Social and organizational problems of military reforms
20-30s of XX century
In Russian history, at various stages of the economic, political and social development of the state, fundamental changes and transformations were repeatedly carried out in military construction, in the sphere of solving defense problems in general (the reforms of Ivan IV in the middle of the 16th century, Peter I in the first quarter of the 18th century; D A. Milyutin in the 60-70s of the XIX century, in 1907-1912 after the Russian-Japanese war). In the Soviet period, after the creation of the Red Army, reforms were carried out in 1923-1925. and on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, which played an important role in the development of the Armed Forces.
What these reforms had in common was the focus primarily on improving the combat element of the army: equipping it with modern technical means of combat, using more rational methods of recruiting human resources, finding the best organizational structure of troops, methods and methods of armed struggle, etc. However, as a rule, the social side the arrangement of the army was relegated to the background and did not find a full resolution.
First of all, it should be noted that the first after the creation of the Red Army, the Soviet military reform of 1923-1925. due to its economic reasons, it had a forced character, tk. exhausted by the First World War and the Civil War, the national economy of Soviet Russia could not withstand the burden of maintaining a modern, combat-ready army. After the end of the civil war and foreign intervention, large-scale domestic industry produced almost 7 times less products than in 1913, in terms of coal and oil production, the country was thrown back by the end of the 19th century, in terms of iron production - to the level of the second half of the 18th century. Most of the metallurgical, machine-building, defense plants were idle or worked at a limited capacity. On the other hand, the temporary stabilization of the capitalist economy and the international situation reduced the threat to the external security of the USSR and, for a certain time, made it possible to develop a front of work to restore the national economy of the country in conditions of peaceful construction.
Maintaining an army of almost five million under these conditions placed an unbearable burden on the country's economy, diverted the bulk of the most able-bodied male population from productive labor and threatened with grave social consequences. Therefore, already in 1921, a consistent reduction in the Armed Forces began. Within three to four years, their number was reduced by more than 10 times (brought to 500 thousand people). From the point of view of ensuring the country's defense capability, this was a very radical and risky decision, but without it it was impossible to carry out fundamental social changes along the lines of the new economic policy.
The Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of September 28, 1922 “On Compulsory Military Service for All Male Citizens of the RSFSR” confirmed the principle of compulsory service for workers, but now they began to call for the army not from the age of 18, but from the age of 20. From 1925, the draft age was raised to 21, which provided significant labor reserves for use in the national economy.
The most important essence of the military reform was the introduction of a mixed system of recruitment and training of the Armed Forces, which consisted in combining the territorial-militia system with personnel. The transition to a mixed territorial-personnel system was announced by the decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of August 8, 1923 "On the organization of territorial military units and the conduct of military training of workers." He took a leading place in the reorganization of the Red Army in peacetime. If by the end of 1923 only 20% of rifle divisions were transferred to the territorial position, then by the end of 1924 there were already 52% of them, in 1928 - 58%. The territorial units occupied a dominant place in the Red Army until the second half of the 1930s.
Forming a limited part of the Armed Forces, cadre formations were constantly manned and armed and were in a relatively high degree of combat readiness. These included a significant part of the divisions of the border districts, technical units, and the navy. In the vast majority of units and formations, recruited according to the territorial-militia principle (“Local troops”), there were always only 16% of the regular command and rank and file, while the main part of the military contingent was a variable composition - the Red Army soldiers called up for military service who were on in the barracks position only during short periods of training camps, the rest of the time they lived at home and were engaged in ordinary labor activities. This significantly reduced the military spending of the state budget and contributed to an increase in labor resources in the national economy, but could not but affect the level of combat readiness of the army. “Of course, if we had a choice between a 1.5-2 million cadre army and the current police system,” M.V. Frunze emphasized, “then from a military point of view, all the data would be in favor of the first decision. But we don't have that choice."
In the course of the military reform, the mixed monetary-in-kind estimate was replaced by a purely monetary one, which transferred the entire content of the Red Army to a paid principle. The maximum reduction in the army made it possible not only to save significant funds for the restoration and development of the country's economy destroyed by the war, but also to increase appropriations for the reconstruction of the defense industry. But the general decline in military spending aggravated the difficult living conditions, service and life of the remaining contingent of regular troops in social terms.
The most burning problem at that time, the housing problem, acutely declared itself. The barracks fund, created back in the pre-revolutionary period at the rate of 1.5 square meters. m per person, was badly damaged and outdated. The most equipped barracks buildings were lost in Poland, the Baltic states, Moldova, and Finland. The repair of the barracks required colossal funds that the state did not have at its disposal. In the remaining habitable barracks, with great difficulty it was possible to accommodate the reorganized personnel contingent, but without any basic amenities (there was no running water, the available stove heating required a large amount of fuel in winter conditions, the norms for which were absolutely small). For the repair of the barracks, the estimate provided for only 15% of the need.
The command staff was in a difficult situation with housing. Of its number, only 30% were tolerably provided with apartments, while the remaining 70% were accommodated either in private apartments or several families in one room. Things were no better with regard to clothing in supplying the troops. There was a lack of clothing, and what was available was of poor quality. A crisis has developed with bedding (sheets, blankets, pillowcases, mattresses, etc.). The troops were provided with them by less than 50%. It should, unfortunately, be noted that in the following decades, the soldier slept on mattresses and pillows stuffed with hay or straw.
Budget cuts have had a severe impact on hygiene. Although diseases decreased in the troops, the threat of epidemics remained: only 30 kopecks were allocated per month for a bath and laundry for each Red Army soldier. The food situation was somewhat better. The food allowance contained 3012 calories, but it was 300-600 calories below the optimum (compared to the norms of the bourgeois armies).
The reduction of the army made it possible to release a certain part of the funds to increase the rates of payment for military personnel. The Red Army began to receive 1 p. 20 kop. instead of the previous 35 kopecks. per month. As for the command staff, the situation remained disastrous, despite the fact that their salary was increased by 38%. Even with this increase, it continued to be less than a third of the norm of the former tsarist army.
A very depressing situation with the monetary content has developed among the command staff of the reserve, involved in non-military training. For one academic hour they were paid 5 kopecks, and the unemployed command staff - 9 kopecks. All ordinary "terarmeytsy", involved in military training, had to provide themselves with clothing, bedding, food at their own expense.
The improvement of the social infrastructure of the Red Army due to the reduction of troops, lack of funds, could not be resolved even in the most urgent measure during the reform. Its improvement was postponed for subsequent years. In the course of the reform, such a problem as the provision of pensions and the employment of command personnel dismissed from the army did not find due reflection. A significant part of them were unemployed and without means of subsistence. The desire to reduce the cost of spending on the army and at the same time maintain its combat capability and combat readiness at the desired level was achieved mainly by infringing on the social sphere and household needs.
The demilitarization of the USSR during the NEP period is clearly visible when compared with the scale of military construction abroad. The number of the Red Army was 183 thousand less than in France, 17 thousand less than in Poland, Romania and the Baltic countries combined. The USSR maintained 41 soldiers for every 10 thousand inhabitants, Poland - about 100, France - 200. In the USSR, a company commander received 53 rubles, in Germany (when recalculating the exchange rate) - 84 rubles, in France - 110 rubles, in England - 343 rub.
Despite the difficult financial situation of the servicemen and the low technical equipment of the troops, the military-political leadership of the country set before the command of the Red Army not only the tasks of combat training of troops, but also involving them on a massive scale in the performance of construction, agricultural and other non-military national economic work.
The personnel of many units of the Red Army units were directly involved in the construction of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station, the Kharkov and Chelyabinsk Tractor Plants, the Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk Metallurgical Plants, the Kramatorsk Heavy Engineering Plant, the development of hard-to-reach areas of the North, Siberia, the Far East, railway construction, the laying of the Moscow metro, etc. In the resolution of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR of January 30, 1930 "On the participation of the Red Army in collective farm construction", the military command was tasked with preparing 100 thousand leading and technical workers for the village from among the rank and file and junior officers. The Red Army soldiers took a systematic part in harvesting in many parts of the country. For the successful fulfillment of national economic tasks, more than 20 formations of the Red Army in the 20-30s were awarded state awards, incl. 1st Zaporozhye Red Banner Division, 39th Irkutsk Rifle Division, Chelyabinsk Rifle Division, 23rd Rifle Division, etc.
A negative factor in the social development of society and the army should be recognized as the unrealistic plans of the party-political leadership to eliminate the illiteracy of the population in the shortest possible time - within three to four years.
In the 20s and early 30s. for military service, one after another, there was a replenishment, almost entirely illiterate and semi-literate. For example, the military conscription born in 1902, despite special selection, turned out to be 20% illiterate and 25% illiterate. Appeals in the national republics revealed an even more depressing situation. Among the conscripts of Georgia there were over 50% illiterates, of Armenia - 85%, of Azerbaijan - even more. The low general educational and cultural level of recruits had the most negative effect on the combat effectiveness of the army until the beginning of World War II, despite the relative increase in the number of young people who received a lower, primary or incomplete secondary education.
Nevertheless, the Red Army became a school not only for combat training, but also for instilling culture, improving education, and educating a soldier as a citizen. In the military units, teachers were introduced to the staff, more than 4,500 "Lenin's corners" were created - where the soldiers could spend their leisure time and self-education. Club, circle and library work was unfolding in the army, which played a huge role in the cultural education of millions of future defenders of the country. If in 1923 6.4 million books were taken from army libraries for reading, then in 1924 this figure increased to 10 million. journal information. The publication of weekly territorial and national newspapers began, incl. 23 army, district, navy newspapers with a circulation of 60,000 copies. daily. During two years of army service in the troops, it was possible to reduce the number of illiterate Red Army soldiers to 12%.
The cultural and educational conditions of army life formed more literate people who, after demobilization, stood out noticeably among the poorly educated inhabitants of the city and village and occupied many leadership positions at the local level. However, the middle and highest leading elite of society was formed mainly not from the rank and file of the Red Army, but from the composition of the party and Komsomol nomenklatura, closely connected with the internal affairs bodies.
The cost of social services and maintenance of one soldier increased from 1924 to 1926 by 90 rubles, but even this small increase had a favorable effect on the political and moral state of the armed forces. From year to year, the morale of the army improved markedly. This was manifested, in particular, in a sharp reduction in such a serious crime as desertion. The Red Army was not spared from it both during the civil war and in the post-war years. In 1923 deserters accounted for 7.5% of the total armed forces, in 1924. - 5%, in 1925. their number decreased to 0.1%. Strict military discipline, unquestioning execution of the statutory requirements and orders of the commander, the fight against licentiousness and slovenliness increasingly found support and understanding from the vast majority of the army personnel. The rank and file in their mass consciously and with conviction went to meet all the requirements of official, civic duty.
The expansion of the territorial system of training conscripts required overcoming considerable social difficulties. 4,500 training centers were deployed throughout the country. But this was far from enough. In many regions, pre-conscripts were forced to go to these points for a distance of more than 100 km, which naturally caused criticism and discontent. To correct the situation, it was necessary to expand the network of training points with a coverage radius of at least 25 km (daily transition). This meant an increase in their number at least twice, therefore, additional appropriations were needed, as well as special care for their arrangement on the part of the military department and local authorities.
The need to overcome the existing difficulties, especially of a social nature, faced by the military reform of 1923-1925, was reflected in the resolution of the III Congress of Soviets of the Union "On the Red Army" (May 1925). Having approved the measures of the ongoing reform, the congress obliged the government to involve all all-Union and Union-Republican departments, as well as public organizations, into active participation in strengthening the country's defense capability. The congress instructed the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars to carry out in the budget year 1925-1926 such practical measures as an increase in the allocation of funds to improve the material and living conditions of the army; qualitative and quantitative improvement of all types of allowances, apartment and barracks conditions (repair, new construction, equipment of barracks), expansion of the apartment and housing stock of command personnel by booking living space at quartering points of military units, making reservations in all civilian institutions, enterprises and institutions for positions subject to exclusive replacement by those demobilized from the ranks of the army and navy and equating them with respect to the conditions of admission to work to members of trade unions; improving the provision of benefits to disabled war veterans; the adoption of a special provision on pensions for the command and command personnel of the army; ensuring the real implementation of the Code of Benefits for the Red Army, etc. This resolution contributed to the removal of socio-economic tension in the army environment.
In the presence of scarce funds, in conditions of social disorder, general poverty and lack of culture, the mixed personnel-territorial system of the army lasted almost until the autumn of 1937. During this time, the number of personnel contingent of the Red Army gradually increased by about 90 thousand per year. As a result, the capacity of the army was formed, which was able to cover with military training the entire contingent of conscripts called up annually. The cost of maintaining the armed forces grew in the same proportions as the growth in their numbers; since 1933, the military budget in its absolute value has risen by 2 times, but its share in the total state budget has gradually decreased before that and reached 4%, which was almost 6 times lower than in 1924. The volume of allocated appropriations for social -household needs of the army in the period under review also increased, but significantly lagged behind the growth rate of general military spending.
The mixed territorial-personnel recruitment system of the Red Army and the minimum number of contingents diverted to military service from the national economy created favorable conditions for the restoration and development of the country's economy. However, the opportunities for strengthening the industrial and defense power of the USSR in the 20s. were used far from being fully due to major miscalculations in the socio-economic policy of the ruling regime.
“We are running our industrial economy in the most terrifying way mismanagement,” wrote F.E. our unheard-of fuss with all the agreements, then you will be horrified by everything.
Of course, it must be admitted that at all costs, on the basis of the NEP policy in the USSR, the national economy was restored to the level of 1913. October, the outlined plan for the eradication of illiteracy and the creation of continuous literacy of the population failed to be implemented. Consistent implementation of the NEP policy in the late 20s. was rolled up. A fairly objective assessment of the state of the economy in the USSR at that time was given by the economist A. Yugov in the book “The National Economy of Soviet Russia and Its Problems”, published in Berlin in 1929. The author explained the essence of the crisis in the Soviet Union by the presence of a steady increase in inflation in the country, an increase in the number of unemployed , a decrease in the proportion of the working population (from 14 workers in 1913 to 10 workers in 1928 for every 100 people of the economically active population), the extreme depreciation of industrial equipment, the renewal of which was not visible in the short term. Further, A. Yugov noted: “Practically in Russia from 1926 to 1928 there was a process not of industrialization, but of “agrarianization”. In the field of industrial management for 10 years there has been a struggle between two main trends - the centralization and decentralization of management. The latter took place only at turning points, critical moments of management. Bureaucracy, formalism, lack of a sense of responsibility, programs and plans did not correspond to production capacities, took root in the economy, abuses, theft and embezzlement of incredible proportions flourished, the administrative apparatus was extremely cumbersome, the governing authorities lacked objective elementary information about the work of enterprises and other negative aspects. Thus, the Soviet state, which took upon itself the titanic task of managing the national economy of a vast country, which no one had previously solved, has been struggling in vain for 10 years to implement it.
Rejecting the market balanced development of agriculture and industry, which was oriented towards a protracted process of industrialization, the party leadership unequivocally set a course for an accelerated technical reconstruction of heavy industry and complete collectivization in the agricultural sector on the basis of a simplified, strictly directive, planned method. Sources of funds for industrialization were sought, first of all, within the country. They were made up of income from light industry and agriculture, income from the monopoly of foreign trade, increased taxes on the NEP, income from the restriction of consumption of the population, intensive use of the spiritual energy of the working people, their labor enthusiasm and boundless faith in the ideals of the revolution. The latter was expressed in mass socialist competition: in shock work (since 1929), the Stakhanov movement (since 1935), for the right to be listed among the leaders of production or to be listed on the honor roll, etc. This was an aspiration in a short time at the cost of exhausting hard efforts to create some social ideal for a "bright future".
Such a source of income as forced gratuitous labor of prisoners in camps and colonies was also widely used, the number of which, through mass repressions, was increased by 1938 to 2 million people. Prisoners produced almost 20% of the total volume of capital work, gave almost half of the gold mined in the country, chromium-nickel ore, a third of platinum and wood. Entire cities (Norilsk, Magadan, etc.), canals (White Sea-Baltic, Moscow-Volga), railways (Khabarovsk-Komsomolsk-on-Amur, BAM-Tynda, etc.) were built by their labor. Many industrial construction projects involved (as already noted) the personnel of the army.
As a result, the industrialization of the national economy and the complete collectivization in the countryside, carried out by the method of "storm and onslaught", due to the huge overstrain of material and human resources, the robbery of rural workers, nevertheless, yielded significant results in the growth of industrial output. Within 9 years, more than 6 thousand large enterprises were put into operation. The rate of development of heavy industry was 2-3 times higher than in Russia in the 13 years before the First World War. From a patriarchal-agrarian country, the USSR turned into an industrial-agrarian country and, in terms of its potential, rose to the level of advanced capitalist states.
Simultaneously with the growth of the economic power of the Soviet Union, its military-technical defense base was being formed, with the level of which the Red Army was gradually brought into line, as well as its social status. The military doctrinal concept was revised, according to which in the field of military construction it was required to be guided by the following provision: “In terms of the size of the army, not to be inferior to our probable opponents in the main theater of war, and in the field of military equipment to be stronger than them in decisive types of weapons: aviation, tanks, artillery , automatic fire weapons.
Changes in the technical equipment of the army and the growth of international tension in the middle of the 30s. necessitated a set of priority military organizational measures. New types of troops appear and are organizationally formalized in the army: tank, aviation, airborne, air defense, the face of artillery has changed (corps artillery, artillery of the reserve of the main command, anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery), engineering troops, signal troops, chemical troops, military -transport troops, the structure of the rear and its support services changed. Territorial militia formations, little adapted to the development of new technology, were gradually curtailed and transferred to a personnel position.
Organizational changes also affected the military administration. In order to increase centralization and establish unity of command in the highest levels of leadership of the armed forces, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR was abolished in June 1934, and the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs was transformed into the People's Commissariat of Defense. In 1935, the Red Army Headquarters was renamed the General Staff. In 1937, instead of the Defense Commission under the Council of People's Commissars, the Defense Committee was created and at the same time an independent People's Commissariat of the Navy was created. Under each of the military people's commissariats, the Main Military Councils were established. In general, these acts laid the administrative and organizational, as well as material foundations for the newly urgent military reform, covering all aspects of the military development of the Soviet state and its army. It should be noted that this military reform has not been fully studied in Russian historiography, and its social aspects have not been studied at all. The transformations carried out in the course of it are interpreted only as certain features of the military reform, which distorts its real significance in the development of the armed forces.
During the period of industrialization and technical reconstruction of the army, the need to solve the most acute problem of training and accumulating technically competent personnel became apparent. A course was taken, first, to familiarize people with technology and to develop in them the necessary technical knowledge in the very process of production and operation of machines in the system of the entire national economy; secondly, for planned and systematic training in the newly created military educational institutions (courses, military schools and colleges, military academies). According to the accelerated program, qualified military-technical specialists capable of mastering military equipment were to be trained here.
The extreme tension of the working people in the struggle to fulfill the five-year plans and mass repressions dramatically changed the socio-demographic situation: if the birth rate in the country in 1913 (per 1,000 people) was 45.5 people, then by 1940 it fell to 31, 2 people, natural population growth over the same period decreased from 16.4 to 13.2 people. The above damage did not immediately manifest itself in the life of the country, since the USSR continued to have a significant potential for labor and mobilization human resources. According to the all-Union census of 1937, the total population was 161.7 million people, on January 1, 1941 (after the annexation of Western Ukraine and Belarus, the Baltic states, Moldova, Northern Bukovina), it increased to 191.7 million people. In the amateur part of the population, a large proportion was occupied by the age categories of men, which constituted the potential of the current and prospective contingent of those liable for military service (Table 1).
The demographic potential of the USSR according to the main ages subject to military registration (according to the 1937 census)
| Age | | All population | | Incl. men |
| 15-19 years old | 13137367 | 6370454 |
| 20-24 | 14441816 | 6151282 |
| 25-29 | 15294331 | 7399935 |
| 30-34 | 12151066 | 6242513 |
| 35-39 | 10500324 | 4850111 |
| 40-44 | 7725879 | 3664840 |
| 45-49 | 6605028 | 3035168 |
| 50-54 | 5585394 | 2493940 |
| Total: | 85441205 | 40208243 |
The number of potentially liable for military service in the USSR significantly exceeded those in Germany and Italy, which had a military reserve of 28 million people.
Despite the significant human resources, the military-political leadership of the country, taking into account the difficult social situation, the presence of deep imbalances in the national economy, the low technological level of industry and the degree of preparedness of young workers who came from the rural environment, did not immediately decide to change the principles of recruiting the army and increase in military spending. The search for optimal ways for the forthcoming increase in the defense potential of the state was intense. During the summer and autumn of 1937, more than seven options for the development of the Red Army for the next five years were considered. Ultimately, the course was taken towards the transition to a single cadre army and the complete abandonment of territorial militia and national formations.
Under the conditions of the growing threat of a world war and the increased economic capabilities of the USSR, the mixed territorial-personnel recruiting system, when a small number of personnel formations were combined with territorial-militia troops deployed only for a period of short-term training camps, could no longer ensure reliable defense of the country. Only a regular standing army with high combat training, high combat readiness, provided with multimillion-dollar reserves could solve this problem.
A consistent transition to the reduction of territorial units and the increase in personnel formations began as early as 1935. In 1937, more than 60% of divisions became personnel; in the subsequent prewar years, territorial units were completely liquidated (Table 2).
table 2
Transition to personnel system of military development
| Parts and connections | 1937 | 1938 | 1939 |
| Personnel rifle divisions Territorial rifle divisions Mixed rifle divisions | 58 35 4 | 60 34 2 | 98 |
On the day of the beginning of the Second World War (September 1, 1939), the USSR adopted the "Law on universal conscription", which became the core of the new military reform. The law reduced the draft age from 21 to 19 years (for those who graduated from high school - from 18 years). Such a change in military legislation made it possible in a short time to call for active service replenishment of more than three ages (boys 19, 20 and 21 years old and partly 18-year-olds). The term of active military service for the rank and file of the ground forces is set at 2 years, for junior command personnel - 3 years, for the Air Force - 3 years, for the Navy - 5 years (for persons with higher education, the service life remained 1 year).
In order to complete and equal replenishment of the Armed Forces, the circle of persons exempted from conscription was significantly reduced, deferrals for university students, teachers and other categories of citizens were abolished. For the entire private and commanding staff, the age of the state in the reserve was increased by 10 years (from 40 to 50), which was caused by the need to increase the army's reserve for wartime. The new law introduced a longer duration of training for military reserve. For command personnel, it increased three times, for junior commanders - almost 5 times, for ordinary personnel the duration of military training camps increased by 3.5 times. At the same time, the initial military training of students in grades 5-7 and pre-conscription training - in grades 8-10 of general education schools, technical schools and higher educational institutions were introduced on a mandatory basis. In order to improve the military registration of pre-conscripts, for the first time a new registration system was introduced at the place of residence (military registration and enlistment offices) instead of the previously existing system of registration of recruits by enterprises.
The cardinal changes in the recruitment of the Red Army on the eve and during the outbreak of World War II were largely due to changes in the technical base of the armed forces. Previously, the mastery of elementary types of weapons (three-line rifle model 1891/30, light and heavy machine guns, cannons of the Civil War period, etc.) required very limited technical training of military personnel. The situation began to change from the beginning of the 1930s, when the first samples of domestic tanks, aircraft and other military equipment began to appear in ever-increasing quantities in the arsenal of the Red Army. The army every year acquired a more industrial appearance, the number of military specialties increased by more than 5 times, and even more in aviation and navy.
Although the level of general education and vocational training of the population (especially in the volume of secondary and higher education) lagged far behind the needs of the national economy and the development of military affairs, the intensive process of eliminating illiteracy and raising primary education among the majority of people was an important factor influencing the degree of general development of all categories of workers. and military personnel, which provided more qualified maintenance and operation of technical means (Table 3).
Table 3
Official dynamics of general literacy of the population of the USSR aged 9-49 years (in%)
years ____________ Urban population __________ Rural population
When conscripted for military service, increased requirements were placed on the educational level of those liable for military service, especially those assigned to technical troops, aviation, artillery, and the navy. Therefore, the general level of education of the Red Army in the 30s. continuously increased and significantly exceeded the educational level of the entire population. From 1937 to 1940, the number of servicemen with a secondary education quadrupled, while the number of illiterates decreased by almost 4-5 times. According to the General Staff, among the autumn draft in 1939, recruits with an education in grades 4-6 were 55%, with an education in grades 7-9 - 25%, with a 10-year education - up to 10%, with a higher education - about 2%.
An increase in the general education of those liable for military service made it possible to increase the share of those types and arms of the troops that required the greatest technical training (Table 4).
The tendency to increase technical personnel in the Armed Forces, ensured by the growth of the general educational and technical level of the population in the country, was associated not only with an absolute increase in the number of new combat weapons, but also with the complication of military equipment itself. So, in 1937, for tank troops as a whole, there were 6 people per armored unit, and by the beginning of 1941 - already 19 people. Over four years, the number of service personnel in the tank troops increased by more than 3.2 times, although the tank fleet increased only 1.5 times during the same time. However, the number of maintenance technical personnel did not always, unfortunately, correspond to its professional training.
Table 4
The share of the regular number of personnel of various branches of the armed forces (in% by 1937)
| Jan 1938 | Jan 1939 | Jan 1940 | Jan 1941 | June 1941 | |
| Red Army in | 108,9 | 128,0 | 176,1 | 294,3 | 361,9 |
| in general | |||||
| Ground troops | 108,2 | 129,3 | 181,1 | 301,3 | 360,9 |
| including: | |||||
| rifle troops | 106,2 | 138,2 | 218,0 | 347,5 | 328,5 |
| armored troops | 105,6 | 124,5 | 412,8 | 513,2 | 620,1 |
| RGK artillery | 119,2 | 143,8 | 186,1 | 394,5 | 528,6 |
| air defense troops | 138,7 | 186,9 | 234,0 | 385,7 | 612,3 |
| Signal Corps | 101,8 | 126,7 | 131,7 | 223,8 | 227,0 |
| engineering troops | 106,0 | 100,6 | 156,3 | 230,6 | 245,1 |
| car troops | 114,8 | 197,9 | 487,9 | 608,2 | 608,2 |
During the military reform of 1937-1941. Significant changes have taken place in solving the organizational problem of national formations, which were widely recruited under the territorial system, although the proportion of various nationalities in the strength of the Red Army during the 20-30s. changed relatively slightly (Table 5).
The national composition of the Red Army in 1926-1938. (in%)
| 1926 | 1938 | |||
| Nationalities | commanders | Private | commanders | Private |
| compound | compound | |||
| Russians | 71,6 | 70 | 65,6 | 67,7 |
| Ukrainians | 5,6 | 14 | 19,7 | 17,2 |
| Belarusians | 3 | 3 | 4,7 | 2,8 |
| Jews | 5,4 | 1 | 4,7 | 1 |
| Armenians | 0,5 | 0,6 | 0,9 | 0,8 |
| Georgians | 0,4 | 0,7 | 0,8 | 0,8 |
| Tatars | 1 | 2,7 | 1 | 2,8 |
| Chuvash, | 2,5 | 6 | 1,5 | 2 |
| Bashkirs | ||||
| mountain peoples | ||||
| Caucasus | 0,5 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Other | 9,5 | - | 0,1 | 0,9 |
Almost until the end of the 30s. in the personnel units of the Red Army - the main combat core of the Armed Forces - Russian-speaking elements prevailed, and in numerous territorial formations, located respectively in one or another republic, there was a significant layer of national units, with their own national command personnel. In fact, a single allied army then consisted of separate national units, but the national question did not arise in full in the army environment then. Military-national construction not only expanded the mobilization capabilities of the state, but also strengthened the friendship of the peoples of the multinational country. In the mid 20s. national units accounted for 10% of the strength of the Red Army. However, already at that time, both real and imaginary deviations from the "nationwide" line were suppressed as "nationalist", which intensified with the approval of the totalitarian regime.
With the transition from the territorial system to the creation of an army on a personnel basis, the situation in the national aspect changed significantly. The Red Army became in its composition a single multinational armed force, with a single extraterritorial principle of recruitment, a single organization, a socio-military way of life and way of life, a single Russian-speaking communication of personnel, a single equally obligated service in different geographical zones of a vast country.
At the same time, the national factor in the army acquired an increasingly nationwide sound, although in the socio-political sense it continued not to be taken into account in the consolidation of the army in the old fashioned way - it was evaded, often brushed aside. By inertia and according to an established dogmatic model, the main attention was focused on the characteristics of the class composition, the level of party membership, and the age limit. Declaring a more complete international community of the allied army, where closer military fraternity, close national ties, nationwide patriotism, equal responsibility for the defense of the motherland, class and ideological orientation in social policy within the army were forged, the military-political leadership in the national aspect was in no hurry to resolve specific life problems of servicemen of different nationalities.
So, in 1940, the conscripted contingent had representatives of the peoples of Central Asia - 11%, the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia - 7.6%. Of these, 56% did not speak Russian. With primary education, semi-literate and illiterate turned out to be 64%. By the beginning of 1941, there were already more than 300 thousand people in the army who did not speak Russian, and another 100 thousand people were expected in the next draft. the same level of language proficiency. The issues of their distribution among units and teaching the Russian language, in which all charters and instructions were issued, orders, instructions and commands were given, were solved unsatisfactorily. A large layer of conscripts were children of the repressed and small peoples of the border regions. They were forbidden to be sent to the border and central districts, and it was proposed to enlist in the internal districts to form special teams or work battalions. The latter also included representatives of small nations (Finns, Poles, Bulgarians, Greeks, Latvians, Estonians, Turks, Karelians, Germans and others) living in the border area of the West and East. The youth of the western regions of Belarus, Ukraine, Bessarabia (Moldova) were not subject to conscription due to the alleged lack of military commissariats there. A certain part of the command staff was also discriminated against: more than 4,000 people were fired from the army. this category of military personnel belonging to the nationalities of the border countries beyond. Such was the real price of the commonplace replica then spreading that “the son is not responsible for the father”, as well as the well-known thesis about the “indestructible” friendship of peoples and their moral and political unity.
In general, the activities carried out within the framework of the military reform of 1937-1941. played an important role in strengthening the Soviet Armed Forces on the eve of repelling fascist aggression. The law on universal conscription created opportunities for the deployment of a mass army; millions of young people were drawn from the national economy into military service. The size of the army, navy, aviation increased several times: if in 1936 it did not exceed 1.1 million people, then in the fall of 1939 - about 2 million, by June 1941 -5.4 million people . By June 22, 1941, the Red Army had more than 303 rifle, tank, motorized, cavalry divisions, although 125 (over 40%) of them were still in the formation stage. The troops received new modern equipment, replacing outdated and ineffective models of the mid-30s.
However, the social factor in the life of the Red Army, in the training of military personnel and their livelihoods, remained the weakest link in raising the combat readiness of troops at the level of military organizational development necessary for that time. The main reason for this was the socio-political situation in the country and, above all, mass repressions among all segments of the population, including the most qualified and experienced military personnel, who formed the backbone of the armed forces, the backbone of their combat readiness and ability to resist the aggressor.
It is known that after the defeat in the First World War, under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was deprived of the opportunity to build up its military-industrial potential, and had severe restrictions on the number of Reichswehr and other paramilitary organizations. However, she took care of the command staff of the army, did everything to preserve his corporatism and high combat skills. In the Red Army, starting from the 20s. the situation with the command staff was deplorable. Thousands of "military specialists" under the pretext of "class filtering" and reduction in the number of troops were dismissed from military service. Mixed personnel-territorial system of military construction by the mid-30s. completely exhausted itself and turned into a brake on the improvement of troops. For 12 years (1926-1937), the training of military personnel, maintaining their necessary availability in the army and in the reserve, took on a stagnant-chronic character, lagging far behind the growing quantitative and qualitative needs.
If in 1924-1925. 8 thousand commanders (1% of the army) graduated from military educational institutions annually, then in the 30s. their release increased only to 10 thousand people. per year (only 0.6% of the army). In terms of the level of military training, the shifts were quite insignificant. Over a period of more than ten years, 115,000 young commanders entered the troops, and the decline in command personnel (only in the ground forces) reached 68,000 people. Taking into account the earlier shortfall, the lack of commanders in the troops already assumed a threatening character.
Our historiography focuses on the repressions of 1937-1938. What was in the army before these years remains a "white spot". Meanwhile, archival documents that have now become available allow us to establish that after the first military reform, with the arrival of K.E. Voroshilov to the leadership of the army, mass purges of army personnel immediately began. Until 1936 alone, on various pretexts, 47 thousand commanders of all levels were dismissed from the army, a significant part of whom were arrested or deprived of the opportunity to continue military service in command positions in the future.
But the real moloch of repression reached its peak in 1937-1938, when almost 43,000 commanders and political workers were dismissed from the army in two years, more than 40,000 of them were arrested. Of these, 35.2 thousand people were physically exterminated. In the future, the wave of repression subsided somewhat, but did not stop. Two and a half years before the start of the war, about 10,000 more commanders were dismissed from the army, of which almost 4,400 were arrested and shot (see Table 6).
Reduction of the command staff of the Red Army and the Red Army for socio-political and administrative reasons from 1926 to June 1941
| years | Total discharged from the army | Of them: | ||
| arrested | dismissed due to illness, death, disability | returned to the army for rehabilitation | ||
| 1926-1933 | 25000 | |||
| 1934-1936 | 22000 | 5000 | ||
| 1937-1941 | 52862 | 44288 | 7248 | 14140 |
| Of them: | ||||
| 1937 | 21202 | 19261 | 1941 | 4661 |
| 1938 | 21680 | 20739 | 941 | 6373 |
| 1939 | 2689 | 1406 | 1283 | 187 |
| 1940 | 4335 | 1450 | 1559 | 1997 |
| 1941 | ||||
| (1.1-30.6) | 2956 | 1432 | 1524 | 942 |
From the data in Table. it can be seen that 7.5 years before the start of the fascist aggression - a period extremely important for the training and formation of the command staff, especially the senior and senior level, more than 49 thousand commanders* were repressed.
The sharp weakening of the command staff of the armed forces by the People's Commissar of Defense - one of the most incapable and mediocre military leaders of the 20th century - justified at meetings of the Politburo and Plenums of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks the need to fight allegedly against the "fifth column", cleanse the army of "enemies and opposition" (the guilt of which no objective judiciary could prove). At the end of 1938, summing up the terror in the army, Voroshilov declared: “1937 and the whole of 1938. we had to clean our ranks, ruthlessly cutting off the infected parts to living healthy meat, cleansing the ulcers from the vile treacherous rot. And then he stated: "... We caught and crushed the reptile of treason in our ranks ...". At the same time, he made an application for the future: “Having freed us, basically, from traitors, we have not had time yet ... to pull out all the roots.”
Repressions in the army were, as you know, not a local phenomenon, but one of the links of all-encompassing terror in the country for class-ideological motives and under the pretext of fighting foreign intelligence agents. Marshal G.K. Zhukov wrote: “A terrible situation has arisen in the country ... An unprecedented epidemic of slander has unfolded ... Every Soviet person, going to bed, could not firmly hope that he would not be taken away that night on some slanderous denunciation.”
Fear reigned in the country, discontent and indignation grew. In 1938, the People's Commissariat of Defense alone, not counting other state and party bodies, received more than 50,000 complaints and applications from workers, relatives and family members about the illegal actions of law enforcement agencies. Under pressure from the public, the Stalinist entourage somewhat weakened the repressions by punishing their henchmen (Ezhov and others), but the release from arrest of an insignificant part of the repressed military professionals could not radically change the overall picture.
The mass annihilation of the commanding staff at the time of the difficult international situation had no precedent in world history and affected all aspects of the preparation of the Red Army, on the level of its combat readiness for the start of the war with Germany.
Due to the extermination and dismissal of almost 100 thousand personnel commanders of various levels, a chronic shortage and shortage of command personnel developed in the army, expressed already in 1937 in 84.5 thousand people. In connection with the growth in the size of the army, this shortfall increased more and more.
The tragic result of the repressions was not only a quantitative decrease in the officer cadre, but also a deep qualitative weakening of the officer corps, especially its top and middle ranks. All commanders of military districts were replaced, 90% of their deputies, chiefs of troops and services, 80% of corps and division commanders, more than 90% of regiment commanders and their deputies. In many units and formations, due to the displacement of commanders, there was an actual anarchy for a certain time, and then a massive leapfrog with a reshuffling of personnel unfolded. In 1938 alone, almost 70% of the commanders were moved and appointed to new positions. At the same time, battalion commanders were often appointed immediately commanders of divisions and corps, platoon commanders became regimental commanders. This was one of the main sources of the heavy defeats of the Soviet troops in 1941-1942.
In order to urgently make up for the colossal shortage of command personnel, the mobilization bodies of the Red Army began a hasty call for storekeepers, which was not provided for by any previous plans. During 1938-1940. 175 thousand people were withdrawn from the reserve. and prepared from among the one-year students 38 thousand commanders. Such a withdrawal from the reserve of human reserves significantly exposed the cadres of the national economy, already weakened by terrorist attacks. But the main thing was that the commanders called up from the reserve could not qualitatively compensate for the loss of highly qualified military commanders who were subjected to repressions. If in Germany there were a large number of experienced officers who participated in the First World War in the many thousands of reserve and reserve contingents, then in the USSR there were almost no such personnel left.
The sharp decline in the quality of the Soviet officer corps, as a direct result, primarily of mass repression of experienced command personnel, was already clearly evident during the Soviet-Finnish war. Describing the actual level of combat training of troops based on the experience of the Soviet-Finnish war, the new People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Tymoshenko admitted: “The war with the White Finns revealed all the perniciousness of our combat training system ... Our commanders and headquarters, having no practical experience, did not know how to really organize the efforts of the armed forces and close interaction, and most importantly, they did not know how to really command” . Speaking about the half-year experience of restructuring the combat training of troops after the Finnish war, the people's commissar drew disappointing conclusions: “Combat training is still lame on both legs today. The facts testify that the legacy of the old laxity has not been expelled and lives close to the big leading chiefs and their headquarters. During the war, such commanders will pay with the blood of their units ... Where the real exactingness and severity of army life are replaced by conversations, success cannot be expected there, failure is preparing for a serious matter, and commanders and chiefs of all degrees are on the verge of crime.
The huge losses of the Soviet troops, who had multiple numerical and technical superiority over the Finnish army, clearly testified to the biggest shortcomings in the condition and training of the Red Army. “Out of a battalion of 970 people,” wrote S. Narovchatov, a participant in the war, “a hundred and something of us remained, of which 40 people were unharmed.” The major setbacks in the Finnish war and the especially low level of combat effectiveness of the troops and staffs greatly discredited the Red Army in the military circles of many countries.
In order to avoid a catastrophic situation with personnel as a result of mass repressions, the government, in a fire order, decided to deploy dozens of new military schools and short-term courses for the training of junior command personnel. If in 1937 there were 47 military schools, then in 1939 their number was increased to 80, in 1940 - to 124, by January 1941 - to 203. All infantry, artillery, tank, technical schools were transferred from three years to two years of study. At short-term courses for the improvement of command personnel (in 1938-1939, about 80 thousand people graduated from them), studies lasted only a few months. All this determined the low level of training of commanders.
Not the best situation was with the training of middle and senior personnel in military academies. Head of the Military Academy M.V. Frunze General M.S. Khozin admitted in December 1940 that out of 610 students graduating that year, 453 people were admitted to the Academy. with bad marks, “moreover, they had not only one bad mark, but 2-3-4 and even more. All this creates a situation in which we ... work with the commanding staff - students for nothing .... We need to abandon such a pursuit for the quantitative acquisition of the academy with students and switch to a qualitative selection. Confirming the low level of personnel of the middle and senior levels of the Red Army, Chief of the General Staff K.A. Meretskov, six months before the start of World War II, said: “Our universities and academies are leaving personnel who have not sufficiently mastered the knowledge and practical skills in the combat use of military branches and modern means of combat. They cannot correctly and quickly organize the interaction of combat arms on the battlefield and do not have a correct idea of the nature of modern combat. This is because the entire system of training commanders from top to bottom does not meet the requirements that apply to modern combat commanders.
The attempt of the Soviet military-political leadership in a matter of months and years to compensate for the enormous damage caused by mass repressions did not lead to noticeable results. By the beginning of 1941, 67,000 commanders continued to be short of ground forces alone in the state, and taking into account the planned organizational measures in the first half of 1941, the shortfall reached 75,000 people. basic military specialties. The mass turnover of military personnel continued, which had an extremely negative effect on the level of combat training of the troops. Two years before the start of fascist aggression, all 100% of the new commanders of military districts, 90% of army commanders, over 60% of corps and division commanders, and 91% of regiment commanders were appointed to positions. Many of them stayed in their new positions for only a few months and, in the absence of sufficient experience, were completely unable to put together combat teams, establish systematic combat training, and raise the training of troops to the proper level. So, only three and a half months before the German attack, 4 army commanders, 42 corps commanders, 117 division commanders accepted their posts.
Almost all commanders of the military districts spoke out against the constant reshuffling and turnover of officer cadres. Member of the Military Council of the Odessa Military District A.F. Kolobyakov at the December (1940) meeting of the leadership of the Red Army said that only during the year 10,000 commanders were transferred in the district. The commander of the troops of the Trans-Baikal District, V.S. Konev, at the same meeting emphasized: “We need to stop rearranging cadres. Our cadres are not selected for promotion, but are rearranged... We are violating the stability of the service of command personnel. As a result, the average command staff, even battalion commanders, command for 3-4 months ... The instructions of the people's commissar to make a company, platoon, battalion all-powerful must be institutionalized ... A company commander must command a company for at least 3 years.
The lack of command personnel, the call-up of untrained reserve officers, the high turnover of military personnel, and the reduction in training periods were exacerbated by the decline in their professional training, especially in terms of the level of military education. If by 1937 among commanders with higher education there were 16.4%, with secondary education - 61.9%, with accelerated education - 17.2%, without education - 4%, then by January 1941 there was a decrease in the first three indicators 1.5-2 times, and persons without education increased more than three times; the number of commanders with combat experience has halved. The most illiterate militarily was the political and economic-administrative staff (in 1938, political workers without military education were listed as 40%, and in May 1941 - already 82%).
The most important task of the military reform was a sharp increase in the combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces, the fastest eradication of those shortcomings that emerged during the Soviet-Finnish war. K.E. Voroshilov, who became famous for numerous reports and speeches about the "invincibility" of the Red Army and complete well-being in its ranks, was replaced by S.K. Timoshenko, who had the difficult task of achieving a radical change in the combat training of troops in a short time, a sharp strengthening of discipline, improving military-theoretical thought, improving the operational-tactical skills of young command personnel who did not have practical experience in leading units and formations, solving targeted military service tasks, which made it possible to improve professionalism, military skills, to master everything that is necessary in a real combat situation. The new leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense made great efforts to change the entire system of combat training of troops.
Instead of the rooted template orders of NGOs for the upcoming academic year, including the prevailing greenhouse-barracks conditions for training soldiers, a course was taken to train troops in a harsh field situation, regardless of the season, time of day, or weather conditions. The frequency of issuing orders for combat training, reduced to half a year, was established, in which training goals and methods for achieving them were specifically indicated. At the end of the period, checks and summing up the results of combat training by the People's Commissar personally and his deputies in a particular region of deployment of troops followed. During the year preceding the German attack, two NPO orders for combat training were implemented (No. 120 of May 16, 1940 for the summer period and No. 30 of January 21, 1941 for the winter period).
What was the useful novelty of these documents, which shook up the army and set all its units in motion?
First of all, the main efforts were aimed at a decisive increase in the art of interaction between all branches of the military, the restoration of the leading role of the infantry, capable of skilfully conducting close combat, the transformation of headquarters into the main and well-coordinated instrument of command and control of troops; it was necessary to form and fine-tune the activities of the rear, to concentrate maximum attention on improving the skills of the command staff, to accustom the troops to the harsh conditions of modern combat and operations, to develop in them a readiness to stubbornly overcome all the difficulties of the war. The basis for increasing the combat readiness of the troops was to put, first of all, military education, the personal example of the commander, and the all-round strengthening of unity of command. Unfortunately, the well-known thesis: "Teach the troops only what is needed in the war and only as it is done in the war" was put forward belatedly, because. only a few months remained before the war, and a lot of things needed to be corrected.
In the process of implementing the tasks put forward, their basic support was weak: the troops lacked important regulatory documents (Combat and Field Manuals), the development of which in its final form was not completed by the start of the war. The training of a single fighter and tactical units continued according to the old charters of the mid-30s. The experience of the Soviet-Finnish war, fighting in the area of the river. Khalkhin Gol, the operations of the Second World War were not fully generalized and were not widely used among the troops. The materials of the December (1940) extended meeting of the senior command staff, where the problems of organizing and conducting operational-strategic operations were discussed, were not published even in the closed press and, therefore, did not become the property of a wide range of command staff and even in the teaching environment of military academies, where they could be an invaluable educational and cognitive material. Such closeness of military-historical and research-theoretical work could not be useful for the training of troops.
In the short time after the end of the Soviet-Finnish war, successes in the fire training of troops were very modest. According to the General Staff, during the autumn inspection of 1940, only certain units and formations received a positive assessment. In the Western Special Military District, out of 54 units tested, only 3 received a positive assessment, in the Leningrad Military District, out of 30 units tested, only 5, in the Volga and Ural Districts, out of 33 units, fire missions were successfully completed only in 9. “Most of the commanding staff, - the leadership of the General Staff stated that it is not an example for a fighter in the ability to wield weapons. In the fire training of fighters and units, various indulgences and relief are allowed. Low rates were in anti-aircraft artillery, the Air Force and other branches of the military.
A feature of the deployment of the army as a result of the aggravation of the international situation was the unpreparedness of many military organizational measures.
As part of the German Wehrmacht on the eve of the attack on the USSR, the youngest soldiers were conscripts in 1940, and recruits in 1941 initially entered the reserve. In the Red Army, those called up from the national economy in the spring of 1941 were immediately sent to the ranks. Among the troops of the border military districts, soldiers of the first year of service accounted for approximately 2/3 of the total number. Many of the conscripts did not even have time to take the military oath before the start of the war.
Multiple increase in the size of the army in 1938-1941. revealed the unpreparedness of the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense for the material and organizational arrangement of new contingents, for the organization of their training, as well as for the proper supply of uniforms, the creation of an apartment and barracks fund, the provision of sanitary and hygienic equipment, cultural, educational and sports services, storage facilities, and a repair base.
If the training of the Wehrmacht in Germany was distinguished by the maximum availability of training grounds, complex simulators and other devices that ensured high training of both regular soldiers and storekeepers, then in the Red Army the equipment with training devices and simulators in many units did not exceed 15%. Commander of the 6th Army I.N. Muzychenko noted: "The practice of providing benefits in a centralized manner has not justified itself, the units do not receive anything." The head of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army, Ya.N. Fedorenko, said about tank exercises: “You put the tank on reconnaissance, it will pass around the forest, swamp, the crew will come out and do not know where the south is, where the north is. Crews have absolutely no maps.” Many drivers had only 1.5-2 hours of practice driving tanks. Small raids, especially on new types of vehicles, had many crews in the Air Force. In aviation, due to the lack of barracks, most pilots lived with their families in private apartments at a great distance from airfields. During the course of the exercises, the troops even lacked paper: company schedules had to be written either on newspapers or on the back of paper targets. Significant damage to combat and operational training was caused by the systematic detachment of a large part of the personnel for household work, escort and protection of cargo, guard duty, auxiliary and construction work, etc.
The effectiveness of combat training largely depended on the logistics of the troops. However, due to the general low level of well-being of the people and unproductive costs in many sectors of the national economy, the social conditions of the military service of conscripts at the end of the 30s, as before, lagged far behind the level of most European armies. In the system of military construction, in the distribution of material and financial resources, the issues of weapons and equipment (the “combat element” of the army) still came first, while the costs of maintaining a fighter, for his social and domestic needs amounted to an insignificant percentage and were invariably reduced.
If the costs of the first military reform of 1923-1926. were calculated at 1660 million rubles, then the reform of 1937-1941. demanded appropriations in the first phase - 62.4 billion rubles, and in the second phase (in progress) - 92.3 billion rubles. In general, the costs of this reform amounted to 154.7 billion rubles. The difference in costs is enormous, but in the course of the last reform, funds were allocated for social needs (in terms of share of the total military budget) by 10% less than in the 1920s.
By the beginning of the 40s. The Red Army had a barracks and housing stock of about 13.5 million square meters. m (it was 3 times more than it had in the mid-20s). But at the same time, in the spring of 1941, the old pre-revolutionary norms of living space per person (up to 1.5 sq. m.) actually remained to accommodate the personnel of the troops in the barracks.
The cost of maintaining the army in social and domestic terms remained at a minimum level. For one soldier per month according to the norms of 1939-1940. released: for current household expenses - 3 rubles. 16 kopecks, bath and laundry expenses - 4 rubles. 88 kopecks, postal and telegraph - 23 kopecks, expenses for combat training were reduced by 50%. The supply of military personnel with food in 1939 was differentiated by 14 rations. At the same time, the calorie content of the main ration in relation to 1925 increased by only 200 calories. The health service was in disrepair.
The monetary content of the Red Army soldiers, especially private and junior officers, differed sharply from foreign armies. The salaries were determined depending on the positions and types of troops. Higher salaries were envisaged in the technical branches of the military, the lowest - in the infantry and cavalry. Additional payments were also introduced: camp, for parachuting, diving, per diem and apartment money, territorial allowances, etc. But no payments were provided for participation in hostilities. Such indifference to the fighters who selflessly endured the hardships of field life, who did not leave the battlefield for weeks, and sometimes for months (Khasan, Khalkhin-Gol, the Finnish war), exposing their lives to mortal danger, was simply immoral *.
Chronic disregard for the social infrastructure of the army, underestimation and delay in considering and preparing the military-social side of the life of the troops in the context of the general political situation in the country, massive rampant repression, terror, fear, and general suspicion could not but affect the level of military discipline and combat capability of the army.
The head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, P.A. Smirnov, in 1937, at a meeting of political workers, was forced to admit that the number of incidents, suicides, mutilations of people, accidents and other gross violations of discipline in the troops is so great that it undermines the very foundation of military power. In the four months of 1937 alone, 400,000 disciplinary offenses were committed in the troops. Compared with the first quarter of 1937, in the second quarter the number of suicides and attempted suicides in the Leningrad Military District increased by almost 27%, in the Belorussian District - by 40%, in Kiev - by 50%, in Kharkov by 150%, in the Black Sea fleet - by 133%, in the Pacific Fleet - by 200%.
The accident rate in aviation and technical troops grew. According to O.F. Suvenirova, in just two and a half months of 1938, 41 accidents and 55 accidents occurred in the Air Force, in which 95 people died and were injured. In total, in the course of planned combat training in 1938 in the Red Army, as a result of emergencies, more than 4 thousand soldiers and commanders were killed or injured. In December 1938, the People's Commissar of Defense was forced to issue a special order "On the fight against drunkenness in the Red Army."
After the Soviet-Finnish war, the issues of establishing strict military discipline became especially acute. In June 1940, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense "On the elimination of outrages and the establishment of a harsh regime in guardhouses" was issued, in July the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council "On criminal liability for unauthorized absences and desertion" was adopted. For these misdemeanors, soldiers and foremen, by decision of the Military Tribunal, were sentenced to imprisonment from 3 months to 2 years with serving a sentence in the newly created disciplinary battalions. Unauthorized absence for more than a day was considered desertion and was punishable by imprisonment for 5-10 years, and in wartime by execution.
In October 1940, instead of the obsolete ones, the new Disciplinary Charter and the Charter of the Internal Service were introduced, which provided for a different system of relations between a superior and a subordinate, senior and junior, more characteristic of an army environment. The text of the new military oath was adopted. Such rituals as greetings in the ranks and out of formation were introduced, more attention was paid to the appearance of military personnel and the wearing of military uniforms, the practice of public analysis of the personal files of commanders was abolished, and complaints were filed on command. General and admiral ranks were established, as well as sergeant ranks for junior officers. Responsibility for political and educational work with personnel was assigned to the assistant commander for political affairs (instead of the abolished commissars).
Improving military legislation, military organizational forms, and raising the requirements for military service standards were an important part of the reforms aimed at strengthening the discipline and combat effectiveness of the troops, and eradicating malicious violations of the norms of army life. However, the social army reality turned out to be much more difficult in fact, so that it could be changed and improved without a certain moral and spiritual climate. Among the commanders, the dominant place was occupied by young cadres with 1-2 years of experience in command or just called up from the reserve. They had neither the experience of educational influence on subordinates, nor official authority, they were inclined in disciplinary practice, to forceful administrative and indiscriminate measures, sometimes to arbitrariness.
After the adoption of the new Disciplinary Rules, there was a sharp jump in the use of assault, and political workers also participated in the perversion of disciplinary practice * . At the December meeting of 1940, Army General K.A. Meretskov cited the fact that the political officer of one of the units “began to explain that now you can beat a Red Army soldier with anything, even pointed out - with a crowbar, an ax, etc.” Corps Commissar N.N. Vashugin reported that in one of the divisions, the commander instructed his subordinate foremen in this way: "Use force of arms, otherwise you yourself will answer." Junior commanders were instructed: "You see that the bed is not filled, call this Red Army soldier and give it in the teeth." Cases of massacre and assault became more and more widespread, often becoming the causes of desertion, unauthorized absences, suicides, mutilations and injuries of military personnel, accidents, disasters, etc. (Table 7).
1940 Deputy People's Commissar of Defense I.I. Proskurov said: "No matter how hard it is, I must say frankly that there is no such looseness and low level of discipline in any army like ours."
An important role in improving the organization, combat and moral training of the troops was assigned to the activities of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda and Agitation and its bodies in the troops. However, the first stages of the reform were characterized by a weak and sluggish pace of restructuring the work of political agencies, which focused on interaction with the NKVD system, compiling relevant reports and “signals” on suspects. The style of work of political agencies and party organizations did not change significantly for a long time, continuing to gravitate toward cabinet-declarative and directive-reporting-denunciation methods and techniques, demonstrating a separation from the urgent needs of the personnel of the Red Army. Thus, in 234 units of the Odessa Military District, a year before the war, there were no battle flags, and this did not bother the military-political leaders at all. The main impetus for the restructuring of political and educational work often came from below. “The banner is the military shrine of the unit,” reported a member of the Military Council of the Odessa Military District A.F. Kolobyakov. - We have submitted relevant information to the General Staff. But the matter is not resolved. This issue needs to be moved forward quickly.” Equally sharply raised in the troops were questions about the continuity of military traditions. “Odessa military district,” said A.F. Kolobyakov, is rich in divisions, formations with a great historical past, great traditions: Perekop, Irkutsk, Chapaev, Taman divisions and a number of other units. And thus, by special order, we checked and compiled a history, by orders from the district we established annual holidays of the units, at which the units could take stock and educate the fighters, so that the fighter would consider it an honor to serve in his unit.
By the end of 1940, the Political Directorate of the Red Army managed to more clearly formulate the tasks of educational work in the troops, bringing it closer to the fighter. A company, battery, squadron, squadron was chosen as the center of party-political, propaganda, educational activities. Here they began to deploy joint propaganda teams, conduct propaganda seminars, and organize cycles of lectures on military history. For the first time, demands were put forward to abandon the peaceful tone and complacency in propaganda and agitation, underestimate the forces of a potential enemy, soberly assess the forces of the Red Army, improve work with fighters of non-Russian nationality, where there was isolation, a manifestation of nationalist sentiments or great-power chauvinism. In the order of the People's Commissar of Defense for the winter period of 1941, it was weightily stated that victory in the war was ultimately determined by the moral strength of the soldiers, their combat skills and the availability of modern technical means.
It should be noted that after the conclusion of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, political educational work in the army took place in difficult and contradictory conditions. The state of public consciousness, its tone, the prevailing cliché about the invulnerable power of the USSR, which was purposefully introduced and cultivated among people, could not but influence political work in the army. The feeling of impending danger and the need for vigilance was eradicated from the population and the army. This situation in society was noted with particular concern by the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda in a closed letter to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated February 22, 1941. “A peaceful tone and a simplified thesis prevail in the country that we are strong, and our Red Army, if us, will march triumphantly through enemy countries,” the letter said. - It is not cultivated among the population that a modern war will require an enormous strain on the material resources of the country and a high endurance of the Soviet people. There is no sober assessment of the forces of the Red Army. Without any sense of proportion, epithets are poured: “great and invincible”, “all-destroying power”, “the most creative, disciplined army of heroes”, etc. All this gives rise to arrogance, complacency, underestimation of the difficulties of war, lowers vigilance and readiness to repulse the enemy.
In the press and radio information, according to the assessment of the Main Directorate of Propaganda, service in the army was noticeably idealized as supposedly simple and easy, it was poorly disclosed that the armed forces are a harsh school of combat training, where one has to endure difficulties and deprivations of a combat situation and, in order to achieve great success in combat training, you need to work hard and hard. The Komsomol, the school in work with youth were aimed more at club-type entertainment. Theatre, cinema, and literature predominantly depicted the heroism of the civil war, which is far from the nature of modern armed struggle. In a number of national republics, they withdrew from teaching the Russian language to pre-conscripts as an important aspect of defense work.
Osoaviakhim represented one of the mass public organizations engaged in pre-conscription military training of youth. By May 1941, he numbered 13 million people in his ranks. (from schoolchildren to students, young workers and collective farmers). It was, of course, difficult to cover such a mass of young people with specific military training, except by organizing the delivery of standards for the TRP, PVCO, Voroshilov Strelka (shooting from a small-caliber rifle). Under the pressure of harsh circumstances, the Central Council of Osoaviakhim in August 1940 revised the system of military training in its structures. New training centers, clubs and schools began to take shape - shooters, cavalrymen, paratroopers, signalmen. Approximately 2.5 million people from among the members of Osoaviakhim were attracted to training in military specialties on the existing rather underpowered educational and technical base, although not all of them had time to start studying by the beginning of the war.
In general, during the entire existence of Osoaviakhim, by June 1941, he trained about 400 thousand military specialists: reserve pilots, paratroopers, glider pilots, aircraft mechanics, motorists, motorcyclists, signalmen, a number of specialists of the Navy. But it was not possible to achieve a wide combination of state and public forms of mass preliminary military training of young people and the creation of the necessary high-quality reserve reserve for military service; therefore, at the beginning of the war, it was necessary to urgently resort to the Vsevobuch system.
The best works of Soviet writers, playwrights, poets, artists, cinematographers, publicists, the creation of films about outstanding Russian commanders and naval commanders largely contributed to the patriotic education of the population and military personnel. Legitimate pride in the great accomplishments of the people in the development of the powerful industrial base of the USSR played a big role in raising the moral self-awareness of Soviet soldiers.
The repressions and daily supervision of the NKVD could not prevent the objective requirements of life, the promotion of skilled, enterprising, professionally competent commanders and military leaders capable of withstanding the formidable enemy in the coming fierce struggle. Only from the walls of the Academy of the General Staff, A.M. Vasilevsky, N.F. Vatutin, A.I. Antonov, A.A. Grechko, S.M. Shtemenko, M.I. .Kazakov, I.Kh.Bagramyan, V.V.Kurasov, L.A.Govorov, M.V.Zakharov and many other generals and officers who became outstanding commanders of the Great Patriotic War.
Military reforms of the 20s - 30s. were carried out in conditions of increasing dynamics in the development of the national economy and society. The first of these reforms took about three or four years, the second of the five years envisaged was used for three and a half years, and it was interrupted due to the outbreak of war. Each of them had a certain target orientation of the transition from one stage of military construction to another, qualitatively different from the previous one. The reformation of the army in 1938 and the first half of 1941 was characterized by the greatest contradictions, primarily due to mass repressions and their consequences, subjectivist approaches in solving many social and military organizational problems.
One reform was separated from another by no more than 12 years. The period was extremely short, during which the country, having barely restored the ruined economy, only began, at great cost, to move on to an upswing in its development. Significant changes in military construction, proceeding from the need to urgently strengthen the defense capability of the state, put heavy pressure on society and its standard of living. It was extremely difficult to overcome the illiteracy of the contingents drafted into the army and the improvement of their education, at least up to the 4th grade level of primary school. The rapid progress in the field of armaments and military equipment required for its development from the personnel of the troops a higher degree of education, as well as the ability to endure high physical loads. The lack of the required level of technical culture and education among young people forced them to have long periods of service in the army (3-5 years) with a separation from family and production. An important social principle - the careful and persistent accumulation of the intellectual and physical potential of the people, for many reasons, was not actually observed.
When reading the speeches of the leaders of the military department and party-political bodies for decades, it is difficult to find in them even a modest objective analysis of the state of the social, moral and moral sphere in the army. If they contained assessments of a moral and political nature, this concerned mainly the class composition, the party and Komsomol stratum, the level of military education, the presence of libraries, clubs, theaters, film installations in the army, the number of newspapers and magazines published. For all the significance of this information, they lacked the most important component - a man-warrior with his spiritual world, the state of which serves as an important indicator of the power of the armed forces.
Soldier's thoughts, aspirations, joys and sorrows, hopes, just the spiritual and physical existence of a warrior, the satisfaction of his most important needs were not taken into account, they were simply hushed up. A man-warrior, defender of the fatherland lived with promises, often false and unrealizable. Satisfaction of the needs for the arrangement of military social infrastructure was carried out on the basis of the residual principle. An insignificant share was allocated from the military budget for this sphere, and even these funds were literally "knocked out" from the national economic sectors with great effort.
Such a practice ultimately led to the chronic backwardness of the army's social security in comparison with its rapid saturation with modern military equipment. This was justified by the "unpretentiousness", "undemanding", "super-tolerance" of the Soviet soldier and officer, allegedly characteristic of the very nature of their military camp life, rooted in the traditions inherent in the Russian people.
An important, socially significant factor in the life of a soldier has always been his draft into the army. With all his attempts to give the conscription a rainbow halo, he could not relieve the callee, still very young, of the heaviest mental burden: separation from family, friends, comrades, beloved girl, from his native places where he grew up and matured, a feeling of unusualness and uncertainty of the future service and other subtleties of the human psyche. And right next to him - a diverse community of young men like him, the disorder of recruiting stations, far from home comfort, uncomfortable echelon transportation, cruel and sometimes rude treatment of commanders and other "charms" of the initial stage of military life. All this immediately fell on the conscript, on his still fragile, far from being formed nature.
The most important lesson of historical experience is the need to think over how to soften and facilitate the process of adaptation, the adaptability of young men of military age to a way of life and activity that is sharply different from their usual way of life.
No less difficult for young people is the process of the opposite nature - demobilization and dismissal from the army. It is no secret that we have long had a simplistic attitude towards demobilized soldiers: they were given severance pay, a set of military uniforms, a free ticket to travel to their place of residence, but they often forgot to say a good parting word to them. And again there came for the young man, even if he had matured, sharp changes in fate, the uncertainty of the future. It is clear that the state and society are called upon to show maximum participation, care and attention to ensuring the rights and well-being of people who have arrived from the army, who have fulfilled their civic duty to ensure the interests and security of the Motherland.
The experience of military reforms in the interwar period shows that maintaining a stable morale of the army personnel to a significant extent depends on how they take care of a serviceman of any rank, so that he is sure, when he leaves the army, that he will always have sufficient and stable providing a job, certain benefits, the possibility of retraining, etc. Much has been done in this area, many decrees and laws have been adopted, but in practice not all of them have been fully implemented.
In modern conditions, as is known, the need for a military reform arose long ago. As in the old days, many traditional problems resurfaced: on the one hand, the army should be as less burdensome as possible for the state; on the other hand, capable of protecting the country; and on the third side - socially equipped, with elements of a strong legal protection of a serviceman in the future. Unlike previous military reforms, modern transformations in the army are forced to take place in the unusual conditions of an unbalanced, unstable economy. All this imposes a special responsibility in decision-making, requires flexibility and firm consistency in the implementation of military reform. The conceptual orientation of the transfer of the army to other qualitative parameters of development basically causes support and approval (although there are other, even extreme points of view), but prioritization in a series of problems to be solved in comparison with past experience requires, in our opinion, a radical revision.
Objectively, the current situation brings to the fore, along with the qualitative improvement of technical means of combat, the solution of urgent social problems: bringing the legal status of the army into line with the changes taking place in society, establishing a flexible system for its recruitment, improving the standards of life and activities of military personnel, creating a favorable social environment (liquidation of the housing crisis, ensuring environmental safety, medical care, employment, maintaining an effective education, high culture, the possibility of mastering new professions, etc.), as well as moral and psychological satisfaction with the service. Any reform cannot be the lot of a narrow circle of specialists; the general public is called upon to participate in it, with a mandatory public exchange of views.
The most important component of the military reforms was the rearmament of the army and navy. It affected the areas of development of new types of weapons and military equipment, their production, taking into account the economic capabilities of the country, development and practical use. All the implemented military reforms are largely similar in their structure, principles, ways and methods. At the same time, in terms of a number of parameters and elements of their content, specific military reforms have some, and sometimes very significant, differences from each other. When determining the completeness of military reform, as a rule, they proceed from the discrepancies between what was conceived in the concepts, programs and the officially proclaimed prohibited, state-legal acts.
Military reforms in the history of Russia
1. Ivan the Terrible - mid-16th century. Reasons: the need to strengthen the centralized Russian state; Strengthen its influence in interstate affairs by increasing military power.
2. Peter the Great (first quarter of the 18th century). Reasons: the need to strengthen the centralized Russian statehood; Strengthen the military power of the state, eliminate the economic and cultural backwardness of Russia; struggle for access to the Baltic Sea; lack of necessary incentives for service.
Content: created a regular army and navy; A unified system of training and education of troops was introduced, the creation of a military collegium, the establishment of the post of commander in chief, the opening of military schools for the training of officers; Military ranks were introduced, orders and medals were established; construction of defense structures, fortresses, fleet bases on the borders; A military-judicial reform was carried out; organized sanitary service.
3. Malyutin - (1862-1874). Reasons: Improving the military system of the state; the growth of the technical equipment of the army; Abolition of serfdom; capital development. relations.
Content: Recruitment service has been replaced by all-class military service; a military-district control system was created (15 districts); Re-equipment with rifled small arms and artillery; A new regulation on the field command and control of troops in wartime and new military regulations; A reserve reserve preparation system has been created; Military and cadet schools were established; A military-judicial reform was carried out and a mobilization plan for the country was developed.
4. Reforms 1905-1912 Reasons: Defeat in the war with Japan in 1905; The need to recreate the military power of the state. Content: The centralization of military command and control has been strengthened, and a territorial recruitment system has been introduced. New statutes and new programs for schools have been adopted; The new department has been reformed, the senior command staff has been updated, the financial situation of officers has been improved; Reduced service life; New samples of artillery systems were created, engineer troops were strengthened; measures have been taken to restore the Navy; The beginning of the aviation units in the army; Increased budget for the War Department.
5. Soviet period (first half of the 20th century - 20 years). Reasons: economic difficulties of the state; Inability to maintain a large army; The need to create a new type of military organization.
6. Reforms 1935-1939 Reasons: The real possibility of starting a war with Germany and its allies; The need to reform the army and the national economy. Content: The transition to the personnel system of recruiting the army has been carried out; The size of the Armed Forces was gradually increased - 1035 - 930 thousand, 1939 - 1.5 million, 1941 - more than five million; A law on universal conscription was adopted; The council of labor and defense was abolished, a defense committee was created under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR; On the eve of the war, 16 military districts, 4 fleets and five flotillas were formed.
7. Reforming the Armed Forces in the 60s of the 20th century. Reasons: General revolution in the military affairs of the leading countries of the world; The rapid development and introduction of nuclear missile weapons in the troops. Content: Change in the issues of strategy and tactics of warfare; Strategic Missile Troops and New Types of Troops have been created; New combat and general military regulations, instructions; A numerical reduction of the Armed Forces has been carried out; The institute of deputies for political affairs was introduced.
8. Unfinished reform of 1987-1991 Reasons: Rejection of a clear confrontation in relations between the USSR and the USA; The need to prevent a nuclear catastrophe, the creation of an international security system. Content: The military spending of the state is limited, the structure of the Armed Forces has been changed; Reduced and updated and rejuvenated the central apparatus and the high command of the Armed Forces; A law was adopted on the increase in pensions for servicemen; Political structures in the army and navy have been abolished.
9. Reforming the Armed Forces in modern conditions. Reasons: The level of financing of the Armed Forces does not meet the needs and daily functioning; The level of monetary allowance does not correspond to the complexity of the intensity, significance and special responsibility of military service; Funds for combat training are sorely lacking, research and development work, the purchase of weapons and military equipment are financed on a residual basis.
After the creation of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) in 1923 - 1925 and on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, reforms were carried out aimed at improving the combat element of the army: equipping it with modern technical means of combat, using more rational methods of recruiting human resources, finding the best organizational structure troops, techniques and methods of armed struggle. The first, after the establishment of the Red Army, the Soviet military reform of 1923-1925, due to the fact that the national economy of Soviet Russia, exhausted after the First World War and the Civil War, could not withstand the burden of maintaining a modern combat-ready army, was forced. The maintenance of an almost five million army was a heavy burden on the economy the USSR, therefore, since 1921, a consistent reduction in the country's Armed Forces began.
Within three to four years, the total strength of the armed forces was brought up to 500 thousand people, that is, in fact, reduced by more than 10 times. The Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of September 28, 1922 "On Compulsory Military Service for All Male Citizens of the RSFSR" confirmed the principle of compulsory service for workers, but now they began to call for the army not from 18, but from 20 years of age. Later, from 1925, the draft age was raised to 21, which provided significant labor reserves for use in the national economy. Reducing the cost of maintaining the army, and at the same time maintaining its combat capability and combat readiness at a high level, were achieved mainly due to the infringement of the social sphere and the household needs of military personnel.
One of the main innovations of the reform was the introduction of a mixed system of recruitment and training of the Armed Forces, which consisted in combining the territorial police system with personnel. This transition to a mixed territorial-personnel system was announced by the decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of August 8, 1923 "On the organization of territorial military units and the conduct of military training of workers" and took a paramount place in the reorganization of the Red Army in peacetime. By the end of 1923, 20% of rifle divisions were transferred to the territorial position, by the end of 1924 - 52%, and in 1928 - 58%. Territorial units occupied a predominant place in the Red Army until the second half of the 1930s. The local troops, staffed according to the territorial-militia principle, constantly had only 16% of the regular command and rank and file, while the main part of the military contingent was a variable composition - the Red Army men called up for military service, who were in the barracks position only during short periods of training camps, and the rest of the time they lived at home and were engaged in their daily work activities.
This significantly reduced the military spending of the state budget and contributed to an increase in labor resources in the national economy, but could not but affect the level of combat readiness of the army. M. V. Frunze put it this way on this occasion: “Of course, if we had a choice between a 1.5-2 million cadre army and the current militia system, then from a military point of view, all the data would be in favor of the first decision. But we don't have that choice." 2 A significant part of the divisions of the border districts, technical units, the navy, which made up personnel formations, were constantly equipped with personnel and weapons and were in a relatively high degree of combat readiness.
The content of the Red Army was transferred from a mixed cash-in-kind to a paid principle. Instead of the previous 35 kopecks a month, the Red Army soldier began to receive 1 ruble 20 kopecks. The salaries of command personnel were increased by 38%, but even with this increase, it continued to be less than a third of the norm of the former tsarist army. The monetary allowance of the company commander of that time (when recalculating the exchange rate) by country: USSR - 53 rubles; Germany - 84 rubles; France - 110 rubles; England - 343 rubles. A bad situation with the monetary content has also developed among the command staff of the reserve, which was involved in non-military training. For one academic hour they were paid 5 kopecks, and the unemployed command staff - 9 kopecks. All privates of the territorial units involved in military training had to provide themselves with clothing, bedding and food at their own expense.
Maximum reduction armies made it possible not only to save significant funds for the restoration and development of the country's economy destroyed by the war, but also to increase allocations for the reconstruction of the defense industry. However, the already difficult living conditions, service and life of the personnel of the personnel troops were worsened socially. The barracks fund, which was created back in the pre-revolutionary period at a rate of 1.5 square meters per person, was badly damaged and outdated, and the state did not have the funds to either repair it or create any basic amenities. The commanding staff was also in a difficult situation with housing: only 30% were provided with some apartments, and the rest were placed either in private apartments or huddled in several families in one room. There were not enough clothes among the troops, and what was available was of poor quality.
A very crisis situation has developed with bedding, with which military units were provided with less than 50%. Only 30 kopecks were allocated for a bath and laundry per month for each Red Army soldier, so the threat of epidemics remained. The food allowance for the day contained 3012 calories, but it was, in comparison with the norms of the bourgeois armies, lower than the optimum by 300-600 calories. In the course of the reform, such a problem as the provision of pensions and the employment of command personnel dismissed from the army did not find due reflection. Most of them were unemployed and without means of subsistence. The number of the Red Army was 183 thousand people less than in France, 17 thousand people less than in Poland, Romania and the Baltic countries combined. AT the USSR for every 10 thousand inhabitants, 41 soldiers were kept, Poland - about 100, France - 200. The combat effectiveness of the Red Army until the beginning of World War II was negatively affected by the low general educational and cultural level of military personnel.
Therefore, teachers were introduced to the staff in the military units, more than 4,500 "Lenin's corners" were created in which the soldiers could spend their leisure time and self-education. Club, circle and library work was unfolding in the army, which played a huge role in the cultural education of millions of future defenders of the country. If in 1923 6.4 million books were taken from army libraries for reading, then in 1924 this figure increased to 10 million books. Houses of the Red Army were opened in many garrisons, the network of cinema installations grew to 420. During the two years of army service in the troops, it was possible to reduce the number of illiterate Red Army soldiers to 12%. The cost of social services and the maintenance of one soldier increased from 1924 to 1926 by 90 rubles. The number of cases of such a serious crime as desertion has sharply decreased. The number of deserters from the total number of armed forces: 1923 - 7.5%; 1924 - 5%; 1925 - 0.1%.
In the resolution of the III Congress of Soviets of the Union "On the Red Army" in May 1925, the military reform of 1923-1925 was approved and instructions were given to the government to involve all all-Union and Union-Republican departments, as well as public organizations in active participation in strengthening the country's defense capability. The congress instructed the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars to carry out in the budget year 1925-1926 the following practical measures to increase the allocation of funds: - to improve the material and living conditions of the army; - qualitative and quantitative improvement of all types of allowances, apartment and barrack conditions (repair, new construction, equipment of barracks), expansion of the apartment and housing stock of command personnel by booking living space at quartering points of military units; - making reservations in all civil institutions, enterprises and establishments for positions subject to exclusive replacement by demobilized from the ranks of the army and navy and equating them in terms of employment conditions to members of trade unions; - improving the provision of benefits to disabled war veterans; - adoption of a special provision on pension provision for the command and command personnel of the army; - ensuring the real implementation of the Code of Benefits for the Red Army. This resolution significantly contributed to the removal of socio-economic tension in the military environment.
In parallel with the growth of the economic power of the USSR, its military-technical defense base was developing, with the level of which the Red Army was gradually brought into line, as well as its social status. The military-doctrinal concept was revised, according to which in the field of military construction it was required to be guided by the following provision: “In terms of the size of the army, not to be inferior to our probable opponents in the main theater of war, and in the field of military equipment to be stronger than them in decisive types of weapons: aviation, tanks, artillery , automatic fire weapons. 3 New types of troops are being created: tank, aviation, airborne, air defense, engineering troops, signal troops, chemical troops, military transport troops. The principle of formation of artillery units is changing - corps artillery, artillery of the reserve of the main command, anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery are being created. There was a gradual curtailment and transfer of territorial-militia formations to a personnel position. Fundamental organizational transformations also affected the military command and control bodies.
Thus, in order to increase centralization and establish unity of command in the highest levels of leadership of the armed forces, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR was abolished in June 1934, and the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs was transformed into the People's Commissariat of Defense. In 1935, the Red Army Headquarters was renamed the General Staff. In 1937, instead of the Defense Commission under the Council of People's Commissars, the Defense Committee was created and at the same time an independent People's Commissariat of the Navy was created. Under each of the military people's commissariats, the Main Military Councils were established. Based on the results of consideration during the summer and autumn of 1937 of more than seven options for the development of the Red Army, it was decided to completely abandon the territorial militia and national formations and move to a single cadre army. In 1937, more than 60% of the divisions became personnel; in the subsequent pre-war years, the territorial units were completely liquidated (see table below).
The "Law on General Conscription", adopted on September 1, 1939, became the core of the new military reform. According to this law, the draft age was reduced from 21 to 19 years (for those who graduated from high school - from 18 years). Such a change in the legislation of the USSR made it possible in a short time to call for active service replenishment of more than three ages (boys 19, 20 and 21 years old and partly 18-year-olds). The term of active military service for the rank and file of the ground forces was set at 2 years, for junior command personnel - 3 years, for the Air Force - 3 years, for the Navy - 5 years, and for persons with higher education, the service life remained 1 year. In order to complete and equal replenishment of the Armed Forces, the circle of persons exempted from conscription was significantly reduced, deferrals for university students, teachers and other categories of citizens were abolished.
For the entire private and commanding staff, the age of the state in the reserve was increased by 10 years (from 40 to 50), which was caused by the need to increase the army's reserve for wartime. The new law introduced a longer duration of training for military reserve. For the command staff, it increased three times, for junior commanders - almost 5 times, for the rank and file, the duration of military training camps increased by 3.5 times. At the same time, the initial military training of students in grades 5-7 and pre-conscription training in grades 8-10 of general education schools, technical schools and higher educational institutions were introduced on a mandatory basis. Instead of the previously existing system of registration of conscripts by enterprises, a system of registration of those liable for military service in the military enlistment offices at the place of residence was introduced.
The size of the army, navy, aviation increased several times: - 1936 - did not exceed 1.1 million people; - autumn 1939 - about 2 million people; - June 1941 -5.4 million people. By June 22, 1941, the Red Army had more than 303 rifle, tank, motorized, cavalry divisions, although 125 (over 40%) of them were still in the formation stage. In order to avoid a catastrophic situation with personnel as a result of mass repressions, the government, in a fire order, decided to deploy dozens of new military schools and short-term courses for the training of junior command personnel.
Number of military schools in the USSR: - 1937 - 47; - 1939 - 80; - 1940 - 124; - January 1941 - 203. All infantry, artillery, tank, technical schools were transferred from a three-year to a two-year period of study. At short-term courses for the improvement of command personnel (in 1938-1939, about 80 thousand people graduated from them), studies lasted only a few months. All this determined the low level of training of commanders.
As for costs, 1,660 million rubles were spent on the first military reform of 1923-1926, and 154.7 billion rubles on the reform of 1937-1941.
Information sources: 1. Klevtsov "Social and organizational problems of military reforms in the 20-30s" 2. Frunze "Selected works" 3. TsAMO RF (form 7)
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The most important essence of the military reform was the introduction of a mixed system of recruitment and training of the Armed Forces, which consisted in combining the territorial-militia system with personnel. The transition to a mixed territorial-personnel system was announced by the decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of August 8, 1923 "On the organization of territorial military units and the conduct of military training of workers." He took a leading place in the reorganization of the Red Army in peacetime. If by the end of 1923 only 20% of rifle divisions were transferred to the territorial position, then by the end of 1924 there were already 52% of them, in 1928 - 58%. The territorial units occupied a dominant place in the Red Army until the second half of the 1930s.
Forming a limited part of the Armed Forces, cadre formations were constantly manned and armed and were in a relatively high degree of combat readiness. These included a significant part of the divisions of the border districts, technical units, and the navy. In the vast majority of units and formations, recruited according to the territorial-militia principle (“Local troops”), there were always only 16% of the regular command and rank and file, while the main part of the military contingent was a variable composition - the Red Army soldiers called up for military service who were on in the barracks position only during short periods of training camps, the rest of the time they lived at home and were engaged in ordinary labor activities. This significantly reduced the military spending of the state budget and contributed to an increase in labor resources in the national economy, but could not but affect the level of combat readiness of the army. “Of course, if we had a choice between a 1.5-2 million cadre army and the current police system,” M.V. Frunze emphasized, “then from a military point of view, all the data would be in favor of the first decision. But we don't have that choice."
In the course of the military reform, the mixed monetary-in-kind estimate was replaced by a purely monetary one, which transferred the entire content of the Red Army to a paid principle. The maximum reduction in the army made it possible not only to save significant funds for the restoration and development of the country's economy destroyed by the war, but also to increase appropriations for the reconstruction of the defense industry. But the general decline in military spending aggravated the difficult living conditions, service and life of the remaining contingent of regular troops in social terms.
The most burning problem at that time, the housing problem, acutely declared itself. The barracks fund, created back in the pre-revolutionary period at the rate of 1.5 square meters. m per person, was badly damaged and outdated. The most equipped barracks buildings were lost in Poland, the Baltic states, Moldova, and Finland. The repair of the barracks required colossal funds that the state did not have at its disposal. In the remaining habitable barracks, with great difficulty it was possible to accommodate the reorganized personnel contingent, but without any basic amenities (there was no running water, the available stove heating required a large amount of fuel in winter conditions, the norms for which were absolutely small). For the repair of the barracks, the estimate provided for only 15% of the need.
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The peasants of the Novgorod land, who served various duties in favor of the "Lord of Veliky Novgorod", were called smerds. They united in rural communities called graveyards. Smerds were personally free and had the right to move from one landowner to another. In their churchyards, they enjoyed self-government, gathered for gatherings ...
Military reforms D.A. Milyutin (1862 -1874).
The military reforms of the 1960s and 1970s became an integral part of the general bourgeois transformations. The evolution of Russia on the way to a bourgeois monarchy also required the reorganization of the army - one of the main instruments of state power - into an army of the bourgeois type. The defeat of Russia in the Crimean War of 1853-1856, the tense international situation, the rapid growth of armaments of the main powers of the world made military reforms urgent.
There were different approaches to the implementation of military reform. Thus, General N.O. Sukhozanet, who was appointed Minister of War in 1856, strove for the maximum reduction in military spending without any plan, without taking into account the need to strengthen the defense capability of the state.
Describing the activities of N.O. Sukhozanet, D.A. Milyutin subsequently wrote: “All the measures taken by General Sukhozanet had the sole purpose of reducing military spending: one or the other was canceled, abolished, reduced ... everything done during this period of time had a negative character. Continuing to follow this path, it was possible to bring the state to complete impotence, at a time when all other European powers were strengthening their armaments. "
In the autumn of 1861, General D. A. Milyutin (1816-1912), an energetic supporter of bourgeois reforms in the army, was approved for the post of Minister of War. In January 1862, he submitted a draft military reform to the tsar, who approved it. Russia entered a period of military reforms that lasted 12 years.
First of all, the system of manning the troops has changed. In January 1874, the Charter on military service was approved. According to the Charter, instead of recruiting sets, all-class military service was introduced. All men were recruited to serve in the army when they reached the age of 20. The term of active military service was significantly reduced. For privates in the ground forces, he was 6 years, and then 9 in the reserve, in the navy - 7 years and 3 years in the reserve.
The charter provided for the release from military service of a significant number of persons: ministers of religious worship, doctors, teachers, peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, the Far North and the Far East, and the Caucasus. They were exempted from being drafted into the army due to marital status (the only son, if he was the breadwinner of the family). In the country as a whole, the number of those annually drafted into the army did not exceed 30% of those of military age. Great benefits were provided to people who had an education: for those who graduated from higher educational institutions, the term of active service was reduced to 6 months, for gymnasiums - to one and a half years. The transition of military service allowed the state to reduce the size of the army in peacetime and significantly increase the contingent of the military-trained reserve. Its population at the end of the century was about 3 million people.
A significant place in the general plan of military reforms was occupied by the problem of officer training.
The development of military equipment and, first of all, the introduction of rifled weapons entailed a change in the nature of the battle, and this, in turn, required a different training of command personnel. Under these conditions, providing the army with officers with a solid knowledge of military affairs, as well as having a certain general educational background, was extremely necessary.
The system of higher military education has not undergone a major reorganization, and reforms in this area have only affected certain aspects of the organization of military academies, as well as changes in curricula towards making military training more practical. Two new academies were opened: the Military Law Academy and the Naval Academy. At the end of the century in Russia there were 6 military academies (of the General Staff, Medical-Surgical, Artillery, Engineering, Legal and Naval). But the number of listeners in them was insignificant. So, in the Artillery Academy, the number of students did not exceed 60 people.
The secondary military school underwent a serious reorganization. Instead of the old cadet corps, military gymnasiums were created, which provided a general secondary education and prepared young men for entering military schools, and pro-gymnasiums with a 4-year term of study to prepare for entering cadet schools. In these gymnasiums, students wore military uniforms, the way of life had a semi-military character.
In the early 1960s, military and cadet schools were organized. In military schools, the period of study was 3 years; young men who graduated from military gymnasiums were accepted there. Military schools immediately acquired a purely military organization, and the internal routine in them was based on the implementation of the strictest military discipline, those who did not comply with it were subject to liability under the disciplinary charter. “... in our school,” says one of the former cadets, Krivenko, in his memoirs, “the cadets were looked at not as they had previously been at the cadets of special classes, but as persons who really were in the military service, and therefore strict discipline was carried out systematically , with a strong hand."
Junker schools were intended to train officers from persons who did not have a general secondary education, as well as from the lower ranks of the army, who came from noble and chief officer families. The volume of military knowledge given to the junkers was much less than in military schools.
For the training of technical and other specialists, weapons, technical, pyrotechnic, topographic, medical assistant and other schools were created. In order to improve military knowledge and retrain officers, one-year schools were established.
As a result of the reform of the military school, the training of command and engineering personnel has noticeably improved, and their number has increased. By the end of the nineteenth century. the average annual release of officers reached 2 thousand people, which made it possible to provide up to 80% of vacancies in the army and navy.
In the 1960s, the military command and control system was restructured. The central administration was still carried out by the Ministry of War, which consisted of: 1) the Military Council; 2) Offices; 3) the General Staff; 4) Main departments. The rights of the ministry were expanded: if earlier most of the troops (guards, active army, etc.) were not subordinate to it, now the entire army has become under its jurisdiction.
A major event was the creation of a military district system. The country was divided into 15 military regions. Each district was headed by a commander who was subordinate to the tsar, but performed his functions under the leadership of the minister of war.
The rearmament of the army has become an important component of the military reforms. The Russian infantry received rifled small arms - a single-shot rifle of the Berdan system (1870), and then a three-line Mosin rifle (1891). The artillery was re-equipped with Obukhov-made steel rifled guns. In the second half of the nineteenth century. the transition from a sailing to a steam armored fleet was carried out. By the end of the century, Russia ranked third in Europe in terms of the number of warships: England had 355 ships, France - 204, Russia - 107.
Military reforms of the 60-70s. nineteenth century were undeniably progressive. They increased the combat effectiveness of the Russian army, which was confirmed in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878.
However, despite the progressivity in general, the reforms of D.A. Milyutin bore the stamp of incompleteness, inconsistency. Their implementation ran into strong resistance from opponents of the reforms.
Only a tiny historical period of 30 years has passed, and after a brutal defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, Russia again faced the need for military reforms.
