One of the most important components of the strength of this army is its super-draft recruitment principle, the only adequate principle when it comes to defending one's own country. The mercenary army, turned into a kind of fetish in today's Russia, as world experience shows, is best suited for punitive operations (against one's own people or strangers are already details), but by no means for the defense of the motherland. In Israel, as you know, even women are drafted into the army, refuseniks are sent to prison without talking. The term of service for men is 3-5 years (depending on the type of troops and specialty), for women - 21 months. In general, 92% of men and 60% of women are covered by the call. The system of retraining (a month of service annually) and mobilization of reservists has been perfectly worked out, without which the recruiting principle of recruitment largely loses its meaning.

Therefore, Israel won the wars of 1948, 1967 and 1973, despite the fact that the Arab armies opposing it had a significant numerical superiority in personnel and weapons, and in general they were not inferior to it in terms of the quality of military equipment.

Today, the armies of 18 Islamic countries of the Near and Middle East (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, UAE, Yemen, Iran, Pakistan) are armed with in total, approximately 21 thousand tanks, almost 27 thousand infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 32.6 thousand artillery systems (self-propelled guns, towed guns, MLRS, mortars), 3.3 thousand combat aircraft, more than 500 combat helicopters. Israel has 3.5 thousand tanks, 10.4 thousand infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 5.8 thousand artillery systems, 400 combat aircraft, 100 attack helicopters. If we take only the most modern models of military equipment, then here the advantage of Islamic countries is very significant. Thus, Islamic countries can oppose 1,525 Israeli Merkava tanks with 1,288 Abrams, 428 Challengers, 390 Leclercs, 320 T-80s and 2,730 T-72s. Islamic countries have 94 Apache combat helicopters, and Israel has 40. In the air, Israeli 89 F-15s and 206 F-16s can be countered by 154 F-15s, 321 F-16s, as well as 39 F / A-18s, 96 "Mirage-2000", at least 150 MiG-29s, as well as 56 not very modern, but very powerful Su-24 front-line bombers. There is no particular point in comparing the Navy, the advantage of Islamic countries is no less great, it’s just that in all the wars of Israel against its neighbors, naval battles were rather “entertaining” in nature, they did not have any real impact on the outcome of the wars.

Islamic armies are very weak precisely in what the IDF is strong in: in the level of combat and moral-psychological training of personnel, competence and initiative of the command. The Arabs have always lost to Israel, Pakistan has always lost to India, Libya, to put it mildly, unsuccessfully fought against the much weaker Chad. Everyone witnessed the defeat of the Iraqi army in 1991 with the final finishing in 2003, although at the time Desert Storm began, the Iraqi Armed Forces were formally among the ten strongest in the world. The Iran-Iraq war was another evidence of the failure of the Islamic armies. In this case, two Islamic countries were at war with each other. The war was extremely cruel and bloody, the level of combat skill of both sides was extremely low, as a result, the eight-year massacre ended, in fact, in a draw.

The most powerful and combat-ready in the Islamic world are precisely those armies that fought the most against Israel - the Egyptian and Syrian. Their defeats taught them a lot, combat experience increased from war to war. Suffice it to recall how Egypt triumphantly launched the 1973 war by conducting a brilliant operation to force the Suez Canal. During the Lebanese war in 1982, the Syrian army showed a high level of combat prowess, which was recognized by the Israelis. And during the "Desert Storm" in 1991, according to representatives of the American command, not the British, not the French, but the Syrian army was the most combat-ready ally of the US Armed Forces (despite the fact that political relations between Washington and Damascus still remained at the highest stretched degrees).

Today, it is Egypt and Syria that remain the leaders of the Islamic world in terms of the number of weapons (except for the nuclear missile potential of Pakistan), each of the countries individually surpasses Israel in the number of tanks and combat aircraft. Nevertheless, it is almost impossible to imagine their war with Israel, since Israel is still stronger, everyone understands this very well. In addition, we must take into account that Egypt has a peace treaty with Israel, and Syria, remaining an implacable enemy of Israel, is squeezed in a vise between itself and American troops in Iraq. The armament and equipment of the Syrian Armed Forces as a whole remained at the level of the late 80s, since after the cessation of gratuitous Soviet assistance, the modernization and renewal of the military and military equipment of the Syrian army is going at a snail's pace.

Most military experts consider the Israeli army the strongest in the world

Of course, the nuclear power of the United States and Russia is incomparably higher than that of Israel - like that of any other country in the world. But nuclear power, as is known, is inapplicable in a "normal" war. The United States and Russia, as well as China and India, outnumber Israel in the number of conventional weapons. But in terms of the combination of qualities, among which the most important are the level of combat and moral and psychological training of personnel, the competence and initiative of the command, there is no equal in the world to the IDF - the Israel Defense Forces.

One of the most important components of this army's strength is its "super draft" recruitment principle, the only adequate principle when it comes to defending one's own country. In Israel, as you know, even women are drafted into the army, “refuseniks” are sent to prison without talking. At the same time, the system of retraining and mobilization of reservists has been perfectly worked out, without which the recruiting principle of recruitment largely loses its meaning.

Therefore, Israel won the wars of 1948, 1967 and 1973, despite the fact that the Arab armies opposing it had a significant numerical superiority in personnel and weapons, and in general, they were not inferior to it in terms of the quality of military equipment. References to American assistance to Israel in relation to the wars of 1967 and 1973 are untenable because Soviet assistance to the Arabs was at least no less.

Today, the armies of 18 Islamic countries of the Near and Middle East - Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, UAE, Yemen, Iran, Pakistan - are armed with in total, approximately 21 thousand tanks, almost 27 thousand infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 32.6 thousand artillery systems, 3.3 thousand combat aircraft, more than 500 combat helicopters. Israel has 3.5 thousand tanks, 10.4 thousand infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 5.8 thousand artillery systems, 400 combat aircraft and 100 attack helicopters.

If we take only the most modern models of military equipment, then here the advantage of Islamic countries is very significant.

Thus, Islamic countries can counter 1,525 Israeli Merkava tanks with 1,288 Abrams, 428 Challengers, 390 Leclercs, 320 T-80s and 2730 T-72s. Islamic countries have 94 Apache combat helicopters, and Israel has 40. In the air, Israeli 89 F-15s and 206 F-16s can be countered by 154 F-15s, 321 F-16s, as well as 39 F / A-18s, 96 "Mirage-2000", at least 150 MiG-29s, as well as 56 not very modern, but very powerful Su-24 front-line bombers. It makes little sense to compare the Navy, the advantage of Islamic countries is also great here, it’s just that in all the wars of Israel against its neighbors, naval battles were rather “entertaining” in nature, and they did not have a real impact on the outcome of the wars.

Despite such a huge superiority, it is very difficult to imagine an attack by the countries of the Islamic world on Israel. And the point is not only that Israel has a powerful nuclear missile arsenal, Pakistan has it not much less. The point is not the strong disunity of the Islamic world, under certain circumstances it can unite. But no one wants to experience the power of the IDF, not only nuclear, but also “conventional”. Too bitter past experience.

Islamic armies are very weak precisely in what the IDF is strong in: in the level of combat and moral-psychological training of personnel, competence and initiative of the command. Arabs have always lost to Israel. Pakistan has always lost to India. Libya, to put it mildly, fought unsuccessfully against the much weaker Chad. Everyone witnessed the defeat of the Iraqi army in 1991 with its final finishing in 2003, although, at the time of the start of Operation Desert Storm, the Iraqi Armed Forces were formally among the ten strongest in the world. The Iran-Iraq war was another evidence of the failure of the Islamic armies. In this case, two Islamic countries were at war with each other. The war was extremely cruel and bloody, the level of combat skill of both sides was extremely low, as a result, the eight-year massacre ended, in fact, in a draw.

The most powerful and combat-ready in the Islamic world are precisely those armies that fought the most against Israel - the Egyptian and Syrian.

Their defeats taught them a lot, combat experience increased from war to war. Suffice it to recall how triumphantly Egypt started the war of 1973, having carried out a brilliant operation to force the Suez Canal. During the Lebanese war of 1982, the Syrian army showed a high level of combat prowess, which the Israelis themselves recognized. And during the Desert Storm in 1991, according to representatives of the American command, neither the British nor the French, namely the Syrian army, was the most combat-ready ally of the US Armed Forces - despite the fact that political relations between Washington and Damascus are still remained extremely tight.

Today, it is Egypt and Syria that remain the leaders of the Islamic world in terms of the number of weapons - except for Pakistan's nuclear missile potential - each of them individually surpasses Israel in the number of tanks and combat aircraft. However, it is almost impossible to imagine their war with Israel, because it is still stronger, which everyone understands perfectly well. In addition, we must take into account that Egypt has a peace treaty with Israel, and Syria, remaining an implacable enemy of Israel, is "clamped in a vise" between itself and the American troops in Iraq. The armament and equipment of the Syrian Armed Forces, in general, remained at the level of the late 80s, since after the cessation of gratuitous Soviet assistance, the modernization and renewal of the Syrian army is proceeding at a microscopic pace.

Moreover, the armies of other Islamic countries, which, moreover, do not have common borders with it - except for Jordan and Lebanon, will not be able to fight the IDF in terms of either quantitative or qualitative parameters. Yes, in fact, they do not show such a desire. Iran seems to be the exception. However, its formally very large army, as the war with Iraq showed, is turned off by an extremely low combat capability. There are strong suspicions that Tehran's vehemently anti-Israeli rhetoric is intended primarily for domestic consumption. By this, it strongly resembles the anti-American and anti-NATO rhetoric of Russian agitprop, which in practice is accompanied by the actual liquidation of the RF Armed Forces, and at a faster pace, precisely those components of them that should have opposed NATO forces in the first place - strategic nuclear forces, air defense and fleet.

Some doubts about the combat capability of the Israeli Armed Forces arose after the Lebanese war of 2006, which the IDF did not win against Hezbollah, at least.

For the first time in its history. The regular army is always not ready for counterguerrilla warfare, even if it has a solid experience of this kind in the past. It is still being prepared only for the classical war. The Afghan experience practically did not help the Russian army in Chechnya, the Vietnamese experience helped the American army in Iraq. Counter-guerrilla warfare continues to be perceived by generals as “wrong” from the point of view of military art and illegitimate legally. Moreover, in the depths of their souls, the military often considers not only the actions of partisans, but also their own, not quite legitimate, which causes serious psychological discomfort and becomes the cause of inappropriate behavior.

The Israeli army is no exception in this regard. Like any other army in the world, it is in all respects easier for it to wage a "classic" war against another army, rather than fight with guerrilla groups. In addition, for a quarter of a century without a major war, the IDF, of course, has slightly lost its qualifications. The influence of the American ideas of "non-contact war", that is, the fetishization of aviation, had a very negative effect on it. Previously, the Israeli army was strong precisely because, despite the desire to minimize losses, it was not at all afraid of a hard contact ground war. Apparently, the fact that the standard of living in Israel has significantly increased has also affected here. This, as world experience shows, always reduces people's desire to fight.

Nevertheless, today, in purely military terms, the IDF has no competitors in the Middle East, it will defeat any army or coalition of armies of Islamic countries. Moreover, Hamas can be crushed into powder, here the forces of the parties are incomparable. But, if Israel wants to occupy the Gaza Strip for a long time, its army will inevitably begin to suffer significant losses from the actions of militants, this is absolutely inevitable in a counterguerrilla war, especially in a city one. And here the main factor will be the psychological stability of the army, government and the population of Israel. First of all, it is the reaction of society that matters, since, by virtue of the aforementioned “super draft” recruitment principle, the IDF can be considered the most popular army in the world. In general, the well-known saying that it is impossible to win a counterguerrilla war is nothing more than a propaganda cliché.

There are many examples in history when the regular army won against the partisans. It is only a question of the psychological stability of the army and the population and the political will of the country's leadership.

On the other hand, the rapid withdrawal of Israel from Gaza will lead to an equally rapid resumption of shelling of its territory. After all, the defeat of workshops for the production of NURSs and explosives is an illusion, it is too easy, simple and cheap to restore them. The destruction of Hamas leaders and, moreover, ordinary militants will also have an extremely short-term effect. The situation of the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation is frankly deadlocked. Each new outbreak of war or, on the contrary, any outbreak of the "peace process" only confirms that it is impossible to get out of this impasse either by political or military means.

Alexander Khramchikhin - Head of the Analytical Department of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis

Special for the Centenary

As for the Soviet intelligence, it found out about it on the day the decision was made by the Egyptian and Syrian presidents - October 4th.

On the eve of the war, the wives of a few Soviet officers (mainly teachers) and oil workers who were in Egypt were urgently evacuated to their homeland. This is how Antonina Andreevna Perfilova, the wife of the head of the group of military engineers, Colonel Yu.V., describes this episode. Perfilova, who taught Russian in Cairo:

“I was working in the evening. Suddenly, General Dolnikov’s car pulled up for me. The driver took me home. My husband was waiting for me there and things already packed in a suitcase. My husband told me that I was leaving for Moscow due to the current situation, but he was staying. it was unexpected and incomprehensible, but no one explained anything.

Only at the airfield Yura at two in the morning, literally just before departure, said that tomorrow the war would begin. We, the wives of officers and some oil workers, were put on a plane. It was, as they later said, the personal plane of L.I. Brezhnev. We landed at a military airfield in Kyiv. From there, those who lived in Moscow were transferred on a small but comfortable plane to the airfield near Moscow in Chkalovsk, and then they were driven home by car. It was in October, and already in February I returned to Egypt again.

At 1400, the Arabs launched a powerful offensive. The starting conditions were not in favor of the Israelis - the 100-kilometer Barlev line on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal was defended by only 2,000 soldiers (according to other sources, about 1,000) and 50 tanks. The hour of the attack was chosen taking into account the solstice, at which time it was on the side of the Egyptians and "blinded" the Israeli soldiers.

By this time, after mobilization, the Egyptian armed forces had 833 thousand people, 2 thousand tanks, 690 aircraft, 190 helicopters, 106 warships. The Syrian army consisted of 332 thousand personnel, 1350 tanks, 351 combat aircraft and 26 warships.

The Israeli armed forces at the start of the war consisted of 415,000 men, 1,700 tanks, 690 aircraft, 84 helicopters, and 57 warships.

The operation to break through the Israeli "insurmountable" fortified line, developed by Soviet advisers, was carried out with lightning speed. First, the advanced shock battalions of the Egyptians crossed a narrow channel in landing boats and boats. Then, equipment was transferred on self-propelled ferries, and the main group of Arabs was transported along the built pontoon bridges. To make passages in the sandy shaft of the Barlev line, the Egyptians used (again on the recommendation and with the participation of Soviet specialists) hydraulic monitors. This method of soil erosion was subsequently described by the Israeli press as "witty".

At the same time, the Egyptians launched a massive bombing attack on the eastern bank of the canal. In the first 20 minutes, the Arab aviation, commanded by the future president of the country X. Mubarak, destroyed almost all Israeli fortifications.

Due to the unexpectedness of the offensive and the ensuing confusion, the defenders were unable to use an important defensive factor of the Barlev line - oil tanks dug into the ground. During the assault on the fortifications, combustible material from the containers had to be poured out through special gutters into the canal. After the oil was set on fire, a wall of fire would rise up in front of the enemy assault groups.

After breaking through the Barlev line and organizing crossings to the eastern coast of Sinai, an advanced Egyptian grouping entered, numbering 72 thousand (according to other sources - 75 thousand) soldiers and 700 tanks. She was opposed only by 5 IDF brigades, forced to fight without their usual predominance in equipment and people, without air superiority and with limited mobility. It was possible to gain time before the approach of reserves only at the cost of significant losses. So, for example, on October 9, the troops of the 2nd Egyptian Army completely defeated the 190th Israeli tank brigade in 45 minutes, and its commander was captured. The main role in this battle belonged to the Malyutka ATGM batteries, which hit a greater number of armored targets than the T-62 tanks.

As a result of the breakthrough of the Barlev line and the defeat of the Israeli units, the path to Tel Aviv was opened. Front commander Shmuel Gonen, having lost control of the situation, was forced to transfer command to Ariel Sharon. Doyen (senior) of the Soviet military-diplomatic corps in the ARE, Admiral N.V. Iliev and Ambassador V. Vinogradov recommended A. Sadat to take advantage of the success and continue the offensive. However, the Egyptian president did not heed their advice, saying: "I have a different tactic. Let the Israelis attack, and we will beat them." Perhaps this decision of A. Sadat saved the world from the third world war.

In any case, as it became known later, in these critical days, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir gave the order to hang nuclear bombs on the planes of the special purpose squadron.

In this situation, there was the last hope for the help of Israel's long-term partner, the United States. “I called Ambassador Dinitz in Washington at any hour of the day or night,” writes Golda Meir in her memoirs. “Where is the air bridge with supplies for our army? , Dinitz replied: “I have no one to talk to now, Golda, it’s still night here.” – “I don’t care what time you have! I yelled in response to Dinitsa. “Call Kissinger immediately, in the middle of the night. We need help today. Tomorrow may be too late."

On the evening of October 12, the first American military transport aircraft arrived in Israel, and soon the air bridge was in full operation. In total, for the period from October 12 to 24, the Israel Defense Forces received 128 combat aircraft, 150 tanks, 2,000 state-of-the-art ATGMs, cluster bombs and other military cargo with a total weight of 27,000 tons.

Note that the Soviet air bridge to Damascus and Cairo was organized two days earlier. In a short time, about 900 sorties were made. On board the An-12 and An-22 aircraft, the necessary ammunition and military equipment were delivered to the country. The bulk of the cargo went by sea, so they began to arrive at their destination only towards the end of the war.

At the same time, no less bloody battles unfolded in the northern (Syrian) direction. The fighting on the Syrian front began simultaneously with the attack on the Barlev line in the Sinai. The intelligence informed the Israeli commanders about the upcoming offensive in advance. The commander of the 77th tank battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Kahalani, writes in his memoirs that at 8 am on October 6 he was called to headquarters. General Janusz, commander of the grouping of troops on the border with Syria, told the arriving officers that a war would begin in the afternoon with coordinated strikes by the Syrian and Egyptian armies.

By 12.00 the tanks were ready for battle: fuel and ammunition stocks were replenished, camouflage nets were stretched, and the crews took up positions according to the combat schedule. By the way, the Syrian battalion commanders received the order to attack only at 12.00.

The offensive began with an attack on the fortifications on the Golan Heights in the El Quneitra area with the forces of three infantry and two tank divisions and a separate tank brigade. (The apparatus of Soviet military advisers in the armed forces of Syria was headed during this period by Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces V. Makarov.) Each infantry division had 200 tanks. The Syrians were opposed by one infantry and one tank brigades, as well as part of the units of the 7th tank brigade of the Israeli army. Four battalions of the 188th Tank Brigade had 90-100 tanks (mostly "centurions") and 44 105-mm and 155-mm self-propelled guns. The total number of Israeli tanks on the Golan Heights reached 180-200 units.

This is how the Soviet military specialist in artillery weapons I.M. describes the beginning of the offensive. Maksakov, who was at that time in the Syrian army. “October 6 has come. In the morning there was a watchful silence in the location of the brigade. The command followed: “Into the shelter!” Guns rumbled, rocket launchers roared, eight SU-20 attack aircraft swept low over the ground. They dropped empty fuel tanks over the location of the brigade, explosions were heard bombs. The roar was unimaginable. Aircraft appeared in the air, artillery and air processing of the front line of the Israeli defense began. Low above the ground, 15 helicopters with troops landed on Mount Jebel Sheikh (2814 m above sea level). It was visible from the territory of the brigade and was the highest point of the Golan Heights. About forty minutes later the helicopters passed in the opposite direction. The cannonade did not subside. The brigade was ready to attack.

Three hours after the artillery preparation, formations and units of the Syrian army broke through the defenses with heavy losses, overcame a heavily fortified anti-tank ditch and advanced 5-6 kilometers deep into the Golan Heights. At night, the brigade made a march and on the morning of October 7 entered the battle. I had a chance to watch the battle from the shelter at the command post of the brigade.

Tanks, armored personnel carriers, cars were on fire (subsequently, the field on which the battle took place will be called by the Israelis the "Valley of Tears." - A.O.). Aircraft of the Israeli and Syrian Air Forces were constantly in the air, covering the battlefield, storming the enemy, and conducting air battles. The command post was hit by a pair of Phantoms, one of them was shot down by a Syrian missile, the pilot jumped out and parachuted down, he was captured and taken to the brigade headquarters.

By the morning of October 7, the maximum depth of the Syrians wedging north and south of El Quneitra reached 10 km. A significant role in this was played by the technical advantage of the Syrian tanks of Soviet production T-62 and T-55, equipped with night vision devices. Fierce fighting continued for several days. During this time, according to I. Maksakov, 26 Israeli planes were destroyed. By the end of the day on October 8, units of the 1st Panzer Division reached the Jordan River and Lake Tiberias, that is, to the 1967 borders. However, reinforcements approaching the Israelis (three tank brigades of General Dan Laner) stopped the attackers.

On October 9, the Israelis seized the initiative and, despite Syrian air superiority and strong air defense, bombed Damascus. Nevertheless, as a result of air defense actions, 2 Israeli aircraft with American pilots were shot down.

On October 10, the Israelis launched a counteroffensive and reached the "truce line", the so-called "Purple Line", established by the UN after the 1967 war. On the same day, Jordanian, Iraqi and Saudi formations entered the war. The Syrian brigade, in which I. Maksakov was located, having lost more than 40% of military equipment and personnel, was withdrawn to the reorganization area on the night of the 11th, and then to the reserve. During the fighting, the air defense division of the brigade destroyed 7 Israeli aircraft and lost 3 anti-aircraft guns. In total, by October 13, 143 Israeli aircraft were destroyed, with Syrian losses of 36 aircraft.

Significant on both sides were losses in manpower and armored vehicles. So, for four days of fighting in the 188th reserve brigade of the IDF, 90% of the officers were out of action. Only in the battle in the Valley of Tears, the 7th Israeli brigade lost 98 (according to other sources - 73) "centurions" out of 150, but was able to destroy 230 Syrian tanks and more than 200 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles.

On October 12, thanks to the attack of the Iraqi 3rd Panzer Division, the offensive of the Israeli troops was stopped, and on October 20, the opponents signed a truce.

In total, as a result of the fighting on the Northern Front, Syria and its allies lost, according to various sources, from 400 to 500 T-54 and T-55 tanks, and Israel - about 250 (according to Israeli data).

No less fierce fighting took place in the air, between the Syrian and Israeli air forces. Recall that by the beginning of the war, the Israeli Air Force was armed with 12 Votur light bombers, 95 F-4E Phantom fighter-bombers, 160 A-4E and H Skyhawk attack aircraft, 23 Mister 4A fighters, 30 Uragan fighters, six RF-4E reconnaissance aircraft. To solve air defense tasks, 35 Mirage fighters, 24 Barak fighters (copies of the French Mirage, produced in Israel), 18 Super-Mister fighters were used.

By the beginning of hostilities, the Syrian Air Force had 180 MiG-21 fighters, 93 MiG-17 fighters, 25 Su-7b fighter-bombers and 15 Su-20 fighters. The air defense forces were armed with 19 divisions of S-75M and S-125M anti-aircraft missile systems, as well as three anti-aircraft missile brigades of the Kvadrat air defense system (an export version of the Kub air defense system). The actions of the Air Force and Air Defense of Syria were supervised by Soviet military advisers. True, according to the adviser on combat use, the head of the Central Command Post of the Air Defense Forces and the Air Force of the Syrian Arab Republic, Colonel K.V. Sukhov, not always with an understanding of the situation and a correct assessment of the enemy. In his memoirs, he, in particular, noted: “There were very serious shortcomings in the training of the Air Force. There was an excessive centralization of control and, as a result, insufficient confidence in the commanders of air brigade.

The flight crew often mixed up from unit to unit, as a result of which there were no permanent combat crews in the squadrons, especially in the flight and pair. The commanders, flight personnel and crews of the command post had little knowledge of the characteristics of the enemy. Possessing good piloting skills, the Syrian pilots had unsatisfactory tactical, and many firearms training. Unfortunately, a large share of the blame for this lies with our advisers to the commanders of squadrons, brigades, and even the Air Force and Air Defense Directorates, who also did not know the enemy well enough and were unable to develop effective tactics to deal with them.

Not all was well in the preparation of air defense systems. Colonel K.V. Sukhov remarks on this:

"The formation of anti-aircraft missile forces (ZRV) ended less than a month before the start of the war, so the units reached only a satisfactory level of training. Combat crews did not have time to master complex types of firing (at high-speed and high-altitude targets, in a difficult radio interference environment, in conditions of use by the enemy anti-radar missiles of the Shrike type and various traps). The training program was not completed and the coherence of the KP crews was not achieved. The interaction of air defense missiles with fighter aircraft was practically not worked out. The equipment of the main, reserve and false positions was not completely completed. Subsequently, these shortcomings were used by the Syrian leadership to accuse the USSR of supplying obsolete equipment and insufficient training of Soviet military specialists. At the same time, the "rushing" policy of the Egyptian president, who turned to the Soviet Union for help at a critical moment, when there was almost no time left for the necessary combat work, was obscured. For example, on the eve of the war, Syrian fighter pilots underwent special training under the guidance of Pakistani instructors. According to Colonel V. Babich, "they mastered the MiG-21 piloting technique quite well in flight modes close to critical," they learned many single and double combat techniques that Israeli pilots knew. However, this did not save them from tangible losses. According to American data, in October 1973, the Syrian Air Force lost 179 aircraft. Other Arab allied countries, Egypt and Iraq, respectively 242 and 21 aircraft (total 442 units). At the same time, the Israeli Air Force lost 35 Phantom fighter-bombers, 55 A-4 attack aircraft, 12 Mirage fighters and six Super-Misters (98 units in total).

During the hostilities, the Syrians experienced considerable difficulty in obtaining operational information regarding the intentions of the enemy. However, the Syrian Air Force did not have a "clean" reconnaissance aircraft capable of obtaining such information, and they were again forced to turn to the Soviet Union for help. For this purpose, a detachment of MiG-25R reconnaissance aircraft was urgently transferred from the USSR to the Middle East. Nikolai Levchenko, officer of the 47th Separate Guards Reconnaissance Aviation Regiment, recalls the formation of the first detachment sent to Egypt:

"On the morning of October 11, 1973, the 47th OGRAP was alerted. Already a couple of hours later, those few who did not have time to leave for Shaikovka to replace them in Poland were delivered on the regimental An-2 from Shatalovo. The task was set in the shortest possible time the terms to dismantle and prepare four MiG-25s for transportation by the VTA, as well as to form a group of flight and technical personnel of about 200 people for a special business trip to one of the countries of the Middle East.

Since many of our brother-soldiers had already visited "one of the countries", almost no one had any doubts - this was Egypt again. And by the evening of the next day, I found out that instead of Brzeg I had to fly to Cairo.

By this time, the 154th separate air squadron (OAO) had already been formed from 220 people of the regiment's personnel. And in the evening of the same day, heading for Cairo West (with an intermediate landing at one of the airfields of the Southern Group of Forces in Hungary), the An-12 took off with an advanced group of technical personnel on board, led by the engineer of the guard squadron, Captain A.K. Trunov. Literally after them went the An-22 with dismantled MiGs on board and with the accompanying personnel.

The first sortie of the group was made on October 22, 1973. It was carried out in difficult conditions - in radio silence, without the use of radio navigation aids, by a pair of MiGs piloted by Levchenko and Major Uvarov. The fighters went north, towards Alexandria, where they turned around and headed for the Sinai Peninsula. Having passed the traverse of Lake Korun, the scouts, having completed a U-turn, returned to their airfield.

The flight duration was 32 minutes. During this time, hundreds of aerial photographs of the combat area were taken, from which a photographic tablet was compiled on the ground. Seeing this material in a couple of hours, the chief of staff of the Egyptian army, according to Levchenko, burst into tears - "a tablet with a desert landscape impartially recorded black traces of burning and soot from dozens of burnt Egyptian tanks, armored vehicles, and other equipment against a light background of sand."

The pilots of the 154th JSC made their last sortie in December 1973. Nevertheless, until May 1975, the Soviet squadron continued to be based in Cairo West and make training flights over the territory of Egypt.

The impending catastrophe on the Syrian front (especially significant losses of aviation equipment and ground-based air defense systems) forced President Hafez Assad to once again request urgent assistance from Moscow. Since the defeat of the Syrians was not part of the Kremlin's plans, an air bridge was organized as soon as possible, through which a stream from the Soviet Union poured into Syria and Egypt. According to General of the Army M. Gareev, Soviet military transport aircraft made about 4,000 sorties to Egypt alone, delivering 1,500 tanks and 109 combat aircraft to make up for serious losses.

Together with the equipment, Soviet military personnel also went to the Middle East. This is how Colonel Yu. Levshov described his urgent business trip: “It all started early in the morning on October 14, 1973. I, an engineer in the missile armament service of the unit, was called to the district headquarters by 7.00. They warned that I would have to go abroad, urgently.

At the appointed time, I and several other officers arrived at the headquarters, where the commander was already waiting for us all. He announced his decision: four of us should leave as part of a repair and restoration brigade in Syria to work on anti-aircraft missile systems.

And, if necessary, to participate in the hostilities near Damascus. The next morning we were already in Moscow, where a team of about 40 people was being formed at the General Staff. Mostly they were officers under 30 years old. We were advised to send all documents home and consider ourselves trade union members traveling to developing countries. After a short briefing about the upcoming work and conditions of service, we were sent to one of the military airfields near Moscow, from where we flew to Hungary.

There, from the airfield where the Air Force of the Southern Group of Forces was based, every 15-20 minutes a military transport plane with cargo on board took off. Flight route: Hungary - Syria. At first, planes landed directly on field airfields to deliver equipment and weapons to the combat area. In the future - to the stationary airfields of the Golan Heights and Damascus."

Upon arrival in Syria, the Soviet officers were dressed in Syrian uniforms without insignia and placed in a hotel in central Damascus. The next morning, the officers went to their duty station, to the anti-aircraft missile battalion, stationed near the border with Jordan. On the eve of Israeli aviation, a missile and bomb strike was launched at its positions, so a rather depressing picture appeared to the eyes of the Soviet military: “After the impact, two diesel engines turned upside down as a result of a direct hit. All launchers are black with soot, two are smashed to smithereens. Control cabins are damaged. Almost half of the position is bombarded with ball bombs and shrapnel."

The tasks of Soviet officers were not limited to repairing damaged equipment. A few days later, the specialists had to join the battle, directly participating in repelling Israeli air attacks: “In the first weeks, the missiles were not removed from preparation for 20-22 hours a day, since the flight time was 2-3 minutes. from behind the mountains The shock group was within minutes in the zone of fire and immediately went back behind the mountains.

I remember such a case. In one of the divisions in the front line, we checked the equipment settings. The receivers in the receiving-transmitting cabin were poorly tuned, and our engineer took up the tuning (in the case of a Shrike-type anti-radar projectile, it was a suicide bomber).

The battalion commander warned that, according to experience, Israeli planes could show up in the near future - a reconnaissance aircraft had just flown by, and it was not possible to shoot it down.

Readiness of the complex to open fire - minutes. The group leader recommended not to touch anything, but our specialist promised to do everything clearly and quickly, and if necessary, switch to manual frequency maintenance mode. As soon as he started setting up, Senior Lieutenant Omelchenko shouted from the command post that, according to the reconnaissance of targets, an attack on the division had begun, and rushed into the cockpit to help the guidance officer. In the transmitting cabin, they became nervous: how to ensure shooting when the setting is in progress? And suddenly they report from the command post that "Shrikes" have been fired at the division. Everyone who heard this immediately fell silent. In the cockpit with the receiver out of tune, the engineer was dumbfounded. Can't take my fingers off the tuning knobs.

The leader of our group jumped into the cab and pushed out the unfortunate specialist, stunned with fear. He himself, in a matter of seconds, tuned the receiver to the desired frequency, ensured the firing of the complex. A missile was fired at the target, and the Shrike was evaded by a tactic.

The senior lieutenant, who was trying to set up the equipment, began to talk a few days later, and he was urgently sent to the Union.

However, the success of the war was still decided on the Southern (Sinai) front.

In the early morning of October 14, the Egyptians launched a powerful frontal offensive. A grandiose tank battle broke out, the scale of which was not inferior to the battle on the Kursk Bulge during the Second World War. Up to 800 Israeli M-60a1, M-48aZ and "tyrants" resisted 1200 of the latest Egyptian tanks (not counting the armored vehicles of motorized infantry). As a result of the fighting in just one day, the Egyptians lost 270 tanks and armored vehicles, the Israelis - about 200.

The next day, the IDF made an attempt to seize the initiative. On October 15, 18 Israeli brigades (including 9 tank brigades), with massive air support, launched a counteroffensive.

A day later, they pressed the Egyptian infantry brigade of the 2nd Army on the right flank and broke through in the area of ​​the Khamsa station to the Great Bitter Lake. For three days, Israeli units, having crossed to the other side, captured the bridgehead and, having accumulated significant forces by October 19 - about 200 tanks and several thousand motorized infantry soldiers under the command of General Ariel Sharon, launched an offensive to the north, northwest and southwest.

On the fourth day, this grouping, divided into small detachments, destroying command posts, communication centers on its way, suppressing anti-aircraft missile batteries, artillery and liquidating supply bases, approached the city of Suez and practically blocked the 3rd Egyptian army. True, not only the Egyptians, but also the Israeli group itself were in a very difficult situation. If she had lost communications, then thousands of Israeli soldiers would have been captured. At one point, a group of Egyptian paratroopers, having made their way to the Israeli crossing, was already ready to blow up the pontoon bridges, but ... received a strict ban from Cairo to carry out this operation.

At the same time, Egyptian batteries were already firing at the crossings. And again from Cairo came the order to cease fire. The riddles of these actually treacherous orders were revealed thanks to the President of Egypt, A. Sadat himself. At the end of 1975, speaking in Cairo with two Soviet representatives, orientalist E. Primakov and journalist I. Belyaev, the president admitted that the Egyptian army was quite capable of striking at the Israelis at the final stage of the war. According to him, the Egyptian army had a double advantage in artillery, tanks and everything necessary to destroy the Israeli group on the west bank of the Suez Canal.

The Egyptian army could have destroyed parts of Ariel Sharon, but did not dare to do so. Anwar Sadat was frightened by the warning received in the first days of the war from US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The latter told the president that "if Soviet weapons win over American ones, the Pentagon will never forgive this, and our" game "with you (on a possible settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict) will be over." There were probably other good reasons for Sadat's "compliance." There is evidence that he was a high-ranking "agent of influence" of the CIA. In February 1977, the Washington Post ran a story about CIA payments to various figures in the Middle East.

One of the recipients was Kamal Adham, a former special adviser to King Faht of Saudi Arabia and a CIA liaison. The newspaper called him "a pivotal figure in the Arab world." Many assumed that some of the money Kamal Adham received from the CIA came from him to Sadat. A senior source who wished to remain anonymous confirmed that as far back as the 1960s, Adham provided Sadat, who was vice president at the time, with a steady private income. And, finally, American intelligence agencies were aware that Anwar Sadat smoked hashish and at times suffered from bouts of fear typical of drug addicts, bordering on paranoia. Public disclosure of this fact was not in the interests of the Egyptian leader. Details of the president's personal life, as well as state secrets, could be supplied to the Americans by Sadat's intelligence chief, General Ahmed Ismail, who had been associated with the CIA for many years.

Thus, the outcome of the campaign was a foregone conclusion from the very beginning. On October 23, the UN Security Council adopted two resolutions 338/339, binding on the belligerents, and October 25 became the official date for the end of the war. On the eve of Israel tried to "slow down" the decision to end hostilities in order to gain a foothold in the occupied Arab territories, but this met with the displeasure of Secretary of State Kissinger. Calling the Israeli ambassador Dinitz, he told him directly: “Tell Meir that if Israel continues the war, then let it no longer count on receiving military assistance from the United States. You want to get the 3rd army, but we are not going to because of you get a third world war!" . There were good reasons for such a statement. On October 24, the Soviet leadership warned of "the most dire consequences" that await Israel in the event of its "aggressive actions against Egypt and Syria." Through diplomatic channels, Moscow made it clear that it would not allow the defeat of Egypt.

In the telegram of the Soviet leader L.I. Brezhnev, sent to R. Nixon, noted that if the American side is passive in resolving the crisis, the USSR will face the need to "urgently consider the issue of taking the necessary unilateral steps" . To reinforce their words with deeds, the USSR declared increased combat readiness of 7 divisions of the airborne troops. In response, the Americans announced an alarm in the nuclear forces. Fear of being between "two millstones" forced Israel to stop the offensive and agree to UN resolutions. On October 25, the state of alert in the Soviet divisions and the American nuclear forces was canceled. The tension subsided, but, probably, it was at this time that the Soviet leadership had the idea of ​​​​destroying the Israeli Dimona nuclear center in the Negev desert. For its implementation, four battle groups were formed. Their training took place at the TurkVO training center in Kelita, where saboteurs on mock-ups reproducing life-size nuclear objects of Dimona practiced an operation to destroy them. The training continued for more than a month, until the command "Let go!" came from the Center.

Leaving the occupied territories, Israeli soldiers, according to eyewitnesses, took with them everything that could be useful, including the household property of Arab residents, and destroyed buildings. Thus, according to G. Kaloyanov, a correspondent for the Bulgarian newspaper Rabotnichesko Delo, the IDF units leaving the Syrian city of El Quneitra carried out a five-day operation to "destroy the city." Its many public buildings were first blown up with dynamite and then "smoothed down" by a bulldozer.

However, Israel's military success came at a heavy price. The IDF lost approximately 3,000 people killed and 7,000 wounded (according to Israeli official figures - 2,521 people killed and 7,056 wounded), 250 aircraft and over 900 tanks. The Arabs suffered even greater losses - 28,000 people killed and wounded and 1,350 tanks. Nevertheless, Israeli casualties, in proportion to the total population, far outnumbered the Arab losses.

As for the Soviet military personnel who participated in the "October" war, in addition to artillerymen, air defense specialists, as well as infantry advisers, Soviet pilots were also in the ranks of the Egyptian and Syrian armies.

It is impossible not to mention the combat work of Soviet sailors who served on the ships of the 5th squadron of the USSR Navy. They were in the Mediterranean, directly in the war zone. Moreover, in readiness for the immediate use of weapons on the enemy. Soviet warships carried out the escort of transports (tankers), both Soviet and foreign, to the ports of Syria and Egypt, the evacuation of Soviet citizens and foreign tourists from these countries, and other tasks. In total, from 96 to 120 warships of various purposes and ships of the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets, including up to 6 nuclear and 20 diesel submarines, were concentrated in the Mediterranean during the war. Part of the diesel submarines was deployed in areas along the routes of passage of Soviet convoys with transports with the task of their anti-submarine defense. Among them was the B-130 submarine under the command of Captain 2nd Rank V. Stepanov, which was on combat duty in the area southeast of the island of Cyprus - west of Haifa. For the successful completion of tasks for the protection and defense of Soviet transports, the boat commander V. Stepanov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of War.

The only known case of combat contact between Soviet sailors and the enemy was the episode with the minesweeper "Rulevoy" and the medium landing ship "SDK-39" of the Black Sea Fleet. They were forced to open fire on Israeli aviation, which was trying to prevent Soviet ships from entering the Syrian port of Latakia. There were no combat losses.

In the West, the strengthening of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron was seen as a sign that it could be used to support Soviet regular troops if they were sent to the conflict area. Such a possibility was not ruled out. It should be noted that at a critical moment for Egypt, the Soviet General Staff urgently worked out the option of landing a "demonstrative landing" of the Soviet marines in Port Said. It is noteworthy, but, according to the former officer of the operational department of the Main Headquarters of the Navy, Captain 1st Rank V. Zaborsky, at that time there were no marines in the 5th squadron. The regiment was just getting ready to be transferred to the Mediterranean Sea from Sevastopol. At the same time, most of the ships of the squadron had non-standard units for amphibious assault operations on the coast. They were trained in the Marine Corps brigade before entering combat service. The command of the landing forces was entrusted to the commander of the 30th division (command post - the cruiser "Admiral Ushakov"). In this situation, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy ordered to form a company (platoon) of volunteer paratroopers on each ship of the 1st and 2nd ranks and prepare ships and watercraft for landing personnel. The combat mission was to enter Port Said, organize defense from land, and prevent the enemy from capturing the city. Defense to be carried out before the arrival of the airborne division from the Union. Only at the last moment this operation was cancelled.

Here it is appropriate to dwell briefly on the attitude of some socialist countries towards the policy of the Soviet Union during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

Most of the socialist countries that were allies of the USSR in the Warsaw Pact supported the actions of the Soviet Union in organizing aid to the Arab countries. The countries that are part of the Warsaw Pact did not take part in hostilities, although a significant number of military specialists from Bulgaria, the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia were in Egypt and Syria.

Bulgaria and East Germany organized on their territory the training and education of Arab military personnel. Czechoslovakia supplied Arab countries with some types of weapons. Bulgaria allowed the use of its airspace by Soviet transport aircraft carrying weapons to the Middle East.

Yugoslavia, although it was not a member of the Warsaw Pact, helped the Arab countries, through the territory of Yugoslavia, flights of Soviet aircraft with weapons were carried out. The SFRY itself sold some types of weapons to the countries of the anti-Israeli coalition.

After the end of the war, it became known that Cuban units were planned to participate in the hostilities on the side of Syria. According to Colonel Vicente Diaz, deputy head of the Political Directorate of the Revolutionary Military Council of Cuba, Syria asked Fidel Castro to help her in combat operations against the Israelis. The request was granted, and 800 Cuban tank volunteers were transferred to the country in absolute secrecy. However, they did not have time to take part in the hostilities: by this time a truce had already been declared.

Nevertheless, starting in April 1974, Cuban crews began to advance in small groups to the front line, where they took part in artillery duels with the Israeli army.

The behavior of Romania was completely different. The Romanian government closed the country's airspace for aircraft carrying military cargo from the USSR to the Middle East. Moreover, the SPP supplied Israel with spare parts during the conflict for the repair of Soviet-made equipment that the Israelis had captured from the Arab countries during previous hostilities. Israel received from Romania not only spare parts, but also modern samples of equipment components, in particular, radio-electronic, Soviet-made, which were in service with the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact.

On the Israeli side, American units fought, trained for combat operations in the desert sands. According to some reports, the soldiers of these units had dual citizenship. In addition, according to the Russian émigré magazine Chasovoy, there were over 40,000 (?) regular American military personnel in the Israeli army.

About 140 ships and vessels from the 6th Fleet of the US Navy were concentrated in the Mediterranean Sea, including 4 attack (multi-purpose) aircraft carriers, 20 landing helicopter carriers with a naval formation of amphibious (amphibious) forces of 10-12 units, 20 cruisers, 40 destroyers and other ships.

Despite the official victory of Israel and its allies, the war "painfully" hit the economies of Western countries, primarily the United States. On the tenth day, the Arabs, without negotiations with importers, imposed an embargo on oil supplies to the United States. US imports from the Arab countries fell from 1.2 million barrels a day to almost nothing. In a matter of weeks, the price of crude oil more than quadrupled from $12 to $42 per barrel. The result was a fuel shortage in America and an economic downturn around the world. Due to the high cost of fuel in the northern regions of the United States, many government agencies and schools were closed, and strict control over gasoline was introduced. It was even regulated filling gasoline in cars at gas stations.

The crisis did not last long. In March 1974, the "Oil Summit" was held in Washington: the Arabs lifted the embargo and increased production. Nevertheless, the price of oil continued to rise intermittently. Odd and even numbers of gasoline were poured until 1976, and the economical "national speed limit" of 90 km / h lasted until 1995.

The "gasoline crisis" that broke out as a result of the embargo of the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf clearly showed the vulnerability of the Western economy. This, in turn, served as an impetus for the creation of an anti-crisis structure, in particular in America - the Department of Energy in 1977 and the strategic oil reserve in 1978.

As for the Soviet Union, the "gasoline crisis" brought him even a certain benefit. Rising oil prices allowed the USSR to buy grain, maintain the same level of military spending, and fuel its economy for more than a decade.

In conclusion of the essay, it is important to touch upon another aspect of the Yom Kippur War related to the study of the experience of conducting combat operations of the parties and their use of modern types of weapons. This aspect received considerable attention from both the USSR and the USA.

The Soviet group, consisting of 12 officers from all branches of the military, was created immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. In addition to studying the experience of the war, military specialists who arrived from Moscow were tasked with collecting samples of the latest enemy weapons and equipment. The group's first "trophy" was an American-made Israeli M-60 tank. A week later, he was delivered to the Soviet Union (in Kubinka), and after another two weeks, the Egyptian command received materials on the tests of the "American", as well as recommendations on combating the M-60 in a combat situation. Other "exhibits" were the English tank "Centurion", an unmanned reconnaissance aircraft of American production and other types of Western weapons and equipment. For the completion of this task, the head of the group, Admiral N.V. Iliev was awarded the Order of the Red Star.

Similar work was carried out by the US military. For this purpose, at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Abrams, a special commission was created, headed by Brigadier General Braid. Its tasks included studying the features of the forms and methods of action of the opposing sides in the conflict and, most importantly, formulating proposals for optimizing the development of the US ground forces based on its results.

As a result of the work of the commission, the effectiveness of the theory of combined arms combat adopted by the Egyptian troops (developed in the USSR) was noted - the use of infantry units with ATGMs in the combat formations of tank units and subunits; an active and coordinated diversity of air defense systems by the Arabs, which deprived the Israelis of the predicted overwhelming superiority in the air, etc.

But the main conclusion made by American experts from the analysis of military operations in the Middle East in 1973 was the need to develop a national theory of operational art.

Immediately after the end of the war, by decision of the UN, the Emergency Armed Forces (CHVS-2), created under the auspices of the UN, were sent to the conflict zone. Their task was to monitor the implementation of the terms of the truce in Palestine. The number of PMCs was 300 officers representing 17 countries. As a result of the persistent work of Soviet diplomacy, by decision of the UN Security Council, 36 military observers from the USSR were included in the peacekeepers (Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 2746 of December 21, 1973). The first group of 12 officers led by Colonel N.F. Blika (deputy commander of the Kantemirovskaya motorized rifle division) began a peacekeeping mission in Egypt, in the Suez Canal zone, on November 25. On November 30, another 24 Soviet military observers arrived in Cairo. Among the arrivals there were many experienced officers, some of them visited different countries, participated in hostilities and had awards. 18 military observers remained in Egypt, while 18 observers left for Syria.

With the beginning of 1977, the USSR and the USA intensified their efforts to convene the Geneva Conference on a Comprehensive Settlement in the Middle East. At the same time, activity also intensified on the "internal front": Egypt and Israel began to secretly establish direct contacts, paving the way for a separate deal. It is significant that the top secret contacts between Egypt and Israel were kept under complete control both in Moscow and in Washington. Soviet intelligence agencies could obtain the necessary information in a matter of hours and pass it on to Andropov, and then to Brezhnev. In addition, three Soviet ships - "Caucasus", "Crimea" and "Yuri Gagarin" - with the necessary electronic equipment, "filmed" all radio and telephone conversations in Egypt, Israel and other neighboring countries, were constantly cruising in the Mediterranean Sea.

On October 1, 1977, the USSR and the USA signed the Statement on the Middle East, in which the parties determined the date for the Geneva Conference (December) and for the first time, at the insistence of Moscow, included a clause on the rights of the Palestinians in the document. However, the American political establishment strongly recommended that the Carter administration, which came to power, maintain a position independent of the Kremlin. The stake was placed on an alliance between Begin and Sadat. On September 17, 1978, Israel and Egypt, with the participation of the United States, signed the David Accords. On March 26 of the following year, a peace treaty was concluded in Washington between the two countries. The withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Sinai Peninsula began, which ended in April 1982. The Soviet Union, not wanting to remain a mere observer in the Middle East issue, was forced to rely on Egypt's political opponents: Libya, Algeria, South Yemen, Iraq, the PLO and Syria.

Notes:

The National Liberation Front of Algeria was created on October 10, 1954 at a meeting of the commanders of the five zones (wilaya) and a representative of the group located in Egypt. At the same meeting, a decision was made to form the military wing of the Front - the National Liberation Army (ELN). The backbone of the Front and the ANO were the leaders of the paramilitary Security Organization (or Special Organization), which arose in 1947 - Ait Ahmed, Ben Bella, Kerim Belkasem, Ben Buland and others. The security organization, in turn, was created in 1946 (headed by Masali Hajj) on the basis of the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Freedoms

Khazhderes S. From the Liberation Front to the Creation Front // Problems of Peace and Socialism. - 1975. - No. 1, January. – S. 83.

Local Wars: History and Modernity / Ed. I.E. Shavrov. M., 1981.-S. 183.

Military history magazine. - 1974. No. 11. - P. 76.

Landa R. Algeria throws off the shackles. M., 1961. - C 73

Abbas Farhat - was born on October 24, 1899 in the family of a prosperous peasant in the village of Shalma of the Babor Kabylia region in the north-east of Algeria. He studied at the "Franco-Arab" school of Taher, then - at Gigelli, the Lyceum of Constantine. Received a bachelor's degree. In 1921-1923. served in a military hospital, rose to the rank of sergeant. After serving in the army, he entered the medical faculty of the University of Algiers. In 1919, he joined the assimilationist movement of the "French-Muslims". In 1926, he became president of the Muslim Students Association of the University of Algiers, and in 1927, president of the Muslim Students Association of North Africa. In 1930 - vice-president of the National Union of Students of France. In the 1930s he was elected to the municipality of Setif, the general council of the department of Constantine, the financial delegation of Algeria. Actively published in newspapers and magazines. He joined the Federation of Native Chosen Ones (FTI). As a delegate of the FTI, he was introduced to the executive committee of the Muslim Congress. In 1938 he created the Algerian People's Union (ANS). One of the authors of the "Manifesto of the Algerian People" (1942), which proclaimed "recognition of the right of peoples to self-determination", "elimination of colonization", etc. In September 1943, he was arrested for "incitement" to disobedience to the authorities, but was soon released. On March 14, 1944, he created the association "Friends of the Manifesto and Freedom" in Setif, which declared its goal to fight "against the violence and aggression of the imperialist powers in Africa and Asia." In 1945 he was again arrested for supporting an uprising against the French authorities. After his release on March 16, 1946, he created the Democratic Union of the Algiers Manifesto. In the mid-1950s, he joined the National Liberation Front (FLN), which raised an uprising on November 1, 1954. In April 1956, he was introduced to the leadership of the FNO, and in August he was elected a member of the National Council of the Algerian Revolution (NSAR). September 19, 1958 headed the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (VPAR), established in Cairo. In 1961, at the session of the NSAR (August 9-27), he was removed from the post of head of the VPAR and resigned. Despite this, he continued to engage in political activities. September 20, 1962 became chairman of the Constituent Assembly of Algeria. On August 13, 1963, he resigned in protest against the "concentration of power in one hand" and the transformation of representatives of the people into "simple figurants." On July 3, 1964, he was arrested as an "enemy of the socialist choice" and exiled to the Sahara. On June 8, 1965, he was released, and in March 1976, after signing the Appeal to the Algerian People, he was again arrested. After his release in 1977, he continued to engage in journalistic activities. He died on December 24, 1985.

In 1974, Ibrahim Shaheen, his wife Dina and two children were arrested by the Egyptian secret services and put on trial. In 1977, when President Anwar Sadat was preparing to travel on a peace mission to Israel, the head of the family was hanged, and Dina and her children were released and soon fled with them to Israel.

Perfilov Yuri Vasilievich. He graduated from the Leningrad Higher Military Engineering School, the Academy. Kuibyshev, postgraduate course. He served in the General Staff, taught at the Military Academy. Kuibyshev. In Egypt, he was the head of a group of military engineers, taught at the Academy. Nasser. Colonel. As an adviser (engineer troops) he participated in the October War. He was awarded the Egyptian order. After returning to his homeland, he received the rank of major general.

Russia (USSR) in local wars and military conflicts in the second half of the 20th century. / Ed. V.A. Zolotarev. M., 2000. S. 200.

Israel failed to establish air supremacy, since a modern air defense system was quickly deployed in Syria with Soviet help, with Soviet officers often at the controls. Moreover, on the eve of the war, Syrian fighter pilots underwent special training under the guidance of Pakistani instructors and well mastered the MiG-21 piloting technique, including single and double piloting, a tactic practiced by Israeli pilots.

Kamenogorsky M. Secrets of the Israeli bomb // Independent military review. 2004. No. 11. P. 5.

Meir G. My life. Chimkent, 1997; Smirnov A. Arab-Israeli wars. M., 2003. C, 318.

Smirnov A. Arab-Israeli wars. M., 2003. S. 318.

"Armor Collection". 2003. No. 2. S. 24.

Maksakov Ivan Mikhailovich Born April 23, 1940 in Ukraine. In 1957 he graduated from high school. In 1959 he was called up for active military service. In 1962 he entered the Kiev Higher Anti-Aircraft Artillery School, from which he graduated in 1967. Until 1972 he served in the KDVO. From 1972 to 1974 he was on a business trip in Syria. From 1974 to 1982 - teacher of the Smolensk VZAKU, and in 1982-1984. - Combined Arms Military Academy in Algiers. From 1984 to 1990 - Deputy Head of the Department of the Smolensk Higher Anti-Aircraft Missile School. In 1990, he was transferred to the reserve. Colonel.

Maksakov I. Mission to Syria. In book. Internationalists. 2001. Smolensk. pp. 213-214.

Isaenko A. In the footsteps of Lawrence of Arabia. Notes of the UN military observer // Independent military review. 2003, 1 August. S. 8.

The civil war in Syria, which has been going on with varying degrees of success in the country for 6 years, has put this once prosperous country on the brink of a humanitarian catastrophe. Once Syria, whose army is now struggling to regain control over previously lost territories, was considered one of the most militarily powerful states in the Middle East. Gone are the days when Syria had great political weight in the Arab world, when not a single political and armed conflict was complete without the participation of Syrian troops. To date, the situation has changed dramatically. The country is torn apart. The fire of civil confrontation covered 70% of the country's territory. From the once mighty military force, there are pitiful remnants. However, even in this state, the current army, which has always been considered the stronghold of the regime of President Assad, has become almost the only tool for maintaining the position of the current government.

Fighting on several fronts at once, the Syrian armed forces managed not only to prevent the final collapse of the state, but also continue to fight for the restoration of the country's sovereignty. And this despite the fact that the size of the armed forces has been greatly reduced due to mass desertion and military losses. A serious blow to the combat capability of the Syrian army was a significant reduction in the sources of funding for military spending items. The army, which does not have a stable and reliable logistics support, in which modern weapons can be counted on the fingers, and there is an acute shortage of qualified personnel, is forced to continue the armed struggle.

What was before, before the war

The Syrian Arab Republic has had powerful armed forces since its inception. This was facilitated by the political situation that developed in the Middle East in the second half of the 20th century. The Syrian leadership, unlike the governments of other Middle Eastern countries, initially pursued a policy oriented towards the Soviet Union. Thanks to friendship with the USSR, the country was constantly in the orbit of Soviet foreign policy, receiving serious military and economic assistance in return.

The Syrian army, which began to receive large quantities of Soviet military equipment, quickly gained strength, eventually becoming one of the most powerful in the region. The combat readiness and condition of the troops were affected not only by the number of army units and subunits, but also by the high technical training and moral and psychological qualities of the personnel. Most of the Syrian officers were trained in the educational institutions of the Soviet Union. Military-diplomatic missions from the USSR constantly worked in Syria, whose employees trained commanders and personnel of the Syrian armed forces. Work was carried out in all directions, both in the field of acquiring skills in handling new models and weapons, and in terms of tactical training. The level of military-technical training of the Syrian army has always remained quite high, even despite a number of heavy defeats suffered by the Syrian troops during the armed conflicts that broke out in the Middle East.

It should be noted that the Syrian military had great political weight in the country. The army constantly took part in the military-political crises that arise in this explosive region of the planet. Throughout the second half of the 20th century, the Syrian armed forces were marked by participation in the following armed conflicts:

• 1948 - the war for the independence of the Israeli state;
• 1967 - six-day war of the coalition of Arab countries against Israel;
• 1973 - "The Doomsday War";
• 1982 - Civil war in Lebanon;
• 1990-91 — First Gulf War.

Evaluating this list, we can conclude that the Syrian armed forces traditionally have vast combat experience. The army in Syria is not a parade-demonstrative structure. The armed forces for the Syrian Arab Republic have always been the main element in the organization of the strategic regional foreign policy. This is also confirmed by the structure of the armed forces, traditionally consisting of three types:

• ground troops;
• air Force;
• naval forces.

The first two types of troops for the Syrian army play a key role in the defense strategy. The last, naval component, due to the limited sea coastline, is an auxiliary branch of the armed forces. The Syrian army in terms of its strength at the zenith of its power ranked 16th in the world. In the army units, in military aviation, in the air defense forces and in the navy, there were up to 354 thousand people. The country had a fairly large mobilization resource, which, according to various sources, was estimated at 3.5-4 million people.

To ensure the solution of tactical tasks on its own territory, Syria had a gendarmerie corps and units of the people's militia (reservists).

The structure of the armed forces of the Syrian Arab Republic

Despite the insignificant area of ​​the state, the entire territory of the country was divided into six military districts, oriented according to the geographical factor. The main strike force of the Syrian armed forces is the ground forces, numbering 215 thousand people in peacetime. Together with the reserve, the army units represented a half-million army. The composition of the ground forces traditionally includes tank, infantry, motorized and airborne troops located in the first line of defense.

In addition to combat units, the ground forces include border troops, communications and chemical defense units, army electronic warfare units and engineering and technical formations. The central governing body of the ground forces is the General Staff of the Syrian army, which in turn is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense of the country and the Supreme Commander. The highest operational-tactical formation of the ground forces is the army corps, divisional and brigade composition.

The main task that was set before the ground forces was to counter the military expansion of Israel on the southern borders of the country, to protect the eastern and northern borders of the state.

At the peak of its military power, the Syrian army had 12 divisions, of which 4 were armored (tank division of the Republican Guard) and one airborne. In addition to motorized and tank divisions, the ground forces included:

• four infantry brigades;
• border brigade;
• two missile and artillery brigades;
• two anti-tank teams;
• up to 11 separate regiments.

In wartime conditions, the army could deploy an additional 31 infantry divisions, about 4-5 tank brigades or divisions.

The artillery of the ground forces had two full-fledged brigades, to which 3 more artillery regiments could be added at any time.

The ground forces were equipped with up to 4,700 tanks. The basis of the tank fleet was made up of Soviet-made vehicles, T-55M, T-62M and T-72M tanks. Of this number, almost a quarter of the tanks are in long-term storage under conservation conditions. The motorized units included 2350 BMP-1 and BMP-2, more than one and a half thousand BTR-152, BTR-50 and BTR-60.

The main force of the artillery of the Syrian ground units was represented by Soviet-style artillery systems. Self-propelled artillery is 152-mm Akatsiya howitzers and 122-mm Gvozdika self-propelled guns. In addition, the motorized and infantry units had up to 1600 towed artillery pieces with a caliber of 100-180 mm. The rocket artillery was equipped with 480 Syrian-made BM-21 Grad and Type-63 multiple launch rocket systems.

Heavy infantry weapons, which are in service with motorized and infantry units, were mainly represented by mortars of 82-120 mm caliber, anti-tank portable systems "Malyutka", "Fagot", "Milan" and "Kornet-E".

Battalion, regimental and brigade air defense systems were equipped with portable air defense systems "Igla", "Strela-1" and "Strela-2", towed anti-aircraft guns ZU-23-2, KS-19 and S-60, self-propelled ZU-23- 4 "Shilka".

Despite the rather large number of the most diverse military equipment, the technical fleet of the Syrian ground forces cannot be called modern. For its time, during the period of active confrontation with Israel, during the time of the Arab-Israeli troops, Soviet tanks and artillery could successfully compete with the best examples of Western military equipment. Currently, there is a rapid obsolescence of the material and technical base of tank units and artillery. Affects the low level of maintenance of mechanized units.

Military aviation

The Air Force of the Syrian Arab Republic was once considered one of the best in the Arab world. The Syrian Air Force includes directly military aviation and air defense units of the country. The Syrian army aviation was armed with up to 500 combat aircraft of various types and up to 100 combat helicopters. Military aviation had a fairly significant number of transport aircraft, helicopters and training machines.

The basis of the aircraft and helicopter fleet were Soviet-made machines. The strike force of aviation was the Su-22 and Su-24 fighter-bombers. Fighter aircraft mainly consisted of Soviet MiG-21 and MiG-23 aircraft. A little later, in the early 90s, the Syrian military aviation was replenished with more modern machines, MiG-29 fighters. The helicopter fleet of the Syrian army aviation is the Mi-8 and Mi-17 transport vehicles. There are several regiments of Mi-25 attack helicopters at the disposal of the Syrian troops. In military-technical terms, Syrian aviation is at a transitional stage, when the goals and objectives set do not correspond to the technical capabilities of aviation technology. Old Soviet machines in most cases have exhausted their technological resource, new machines are just beginning to be supplied to equip aviation units, and in limited quantities.

The country's air defense system is built on the sectoral defense of the Northern and Southern air defense zones, where the main load is borne by ground-based air defense systems. The emphasis in the organization of defense measures is placed on the southern zone, which directly borders on the territory of Lebanon and Israel. Structurally, the entire air defense is represented by two divisions and 25 separate missile brigades. The Syrian military has 900 launchers at its disposal, among which it is worth highlighting Soviet models: the S-200 Kvadrat, the S-125, S-75 and Osa launchers.

In modern conditions, it is not necessary to talk about the high quality of Syria's air defense. They are armed with obsolete missile systems. At one time, the modernization carried out slightly increased the combat characteristics of anti-aircraft missile systems. In view of this situation, the country's top military leadership is betting on increasing the role of aviation in securing the air borders of the Syrian Arab Republic.

Syrian navy

There is no need to talk much about the Syrian Naval Forces. A small number of ships, represented mainly by boats and ships of the old Soviet construction, a weak material and technical base do not allow the Syrian fleet to play an important role in the Eastern Mediterranean. The main task of the Syrian fleet is to protect its own coastline from a possible invasion in conditions of close cooperation with the ground and aviation units of the Syrian army.

The main naval base of the Syrian Navy is the port of Latakia. Detachments of military boats and ships are also based on Tartus and Mina el-Beid. The main fighting force of the Syrian fleet is two Project 159e frigates, which the country received back in 1975, and 10 Soviet-built missile boats.

In total, the Syrian Navy has 10 ships, 18 boats and up to 30 ships of other types and classes. The strength of the fleet is 4 thousand people. Coastal defense units are represented by Soviet-made Redut and Rubezh missile systems. They are complemented by artillery units armed with long-range 100 and 130 mm. tools.

The acquisition of the Syrian army

The principle of staffing, the military field and rear structures of the Syrian army units, the governing bodies repeated the structure of the Soviet Army. To maintain a constant staffing of army units in the Syrian Republic, universal military service has been introduced. The entire male population of the country aged 19-40 years old, who does not have restrictions for health reasons, is called up for military service. The call was carried out twice a year - in spring and autumn. The approximate number of conscripts who annually replenished the ranks of the armed forces is 120-130 thousand people. Such a system allowed for a long time to maintain the strength of the Syrian armed forces at a high level. Service in the army lasted 2.5 years.

In Syria, as in other Arab states, starting from 1953, there was a system of paying off military service. Those segments of the population who could financially solve these issues sought to be freed from military service. This practice was especially vividly observed during the period of the Arab-Israeli conflicts, when armed clashes and hostilities were of an intense nature.

It should be noted that for the most part, the Syrian army is a worker-peasant army. Wealthy Syrians were not eager to go to war for the idea of ​​the domination of the Arab world. This fact explains the extremely low level of technical training of soldiers and sergeants, which is often explained by the failures of the Syrian army at the front, significant losses of Syrian troops in manpower and equipment. In a sense, the situation with the recruitment of army units by sergeants was saved by the introduction of a contract system in the army. Syrians who served in the active army could remain in long-term service by signing a contract for a period of 5 years or more. Those who retired to the reserve were transferred to the passive reserve, which was a mobilization resource for the wartime army.

The sergeants, the main driving force of any modern army, were recruited from over-conscripts and conscripts who graduated from higher educational institutions. The preparation and education of the officer corps in the country was carried out by military schools, as well as two military academies. The senior command staff was trained at the Higher Military Academy, Damascus, and at the military-technical academy in Aleppo. For 30 years in the USSR from the Syrian Arab Republic, within the framework of existing agreements on military-technical cooperation, Syrian officers were trained and retrained.

Military-political strategy of Syria

For a long time, the defense strategy of the Syrian Arab Republic was based on solidarity with the united Arab front and was aimed at containing the expansion of Israel. However, the agreements reached between Egypt and Israel, the split in the unity in the Arab world, became the reason for the revision of the defensive strategy of the Syrian state.

For many years, armaments were flowing into the country from the USSR to Syria. Soviet tanks, artillery and missile systems, armored personnel carriers and vehicles constituted the main fleet of military equipment of the Syrian armed forces. At a certain moment, in terms of military-technical condition, the Syrian troops, especially tank units and military aviation, were not inferior to either Israel or other neighboring countries. Syrian tanks were stationed 200 km from Tel Aviv, occupying positions on the Golan Heights. The Syrian Air Force had sufficient technical resources to counter the Israeli Air Force in the zone of potential conflict. The defense strategy of the Syrian state was formed in a similar way. With the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Syria lost the opportunity to form its military and economic potential.

Since the beginning of the 90s, the SAR leadership began to focus on the principle of reasonable defensive sufficiency, to which the army played a key role as a deterrent. The transition to such a defense strategy does not mean that the foreign policy conditions in the region have changed dramatically. Israel was still seen as the main adversary. The Syrian military command looked cautiously towards Turkey and Iraq. In Iraq, after the military defeat, Saddam Hussein's regime retained its influence. Turkey continued to build up its military potential, seeking to take the place of a regional leader.

In the military-technical competition with Israel and Turkey, the Syrian Republic was clearly losing. The lack of serious support and assistance from abroad immediately affected the military-technical condition of the Syrian army.

The current situation in the Syrian army

Today, the Syrian army is only a small part of the former power that the Syrian armed forces had in the 20th century. The current leadership of the country is trying to prevent a decrease in the combat capability of regular troops in the context of the ongoing military civil conflict.

By stopping the mass desertion that swept the army with the beginning of the civil confrontation, the command managed to mobilize sections of the population loyal to the Assad regime. Thus, it was possible to preserve the backbone of the army, giving it the opportunity to gradually restore its combat capability. Today, when several groups are fighting in Syria at once, Assad's army continues to be the backbone of the ruling regime. The Syrian troops rely on the military-technical assistance of the Russian Federation, which is trying to keep President Assad as its last ally in the Middle East.

There is a slow re-equipment of army units with new models of weapons, the combat and morale of the army has significantly increased in comparison with that observed at the initial stage of the armed conflict. The latest reports from the fronts indicate that the Syrian army is gradually reviving, pushing rebel units in important areas. A considerable merit of the Syrian troops in delivering painful blows to the positions of the terrorists of the Islamic State group, which is opposed by the combined armed forces of the United States and Great Britain, Turkey and Russia.