The non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany turned 79 on August 23. Why did the USSR conclude an agreement with Germany in August 1939, and not with England and France? Were Hitler and Stalin allies and why did they divide Poland? Are the military failures of 1941 related to the decisions taken in 1939?

This was told by a military historian, candidate of historical sciences Alexei Isaev.

Pact without alliance

In your opinion, did the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact bring the outbreak of World War II closer? Did he become her catalyst?

Of course, he did not, because all the military plans of Germany had already been drawn up by that time and the conclusion of the Soviet-German treaty in August 1939 did not affect them in any way. Hitler hoped that the pact would significantly change the position of England and France, but when this did not happen, he did not abandon his intentions.

That is, Germany would have attacked Poland in 1939 anyway, even without the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact?

Oh sure. The Wehrmacht was already ready for the invasion, and even a special sabotage group was sent to capture the Yablunkovsky pass, which opens the way to Krakow. At the end of August 1939, the wheels of the German military machine were spinning, regardless of the results of the negotiations in Moscow.

Is it possible to say that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact made the Stalinist USSR and Nazi Germany allies, who supposedly unleashed the Second World War together?

No, the USSR and Germany did not become any allies after August 1939. They did not have joint planning of military operations, and even the military operations on the territory of Poland were carried out by both sides independently of each other. Moreover, the USSR waited a long time before reaching the line of delimitation of spheres of interest, determined by the secret protocols to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939 did not carry out any mutual coordination of military operations, similar to the Anglo-American coalition that was formed later.

But what about the joint parade in Brest and the supply of Soviet resources to Germany until June 1941?

The parade in Brest was not a parade in the truest sense of the word, a kind of solemn event. The passage of German and then Soviet troops through the streets of the city served as a visible confirmation for the Soviet command that the Germans were indeed leaving the territory that was in the sphere of interests of the USSR.

As for deliveries, they went both ways. The Soviet Union received high-tech equipment, and in return supplied raw materials to Germany. Subsequently, we actively used German equipment for the production of weapons, with which we fought against Germany. In addition, the deliveries themselves do not say anything. Consider the relationship between Germany and Sweden. As you know, the Germans were perhaps the main consumers of Swedish iron ore. But does this mean that Sweden was an ally of Germany? Of course not. Sweden supplied raw materials to Hitler due to the lack of other trading partners and the difficult food situation. At the same time, Germany had plans to occupy Sweden.

Partition of Poland

If the relations of the USSR with Germany were not allied, then how can they be called? Friendly?

No, there was no friendship. In our relations with Germany from 1939 to 1941 tension and mutual distrust remained.

It was called that only formally. Of course, there was no real friendship between the USSR and Nazi Germany, and there could not be. It was a forced situational partnership and wary neutrality.

Did the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact or the secret protocols to it specifically stipulate the timing of the USSR's action against Poland, which took place on September 17, 1939?

That is, according to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the USSR did not have a written obligation to attack Poland together with Germany?

Of course, there were no obligations, especially with the designation of specific dates. Moreover, the USSR could not cross the Soviet-Polish border at all either on September 17 or later. But since there was a clear distrust of the Germans, who in some places crossed the line of delimitation of interests, they made such a decision. However, let's think about how the situation would develop if these Polish territories were occupied by German troops? Moreover, at that time there were no active hostilities at all on the western front - the British and French waged the so-called "strange war" with the Germans.

In today's Poland, the occupation of its eastern territories by the Red Army in September 1939 is called a "stab in the back." And how do you evaluate it?

If we use this terminology, then by the time the Soviet tank brigades invaded, Poland no longer had any back. By September 17, the Polish army was already completely defeated by the Wehrmacht.

And the government of Poland by that time was evacuated from the country.

Yes, but that was not the trigger for the Soviet invasion. The decision on the Polish campaign of the Red Army was made independently of this. Although the evacuation of the Polish government clearly demonstrated the collapse of its army. I repeat, the occupation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus by the Red Army in September 1939 prevented its capture by the Nazi troops.

"Pripyat problem"

How do you assess the annexation of Eastern Poland (aka Western Belarus and Western Ukraine) from a military-strategic point of view? Did the division of Poland between Germany and the USSR help delay the war, or is it better to prepare for it?

This should not be limited only to Poland. The Germans then allowed us to occupy part of the territory of Finland to the north-west of Leningrad and absorb the Baltic states. And this radically changed the entire strategic situation in the region.

Significant changes also took place on the territory of the former Eastern Poland. Until 1939, the so-called “Pripyat problem” was a headache for Soviet military planning, a difficult wooded and swampy area in the south of present-day Belarus. But then this area became a problem for the German command, which in 1941 had a negative impact on the interaction between Army Groups Center and South and the further implementation of the Barbarossa plan.

After the end of World War II, former Wehrmacht General Alfred Philippi wrote a whole book about this, which is called: “The Pripyat problem. Essay on the operational significance of the Pripyat region for the military campaign of 1941. Therefore, here our strategic position in 1939 also improved, and 300 kilometers from the old to the new border gave the USSR a significant gain in time and distance.

But your opponents may object to this as follows: the border was pushed back 300 kilometers, but as a result, we mothballed the well-fortified "Stalin Line" on the old border, and the "Molotov Line" on the new border by June 1941 was not equipped.

The assertion that the so-called "Stalin Line" was well fortified can only arouse a bitter smile. It was built in the 1930s largely according to outdated drawings and patterns, and there were large gaps in it, especially on the territory of Belarus. Therefore, there was no point in clinging to her. But the line of defense on the new border, oddly enough, played an important role in 1941, despite the fact that the Germans overcame it.

Photo: Berliner Verlag / Archiv / Globallookpress.com

For example?

Thanks to her, the 1st Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht was forced to slow down the pace of the offensive and significantly adjust their plans. The Germans had to redistribute their forces and means, which subsequently prevented them from advancing to Kyiv.

They also say that in the newly annexed territories (especially in Western Ukraine), the Soviet Union received a hostile local population, who in 1941 warmly welcomed the Germans.

Against the general background of those events when millions of armies fought, this factor was not significant. He did not influence the outcome of the military confrontation at all.

Respite before the blitzkrieg

So you don't think that the achievements of Stalin's diplomacy in 1939 were devalued by the military catastrophe of 1941? After all, say, the Germans took Minsk, located not far from the 1939 border, on June 28, 1941.

This is a false conclusion. The mistakes made by the Soviet leadership in 1941 were by no means the result of decisions taken in 1939. The fact that Stalin did not dare to deploy troops on the western borders in May 1941 does not mean that the position of the Red Army on the borders of 1941 was worse than at the borders of two years ago. If there had been a normal reaction on the part of the Soviet leadership to the events preceding June 22, 1941, then there would have been no catastrophe.

But this did not happen, so the Germans really took Minsk on June 28. However, it should be remembered that the mobile divisions of the Wehrmacht did this even before the main infantry forces of Army Group Center reached the city. It is the infantry that determines the final control over the territory, and not the actions of mechanized formations.

The Soviet Union was given a two-year respite to prepare for war. Our military industry has grown considerably, and the strength of the Red Army has grown from 1,700,000 men in August 1939 to 5.4 million men in June 1941.

Yes, but of these, in 1941, more than three million were taken prisoner.

So what? And if the war began in 1939, and a million were captured by the Germans, after which the Wehrmacht troops would calmly go to the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line? Who would benefit from this?

Why do you think the negotiations of the USSR with France and England in the summer of 1939 ended in failure? Was an alliance between them real instead of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact?

Yes, theoretically they could agree, but only if the Western allies offered the USSR what it so insistently sought from them - a specific plan of action in case of war. However, Britain and France viewed these negotiations only as a means of influencing Hitler to restrain his ambitions, and they had little to offer Moscow. In turn, Stalin, in the event of a conflict with Germany, did not want to save the Western allies, as was the case during the First World War, and take the brunt of it. These contradictions largely led to the failure of the negotiations. In general, the main problem of pre-war Europe was that no one was ready to fight together against Hitler, discarding their momentary interests.

You wrote that for the USSR, the Soviet-German treaty militarily was the same as the Munich Agreement of 1938 was for England: at least a year's pause to prepare the country for war. That is, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is our Munich?

Yes, it was our Munich. England and France had exactly the same motivation: better prepare for war. The difference between Munich and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is only in the secret protocols on the delimitation of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. The fact that the Munich Agreement allegedly aimed to redirect Hitlerite aggression to the East is an invention of Soviet propagandists. In fact, England and France also needed at least some respite to mobilize their resources.

Concluding an agreement with Hitler in 1939, Stalin could not foresee in any way that the future war would go according to a completely different scenario than he had imagined. For example, he did not expect at all that the Dunkirk catastrophe would happen in May 1940 and France, which had successfully held the western front for almost four years in the First World War, would capitulate to Hitler just a month and a half after the start of the active phase of hostilities. Of course, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was a cynical deal with the devil for the sake of the interests of our country. However, the subsequent course of events showed that this deal was justified for us.

Source - https://lenta.ru/articles/2017/08/23/packt/

Who else did Germany sign non-aggression pacts with?

01/26/1934. Non-aggression pact between Germany and Poland (Pilsudski-Hitler pact).

06/18/1935. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement (the Hoare-Ribbentrop pact, which actually lifted the ban on the re-creation of the navy by Germany, established after the First World War).

09/30/1938. Munich Agreement between Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy (on the transfer of the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia to the Third Reich). On the same day, the Anglo-German Declaration of Friendship and Non-Aggression was signed separately.

12/06/1938. Franco-German Declaration (Bonnet-Ribbentrop pact on peaceful relations and renunciation of territorial disputes).

03/15/1939. Düsseldorf Agreement (signed between representatives of British and German industrial circles on joint economic activities in Europe).

06/07/1939. Non-aggression pacts between Germany and Latvia, as well as between Germany and Estonia.

08/23/1939. Non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact).

On August 25, 1939, the Anglo-Polish military alliance was concluded, which guaranteed British assistance to the Poles in the event of an attack by the Wehrmacht. But, in fact, the British did nothing

Guided by the desire to strengthen the cause of peace between the USSR and Germany and proceeding from the main provisions of the neutrality treaty concluded between the USSR and Germany in April 1926, we came to the following agreement:

1. Both Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any violence, from any aggressive action and any attack against each other, either separately or jointly with other powers.

2. If one of the Contracting Parties becomes the object of hostilities by a third power, the other Contracting Party will not support that power in any form.

3. The Governments of both Contracting Parties shall remain in future contact with each other for consultation, in order to inform each other of matters affecting their common interests.

4. None of the Contracting Parties will participate in any grouping of powers which is directly or indirectly directed against the other side.

5. In the event of disputes or conflicts between the Contracting Parties on issues of one kind or another, both parties will resolve these disputes and conflicts exclusively by peaceful means through a friendly exchange of views or, if necessary, by creating commissions to resolve the conflict.

6. This treaty is concluded for a period of ten years, so long as one of the Contracting Parties does not denounce it one year before the expiration of the term, the term of the treaty will be considered automatically extended for another five years.

7. This treaty is subject to ratification as soon as possible. The exchange of instruments of ratification is to take place in Berlin. The agreement comes into force immediately after its signing.

Signing of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany (Molotov-Ribbentrop pact) August 23, 1939

On the occasion of the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the undersigned representatives of both Parties discussed in strictly confidential conversations the question of delimiting their spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. These conversations led to an agreement as follows:

1. In the event of territorial and political transformations in the areas belonging to the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern border of Lithuania will be the line separating the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR. In this regard, Lithuania's interest in the Vilna area is recognized by both Parties.

2. In the event of territorial and political transformations in the areas belonging to the Polish state, the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR will be delimited approximately along the lines of the Narew, Vistula and San rivers.

The question of whether it is desirable in the interests of both Parties to preserve the independence of the Polish state and the boundaries of such a state will be finally decided only by the course of future political events.

In any case, both Governments will resolve this issue by friendly agreement.

3. With regard to South-Eastern Europe, the Soviet side indicated its interest in Bessarabia. The German side has clearly stated its complete political disinterest in these territories.

4. This protocol is considered by both Parties as strictly secret.

(see also protocol option taken from another edition)

FRIENDSHIP AGREEMENT AND BORDER BETWEEN THE USSR AND GERMANY.

After the collapse of the former Polish state, the Government of the USSR and the German Government consider it solely their task to restore peace and order in this territory and to ensure a peaceful existence for the peoples living there, in accordance with their national characteristics. To this end, they have come to an agreement as follows:

1. The Government of the USSR and the German Government establish as the boundary between mutual state interests on the territory of the former Polish state a line which is drawn on the map attached hereto and will be described in more detail in an additional protocol.

2. Both Parties recognize the boundary of mutual state interests established in Article 1 as final, and eliminate any interference of third powers in this decision.

3. The necessary state reorganization in the territory to the west of the line indicated in the article is carried out by the German Government, in the territory to the east of this line - by the Government of the USSR.

4. The Government of the USSR and the German Government regard the above reorganization as a reliable foundation for the further development of friendly relations between their peoples.

5. This treaty is subject to ratification. The exchange of instruments of ratification should take place as soon as possible in Berlin. The agreement comes into force from the moment of its signing. Compiled in two originals, in German and Russian.

SECRET ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

The undersigned plenipotentiaries declare the agreement of the Government of Germany and the Government of the USSR as follows:

The secret additional protocol, signed on August 23, 1939, should be amended in paragraph 1, reflecting the fact that the territory of the State of Lithuania fell into the sphere of influence of the USSR, while, on the other hand, the Lublin Voivodeship and part of the Warsaw Voivodeship went into the sphere of influence Germany (see the map attached to the Friendship and Border Treaty signed today). As soon as the Government of the USSR takes special measures on Lithuanian territory to protect its interests, the present German-Lithuanian frontier, in order to establish a natural and simple frontier description, should be corrected in such a way that the Lithuanian territory located southwest of the line marked on attached map, went to Germany.

The undersigned plenipotentiaries, upon the conclusion of the German-Russian Treaty of Friendship and Border, declare their agreement as follows:

Both Parties will not allow any Polish agitation in their territories affecting the territory of the other Party. They will suppress in their territories all sources of such agitation and inform each other of the measures taken to this end.

Quoted from the book: Ponomarev M.V. Smirnova S.Yu. Modern and recent history of Europe and America. v. 3. Moscow, 2000, ss. 173-175

Contemporary testimony:

What happened seemed fair to me, and I sympathized with it. He sympathized while still at Khalkhin Gol and got a week later, still in military uniform, from Khalkhin Gol to the already liberated Western Belarus. I traveled along it on the eve of the elections to the people's assembly, I saw with my own eyes the people really liberated from the domination they hated, I heard conversations, I was present on the first day at a meeting of the people's assembly. I was young and inexperienced, but still, how and what people in the hall clap, and why they stand up, and what kind of faces they have, it seems to me, I understood even then. There was no question for me: in Western Belarus, where I ended up, the Belarusian population - and it was a huge majority - was glad to see us, they wanted it. And, of course, the thought did not go out of my head, not alien to many at that time: well, if we hadn’t made our statement, hadn’t agreed on a demarcation line with the Germans, we wouldn’t have reached it, if it weren’t for all this, obviously, connected in one way or another - as one had to guess - with a non-aggression pact, then who would enter these cities and villages, who would occupy all this Western Belarus, who would come sixty kilometers to Minsk, almost to Minsk itself? Germans. No, at that time there were no questions of this kind for me, in my eyes Stalin was right that he did it. And the fact that practically neither England nor France, having declared war on the Germans, came to the aid of the Poles, confirmed for me what was written about the futility and insincerity on their part of those military negotiations on a treaty that could have kept Germany out of war. .

Significance and consequences of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939.

Terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact.

The agreement signed by the USSR and Germany consisted of 7 articles. Articles 3 and 7 are purely technical. Article 6 establishes the duration of the contract - 10 years, with a subsequent extension for 5 years if the parties agree. The content of the contract is disclosed by articles 1, 2, 4, 5.

Article 1 requires the parties to refrain from aggression against each other. Article 2 obliges not to support in any form the aggression of a third power, and Article 4 - not to participate in alliances directed against the contracting parties. At the same time, Article 5 emphasizes that disagreements between the contracting parties must be resolved peacefully. (Felshtinsky Yu. Dashichev V.: Subject to disclosure: USSR-Germany, 1939-1941 (Documents and materials). Moscow worker. M., 1991. S. 42.).

From a legal point of view, the Soviet-German non-aggression pact is nothing supernatural. Treaties similar in form and content were concluded both by the Soviet Union and Germany (non-aggression treaties with Poland of January 26, 1934, with Latvia and Estonia of June 7, 1939), Great Britain (a pact between Poland and Great Britain on common defense of August 25 1939).

The only feature of this treaty is the absence of a clause canceling the treaty in the event of aggression by one of the contracting parties against a third state (this clause was present in many non-aggression pacts concluded by the USSR). The absence of this clause can be interpreted as a hint at the division of spheres of influence between Germany and the USSR in Eastern Europe, which took place during the negotiations on August 23, 1939.

One of the most topical issues regarding the Soviet-German non-aggression pact is the Secret Additional Protocol, which delineated the spheres of interest of the contracting parties.

Let us immediately note that there is nothing reprehensible in the very fact of the existence of a secret protocol accompanying the main articles of the treaty. This is a normal practice in the international relations of states. So, the Russian-French treaty of 1884. and the Japanese-American agreement of 1905. were completely secret. And the aforementioned non-aggression pacts, concluded in 1939, also contained secret articles. In this case, we are interested in the content of the secret protocol, as well as its publication.

The articles of the Secret Protocol delimited the spheres of influence of the contracting parties in Eastern Europe. According to them, the zone of influence of the USSR included Finland, Estonia and Latvia; the border of Soviet-German interests was the northern border of Lithuania. In addition, the zone of influence of the USSR included Western Belarus, Western Ukraine and Bessarabia (a region in the north-east of Romania). In turn, Germany's zone of interests included Poland and Lithuania. As for Bessarabia, Germany emphasized its disinterest in this issue. (Felshtinsky Yu. Dashichev V.: Subject to disclosure: USSR-Germany, 1939-1941 (Documents and materials). Moscow worker. M., 1991. P. 43.).

Division of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe between the USSR and Germany in 1939-1940.

It should be noted that the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was by no means the first treaty containing secret agreements on the division of spheres of influence. Thus, the aforementioned secret Japanese-American agreement of 1905, known as the Katsura-Taft agreement, demarcated the interests of Japan and the United States in the Far East (Japan established a protectorate over Korea, and the Philippines remained a zone of influence of the United States). This once again shows that neither the Soviet-German non-aggression pact itself, nor its secret protocol, are unprecedented in the history of international relations. From the point of view of coordinating the geopolitical interests of the parties, the division of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe between the Soviet Union and Germany was a completely logical step.

The history of the publication of the Secret Additional Protocol deserves close attention. This document was first published in 1948. in the collection of the US State Department "Nazi-Soviet Relations. 1939-1941". The publication caused a wide public outcry and for a number of researchers served as the basis for comparing Soviet foreign policy with the policy of the Third Reich and accusing the USSR of unleashing World War II. We shall return to the consequences of the treaty; here we note that the secret protocol began to be used as an ideological one in the Cold War.

In the USSR, the question of the Soviet-German treaty and the secret protocol was raised during Perestroika (before that, the existence of a secret protocol was denied). December 24, 1989 at the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, the existence of a secret protocol was recognized. The basis was the conclusions of a special commission headed by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Alexander Yakovlev. According to the conclusions of this commission, despite the absence of the original, a secret protocol existed. The resolution of the same congress condemned the protocol. It is not the author’s task to find out how convincing the evidence of the special commission was, however, the activities of A. Yakovlev, the “architect” and “foreman” of perestroika, allow us to interpret the recognition of the existence of the protocol as the fulfillment of a political order to denigrate national history.

Alexander Yakovlev - "foreman" of perestroika; one of the main falsifiers and detractors of national history.

It is also worth noting that of the documents relating to the international relations of those days, only Soviet and German ones have been declassified. English documents are classified until 2017, and the United States does not indicate the limitation period.

Significance of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939.

To understand the significance of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, one must first of all take into account the reaction of the leading world powers of that time.

In London and Paris, the signing of this treaty had the effect of an exploding bomb. “Reproaches and accusations in London and Paris against the two-faced Stalin were loud and vicious,” writes William Shearer. “The Soviet despot for many years loudly condemned the “fascist beasts” and called on peace-loving states to unite to stop Nazi aggression. Now he himself has become her accomplice.

... About Stalin's cynical secret deal with Hitler to partition Poland and gain a free hand to swallow Latvia, Estonia, Finland and Bessarabia, no one outside of Berlin and Moscow knew, but it will soon become apparent thanks to Soviet actions and will shock many countries of the world even now" (From Munich to Tokyo Bay: A Western View of the Tragic Pages of the History of the Second World War: Translation. / Compiled by E.Ya. Troyanovskaya. - M .: Politizdat, 1992. P. 78.).

Winston Churchill echoed the American historian: “Only totalitarian despotism in both countries could have decided on such an odious unnatural act” .

The negative attitude of Western historians and statesmen towards the Soviet-German non-aggression pact is quite understandable if we recall what policy these countries pursued during 1933-1939. in relation to Nazi Germany, and what it eventually led to.

From the content of the articles of the non-aggression pact, it becomes clear that in the near future there will be no war between the USSR and Germany, which was counted on by Great Britain, France and the United States, which ignored Hitler's violations of the Versailles Treaty, financed the economy of the Third Reich and surrendered position after position to it. This meant that the multi-way geopolitical combination of the Allies (the leading role in the implementation of which was played by the politicians of the foggy Albion) eventually led to the re-establishment of Germany as their geopolitical rival. Moreover, they actually recreated this opponent with their own hands and on their own heads.

In addition, in the event of an aggravation of relations with the countries of the West, Hitler can fearlessly turn to face them, since now, in the event of a war with these countries, the Soviet Union will not support them and will take a very convenient position of non-intervention. That is, to fight with much stronger by 1939. The Third Reich will have to independently.

Thus, the entire foreign policy line of the allies was crossed out by the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact. As Winston Churchill writes, "The fact that such an agreement was possible marks the depth of the failure of British and French policy and diplomacy in a few years" (Churchill W. Second World War. M .: Military Publishing House, 1991. Vol. 1. S. 119.).

In the new situation, the politicians of London and Paris needed to quickly decide which foreign policy line to follow now: to fight seriously with Germany or still try to turn Germany's expansion to the east in order to return it to its former course.

The agreement made no less impression on Japan, because at the time of signing the agreement between the Soviet-Mongolian and Japanese troops there were battles on the Khalkhin-Gol River, which eventually ended in the encirclement and defeat of the Japanese group. In this situation, Japan, as Germany's partner in the Anti-Comintern Pact, had every reason to count on support. Instead, Germany concluded a non-aggression pact with the USSR, which provoked a protest from the Japanese Foreign Minister Arita Hachiro and eventually led to a government crisis in Japan, as a result of which on August 28, 1939. The government of Japan, headed by Kiichiro Hiranuma, who was a supporter of a joint Japanese-German war against the USSR, resigned. The new Japanese government of Abe decided to sign an armistice agreement on September 15, 1939, and on April 13, 1941. and complete the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact.

As for Italy, another of the countries participating in the Anti-Comintern Pact, Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini reacted positively to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact:

"As regards the agreement with Russia, I approve of it fully. The rapprochement between Germany and Russia is necessary to prevent their encirclement by democracies" (Felshtinsky Yu. Dashichev V.: Subject to disclosure: USSR-Germany, 1939-1941 (Documents and materials). Moscow worker. M., 1991. S. 47-48.).

What benefits did the contracting parties themselves receive: Germany and the USSR?

For Germany, the signing of the non-aggression pact meant the division of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe and, consequently, the opportunity to seize Poland, which became in March 1939. a state hostile to the Third Reich, without fear of military intervention by the USSR. In addition, in the event that England and France declared war, the non-intervention of the Soviet Union gave Germany the opportunity to use the main forces on the western front without fear of being stabbed in the back.

For the Soviet Union, the non-aggression pact of 1939 also had a number of positive points:

- The signing of the non-aggression pact made it possible for a while to avoid a war with Germany and stay away from the war (the very position of non-intervention that England and France wanted to take).

- Changing the direction of Japan's expansion. Under the impression of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, Japan began to consider the southern direction a priority.

– The non-aggression pact demarcated the spheres of influence in Eastern Europe and made it possible to almost unhinderedly return part of the territories that were lost by the Russian Empire after the First World War and the Civil War.

- The trade agreement concluded on August 20 was an undoubted success for the Soviet Union, as it made it possible to purchase the latest technological equipment, paying for it with raw materials.

Consequences of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939.

The events that followed the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact showed that in the new reality, the politicians of foggy Albion did not have enough flexibility to radically restructure their foreign policy line. This is clearly demonstrated by the so-called Strange War - a declaration of war in the actual absence of hostilities (with the exception of hostilities at sea).

September 1, 1939 Germany attacked Poland. Under the terms of the Anglo-Polish alliance, Great Britain was obliged to provide military assistance to Poland in the event of a war with Germany. This help was all the more necessary, since soon after the start of the war the situation in Poland became critical: by September 9, 1939. German troops approached Warsaw.

However, having declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939, Great Britain and France did not undertake practically any significant hostilities, with the exception of the war at sea, the Saar Offensive on land and "truth raids" in the air - British bombers bombarded Germany with propaganda leaflets (From Munich to Tokyo Bay: A Western View of the Tragic Pages of the History of the Second World War: Translation. / Compiled by E.Ya. Troyanovskaya. M .: Politizdat, 1992. P 82.). The only combat operation of the British Air Force was a raid on Wilhelmshafen - the base of the Kriegsmarine, which was carried out on September 4, 1939. Meanwhile, the Polish army was quickly defeated. On September 17, the Polish government fled the country. On September 28, Warsaw fell, and on October 2, the last units of the Polish army capitulated.

However, no change took place on the western front. The French army and the English expeditionary force continued to stand in their previous positions, without taking any offensive action. And this despite the fact that the main part of the Wehrmacht at that time was on the eastern front, and the second-rate units located on the so-called "Siegfried Line" had a supply of ammunition for 3 days (From Munich to Tokyo Bay: A Western View of the Tragic Pages of the History of the Second World War: Translation. / Compiled by E.Ya. Troyanovskaya. M .: Politizdat, 1992. P 85.).

The raid on Wilhelmshaven is one of the few Allied operations during the "strange war".

It is significant that if Western historians and statesmen still somehow try to explain the “policy of appeasement” by “disunity”, “isolation” and “timidity”, then the “phenomenon” of the Strange War is still considered inexplicable. Although in fact there is nothing inexplicable here: the Strange War was an imitation of hostilities in order to persuade Hitler to return to the former foreign policy line, which he adhered to in the period 1933-1939, until the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact. Moreover, after the partition of Poland, Germany and the USSR finally had a common border.

However, by 1939 Germany's capabilities already allowed Hitler to play his game (as can be seen from the example of the March crisis of 1939). The conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact allowed him, after the completion of the Polish campaign, to transfer troops to the western front without fear of being stabbed in the back. However, in his speech of October 6, 1939. Hitler comes forward with a proposal to convene a peace conference, which will bring together representatives of all the major powers to resolve the existing contradictions in Europe. But even after this idea failed, and the first date for the offensive against France was set for November 12, 1939, Hitler, under various pretexts, constantly postponed the timing of the offensive a total of 20 times. As a result, active hostilities on the western front began on May 10, 1940. Their result was the capitulation of France on June 22, 1940, signed in Compiègne. Thus, the foreign policy line of the allies led France to a national catastrophe and significantly worsened the position of Great Britain, which by the middle of 1940. had to fight Germany alone.

Dunkirk, 1940. After the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force.

At the same time, while the Strange War was going on in the west, the Soviet Union was successfully solving its geopolitical tasks. September 17, 1939 Soviet troops entered the territory of Eastern Poland. On September 28, an agreement on friendship and border was concluded between the USSR and Germany, delimiting the zones of influence of the parties in Poland. In November of the same year, limited contingents of Soviet troops were introduced into the territory of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with the permission of their authorities. The final accession of the Baltic countries to the USSR took place in 1940.

In this case, it is appropriate to speak of joining. In fact, the "annexation" of the Baltic countries, which the leaders of these countries are so fond of recalling now, was the return to the USSR of territories that were lost by the Russian Empire during the First World War and the Civil War. In addition, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had a number of ports necessary for the deployment of the Baltic Fleet; otherwise, the territory of these states could be used to deploy the forces of the Wehrmacht, the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine. Thus, the territorial expansion of the Soviet Union was caused by specific geopolitical considerations.

A similar situation was with Poland. Emerged on the ruins of the Russian and German empires, this state during the Soviet-Polish war of 1919-1921. under the terms of the Riga Peace Treaty of 1921. included in its territory the lands of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. The return of these territories to the Soviet Union made it possible to significantly push the border to the west. Bessarabia in 1918 was annexed by Romania, which, like Poland, took advantage of the Russian Civil War. Bessarabian protocol, signed on October 28, 1920. in Paris, recognized the accession of Bessarabia to Romania as legal. At the same time, the RSFSR did not take part in the signing of this agreement, and the decision to annex Bessarabia to Romania was made without it.

Like Poland and Romania, Finland pursued a similar policy during the Civil War, repeatedly making attempts to seize Eastern Karelia. Under the terms of the Tartu Peace Treaty of October 14, 1920, in the north of Finland, the Pechenga Territory and part of the Rybachy Peninsula were transferred; in response, the Finns abandoned their claims to East Karelia. At the same time, the border between the two countries passed 30 km from Leningrad. The desire to move the border away from Leningrad was the reason for the Soviet-Finnish (Winter) War of 1939-1940, during which this task was completed. Thus, all the territorial acquisitions of the USSR in the period 1939-1941. were conditioned not by “aggression” or “thirst for world domination”, but by quite specific geopolitical interests. It is worth noting that these acquisitions became possible precisely thanks to the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939. It is also worth noting that, with the exception of the Winter War, the territorial expansion of the USSR did not meet with condemnation from the world community. Here is what Winston Churchill wrote about this:

“For the benefit of the Soviets, it must be said that it was vital for the Soviet Union to move as far to the west as possible the starting positions of the German armies, so that the Russians would have time to gather forces from all over their colossal empire. The catastrophes that their armies suffered in 1914, when they rushed to the offensive against the Germans, were imprinted in the minds of the Russians with red-hot iron, not yet completed the mobilization. And now their borders were much further east than during the first war. They needed to occupy the Baltic states and most of Poland by force or deceit before they were attacked. If their policy was coldly calculating, it was also at that moment highly realistic. (Churchill W. Second World War. M .: Military Publishing House, 1991. Vol. 1. P. 120.). In defiance of future researchers, the British statesman recognizes the expediency of the foreign policy line of the Soviet Union.

At the same time, the negative attitude of Western historians to the Soviet-German non-aggression pact is due precisely to the benefits that the Soviet Union and Germany received when it was signed and the disadvantages that Great Britain and France received. Therefore, they made a number of attempts designed to discredit this treaty. In particular, considerations were put forward that the Soviet-German non-aggression pact led to the disruption of the formation of a united anti-fascist front, untied Hitler's hands and thus allowed him to start a war. However, the above facts indicate that this version is not true.

The Second World War did not start because of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The Second World War was a consequence of the policy pursued by the leading countries of the West in relation to Germany in the period 1933-1939, and carried out deliberately. No "united anti-fascist front" in 1939. there was no trace, because the creation of an anti-Hitler coalition was not part of the plans of the Western countries. This is confirmed both by the “policy of appeasement” and by the Moscow negotiations in the summer of 1939. The goal of Britain and France was to leave the Soviet Union in international isolation and prevent it from reaching an agreement with Germany. In this case, after the capture of Poland, the two hostile states would have a common border, without having any agreements. Considering that even after the conclusion of the non-aggression pact, England did not provide real assistance to Poland, it is logical to assume that in the absence of such a pact, assistance would not have been rendered even more likely.

The actions of the Soviet Union were aimed at deciding on the choice of an ally. To this end, negotiations were held with both sides. Stalin agreed to the arrival of Ribbentrop only when it finally became clear that it would not be possible to reach specific mutually binding agreements with England and France. It is important to understand that these events took place during the battles at Khalkin Gol, and the threat of conflict with the countries of the Anti-Comintern Pact was real. In the light of the above, the signing of a non-aggression pact with Germany and the delimitation of interests in Eastern Europe were in full accordance with the geopolitical interests of the USSR.

As for the “proximity of totalitarian regimes” and the “kinship of the souls of dictators”, which is also what they are trying to explain the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, these statements are designed to influence emotions and do not take into account a number of important facts. One of these facts is that in the West Hitler began to be considered a "brazen aggressor" after the March crisis of 1939, when events did not go as expected. Characterizations of Hitler as a madman and a maniac appeared in Western historiography after the Second World War and were intended to justify the "policy of appeasement" and other unsightly facts. Before Hitler started his game, he was considered quite a respectable politician, like the Nazi regime itself.. Nuremberg Race Laws 1935 did not interfere in 1936. to hold the Summer Olympics in Berlin, and such Jewish pogroms of 1938 as Kristallnacht did not prevent the American magazine Time from declaring Hitler man of the year. Similarly, the use of chemical weapons by the Italian troops in Abyssinia in 1935. did not cause any sanctions from the international community, and the Nanjing massacre of 1937. did not prevent the International Olympic Committee from suggesting that Japan host the 1940 Olympics. in Tokyo.

Adolf Hitler is Time magazine's Person of the Year (the only issue in which the chosen person is not featured on the cover).

Statements that "Stalin believed Hitler" and so on are also untenable. The conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact did not affect the further increase in the Red Army and the mass production of military equipment. Hitler's statements about his desire to make peace with France and England, the actual amnesty of the British Expeditionary Force at Dunkirk and the curtailment of Operation Sea Lion showed that the turn in the Third Reich's foreign policy was temporary, and Germany remains a potential adversary of the Soviet Union.

The task of this work does not include an analysis of the causes of the tragedy of June 22, 1941. However, it is important to note that until the very beginning of the war, the situation remained extremely confused. Back in 1939, after the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, the military-political leadership of England and France did not rule out the outbreak of hostilities against the USSR (see the documentary "Black Blood"). In particular, air raids on the Baku oilfields were planned, but after the defeat of France, these plans had to be put aside. Britain's refusal to make peace with Germany and (together with the United States) support for the USSR during the Great Patriotic War are due to the fact that after the defeat of France, Germany became too strong. The existence of the Third Reich, whose sphere of influence now covered Western, Northern and Central Europe, did not correspond to British geopolitical interests. Therefore, after June 22, 1941. Hitler attacked the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the USA took the side of the latter.

It is noteworthy that the Americans and the British did not immediately begin to provide real assistance. The first convoy with military equipment arrived in Arkhangelsk only on October 12, 1941, when the situation in the Soviet Union was critical. At the same time, assistance was not free of charge and was paid in advance by the Soviet side. As for the opening of a second front in Europe in 1944, this operation was conditioned not by the desire to help the USSR and end the war as soon as possible, but by the fear that the offensive of the Red Army would make Central and Western Europe a zone of influence of the Soviet Union.

In any case, the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939. is not the cause of the outbreak of World War II and the catastrophe of 1941. The German attack on the Soviet Union was due to the fact that Hitler could not give up the idea of ​​conquering living space in the east; contrary to common sense, he started a war on two fronts, about the fatality of which he himself wrote, and which eventually turned Germany from a contender for world leadership into a secondary state. As for the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939, it not only redirected the aggression of Germany (albeit temporarily) and Japan, but also gained time, returned a number of territories, and also received a number of economic benefits. And most importantly, the Soviet-German non-aggression pact completely crossed out the scenario of the Second World War planned by the Western countries, eventually forcing them to fight against the geopolitical competitor they themselves recreated in the face of Germany. This treaty was an unconditional victory for Soviet diplomacy.

So is it worth it to repent of defending your geopolitical interests?

The Small Soviet Encyclopedia of 1936 edition reflects the general mood of the USSR towards National Socialist Germany, describing Hitler's "theoretical squalor" and "ignorance"

"Mission Kandelaki"

In 1934-1937, the Soviet Union made a number of attempts to expand Soviet-German economic relations and to defuse political relations. At the end of 1934, Stalin's personal emissary David Kandelaki was sent to Berlin as a trade representative. While negotiating in Germany, Kandelaki tried to transfer them from the economic to the political level - to the Reich Minister G. Goering and the director of the Imperial Bank J. Schacht.

In 1936, the Soviet side offered Berlin the signing of a non-aggression pact. The proposal was rejected on the grounds that there was no common border between the USSR and Germany. According to the head of the Soviet intelligence network, Walter Krivitsky, to demonstrate goodwill on the part of Moscow, he was ordered in December 1936 to ease up on intelligence work in Germany.

The so-called “Kandelaki mission” continued until 1937 and ended in failure: the German side, for ideological and political reasons, did not consider it necessary to expand ties with the USSR.

"It's About Roasted Chestnuts"

This name was given to Stalin's speech, delivered on March 10, 1939 at the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b). In this speech, Stalin accused the Anglo-French of provoking the war and declared his readiness for a "peace policy" towards Germany. Listing the aggressive acts of the Axis countries and stating that the reason for this was "the refusal of the majority of non-aggressive countries, and above all England and France, from the policy of collective rebuff to the aggressors" "to the position of non-intervention, to the position of "neutrality"”, he then formulated the main tasks of Soviet policy as follows:

According to some historians, the speech was perceived by Ribbentrop as a hint at the possibility of improving relations between Germany and the USSR. Subsequently, after the conclusion of the Pact, Molotov called it "the beginning of a turn" in Soviet-German relations.

Crisis of 1939

Spring-Summer Crisis of 1939

Soviet diplomacy in the conditions of the spring-summer crisis

In response to the occupation of the Czech Republic and its inclusion in Germany, the Soviet government in its note of March 18 stated: “... In the absence of any expression of the will of the Czech people, the occupation of the Czech Republic by German troops and the subsequent actions of the German government cannot but be recognized as arbitrary, violent, aggressive."

On March 18, in connection with the news of the German ultimatum to Romania, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M. M. Litvinov, through the British ambassador in Moscow, proposed convening a conference of six countries: the USSR, England, France, Romania, Poland and Turkey in order to prevent further German aggression. However, the British side found this proposal "premature" and proposed limiting itself to a joint declaration of England, France, the USSR and Poland on the interest of these countries in maintaining the independence and integrity of the states of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.

Negotiations in the summer of 1939

Political negotiations with England and France

Trilateral political negotiations between the USSR, Great Britain and France, which began on April 10, were based on the Anglo-French draft of May 27 with Soviet amendments of June 2.

The entry into force of the union was envisaged in the following cases:

• in the event of an attack by one of the European powers (that is, Germany) on the contracting party;
• in the event of German aggression against Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Rumania, Poland, Latvia, Estonia or Finland (to all of them, the contracting parties gave guarantees of protection);
• in the event that one of the parties will be involved in the war due to the provision of assistance at the request of a third European country.

According to Churchill,

An obstacle to concluding such an agreement (with the USSR) was the horror that these same border states experienced before Soviet help in the form of Soviet armies that could pass through their territories to protect them from the Germans and, along the way, include them in the Soviet-communist system. After all, they were the most violent opponents of this system. Poland, Romania, Finland and the three Baltic states did not know what they feared more - German aggression or Russian salvation. It was the need to make such a terrible choice that paralyzed the politics of England and France. Even now, however, there can be no doubt that England and France should have accepted Russia's proposal, proclaimed a tripartite alliance, and left the methods of its functioning in case of war to the discretion of the Allies, who would then be fighting against a common enemy.

Rapprochement between the USSR and Germany

Already in the first days after the conclusion of the Munich Agreement, the German embassy in Moscow foresaw the possibility of revising the foreign policy of the USSR.

On October 3, 1938, adviser to the German embassy Werner von Tippelskirch reported from Moscow to the German Foreign Ministry: “Turning to the field of political forecasting, one cannot give up the idea that the Soviet Union will reconsider its foreign policy. In this regard, we must bear in mind, first of all, relations with Germany, France and Japan ... I do not consider it incredible the hypothesis that the current situation opens up favorable opportunities for a new and broader economic agreement between Germany and the USSR.

On July 24, 1939, Karl Schnurre, Advisor to the Eastern European Referent Office of the Department of Economic Policy of the German Foreign Ministry, in a conversation with the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires G.I. part of a conversation, as an informal exchange of views). The German plan included: 1) the conclusion of a trade and credit agreement; 2) normalization of relations in the field of the press and cultural relations, establishment of an atmosphere of mutual respect; 3) political rapprochement. At the same time, Schnurre noted that the repeated attempts of the German side to raise this topic were ignored by the Soviet side. On July 26, Schnurre continued to develop this topic, inviting Ribbentrop Astakhov and Deputy Trade Representative E. I. Babarin to the restaurant at the direction of Ribbentrop. The third point of the plan was somewhat specified by the German side: “or a return to what was before<договор о нейтралитете 1926 г.>or a new agreement that takes into account the vital political interests of both sides. Astakhov reports on Germany's position in a telegram:

Germany is ready to talk and come to an agreement with us [USSR] on all issues of interest to both sides, giving all the security guarantees that we would like to receive from her. Even with respect to the Baltic States and Poland, it would be as easy to reach an agreement as it would be with respect to Ukraine (which Germany abandoned).

The question of the passage of the Red Army through the territory of Poland, along the Vilna and Galician corridors - without which, in the opinion of the Soviet side, a possible German aggression could not be repelled, turned out to be a "dead point" on which the negotiations froze. The Poles refused to let the Red Army through their territory, despite pressure from France. The aphoristic expression said by Beck to the French ambassador is known: “ With the Germans, we risk losing our freedom, and with the Russians, our soul.» .

Simultaneously with the Moscow talks, Wilson, as an unofficial representative of Chamberlain, was probing in London to the official at large of the department for the implementation of the four-year plan, Helmut Wohltath, about the possibility of concluding an agreement that would recognize special German interests in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe in exchange for refusal Germany from the use of force secured by disarmament agreements; in addition, England was ready to allow Germany to exploit the "colonial-African zone." The negotiations ended in failure due to the actual refusal of Germany to consider the British proposals, due to the depth of mutual contradictions.

According to the official Soviet version, it was after this that the Soviet government ceased to trust its partners in the Moscow negotiations and agreed to consider the German proposal to conclude a German-Soviet non-aggression pact.

Politics of the countries of Eastern Europe

rendezvous. British caricature of the partition of Poland. Hitler: "The dregs of society, if I'm not mistaken?" Stalin: "A bloody killer of workers, dare I guess?" ("Evening Standard", 09/20/1939)

The governments of the Eastern European countries treated the USSR with deep distrust. In March 1939, after the capture of the Klaipeda region of Lithuania by Germany, the USSR took diplomatic steps towards rapprochement with Latvia and Estonia, but they were met coldly. In May, despite the aggravation of relations with Germany, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Poland did not want to be bound by any agreements with the USSR.

The American historian William Shearer characterizes Poland's pre-war policy as "suicidal." Shearer notes that Poland has consistently supported Germany since 1934 to the detriment of the Versailles system. At the same time, there was a sharp territorial dispute between Poland and Germany over the Danzig corridor, which divided German territory into two parts. Relations between Poland and the USSR have been lukewarm since the Soviet–Polish War, during which Poland moved its border east of the Curzon Line (as a result of which about 6 million ethnic Belarusians and Ukrainians ended up in Poland). After Piłsudski's death, Poland's policy was determined by veterans of the Polish–Soviet War, such as Beck and Rydz-Smigly, who were determined to confront the USSR. Thus, according to Shearer, Poland had a border "unacceptable" to either Germany or the USSR, while not being strong enough to be able to quarrel with both neighbors at the same time.

As a result, the governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Finland declared that any guarantee given without their request would be regarded as an act of aggression, after which they hastened to conclude non-aggression pacts with Germany (June 7). At the same time, Germany not only promised not to attack the Baltic countries, but also guaranteed assistance in case of aggression by the USSR. This gave the Baltic governments a sense of security, which soon turned out to be false. High-ranking German military officers (Franz Halder and Wilhelm Canaris) visited the Baltic countries and negotiated military cooperation there. According to the German envoy in Tallinn, the chief of staff of the Estonian army Reck told him that Estonia could assist Germany in establishing control over the Baltic Sea, including mining the Gulf of Finland against Soviet warships.

non-aggression pact

The original secret protocol to the treaty (German version)

Recent negotiations

Ribbentrop flew to Moscow at noon on 23 August. Ribbentrop's plane was mistakenly fired upon by Soviet anti-aircraft gunners near Velikiye Luki. According to the US Ambassador to the USSR C. Bohlen, the Nazi flag that was hung out at the meeting with Ribbentrop was borrowed from the Mosfilm film studio, where it was used as a prop when shooting anti-fascist films.

Ribbentrop's meeting with Stalin and Molotov, which lasted three hours, ended favorably for the Germans. According to Stalin’s personal translator, Vladimir Pavlov, who was present at the meeting, when the discussion of the draft treaty began, Stalin said: “Additional agreements are needed for this treaty, about which we will not publish anything anywhere,” after which he outlined the contents of the future secret protocol on the division of spheres of mutual interests. In a telegram sent to Hitler on the same day, Ribbentrop reported on the successful progress of the negotiations. He called the demand of the Soviet side to include two Latvian ports (Liepaja and Ventspils) in the "sphere of interest" of the USSR as the only obstacle to signing. Hitler gave his consent to this.

The treaty consisted of seven short articles:

• article I obliged the parties to refrain from aggression against each other;
• Article II obliged the parties not to support the aggression of third countries against the other side;
• article IV obliged the parties not to enter into military alliances directed against the other side;
• Article V offered ways for the peaceful resolution of conflicts;
• article VI described the duration of the treaty (ten years, with automatic renewal each time for five years);
• articles III and VII were purely technical.

Secret protocol to the treaty

The "Secret Additional Protocol" described the "boundaries of the spheres of interest" of the parties "in the event of a territorial and political reorganization" of the Baltic states and Poland. The Baltic states were included in the sphere of interests of the USSR. At the same time, Lithuania received Vilnius (Polish at that time), and the border of interests in Poland ran along the Narew, Vistula and San rivers.

The question of Poland's independence, according to the protocol, could "be finally clarified" later, by agreement of the parties. The USSR also emphasized its interest in Bessarabia, and Germany - disinterest in it.

Signing an agreement

On the same evening both documents were signed. Negotiations continued until the morning. The meeting ended with a banquet that opened with Stalin's toast: “I know how the German people love the Fuhrer. Therefore, I want to drink to his health.

Later, in 1946, recalling this event at the Nuremberg trials, Ribbentrop said: “When I arrived in Moscow in 1939 to Marshal Stalin, he discussed with me not the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the German-Polish conflict within the framework of the Briand-Kellogg pact, but made it clear that if he does not get half of Poland and the Baltic countries without Lithuania with the port of Libava, then I can immediately fly back ”

Legal characteristics of the contract

Estimates of the legal side of the contract are contradictory. According to some opinions, the Non-Aggression Pact itself (without a protocol) contains nothing unusual and is a typical non-aggression pact, examples of which are frequent in contemporary European history (see, for example, a similar pact between Germany and Poland) .

According to N.V. Pavlov, the treaty did not mean any changes at all in the anti-Soviet policy and program goals of Germany pursued before that, which is proved by Hitler’s statement twelve days before its signing, on August 11, 1939, in a conversation with Karl Burkhard: “Everything, what I do is directed against Russia; if the West is too stupid and blind to understand this, I will be forced to negotiate with the Russians, defeat the West, and then, after its defeat, turn against the Soviet Union with concentrated forces. I need Ukraine so that we are not starved to death, as in the last war.” Hitler thus tried to avoid a war on two fronts and ensure freedom of action in Poland and in the West, which he took advantage of.

A similar opinion is shared by G. A. Kumanev, who also notes that this agreement damaged the international prestige of the USSR and led to the curtailment of anti-fascist propaganda in the country, which weakened the united anti-fascist front. According to Kumanev, the pact represented for the USSR nothing more than a temporary achievement of unstable neutrality, and Stalin was well aware of this: on the eve of signing the treaty, he admitted that this choice was not easy and even difficult, nevertheless, there were still more “pluses” for the Soviet Union. The pact gave the USSR a gain of time, while Hitler began to carry out large-scale military operations against a number of states.

As the Russian historian O. B. Mozokhin points out, the conclusion of an agreement with Hitler, as well as the subsequent military conflict with Finland and the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations, undermined the international authority of the Soviet Union as a real force capable of resisting Nazism, and complicated the participation of foreign communist parties in the anti-fascist movement, since, on the instructions of the Comintern, they stopped their political and propaganda work against Nazi Germany.

International reaction to the signing of the treaty

Japan

Since the spring of 1939, there was a full-scale undeclared war on Khalkhin Gol in Mongolia, unleashed by Germany's allied Japan against the USSR and Mongolia. On the day the treaty was signed, the encirclement of the main grouping of Japanese troops was completed. Attempts to release the encircled group, made on August 24-25, did not bring success, and were not made further. The defeat inflicted by the Soviet-Mongolian troops and the simultaneous signing of the Soviet-German treaty led Japan to a government crisis and a far-reaching change in military plans.

On August 25, 1939, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Japanese Empire, Arita Hachiro, protested to the German Ambassador in Tokyo, Otto, about the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact. The protest noted that "this treaty in its spirit contradicts the anti-Comintern agreement".

On August 28, 1939, the Japanese government, headed by Kiichiro Hiranuma, who was a supporter of a joint Japanese-German war against the USSR, resigned. According to the historian H. Teratani, "never - neither before nor after - in history was there a case for the Japanese government to resign due to the conclusion of an agreement between two other states between themselves." The new Japanese government signed an armistice agreement on 15 September 1939, and on 13 April 1941 concluded the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact.

One can imagine the shock that struck Tokyo when, in the midst of the fighting at Khalkhin Gol, it became known that the Soviet-German non-aggression pact had been signed.

It turned out that the Hiranuma Japanese government had bet on the wrong horse. Germany betrayed Japan and all hopes associated with the development of the Khalkhin-Gol conflict with the help of Germany and its transformation into a victorious war against communism burst. Already on September 4, Japan issued a statement that it did not intend to interfere in the conflict in Europe in any form. The German slap in the face was hard to bear. Hiranuma resigned in disgrace, and was replaced by the Abe government, which considered the south to be a priority in the war.

--Igor Mozheiko, historian, orientalist, writer. West wind - clear weather

England and France

As the Russian historian O. B. Mozokhin points out, the rapprochement of the USSR with Germany, the supply of Soviet oil products to Germany, which were of strategic importance, caused a negative reaction from England and France. The military-political leadership of these countries did not rule out the outbreak of hostilities against the USSR, primarily in order to counteract the supply of Soviet oil to Germany. At the same time, it was planned to launch air strikes on communications and directly on the objects of the oil production and oil refining industry in the Caucasus. Followed in 1939-1940. the accession to the Soviet Union of the Baltic States, the western regions of Ukraine, Belarus and Bessarabia, carried out on the basis of agreements between the USSR and Germany, had a negative impact on public opinion abroad, especially in countries that were at war or already occupied by Germany. However, the fact that the USSR was annexed mainly to the regions that were part of the Russian Empire until 1917 and were located east of the “Curzon Line”, recommended as the eastern border of Poland during the preparation of the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919, had a certain deterrent effect on the position of the Western powers in relation to the USSR.

Versions about the reasons for signing the contract

The version about the desire of the USSR to avoid war with Germany

This version is followed by Soviet and modern Russian historiography.

The agreement was signed after the failure of the Moscow negotiations held in the spring and summer of 1939 between representatives of the USSR, England and France in order to conclude a tripartite agreement on mutual assistance (the draft agreement was presented by the Soviet government on June 2) and a military convention providing for specific military measures to ensure collective security in Europe.

During the negotiations, the unwillingness of England and France to give concrete military obligations and develop real military plans to counter possible German aggression was revealed. Moreover, in parallel with the Moscow talks, the British government was holding talks in London with German representatives on the delimitation of spheres of influence. And this further strengthened the fears of the Soviet government that its Western partners were seeking to direct Hitler's aggression to the east, the aggression that had already led to the "Munich Pact" and the division of Czechoslovakia. As a result of the failure of the Moscow talks, the USSR lost hope of creating a military coalition with the Western powers and found itself in a hostile environment, when in the West both the cordon sanitaire countries and Germany were its potential opponents, and in the East militaristic Japan acted as an aggressor. Under these conditions, the USSR was forced to agree to Germany's proposals to start negotiations on a non-aggression pact.

The position of the Western powers predetermined the failure of the Moscow negotiations and confronted the Soviet Union with an alternative: to be isolated in the face of a direct threat of an attack by fascist Germany or, having exhausted the possibilities of concluding an alliance with Great Britain and France, to sign the non-aggression pact proposed by Germany and thereby push back the threat of war. The situation made the second choice inevitable. The Soviet-German treaty concluded on August 23, 1939 contributed to the fact that, contrary to the calculations of Western politicians, the world war began with a clash within the capitalist world.

Thus, Soviet historiography considered the signing of a non-aggression pact with Germany the only way to avoid war with Germany and other countries of the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1939, when the USSR, in its opinion, was in isolation, having no allies.

The version about the expansionist motives of Stalin

According to a number of researchers, the treaty was a manifestation of the expansionist aspirations of Stalin, who sought to push Germany against the "Western democracies" and take the position of the "third rejoicing", and after their mutual weakening - to Sovietize Western Europe. S. Z. Sluch, who believes that Stalin saw in Germany, first of all, a “natural ally” in the struggle against the capitalist world, characterizes the agreement as follows: “Essentially, even before the start of the Second World War, continental Europe was divided between two dictators who represented models of largely similar behavior in the international arena - a new type of political gangsterism, differing only in the scale and degree of hypocrisy” .

This point of view is also criticized, since the non-aggression pact did not provide for any territorial changes in relation to third countries. Critics of the "expansionist" theory proceed from the fact that After does not mean Due to. The intervention of the USSR in the war in Poland could have been caused by the desire to prevent Germany from occupying the entire territory of Poland and ending up on the then border of the USSR, passing through the center of Belarus.

The opinion of S. Sluch that Stalin saw in Germany, first of all, a “natural ally” does not agree well with the fact that the USSR in the 1930s pursued a policy directed against Nazi Germany, and only after the “Munich Agreement” abandoned the line aimed at joint containment of Germany with Great Britain and France. As for the "Buffer States", there was a possibility that they, primarily Poland, would join Germany in the event of its aggression against the USSR. .

Version about Stalin's imperial motives

This point of view explains Stalin's actions exclusively by pragmatic-imperial considerations. According to it, Stalin for some time chose between Germany, on the one hand, and Great Britain and France, on the other, but, faced with the dishonesty of the latter, he preferred to stay away from the war and take advantage of the "friendship" with Germany, first of all, affirming political interests USSR in Eastern Europe. This opinion was expressed by Winston Churchill immediately after the signing of the treaty.

Geoffrey Roberts, professor of history at the University of Ireland, believes that the policy of the USSR was to achieve, on the basis of an agreement with Germany, a limited sphere of influence that would guarantee the country's primary security needs, mainly to keep the country from being drawn into the war and limit Germany's expansion to the east. .

Possible motives for Stalin's actions

Calculations for the provocation of war

According to a number of researchers, Stalin was not an adherent of the course of collective security officially proclaimed (and sincerely defended) by Litvinov.

It is significant that not a word is mentioned about collective security in the “Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks”, edited and partly written by Stalin himself. Moreover, in this work, written in , it was stated that "the second imperialist war had actually already begun" - thus, the ongoing political events were qualified by Stalin as a war between imperialist states. Deputy People's Commissar of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs V. Potemkin stated in the Bolshevik magazine the official concept of the "second imperialist war" and its prospects:

“The front of the second imperialist war is expanding. One nation after another is drawn into it. Humanity is heading towards great battles that will unleash a world revolution.” As a result, "between the two millstones - the Soviet Union, menacingly rising in all its gigantic growth, and the indestructible wall of revolutionary democracy, rising to its aid - the remnants of the capitalist system will be turned into dust and dust."

A. A. Zhdanov, having outlined the theses of the future Stalinist “speech on roasted chestnuts” at the Leningrad Party Conference on March 3, 1939, made the following summary: Moscow’s task is “to accumulate our strength for the time when we will deal with Hitler and Mussolini, and at the same time, of course, , and with Chamberlain"

As S. Z. Sluch believes, Stalin “saw in the acutely confrontational development of the international situation additional opportunities for realizing his own imperial ambitions, identified with the interests of the country’s security, and sought to force the capitalist world“ to make room a little and retreat “” .

In 1935, Stalin wrote to Kaganovich in a cipher telegram:

The stronger the fight between them<капиталистическими странами>the better for the USSR. We can sell bread to both so that they can fight.<…>It is beneficial for us that their fight be as long as possible, but without an early victory of one over the other

Almost the same thoughts were expressed by Stalin immediately after the outbreak of World War II to Georgy Dimitrov:

A war is going on between two groups of capitalist countries (the poor and the rich in terms of colonies, raw materials, etc.) for the redistribution of the world, for domination of the world! We don't mind if they fight well and weaken each other. It would not be bad if the position of the richest capitalist countries (especially England) were shaken by the hands of Germany. Hitler himself, without understanding or wanting to do so, shakes and undermines the capitalist system.<…>We can maneuver, push one side against the other, so that we better tear ourselves apart.<…>What would be bad if, as a result of the defeat of Poland, we extended the socialist system to new territories and populations?

In this regard, some historians believe that Stalin was really guided by the "rules of the game" that he formulated in his "speech on roasted chestnuts" in relation to England and France:

Formally, the policy of non-intervention could be described as follows: "Let each country defend itself against aggressors as it wants and as best it can, our business is a side, we will trade with both aggressors and their victims." In reality, however, the policy of non-intervention means condoning aggression, unleashing a war, and consequently turning it into a world war. In the policy of non-intervention, there is a desire, a desire not to interfere with the aggressors from doing their dirty work<…>let all the participants in the war get bogged down deep in the mire of war, encourage them to do so in secret, let them weaken and exhaust each other, and then, when they are sufficiently weakened, come on stage with fresh strength - to speak, of course, "in the interests of peace" and dictate weakened participants in the war their conditions. And cheap and cute!

"State tasks of the USSR" in the understanding of Stalin

A number of researchers believe that Stalin, putting forward his proposals for a joint struggle against Hitler, was not at all as disinterested as official Moscow represented. In this they rely on a number of statements, directly or indirectly going back to Stalin himself. In the city, the Pravda newspaper defined the behavior of the USSR before the signing of the pact as follows: “The USSR sought to carry out its state tasks within the western borders of our country and strengthen peace, while Anglo-French diplomacy - to ignore these tasks of the USSR, to organize war and the involvement of the Soviet Union in it.

They also point to Stalin's words to Georgy Dimitrov (September 7), from which it is clear that Stalin expected to receive a "payment" for an alliance with the democracies:

We preferred an agreement with the so-called democratic countries, and therefore we negotiated. But the English and French wanted to have us as farmhands, and, moreover, to pay nothing! Of course, we would not have gone to work as farm laborers, and even less, without receiving anything.

Opinions of contemporaries

Our enemies also counted on the fact that Russia would become our adversary after the conquest of Poland. Enemies did not take into account my determination. Our enemies are like little worms. I saw them in Munich. I was convinced that Stalin would never accept the proposal of the British. Only reckless optimists could think that Stalin was so stupid that he did not recognize their true goal. Russia is not interested in preserving Poland... Litvinov's resignation was a decisive factor. After that, I immediately realized that in Moscow the attitude towards the Western powers had changed. I have taken steps to change relations with Russia. In connection with the economic agreement, political negotiations began. In the end, a proposal came from the Russians to sign a non-aggression pact. Four days ago, I took a special step that led to Russia yesterday announcing its readiness to sign the pact. Established personal contact with Stalin. The day after tomorrow Ribbentrop will conclude a treaty. Now Poland was in the position in which I wanted to see her... The beginning of the destruction of the hegemony of England. Now that I have made the necessary diplomatic preparations, the way is open for the soldiers.

This treaty (as well as the unsuccessful Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations) shows that it is now impossible to resolve important issues of international relations - especially issues of Eastern Europe - without the active participation of the Soviet Union, that any attempts to bypass the Soviet Union and solve such issues behind the back of the Soviet Union must end in failure. The Soviet-German non-aggression pact means a turn in the development of Europe... This pact not only gives us the elimination of the threat of war with Germany... - it should provide us with new opportunities for the growth of forces, strengthening our positions, further growth of the influence of the Soviet Union on international development.

From Molotov's speech at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the issue of ratifying the non-aggression pact.
Meltyukhov M.I. Stalin's missed chance. The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Europe: 1939-1941. Moscow: Veche, 2000.

The question of the Pact and, especially, the secret appendices to it was raised in the USSR during Perestroika, primarily due to pressure from Poland. To study the issue, a special commission was created, headed by the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Alexander Yakovlev. On December 24, 1989, the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, after hearing the conclusions of the commission reported by Yakovlev, adopted a resolution condemning the protocol (noting the absence of originals, but recognizing its authenticity, based on graphological, phototechnical and lexical examination of copies, and the correspondence of subsequent events). At the same time, for the first time in the USSR, the text of the secret protocols was published (according to the German microfilm - "Questions of History", No. 6, 1989)

Discussions about the historical role of the non-aggression pact and secret protocols are still relevant today.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in the autumn session can "assess and condemn the crimes of communism." A group of delegates from the countries of Eastern and Central Europe made a corresponding declaration before the start of the hearings on the question of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

The authors of the document remind that September 2009 marks the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II. However, in all these years, neither the international community nor the Russian Federation has condemned the crimes of the Stalinist regime, the document says.

Many Russian political scientists, including liberal ones, consider the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact to be a necessary measure. “From the moment the Nazis came to power in Germany, Moscow has consistently opposed the regime that won in Berlin. The first clash between the USSR and Germany took place in Spain. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was the hardest, due to Munich, the positions of France and Great Britain, the temporary retreat of the USSR from the fight against the Nazis. Despite the pact, the USSR continued to prepare for the inevitable war with Nazism. As a result, it was our country, at the cost of millions of lives, together with its allies, the United States and Great Britain, that crushed Nazi Germany, ”Igor Yurgens, chairman of the board of the Institute of Contemporary Development, described the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

see also

• Secret Additional Protocol to the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the USSR
• Soviet-German treaties 1939
• European Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Stalinism and Nazism (celebrated on 23 August)

Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact: Legal Analysis

From newspaper articles:

Pravda, August 24, 1939: “On August 23, at 1 pm, the German Foreign Minister, Mr. Joachim von Ribbentrop, arrived in Moscow ... At 3:30 pm, the first conversation between the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and the People's Commissariat of the USSR Comrade took place. Molotov with German Foreign Minister Mr. von Ribbentrop on the issue of concluding a non-aggression pact. The conversation took place in the presence of Comrade. Stalin and the German ambassador, Mr. Schulenburg, and lasted about 3 hours. After a break at 10 pm, the conversation was resumed and ended with the signing of a non-aggression pact.

The text of the pact was extremely concise and consisted of only seven articles. According to M. I. Semiryaga, it was a typical non-aggression or neutrality pact drawn up in the classical style. Doctor of Historical Sciences M. I. Semiryaga and Doctor of Law R. A. Mullerson note that similar agreements were concluded in the past with other countries, both Germany and the USSR. The report of the Commission of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR on the political and legal assessment of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact dated August 23, 1939 stated that the treaty itself, from a legal point of view, did not go beyond the agreements adopted at that time, did not violate domestic legislation and international obligations of the USSR. In paragraph 3 of the decision of the Congress, which approved the conclusions of the Commission, it was noted that the content of this agreement did not differ from the norms of international law and the contractual practice of states adopted for such settlements.

With the assertion that the Soviet-German non-aggression pact did not violate the international obligations of the USSR, bearing in mind the analysis of Art. IV of the pact, it is not possible to agree, because the named article devalued the Franco-Soviet mutual assistance treaty of May 2, 1935, as well as a number of other international legal agreements of the USSR, which will be discussed in more detail below.

Also, one cannot agree with the assertion that the content of this pact did not differ from the treaty practice of the USSR. The vast majority of the non-aggression pacts concluded by the USSR (part 2, article 2 of the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression treaty and on the peaceful settlement of conflicts of January 21, 1932, part 2 of article 2 of the Polish-Soviet pact of July 25, 1932, part Article 2 of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and France of November 29, 1932, part 1 of article 6 of the Soviet-Latvian treaty of February 5, 1932, part 2 of article 6 of the non-aggression pact and on the peaceful settlement of conflicts between the USSR and Estonia of May 4, 1932, contained provisions on the automatic termination of the pact at the time the other side began aggression against a third state, i.e. obligations under the agreement were linked to the partner’s peaceful manner of actions.This provision was even included in the friendship agreement (!), non-aggression and neutrality between the Union of the USSR and fascist Italy of September 2, 1933 (part 2 of article 2). transmitted by V. M. Molotov 19 August 1939 for consideration by the German side of the Soviet draft treaty. In the situation in which the Soviet-German agreements were worked out in August 1939, this reservation did not make sense: both sides were clearly aware that the non-aggression pact they had concluded meant German-Soviet aggression against Poland. Therefore, it is unconvincing and rather testifies to the true intentions of the Soviet government, contrary to what was proclaimed (V. M. Molotov argued that the Soviet-German treaty "would contribute to the cause of peace in Europe"), an attempt made on August 31, 1939 by V. M. Molotov to justify the absence in the agreement, a clause on the automatic termination of the pact in the event of an attack by one of the parties on a third power refers to the Polish-German non-aggression pact of 1934, where such a clause was also absent: the named Polish-German pact actually laid the foundation for the military alliance of Germany and Poland. Also unconvincing is V. M. Molotov’s reference to the Anglo-German non-aggression declaration of September 30, 1938, signed by Chamberlain before his departure from Munich (some historians, justifying the legitimacy of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact by the fact that England and France even earlier concluded similar treaties with Germany, in addition to the named Anglo-German declaration, they also mention the similar German-French declaration of December 6, 1938. ). As M. I. Semiryaga points out, such a comparison is impossible for a number of reasons. Firstly, the general military-political situation in the autumn of 1939 is incomparable with the same period of the previous year, if only because in 1938 Germany did not even think about a serious war. Secondly, the governments of the contracting parties agreed to develop good neighborly relations, recognized the absence of any territorial disputes between them, and established that the existing border between them was final. Can this agreement be considered reprehensible, and why should it, if observed by its partners, lead to a destabilization of the situation and arouse any suspicion in the Soviet government? Finally, thirdly, and this is especially important, the declarations were open in nature and did not contain any secret protocols directed against the interests of other countries. In addition, in their form they were declarations, which, as is known, differ from other agreements in that they are a statement of two or more states, where their positions are expressed on the major problems discussed and the general principles of relations between countries are stated. These declarations were consistent with the principles of international law and could not be a source of international tension.

Some researchers (in particular, A. S. Orlov) argue that the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, in essence, repeats the Berlin Treaty of Neutrality, concluded by the USSR and Germany on April 24, 1926. This opinion is a serious misconception. Article 2 (neutrality) of the pact of August 23, 1939 very characteristically differed from the corresponding article of the Berlin Treaty of 1926: there the obligation of neutrality was conditioned by the “peaceful course of action” of the partner in the treaty, but now in the Soviet-German non-aggression pact this condition was not , just as it was not in the Soviet draft pact taken by the countries when developing this agreement as the basis. The Soviet government apparently found it superfluous to adhere to the condition of "peaceful conduct", given the apparently belligerent attitude of Germany. Observance of the neutrality of one of the parties to the agreement of August 23 was conditioned by such a position of the other side, in which it became "the object of hostilities on the part of a third power." This treaty opened the door wide for any German attack "provoked" by an alleged act of violence by a third power.

Formally, the Berlin Treaty of Neutrality, extended by the Nazi government in 1933, remained in force, despite the political alienation of both parties, and by August 23, 1939, after which, although the parties, when signing the non-aggression pact, refused to mention the Berlin Treaty in it , as envisaged by the preamble of the Soviet draft pact, continued to remain valid. This was confirmed by V. M. Molotov at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on August 31, 1939 dedicated to the ratification of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact.

Article I (declaration of non-use of force) of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact contained an obligation "to refrain from any violence, from any aggressive action and any attack against each other, either separately or jointly with other powers." In its content, it coincided with Art. I of the Soviet draft pact.

Article II (neutrality) adopted a wording different from the wording of the Soviet draft: if in the Soviet draft the observance of neutrality was a prerequisite for a situation in which the other side would be "the object of violence or attack by a third power", then the final text of the treaty contained only a condition that it should become "an object of hostilities by a third power". Here the German side managed to insist on a wording that ignored the question of who initiated the "military actions", and in which the qualification of any "actions" of other states as simply "military", according to the German doctor of history I. Fleischhauer, deprived them of an objective definition (violent act, attack) and thus left such a definition to the discretion of the interested party. This formulation particularly clearly reflected the peculiarity of this "neutrality agreement", which was supposed to operate regardless of the nature of the war.

M. I. Semiryaga notes that the provisions of Art. II, the obligation of the parties not to support the attacking power meant for the Soviet Union that it could not support England and France, which declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939, and, therefore, objectively had to take the side of Germany as a “victim of aggression”, which happened after the adoption on September 28, 1939 of the joint Declaration of the Soviet and German governments. Thus, the cited article did not ensure a truly neutral status for the USSR, rather firmly tied its hands and limited the flexibility of its foreign policy line.

Article III of the Soviet draft pact (the question of consultations) was divided into two articles - III and IV. The first of them was more related to the situation of war, and the second - to the situation of peace: Art. III of the non-aggression pact determined that "the governments of both contracting parties will remain in future contact with each other for consultation in order to inform each other about issues affecting their common interests." Consultations here were not limited, as was supposed in the Soviet draft, to cases of "disputes or conflicts." They had to be permanent and therefore serve to prevent mutual infringement of interests at the time of military expansion.

As I. Fleischhauer writes, this article also took into account (and above all) Hitler's wish that the Soviet Union under no circumstances - for example, on the basis of its treaty obligations with respect to Poland or France - would not be drawn in one form or another into the upcoming conflict with Poland on the side of these countries. (However, Article I of the Berlin Neutrality Treaty, which provided for the maintenance of contacts between the USSR and Germany in order to agree on all issues relating jointly to both countries, could also contribute to the implementation of this wish of the German side.) An expression of this interest of Hitler was the stubborn insistence of the German side on sending to Berlin of the Soviet military mission and at the accreditation of the new Soviet plenipotentiary in Germany, Shkvartsev, in the last days before the attack on Poland. During the Polish campaign, this opportunity for constant consultation brought Hitler its most favorable fruits: one of the results was friendly contact between the Wehrmacht and Soviet military units in the center of Poland. In the course of further German expansion, in particular in the Balkans, the obligation to consult was increasingly violated and eventually ignored.

The establishment of arbitration commissions, envisaged by the Soviet draft non-aggression pact to eliminate disputes and conflicts, in relation to the case, which for Hitler was the only determining factor in his decision to conclude this pact, seemed too cumbersome and time-consuming method. Therefore, this proposal is reflected in Art. V and was envisaged to resolve such "disputes and conflicts" that could not be resolved within the framework of ongoing consultations, but did not directly interfere with the desired course of (military) events. In fact, this article has remained inoperative.

Article IV embodied the desire of the German side to neutralize the USSR, as well as the desire of the USSR not to be drawn into the war on the side of England and France (the latter thesis will be proved below). This article determined that none of the contracting parties "will participate in any grouping of powers that is directly or indirectly directed against the other side." Hitler believed that, having secured Molotov's signature under this article, he would ensure the breakthrough of the "encirclement ring" around Germany: the threat of such a ring arose for Germany during the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations in the summer of 1939. However, this article also entailed that the Anti-Comintern Pact, as a grouping directed against the Soviet Union, lost its force: the definition contained in the article imposed restrictions on Germany in its relations with Japan. Another fact that refutes the judgment that the non-aggression pact did not go beyond the treaty practice of the USSR is the absence in Art. IV of the pact usual in treaties of this kind (for example, article 3 of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and France of November 29, 1932, article 4 of the Polish-Soviet pact of July 25, 1932, article 5 of the Soviet-Italian friendship treaty , non-aggression and neutrality of September 2, 1939) provisions that the obligations arising from agreements previously signed by the parties remain in force. There was no such provision in the Soviet draft non-aggression pact either. This meant that, in particular, the obligations of the USSR from Part 1 of Art. 2 of the Franco-Soviet non-aggression treaty, which provided for the parties' refusal in the event of an attack on one of them by a third power from direct and indirect assistance and support to the attacker throughout the conflict, obligations from Part 1 of Art. 5 of the aforementioned pact, which imposed on the USSR a ban on encouraging propaganda or attempted intervention aimed at violating the territorial integrity of France, changing the political and social system or part of its territory by force. It also meant that the obligations of the USSR from the Polish-Soviet pact on non-aggression and non-participation in hostile political combinations, extended by the USSR and Poland until 1945, had actually become null and void. Thus, Art. IV of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939 opened the way for German-Soviet aggression against both Poland and France.

Speaking of Art. IV of the pact, it is necessary to mention the following. On April 5, 1941, a treaty of friendship and non-aggression was concluded between the USSR and Yugoslavia. This agreement was signed just a few days after a coup d'etat took place in Yugoslavia (on the night of March 26-27, 1941), as a result of which a pro-British, anti-fascist government headed by General D. Simovic came to power. Immediately after March 27, the Yugoslav General Staff, together with the Greek General Staff and the High Command of the British Expeditionary Army that landed in Greece, began to actively prepare for joint operations against Germany and Italy. Under these conditions, the USSR considered it expedient for itself to sign a pact with the new Yugoslav government, Art. 2 of which imposed on the parties the obligation to "observe the policy of friendly relations" in relation to that of the contracting parties that would become the object of attack by a third state. Thus, the said article did not speak of the neutrality of the parties in the event of an attack on one of them by a third power, but implied an obligation of mutual assistance. In the situation that existed in April 1941, Art. 2 of the Soviet-Yugoslav Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression meant the Soviet Union's support for the anti-German government of Yugoslavia in the event of its war with the Reich, the inevitability of which was obvious (military operations between Germany and Yugoslavia began the very next day after the signing of the Soviet-Yugoslav pact). So, with the conclusion of the friendship treaty of April 5, 1941, the USSR actually joined the common Anglo-Yugoslav-Greek front directed against Germany. Of course, these actions of the Soviet government were contrary to Art. IV of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, which forbade the contracting parties to participate in any grouping of powers that is directly or indirectly directed against the other side.

Like the Soviet-German treaty of August 23, 1939, the Soviet-Yugoslav Pact of Friendship and Non-Aggression also did not contain a provision that the obligations arising from agreements previously signed by the parties remain in force. The refusal of the USSR to include this norm in the pact with Yugoslavia meant that the USSR no longer considered itself bound by a non-aggression pact with Germany, going over to the camp of its military opponents.

The signing of friendship agreements first with fascist Germany (friendship and border treaty of September 28, 1939), then with anti-fascist Yugoslavia (pact of April 5, 1941) highlighted the true goals of the Soviet leadership in the best possible way: to push one belligerent against another , weaken both Germany and Europe, and then take advantage of this in the interests of socialism.

In Article IV of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939 - at the request of the German side - the duration of the pact was determined for 10 years (with automatic extension for the next five years, if a year before the expiration of the agreement is not denounced by one from the parties), and not, as the Soviet project envisaged, for 5 years. Finally, Art. VII treaty prescribed its entry into force "immediately after signing", while the Soviet draft provided for its entry into force only after ratification. As for the timing of ratification, both the draft and the treaty itself prescribed that this be done "in the shortest possible time." Thus, the Soviet side succumbed to the pressure of time trouble experienced by Germany in the field of military planning. However, the exchange of instruments of ratification, after which the treaty became the law in force, did not take place in Berlin until September 24, 1939.

Already in the pre-war period, there was a generally accepted customary rule that war between states terminates the operation of international treaties. An example here is Art. 289 of the Treaty of Versailles, according to which the Allied Powers must indicate the bilateral treaties that existed before the First World War between them and Germany and whose effect they would like to renew. “Only those bilateral treaties and conventions,” the article said, “which become the subject of such an indication, will resume their effect between the allied states, on the one hand, and Germany, on the other. All others remain cancelled." Similar provisions were contained in Art. 241 of the Saint-Germain Peace Treaty of September 10, 1919 and Art. 224 of the Trianon Peace Treaty of June 4, 1920.

Consequently, the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany ceased to be valid on June 22, 1941, i.e. from the moment of the German attack on the Soviet Union, like all Soviet-German agreements that existed at that time. This was confirmed in the report of the Commission of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR on the political and legal assessment of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939 and in paragraph 4 of the Congress resolution of the same name.

As for post-war Europe, as indicated in the report of the Commission of the SND of the USSR, it was built on international legal norms that had different origins, which is reflected primarily in the UN Charter and the Final Act of the 1975 All-European Conference.

The performed international legal analysis concerns only the non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, which became the "head" in the system of other political, economic and trade treaties and agreements between the USSR and Germany, and does not apply to the protocol on the delimitation of "spheres of interest" signed on the same day.

In paragraph 2, clause 3 of the above-mentioned resolution of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, it was stated that “the originals of the protocol were not found either in Soviet or foreign archives. However, graphological, phototechnical and lexical examination of copies, maps and other documents, the correspondence of subsequent events to the content of the protocol confirm the fact of its signing and existence.” Putting his signature under such conclusions of the Congress Commission, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR M. S. Gorbachev agreed with them, although he knew better than anyone else that the original secret protocols really existed: in 1987, the last Soviet leader personally got acquainted with these documents .

By decrees of the President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin, the archives of the CPSU were transferred to the State Archival Service of the Russian Federation, which is declassifying them. As a result of this work, on October 30, 1992, the historian D. A. Volkogonov found the texts of both Soviet and German original documents marked “Top Secret” on Soviet-German relations in 1939–1941, which were stored in the “Special Folder” in Central Committee of the CPSU (Moscow, Staraya Square, 4). Currently, the documents are in the Archive of the President of Russia. These documents were first published in the journal New and Contemporary History, 1993, No. 1.

Note that both the non-aggression pact and the secret protocol of August 23, 1939 were drawn up in German and Russian, and both German and Russian texts were signed. The secret additional protocol was made only in two copies - one in Russian, the other in German. After signing on August 23, 1939, one copy was left in Moscow, and the other Ribbentrop brought to Berlin, where the German copy was kept in a special place in Ribbentrop's office. During 1943–1944 this protocol, together with other documents of Ribbentrop's office, was microfilmed, and in the spring of 1945, for security reasons, was transported to the Schoenberg estate in Thuringia. In the last days of the war, by order from Berlin, a significant part of the transported documents was burned. The troops of the Western Allies managed to save part of this important archive and take it to a safe place. However, the secret additional protocol was not among them.

It is very likely that the stubborn and confident denial in the USSR for more than forty years of the existence of secret protocols was due to the fact that after the end of the war in Europe, the German original copy of the secret protocol dated August 23, 1939, like the German originals of later Soviet German agreements ended up in Moscow. Thus, Moscow turned out to be the only custodian of the original secret agreements.

In a resolution of December 24, 1989 (p. 6), the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR stated that Stalin and Molotov did not introduce the secret protocol to either members of the Politburo, or any of the people's commissars or party and state functionaries, without also thinking about it ratification. However, it is impossible to recognize the invalidity of the secret additional protocol on the basis that it has never been ratified, because according to Art. 2 of the Law of the USSR of August 20, 1938 “On the procedure for ratification and denunciation of international treaties USSR”, only peace treaties concluded by the USSR, treaties on mutual defense against aggression, treaties on mutual non-aggression, as well as those international treaties, at the conclusion of which the parties agreed on subsequent ratification, were subject to ratification. The Soviet-German secret agreements cannot be attributed to any of the listed types of international treaties, and the reason for their invalidity must be sought elsewhere.

The secret protocols of August 23 and September 28, 1939, and of January 10, 1941, are invalid from the very beginning, because they contradicted the principle of the sovereign equality of states, that is, the imperative norm of international law. The Polish scientist, Judge of the International Court of Justice M. Lahe writes that treaties that resolve issues of the vital interests of some states without their participation and consent are not only deprived of binding force in relation to a third state, but are generally invalid from the point of view of law. This provision fully applies to the secret protocols concluded between the USSR and Germany. Therefore, as is clear from the resolution of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR of December 24, 1989 "On the political and legal assessment of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939" (p. 5), primarily on the basis of precisely these reasons, the Congress recognized the named protocols (p. 7) "legally untenable and invalid from the moment they were signed."

The enumerated secret arrangements had an illegal object. In the "sphere of interest" of the contracting states, they included the territory of third countries. Any agreement relating to the interests, rights and obligations of third states, regardless of what is meant by interests and whether they and their implementation are understood by the parties in the same way, cannot impose any obligations on these third countries. It also does not confer any rights on the parties to the treaty with respect to these third states. Such a contract violates the generally recognized principle of the law of contracts - the contract does not grant rights to a third party, does not impose obligations on it. In paragraph 2, clause 7 of the said resolution of the Congress, it was rightly noted that “the protocols did not create a new legal basis for the relations of the Soviet Union with third countries, but were used by Stalin and his entourage to present ultimatums and forceful pressure on other states in violation of the legal obligations."

Since an agreement invalid from the very beginning does not give rise to any legal consequences and everything done in pursuance of such an agreement returns to its original state, it is possible to judge the legality or illegality of the inclusion of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Bessarabia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia into the USSR , only by studying the processes of the attachment itself, which will be done below.

State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry von Weizsäcker once wrote about the August 23 protocol: “The significance of this document was so great because it concerned the delimitation of spheres of interest, drawing a line between those territories that, under given circumstances, should belong to the Soviet-Russian sphere, and those regions which, in such a case, must enter into the German sphere. In the view of both sides, these circumstances were war (according to I. Fleischhauer, the words “territorial and political rearrangement” used in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the secret additional protocol of August 23, 1939 unequivocally indicated that in this case it was about the conclusion of an alliance for war. The "reorganization" agreed in this way could come either during military clashes, or as a result of the seizure and use of force), the destruction of the traditional, based on the Versailles system, political, territorial-administrative, and even social and ethnic order in located between the Baltic and Black Sea states of Northern, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. In this regard, the secret additional protocol of August 23, 1939, as well as the clarification to this protocol signed by Molotov and Shulenberg on August 28, 1939, as well as the secret additional protocol of September 28, 1939 on changing the Soviet-German agreement of August 23 1939 regarding the spheres of interests of Germany and the USSR were of a nature that clearly contradicted the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

The Kellogg Pact, signed on August 27, 1928 by all the major powers of the world, including Germany, was joined by the USSR on September 6 of the same year. Moreover, the obligations from the Kellogg Pact, at the suggestion of the USSR, were put into effect ahead of schedule between the USSR, Poland, Romania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1929 (an agreement on this appears in the literature under the name of the Moscow Protocol, which was ratified by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR 13 February 1929). In article 1 of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the parties condemned the method of resorting to war to resolve international conflicts and solemnly proclaimed the renunciation in their mutual relations of war as an instrument of national policy, and in Art. 2 pledged to resolve all differences or conflicts that may arise between them in the future, regardless of the nature of their origin, only by peaceful means.

With the signing of the above secret agreements, the USSR and Germany arrogated to themselves the right to encroach on the sovereignty of states fighting for the preservation of their independence by means of armed violence, therefore, they clearly violated their obligations under the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

Due to the fact that the word “additional” appears in the title of the secret protocols of August 23 and September 28, 1939, they are often considered as protocols to the corresponding treaties concluded on the same days, that is, as their integral parts. Then the protocols, constituting a certain integrity together with the treaties, would turn the treaties themselves into invalid. However, from the point of view of R. A. Mullerson (and one should agree with her), such an approach is very doubtful, since if both parties to the contract want any existing formally separate documents to be considered part of the contract, this is always directly stated either in the contract (this is exactly what the Soviet draft non-aggression pact envisaged, containing a postscript stating that the said treaty enters into force only in the event of the simultaneous signing of a special protocol, which is an integral part of the pact, on foreign policy issues of interest to the contracting parties; from this mention of the party during the negotiations uncompensated refused, giving the protocol a secret character), or in these additional documents. But there are no such guidelines. The words of the preamble of the secret protocol of August 23, 1939 that “when signing the non-aggression pact between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the undersigned representatives of both parties discussed in a strictly confidential manner the question of delimiting the spheres of mutual interests in Eastern Europe” cannot be considered as an indication that the protocol has therefore become an integral part of the non-aggression pact and deduce from this the invalidity of the latter.

Article 4 of the secret additional protocol of August 23, 1939 on the border of the spheres of interests of Germany and the USSR stipulated that both sides would keep it “strictly secret”. The Soviet government kept this promise until the last moment. Along with the (subsequent) desire of the Soviet leaders to keep in their hands those future union republics that went to the Soviet Union in fulfillment of the opportunities arising from the signed in 1939-1941. secret protocols with Germany, and along with the desire to maintain advantageous military-strategic positions in the space from the Baltic to the Black Sea, which these treaties provided them with, first of all, deep shame prevented them from openly declaring their involvement in these agreements: in 1939, the Soviet the leaders firmly embarked on the false path of readiness for expansion that contradicted all international legal norms.

In paragraph 5 of the resolution of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR of December 24, 1989, it was stated that the protocol of August 23, 1939 and other secret protocols signed with Germany in 1939–1941, “both in terms of the method of compilation and in content were departure from the Leninist principles of politics. I. Flyashhauer fully agrees with this assessment of the Congress.

These judgments do not stand up to scrutiny for the following reasons.

The wording “Leninist principles of foreign policy” has as its content the openness of international legal agreements proclaimed in paragraph 8 of the Decree on Peace adopted on October 26, 1917 by the Second Congress of Soviets, which stated: “The government cancels secret diplomacy, for its part expressing its firm intention to conduct all negotiations quite openly before the whole people. (The text of the decree was written by V. I. Lenin.) However, the cited norm by no means became the rule of Soviet foreign policy. Suffice it to recall the role of Lenin in the formation and development of secret and illegal Soviet-German military cooperation, based on the secret agreements approved by him with the German government. So the secret agreements of 1939-1941. were just a continuation of the Leninist traditions, well assimilated by Stalin and his inner circle. author

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