two divisions of the 6th Romanian Corps into the Elista area. The German division operated along the grader Elista - Astrakhan to the village of Khulhuta. And in the northern uluses (districts) of the republic - Katgenery, Sarpa, Small Derbe - Romanian units operated.
To the south in the Caspian steppes, covering the open flank of the Mozdok grouping, Colonel General E. von Kleist concentrated the African Corps of General Felmi, encrypted with the letter "P" and intended for a campaign against Iran and further to India. It consisted of units of all military branches. Including it included the 3rd Panzer Division, four battalions of 6-barreled rocket launchers, several special forces.
In the city of Elista itself, a special unit was created to fight partisans and sabotage and reconnaissance groups, headed by Colonel Wolf.
This grouping of Germans received the task of breaking through to Astrakhan along the Elista-Yashkul-Khulkhut road with the task of capturing Astrakhan and cutting off the center of the USSR from Caucasian oil.
The road to Astrakhan was open. In order to prevent the Germans from carrying out their plans and closing the hole that had formed in our defense, units of the Stalingrad Military District were advanced to the far borders of the city, reinforced by the reserves of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK) - the 34th Guards Division, the 152nd Separate Brigade, and some others parts. On their basis, the recruitment of the 28th Army, whose headquarters was in the Astrakhan Kremlin, was accelerated.
In August 1942, she stopped the advance of non-Metsko-Romanian troops to Astrakhan in the area of the villages of Khulhuta - Yusta - Enotaevskaya station. But there was no solid front line there. On both sides there were strongholds in the areas of khotuns (villages), koshars (sheep sheds) and khunduks (wells). The front line on both sides was guarded by mobile groups and patrols.
Astrakhan was intensively preparing for defense. The Germans systematically bombed the city and port. Astrakhan was filled with troops. New military units were formed in the city. Some of them went to Stalingrad, others to the Caucasus.
And in the occupied uluses of the Kalmyk Republic, the Germans conducted intensified propaganda among the population with the aim of inciting ethnic hatred between Russians and Kalmyks, under the slogans of separating Kalmykia from Russia and creating a Great Kalmyk state from the Caspian to the Black Sea.
The situation in the occupied uluses of Kalmykia was very difficult. Even before the occupation of Rhea by German troops, bandit groups appeared in a number of its uluses, consisting mainly of deserters who had fled the army or were hiding from mobilization, as well as staunch opponents of Soviet power. These groups were engaged in robberies.
During the occupation, the number of these bandit groups increased, and their activity increased significantly. The Germans began to forcibly recruit people from the local population into them. This bandit formation was now in most cases led by German officers. They were used to carry out patrol service, protect the flanks, conduct reconnaissance, but mainly to fight Soviet partisans, scouts, and saboteurs.
In the occupied Elista, the Germans established a military commandant's office, a city government, police and security agencies (Gestapo). And to fight the partisans, they created a special mobile group, the basis of which was the 146th security regiment of internal troops. To help him, two regiments of Don Cossacks were allocated under the command of a marching ataman SV. Pavlov, various formations of the Kuban, Terek and even Zaporozhye Cossacks, the Turkestan-Muslim Legion (three battalions) and four Kalmyk squadrons. The Kalmyk formations were commanded by the Sturmbannführer (major) of the SS troops Rudolf Werbe or, as he was more commonly called, Dr. Otto Doll.
Later, by the time Kalmykia was liberated from the Germans, the Kalmyk formations already amounted to more than 20 squadrons; on their basis, the Kalmyk cavalry corps was formed, consisting of four divisions (5 squadrons each). But this happened already in the middle of 1943.
In addition to the Kalmyk units, the 600th Cossack division operated in the Kalmyk and Sal steppes, consisting of three cavalry squadrons, three plastun (foot) companies, artillery and mortar batteries. The total number of this compound exceeded two thousand people. It was commanded by Major Kononov, who had escaped from the Red Army.
The military units of the rear of the German army on the sector of the Kalmykia front - the south of the Rostov-on-Don region were commanded by German Colonel Wolf.
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The spring of 1942 became one of the most significant periods in the development of the Soviet partisan movement. The growth in the number of partisan formations, the increase in the number of people involved in the partisan struggle, made it possible to turn the fight behind enemy lines from a factor of tactical significance, as it was before, into a genuine "second front" that affects the operational rear of the German troops and, consequently, the course of the war .
However, this could only be achieved through the creation of appropriate management structures. The existing departmental systems for managing the partisan movement could not take on these functions due to the limited scope of their activities and the presence of competing structures.
In addition, the events of the spring of 1942 showed that the effectiveness of departmental structures is rather doubtful. Even the 4th Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR experienced serious difficulties in providing for the growing partisan formations; similar, but much greater difficulties were experienced by military intelligence agencies, special departments of political departments. These significant problems, however, could not be compared with the catastrophe that befell the organs of the party leadership of the partisan movement. In the spring of 1942, the German secret services dealt a crushing blow to the Minsk underground; 405 underground workers and partisans were executed, including 28 leading employees of the place with the secretary of the underground city committee. At the same time, leaders of underground party organizations in Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, Kyiv, Vinnitsa, Slavuta and other cities were captured and subsequently executed in Ukraine. In Lithuania, as early as March 1942, two operational groups of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Lithuania, headed by Secretary of the Central Committee I. Meskupas-Adomas, were killed, the Panevezys and Siauliai underground organizations were destroyed. Organizing groups thrown into the rear of the enemy by party organs perished almost everywhere. Those from the underground who did not immediately fall under the blow of the German counterintelligence went to the partisan detachments; it was much safer there and there were more opportunities to harm the enemy. It was almost impossible to lead the war in the enemy rear “from underground”.
The crisis of departmental control systems was aggravated by the fact that the partisan detachments operating in the occupied territory closely interacted with each other; it was impossible to maintain a closed, departmental nature while performing the same tasks. Thus, the partisan movement acquired a unified character, which raised the question of a unified management of it. This was realized by the partisans themselves. “The worst thing was that we did not know who was leading us, to whom we were subordinate, we did not know who we were dealing with and to whom we should turn. There were a lot of people to subjugate us, and if you had to get something, you won’t find it, ”one of the partisan commanders characterized the current situation.
The military leadership, objectively interested in the development of the largest possible partisan movement, realized that the actions of the partisans could be more effective. In early April 1942, the General Staff of the Red Army issued an order to the headquarters of the directions and fronts on the need to use sabotage groups and partisan detachments to reduce the maneuverability of the enemy, creating difficulties for him with transportation and evacuation. The order was unique in its way; at least before that, the General Staff paid practically no attention to the partisans. In March - April 1942, the commander of the Western Front G.K. Zhukov ordered partisan detachments to intensify combat operations on enemy communications; this is what the active troops were interested in. At the same time, the army political agencies stepped up propaganda activities in the occupied territory.
The crisis experienced by departmental systems for managing the partisan movement; the interest of the military in increasing the effectiveness of partisan operations; the growth of partisan detachments, closely interacting with each other, regardless of the initial departmental affiliation - all this testified to the need to create a new, centralized system for managing the partisan movement.
However, putting this into practice was not so easy.
Attempts to centralize on the basis of any one department led to very sharp and painful conflicts that negatively affected the effectiveness of the partisan movement. Thus, the head of the operational-Chekist group, which was engaged in the leadership of the partisan movement in Crimea, complained to the Center: “All intelligence work was carried out exclusively by the operational-Chekist group, but due to the lack of its connection, the obtained materials were transferred to the intelligence department of the Crimean, and then the North Caucasian Front, which not only this data, but also in a number of cases packages delivered by planes from partisan detachments and directly addressed to the Crimean NKVD were deliberately not handed over to us. This same intelligence department and its leader Kapalkin, as well as Marshal of the Soviet Union Budyonny, instead of helping, interfered with our work in every possible way. Thus, an attempt to solve the problem within the framework of the front by voluntaristic transfer of the tasks of leading the partisan movement to the jurisdiction of any one department turned out to be ineffective.
Memorandums on the need to create a centralized control system for the partisans, which were sent to the country's leadership by the military directly involved in the issues of the partisan movement, did not reach those in whose competence it was to make decisions, and did not cause any reaction. The leadership of the country, which relatively recently (at the beginning of January 1942) made a fundamental decision on the leadership of partisan formations through the established departmental systems, focused on solving more important tasks and sincerely believed that everything was fine in the field of organizing the partisan movement.
Thus, the situation seemed hopeless: trying to change the situation at the level of fronts and armies meant blowing up the balance between departmental systems and provoking interdepartmental conflicts that were destructive for the partisan movement, and it was impossible to change the situation on a national scale, since information about an unexpected crisis in the existing systems for managing the partisan movement did not reached the leadership of the country.
There are moments when it seems impossible to get off the path leading to catastrophe, when it seems that the coming catastrophe is objectively determined, inevitable. At such moments, it is incredibly difficult to change the course of events going on as usual, but the one who manages to do this enters history.
For the Soviet partisan movement, the spring of 1942 was a period of crisis, a period when the question was being decided whether partisan formations would be able to influence the strategic course of the war, or whether their actions would remain, albeit mass, but essentially local actions that caused inconvenience to the enemy, but not affecting the situation on the fronts.
The natural course of events made the first option more than likely; what was actually realized turned out to be the second, was the result of the efforts of one person.
Colonel I.G. Starinov, a professional saboteur with pre-war experience, a man who in the summer and autumn of 1941 did a lot to organize partisan formations in Belarus and Ukraine, was not the only one who wrote to the country's leadership about the need to centralize the management of the partisan movement. However, he did this with exceptional energy and perseverance, the likes of which no one showed.
Throughout the spring of 1942, in addition to performing his immediate duties as Assistant Chief of Staff of the Red Army Engineering Troops and Chief of the Operational Engineering Group of the Southern Front, Starinov continuously addressed with ideas on how to increase the effectiveness of partisan operations to everyone he met in the service - from his immediate superior, General M.P. Vorobyov to Rear Admiral S.G. Gorshkov and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus P.K. Ponomarenko. He developed memos on the need to centralize the partisan movement and create special forces, which he convinced those who had any weight for the country's leadership to sign - even if they had nothing to do with the partisans. Finally, while in Moscow, Starinov turned to the head of artillery of the Red Army, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Colonel-General N.N. Voronov. He knew Voronov well from Spain, where he was a senior military adviser on the same front where Starinov's sabotage detachments operated.
On May 24, 1942, Voronov turned to Stalin with proposals to improve the leadership of the partisan struggle. Their essence boiled down to the following: the creation of a single center for the management of partisan and sabotage operations in the form of a partisan front with a front commander and his headquarters subordinate to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, at the fronts to create operational groups for the management of partisan operations. In addition, it was proposed to move from the actions of large detachments to the actions of numerous, small, invulnerable groups and detachments. The style of the document clearly indicates that Colonel Starinov took part in its writing.
“A few days later I reported to the Headquarters on urgent matters,” Voronov later recalled. - The Supreme Commander detained me and offered to take part in the consideration of other issues. He took a folder from the table and outlined the contents of my memorandum to those present. My proposals were accepted in full."
Thus, the many months of Starinov's efforts were crowned with success; the country's leadership made a fundamental decision to centralize the partisan movement.
In the twentieth of May, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks P.K. Ponomarenko was summoned to Moscow. When in the winter of 1941 - 1942. the idea of creating the TsSHPD appeared for the first time, Ponomarenko was appointed its chief; now the Central Headquarters was being created again, and Ponomarenko, not without reason, hoped that it was he who would head it. In Moscow, he was severely disappointed. “In one of the departments of the Central Committee,” Panteleimon Kondratievich later recalled, “I was introduced to V.T. Sergienko, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, who also arrived in the capital in connection with the forthcoming decision of the State Defense Committee on the creation of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement. Only this time it was he who was supposed to head the TsSHPD.
Memoirists who have ever encountered the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, Commissar of State Security of the 3rd rank V.T. Sergienko, characterize him extremely negatively with surprising unanimity. The promoter of the "great purge", he achieved high positions not by talent or hard work, but by executioner diligence and loyalty to his superiors. During the defense of Kyiv in 1941, he reported on the commander of the Southwestern Front M.P. Kriponos and a member of the military council of the front N.S. Khrushchev that they are going to surrender Kyiv to the enemy. After the Germans nevertheless bypassed Kyiv, Sergienko showed confusion and cowardice, did not ensure the evacuation of the apparatus of the NKVD of Ukraine (800 employees were surrounded, many were captured, died or went missing - including the entire 4th department of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR), and himself, having told his subordinates: “Now I’m not a people’s commissar for you, and do what you want,” he separated from a group of Chekists who were making their way to the front line, after which he lived in occupied Kharkov for a month and a half, and then unexpectedly appeared at the location of the Soviet troops . Thanks to the intercession of Beria and Khrushchev, Sergienko remained People's Commissar and, in particular, oversaw the organization of the partisan movement in Ukraine.
Now Sergienko was nominated by Beria and Khrushchev to the post of chief of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement. For Beria, it was important to maintain control over the partisans. For objective reasons, it was impossible to directly control the partisan movement; All that remained was to put his man in this position. Khrushchev's motives are more complex. On the one hand, personal hostility between Khrushchev and Ponomarenko was legendary; therefore, it is not surprising that Nikita Sergeevich least of all wanted his opponent to be the head of the TsSHPD. At that time, however, for Khrushchev the opportunity to promote his own to the head of the TsSHPD was also important for another reason. On May 12, the offensive of the Southwestern Front began, aiming at the liberation of Kharkov. By May 16, the offensive had ground to a halt. It became clear that the people who were directly responsible for this operation, Timoshenko and Khrushchev, would have to answer for the failure; control over the partisans could compensate Khrushchev for the consequences of defeat at the front.
Commissar of State Security 3rd rank Sergienko was an employee of the NKVD, and as such, suited Beria. He was the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and, as such, suited Khrushchev. Finally, he had a high enough rank to be appointed head of the TSShPD. On May 27, Beria introduced Sergienko to Stalin; according to the Visitor Log..., the conversation lasted almost an hour.
Ponomarenko, on the other hand, was not entirely satisfied with the People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR; later he ingenuously admitted: "I did not like the future chief of the Central Staff." Panteleimon Kondratievich was an experienced apparatchik and understood that even if Sergienko became his immediate superior, this would not be the end of the undercover struggle, but its beginning. Therefore, he inquired at the Central Committee about the personnel destined for senior positions in the TsSHPD, and began recruiting supporters. Thus, Major A.I. Bryukhanov, told in his memoirs about how Ponomarenko made him an offer that was impossible to refuse. “You, comrade major, came to us from the army and, of course, you got used to army subordination and discipline over many years of service. This is good. But do not forget that you are not only a career commander of the Red Army, but also a communist. When working with us, you must adhere to the party style of work and not limit your activities to the usual framework of purely military service ... If the situation requires it, I will call you personally, without resorting to the help of your immediate superiors, and give appropriate instructions. Bryukhanov agreed to this proposal, which was contrary to all army orders, but was common in bureaucratic struggle.
On May 30, 1942, a meeting of the GKO was held on the issues of the partisan movement. Here is how Ponomarenko talks about this: “The speaker on this issue was Lavrenty Beria. Together with Nikita Khrushchev, they prepared proposals for the main tasks and activities of the TsSHPD, which should function under the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, but under the leadership of the NKVD of the USSR. He also reported on the personnel of the new body headed by V.T. Sergienko, who, according to Beria, “proved himself very well in the position of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.
“Aren’t you sorry to send such good Ukrainian personnel to the Center?” Stalin asked, not without irony, addressing Khrushchev and Beria. Following this, in a harsher tone, he said, looking only at Beria:
“You have a narrow departmental approach to this extremely important problem. The partisan movement, the partisan struggle is a people's movement, a people's struggle. And the party must and will lead this movement, this struggle. Now what is required, we will fix it. And the head of the TsShPD will be a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.” With these words, Stalin took a blue pencil, circled my last name on the list presented, and put it in the first place with an arrow.
The decision to create the TSShPD was made.
It is worth saying a few more words about the man who officially headed the partisan movement in the USSR during the war years, about the head of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement in 1942-44 P.K. Ponomarenko and about the work of the Central Headquarters itself, its directives.
6.1. The history of the headquarters.
The organization of partisan actions in the rear of the German troops by the Soviet political leadership from the beginning of the war was considered mainly not as a task of the armed forces, but as one of the tasks of party and Soviet bodies. June 29, 1941, i.e. a week after the start of the invasion, the Directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was issued to the party and Soviet organizations of the front-line regions, which specifically stated: "In areas occupied by the enemy, create partisan detachments and sabotage groups to fight against parts of the enemy army, to incite a partisan war everywhere and everywhere, to blow up bridges, roads, damage telephone and telegraph communications, set fire to warehouses, etc. In the occupied areas, create unbearable conditions for the enemy and all his accomplices, pursue and destroy them at every turn, disrupt all their activities. From the point of view of organizing armed resistance behind enemy lines, this directive was a slogan, since no leading party or state structure intended to "ignite a guerrilla war" had been created in advance. The intention to conduct an open armed struggle against well-equipped and trained units of the German army doomed partisan detachments to defeat and extremely heavy losses.
One of the reasons for the incorrect choice of goals and tasks of partisan detachments and sabotage groups behind enemy lines was the mechanical transfer of forms of partisan struggle from the civil war to the new conditions of the outbreak of war. If during the Civil War the weapons of the partisan detachments and the units of the regular troops opposing them, with the exception of artillery, were basically the same (machine guns, rifles, grenades, sabers), then in 1941 the enemy had a large number of tank and mechanized formations and units, which, when air and artillery support had overwhelming superiority in open battle with partisans. Therefore, if during the civil war "partisan detachments occupied cities" and could defeat the enemy in open battle, then by the beginning of World War II they had basically lost this ability. The larger the partisan detachment that got involved in an open battle with the Germans, the easier it was for the enemy to use modern weapons and destroy the partisan formation.
On July 10, 1941, the State Defense Committee sent K.E. Voroshilov, S.K. Timoshenko, S.M. Budyonny, as well as the commanders of districts, fronts and armies, the chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars and the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Union Republics Decree No. GKO-83ss signed by I. Stalin, where it was prescribed: "To oblige commanders in chief to more often scatter small leaflets from aircraft in the rear of German troops signed with an appeal smash the rear of the German armies, tear up bridges, unscrew the rails, set fire to the forests, join the partisans, all the time disturb the German oppressors. In an appeal to indicate that the Red Army will soon come and free them from German oppression. " Thus, it was not the special units of the armed forces who were supposed to smash the rear of the Germans, but the unarmed civilian population of the occupied regions, who were called for self-organization for armed struggle in the occupied territories.
On July 8, 1941, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Land Forces, Colonel-General F. Halder, makes the following entry in his diary: “Wagner (Quartermaster General) presented a report on the supply situation. It is quite satisfactory everywhere. The work of the railways has exceeded all our expectations.
Only on the Brest-Minsk section, the capacity of the railway is somewhat lower than expected. The fulfillment of the immediate operational tasks in the material and technical sense is fully ensured. Heavy-duty vehicles are quite enough." Only from August 1 to August 16, 340 echelons of ammunition were delivered to the German troops, i.e. such an amount of ammunition as was envisaged by the entire Barbarossa plan. It is noteworthy that around this time the Army Group "Center "from air strikes, for technical and other reasons, lost one third of its heavy-duty vehicles. Partisan actions on the highways are not noted by the enemy, although the bulk of German heavy-duty vehicles are still busy transporting ammunition and other supplies from the border to the Dnieper.
On July 18, 1941, when the German troops had already occupied the Baltic states, almost all of Belarus, the western part of Ukraine, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks issued a resolution "On organizing the struggle in the rear of the German troops", where partisan actions were still considered as an armed form political struggle. It emphasized the role of the party leadership and put forward the task: "...to deploy a network of our Bolshevik underground organizations in the occupied territory to direct all actions against the fascist occupiers." To guide the partisan struggle, organizational work began, aimed primarily at creating party committees in the occupied territory, and by the end of 1941, 18 underground regional committees, more than 260 district committees, city committees, district committees and other underground party organizations operated behind enemy lines.
Based on this Decree and the order of the People's Commissar of Defense, the 10th departments were organized in the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army and the political departments of the fronts, and the 10th departments in the political departments of the armies to organize party-mass work among the population of the occupied regions and political leadership of the partisan movement. “Since at that time there were no manuals and instructions on the organization and tactics of partisan struggle,” P.K. Ponomarenko later recalled, “In October 1941, the Main Political Directorate sent out to the army political agencies “Instructions on organizing small local partisan detachments,” drawn up during the civil war and intervention against Soviet Russia. The absence of charters, manuals and other guiding documents on the preparation and conduct of partisan operations, the tactics of operations of partisan detachments and sabotage groups was an important factor influencing the choice of forms of special operations. Ignorance of the basic provisions for the preparation and conduct of special operations forced the partisans to look for the most optimal structure for organizing forces and means, to develop special forms of their combat use already in the course of hostilities and to suffer heavy losses.
The practice of directing partisan actions by party and Soviet bodies within the framework of the forms of party and Soviet work, as well as by military political agencies, showed their obvious inability to perform the tasks of preparing and transferring partisan detachments to the rear of the enemy, planning the combat use of partisan detachments and directing the fighting of partisans, organizing supplies partisan detachments with weapons, ammunition, mine-explosive and other means. Therefore, by November 1941, the military councils of the fronts, on their own initiative, organized special operational groups, which took over the leadership of the fighting of the partisans as an integral part of command and control. The organization of the restoration of Soviet and party bodies in the occupied territory continued to be dealt with by various party committees, as well as departments and branches of the political bodies of the fronts and armies.
The issues of preparation, withdrawal and leadership of partisan detachments behind enemy lines also went beyond the scope of reconnaissance support for operations and combat. The reconnaissance departments of the fronts and armies tried to direct the activities of partisan detachments and sabotage groups only to solve the tasks assigned to reconnaissance. This shortcoming, in particular, was noted in the resolution of the Smolensk Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated November 11, 1941, when analyzing the state of the partisan movement in the region: "The command of the armies, divisions and regiments directs the activities of partisan detachments and uses them unilaterally, only for reconnaissance, which limits the initiative of partisan detachments and their commanders to destroy the enemy's manpower, materiel, transport and communications." Thus, the presence and departmental affiliation of a special operations control body was a significant factor influencing the choice of tasks and forms of combat use of partisan detachments and sabotage groups behind enemy lines.
With the outbreak of war, the need for a wide deployment of sabotage operations by partisan detachments on enemy lines of communication and the training of appropriate specialists became obvious. In July 1941, the Operational Training Center of the Western Front was created to prepare partisans for sabotage. Soon, similar centers and schools for the training of partisan saboteurs were created in other fronts. The absence of demolition miners in partisan detachments hampered the development and widespread use of such effective methods of sabotage as train crashes, ambush using mines and guided land mines, destruction of objects using radio-controlled mines and land mines, sabotage using surprise mines and other special actions with the use of mines and explosives.
The use of sabotage as a method of action on a large scale, in addition, was not possible due to the lack of a sufficient number of mines and charges specially adapted for use on enemy communications. Service mines TM-35, TMD-40, AM-5, PMD and others, which were in service with the Red Army, turned out to be difficult to use behind enemy lines. They were bulky, heavy and required considerable time to set up and camouflage.
The simultaneous conduct of special actions agreed upon in purpose, place and time in the form of a strike was also hampered by the lack of communication between the partisan detachments and the Center due to a lack of communications equipment and radio operators. "By June 1942, 387 registered partisan detachments and groups were operating behind enemy lines, of which only 37, that is, 10% had radio stations for communication with the Command." The insufficient number of demolition workers, radio operators and special weapons did not allow at the initial stage of the war to use such a form of special actions as a strike on railway communications behind enemy lines. Only as the partisan detachments received special mine-explosive weapons and trained specialists, the scale of sabotage began to increase. So, according to the data of the main railway directorate of Army Group Center, the number of partisan raids on railway transport facilities in the first half of 1942 was: January - 5, February - 6, March - 27, April - 65, May - 145; the number of steam locomotives blown up by mines was: in February - 5 (under repair 2), in March - 5 (2), in April 13 (6), in May 25 (13); the number of heavily damaged and completely disabled cars: January - 0, February - 0, March - 57, April - 45, May - 166. Thus, the presence or absence of specially trained and equipped personnel, as well as special weapons, was one of decisive factors influencing the scale of sabotage work and the forms of special operations behind enemy lines.
In August 1941, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus P.K. Ponomarenko was developed and sent to I.V. A note to Stalin "On the question of setting up sabotage work" behind enemy lines. However, only in December, its author was summoned to Moscow, where he was offered to familiarize himself with the proposals for organizing the partisan movement, developed by the newly created Directorate for the Formation of Partisan Units, Detachments and Groups of the Main Directorate of Formations (Glavupraform) of the NPO. The following fact speaks of the lack of understanding by this administration of the essence, goals and objectives of partisan actions. It was proposed by the head of the NPO to create on the unoccupied territory of the Don, Kuban and Terek 6-7 cavalry divisions numbering 5483 people each, consolidated into the "1st Cavalry Army of the People's Avengers" with a total number of 33,000 people, as well as five partisan divisions from the Volga, Ural and Siberian partisans, united in the "1st Rifle Partisan Army of People's Avengers" with a total number of over 26,000 people. The note emphasized that the operational use of partisan armies should be carried out in large numbers, because. "In the mass, the fighters act more boldly, more decisively and more independently." It was proposed to withdraw these partisan armadas behind enemy lines across the front line for subsequent operations in the German rear. The absurdity of such proposals, their apparent inconsistency with the real conditions of the war was not then obvious and was seriously considered in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, therefore their reasoned refutation required a lot of work and time. Ultimately, they were rejected, and P.K. Ponomarenko was asked to start organizing the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement.
However, already at the end of January 1942, by decision of the State Defense Committee, work on the creation of the TsSHPD and republican broadband was stopped. As it turned out later, the then leadership of the NKVD filed I.V. A note to Stalin, where he considered it inappropriate to have such a governing body and expressed doubts about the effectiveness and possibility of large-scale partisan sabotage. Sabotage actions to disrupt the work of the enemy's rear, the note emphasized, can only be carried out by fully reliable and qualified saboteurs who have been trained by the NKVD.
In the first period, attempts were also made to use cavalry to conduct special operations behind enemy lines. On July 15, 1941, the Headquarters of the High Command sent a directive to the troops, where the first experience of waging war was summarized. One of the points of the directive was devoted to the tasks of armed struggle behind enemy lines. Quite rightly, having identified stretched communications as the enemy's most vulnerable spot, the directive nevertheless assigned a decisive role in disorganizing the command and control and supply of the German army to "red cavalry raids" as part of light cavalry divisions numbering 3,000 people. Prior to this, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, by its directive No. 00304 of July 13, ordered the commanders-in-chief of the troops of the directions for operations in the rear and communications of the enemy to form a cavalry group consisting of one or two cavalry divisions. On July 18, it was decided to send such a cavalry group behind enemy lines in the Western direction. The request to switch to partisan operations ended the raid behind enemy lines of the 55th Cavalry Division in the Bryansk Front at the end of August. Commander of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, General P.A. Belov, recalling the joint actions of the corps with partisans in the rear in the winter of 1941-1842, wrote: "Our charters did not at all reflect the richest experience of joint actions of regular troops and partisans accumulated in past wars." Having failed in the implementation of the forms of partisan operations known to them from the civil war behind enemy lines, the commanders-in-chief of the troops of the directions and the commanders of the fronts subsequently abandoned planning the combat use of large cavalry formations and units in the rear of the German troops with special tasks.
The expansion of the scale of guerrilla warfare required the centralization of leadership and coordination of the combat operations of guerrilla formations. In this regard, there was a need to create a single body of military-operational leadership of the guerrilla war.
On May 24, 1942, the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Colonel-General of Artillery N. Voronov, turned to I. Stalin with a proposal to create a single center for the leadership of partisan and sabotage operations, justifying this by the fact that almost a year's experience of the war showed a low level of leadership in the partisan struggle in the rear enemy: “The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the NKVD, a little the General Staff and a number of leading officials of Belarus and Ukraine are engaged in guerrilla warfare in our country” 621 .
According to GKO resolution No. 1837 of May 30, 1942, at the headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army, Central headquarters of the partisan movement(TSSHPD) headed by the secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) B P. Ponomarenko. V. Sergienko became his deputy from the NKVD, and T. Korneev from the General Staff of the Red Army 622 .
Simultaneously with the TsSHPD, front-line headquarters of the partisan movement were created under the Military Councils of the corresponding fronts: Ukrainian (under the Military Council of the South-Western Front), Bryansk, Western, Kalinin and Leningrad 623 .
The central and front headquarters of the partisan movement were faced with the task of disorganizing the rear of the enemy by deploying mass resistance to the invaders in cities and towns, destroying its communications and communication lines, destroying warehouses and bases with ammunition, weapons and fuel, attacking military headquarters, police stations and commandant's offices , administrative and economic institutions, strengthening intelligence activities, etc. According to the tasks set, the structure of headquarters was also determined. As part of the Central Headquarters, 6 departments were formed: operational, intelligence, communications, personnel, logistics and general. Subsequently, they were replenished with political, encryption, secret and financial departments. The front headquarters had an almost similar organization, only in a reduced composition. The sphere of activity of the front headquarters was determined by the strip of that front, under the military council of which it was created 624 .
Until the establishment of the Belarusian Headquarters of the partisan movement on the territory of Belarus, the organization and leadership of partisan detachments, together with the leadership of the Central Committee of the CP (b) B, was carried out by the TsShPD, the operations department of which maintained close contact with 65 partisan detachments with a total number of 17 thousand people, of which up to 10 thousand acted in the Vitebsk region 625
The main task of operational activities in the Belarusian direction was to restore communication with active partisan detachments and groups throughout the republic, to carry out measures jointly with the Central Committee of the CP (b) B for the further development and intensification of combat operations of partisan forces, the development of sabotage operations of partisan forces, the development sabotage operations on enemy communications, organization of assistance to partisans with weapons, ammunition, mine-explosive means, improvement of communications, etc. Operational activities in connection with the assigned tasks until October 1942 were carried out through the Kalinin, Western and Bryansk headquarters of the partisan movement 626 .
Subsequently, by a decree of the State Defense Committee of September 9, 1942, the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement(BShPD) headed by Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b)B P. Kalinin, Deputy Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b)B R. Eidinov. Initially, it was located in the villages of Sheino and Timokhino, Toropetsky district, Kalinin region, from November 1942 - in Moscow, then at the station. Gangway near Moscow, and since February 1944 in the village of Chonki, Gomel district 627.
The structure of the BSPD was constantly changing and improving as the functions of leading the partisan movement became more complex. In 1944, the headquarters consisted of a command, 10 departments (operational, intelligence, information, communications, personnel, encryption, logistics, financial, secret, engineering), sanitary service, administrative unit, commandant platoon. Directly subordinated to him were stationary and mobile communication centers, a training reserve point, an expeditionary transport base, the 119th special air squadron with an airfield team.
In his activities, he was guided by the directive documents of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the State Defense Committee of the USSR and other higher bodies of state and military administration. In addition to the main headquarters, auxiliary command and control bodies were also created - representations and operational groups of the BSHPD under the Military Councils of the fronts, whose tasks included providing control of partisan formations and detachments based in the offensive zone of these fronts, coordinating the combat missions of partisans with the actions of regular units and formations Red Army. At various times, the BSHPD had its own representative offices on the 1st Baltic, Western, Bryansk, Belorussian fronts, and on the Kalinin, 1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian fronts and in the 61st Army - operational groups 628.
At the time of the creation of the BSHPD, 324 partisan detachments operated in the rear of the Wehrmacht regular units on the territory of Belarus, of which 168 were part of 32 brigades.
Thus, analyzing the partisan movement in the occupied territory of the Soviet Union, including Belarus, we can distinguish four periods in the organization and development of the partisan movement:
The first period - June 1941 - May 30, 1942 - the period of formation of the partisan struggle, the political leadership of which was carried out mainly by the Communist Party, there was no operational planning of combat activities. The main role in the organization of partisan detachments belonged to the organs of the NKGB and the NKVD. An essential feature of this period was that an important reserve for the development of the partisan movement were tens of thousands of commanders and soldiers of the Red Army, who found themselves behind enemy lines due to forced circumstances.
The second period - from May 30, 1942 to March 1943 - is characterized by the switching of party bodies from political to direct leadership of the partisan struggle. The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the intelligence agencies of the Red Army handed over partisan formations to the republican and regional headquarters of the partisan movement.
The third period (from April 1943 to January 1944 - until the liquidation of the TsSHPD). The partisan movement becomes controllable. Measures are being taken to coordinate the actions of partisan formations with the troops of the Red Army. The military command is planning a partisan struggle in the front lines.
The last, fourth, - January 1944 to May 1945 - is characterized by the premature liquidation of the leadership of the partisan movement, the curtailment of the military-technical and material support of the partisan forces. At the same time, the partisan formations switched to direct interaction with the Soviet troops 629 .
During 1941 - 1944. various partisan formations. They were built mainly on the military principle. Structurally, they consisted of formations, brigades, regiments, detachments and groups.
Partisan connection- one of the organizational forms of association of partisan brigades, regiments, detachments that operated on the territory occupied by the Nazi invaders. The combat and numerical strength of this form of organization depended on the partisan forces in the area of their deployment, locations, material support, and the nature of combat missions. Combat activity of a partisan formation combined the obligatory fulfillment of the orders of the joint command by all formations of the formation in solving common combat missions and maximum independence in the choice of methods and forms of struggle. At different times, about 40 territorial formations operated in the occupied territory of Belarus, which had the names of partisan formations, military task forces (VOG) and operational centers: Baranovichi, Brest, Vileika, Gomel, Mogilev, Minsk, Polessky, Pinsk regional formations; connections of the Borisov-Begoml, Ivenets, Lida, South zones of the Baranovichi region, the South Pripyat zone of the Polesye region, Slutsk, Stolbtsovsk, Shchuchin zones; Klichev operational center; Osipovichi, Bykhovskaya, Belynichskaya, Berezinskaya, Kirovskaya, Klichevskaya, Kruglyanskaya, Mogilevskaya, Rogachevskaya, Shklovskaya military operational groups; partisan formation "Thirteen", etc. It should be noted that most of the partisan formations were formed in 1943. In addition to the detachments, regiments, brigades that were part of the formation, special subdivisions of submachine gunners, artillerymen, mortarmen were often formed, which reported directly to the commander of the formation. Heading formations, usually secretaries of underground regional committees, inter-district committees of the party or officers of the Red Army; control was carried out through the Headquarters of the 630 formations.
Partisan brigade was the main organizational form of partisan formations and usually consisted of 3 - 7 or more detachments (battalions), depending on their number. Many of them included cavalry units and heavy weapons units - artillery, mortar and machine gun platoons, companies, batteries (divisions). The number of partisan brigades was not constant and fluctuated on average from several hundred to 3-4 or more thousand people. The brigade administration usually consisted of the commander, commissar, chief of staff, deputy commanders for intelligence, sabotage, assistant commander for support, head of the medical service, deputy commissar for the Komsomol. Most brigades had headquarters companies or platoons of communications, security, a radio station, an underground printing house, many had their own hospitals, workshops for the repair of weapons and property, ammunition platoons, landing sites for aircraft. 631 .
On the territory of Belarus, the first brigade-like formation was the garrison of F. Pavlovsky, created in January 1942 in the Oktyabrsky district. In the Vitebsk region, these were the 1st Belorusskaya and Aleksey brigades operating in Surazh and adjacent areas. In total, there were about 199 brigades 632.
The partisan regiment, as one of the formations of the partisans, did not have such a distribution as the formations and brigades listed above. The main distribution was received on the territory of the Mogilev and Smolensk regions. In its structure, it repeats the structure of the partisan brigade 633.
During the war years, the partisan detachment became one of the main organizational structures and the most common combat unit of partisan formations. By purpose, the detachments were divided into ordinary (unitary), special (reconnaissance and sabotage), cavalry, artillery, staff, reserve, local self-defense, marching. Initially, the detachments had 25 - 70 partisans, were divided into 2 - 3 combat groups 634.
The first partisan detachments were named after the place of deployment, by the surname or nickname of the commander (for example, the detachment "Father Minai", organized in June 1941 from factory workers in the village of Pudot between Surazh and Usvyaty). Later, the names of famous commanders, political, military figures of the Soviet Republic, heroes of the civil war were given (for example, the partisan detachment of the 3rd named after Zhukov, 2nd named after Chkalov, named after Kirov, acted on the territory of the Sharkovshchinsky district); partisans who died, or names that reflected patriotic and strong-willed motives or a political orientation in the struggle (partisan detachment 3rd "Fearless", operating on the territory of the Polotsk and Rossony districts). Many units had number designations.
In total, about 1,255 partisan detachments operated on the territory of Belarus.
The smallest unit of partisan formations is Group. It was created by party and Soviet bodies mainly in the territory occupied by the Nazis from among the military personnel who were surrounded, as well as the local population. The size and armament of the groups were varied, depending on the nature of the tasks and the conditions in which each of them was created and operated 635 .
It follows from the above that the structure of partisan formations, on the one hand, had similar features with regular military formations, at the same time, it did not have a single structure for all.
Of great importance for raising morale and patriotism was the “Oath of the Belarusian partisan”, approved in May 1942: “I, a citizen of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a faithful son of the heroic Belarusian people, I swear that I will spare neither strength nor life itself for the cause liberation of my people from the Nazi invaders and monsters, and I will not lay down my arms until the time when my native Belarusian land is cleared of the German fascist trash. ... I swear, for the burned cities and villages, for the blood and death of our wives and children, fathers and mothers, for violence and mockery of my people, to cruelly avenge the enemy and impeccably, without stopping at anything, always and everywhere boldly, decisively, boldly and ruthlessly destroy the German invaders .... " 636 .
In general, in the partisan movement in Belarus during the Great Patriotic War, according to official data, 373,492 people took part. Among them were representatives of almost 70 nationalities of the USSR and many European nations: hundreds of Poles, Czechs and Slovaks, Yugoslavs, dozens of Hungarians, French, Belgians, Austrians, Dutch 637 .
