The beginning of the 20th century was a time when the world was collapsing and reshaping before our eyes - sometimes quite bizarrely.

For example, in July 1934, a Russian émigré officer Boris Skosyrev came to the tiny European principality of Andorra and, following the example of Ostap Bender, so fooled the members of the local General Council that they unanimously recognized him as king BorisI. The reign of this sovereign did not last long - just enough to become an international incident. A week later, he quarreled with the spiritual shepherd of Andorra Bishop of Urgell and declared war on him. An outfit of the Italian gendarmerie arrived in the capital of the newly-minted kingdom, which radically strangled the brilliant reign of the unlucky monarch.

However, history also knows more successful cases of ascension to the throne of people of completely non-royal origin. The phrase "Persian Cossack brigade" sounds ridiculous, but such a military unit really existed, and the brave Cossack Reza Khan fought in it.

Learn from the enemy

For more than a century, the Persians kept fighting with the Russian Cossacks in the Caucasus, suffering huge losses and not having success. Finally, in 1878 the Persian Shah Nasser al-Din Shah from the Qajar dynasty, impressed by the prowess of the Terek Cossacks, turned to the governor of the Caucasus, the Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich with a request to detach officers for the device in his possessions of a similar military unit. In St. Petersburg, they did not resist for a long time - it was a chance to seriously strengthen Russia's position in Persia and begin to squeeze out the British from there, with whom the Russian Empire had a protracted undeclared war.

Officers and conscripts were sent to Tehran. Officially, the brigade was subordinate to the Persian Minister of War (and then to the Shah himself), but in reality it was led by a Russian envoy, especially since the payment for this military unit came from the Russian treasury. The direct commander of the brigade was modestly listed as the "head of training for the Persian cavalry" (I recall the Soviet "military experts" in Korea, Vietnam and African countries). The brigade was mainly recruited from Caucasians, who at one time fled to Persia from Russian troops. Now they or their descendants themselves had to serve under the command of Russian officers. The task before the Cossack brigade was set responsible - the protection of the sovereign himself, his family members, the first persons of the state and members of the diplomatic corps. By the beginning of the 20th century, the brigade was rightly revered as the most organized and combat-ready part of the Persian army.

Capable boy

It was at this time that a fourteen-year-old "Cossack" joined the ranks of the brigade. Reza Khan Savadkuhi. The origin of the recruit was quite ordinary for this military unit. He was born and raised in the small village of Alasht in northern Persia. He had undoubted talents, knew several languages, but had practically no education and wrote with difficulty. His militant ancestors once lived in the Caucasus, his grandfather was already a major in the Persian army, his father a colonel. However, Reza Khan barely remembered him - he died when the future Cossack was still a child. The son of a younger wife, he had fadingly small chances for a poor inheritance, but he was distinguished by excellent physical development and a representative appearance. Service in a privileged part gave him a relatively good position and the opportunity to advance to the officer rank. At that time, this was the height of Reza's dreams.

The service was easy for him, a natural rider and grunt quickly attracted the attention of commanders. In 1900, he finally received his first officer rank. Three years later, he was entrusted with a responsible mission - the protection of the Dutch consul. General Fritz Knebel, whose bodyguard was the handsome young Reza Khan, appreciated the smart and inquisitive officer. Thanks to the Dutchman, he mastered the basics of diplomacy with political literacy, and received a thorough knowledge of European military science. By 1910, Reza had already become the captain of the Persian Cossack brigade - not only a dashing horseman, but also a very knowledgeable officer. I must say that such an elevation in this brigade was more the exception than the norm, the command staff here was predominantly Russian. But then Captain Reza Khan was lucky: in 1916, at the height of World War I, it was decided to deploy the brigade into a division.

Between two fires

In contrast to the Persian Cossacks, Great Britain, as if Russia's ally in the Entente, formed South Persian rifle units on the model of Indian sepoys to protect its interests in Persia. Russia could not put up with this and increased its presence in a strategically important region (Baku was nearby, which at that time provided the lion's share of oil to the world market). Officers needed much more than before, and Russian military experts were needed on the fronts of the war with Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. This is where Reza Khan becomes a colonel and commander of a separate Kazvin detachment. As a child, looking at the brave Cossacks in Circassian coats - with gazyrs, in shaggy hats, with decorated checkers and daggers on their belts - he could only dream of such a career. In reality, however, his rise was just beginning.

The revolution in Russia set in motion hitherto unknown mechanisms of world politics. Most of the officers of the Cossack division took the side of the Whites, but the Bolsheviks also looked at the Persian lands with considerable interest: the revolution must be world! In 1920, a detachment of sailors under the command of a former midshipman of the imperial fleet Fyodor Ilyin (Raskolnikov), commander of the Astrakhan-Caspian flotilla, landed in the Persian port of Anzeli, allegedly to return the ships stolen by the White Guards. But soon the landing force was surrounded by Cossacks patrolling the Caspian coast and thrown into the sea. The heroes of this battle were Russian Cossack officers who remained in the service of the Shah. They were led by Reza Khan. However, such a vivid manifestation of combat readiness and loyalty did not so much please the weak Ahmad Shah how much it frightened the British military mission, which planned to seize the Baku oil fields. The British began to actively put pressure on the Shah and his Prime Minister, demanding the dissolution of the Cossack division. Since, after the collapse of the Russian Empire, the financing of the “allied” military unit now lay on their shoulders, it was not difficult to “cut off the oxygen”.

Sardar Sepah

This is where the lessons learned from the Dutch consul came in handy for Colonel Reza Khan. On the night of February 20-21, 1921, his Cossacks supported the coup in the capital. The new prime minister approved the military leader of the uprising as the commander of the revived Cossack division and granted him the rank of general (with the high title of "Sardar Sepah"). Soon Reza Khan became the military governor of the capital, the commander in chief and the military minister of Persia. One of the first actions of the new government on February 26, 1921 was the signing of a friendship treaty with the Soviet government. The British could bite their elbows, but access to Baku oil was blocked for them.

A couple of years later, Reza Khan himself became the prime minister of Persia, and two years later the incredible happened: on October 31, 1925, the Majlis (parliament) announced the deposition of Ahmad Shah and the entire Qajar dynasty, and on December 12, the dashing Cossack Reza was declared Shah of Persia Khan, who became known as Reza Pahlavi. The new Shahinshah had nothing to do with the ancient Parthian Karen-Pahlavid dynasty, but his name sounded much more magnificent than before.

It was here that a number of details were revealed that had not previously been focused on. Thought to be a Shiite Muslim, the new Shah turned out to be a Zoroastrian and introduced a number of innovations that turned old-fashioned Persia into a rapidly developing secular power. Laws unprecedented for these places were adopted, including a civil code, a law against the violent seizure of land, an autonomous customs tax was introduced ... The Shah actively laid highways and railways, built factories, distributed land allotments to four million poor peasants, practically eliminated illiteracy in the country, gave women the right to vote. It was under him, in 1935, that a decree was issued on the removal of the veil! In the same year, the old name of the country - Persia - was changed to Iran, i.e. Aryan country.

Not for that horse

The Aryan theme was generally popular in the 30s of the last century, and most of all in Germany, which had the same relation to this ancient people as Shah Reza had to the Parthians (translated by Pahlavi means "Parthian"). This determined the interest of the "true Aryans" in the true Iranians and probably determined the fate of the most progressive of the eastern rulers of that era. He saw in the Nazi Reich a counterbalance to the USSR and Great Britain, from which Iran took a sip of dashing, and maintained active diplomatic contacts with the Germans.

In 1941, the Soviet Union and Britain, fearing the deployment of German bases on the Caspian coast, demanded that the Shah allow allied troops into their territory. Reza Pahlavi declared his neutrality and refused. Then, on August 25, Soviet and British troops from the north and south began to move inland towards each other. Not wanting senseless bloodshed, Reza Pahlavi abdicated in favor of his son and left the country. He died in Johannesburg (South Africa) in 1944. After the end of the war, his remains were returned to their homeland, and in 1949 the Mejlis awarded the late sovereign the title of "Great". Thus ended the long and glorious epic of the Russian-Persian Cossack - the father of Iran.

The Persian Cossack brigade (hereinafter referred to as the PKB; the official name is His Majesty Shah's Cossack brigade) is a unique military unit of the Persian army that existed under the leadership of Russian instructors from the moment the first regiment was formed in 1879 until 1920 (in 1916 it was reorganized into division). Its creation was initiated by the Russian envoy in Tehran I.A. Zinoviev. It was in close connection with the conquest of Akhal-Teke by the Russians and the struggle with Great Britain on this occasion, as well as for influence at the Shah's court [Khidoyatov G.A., 1969, p. 348-423]. Despite the existing publications [Gokov O.A., 2003; Gokov O.A., 2008; Krasnyak O.A.; Krasnyak O.A., 2007; Ter-Oganov N.K., 2010; Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012; Rabi U., Ter-Oganov N., 2009], some fragments of its history require more detailed study. One of them is the period from 1882 to 1885, when Pyotr Vladimirovich Charkovsky was the commander of the PKB, or the Head of Training of the Persian Cavalry (hereinafter referred to as the Head), as his position was officially called. So far, his activities in Iran have been described most holistically in the study by N.K. Ter-Oganov [Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012, p. 62–67]. But the internal problems and the real state of the PKB are poorly covered by him. In our article, we will try to give a possibly complete analysis of the activities of P.V. Charkovsky and the position of the brigade in the period under review.

The first Head was Lieutenant Colonel (later - Colonel) of the General Staff (hereinafter - General Staff) Alexei Ivanovich Domontovich, who had been in Persia from 1879 to 1882. and liked by Shah Nasreddin [Krasnyak O.A., 2007, p. 72–78; Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012, p. 52–62]. In 1882, at the end of the contract, A.I. Domontovich, despite the requests of the Shah, was not left in his position. The reason for this was the conflict with the envoy [Kosogovsky V.A., 1923, p. 392]. By order of the Minister of War, since March 1882, the Caucasian authorities were preoccupied with the search for a new candidate for the post of Head. At the initiative of the Chief of Staff of the Caucasian Military District, Lieutenant General of the General Staff P.P. Pavlov, approved by General of Cavalry A.M. Dondukov-Korsakov, instead of A.I. Domontovich, it was decided to send Colonel P.V. Charkovsky.

The new Head came from St. Petersburg nobles. He was born on April 15, 1845, graduated from the Pavlovsky Cadet Corps, the Mikhailovsky Artillery School and the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff. He entered the service on September 29, 1861. He served in the Life Guards Horse Artillery Brigade. In the rank of captain he participated in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. During the first year of the war, he was awarded the Orders of Vladimir 4th class with swords and a bow, St. Stanislaus 2nd class and St. Anna 2nd class with swords. After graduating from the accelerated course of the Academy of the General Staff, he was released into the General Staff. In March 1878 he was renamed lieutenant colonel of the General Staff, and in August he was promoted to colonel for distinction. In 1879 he was awarded a golden weapon for the campaign. From March 1878 to January 1879 P.V. Charkovsky was the commander of a cavalry artillery brigade division and served as chief of staff of the 1st Caucasian Cossack division. From January 1879 to October 1882, he was listed only as chief of staff [Glinoetsky N.P., 1882, p. 174; List of generals by seniority, 1891, p. 840; List of generals by seniority, 1896, p. 659]. At the same time, he was an active participant in military intelligence in the Caucasus. Being in this position, P.V. Charkovsky was appointed to the post of secretary of the Trebizond consulate [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. nineteen] . In the Ministry of War, neither the chief of the General Staff nor the head of the department raised objections to the candidacy, which was reported to the envoy in Tehran [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 8–9].

On June 5, 1882, Emperor Alexander III allowed the appointment of Colonel of the General Staff P.V. Charkovsky to the post of Head of Training of the Persian Cavalry [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 19–20] . The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was informed about this. Since the shah insisted on the speedy arrival of the new Head [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 16], appointed on March 28, 1882 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs N.K. Girs telegraphed the charge d'affaires in Tehran (I.A. Zinoviev was on vacation in Russia) to urgently begin negotiations on the renewal "on the previous basis of the contract for our instructor" [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 27]. On July 16, Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Tehran K.M. Argiropulo signed a new three-year contract with the Shah's government [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 52–53] .

The terms of the contract basically repeated the text of the agreement of 1879 [Krasnyak O.A. , 2007, p. 79; RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 52, 57–59; Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012, p. 63–64; Browne E.G., 1910, p. 228–232]. It was written in French and Persian and consisted of eleven articles. The first of them indicated that P.V. Charkovsky, is appointed by the Caucasian authorities to replace A.I. Domontovich for three years as a military instructor of the Persian "Cossacks". His duty was to prepare and drill cavalry units, determined by the Persian Ministry of War, according to the Russian model. The second article stipulated that 3 officers and 5 officers were appointed to help the colonel by the Caucasian administration. It was pointed out that the names of the members of the military mission, the colonel should inform the envoy in Tehran, and he - to the Iranian government. The third article was devoted to the issues of material and financial support. The manager was to receive 2,400 fogs (24,000 French francs) a year, paid quarterly, and daily fodder for five horses. The chief officers were left with a salary, as in the case of A.I. Domontovich, i.e., each about 5,000 fogs (12,000 French francs). The maintenance of officers was 20 fogs per month or 240 fogs per person per year. The fifth article stated that this money should be paid starting from the date of signing this agreement. The sixth article stated that 400 fogs (4,006 francs) - an advance payment for two months - should be issued to the colonel on the day the contract was signed. According to the fourth article, the instructors were to receive from the Persian government 100, 75 and 24 semi-imperials, respectively, to pay for their journey. According to Article Ten, at the end of the contract, the Persian government undertook to pay the officers the same amount of travel expenses for returning to Russia. At the same time, the members of the military mission retained the right to them if "the agreement is canceled at the request of the Persian government before the end of the specified period." The seventh article stated that in all matters related to the service, the colonel must act in accordance with the instructions of the Persian Ministry of War, to which he is subordinate. The same ministry was obliged to pay him a salary. In the eighth paragraph, the Iranian government undertook to compensate P.V. Charkovsky all travel expenses made by the colonel on his orders. The ninth article fixed that the colonel could not cancel or change the provisions of the contract, could not leave the service of the Persian government before the end of the three-year term. The exception was the disease, due to which P.V. Charkovsky would not have been able to fulfill his duties. The colonel was allowed leave for a period not exceeding three months, "if his health or private affairs need it." But in this case, the General Staff officer did not have the right to receive any payments (including salaries) from the Tehran government. Similar conditions were recorded for other members of the military mission. According to the last eleventh article, the instructors had to arrive in Tehran within two and a half months from the moment they received the amount for travel expenses through the Russian diplomatic mission.

At the same time, the process of enrolling the colonel in a new position took place. As noted, since 1879 he was the secretary of the Trebizond consulate, being an unofficial military agent. By tradition, before being appointed to this post, P.V. Charkovsky was dismissed from military service with the retention of a full-time position, but without maintenance, the right to be promoted to the next rank, etc., and assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a renaming to the rank of collegiate adviser. Therefore, when sending him to Persia, the reverse procedure was necessary. This required agreements between the War Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They were completed in early July. By the highest order of July 16, P.V. Charkovsky was returned to military service and renamed the colonel of the General Staff [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 43]. And on July 18, P.P. Pavlov was given an order signed by the Chief of the General Staff N.N. Obruchev call P.V. Charkovsky from Trebizond to Tiflis. Upon arrival, the colonel received an eight-day leave [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 45–46]. His trip to Iran was delayed, because one of the new instructors was expected in Tiflis - cornet Denisov, seconded by the General Staff [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 46–47]. Finally, in August, members of the mission left for Tehran. Along with the change of the Head, there was also a change of Russian instructors. Esaul E.A. Makovkin was left by the Caucasian authorities for a second term. In addition to him, Yesaul Menyaev and cornet Denisov were appointed officers of the Kuban Cossack army [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 53]. As for the officers, some of them were replaced, and some remained for a second term [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 27].

The new commander obviously did not have the initiative in political affairs that his predecessor, but he knew his job well and tried to do it the same way. During his command of the PKB P.V. Charkovsky brought the number of people in the brigade to 900 by including 300 Muhajirs in it. Mukhajirs were people from Transcaucasia (Erivan and Baku regions), who left it after the signing of the Turkmanchai Peace Treaty of 1828 and settled in Persia [Kolyubakin, 1883, p. 61–62; Mamontov N.P., 1909, p. 91]. A.I. Domontovich was allocated 400 people from the irregular cavalry of the Muhajir, who were distinguished by extremely weak discipline [Kosogovsky V.A., 1923, p. 391]. V.A. Kosogovsky wrote that “under Charkovsky, they managed to convince the remaining 300 Tehran muhajirs, who, during the initial formation of the brigade, did not want to become Cossacks and sat in the best, to join the brigade on the same conditions on which the first four hundred were accepted, that is, with the preservation of their tribal or hereditary content” [Kosogovsky V.A., 1923, p. 392]. Following V.A. Kosogovsky, modern researchers also argue that that part of the Muhajirs who did not agree to serve in the brigade, through the efforts of P.V. Charkovsky was enlisted in the brigade under the same conditions as their compatriots [Krasnyak O.A., 2007, p. 79; Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012, p. 64].

However, it seems to us that this enrollment occurred not only at the insistence of the colonel, but at the request of the Muhajirs themselves and the Shah. Initially, the Muhajirs reacted negatively to attempts to enroll them in the PCB during its formation. Their boss frankly harmed A.I. Domontovich, not wanting to lose his position. However, over time, the situation has changed. Central to this change was the financial support and status achieved for the brigade by its first commander. In conditions when the financial allowance of the Muhajirs worsened from year to year, the stable position of their fellow tribesmen who were in the PKB could not but attract. At the same time, the inclusion of the remaining Muhajirs in the ranks of the Design Bureau was temporarily solved by the task set by Colonel of the General Staff A.I. Domontovich. In 1880 he wrote to I.A. Zinoviev that the position of the Muhajirs, who were not included in the brigade, acts corruptingly on their fellow tribesmen - "Cossacks" [Krasnyak O.A., 2007, p. 132-133]. In particular, the first Head paid attention to the fact that, without carrying out any service, they live in Tehran and use their content. “Facts of this kind,” he wrote, “have a very unfavorable effect on the“ Cossacks ” who carry out a rather difficult service, forcing them to evade it with all their might” [Krasnyak O.A., 2007, p. 132-133].

In 1883 P.V. Charkovsky formed the third regiment and squadron "Kadam" from Muhajirs of different sex and age, i.e. veterans (in this case, old people), and women and children were enrolled as pensioners, who continued to receive the Muhajirs' hereditary salary in the form of pensions. In addition, the colonel transformed the Guards semi-squadron into a squadron and formed a choir of musicians [Kosogovsky V.A., 1923, p. 393]. In October of the same year, 4 guns of the 1877 model and 532 charges for them were delivered as a gift from the Russian Emperor Alexander III to the Design Bureau [Kublitsky, 1884]. On the basis of these guns in 1884, P.V. Charkovsky formed a horse battery at the Design Bureau [Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012, p. 65]. It seems that these changes were also connected with Russia's foreign policy plans in the Middle East. In 1881–1885 there was a conquest of the Turkmen lands by the empire, to which Persia partly claimed. The advance of Russia caused a response from the British, who sought to create an anti-Russian bloc in the Middle East [Davletov J., Ilyasov A., 1972; Accession of Turkmenistan to Russia, 1960, p. 549-797]. Therefore, maintaining peaceful relations with Iran, attracting the favor of the Shah to Russia, were among the most important tasks of Russian diplomacy. A P.V. Charkovsky and the PKB acted as elements of foreign policy influence.

The structure of the brigade began to look as follows. It was headed by a colonel of the Russian General Staff - the head of the training of the Persian cavalry; Russian officers and sergeants were considered his assistants - naibs. The PCB consisted of three regiments: two of the Muhajirs, one of the volunteers. “When formed, according to the state, each regiment was supposed to have four squadrons, and in the third - only personnel for four squadrons” [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 5, d. 481, l. 5]. According to the lists, the number of regiments of the brigade was 800 people. “There are 300 men in the 1st and 2nd regiments, about 150 in the third, and about 50 in the battery,” wrote Misl-Rustem [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 146]. In addition to them, there was a squadron of guards, a squadron "Kadam" and a musical choir. At the head of each regiment was an Iranian general with the rank of sarkhang (colonel) or sartip (general). He, however, was usually subordinate to a junior Russian officer-instructor. These Russian officers were the actual commanders of the regiments. In each regiment, a Russian officer had one sergeant at his disposal, with whose help he trained the regiment [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 148]. “They are held in high esteem by the Persian officers,” wrote the author, hiding under the pseudonym Misl-Rustem, “who shake hands with them and obey them in everything. This comes from the fact that the Russian officers are much more educated and know how to behave more importantly with the lower ranks” [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 148]. The regiment or foudzh was divided into 4 squadrons (hundreds), commanded by Iranian staff officers. According to Misl-Rustem, who observed the PKB, the latter “are trying to recruit as many people from their “nukers” as possible into their squadrons, i.e. servants, or peasants of their villages and related villages. With such nukers, they are better off, they get more profit, and it’s easier to deal with them” [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 148]. Each squadron was divided into 4 deste (platoons). Each regiment had a banner with the Persian coat of arms. They were kept either in the colonel's apartment or in the duty room.

The brigade had at its disposal barracks, stables, pantries for fodder. There were also small workshops (in which the "Cossacks" themselves repaired weapons and equipment), arsenals, a smithy and an infirmary. All this was located in the central part of Tehran. The officers of the PKB, including the Head, lived in houses located opposite the barracks [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 142–146]. As for the "Cossacks", those who were not on vacation lived partly in the barracks, partly in various parts of Tehran in apartments [RGVIA, f. 401, op., 5, file 515, fol. 204]. P.V. Charkovsky sought to equip the unit entrusted to him on the model of European armies. Through his efforts, the appearance of the premises (especially the infirmary, kitchen and barracks) was kept clean and tidy. In 1883, on the orders of the colonel, a duty room was made [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 143].

The appearance of the "Cossacks" was as close as possible to that of the Russian ones. They wore the uniform of the Caucasian Cossacks. The first regiment was dressed in the uniform of the Kuban Cossack army with red beshmets and papa tops. The second regiment wore the uniform of the Terek Cossack army with blue beshmets and papa tops. The third was distinguished by green beshmets and papa tops. On the shoulder straps of the "Cossacks" were embroidered the "initials" of the regiment to which they belonged. The uniforms of the batterymen copied those of the Russian "Kubans". The Guards squadron was equipped in the uniform of the Russian Life Guards Cossack Regiment. On solemn occasions, his soldiers and officers wore red uniforms, and in everyday life - blue, trimmed with galloons, and Circassians. The armament consisted of a Caucasian dagger and checker, as well as a rifle of the Berdan No. 2 system. The latter, however, were handed out only for the duration of the exercises [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 141]. It should be noted that Russian instructors followed the appearance of the "Cossacks", starting from the creation of the unit. This was explained by the psychological impact that the well-equipped cavalrymen had on not only the Shah, his entourage, but also the inhabitants of Iran in general (thus raising the status of Russia in their eyes), but also on foreign observers [Medvedik I.S. ., 2009, p. 120].

Initially, the PKB was formed exclusively from cavalrymen. “Those who wanted to join the brigade brought a horse with a saddle,” wrote Misl-Rustem [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 141]. D. N. Curzon reported that “the lower ranks should have their own horses, but to keep them in order and to replace them with new ones in case of loss or damage, each person is given 100 cranes in excess of the prescribed annually” [Kurzon G., 1893, p. 134]. In reality, the treasury saved on these "vacations". The horse composition consisted of stallions. Only in the guards squadron they were of a certain color - gray. The PKB had state-owned horses. They were used for the internal needs of the brigade, a detachment of musicians rode them, a battery was transported [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 5, d. 481, l. 6].

The PKB was trained according to abbreviated Russian military regulations, which were translated into Persian. Classes took place on the training ground Meydan-e Meshk, located near the barracks of the brigade. First, each "Cossack" was trained separately, then squadron, regimental and brigade exercises were carried out. In addition, they practiced riding and horse riding.

A certain idea of ​​​​the preparation of the brigade is given by the testimony of the Russian officer A.M. Alikhanov-Avarsky. He traveled to Persia in the middle of 1883 and observed the Guards squadron of the PKB, which constituted the personal guard of Nasreddin Shah. “A few minutes later, a platoon-by-platoon, with music at the head, excellently dressed in red Circassian coats, the shah’s escort squadron passed by us,” A.M. Alikhanov-Avarsky impressions of the review of the troops that accompanied Nasreddin Shah on his trip to Budzhnurt. - It was an exact copy from our St. Petersburg convoy to the last detail (we are talking about the Life Guards Cossack Regiment of His Majesty, whose Cossacks made up the convoy of the Russian Emperor - O.G.); even the officers were wearing Russian epaulettes” [Alikhanov-Avarsky M., 1898, p. 157]. “As far as one can judge from one passage,” the Russian observer noted, “the imitation seems to have succeeded this time not only in appearance ... the squadron made such an impression on us (the officers who watched the review - O.G.) that it seemed , he can, without any exaggeration, with dignity enter the environment of any European army" [Alikhanov-Avarsky M., 1898, p. 157–158].

Under P.V. The Charkovsky Design Bureau also received its first baptism of fire. In 1882, 100 "Cossacks" were "among other troops" sent by the Persian government to the Astrabad region "to curb the Turkmens." Then, in 1884, 300 people were sent, and in 1885, 100 people [RGVIA, F. 401, op. 5, d. 61, L. 20]. Unfortunately, the only thing known about the details of the expeditions is that among the "Cossacks" 28 rifles were killed and lost [RGVIA, F. 401, op. 5, d. 61, L. 20]. The following was reported about the last expedition against the Yomud Turkmens in the collection of the Russian Military Ministry: “In 1885, an expeditionary detachment was equipped to the Atrek River to pacify the Yomud Turkmens. During the speech, it consisted of 1,600 infantry, 200 Cossacks and 200 irregular cavalry, a total of 2,000 people. 600 people arrived at Atrek, the rest deserted along the way” [Collection of the latest information about the armed forces of European and Asian states, 1894, p.804].

However, the external gloss could not cover up the internal decay. The system of relations characteristic of the Persian armed forces and society as a whole more and more penetrated into the PCB. The main problem remained financial. P.V. Charkovsky was forced to resort to extensive austerity measures, since a large amount of money was spent on the maintenance of pensioners. In addition, the brigade's financing system required the Head to be able to resolve economic issues in such a way as to avoid riots in the Design Bureau and at the same time preserve its appearance. The latter for Nasreddin Shah was more important than the actual combat capability.

As before, the remark of A.I. Domontovich about "inaccurate issuance of money for the maintenance of the brigade", which "prevents the proper conduct of business" [Krasnyak O.A., 2007, p. 133]. In the Persian army, there was a complex system of issuing amounts for the maintenance of individual military units [Vrevsky A.B., 1868, p.29; Frankini, 1883, p. 27–28]. Since the PKB was part of the Iranian armed forces, it was also subject to generally accepted norms. The entire funding system was "tied" to the Minister of War, who distributed the country's military budget. And in the case of the Design Bureau, it was he who was the most important obstacle, since he withheld part of the brigade's funds in his favor. It should also be noted that a significant reason for the financial turmoil of the Design Bureau was the fact that initially no long-term documents were agreed and signed that determined budget allocations, their spending and reporting. In fact, everything was carried out on the basis of agreements between the Russian Mission and the Shah and the Minister of War each time a new Head was appointed. As a result, P.V. Charkovsky was constantly faced with the untimely issuance of money to him for the maintenance of the Design Bureau [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 4, d. 57, l. 4]. In addition, the money was paid to the brigade only starting a few months after the beginning of the year [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 46, l. 90]. The budget for 1882–1883 ​​was 66,536 fogs [Ter-Oganov N.K., 2010, p. 77] and had no tendency to increase. Misl-Rustem described the financial side of the life of the brigade in this way. “The colonel is given a certain amount for the brigade, according to the budget approved by the shah ... but they will not give him all the money: having withheld a lot in favor of the military ministry, and even the “saraf” - the tax collector - will charge interest, since checks are issued to receive money ahead of schedule. Then the colonels must sometimes bring gifts, like real Persians, to the Minister of War and even to the Shah ... After all, these gifts also cost a lot, which should cause savings, in view of which there are, especially in summer, half of the people on vacation in the brigade, meanwhile, everyone is listed. [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 150]. In addition, “the salary of the third regiment was issued in addition to the Russian colonel and was paid extremely inaccurately” [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 46, l. 90].

The result of cost savings was a decrease in the quality of training of the people of the brigade. I had to save on almost everything. Thus, the indicated author, who observed the PCB for about 6 years, reported that P.V. Charkovsky “dressed people in shirts for the summer, and hid Circassian coats in the arsenal, on the one hand, on the occasion of the heat, and on the other, to save Circassian coats” [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 151]. There is a gradual departure from the principles of management laid down by A.I. Domontovich. An indicator of this was the case when P.V. Charkovsky decided not to give portioned money to his hands, so that they would not be spent for other purposes. “But he did not succeed for a long time,” Misl-Rustem reported. - there was a murmur, and the food was no longer cooked. “The fact is,” he explained, “that the Persian “Cossack” manages to feed his entire family on the portions received, and it is unthinkable to do this from a cauldron” [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 145]. Thus, the idea of ​​the first Head that the satisfaction of people with food should not be given into the hands of each horseman receded before the realities of Persian life. The result of financial problems was that by the time the contract ended, the colonel failed to provide a "reporting on the expenditure of amounts" on time. The Russian envoy described this as a "misunderstanding" [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 4, d. 57, l. 5]. And it consisted in the fact that the Minister of War Kamran Mirza withheld part of the payments in the amount of 6,000 fogs in his favor [Kosogovsky V.A., 1923, p.393]. Nevertheless, with each new Head, the “misunderstanding” grew and in the end almost led to the liquidation of the Design Bureau.

Under P.V. Charkovsky, such a pan-Persian phenomenon as the transfer of part of the personnel of the brigade "on leave" is spreading. Continuing to be listed in the Design Bureau, the soldiers were sent home to earn money. This made it possible to save their salaries (on vacation it was supposed to allocate half the content for a soldier), but also caused criticism of the colonel in an effort to enrich himself at the expense of the “Cossacks” [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 151-152]. However, it seems to us that these complaints were caused by the activities of the next Head. Financial problems led to the fact that when leaving Persia in 1885, P.V. Charkovsky was unable to provide timely reports on the expenditure of amounts [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 4, d. 57, l. 5]. However, the history of the Design Bureau shows that this fact cannot be used as unconditional evidence of the financial unscrupulousness of the Head. Each of the brigade commanders in the 19th century had problems with submitting a financial report to the envoy. In the case of P.V. Charkovsky, unfortunately, lacks facts and information to clarify all the causes of financial troubles.

Outwardly, the structure and activities of the PCB looked quite respectable. However, it is difficult to fully agree with the opinion of A. Rzhevussky (made, by the way, at the beginning of the 20th century), which the researchers cite, that “The Persian Cossack brigade ... occupied a special position in the Iranian armed forces and by that time was already a good organized military unit” [Krasnyak O.A., 2007, p. 80; Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012, p. 65]. Indeed, by Persian standards, the PKB was an elite unit with good organization and funding. At the same time, external indicators should not obscure internal processes. As stated in the “Report on Issues Concerning the Current Situation of the Persian Cossack Brigade”, compiled in October 1907, at the beginning of its existence, the PCB was an “ordinary, only better trained” part of the Iranian army [Rybachyonok I.S., 2012, p. . 452]. So, despite the relatively regular training of the Cossacks (three times a week, each no more than two hours [Kublitsky, 1884, p. 71]), the main thing that the PKB was taught was horse riding and defile, or a ceremonial march [Alikhanov-Avarsky M., 1898, p. 223]. “All the people at the head of the army,” explained one of the officers who observed the PKB in 1883, “including here the Minister of War Naib os-Soltan, have no idea about military affairs and consider it the height of perfection if the part approximately exactly goes through the ceremonial march” [Kublitsky, 1884, p. 71]. “The brigade walks wonderfully in ceremonial,” noted Misl-Rustem [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 149]. An extremely negative characterization of the PKB was given by the Russian officer A.M., who visited Khorasan in 1883. Alikhanov-Avarsky. Its number does not always reach even 750 people, he reported. “This, in essence, a police cavalry regiment (So in the text - O.G.) is quite arbitrarily called a brigade, and even more so - a Cossack brigade, because, in addition to the costume of the Caucasian highlanders, this part has nothing to do with the Cossacks” [Alikhanov-Avarsky M. , 1898, p. 222]. The training of the brigade, from the point of view of the European military, was far from being in the best condition. The internal reason for this, most likely, was not the reluctance of the colonel, but the lack of funds. P.V. Charkovsky took care of the Design Bureau, but was forced to adapt to existing conditions. So, “during the 6 years that I spent in Persia,” an anonymous correspondent wrote, “the brigade did not have a single live ammunition firing exercise” [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 149]. “Why waste expensive ammo?! - cited the statement of the Minister of War, the third son of Nasreddin Shah, Kamran Mirza Naib os-Saltane A. M. Alikhanov-Avarsky. - ... After all, in wartime you will have to shoot not at birds, not even at single people, but at the masses, on which our boys will not miss! [Alikhanov-Avarsky M., 1898, p. 212–213]. It was necessary to save cartridges, since there was nothing to replenish their loss. “I know for certain,” Kublitsky reported, “that at present, in the Cossack brigade, the entire combat set of cartridges for 600 Berdan rifles is limited to two and a half thousand, that is, only four cartridges per gun” [Kublitsky, 1884, p. 69]. At the same time, they were not always spent rationally, and not through the fault of the Head. So, due to the poor quality of local gunpowder, cartridges from Russian rifles were used for blank firing on the orders of the Minister of War at the shah's maneuvers of the Tehran garrison [Kublitsky, 1884, p. 68]. The same was true for artillery. “For 1883 to 1898,” the new PKB commander V.A. Kosogovsky, - The Persian Cossack battery, due to the impossibility of replenishing the produced shells, did not fire almost any live shells at all, only from time to time releasing a few grenades for the shah's amusement. The consequence of this is that, being well trained in combat and action with guns, officers and servants in essence have no idea about firing live projectiles ”[RGVIA, f. 401, op. 5, d. 61, l. 38].

The position of the PKB was also only partly privileged. It consisted in the fact that Russian instructors trained the "Cossacks", the brigade was under the patronage of the Russian diplomatic mission and the salary was paid regularly in it in comparison with other parts of the Persian army. Otherwise, the PKB was an integral part of the Iranian armed forces, which was subject to most of their rules and shortcomings. The brigade was also part of the Tehran garrison. Contrary to popular belief [Kalugin S., 2003, p. 364; Rybachenok I.S., 2012, p. 451; Sergeev E.Yu., 2012, p. 175; Strelianov (Kalabukhov) P.N., 2007, p. 215; Shishov A.V., 2012, p. 20], the brigade was neither a personal escort nor the Shah's guard. Convoy functions were performed only by "Cossacks" from the Guards squadron, who accompanied the Shah on trips around the country. Under Nasreddin Shah, the “guards” and personal units guarding the Persian ruler were ghouls [Krasnyak O.A., 2007, p. 57; Frankini, 1883, p. 20–21].

As already noted, the brigade had at its disposal barracks, stables, pantries for fodder and other utility and residential premises. However, Misl-Rustem, who observed them from the inside, reported that part of the existing one was finished for display to visiting higher officials, and the main buildings were not updated and gradually fell into decay [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 142–146].

Another negative phenomenon that "overwhelmed" the PKB was an overabundance of officers. The fact is that in the production of ranks the brigade commander was not independent and could not regulate it. Being part of the Persian armed forces, the PKB also fell under their practice of forming a command corps. “The quality of officers is also not paid attention here,” wrote M.A. Alikhanov-Avarsky. - they are produced not only by the Minister of War for a fee, but also by the brigade commander himself indiscriminately" [Alikhanov-Avarsky M., 1898, p. 233]. In addition, the Shah himself also made officers for offerings. There was an unwritten rule in the Persian army, according to which all ranks from the naib (second lieutenant) to the sultan (captain) complained to the commander of the fouja, from the sultan to the sartip (general) - to the minister of war, and in the sartip they became only at the behest of the shah [Collection of the latest information about the armed forces of European and Asian states, 1894, p. 797]. The colonel could promote himself to the ranks up to the sultan, without bringing to the attention of the Persian ruler. All that was required was the approval of the Minister of War. However, M.A. Alikhanov-Avarsky was not quite right in criticizing the brigade commander. In Russia, the heads of individual units had the right to be promoted to headquarters officers and awarded [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 5, d. 61, l. 121]. The same was sought by the first Heads - control over the production of ranks. The PKB commanders were put in such a position that they were forced to put up with appointments "from outside". From the outside, to an ignorant person, especially accustomed to the strict system of promotion to officer ranks in the European armies, it seemed that the Head was illegible in his choice. But, on the other hand, under the orders that prevailed in the armed forces and the administration of Persia, chinoproizvodstvo became a profitable item for the producer. It is difficult to say how much the first two colonels used their position to improve their own financial affairs. Regarding P.V. Charkovsky has no direct information of this kind. It is possible that he adopted the practice of his predecessor regarding the production of noble "Cossacks" as officers, since he also had to fight the privileged position of the former residents of the South Caucasus. On the other hand, it can be assumed that the colonel also promoted muhajirs to officers in order to enlist their loyalty. Those who considered themselves descendants of noble muhajirs, “found service in the lower ranks of the brigade for themselves humiliating” [Kosogovsky V.A., 1923, p. 393]. The same situation developed if unborn Muhajirs were appointed commanders of well-born Muhajirs. Therefore, the Head was forced to maneuver in order to avoid intra-brigade conflicts. As for the sale of ranks, Misl-Rustem extended his thoughts about the financial unscrupulousness of the brigade commanders to the first three colonels in general [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 150], and they were based largely on rumors and misunderstood actions.

From indirect information it can be seen that P.V. Charkovsky enjoyed great authority among his subordinates [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 145–146]. There is no doubt about his competence: he did a lot to equip the Design Bureau, developed the "Guide to the training of Cossack horse artillery", translated into Farsi and published in Tehran in 1885 [Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012, p. 65]. Foreign observers have noted that "the influence of seconded Russian officers continues to be noticeable" [Armed Forces of Persia by Löbel Jahresbericht, 1888, p. 129]. From the side, the brigade really made an impression. The English doctor Wils wrote: “Three years ago (the Russian translation was published in 1887 - O.G.) the Shah had three Cossack regiments that received the correct salary, with Europeans as instructors. I have never seen a more beautiful composition of soldiers and horses" [Wils, 1887, p. 179]. The activity of Russian instructors had an external effect. Wils' opinion was shared by many observers, and in their words, by the inhabitants in these countries. These fears were clearly manifested in the political circles of Great Britain [Medvedik I.S., 2009, p. 117; Rotstein F.A., 1960, p. 221]. However, the Russian government during the period under review was not interested in creating an organized armed force in Persia [The Most Submissive Report of Lieutenant General Kuropatkin ..., 1902, p. 60]. In this context, an interesting question that still remains open is the attitude of the colonel to the Mission.

N.K. Ter-Oganov claims that between P.V. Charkovsky and A.A. Melnikov in 1885 there was a conflict. The reason for it, as in the case of A.I. Domontovich, was the desire of the PKB commander to achieve the status of a military agent and greater independence from the Russian diplomatic representative [Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012, p. 109]. Unfortunately, the author does not provide any links to documents or details of the conflict. The sources known to us do not allow us to state with certainty that there are sharp contradictions between the representatives of the Romanov Empire in Tehran. Therefore, if there were any, then they are waiting for their researcher. Nevertheless, this question is important for a better understanding of the history of the PKB and requires a little explanation.

A.I. Domontovich put forward, according to the envoy, the same demands as P.V. Charkovsky, according to N.K. Ter-Oganov. And it should be noted that from the point of view of the position of the Head and personally of his own, the first commander of the Design Bureau had reason to do this. The fact is that until the early 1890s. only the duties of the Head were defined in writing, but not his rights. “Having left Russia by order of the Caucasian authorities with the officers, I found myself here in the position of an entrepreneur,” wrote A.I. Domontovich. - The officers depend on the solution of the money issue, the officers receive the agreed content from the Persian government, and I don’t even have any instructions from the authorities in what respect they should stand towards me. The authority of a regimental commander, with all his valid rights, is hardly sufficient under such circumstances. Here, in the midst of a Muslim, fanatical people who do not value their lives in anything, we are placed with the demand of various shy and not always understood by them rules. The slightest oversight, the slowdown of officers in the execution of my instructions, can bring evil” [Krasnyak O.A., 2007, p. 130]. December 5, 1892 next Head - Colonel of the General Staff N.Ya. Shneur - received the Shah's destikhat (handwritten command), which established new rules for managing the brigade. On this occasion, he wrote to his superiors: “this is the first attempt to establish some kind of order in the brigade and to determine in writing the rights of the Head of Training for the Persian cavalry, since until now everything has been done according to the established custom” [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 46, l. 89]. A.I. Domontovich, heading the PKB, was formally listed as a staff officer for assignments from the headquarters of the Caucasian Military District, who was on a business trip. In the case of P.V. Charkovsky, apparently, took into account this shortcoming - he received an official appointment as commander of the Design Bureau. However, it was a palliative solution. Formally, he remained only one of the many commanders of military units, albeit in a somewhat privileged position. In Iran, where the position and status were of great importance, this interfered, reducing the authority of the Head both among the highest dignitaries and among the Muhajirs of the brigade, especially the noble ones. A military agent (attache) was the official representative of the Russian Military Ministry abroad. He was included in the diplomatic corps, enjoyed the appropriate privileges, and in political matters was subordinate to the envoy [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 4, d. "On military agents and persons occupying their positions"]. None of this, with the exception of dependence on the head of the diplomatic corps, neither the first nor the second Heads had. The brigade commanders were at the same time secret military agents, that is, they had to deliver intelligence information to the headquarters of the Caucasian Military District. The status of a military attache would have contributed to greater activity of the colonels in this direction. And so the workload of brigade affairs did not allow them to fully perform the functions of military intelligence.

In addition, the colonels were in a delicate position. Formally, according to the contract, they had to obey the Minister of War (and informally - the Shah). As representatives of Russia, they were obliged to coordinate all their actions with the head of the Mission. And, as secret military agents, the PKB commanders depended on the command of the Caucasian Military District (although this dependence was less than the first two). As a result, the Heads turned out to be, as it were, a triple overlapping subordination. The main problem in this situation was how to behave in the event of a conflict of interests of the Shah's Russian side. Failure to comply with the wishes of the Persian ruler or the Minister of War entailed a deterioration in their attitude towards the head and the design bureau. In turn, ignoring or incompletely following the instructions of the Russian Mission could provoke a conflict with it and a recall from Tehran. Based on the foregoing, there is nothing surprising if P.V. Charkovsky really turned to the envoy and the Caucasian authorities with requests to strengthen their position. However, the facts proving this are not yet known. Judging by external signs, P.V. Charkovsky, apparently, did not seek to play an independent role, like A.I. Domontovich, and tried to follow the instructions of the Russian mission.

In June, due to the end of the contract, V.P. Charkovsky went to Russia [Kosogovsky V.A., 1923, p. 393]. Before the arrival of the new Head, Yesaul E.A. Makovkin. Together with the colonel from Persia, 2 officers and 1 officer from the mission left. The rest decided to continue serving in the PKB.

Thus, during the command of P.V. Charkovsky Design Bureau acquired a classic look, which formally did not change until the end of the 19th century. . Outwardly, it was a well-organized, uniformed and trained military unit. However, the internal problems that have manifested themselves in the brigade since its inception acquire more pronounced features in the period under review. They remained outside the attention of outside observers, but gradually began to exert an ever greater influence on the internal climate of the PKB and its position. After the change of A.I. Domontovich and the transition of I.A. Zinoviev to the post of director of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the point of view on the Design Bureau as a political (sometimes even advertising) project prevailed. Its main goals were to prevent English instructors from entering the Iranian army and to satisfy the needs of the Shah to have a well-trained military unit by Russian hands. The result of this was the emphasis in the training of the brigade on external training, when combat effectiveness and internal integrity were sacrificed for ostentatious effect. In the future, this played a negative role, putting in the first half of the 1890s. PCB is on the brink of liquidation. ">

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The Cossacks were one of the most important levers of political and military influence of tsarist Russia in Iran, whose official name until 1935 was Persia. The Persian Cossack brigade under the leadership of Russian officers appeared in the country in 1879 during the reign of Nasreddin Shah Qajar. Until the end of the military-political domination of the Russian Empire in Iran, this unit was considered the most important organized combat force of the Shah's army. Throughout the existence of the brigade, its top leadership was carried out by Russian officers.

Context

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Der Spiegel 12/17/2014 The members of the command of the Persian Cossack brigade, who were appointed directly from St. Petersburg, were guided in their actions not so much by the orders of the Iranian government, but by the decrees of the Russian authorities. Despite this, all expenses for the maintenance of the unit were compensated by the shah's treasury, although the members of the Iranian government themselves could not determine its size and determine what needs the allocated funds were spent on.

Thus, as historian Rahim Namvar writes in his book A Brief Outline of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran, “the Persian Cossack brigade was an armed force modeled on the Russian army, and was actually under its command, obeying the orders of the Russian Cossack command. The budget of this military unit directly went to its command through the Russian Accounting and Loan Bank at the expense of the Iranian government, but it itself did not control the Cossacks.
In his memoirs, a well-known Iranian traveler and participant in the Constitutional Revolution, Mohammad Ali Sayah Mahalati, reports that back in 1905, the number of the Cossack Corps in Persia was about one thousand people, and it was the most effective military unit in the country.

However, despite the fact that the Cossacks were provided at the expense of the Shah's government, they were under the influence of the Russian embassy. Salaries, maintenance and other expenses were paid at the expense of customs duties on the northern borders of Persia, received by the Accounting and Loan Bank. Its leadership, in accordance with the orders of the Russian ambassador in Tehran, made all the necessary payments, without even informing the Persian authorities about it. As the Soviet historian Mikhail Pavlovich writes in his monograph “Persia in the Struggle for Independence”, “the salaries and provisions of the officers and privates of the Persian Cossack brigade depended on the Russian government. In political matters, its commander, who was appointed and sent from St. Petersburg, acted taking into account the position of the Russian ambassador in Tehran. The commander received his salary from the Accounting and Loan Bank, and all the necessary orders from the Russian diplomatic mission. In a word, he was a direct agent of the tsarist government.

During the period of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran, it was the forces of the Persian Cossack Brigade that in 1908 bombarded the national parliament of the first convocation. By the way, the Accounting and Loan Bank itself, which financially supported the Cossacks, mainly attracted them to ensure the safety of its funds and the safety of personnel.

In addition to the fact that under the protection of the Persian Cossack brigade there were branches of this bank in Tehran and other regions of the country, its duties included escorting representatives of the bank's management traveling around the country and controlling the transportation of its cash and other goods. The main part of the researchers of that period is inclined to believe that this formation played a negative role in the political life of Iran in those years. In particular, information is provided that it was the Accounting and Loan Bank, which pays funds for the maintenance of the Persian Cossack brigade, that determined its goals, while defending the military-political interests of the Russian Empire.

In his memoirs, the German Consul General in Tabriz, Wilhelm Liten, who worked in Iran even before the outbreak of the First World War, described the Persian Cossack Brigade in detail, noting the role played by the Accounting and Loan Bank in strengthening this military formation. According to him, the Persian Cossack Brigade was founded in 1879, when it was headed by Colonel Alexei Domontovich. In 1882, the command passed to Colonel Pyotr Charkovsky, in 1885 he was replaced by Colonel Alexander Kuzmin-Karavaev, and in 1890 Colonel Konstantin Shneur was appointed to this position. Then, in 1896, the leadership of the brigade was entrusted to Colonel Vladimir Kosogovsky, already in 1903 Colonel Vladimir Lyakhov took his place, and in 1907 Colonel Prince Nikolai Vadbolsky was appointed the new commander.

According to Liten, the Cossack Brigade was a Persian military unit commanded by Russian officers and subordinate to the high command of the Russian army. Annually, 342 thousand fogs were spent on its maintenance (which was almost 1.2 million marks at the then exchange rate), but in 1913 this amount was increased to 900 thousand fogs (3.5 million marks). These funds were paid directly by the Accounting and Loan Bank of Iran at the expense of proceeds from customs duties in the north of the shah.

The budget of this formation was made by its commander, who at the same time did not provide any accounts to either the Shah's government or the treasury. The number of the brigade was 1,600 people, but in 1913 its units were also founded in other Iranian cities - Tabriz, Resht and Hamadan, so the number of personnel was increased. Initially, efforts were made to use the Cossacks as gendarmes on the roads in the northern part of Persia, but due to the disagreement of Colonel Vadbolsky, this plan could not be implemented.

In fact, the Persian Cossack Brigade was a court military formation, which was used for parades and as a guard guarding the Shah personally and Russian envoys. However, from the very beginning of its existence in 1879, not a single Russian officer died in the line of duty and was not even injured. Let's take a look at this fact for comparison. Swedish officers, who in 1911 organized a gendarmerie service in Iran, lost six people killed in the line of duty in 1914 alone. The post of commander of the Persian Cossack brigade was very profitable for its owner, but subordinate officers treated him without much respect.

After the defeat of tsarism in Russia, the Persian Cossack Brigade, along with other Russian units, swore allegiance to Great Britain.

Coming to the end, it should be said that the Cossacks played a crucial role in the 1921 coup d'état. As in 1908, when, under the command of Colonel Lyakhov, members of the Persian Cossack Brigade shot down the Iranian parliament, 13 years later, having taken part in another political coup, they dealt an even more crushing blow to the gains of the Constitutional Revolution.

The brigade, reorganized into a division in 1916, existed until 1920. During this time, the unit has changed more than 10 commanders - but invariably all of them were Russian officers and each of them brought something new to the unit.

So, under Colonel Petr Charkovsky, who replaced Domontovich, an artillery semi-battery was created as part of the formation. And at the initiative of the third commander - Colonel Alexander Kuzmin-Karavaev - a Russian paramedic appeared in the brigade, who became the first military doctor of the Persian army.

Later, a training infantry team, a machine gun team, and even a cadet corps appeared in the unit. However, before that, the brigade had to endure a decline. After the change of Kuzmin-Karavaev in 1890, the quality of training of the Cossacks decreased, the unit was simply not given due attention and, most importantly, funding. As a result, with a nominal strength of a thousand people, there were actually only a few hundred fighters in the state. It even got to the point that the Shah was seriously considering transferring command of the brigade to the British - he was stopped only by his unwillingness to spoil relations with the Russian Empire.

Only Colonel Vladimir Kosogovsky, who took command in 1894, could help the Persian Cossacks to get out of the crisis. He managed to achieve an increase in the brigade budget, return the Shah's favor to the Russian instructors and stop the practice of transferring officer ranks by inheritance. The commander also received permission to rebuild the third regiment and form a full battery.

But most importantly, it was Kosogovsky who put forward the idea to form a new Persian army on the basis of the Cossack brigade. It will be brought to life by his followers.

“Very quickly, the corps again turned into the best and most prestigious Persian unit. With his help, many military formations that were in the service of local authorities were disbanded,” writes Oleg Pauller.

To control order from 1910 to 1914, a dozen territorial detachments appeared in the unit, responsible for certain regions of the country. The authorities pushed for their creation, including the events that unfolded in Persia in the second half of the first decade of the 20th century. For six years, the country will be engulfed in revolutions and unrest, with which the sheikh will have to fight, including by force. At the same time, the Cossack brigade will also be used - for example, it will be noted by the shelling of the Majlis in 1908.

The history of the unit will come to an end exactly along with the history of the Russian Empire. After the revolutions of 1917, the affairs of the Middle East faded into the background for the new leadership, and the presence of "their" connection in Persia would lose its significance. Already in 1918, the British began to finance the division, and the Russian officers in it were replaced by local, Persian ones. The unit will be finally disbanded in 1920. Nevertheless, even in a short 40-year history, the brigade left its indelible mark, laying the foundation for the formation of the modern Iranian army.

By the end of the XIX century. the empires of the Middle East slowly declined. While the European powers competed for colonial possessions, the Shah of Persia did not even have a regular army. In the event of an attack, a temporary army was assembled, the soldiers for which were supplied by tribal leaders. Such an army was poorly trained and could not offer serious resistance.

In the neighboring Ottoman Empire, the sultan called in German and French instructors to reorganize the army, while England and the Russian Empire argued for influence in Persia. English historians con. XIX - early. XX century., such as Lord Curzon or Edward Brown, deny the colonial policy of England in Persia. They argue that Persia was much more important to Russia, and the formation of the Persian Cossack brigade was the main evidence of Russian influence.

Formation of the Persian Cossack Brigade

The military power of Persia was significantly weakened by the wars with Russia at the beginning of the 19th century. Attempts by Fath-Ali Shah's heir Abbas Mirza to reform the army along European lines with the help of French and British officers only led to more confusion. During the reign of Muhammad Shah (1834-1848), together with his prime minister, the Sufi Haja Mirza Agasy, the Persian army lost the last remnants of its former power. Nasser ed-Din Shah (1848-1896) made no attempt to remedy the situation. Pervasive corruption and general decline made it difficult to carry out any reforms. The army, which had previously successfully crushed the Babit uprising at the beginning of the Shah's reign, was completely demoralized. Despite the fact that the Persians managed to occupy Herat in 1857 during the Anglo-Persian War, the British intervention in the south of the country showed the defenselessness of Persia before the West. During the battles in Fars and Khuzestan, the Persian army, which outnumbered the British by 10 times, fled in panic. A few years later, the battle with the Turkmens in Khorasan showed that the Persians were weaker even than the semi-savage nomads of Central Asia.

Nasser ed-Din Shah was the first Persian ruler to visit Western countries. While traveling through Russia, Germany, Austria, France and Great Britain, the Shah and the ministers who accompanied him were most struck by the military bearing and beautiful uniforms of various European troops. Returning home, the shah came to the idea of ​​reforming his own army. On his second trip to Europe in 1878, Nasser ed-Din passed through the Caucasus, which was overrun with Russian troops after the recent war with the Ottoman Empire. The Shah was accompanied everywhere by a Cossack detachment. The shah liked their elegant uniform and magnificent horse riding so much that he expressed his intention to create a similar cavalry detachment in Persia to the Viceroy of the Caucasus, Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolayevich. Prior to this, the Shah had thought of instructing the Austrian officers to reorganize the infantry and artillery, but not the cavalry.

Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich informed Tsar Alexander II of the Shah's desire, and he allowed him to send several officers to Iran. The head of the Tiflis military district, General Pavlov, chose Lieutenant Colonel Alexei Ivanovich Domontovich, who had just returned from the war with the Turks. The lieutenant colonel was given money, a translator and was given freedom of action.

At the end of November 1878, Domontovich entered Persia, and in January 1879 he arrived in Tehran. Upon learning of his arrival, the shah arranged a review of the cavalry. The riders gathered on the plain near Eshratabad presented a sad sight. When the shah rode past, the cavalrymen bowed. But as soon as he had gone ten paces, they began to talk. Some dismounted, bought fruit from nearby pedlars, or sat on the ground and lit their pipes. The troops did not know the training. Many rode on horses borrowed for a day from the stables of noble Tehrans, since even the Shah's personal guard did not have enough horses. It was only out of courtesy that Domontovich had to admit that the state of the troops was good. After that, the lieutenant colonel left for Russia and returned in April 1879 with three officers and five sergeants.

First brigade commander Colonel Domontovich

Quite a lot is known about the Cossack brigade, since many of the officers left memoirs. The memoirs of the brigade commanders Domontovich and Kosogovsky are most interesting, while Kalugin's memoirs are notable for inaccuracy. So, he made a mistake with the date of creation of the brigade, and named Kosogovsky as the first commander.

From the very beginning, Russian officers faced a number of difficulties. The Shah promised to give part of the riders from the personal guard to the Cossack brigade, but the head of the guard, Ala od-Dole, opposed this. He was afraid of losing part of the income and managed to dissuade the shah. Domontovich spent three months without work. Finally, he was given 400 Muhajirs, descendants of Transcaucasian Muslims who fled to Persia from Russia at the beginning of the 19th century. They became the basis of the Cossack brigade. Domontovich trained them intensively, and by the end of the summer of 1879 he was able to present the brigade for review to the shah.

The Shah was satisfied and ordered to increase the detachment to 600 people. But, despite all the privileges of the Cossacks, the Muhajirs did not want to replenish the ranks of the brigade anymore. Rumors spread among them that they were going to be taken to Russia and forcibly converted to Christianity. As a result, the Shah ordered the recruitment of 200 volunteers, including representatives of various religious and ethnic minorities.

The commander of the Cossack brigade was appointed by the Russian government in the Caucasus, and not by the Persian government. The commander and other Russian officers served under the contract for several years, sometimes the terms of the contract changed. At the time of Domontovich, there were 9 Russian officers in the brigade, by 1920 their number reached 120 people.

The Persians were also able to move up the ranks in the brigade, which later became a source of conflict. Muhajirs, who had official privileges from the very creation of the brigade, were unhappy that any Persian, even of humble origin, could become an officer and command them. Until the mid 1890s. the sons of officers could inherit the ranks of their fathers, I do not bother with ordinary service.

Along with a lack of internal discipline and conflicts between social groups, the Cossack brigade suffered from poor supplies. This was due both to the difficult financial situation of the Persian court, and to the intrigues of certain influential aristocrats at the court.

Another problem for the Cossack brigade was the confrontation between Russian officers-commanders and Russian diplomatic representatives in Tehran. Although sometimes commanders and ambassadors acted in concert in the interests of the Cossack brigade and the wider interests of Russian policy in Persia, more often Russian diplomats deliberately frustrated all attempts by brigade commanders to enlist the support of the Persian government or high-ranking officials in Russia. The quarrel between the wife of the Russian ambassador and the wife of Domontovich spoiled the relationship between the brigade commander and the Russian embassy. The embassy not only refused to support the colonel, but also began to weave all sorts of intrigues against him. As another brigade commander, Kosogovsky, noted in his memoirs, the Russian ambassador disliked Domontovich so much that he even wrote to the Viceroy of the Caucasus, accusing the brigade commander of betraying the interests of Russia.

Brigade in the 1880s

Domontovich's contract ended in 1881, and the shah immediately renewed it. The colonel went on vacation to Russia for four months, and never returned to Persia. Probably, the Viceroy of the Caucasus listened to the opinion of the Russian ambassador, and instead of Domontovich, Colonel Charkovsky went to Tehran. The Russian government tried to convince the Shah that Charkovsky was much better than Domontovich, but the latter made such an indelible impression on the Shah that after Charkovsky's resignation, he again began to beg to send Domontovich to Tehran. The Shah's request was denied, so from the very beginning the choice of the commanders of the Persian Cossack brigade depended entirely on the decision of the Russian military department in the Caucasus.

The only merit of Charkovsky as a brigade commander was the acquisition of four guns in 1883. In 1886 he was replaced by Colonel Kuzmin-Karavaev, who found the brigade in a difficult financial situation. Dissatisfied with Charkovsky, the Persian government cut the brigade's funding by 6,000 tumans. However, Kuzmin-Karavaev found support in the person of the Russian ambassador in Tehran, Adjutant General Prince Dolgoruky. The brigade commander not only managed to return 6,000 fogs, but also received, in addition, 4,000 fogs for the needs of the brigade per year. During his service in Tehran, he paid off all the debts of the brigade, but did not advance at all in military training.

In 1890, Colonel Shneur was appointed commander of the brigade, completely different from his predecessor. Schneur hoped that the Persians would increase their funding after being impressed by the military marches. However, his hopes were not justified, and soon the colonel found himself with nothing to pay the salaries of the Cossacks. Shneur took advantage of the old Persian custom - in order not to pay the soldiers, he sent them on indefinite leave. Cholera epidemic 1891-1892 demoralized the Cossacks even more, and many of them fled from Tehran.

Among other troubles, Shneur was informed that the Shah wanted to inspect the brigade. For the colonel, this was a failure - out of 600, only 450 Cossacks were present at the review, including officers and mercenaries. The shah immediately cut the brigade's budget by 30,000 fogs - almost a third. With the help of the Russian embassy, ​​Shneur managed to return 12,000 fogs. Together with the ambassador, the shah decided to reduce the composition of the brigade to 200 people, excluding mercenaries, musicians and a small detachment of infantry.

After Shneur's departure in May 1893, Captain Bellegarde became the commander of the brigade. Instead of serious training, most of the time he prepared the Cossacks for parades. The Cossack brigade quickly fell into decay and more and more resembled the old Persian army. Shah was disappointed. His son and Minister of War Kamran Mirza Naib os-Sultane pushed for the brigade to be disbanded, leaving only 150 Cossacks under a single Russian officer as the Shah's personal guard. The Shah could not make up his mind: on the one hand, he had already agreed with the German ambassador on the arrival of German instructors instead of Russians, and on the other hand, he was afraid to offend the Russian government. However, the Germans asked too high a price for their services, and the decision was made in favor of the Russians.

The heyday of the Cossack brigade under the command of Kosogovsky

At this time, a new brigade commander, Colonel Vladimir Andreevich Kosogovsky, arrived in Tehran. Muhajirs represented the problem in the brigade. They considered themselves a military aristocracy and honored hereditary privileges. Mukhajir Cossacks often hired servants to care for horses, refused to do any manual work in the barracks, and were rude and disobedient. A Muhajir could go on vacation without permission and return as if nothing had happened. The Shah, who saw the Muhajirs as "defenders of religion", not only did not punish them for such actions, but, on the contrary, demanded a reward for their return. To Kosogovsky's complaints, the Shah usually replied: "You do not respect them enough, so they are running away from you."

Kosogovsky's attempts to strengthen discipline led to an uprising of the Muhajirs. In May 1895, they left the brigade, taking with them 20,000 salaries. The Persian government expected the brigade to disintegrate - only a year remained until the end of Kosogovsky's contract. The Persian Minister of War had already begun negotiations with the British. Having learned about this, the Russian ambassador could not stand aside. A little pressure on the Shah was enough for him to decide to keep the brigade under the command of Kosogovsky.

In May 1895, Kosogovsky was granted an audience with the Shah. Together with the Russian ambassador, the commander prepared an agreement in which he put forward the following conditions: Muhajirs would serve in the brigade on equal terms with the rest of the personnel; the powers of the commander should be expanded, and he will obey only the shah and his sadrazam (prime minister). Sadrazam also took responsibility for financing the brigade, completely removing the Minister of War from all its affairs. The Shah and the Sadrazam immediately signed this treaty. The Minister of War tried to object, but the Shah threatened him with resignation, and he also signed the agreement.

The solution of the problem with the Muhajirs immediately led to the strengthening of the Cossack brigade. The practice of hereditary transfer of rank was canceled, and now, in order to receive the rank of officer, a Cossack had to go all the way up the career ladder, starting from the very bottom. Soon Kosogovsky received a well-organized, trained and disciplined detachment.

The assassination of Shah Nasser ed-Din and the struggle for power

Until the spring of 1896, the brigade demonstrated its capabilities only at parades. The assassination of Shah Nasser ed-Din on May 1, 1896 led to a crisis that gave the brigade an opportunity to show itself. During the 48 years of the reign of Shah Nasser ed-Din, the situation in Persia only worsened. He began his reign by killing thousands of Baha'i subjects, the followers of the Bab. The Shah plunged the country into an unnecessary war that ended in defeat. He handed over the management of internal affairs to foreigners in order to get money for his own whims. 48 years of Nasser al-Din's rule led to the decline of public morality, economic stagnation, general impoverishment and famine.

When Mirza Reza Kermani, a follower of Jamal ed-Din Afghani, assassinated the Shah, the country was on the brink of disaster. In Isfahan, the eldest son of the Shah, Zell os-Sultan, with the support of his personal army, claimed the throne, in Tehran - Kamran Mirza, the favorite son of the Shah. As minister of war and governor of Tehran, Kamran Mirza was in a better position. The heir to the throne, Muzaffar ed-Din Mirza was in Tabriz. However, he was in poor health, which inevitably led to a power struggle between the brothers. The Shah was the sole guarantor of law and order. If the people knew about his death, neither the police nor the weak and unreliable army could cope with the popular uprisings.

The assassination of the Shah took place in the morning in a sanctuary in the vicinity of Tehran. As soon as he fell to the ground, Amin os-Sultan, who was near the sadrazam, sent a courier to Kosogovsky with news of the attempt on the Shah's life. Sadrazam ordered Sardar Akram, the commander of nine Azerbaijani regiments, Nezam od-Dole, the commander of artillery, and Colonel Kosogovsky to be called together in order to prevent unrest and spread rumors. In a note to Kosogovsky, Sadrazam wrote that the wound was not serious, and in the evening the shah would return to Tehran. In fact, the shah was already dead, and Amin os-Sultan was only trying to gain time.

When the body of the Shah was brought to Tehran in the evening, Kosogovsky realized the gravity of the situation. Now he could only report directly to the Sadrazam. In a short time, the commander assembled a brigade and began to patrol the streets of Tehran. Rumors about the assassination of the Shah had already begun to spread throughout the city, but strong unrest was avoided. The danger was Kamran Mirza Naib os-Sultan, whose desire to take the place of Shah was known to both the Russians and the British. The legitimate heir, Muzaffar ed-Din, was far away in Tabriz, and Naib os-Sultan, as the commander of the army, could try to seize power in Tehran. Kosogovsky informed the Minister of War that the Russian and British governments recognized Muzaffar ed-Din as the legitimate ruler, so Naib os-Sultane should immediately submit to his brother. Frightened, Kamran Mirza swore allegiance to the new Shah.

On June 7, 1896, the new Shah, accompanied by a Cossack brigade, entered Tehran. From that moment on, its influence began to increase, and over the next twenty years, the brigade played an important role in Persian politics, being an instrument of Russian influence. Beginning in 1896, the brigade assumed a number of internal security functions. Small detachments were sent to the provinces of Persia under the leadership of local governors. In 1901, the Cossacks helped put down an uprising in Fars. In 1903, Kosogovsky was replaced by an incompetent Colonel Chernozubov, under whom the brigade began to decline again. As a result, the Russian military department recalled him ahead of schedule, and in 1906 the post of commander of the Cossack brigade was taken by Colonel Vladimir Platonovich Lyakhov.

Participation of the brigade in the Constitutional Revolution under the command of Colonel Lyakhov

Muzaffar ed-Din Shah, who was in poor health, placed most of the country's industry under the control of foreigners. So, in Persia, the Bank of England operated, which printed state money, completely not obeying the Persian government. In 1906, the shah signed the long-awaited constitution, and 40 days later he died of a heart attack. The Constitutional Revolution broke out in the country, which lasted from 1906 to 1911. The Cossack brigade played an important role in it.

In 1907, the son of Muzaffar ed-Din Shah Muhammad Ali Shah ascended the throne. The majles (parliament) formed in accordance with the Constitution represented the Shah's opponents. On June 22, 1908, the Shah appointed Colonel Lyakhov as the military governor of Tehran. The next day, Colonel Lyakhov, six more officers and Cossacks with six guns stormed the building where the majdles met. During the dispersal of Parliament, several hundred people were killed.

An excerpt from the historical series "Khezar Dastan" with the scene of the defeat of the parliament by the Cossack brigade

In 1909, a detachment of 400 Cossacks took part in the siege of Tabriz, whose inhabitants opposed the Shah. However, the Cossacks failed to stop the advance of the supporters of the constitution to Tehran, and on July 13, 1909, the constitutionalists entered the city. Muhammad Ali Shah with an escort of Cossacks fled the summer quarters of the Russian embassy north of Tehran. When the restored parliament deposed the Shah, under the protection of the Cossacks and British sepoys, his youngest son and heir Ahmad Shah was brought to Tehran. The 14-year-old Ahmad Shah had no real power, but Colonel Lyakhov agreed to serve the new regime.

The collapse of the Russian Empire and the Cossack brigade

The overthrow of the Russian monarchy in March 1917 affected the discipline and morale of the Cossacks, but the brigade did not break up. The officers of the tsarist army were opposed to the communists. In 1918, some returned to Russia and joined the White Guard, but many remained in the Cossack brigade. They decided to support the Persian government's fight against the revolution and oppose Soviet intervention in northern Persia. In 1920, Great Britain began to finance the Cossack brigade, hoping to use the Cossacks to suppress communist activity and anti-government uprisings in Northern Persia.

During 1919-1920. Cossacks fought with the Red Army on the Caspian coast and in Azerbaijan. After the first victories in Mazendaran, the Cossacks were defeated in Gilan, and were driven back to Qazvin. Rumors began to spread in Tehran that Russian officers were unreliable and were collaborating either with the British or with the Soviet army. However, Ahmad Shah did not believe the rumors, as he considered the Cossack brigade to be his strongest weapon. In October 1920, the British came to the conclusion (or tried to make it appear so) that the brigade commander, Colonel Staroselsky, was winning fictitious victories over the communists. They intensified the campaign against Russian officers, and soon Colonel Staroselsky and almost 120 other Russian officers retired. Thus ended Russian influence in Persia. After their departure, Reza Khan, who had previously served as a brigadier (mirpanj), became the brigade commander, and British officers also entered the brigade.

With the help of a detachment of 1500-3000 Cossacks on February 20-21, Reza Khan captured key positions in Tehran. First, he took the post of army commander, and then the minister of war. Having gained power over the Persian army, Reza Khan began its centralization along the European model, while the Cossack brigade, renamed the division, formed the basis of the new army. By 1925, the new army numbered 40 thousand people. In the summer of 1925, Reza Khan made a coup, overthrowing Ahmad Shah Qajar and becoming the first Shah of the Pahlavi dynasty.

So the Persian Cossack brigade played an important role in the major political events in Persia. XIX - early. XX centuries Subordinating to the Russian military department, Russian officers at critical moments supported the legitimate rulers of Persia, preventing the country from falling apart.