Good World Evil (Myth)

I remember how, several years ago, I read Viktor Markovsky's articles in a magazine about the use of Soviet military aviation in Afghanistan with pleasure. I still have these magazines and sometimes I re-read them. But the Internet allows us to find them in electronic form. I think these articles will be of interest to people who are fond of military history and military equipment.

HELICOPTERS Mi-8

FIGHTER-BOMBER AVIATION


Already in 1981, the saturation of combat areas with air defense systems reached such proportions that, when planning operations, it was necessary to take into account the need to overcome them. Around the fortified areas and bases of the Mujahideen, there were up to several dozen anti-aircraft firing points. Risk reduction was achieved by the skillful use of the terrain, which ensured the secrecy of the approach and the suddenness of reaching the target, as well as the choice of escape routes after the attack.

As a rule, a pair of Su-17s was the first to appear in the designated area, whose task was additional reconnaissance and target designation with lighting and smoke bombs, which made it easier for the strike group to reach the target. They were piloted by the most experienced pilots who had combat experience and skills in detecting subtle objects. The search for the enemy was carried out at an altitude of 800-1000 m and a speed of 850-900 km / h, taking about 3-5 minutes. Then everything was decided by the speed of the strike, which did not allow the enemy to organize return fire.

In one or two minutes, an air defense suppression group from 2-6 Su-17s entered the target designated by the SAB. From a height of 2000-2500 m, they detected the positions of the DShK and ZGU and, from a dive, struck with NAR S-5, S-8 and RBC-250 or RBC-500 cassettes. The destruction of anti-aircraft points was carried out both by a single aircraft and by a pair - the wingman "finished off" the air defense centers. Not allowing the enemy to come to his senses, after 1-2 minutes, the main strike group appeared above the target, performing an attack on the move. FAB (OFAB) -250 and -500 bombs, S-8 and S-24 missiles fell on the fortifications and rock structures. Reliable and easy to operate, the C-24 had a long range and launch accuracy (especially from a dive) and were used very widely. To combat manpower, cluster munitions RBC-250 and RBC-500 were used. During operations in the "green" and in open places, incendiary tanks with fire mixture were sometimes used. The guns gradually lost their importance - their fire at high speeds and increased heights was ineffective.

FIGHTERS IN AFGHANISTAN

With the advent of the enemy MANPADS, the danger to aviation has increased many times over. At first, the pilots were rescued by the inexperience of the Mujahideen: there were cases when the arrows forgot to connect the power sources (for the most powerful commanders, the one who missed at the same time lost his head), but the development of new weapons took place quickly. The compact and easy-to-handle MANPADS allowed dushmans to organize ambushes on flight routes and near airfields. In order to protect aircraft during takeoff and landing, when the speed and altitude are insufficient to perform an anti-missile maneuver, helicopter patrols were organized within a radius of 3-4 km around the airfield. It is almost impossible to distinguish a shooter with a Stinger from a peaceful peasant from the air, and despite the order in force since 1981 that categorically prohibited attacks on unidentified targets, during the patrol, fire was opened on any suspicious that appeared in the "forbidden zone". The combing of the surroundings did not stop even at night, searching with the help of SAB and night vision devices. In order to reduce the danger, the pilots had to master almost acrobatic tricks. So, “climbing with large gradients” made it possible to reach a safe level, remaining under the cover of circling helicopters. Immediately after lift-off, the aircraft went into a steep upward spiral with a roll and pitch of up to 30°, and in this position "screwed" into the sky. The landing was carried out without the usual "box" around the airfield and required a jewelry calculation, especially when returning from a group mission. The planes entered the airfield across the runway and, one after the other, "fell" down in an even steeper spiral at extremely short intervals. Pilots leveled out on the last turn already above the edge of the runway and, without stopping after the run, they cleared the lane for the cars that landed behind them, walking a few hundred meters away. The landing of the squadron took a matter of minutes. Outside observers froze at this impressive spectacle, and in the cockpits of the MiGs, “Rita” * (* speech informant RI-65) was constantly blaring, warning of the approach of critical flight conditions. The price of reducing combat losses during such landings was an increased accident rate - due to the complexity of the maneuver and high landing speed, the aircraft often did not fit into the alignment of the runway, flew out of it, "take off their shoes" on the run and received damage.

All articles are written by V.Yu.Markovsky.

151. October 1, 1988 - combat loss of a Mi-8MT helicopter, 4th wing of the 50th osap (Kabul). In the area 25 km south of Kabul, at an altitude of 7 m, the helicopter was hit by a Stinger MANPADS missile. The crew died.

152–153. February 9, 1989 - combat loss of two Mi-8MT helicopters, 254th OVE (Puli-Khumri). According to the report of the pilots of a pair of cover on Mi-24 helicopters, after entering a narrow gorge of a pair of Mi-8 helicopters, they both caught the main rotors on the rocks. The leader, Major Sidorov, managed to land the damaged helicopter on a slope 8 km northeast of the Tashkurgan settlement. The crew barely had time to leave the helicopter that fell on its side and caught fire. The crew of the wingman burned down in the helicopter. The entrance to the narrow gorge turned out to be so unexpected that the leader of the cover pair himself barely managed to take the helicopter away from the collision with the rock, abruptly taking over the control stick.

AFGHANISTAN'S EXPERIENCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE USSR AIR FORCE IN THE 1980S

Unfortunately, the Air Force command, and the Ministry of Defense as a whole, did not draw conclusions from the experience of military operations in Afghanistan. The pilots who returned from the war represented the elite of the Air Force, but they were very "inconvenient" for high bosses. The system of appointments that existed in the USSR from the commander of a division and above was vicious. The military bureaucracy has, of course, always existed, but it became especially strong in the 1970s and 1980s. This led to the fact that the pilots were not allowed to learn more fully the combat capabilities of the aircraft. After all, any complication of training programs could lead to an increase in the accident rate, which means goodbye to positions and ranks. So, for example, the commander of the OdVO aviation, Vasiliev, did not receive the rank of general for two years because of the accident rate in the army.

Therefore, they tried to get rid of experienced pilots who had passed through Afghanistan in the first place. After all, they were troublemakers, trying to teach their colleagues what was needed in the war and often did not fit into the dry framework of combat training courses.

Oils were added to the fire by the ill-conceived reforms of the Air Force, in particular, the withdrawal of single-engine aircraft from the combat strength, which fell under:

All fighter-bomber aviation with Su-17M2, M3, M4 and MiG-27M, D, K aircraft;

Almost all reconnaissance aviation (RA) of front-line aviation (FA) Su-17M2R, MZR, M4R;

A significant part of fighter aviation (IA) - MiG-23M, ML, MLD.

Thus, with the destruction of the IBA, the Air Force was deprived of aircraft that filled the gap between the relatively cheap Su-25 and the very expensive Su-24 (M), capable of not only performing these tasks, but also using high-precision weapons, as well as navigational (automatic) bombing with the help of sighting and navigation systems. The Air Force lost the Su-17M4 with PrNK-54 and MiG-27K with PrNK-27K. Particularly noteworthy is the MiG-27K, equipped with the Kaira LTPS and, in terms of aiming characteristics, close to the Su-24M. These were cars of the 80s of release, barely flying in time before the first repair.

As a result of the destruction of the IBA, only bomber aircraft remained in the FA as the main striking force, consisting of Su-24 and Su-24M in quantities clearly exceeding the required proportions in relation to other aircraft. Front-line bomber aviation was the main aviation means of the main commands in the theater of operations and front commanders. Its main purpose was the destruction of groupings of troops and the destruction of the most important objects of the enemy. The use of the Su-24(M) front-line bomber, designed to solve somewhat different goals, to solve the tasks that the IBA had previously performed, looked, to put it mildly, irrational. If we choose the cost / effectiveness criterion when solving combat missions in tactical depth, then the Su-24 (M) will be clearly outperformed by the Su-17M4 and MiG-27.

Apparently, this is why the Su-24s were practically not used during the war in the DRA, since the military understood the lack of such expediency.

By coincidence, the first to be reduced were units that had passed through Afghanistan and had experience in combat use. After all, it was they who were armed with MiG-23ML (MLD), Su-17M2, M3, M4 aircraft.

It is clear that the experience of the Afghan war for the Air Force was completely unclaimed.

Applications

Appendix 1
PARTS OF THE SOVIET AIR FORCE TAKING PART IN COMBAT ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN (1979-1989)

The Afghan war and events in the Middle East led to a serious change in the structure of the Soviet Air Force in this direction and, first of all, in the aviation of the southern districts - TurkVO and SAVO. Previously considered a secondary South, it had fighters from the 12th Air Defense Army and front-line aviation (FA) of the districts, which numbered only three regiments of the IBA, armed, moreover, with far from new equipment (Su-17 of the first series and MiG-21PFM). The bombing forces of both districts were limited to the only regiment of the FBA - the 149th BAP in Nikolaevka on the Yak-28I. In the early 80s. a number of measures followed to increase the strike capabilities of this grouping: the regiments were re-equipped with new equipment, and some fighter units were transferred from the air defense to the subordination of the air force, reorganizing them to strengthen the IBA and FBA. Although there were still no Long-Range Aviation (DA) forces in the districts, all of its units remained concentrated in the European part of the country, on the border with China and the Far East. However, the formidable shadow of Long-Range Aviation hovered over Afghanistan from the very first days of the introduction of troops ...

Assuming extreme scenarios, up to an open clash with the "forward detachments of imperialism" and "reactionary Arab regimes", the command took appropriate steps to ensure the operation. Although the original directive of the General Staff of December 24, 1979 only required "to put on full combat readiness ... the aviation of the TurkVO and SAVO for a possible increase in the group of Soviet troops in Afghanistan," the readiness affected almost all parts of the Air Force and Air Defense, including Long-Range Aviation. Unlike the usual alarms carried out according to the scenario of a nuclear conflict, this time the "long-range" task was to ensure the advance of the troops, if necessary, using their strike capabilities and crushing resistance with conventional ammunition. So, in Engels, even Myasishchev’s emki of the 1096th and 1230th TBAP were preparing for bombing attacks, removing fuel “barrels” from tankers and converting them for suspension on cluster holders of 52 FAB-250 or 28 FAB-500. Tu-16s from Orsha were transferred to the Khanabad airfield closer to the border, and to Semipalatinsk from Priluki. They took everything they needed with them, including large-caliber bombs. They received a combat mission on the spot - to strike at the northwestern outskirts of Herat, and due to the ambiguity of the situation (the first reports of "satisfying the request of the Afghan side for military assistance" appeared only on December 29), the flight was required to be made under the cover of darkness. The reason for such an order was the fear of meeting serious resistance in this city, because in March 1979 a major uprising took place there, supported by the local garrison and led to the death of thousands of people. The information received by the “long-range” about the location and forces of the enemy was not certain: “A dozen of them or a whole division, whether they were sitting in a house or holding a rally in the city square - no one knew anything about this,” recalled the commander-in-chief of the YES V.V. Reshetnikov. As a result, the raid did not take place. The entry of troops went almost without hindrance.

Despite the growth of hostilities, in the first years of the war, the 40th Army managed with the forces of army and front-line aviation that were at hand. The exception was the appeal for help to the Long-Range Aviation, when it was necessary to strike at the lapis lazuli mines in the northern district of Jarm, which belonged to the possessions of Ahmad Shah. The blatant disregard for the central authorities and the willfulness of the owner of these places were based, in addition to his personal abilities and the military strength of the rebels, also on the original crafts of these places - the extraction of precious stones. Tangible income from their export strengthened the power of Masud and allowed him to pursue his own policy, supplying his troops well in the tradition of the combination of war and trade adopted in the East. The area, where even in the best of times they did not recognize the central government, did not give rest to Kabul, which now and then made attempts to “feel” the deposits. The next operation to “undermine the Dushman economy” was being prepared for the summer of 1981 - in the tradition of a planned economy, the directives of the USSR Ministry of Defense at the beginning of the year demanded “to liberate at least 70% of the country’s territory and 80% of county and volost centers from the rebels.” In preparation, reconnaissance discovered a field airfield near the village of Sarnsang, from which the stones were taken to Pakistan. Mi-8s of the Soviet border troops from Gulkhana were sent to this area, but the mines were well guarded, and the helicopters came across an unprecedented dense anti-aircraft fire. Not reaching the goal, they turned back, bringing an impressive set of holes. The next step was preparing a raid by an entire helicopter squadron from Faizabad, but the work was forbidden from the headquarters of the Air Force of the 40th Army, considering it too risky.

They decided to destroy the mines by bombardment, but a considerable distance separated Dzharm from the airfields of the 40th Army and the border bases of the TurkVO. It was not easy for the MiG-21 and Su-17 pilots, who had rather modest aiming and navigation equipment, to search for a target lost among glaciers and mountain ranges (a year earlier, a group of Chirchik MiG-21s on the route was so “blown away” by jet streams that they almost evaded 100 km and sat down in Bagram literally on the last liters of fuel). The strike was entrusted to the Long-Range Aviation, and on June 10, a heavy bomber squadron worked on Jarm. Bombing was carried out from heights of 10-12 thousand meters, not so much out of fear of fire from the ground, but for the safety of flying over the mountains, reaching here heights of 5-6.5 thousand meters (the target itself lay at the foot of the "mark 6729 m" - the highest peak of the Afghan Hindu Kush). It was not possible to clearly establish the effectiveness of the strike, but it is known that even before that, lapis lazuli was mined there in an explosive way ...

FAB-1500 dropped in the Kandahar area. It is clearly seen that the aiming mark lies away from the duvals, on the border of the sands near the Dori River

DA again appeared over Afghanistan during the large-scale Panjshir operation of 1984. For the previous two years, a truce was in effect with Massoud, according to which the 40th Army even undertook to provide him with "air and artillery support in the event of armed clashes between his detachments and rival formations." The promise "not to inflict air strikes on the Panjshir" was specifically stipulated. Personal work with Ahmad Shah was carried out by a lieutenant colonel of the GRU sent to him, "acquainting him with the Soviet way of life and the works of the classics of Marxism." However, the peace was unsteady: the growing influence of the “Panjshir lion” aroused the jealousy not only of Kabul, but also of the numerous advisory apparatus, which justified its role by the war. To get rid of this “splinter”, one of the high-ranking KGB officers, who was not accustomed to exchanging for trifles, proposed drastic measures: “Plan a set of military-tactical measures (operation) for Ahmad Shah’s group, including using special power.” The latter implied not only participation in the leadership of the operation by the Minister of Defense S. L. Sokolov himself, but also an unprecedented large-scale involvement of aviation.

In addition to the Air Force 40th A, four regiments of the FA from border airfields were involved in the raids, and the use of ammunition of the largest calibers required the participation of "long rangers". In early April, a squadron of the Bobruisk 200th Guards TBAP was relocated to Khanabad on Tu-16s, capable of delivering 9 tons of bombs to the target at once, including three-, five- and nine-ton bombs. Six Tu-22M2s from the 1225th TBAP from the Trans-Baikal Belaya airfield under the command of the deputy flew to the Mary-2 base. commander of the regiment p / p-ka V. Galanin. The amount of work to be done was obvious: the warehouses could not accommodate all the imported ammunition, and everywhere - at the parking lots, between the runway and the "taxiing" bombs of various types and calibers were piled up. All these stocks were to be dumped on Panjshir, where intelligence estimated the number of Masud's detachments by April 1984 at 3,500 fighters. In other words, for every 12-15 enemy men, there was one Soviet aircraft or helicopter.

At 4.00 on April 19, the bombers went to the target. Tu-16s climbed first, then Tu-22M2s, half an hour later 60 Su-24s followed them. The concentration of aircraft in the sky over Panjshir was such that the "sides" approaching the impact site were recommended to turn on the RSBN only from the near line, otherwise the station in Bagram, which had a capacity of 100 cars, would "choke" (higher density is not found in the capital's airports). So that the pilots could better navigate over unfamiliar terrain, they mounted “beacons” for airborne radars ahead of time - trusses with corner reflectors of the type that stood at the training grounds. "Rangers" entered the targets above the rest, dropping bombs from 9000-10000 m through dense clouds. Particularly impressive were the strikes of the “twos”: each of the machines carried 64 OFAB-250-270s, which fell out in a series from a horizontal flight, after which tens of hectares below boiled up with a continuous carpet of tears. To maintain alignment, the bomb rack locks were opened in a certain order: in pairs on the left and right, front and rear.

Tu-22M2 was the first of the Backfire family to appear over Afghanistan

Massed strikes continued for the first three days of the operation, but the "carcasses" from Khanabad and Mary carried out only one sortie in the morning - after it, the targets were covered with a dusty veil, and for stealth, the long-range aviation combat work was ordered to be carried out at dusk. This limited the participation of YES in the operation. Already in May, her cars left the border airfields.

The effectiveness of high-altitude bombing was low. One of the reasons for this was the unsuitable nature of the ammunition used. The heavy land mines shaking the ground did not achieve a result: the few barriers on the path of the troops identified by reconnaissance did not linger in one place, leaving the blows in time. The bombs themselves of calibers of 3000, 5000 and 9000 kg did not at all correspond to the tasks of combating manpower and even destroying buildings - when they were created, they were not intended to be used against ground targets at all! Heavy FABs appeared in the late forties as the only means of dealing with large ships at that time and have since remained in service, although the characteristics of their damaging effect on other objects were not even evaluated (the exception was the “one and a half”, which were considered acceptable for strikes against industrial facilities, dams and underground structures). Even during the bombardment of "enemy villages", which completely swept away houses and duvals, the real effect was small. The power of impressive-looking bombs was wasted: the lethal radius of the FAB-3000 shock wave did not exceed 39 m, and even for the FAB-9000 remained within 57 m. The enemy received incapacitating concussions with bleeding from the nose and ears, respectively, at 158 ​​and 225 m around - the result, inferior to a series of bombs "front-line caliber", aimed dropped from an attack aircraft. Despite all this, for several sorties, infrequent in the practice of "long-range", the commanders of both groups received the Order of the Red Banner of Battle.

Despite their advanced age, Tu-16s from the 251st Guards TBAP successfully passed the Afghan exam

The emblem on board one of the "Afghans" of the 251st Guards TBAP

The Afghan campaign is usually compared to the Vietnam War. A parallel arises in the assessment of the work of Long-Range Aviation. was repeated: starting with the use of links of attack aircraft and fighters, the US Air Force was drawn into an endless chain of build-up of strikes, and a year later they involved strategic aviation in the matter, trying to solve all problems with a tonnage of bombs. Nevertheless, with all the apparent similarity, fundamental differences should be taken into account. OKSV was five times smaller than the American forces in Vietnam, the hostilities were of a much smaller scale, and, accordingly, the Air Force of the 40th Army, even with the units involved, was an order of magnitude inferior to the US air armada of many thousands. North of the 16th parallel, the United States still dealt with the state, including enterprises, warehouses, transport hubs with bridges, stations and ports - the usual large targets for bombing. Even in the South, where rampant carpet bombing was practiced, the goal was a network of roads along which reinforcements and weapons were moved.

These recipes were not suitable for the fight against a scattered and small enemy, as was the case in a purely counter-guerrilla Afghan war. Accordingly, the participation of Long-Range Aviation in it remained episodic. The enemy carried everything he needed with him, not needing the support provided by military science for infrastructure - fortifications, warehouses, headquarters and barracks, habitually searched for by intelligence. Even the fortresses and caves that have been preserved since ancient times, which could serve as a haven for the Mujahideen and looked like a “reliable target”, were immediately left by fighters accustomed to nomadism, dissolving in the mountains and greenery. When ambushes on roads and in villages caused the greatest damage, the power of the bombers was not used.

An awkward situation developed: the enemy continued to gain strength, expanding the sphere of influence, but was not suitable for overly powerful aircraft, which literally did not notice the enemy. This fully applied to the results of the "Big Panjshir" in 1984. Although the then commander of the 40th Army, General Lt. L.E. Generalov, called it "an example of the largest and most effective operation", real successes were more than modest . The Panjshir had to be abandoned, and the detachments that had escaped heavy losses and Masud himself returned to it. The conclusion of GlavPUR read: "Experience has confirmed the low efficiency of major military operations from a military point of view, and sometimes their political damage." As for the bombing strikes, the infantry spoke out even more clearly, reproaching the aviators that they "eat their chocolate for nothing."

And yet, in the summer of 1986, long-range aviation was again involved in work on Afghanistan: the very existence of such a powerful force required its use. In those months, a widely declared withdrawal of a part of the OKSV was being prepared, during which 6 regiments were to leave the country (however, the army was replenished in parallel), and long-range bombers were to prevent the movement of dushmans and shelling of the departing columns. In addition, a number of operations were planned in the south that needed air support. By this time, in addition to the usual hostilities to "cleanse" the provinces and return them to the rule of Kabul - an occupation as regular as hopeless - attacks on bases and base areas, on which the "regiments" and "fronts" began to rely, came into use. , uniting the former disparate gangs under the command of large field commanders. There were bases that served as a support for one formation, transshipment bases and points from which weapons were shipped and caravans were sent, and large base areas that included headquarters, warehouses, weapons and ammunition workshops, communication centers and training centers. Hard-to-reach gorges, lost in the mountains, served as places for them.

Describing the qualitative changes, an analytical note by the Combat Training Directorate of the Ground Forces back in October 1984 drew attention to the appearance of objects that "the rebels are preparing for a stubborn defense in terms of engineering." Aviation became the most reliable means of defeating them. However, the "pin pricks" of the Air Force 40th A, forced to operate at a considerable distance from the bases, did not give due success: at such a distance, Bagram's fighters and attack aircraft could, at best, deliver a couple of bombs, and due to supply difficulties from time to time. At that time, the headquarters was even forced to introduce restrictions, obliging them to hang only one bomb at a time! (However, by that time the entire combat load was usually dropped in the first run, and the result of the strike depended more on its accuracy than on the number of bombs.) besides, the high-explosive power of the “five hundred” limiting for them was not enough to destroy shelters, often carved into solid rock or filled with concrete. It is curious that even sappers failed to blow up some caves - the laid charges could not bring down the vaults, and the explosions only “cleaned out” them as if under a whisk. Protected targets required proper measures of influence, and here those same large-caliber bombs turned out to be suitable. A high-explosive blow from above caused tremors, cracking and collapse of the stone that filled the caves, and landslides covered their entrances. Bombing on the slopes had an impressive effect: the descent of hundreds of tons of stones buried the mouths of the caves and approaches to them, cornices fell to the bottom of the gorges, a few roads and paths rested on heaps of rocky blocks, and the enemy had to spend weeks searching for workarounds. To prevent the power of the explosion from being wasted on the surface, the fuses were set to operate with a slowdown, which allowed the bomb to deepen and explode in the thickness of the mountain. Usually used electric fuses AVU-E and AV-139E, specially designed for large-caliber bombs and high-altitude bombing. They were distinguished by increased safety - the final cocking took place only 18-23 seconds after separation from the aircraft. , The use of special thick-walled FAB-1500-2600TS turned out to be especially beneficial. Despite the “one and a half” caliber, they had a real mass of more than 2.5 tons, and a strong cast “head” of ten centimeters thickness (against the 18 mm walls of the usual FAB-1500), like a ram, made it possible to go deep into the rock. Thus, 469 kg of its contents gave a greater effect than 675 kg of explosives of the “one and a half” types M-46 and M-54 (besides, the TGAS-5 TNT hexogen, which filled the Teeska, had one and a half equivalent compared to TNT in other large-caliber bombs) . The three-ton bombs of the M-46 and M-54 models contained 1400 and 1387 kg of TNT each, the five-ton FAB-5000M-54 - 2207.6 kg, and the nine-ton FAB-9000M-54 - 4297 kg. By the mid-80s, ammunition of the 1950 model had already been removed from service, as well as armor-piercing monsters BrAB-3000 and -6000, which could be useful here.

Tu-22M3 from the 185th Guards TBAP strike FAB-3000M54

The commander of the detachment of the 185th Guards TBAP, Mr. V.I. Bandyukov, in the cockpit of his Backfire. Mary-2, November 1988. Each star aboard long-range bombers meant a sortie

Tu-16s of the 251st Guards took part in the raids. Red Banner TBAP, relocated to Mary from Bila Tserkva. In those summer months, such a virtue of YES was clearly manifested as independence from “seasonal” problems, due to which the combat load of FA aircraft depended not so much on the task as on the season. The heat sometimes did not even allow the car “overloaded” with a couple of bombs to be torn off the ground - a fresh (June) confirmation of this was the Su-17 “decomposed” on takeoff in Bagram. And the Tu-16 with bomb bays loaded to the eyeballs and with half refueling could easily cover the entire territory of Afghanistan. Anti-aircraft fire did not pose a threat to the long-range bombers, but fears were inspired by the appearance of the latest F-16s in Pakistan, which had already managed to “mark themselves” with an attack in May by two Afghan aircraft.

Therefore, the Tu-16 sorties were covered by the MiG-21bis of the 115th Guards IAP from Kokaity, with which the only incident in the entire “arrival” turned out to be connected. The stern gunner of one of the “carcasses”, ensign N. Slipchuk, known in the regiment as a romantic and a poet, suddenly mistook the fighters chasing them for the enemy and, without hesitation, opened fire. The firing lasted half a minute, which was enough to land the entire ammunition load of 1000 shells in one long burst. The fighters shied away from the tracks, but the training of the shooter, fortunately, left much to be desired, and all the damage was reduced to the replacement of “shot” cannon barrels (the queue, which is normal for overheating and wear, should not exceed 200-300 rounds).

The most extensive was the use of long-range aviation "before the curtain", in the last months of the war. They turned to the “long-range” for help in October 1988, with the beginning of the final stage of the withdrawal of troops, when the enemy’s actions were expected to intensify: in the end, many opposition leaders threatened with especially painful blows, not only in the usual manner of hitting in the back, but also scoring points in anticipation of future struggle for power. Other leaders saw in the departure of Soviet troops an opportunity to “deal with” Kabul without interference, and at the same time resolve contradictions among themselves, and they willingly signed “non-aggression pacts” with the 40th Army. the word "rebels", which confirmed the well-known: "The rebellion cannot end in success - otherwise it is called differently." Peace agreements with the Mujahideen, in which the leadership of the OKSV had a certain experience, made it possible to withdraw troops without hindrance, but the way home was seen differently "from above". Nevertheless, the position of the headquarters of General B.V. Gromov and the leadership of the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, headed by General of the Army V.I. Varennikov, tangibly affected the organization of the withdrawal and the work of the involved aviation forces.

By the fall of 1988, part of the Air Force of the 40th Army (up to 45%) had already left the DRA. To compensate, along with other forces, by the end of October, a separate long-range aviation group was formed, seconded to the SAVO Air Force (TurkVO had been liquidated by this time, but the headquarters of the united district and the Air Force command post were located in Tashkent). The main task of the group was to cover the withdrawn units and places of deployment with preemptive strikes against the areas of deployment of opposition fire weapons, as well as disrupting the shelling of large cities, attacking bases and warehouses, supporting Afghan troops in blockaded garrisons, designed to "eliminate political deformations in the abandoned areas of the country" .

FAB-1500 are torn in green

The group included aircraft and crews of the DA Guards units: a Tu-16 squadron of the 251st Guards TBAP from Belaya Tserkov and two Tu-22M3 squadrons from the Poltava 185th Guards TBAP. They were placed at two nearby airfields Mary-1 and Mary-2 - the only free ones. time, even if they lie farther from the target, than the border bases (for the "long-distance" the difference of 200-300 km was not significant). In Mary-1, where she was. The 1521st airbase of MiG-23 and MiG-29 fighters, which "played along" for the enemy in the training of IA pilots, deployed 11 Tu-16s - three detachments and two vehicles of the control group. On the other side of the runway, there was a local airport, which was another reason for the separation of the Long-Range Aviation group: Mary-1 was used to receive "transporters" with troops withdrawn, UN representatives were invited there, and the menacing-looking Backfires did not fit well into the ideas of Western diplomats about implementation of the Geneva Accords. Tu-16s, day after day, methodically taxiing to the start, attracted less attention, being engaged in "planned combat training."

The "carcasses" from Belaya Tserkov were of considerable age - almost all of them began their service in the early sixties and were the same age as their pilots. Unlike the 40th A sent to the Air Force, which they tried to select according to qualifications of at least 1-2 classes, the method of work of the "long-range" made it possible to attract almost the entire flight crew, bypassing any special training. The same applied to machines that had not undergone any modifications: in order to "take and throw", the capabilities of a long-range aviation veteran were quite enough. By 1988, Tu-16s were the only aircraft capable of carrying the FAB-9000, and this advantage was finally in demand. It was not without problems: at home no one had to deal with monster bombs, to accommodate which a whole structure was mounted in the cargo compartment - a BD-6 bridge holder with massive beams and struts. The transportation of the "nine-ton" required a personal transport - a BT-6 trolley, which could be moved by the efforts of several dozen people. The unaccustomed bulky equipment during one of the first attempts to hang the bomb led to someone that the FAB-9000, which had gone skewed, got stuck in the compartment and almost fell down. The gunsmiths rushed in all directions and only the second time they managed to put the recalcitrant bomb in place. "Nine-tons" were the main cargo, but from time to time bombs of smaller calibers were also used, up to the "placer" FAB-250, which were taken by 24. Such differences in loading were explained not so much by tactical necessity as by breaks in the supply, which "cleaned up" warehouses countrywide.

Many targets lay in the vicinity of Kandahar and Jalalabad, already abandoned by the Soviet troops. The bombardments here were in the nature of a counterbalance to the incessant shelling and sorties, especially since there was no hope for the active actions of government garrisons. This also affected the nature of the work of the "long-range", for the most part, did not imagine the objects of strikes, distinguishing them only geographically. Upon returning to questions about what targets were bombed, they got off with the words: "Those that indicated."

Flights to the "far corners" took 3.5-4 hours. In view of the fact that they had to work near the Pakistani border itself, and there was no need to rely on their own weapons and means of passive defense (the Tu-16s were not equipped with IR traps, which are mandatory in the Afghan sky, having only “seeders” of dipole ribbons for radar interference), each the departure was accompanied by fighter cover, and due to the duration of the raids, the escort was replaceable. The neighboring MiG-29s escorted and met the group, sometimes the duty link of the Su-17MZ from Mary-2 was involved for this. Confirming their partly fighter mission, the Su-17s carried a pair of R-60 missiles and PTB-800 tanks, which made it possible to escort bombers over the north of the DRA. Closer to the target, the baton was taken over by the MiG-23MLD from the 120th IAP in Bagram.

One detachment of three Tu-16s was constantly sent to the bombardment. Departures were usually scheduled in the morning, and they went to the target without using the RBP-4 radio sight, “blind-sighted” and useless over the mountains, where there were no clear radar reference points (a thirty-year-old device was theoretically capable of detecting objects from 150-180 km, but only if they stood out well against the background of the area, and were suitable, as they said, "to notice the skyscrapers and the Statue of Liberty"). On the route, they managed with navigation crews using the ARK-5 and DISS "Trassa", the flight mode was almost constant: altitude 10-11 thousand meters and speed 850 km / h. With access to the target, the bombing was carried out by the navigator, who used the optical sight OPB-11R.

Sometimes the Tu-16 was involved in night strikes, while the area was illuminated by SAB from the Su-17. Once, helicopters were sent to control the results of the strike, but they did not find any traces of the target - a powerful collapse buried not only the object itself, but also the entire former relief. Another time, paratroopers flew out to “clean up” the bombing area in the green zone. Upon their return, they reported: "You fought off the desire to fight there for a long time." There were also some misses - the inevitable satellites of high-altitude bombing, in which dispersion of the order of 300-500 m was considered normal: the explosions of the "nine-tons" lay too close to the checkpoint near Kabul and led to contusions of the fighters on duty there, some of whom lost their hearing. In just three months of Tu-16 operation, 289 FAB-9000M-54 bombs were dropped. For the pilots themselves, the “cover” and the flight altitude, which made it possible not to be afraid of fire from the ground, inspired confidence and made sorties a routine matter. The work was facilitated by the organization of its “rotational method”: from time to time, part of the crews flew home to rest, and others replaced them, so that their participation in the war was limited to 15-20 sorties. The trouble was delivered by the “very new” machines themselves, on which minor failures and breakdowns constantly occurred, which is why aircraft were attracted to take off as they were in good condition. To the credit of the old but strong Tu-16, even with failures in the air, it was possible to complete the task, and the crews tried to eliminate malfunctions right in flight (the dignity of the “old” and not very complex equipment). The cabin of the “carcass” made it possible to get to many units and shelves of equipment, in all corners, just in case, all kinds of small spare parts, fasteners, clamps, locks, etc. were piled up, and the crew members shoved screwdrivers and pliers into their pockets.

Even a serious incident that happened in January 1989 with the Tu-16 of Dr. E. Pomorov did not prevent reaching the goal. On the plane carrying the FAB-9000, at an altitude of 10100 m, the nasal blister was torn off. A furious whirlwind burst into the cockpit of the bomber, which was moving at a speed of 850 km / h. Inside, the temperature dropped to the outboard - 50 ° C, and a rarefaction hit my ears. Worst of all was the navigator, Mr. Lylov, who found himself right under the freezing stream. It only remained to thank the fur flight jackets and headsets with retro goggles, which were preserved in the outfit of the Tu-16 crews. In the event of a depressurization, the instruction prescribed an immediate descent, but only 15 minutes remained to the target, and the commander continued to keep the aircraft at flight level and heading. The crew bombed, although not particularly accurately (under the wind raging in the cockpit, it was not up to it) and safely reached home. For this flight, Mr. Pomorov received the Order of the Red Star, and the rest of the crew received medals "For Military Merit".

Tu-22MZ of the Poltava regiment settled in Mary-2, where the 156th APIB was based on the Su-17MZ, which at that time received a respite from almost continuous work in the Afghan campaign. The involvement of Poltava residents for the combat debut of new bombers was justified by the fact that the 185th Guards TBAP was the leader in the development of the machine and had the greatest experience in its operation, including flights to distant ranges with practical bombing. The appearance of "troikas" meant a qualitatively new level of the "Afghan" Air Force grouping. The new vehicles had a perfect NK-45 navigation system and sighting and navigation equipment, which gave accurate access to targets and bombing, high-quality radio communications equipment and an impressive range of combat payloads. Although the cargo compartment of the Tu-22M3 was not designed for bombs larger than three tons, the total weight of the cargo could reach 24 tons. For work from Mary, more moderate options were chosen, not exceeding 12 tons, for reasons of maintaining “volatility”.

FAB-1500 and FAB-3000 are ready for suspension on aircraft

On October 28, two squadrons of 8 aircraft flew to Mary-2 from Poltava together with the leadership of the regiment - commander Colonel V.I. Nikitin, his deputies p / p-kami Parshin and Androsov and regiment navigator A.N. The squadrons led the commander-1 p / p-k R.N. Saberov and the commander-2p / p-k I.P. Degterev. among them were aircraft not yet equipped with IR traps, two Tu-22MZ of the latest series were borrowed from the 402nd TBAP from Orsha. With the help of the Il-76 and An-12, the technical staff, the necessary equipment and replacement pilots were transferred to Mary (in total, 21 crews were involved in the work).

Already on October 31, the first flight took place. As in the next two, the targets were located near Kandahar - in the mountain range in the north and "green" in the south along the Dori River, where there were detachments blocking the roads to the city. On November 3, bombs fell in the vicinity of the Kandahar air base, from where it was shelled. The next day, the target was the town of Jalez, which lay in a favorable place for the dushmans - a gorge with access directly to Kabul. From the nearest mountains, a panorama of the capital opened, and a route to the south passed nearby.

For the next week, bombardments were carried out in the northeastern sector around Kabul, where launchers were concentrated, showering missiles on the city. A rare day went by without shelling - Kabul remained the center of the aspirations of detachments of the most diverse affiliation, not only for tactical reasons, but more as a means of expressing themselves. It was a matter of prestige to bombard the capital, firing at least a few shells in its direction. At first, the harassing fire did not cause much harm, but gradually gained strength: if in 1987 147 rockets fell in the city, killing 14 residents, then in 1988 the number of rockets increased to 635, and the number of victims to 233. Even unaimed launches sooner or later they found targets late: on June 26, 1988, the hit of one missile on the Kabul airport turned the Su-25 parking lot into a bonfire, leaving only fragments of 8 attack aircraft. On November 14, to the accompaniment of explosions, a Tu-154 with a Soviet government commission had to take off, the same shelling hit the residential module of the 50th OSAP aviators, burying 11 people in it.

To answer, they attracted "long-distance" people, who flew out on alarm in half an hour. After the evening bombardment, strikes on the "dushman ring" around Kabul continued for the next two weeks, falling mainly on the surrounding mountain plateaus and ridges, from where launches were noted from checkpoints, as well as on reconnoitered warehouses and storage facilities for missiles. The hunt for rocket launchers was not very successful: launchers often stood on cars and immediately changed positions, primitive disposable guides with a clockwork were even more often used. As a result of all the work of the 185th regiment, the reconnaissance department of the 40th Army attributed only 6 vehicles, 4 launchers and 340 rockets to its account.

Tu-22MZ from the 185th Guards TBAP leave the Mary-2 airfield for a combat mission

At the end of November, they carried out two sorties on targets near Faizabad, which stood out against the general background - the mines of lapis lazuli and emeralds in the possessions of Masud were again bombarded (by the way, these targets were the only ones that could hardly be attributed to the stipulated combat charter of the Long-Range Aviation as "operational and strategic reserves": he simply did not provide for all the others). The outskirts of Kabul were processed day by day by local aviation. Once, the departures of the YES and the Bagram attack aircraft coincided in time and place, and already on the combat course, a Su-25 circling below was suddenly found in the sight of one of the bombers. They managed to drive him away by radio, because close bursts of powerful bombs could hit the “rook”, if not with a shock wave, then with fragments that flew up to a two-kilometer height and “floated” in the air for almost a minute.

After several bombardments using the FAB-500, they were abandoned, switching to a larger caliber, which made it possible to more fully use the capabilities of the machines (another reason was the troublesome equipment and suspension of hundreds of such bombs in each shift). Two FAB-3000s or eight FAB-1500s became typical options, while the group heading for the same target was trying to load the same type so that the difference in the suspension would not make it difficult to fly in formation. Some of the bombs were equipped with special fuses AVPZ for mining with self-destruction within 6 days. One and a half and three-ton "mines" were laid in areas of enemy activity, and defusing them (there were cases when spooks themselves used unexploded bombs as land mines) was not given by a trap that reacted to an attempt to unscrew the fuse or pull the bomb. The unnecessary external multi-lock MBDZ-U9-68s were immediately removed from the aircraft, although the rocket pylons continued to remain under the wings for another month (it was difficult to dismantle them, and it was simply impossible to get their hands on everyday work).

The regiment's control group, participating in combat sorties, managed to establish effective work. In the evening, on a call from Tashkent, they sorted out maps, and the crews were already ready to receive a combat order. The planes were waiting for them fully equipped, immediately after the previous flight, they received a “duty” charge of bombs and refueling with 40 tons of kerosene, which allowed them to work on any targets. The formation of a battle order and approach to the target worked out "on foot in flight", painting them with chalk on the asphalt. In flight, they used maps of a 10-km scale, and over the impact site they were guided by more detailed “two-kilometer” and “half-kilometer”, having carefully studied each pea on the tablet ahead of time. The sorties were carried out by the forces of the eight Tu-22MZ. Targets were also assigned by squadron, sometimes divided into fours and pairs. Usually they were grouped and were located 500-1000 m from one another. Sometimes two squadrons were sent to strike at once. The planes leaving for the mission taxied out all at once, lining up before the start and starting the takeoff run immediately after the leader took off. This achieved a quick take-off, after which, already at the turn around the airfield, the group gathered in close formation and went to the target in a column of pairs with a 150-m excess of slaves, a 10-second interval between pairs and a 40-second interval between links.

OFAB-250 in the cargo compartment "TU-22"

The route was kept at a speed of 900 km / h, at first at an altitude of 7200-7800 m. After warning about the danger of MANPADS launches from mountain peaks, the echelons were raised to 9000-9600 m, paving the way around the high peaks. The danger was not exaggerated: a year earlier, the defeat of the Su-17M3R MANPADS, which was flying at an altitude of 7000 m, was noted, and the launch from the top was confirmed by a KhAD agent who was in the gang. Immediately after the start of work, the “long-range” themselves observed the launch. To R. Saberov, he was remembered as “a dusty cloud on a slope, a trickle of disturbed air upwards and a flash of a rocket that went into self-destruction.”

Departures began every day according to plan, at 10 o'clock in the morning, but the crews began to notice columns of smoke rising along the way, apparently warning the enemy. The time began to change, but most flights remained daytime. The flight to a distance of 800-1000 km passed without any problems: the NK-45 navigation system with the TsVM-10TS-45 digital machine provided access to the target with an accuracy of the order of hundreds of meters, and the automation of the onboard control system was able to guide the aircraft along the route and start landing . The work of the navigator was simplified by the continuous indication of the position on the movable map of the PA-3 tablet. With an exit to the designated square, the entire crew joined in to help the navigator-operator, looking for a target. To attack, the group scattered, and each aimed individually using the OPB-15T television sight, which gave a high-resolution picture. At the same time, the control of the aircraft passed to the navigator, and the reset followed in automatic mode. The accuracy of bombing was impressive: sometimes, on a dare, navigators placed bombs in a separate building or duval. More often, however, the specified square was covered with gaps. The pilots were not particularly inclined to understand the type of target - they received tasks and performed work, and dusty mushrooms of explosions swelled equally among the dashes of duvals, on the roads and near the deserted dunes. To the questions of a metropolitan correspondent who looked into Mary, who inquired about the sensations during the bombing, the pilots got off with the words: “If something goes wrong, it’s not our business, as they say, the Motherland ordered,” or even frankly sent him away.

The commander of the YA, General Lieutenant P.S. Deinekin (right) inspects the work of his subordinates. Mary-2, November 1988

Gunsmiths of the 185th TBAP are preparing for the suspension of the FAB-1500

Bombs were regularly dropped, even if not a single village was visible for many kilometers around in the indicated areas, only mountains and desert floated in the sights. It is doubtful that such an expenditure of ammunition was due to reconnaissance misses - there were also no targets on the photographic plates. One of the motivations for such strikes was their warning nature for the surrounding population: the earth leaving from under their feet and crumbling rocks clearly showed what awaited the especially restless. According to rumors, the headquarters of the 40th A, obeying the orders dictated by big politics "from above" not to stop the bombing, thus nevertheless diverted strikes from the "contractual" villages and groups. Most likely, this also applied to Massoud, who conscientiously observed the terms of the truce. Already after the war, Lieutenant-General Gromov uttered at first glance surprising words: “Even during periods of tough confrontation ... we did not seek to break his gangs, but to physically destroy Ahmad Shah himself.” However, everything is logical: after the defeat of the “Panjshir lion” detachments, their place would be taken by the “irreconcilable” formations.

The war still continued, and the necessary tactical measures were taken: approaching the target for surprise was built a little to the side, then, 4-5 minutes from the drop point, they sharply turned, getting rid of the cargo in one go. Without stopping over the place of impact, they closed the formation on the retreat and at once increased their speed, heading for Termez. They usually went back on the afterburner, accelerating to M = 1.7, and many noted with satisfaction that “only in the war did they manage to fly enough on supersonic sound” (at home it was not always possible to break the sound barrier and at an altitude not lower than 11000 m). The fighter cover, which accompanied the group in all sorties, did not keep pace with the Tu-22MZ. The MiG-23s carrying the tank and missiles had speed limits and could not keep up with the “long-range” ones, because of which one could hear the requests of the “cover” on the air: “Big, don’t drive horses, I’m behind!”

Tu-22PD jammers were also in combat formations, supplementing the work of their own airborne defense systems of the "troikas". Three Tu-22PDs from the 341st TBAP under the command of the p / p-ka V. Melnik, attached to the Long-Range Aviation Group, were based together with the Poltava residents. Their task was to disrupt possible launches of Pakistani missiles by the Krotal air defense system and, especially, F-16 attacks. When working near the border, this danger had to be taken into account, since after the drop it was necessary to carry out photo control of the results with on-board AFA-42/20 and 42/100, for which the aircraft had to be kept on a straight line for at least a minute, and the extra 15-20 km were taken to the "ribbon" itself. The tension in the cockpit was added by the sensitive SPO-15 Bereza, which continually reacted with an alarming squeak to everything in a row, whether it was the work of the PNA of neighboring aircraft, the radiation of the "cover" sights or the powerful interference of the "shumoviks".

The use of IR traps by "long rangers" differed from the accepted methodology of the FA, where the pilots immediately turned off the shooting when they left the attack. Tu-22MZ, on the move away from the target, began to pour LO-43 kilogram traps (each carrying 48 rounds), and the trailing ones opened fire from the stern guns with special projectiles from the PRLS with dipole "noodles" and radiating heat PICS. The shells, however, were soon abandoned, saving time on stuffing tapes and the troublesome replacement of cartridge boxes, which had to be hoisted to a height of five meters. Pakistani fighters already had little chance of attacking the troikas that were picking up speed, and the train of blazing balls and tracks served as a barrier against launches in pursuit.

“Just for every fireman”, the pilots were given AKS-74U, grenades and a couple of pistols to fly, and instead of soldering and a useless rescue boat, jars of water and magazines for weapons were placed in the ejection seats moved by NAZ (as they joked, “for a complete set, there is only enough robes and skullcaps). Even on the way to the airfield, the pilots were each time accompanied by a submachine gunner to protect themselves from possible sabotage. The precautionary measure was not superfluous: in the neighboring Karshi, a Tajik soldier was detained at the airfield, unscrewing fuses from bombs in order to help fellow believers.

On the Tu-22MZ (board 74) from the 132nd TBAP, several sorties were carried out by Gen.-Mr. D.M.Dudaev

In the end, several sorties were carried out at night, once it was necessary to bomb through dense clouds covering the target. At the same time, in addition to the NK-45 and PNA inertial gyroplatforms, the A-713 automatic long-range navigation system was used, which determined the position from ground-based radio beacons (with its help, the navigation crew was often checked during flights under normal conditions). The system gave high accuracy, “up to a scale”, however, bombing with its help required good teamwork in the crew, where the commander had to perform additional turns on the commands of the navigator, taking into account all the impositions and amendments, and the operator to control. There were few failures, although the "troika" was considered a rather capricious machine, mainly in terms of complex electrical equipment and electronics. Once, due to a drop in oil pressure, I had to turn off the engine on Mr. P. Androsov's plane and return on the remaining one. Another time, an airplane landing in a dust storm (the famous "Afghan") began to be blown away by the wind, and the pilot "attached" the car on the runway with a double overload.

The “extreme” sorties, which fell on December 3, 4 and 5, were carried out near Kandahar by Poltava: the airfields of the Air Force of the 40th Army were closed due to the weather, and the Afghan garrison requested urgent assistance. As a result of the trip, the commander of the 185th Guards TBAP V. Nikitin, who completed a dozen and a half sorties, received the Order of the Red Banner of War, the same awards were presented to A. Libenkov and both commanders - R. Saberov and I. Degterev. The crew commanders and pilots were awarded the Orders of the Red Star, and the navigators were awarded "For Military Merit".

In the raid on December 5, the long-distance fighters from Orsha, who arrived to replace the Poltava, took part, and on December 7, the crews and vehicles of the 402nd TBAP, commanded by p / p-k Yanin, fell on the entire amount of combat work. The group from Orsha consisted of the same two squadrons of 8 Tu-22MZ and one more spare aircraft to maintain the order of forces in case of failures and breakdowns. It also included two bombers loaned to Poltava, which were to serve a second term (on one of them, 35 sorties were completed in total - the largest number among all the "troikas").

The 402nd TBAP continued the same work, the “geography” of the targets also changed little. At the same time, winter bad weather led to more frequent use of "blind" bombing methods. The bombing with the help of the navigation system remained the most reliable, which, using the data of the radar operating in the review mode, issued the “Thunder” command at the right time - a signal to reset. Gradually, sorties were increasingly carried out at night, inflicting harassing blows. At the same time, the situation did not allow the use of the PNA radar associated with the NK-45 for bombing: the snow-covered mountains looked “smooth”, there were no large buildings, bridges or clusters of equipment among the targets. Sometimes a reset was practiced along a remote radar landmark, if a characteristic contrasting object was nearby (usually they were the bend of the river or the Surubi and Darunt dams east of Kabul), according to which the heading angle and range were specified. Several times near Kabul they tried to bomb on the teams of gunners who had "balalaikas" - goniometer-range automatic radio beacons. This technique did not give much success due to the low accuracy of the impact. And the very tactics of long-range aviation, which involved dropping cargo in one run, were not suitable for target designation of the ground, when the gunner and pilots understood each other perfectly and corrected their blows.

In almost all sorties, the FAB-3000 was bombed, only once making an exception and laying “one and a half” for mining in the mountains. The increased consumption of heavy bombs even forced them to be ordered additionally from industry.

Tu-22M3 worked in tight combat formations

During night sorties, observing the blackout, they turned off the BANO, leaving only dim combat lights visible from above and illuminating the cockpit with a “mouse” - a red light lantern on the starboard side. If there were misses, then no complaints came from remote areas. Only one of the sorties ended in scandal, when during the bombing near Kandahar in December one of the dropped bombs fell near the headquarters of the Afghan 2nd Army Corps, and the other exploded right in a residential area, killing several dozen people. Governor-General of the province N. Olumi flew in with a complaint, and a joint commission of General V. Afanasyev and Afghan Kadyr arrived in Mary. It was not possible to attribute the incident to the Dushman shelling - fragments of heavy bombs were picked up at the site of the explosions, with which only long-range bombers worked there (although the case included "two-ton caliber bombs" that do not exist in service). In the end, the story was hushed up without looking for the guilty, partly because the use of Long-Range Aviation was not advertised and was presented as bombing Afghan aircraft.

In isolated cases, in addition to coordinates and squares, they specifically spoke about the nature of the target. On Saturday, January 7, a Su-25 was shot down over the Janez Gorge near Kabul, and the pilot was killed with him (this was the last loss of attack aircraft in the Afghan war). In response, heavy bombs covered the entire area around the crash site. A month later, on February 8, two Afghan crews, taking their families with them, flew on their Mi-8s to Panjshir. The hunt for hijacked helicopters that landed after running out of fuel in one of the gorges lasted three days. The Tu-22MZ was also attracted to it, without much success looking for helicopters through the "windows" in the clouds, but only the Su-25 managed to finally bomb them.

In one of the sorties, right under the formation of the Tu-22MZ, there was a scheduled Boeing, which was heading somewhere to the east. According to the navigator, senior lieutenant S.A. Novikov, “we didn’t think much about all their air corridors, observing only the echelons in height so as not to collide. The Boeing followed its own course, got out right under its nose on the catch-up and slowly floated out on the screen of the OPB-15T, when the doors of the cargo compartment were already open. It seems that it was an Indian - all decorated, the lights are burning, multi-colored, like on a Christmas tree. Maybe he purposely wanted to take a closer look at the military, but because of him I had to delay the reset - there were still mountains below, we’ll hit more than one, so a friend.

Tu-22PD jammers covered strike groups during raids on the border areas with Pakistan

However, the "sparing regime" of the bombardment of deserted plains and mountains did not last long. In the central regions, the remaining units of the 40th Army again concentrated near the possessions of Masud, who, according to the report of General Varennikov, nevertheless "categorically forbade his formations to conduct military operations against the Soviet troops, which they strictly observed." However, the top leadership of the USSR openly accused the military of unwillingness to defeat the enemy, after which a strict order was issued to prepare a new strike against the Panjshir. Nevertheless, they managed to choose a compromise solution on the spot, and in mid-December, not the positions of Masud and the villages in the valley, but the remote area of ​​\u200b\u200bKoran-o-Munjan with lapis lazuli mines were bombed. But by the New Year, the raids had stopped, and the hint from the air remained half-hearted.

The OKSV had the last step home, and this path led through Charikar and Salang, controlled by the “Panjshir army”. On January 6, the raids resumed, and on the 10th, a Soviet government group flew into Afghanistan, after which an order was received to carry out Operation Typhoon, which became the last chord of the war. Special merit in this belonged to Kabul, according to advisers, "showing indefatigable perseverance" in trying to inflict damage on the enemy with the forces of the outgoing army. Playing politics, Najibullah convinced Moscow of Massoud's intentions to "surrender 14 northern provinces of the country to the Americans" (there were 12 in total).

Tu-22PD from the 341st TBAP two and a half years after the end of the Afghan epic. Ozernoe, 1991

The three-day operation was supposed to begin on January 24, but at the last moment it was ordered "not to delay", and the strikes began a day earlier, and the political workers were tasked with "exposing the criminal position taken by Ahmad Shah." The bombardments also took place on the Panjshir in the previous days, but during the operation they became non-stop. The withdrawal of troops was halted so that artillery and bombers could work unhindered along the roadside areas. The villages also got it, and in those days the bombers were not limited to one sortie per shift. However, the enemy once again left the bombardment. There was, in fact, no return fire, and during the Typhoon, losses were limited to three dead soldiers. From the air it was impossible to assess the successes presented in the reports, but the troops who continued on their way to the pass escorted hundreds of bodies of dead civilians carried to the road.

Long-range aviation continued to work at the same pace, although combat sorties were not counted for pilots, only later in personal files did records appear about "participation in hostilities in the DRA from the territory of the USSR." At the same time, the “bonus” was regularly accrued to the flight crew - determined with accounting accuracy of 11 rubles. 78 kop. "for the combat day" on which the work fell out, regardless of the number of sorties. Together with the travel "three rubles", a tangible amount ran up, which amounted to almost one more pay in a month. It was well deserved: flight work is already classified as heavy, and especially in the cramped cockpits of bombers. The chairs of KT-1 did not differ in comfort, it was impossible to straighten up at the workplaces, and the flights that took more than two hours exhausted people in order. The frosty winter added hardships - somehow adapted local housing was not really heated, and people even slept in winter uniforms, and even in shoes.

The population of the military town also had a hard time - taxiing to the start, the bombers turned their tails in his direction and began the three-minute gasification of the engines prescribed by the regulations. The twenty-five-ton thrust of the NK-25 raised clouds of sand and dust, mixed with kerosene fumes, that covered the village. The work of heavy airships affected the state of taxiways and runways, which were already not very suitable for them (the width of the runway in Mary-2 was much more familiar - 44 instead of 100m). The rather worn-out concrete coating could not withstand the loads and in a few months it was literally rolled out by the wheels and gas jets of the hundred-ton Backfires, covered with cracks and potholes. Yanin's plane hit one of them with the nose landing gear, damaged the support, and this day was the only one when the flight had to be canceled.

Tu-22M3 from Orsha during routine maintenance immediately upon returning from an Afghan mission

With the advent of wet weather, malfunctions of on-board electronics became more frequent. Due to failures and failures in the operation of the engines due to the fault of the control system, they had to be turned off twice in the air on the Ty-22M3 Ananyev post (the defect was not a single one in the operation of the machine). On the plane of Mr. Sokolov, when returning due to the failure of the main rack, I had to resort to an emergency system.

The work of the 402nd TBAP, as well as the first shift, came to control Deinekin with the chief navigator of Long-Range Aviation Egorov. The commander himself, although he continued to fly and had access to the Ty-22M3, did not participate in combat missions. However, division commander D.M.Dudaev, who took over the division a year ago, flew in from Tartu in December and flew several times with his subordinates to bombard, being among those awarded the Red Banner of Battle, and soon received the rank of major general. The division of a promising general, based on the results of combat training, was then recognized as the best in DA.

By the beginning of February, a replacement for the crews from Orsha, who had worked for 2 months, arrived. Eight Ty-22M3s of the 840th TBAP arrived in Mary-2 from Novgorod Soltsy. Selecting trained pilots, one crew from the 52nd training TBAP from Shaikovka under the command of the guards of Mr. Primak was seconded to replace. From the beginning of February, flights were carried out without Tu-22PD escort, since most of the targets were located in the central regions, far from the border. Another reason was the visibility of noise interference, audible even by ordinary radios and outright drowning out the transmission of the Kabul television center. It served as a warning about the approach of the bombers, and they preferred to "enter without knocking."

The last sortie of the crews of a separate long-range aviation group fell on the very eve of the complete withdrawal of troops. On February 14, when only General Gromov and his escort were left to cross the border, the "long-distance" bombers bombed the northern regions. The attacks against the opposition planned for the next day in the event of the storming of Kabul did not take place. Despite the persuasion of the Afghan authorities, who insisted on the continuation of the bombing as compensation for the departure of the 40th A, they did not agree to this. Nevertheless, a real armada remained at the border, ready to take a “step back”. In addition to local and seconded aviation forces, the entire withdrawn grouping of the 40th Army Air Force was detained at the airfields, and only three weeks later the readiness was removed. The Dalniks left Mary later than the others - the Long-Range Aviation group, which had the longest arms, was given the go-ahead to fly home only on March 13, 1989.

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The Afghan war and events in the Middle East led to a serious change in the structure of the Soviet Air Force in this direction and, first of all, in the aviation of the southern districts - TurkVO and SAVO. Previously considered a secondary South, it had fighters from the 12th Air Defense Army and front-line aviation (FA) of the districts, which numbered only three regiments of the IBA, armed, moreover, with far from new equipment (Su-17 of the first series and MiG-21PFM). The bombing forces of both districts were limited to the only regiment of the FBA - the 149th BAP in Nikolaevka on the Yak-28I. In the early 80s. a number of measures followed to increase the strike capabilities of this grouping: the regiments were re-equipped with new equipment, and some fighter units were transferred from the air defense to the subordination of the air force, reorganizing them to strengthen the IBA and FBA. Although there were still no Long-Range Aviation (DA) forces in the districts, all of its units remained concentrated in the European part of the country, on the border with China and the Far East. However, the formidable shadow of Long-Range Aviation hovered over Afghanistan from the very first days of the introduction of troops ...

Assuming extreme scenarios, up to an open clash with the "forward detachments of imperialism" and "reactionary Arab regimes", the command took appropriate steps to ensure the operation. Although the original directive of the General Staff of December 24, 1979 only required "to put on full combat readiness ... the aviation of the TurkVO and SAVO for a possible increase in the group of Soviet troops in Afghanistan," the readiness affected almost all parts of the Air Force and Air Defense, including Long-Range Aviation. Unlike the usual alarms carried out according to the scenario of a nuclear conflict, this time the "long-range" task was to ensure the advance of the troops, if necessary, using their strike capabilities and crushing resistance with conventional ammunition. So, in Engels, even Myasishchev’s emki of the 1096th and 1230th TBAP were preparing for bombing attacks, removing fuel “barrels” from tankers and converting them for suspension on cluster holders of 52 FAB-250 or 28 FAB-500. Tu-16s from Orsha were transferred to the Khanabad airfield closer to the border, and to Semipalatinsk - from Priluki. They took everything they needed with them, including large-caliber bombs. They received a combat mission on the spot - to strike at the northwestern outskirts of Herat, and due to the ambiguity of the situation (the first reports of "satisfying the request of the Afghan side for military assistance" appeared only on December 29), the flight was required to be made under the cover of darkness. The reason for such an order was the fear of meeting serious resistance in this city, because in March 1979 a major uprising took place there, supported by the local garrison and led to the death of thousands of people. The information received by the “long-range” about the location and forces of the enemy was not definite: “A dozen of them or a whole division, whether they are sitting in the house or rallying on urban square - no one knew anything about this, ”recalled the commander-in-chief of YES V.V. Reshetnikov. As a result, the raid did not take place. The entry of troops went almost without hindrance.

Despite the growth of hostilities, in the first years of the war, the 40th Army managed with the forces of army and front-line aviation that were at hand. The exception was the appeal for help to the Long-Range Aviation, when it was necessary to strike at the lapis lazuli mines in the northern district of Jarm, which belonged to the possessions of Ahmad Shah. The blatant disregard for the central authorities and the willfulness of the owner of these places were based, in addition to his personal abilities and the military strength of the rebels, also on the original crafts of these places - the extraction of precious stones. Tangible income from their export strengthened the power of Masud and allowed him to pursue his own policy, supplying his troops well in the tradition of the combination of war and trade adopted in the East. The area, where even in the best of times they did not recognize the central government, did not give rest to Kabul, which now and then made attempts to “feel” the deposits. The next operation to “undermine the Dushman economy” was being prepared for the summer of 1981 - in the tradition of a planned economy, the directives of the USSR Ministry of Defense at the beginning of the year demanded “to free at least 70% of the country’s territory and 80% of county and volost centers from the rebels.” In preparation, reconnaissance discovered a field airfield near the village of Sarnsang, from which the stones were taken to Pakistan. Mi-8s of the Soviet border troops from Gulkhana were sent to this area, but the mines were well guarded, and the helicopters came across an unprecedented dense anti-aircraft fire. Not reaching the goal, they turned back, bringing an impressive set of holes. The next step was preparing a raid by an entire helicopter squadron from Faizabad, but the work was forbidden from the headquarters of the Air Force of the 40th Army, considering it too risky.

They decided to destroy the mines by bombardment, but TurkVO Jarm separated from the airfields of the 40th Army and the border bases solid distance. It was not easy for the MiG-21 and Su-17 pilots, who had rather modest aiming and navigation equipment, to search for a target lost among glaciers and mountain ranges (a year earlier, a group of Chirchik MiG-21s on the route was so “blown away” by jet streams that they almost evaded 100 km and sat down in Bagram literally on the last liters of fuel). The strike was entrusted to the Long-Range Aviation, and on June 10, a heavy bomber squadron worked on Jarm. Bombing was carried out from heights of 10-12 thousand meters, not so much for fear of fire from the ground, but for security flying over the mountains, reaching here heights of 5-6.5 thousand meters (the goal itself lay at the foot of the "mark 6729 m" - the highest peak of the Afghan Hindu Kush). It was not possible to clearly establish the effectiveness of the strike, but it is known that even before that, lapis lazuli was mined there in an explosive way ...

FAB-1500 dropped in the Kandahar area. It is clearly seen that the aiming mark lies away from the duvals, on the border of the sands near the Dori River

DA again appeared over Afghanistan during the large-scale Panjshir operation of 1984. For the previous two years, a truce was in effect with Massoud, according to which the 40th Army even undertook to provide him with "air and artillery support in the event of armed clashes between his detachments and rival formations." The promise "not to inflict air strikes on the Panjshir" was specifically stipulated. Personal work with Ahmad Shah was carried out by a lieutenant colonel of the GRU sent to him, "acquainting him with the Soviet way of life and the works of the classics of Marxism." However, the peace was unsteady: the growing influence of the “Panjshir lion” aroused the jealousy not only of Kabul, but also of the numerous advisory apparatus, which justified its role by the war. To get rid of this “splinter”, one of the high-ranking KGB officers, who was not accustomed to exchanging for trifles, proposed drastic measures: power". The latter implied not only participation in the leadership of the operation by the Minister of Defense S. L. Sokolov himself, but also an unprecedented large-scale involvement of aviation.

In addition to the Air Force 40th A, four regiments of the FA from border airfields were involved in the raids, and the use of ammunition of the largest calibers required the participation of "long rangers". In early April, a squadron of the Bobruisk 200th Guards TBAP was relocated to Khanabad on Tu-16s, capable of delivering 9 tons of bombs to the target at once, including three-, five- and nine-ton bombs. Six Tu-22M2s from the 1225th TBAP from the Trans-Baikal Belaya airfield under the command of the deputy flew to the Mary-2 base. commander of the regiment p / p-ka V. Galanin. The amount of work to be done was obvious: the warehouses could not accommodate all the ammunition brought in, and bombs of various types and calibers were piled up everywhere - at the parking lots, between the runway and the taxiways. All these stocks were to be dumped on Panjshir, where intelligence estimated the number of Masud's detachments by April 1984 at 3,500 fighters. In other words, for every 12-15 enemy men, there was one Soviet aircraft or helicopter.

At 4.00 on April 19, the bombers went to the target. Tu-16s went up first, then Tu-22M2s, half an hour later 60 Su-24s followed them. The concentration of aircraft in the sky over Panjshir was such that the "sides" approaching the impact site were recommended to turn on the RSBN only from the near line, otherwise the station in Bagram, which had a capacity of 100 cars, would "choke" (higher density is not found in the capital's airports). So that the pilots could better navigate over unfamiliar terrain, they mounted “beacons” for airborne radars ahead of time - trusses with corner reflectors of the type that stood at the training grounds. "Rangers" entered the targets above the rest, dropping bombs from 9000-10000 m through dense clouds. Particularly impressive were the strikes of the “twos”: each of the machines carried 64 OFAB-250-270s, which fell out in a series from a horizontal flight, after which tens of hectares below boiled up with a continuous carpet of tears. To maintain alignment, the bomb rack locks were opened in a certain order: in pairs on the left and right, front and rear.

Tu-22M2 was the first of the Backfire family to appear over Afghanistan

Massed strikes continued for the first three days of the operation, but the "carcasses" from Khanabad and Mary carried out only one sortie in the morning - after it, the targets were covered with a dusty veil, and the combat work of Long-Range Aviation for secrecy was ordered to be carried out at dusk. This limited the participation of YES in the operation. Already in May cars left the border airfields.

The effectiveness of high-altitude bombing was low. One of the reasons for this was the unsuitable nature of the ammunition used. The heavy land mines shaking the ground did not achieve a result: the few barriers on the path of the troops identified by reconnaissance did not linger in one place, leaving the blows in time. The bombs themselves of calibers of 3000, 5000 and 9000 kg did not at all correspond to the tasks of combating manpower and even destroying buildings - when they were created, they were not supposed to be used against ground targets at all! Heavy FABs appeared in the late forties as the only means of dealing with large ships at that time and have since remained in service, although the characteristics of their damaging effect on other objects were not even evaluated (the exception was the “one and a half”, which were considered acceptable for strikes against industrial facilities, dams and underground structures). Even during the bombardment of "enemy villages", which completely swept away houses and duvals, the real effect was small. The power of impressive-looking bombs was wasted: the lethal radius of the FAB-3000 shock wave did not exceed 39 m, and even for the FAB-9000 remained within 57 m. The enemy received incapacitating concussions with bleeding from the nose and ears, respectively, at 158 ​​and 225 m around - the result, inferior to a series of bombs of "front-line caliber", aimed dropped from an attack aircraft. Despite all this, for several sorties, infrequent in the practice of "long-range", the commanders of both groups received the Order of the Red Banner of Battle.

Despite their advanced age, Tu-16s from the 251st Guards TBDP successfully passed the Afghan exam

The emblem on board one of the "Afghans" of the 251st Guards TBAP

The Afghan campaign is usually compared to the Vietnam War. A parallel arises in the assessment of the work of Long-Range Aviation. History repeated itself: starting with the use of links of attack aircraft and fighters, the US Air Force was drawn into an endless chain of increasing strikes, and a year later they involved strategic aviation in the business, trying to solve all problems with a tonnage of bombs. Nevertheless, with all the apparent similarity, fundamental differences should be taken into account. OKSV was five times smaller than the American forces in Vietnam, the hostilities were of a much smaller scale, and, accordingly, the Air Force of the 40th Army, even with the units involved, was an order of magnitude inferior to the US air armada of many thousands. North of the 16th parallel, the United States still dealt with the state, including enterprises, warehouses, transport nodes with bridges, stations and ports - the usual large targets for bombardment. Even in the South, where rampant carpet bombing was practiced, the goal was a network of roads along which reinforcements and weapons were moved.

These recipes were not suitable for the fight against a scattered and small enemy, as was the case in a purely counter-guerrilla Afghan war. Accordingly, the participation of Long-Range Aviation in it remained episodic. The enemy carried everything he needed with him, not needing the support provided by military science for infrastructure - fortifications, warehouses, headquarters and barracks, habitually searched for by intelligence. Even the fortresses and caves that have been preserved since ancient times, which could serve as a haven for the Mujahideen and looked like a “reliable target”, were immediately left by fighters accustomed to nomadism, dissolving in the mountains and greenery. When ambushes on roads and in villages caused the greatest damage, the power of the bombers was not used.

An awkward situation developed: the enemy continued to gain strength, expanding the sphere of influence, but was not suitable for overly powerful aircraft, which literally did not notice the enemy. This fully applied to the results of the "Big Panjshir" in 1984. Although the then commander of the 40th Army, General Lt. L.E. Generalov, called it "an example of the largest and most effective operation", real successes were more than modest . The Panjshir had to be abandoned, and the detachments that had escaped heavy losses and Masud himself returned to it. The conclusion of GlavPUR read: “Experience confirmed the low efficiency conducting major military operations precisely from a military point of view, and sometimes their political damage. As for the bombing strikes, the infantry spoke out even more clearly, reproaching the aviators that they "eat their chocolate for nothing."

And yet, in the summer of 1986, long-range aviation was again involved in work on Afghanistan: the very existence of such a powerful force required its use. In those months, a widely declared withdrawal of a part of the OKSV was being prepared, during which 6 regiments were to leave the country (however, the army was replenished in parallel), and long-range bombers were to prevent the movement of dushmans and shelling of the departing columns. In addition, a number of operations were planned in the south that needed air support. By this time, in addition to the usual hostilities to "cleanse" the provinces and return them to the rule of Kabul - an occupation as regular as hopeless - attacks on bases and base areas, on which the "regiments" and "fronts" began to rely, came into use. , uniting the former disparate gangs under the command of large field commanders. There were bases that served as a support for one formation, transshipment bases and points from which weapons were shipped and caravans were sent, and large base areas that included headquarters, warehouses, weapons and ammunition workshops, communication centers and training centers. Hard-to-reach gorges, lost in the mountains, served as places for them.

Characterizing qualitative changes, an analytical note by the Combat Training Directorate of the Ground Forces back in October 1984 drew attention to the appearance of objects that "the rebels are preparing for a stubborn defense in engineering terms." Aviation became the most reliable means of defeating them. However, the "pin pricks" of the Air Force 40th A, forced to operate at a considerable distance from the bases, did not give due success: at such a distance, Bagram's fighters and attack aircraft could, at best, deliver a couple of bombs, and due to supply difficulties from time to time. At that time, the headquarters was even forced to introduce restrictions, obliging them to hang only one bomb at a time! (However, by that time the entire combat load was usually dropped in the first run, and the result of the strike depended more on its accuracy than on the number of bombs.) besides, the high-explosive power of the “five hundred” limiting for them was not enough to destroy shelters, often carved into solid rock or filled with concrete. It is curious that even sappers failed to blow up some caves - the laid charges could not bring down the vaults, and the explosions only “cleaned out” them as if under a whisk. Protected targets required proper measures of influence, and here those same large-caliber bombs turned out to be suitable. A high-explosive blow from above caused tremors, cracking and collapse of the stone that filled the caves, and landslides covered their entrances. Bombing on the slopes had an impressive effect: the descent of hundreds of tons of stones buried the mouths of the caves and approaches to them, cornices fell to the bottom of the gorges, a few roads and paths rested on heaps of rocky blocks, and the enemy had to spend weeks searching for workarounds. To power of the explosion was not wasted on the surface, the fuses were set to work with a slowdown that allowed the bomb to deepen and explode in the thickness of the mountain. Usually used electric fuses AVU-E and AV-139E, specially designed for large-caliber bombs and high-altitude bombing. They were distinguished by increased safety - the final cocking took place only 18-23 s after separation from the aircraft. , The use of special thick-walled FAB-1500-2600TS turned out to be especially beneficial. Despite the “one and a half” caliber, they had a real mass of more than 2.5 tons, and a strong cast “head” of ten centimeters thickness (against the 18 mm walls of the usual FAB-1500), like a ram, made it possible to go deep into the rock. Thus, 469 kg of its contents gave a greater effect than 675 kg of explosives of the “one and a half” types M-46 and M-54 (besides, the TGAS-5 TNT hexogen, which filled the Teeska, had one and a half equivalent compared to TNT in other large-caliber bombs) . The three-ton bombs of the M-46 and M-54 models contained 1400 and 1387 kg of TNT each, the five-ton FAB-5000M-54 - 2207.6 kg, and the nine-ton FAB-9000M-54 - 4297 kg. By the mid-80s, ammunition of the 1950 model had already been removed from service, as well as armor-piercing monsters BrAB-3000 and -6000, which could be useful here.

Tu-22M3 from the 185th Guards TBAP strike FAB-3000M54

The commander of the detachment of the 185th Guards TBDP, Mr. V.I. Bandyukov, in the cockpit of his "Backfire". Mary-2, November 1988. Each star aboard long-range bombers meant a sortie

Tu-16s of the 251st Guards took part in the raids. Red Banner TBAP, relocated to Mary from Bila Tserkva. In those summer months, such a virtue of YES was clearly manifested as independence from “seasonal” problems, due to which the combat load of FA aircraft depended not so much on the task as on the season. The heat sometimes did not even allow to tear off the "overloaded" pair of bombs car from the ground - a fresh (June) confirmation of this was the "decomposed" Su-17 on takeoff in Bagram. And the Tu-16 with bomb bays loaded to the eyeballs and with half refueling could easily cover the entire territory of Afghanistan. Anti-aircraft fire did not pose a threat to the long-range bombers, but fears were inspired by the appearance of the latest F-16s in Pakistan, which had already managed to “mark themselves” with an attack in May by two Afghan aircraft.

Therefore, the Tu-16 sorties were covered by the MiG-21bis of the 115th Guards IAP from Kokaity, with which the only incident in the entire “arrival” turned out to be connected. The stern gunner of one of the “carcasses”, ensign N. Slipchuk, known in the regiment as a romantic and a poet, suddenly mistook the fighters chasing them for the enemy and, without hesitation, opened fire. The firing lasted half a minute, which was enough to land the entire ammunition load of 1000 shells in one long burst. The fighters shied away from the tracks, but the training of the shooter, fortunately, left much to be desired, and all the damage was reduced to the replacement of “shot” cannon barrels (the queue, which is normal for overheating and wear, should not exceed 200-300 rounds).

The most extensive was the use of long-range aviation "before the curtain", in the last months of the war. They turned to the “long-range” for help in October 1988, with the beginning of the final stage of the withdrawal of troops, when the enemy’s actions were expected to intensify: in the end, many opposition leaders threatened with especially painful blows, not only in the usual manner of hitting in the back, but also scoring points in anticipation of future struggle for power. Other leaders saw in the departure of Soviet troops an opportunity to “deal with” Kabul without interference, and at the same time resolve contradictions among themselves, and they willingly signed “non-aggression pacts” with the 40th Army. the word "rebels", which confirmed the well-known: "The rebellion cannot end in success - otherwise it is called differently." Peace agreements with the Mujahideen, in which the leadership of the OKSV had a certain experience, made it possible to withdraw troops without hindrance, but the way home was seen differently "from above". Nevertheless, the position of the headquarters of General B.V. Gromov and the leadership of the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, headed by General of the Army V.I. Varennikov, tangibly affected the organization of the withdrawal and the work of the involved aviation forces.

By the fall of 1988, part of the Air Force of the 40th Army (up to 45%) had already left the DRA. To compensate, along with other forces, by the end of October, a separate long-range aviation group was formed, seconded to the SAVO Air Force (TurkVO had been liquidated by this time, but the headquarters of the united district and the Air Force command post were located in Tashkent). The main task of the group was to cover the withdrawn units and places of deployment with preemptive strikes against the areas of deployment of opposition fire weapons, as well as disrupting the shelling of large cities, attacking bases and warehouses, supporting Afghan troops in blockaded garrisons, designed to "eliminate political deformations in the abandoned areas of the country" .

FAB-1500 are torn in green

The group included aircraft and crews of the DA Guards units: a Tu-16 squadron of the 251st Guards TBAP from Belaya Tserkov and two Tu-22M3 squadrons from the Poltava 185th Guards TBAP. They were placed at two nearby airfields Mary-1 and Mary-2 - the only free ones. time, even if they lie farther from the target, than the border bases (for the "long-distance" the difference of 200-300 km was not significant). In Mary-1, where she was. The 1521st airbase of MiG-23 and MiG-29 fighters, "playing along" for the enemy in the training of IA pilots, deployed 11 Tu-16s - three detachments and two cars control groups. On the other side of the runway, there was a local airport, which was another reason for the separation of the Long-Range Aviation group: Mary-1 was used to receive "transporters" with troops withdrawn, UN representatives were invited there, and the menacing-looking Backfires did not fit well into the ideas of Western diplomats about implementation of the Geneva Accords. Tu-16s, day after day, methodically taxiing to the start, attracted less attention, being engaged in "planned combat training."

The "carcasses" from Belaya Tserkov were of considerable age - almost all of them began their service in the early sixties and were the same age as their pilots. Unlike the 40th A sent to the Air Force, which they tried to select according to qualifications of at least 1-2 classes, the method of work of the "long-range" made it possible to attract almost the entire flight crew, bypassing any special training. The same applied to machines that had not undergone any modifications: in order to "take and throw", the capabilities of a long-range aviation veteran were quite enough. By 1988, Tu-16s were the only aircraft capable of carrying the FAB-9000, and this advantage was finally in demand. It was not without problems: at home, no one had to deal with monster bombs, for the placement of which in cargo bay a whole structure was mounted - a bridge holder BD-6 with massive beams and struts. The transportation of the "nine-ton" required a personal transport - a BT-6 trolley, which could be moved by the efforts of several dozen people. The unaccustomed bulky equipment during one of the first attempts to hang the bomb led to someone that the FAB-9000, which had gone skewed, got stuck in the compartment and almost fell down. The gunsmiths rushed in all directions and only the second time they managed to put the recalcitrant bomb in place. "Nine-tons" were the main cargo, but from time to time bombs of smaller calibers were also used, up to the "placer" FAB-250, which were taken by 24. Such differences in loading were explained not so much by tactical necessity as by breaks in the supply, which "cleaned up" warehouses countrywide.

Many targets lay in the vicinity of Kandahar and Jalalabad, already abandoned by the Soviet troops. The bombardments here were in the nature of a counterbalance to the incessant shelling and sorties, especially since there was no hope for the active actions of government garrisons. This also affected the nature of the work of the "long-range", for the most part, did not imagine the objects of strikes, distinguishing them only geographically. Upon returning to questions about what targets were bombed, they got off with the words: "Those that indicated."

Flights to the "far corners" took 3.5-4 hours. In view of the fact that they had to work near the Pakistani border itself, and there was no need to rely on their own weapons and means of passive defense (the Tu-16s were not equipped with IR traps, which are mandatory in the Afghan sky, having only “seeders” of dipole ribbons for radar interference), each the departure was accompanied by fighter cover, and due to the duration of the raids, the escort was replaceable. The neighboring MiG-29s escorted and met the group, sometimes the duty link of the Su-17MZ from Mary-2 was involved for this. Confirming their partly fighter mission, the Su-17s carried a pair of R-60 missiles and PTB-800 tanks, which made it possible to escort bombers over the north of the DRA. Closer to the target, the baton was taken over by the MiG-23MLD from the 120th IAP in Bagram.

One detachment of three Tu-16s was constantly sent to the bombardment. Departures were usually scheduled in the morning, and they went to the target without using the RBP-4 radio sight, “blind-sighted” and useless over the mountains, where there were no clear radar reference points (a thirty-year-old device was theoretically capable of detecting objects from 150-180 km, but only if they stood out well against the background of the area, and were suitable, as they said, "to notice the skyscrapers and the Statue of Liberty"). On the route, they managed with navigation crew using ARC-5 and DISS " track”, the flight mode was also almost constant: an altitude of 10-11 thousand meters and a speed of 850 km / h. With access to the target, the bombing was carried out by the navigator, who used the optical sight OPB-11R.

Sometimes the Tu-16 was involved in night strikes, while the area was illuminated by SAB from the Su-17. Once, helicopters were sent to control the results of the strike, but they did not find any traces of the target - a powerful collapse buried not only the object itself, but also the entire former relief. Another time, paratroopers flew out to “clean up” the bombing area in the green zone. Upon their return, they reported: "You fought off the desire to fight there for a long time." There were some mistakes - the inevitable satellites of high-altitude bombing, in which dispersion of the order of 300-500 m was considered normal: the explosions of the "nine-ton" lay too close to the checkpoint near Kabul and led to contusions of the fighters on duty there, some of whom lost their hearing. In just three months of Tu-16 operation, 289 FAB-9000M-54 bombs were dropped. For the pilots themselves, the “cover” and the flight altitude, which made it possible not to be afraid of fire from the ground, inspired confidence and made sorties a routine matter. The work was facilitated by the organization of its “rotational method”: from time to time, part of the crews flew home to rest, and others replaced them, so that their participation in the war was limited to 15-20 sorties. Trouble delivered themselves "not very new" cars, on which minor failures and breakdowns constantly occurred, which is why aircraft were involved in sorties as they were in good condition. To the credit of the old but strong Tu-16, even with failures in the air, it was possible to complete the task, and the crews tried to eliminate malfunctions right in flight (the dignity of the “old” and not very complex equipment). The cabin of the “carcass” made it possible to get to many units and shelves of equipment, in all corners, just in case, all kinds of small spare parts, fasteners, clamps, locks, etc. were piled up, and the crew members shoved screwdrivers and pliers into their pockets.

Even a serious incident that happened in January 1989 with the Tu-16 of Dr. E. Pomorov did not prevent reaching the goal. On the plane carrying the FAB-9000, at an altitude of 10100 m, the nasal blister was torn off. A furious whirlwind burst into the cockpit of the bomber, which was moving at a speed of 850 km / h. Inside, the temperature dropped to the outboard - 50 ° C, and a rarefaction hit my ears. Worst of all was the navigator, Mr. Lylov, who found himself right under the freezing stream. It only remained to thank the fur flight jackets and headsets with retro goggles, which were preserved in the outfit of the Tu-16 crews. In the event of a depressurization, the instruction prescribed an immediate descent, but only 15 minutes remained to the target, and the commander continued to keep the aircraft at flight level and heading. The crew bombed, although not particularly accurately (under the wind raging in the cockpit, it was not up to it) and safely reached home. For this flight, Mr. Pomorov received the Order of the Red Star, and the rest of the crew received medals "For Military Merit".

Tu-22MZ of the Poltava regiment settled in Mary-2, where the 156th APIB was based on the Su-17MZ, which at that time received a respite from almost continuous work in the Afghan campaign. The involvement of Poltava residents for the combat debut of new bombers was justified by the fact that the 185th Guards TBAP was a leader in the development cars and had the greatest experience in its operation, including flights to distant ranges with practical bombing. The appearance of "troikas" meant a qualitatively new level of the "Afghan" Air Force grouping. The new vehicles had a perfect NK-45 navigation system and sighting and navigation equipment, which gave accurate access to targets and bombing, high-quality radio communications equipment and an impressive range of combat payloads. Although the cargo compartment of the Tu-22M3 was not designed for bombs larger than three tons, the total weight of the cargo could reach 24 tons. For work from Mary, more moderate options were chosen, not exceeding 12 tons, for reasons of maintaining “volatility”.

FAB-1500 and FAB-3000 are ready for suspension on aircraft

On October 28, two squadrons of 8 aircraft each flew to Mary-2 from Poltava, together with the leadership of the regiment - commander Colonel V.I. Nikitin, his deputies p / p-kami Parshin and Androsov and regiment navigator A.N. The squadrons led the commander-1 p / p-k R.N. Saberov and the commander-2p / p-k I.P. Degterev. among them were aircraft not yet equipped with IR traps, two Tu-22MZ of the latest series were borrowed from the 402nd TBAP from Orsha. With the help of the Il-76 and An-12, the technical staff, the necessary equipment and replacement pilots were transferred to Mary (in total, 21 crews were involved in the work).

Already on October 31, the first flight took place. As in the next two, the targets were located near Kandahar - in the mountain range in the north and "green" in the south along the Dori River, where there were detachments blocking the roads to the city. On November 3, bombs fell in the vicinity of the Kandahar air base, from where it was shelled. The next day, the target was the town of Jalez, which lay in advantageous for dushmans, the place is a gorge with access directly to Kabul. From the nearest mountains, a panorama of the capital opened, and a route to the south passed nearby.

For the next week, bombardments were carried out in the northeastern sector around Kabul, where launchers were concentrated, showering missiles on the city. A rare day went by without shelling - Kabul remained the center of the aspirations of detachments of the most diverse affiliation, not only for tactical reasons, but more as a means of expressing themselves. It was a matter of prestige to bombard the capital, firing at least a few shells in its direction. At first, the harassing fire did not cause much harm, but gradually gained strength: if in 1987 147 rockets fell in the city, killing 14 residents, then in 1988 the number of rockets increased to 635, and victims - to 233. Even unaimed launches sooner or they found targets late: on June 26, 1988, the hit of one missile on the Kabul airport turned the Su-25 parking lot into a bonfire, leaving only fragments of 8 attack aircraft. On November 14, to the accompaniment of explosions, a Tu-154 with a Soviet government commission had to take off, the same shelling hit the residential module of the 50th OSAP aviators, burying 11 people in it.

To answer, they attracted "long-distance" people, who flew out on alarm in half an hour. After the evening bombardment, strikes on the "dushman ring" around Kabul continued for the next two weeks, falling mainly on the surrounding mountain plateaus and ridges, from where launches were noted from checkpoints, as well as on reconnoitered warehouses and storage facilities for missiles. The hunt for missilemen was not very successful: launchers often stood on cars and immediately changed positions, even more often primitive disposable guides with a clockwork were used. As a result of all the work of the 185th regiment, the reconnaissance department of the 40th Army attributed only 6 vehicles, 4 launchers and 340 rockets to its account.

Tu-22MZ from the 185th Guards TBDP leave the Mary-2 airfield for a combat mission

At the end of November, they carried out two sorties on targets near Fayzabad, which stood out against the general background - the mines of lapis lazuli and emeralds in the possessions of Masud were again bombarded (by the way, these targets were the only ones that can hardly be attributed to the stipulated combat charter of the Long-Range Aviation as "operational and strategic reserves": he simply did not provide for all the others). The outskirts of Kabul were processed day by day by local aviation. Once, the departures of the YES and the Bagram attack aircraft coincided in time and place, and already on the combat course, a Su-25 circling below was suddenly found in the sight of one of the bombers. They managed to drive him away by radio, because close bursts of powerful bombs could hit the “rook”, if not with a shock wave, then with fragments that flew up to a two-kilometer height and “floated” in the air for almost a minute.

After several bombardments using the FAB-500, they were abandoned, switching to a larger caliber, which made it possible to more fully use the capabilities of the machines (another reason was the troublesome equipment and suspension of hundreds of such bombs in each shift). Two FAB-3000s or eight FAB-1500s became typical options, while the group heading for the same target was trying to load the same type so that the difference in the suspension would not make it difficult to fly in formation. Some of the bombs were equipped with special fuses AVPZ for mining with self-destruction within 6 days. One and a half and three-ton "mines" were laid in areas of enemy activity, and to defuse them (there were cases when dushmans themselves used unexploded bombs in quality land mines) did not give a trap that reacted to an attempt to unscrew the fuse or pull the bomb. The unnecessary external multi-lock MBDZ-U9-68s were immediately removed from the aircraft, although the rocket pylons continued to remain under the wings for another month (it was difficult to dismantle them, and it was simply impossible to get their hands on everyday work).

The regiment's control group, participating in combat sorties, managed to establish effective work. In the evening, on a call from Tashkent, they sorted out maps, and the crews were already ready to receive a combat order. The planes were waiting for them fully equipped, immediately after the previous flight, they received a “duty” charge of bombs and refueling with 40 tons of kerosene, which allowed them to work on any targets. The formation of a battle order and approach to the target worked out "on foot in flight", painting them with chalk on the asphalt. In flight, they used maps of a 10-km scale, and over the impact site they were guided by more detailed “two-kilometer” and “half-kilometer”, having carefully studied each pea on the tablet ahead of time. The sorties were carried out by the forces of the eight Tu-22MZ. Targets were also assigned by squadron, sometimes divided into fours and pairs. Usually they were grouped and were located 500-1000 m from one another. Sometimes two squadrons were sent to strike at once. The planes leaving for the mission taxied out all at once, lining up before the start and starting the takeoff run immediately after the leader took off. This achieved a quick take-off, after which, already at the turn around the airfield, the group gathered in close formation and went to the target in a column of pairs with a 150-m excess of slaves, a 10-second interval between pairs and a 40-second interval between links.

The route was kept at a speed of 900 km / h, at first at an altitude of 7200-7800 m. After warning about the danger of MANPADS launches from mountain peaks, the echelons were raised to 9000-9600 m, paving the way around the high peaks. The danger was not exaggerated: a year earlier, the defeat of the Su-17M3R MANPADS, which was flying at an altitude of 7000 m, was noted, and the launch from the top was confirmed by a KhAD agent who was in the gang. Immediately after the start of work, the “long-range” themselves observed the launch. To R. Saberov, he was remembered as “a dusty cloud on a slope, a trickle of disturbed air upwards and a flash of a rocket that went into self-destruction.”

Departures began every day according to plan, at 10 o'clock in the morning, but the crews began to notice columns of smoke rising along the way, apparently warning the enemy. The time began to change, but most flights remained daytime. The flight to a distance of 800-1000 km passed without any problems: the NK-45 navigation system with the TsVM-10TS-45 digital machine provided access to the target with an accuracy of about hundreds of meters, and automation the on-board control system was able to guide the aircraft along the route and land it. The work of the navigator was simplified by the continuous indication of the position on the movable map of the PA-3 tablet. With an exit to the designated square, the entire crew joined in to help the navigator-operator, looking for a target. To attack, the group scattered, and each aimed individually using the OPB-15T television sight, which gave a high-resolution picture. At the same time, the control of the aircraft passed to the navigator, and the reset followed in automatic mode. The accuracy of bombing was impressive: sometimes, on a dare, navigators placed bombs in a separate building or duval. More often, however, the specified square was covered with gaps. The pilots were not particularly inclined to understand the type of target - they received tasks and performed work, and dusty mushrooms of explosions swelled equally among the dashes of duvals, on the roads and near the deserted dunes. To the questions of a capital correspondent who looked into Mary, who inquired about the sensations during the bombing, the pilots got off with the words: “If something goes wrong, it’s not our business, as they say, the Motherland ordered,” or even frankly sent him away.

The commander of the YA, General Lieutenant P.S. Deinekin (right) inspects the work of his subordinates. Mary-2, November 1988

Gunsmiths of the 185th TBAP are preparing for the suspension of the FAB-1500

Bombs were regularly dropped, even if not a single village was visible for many kilometers around in the indicated areas, only mountains and desert floated in the sights. It is doubtful that such an expenditure of ammunition was due to reconnaissance misses - there were also no targets on the photographic plates. One of the motivations for such strikes was their warning nature for the surrounding population: the earth leaving from under their feet and crumbling rocks clearly showed what awaited the especially restless. According to rumors, the headquarters of the 40th A, obeying the orders dictated by big politics "from above" not to stop the bombing, thus nevertheless diverted strikes from the "contractual" villages and groups. Most likely, this also applied to Massoud, who conscientiously observed the terms of the truce. Already after the war, Lieutenant-General Gromov uttered at first glance surprising words: “Even during periods of tough confrontation ... we did not seek to break his gangs, but to physically destroy Ahmad Shah himself.” However, everything is logical: after the defeat of the “Panjshir lion” detachments, their place would be taken by the “irreconcilable” formations.

The war still continued, and the necessary tactical measures were taken: approaching the target for surprise was built a little to the side, then 4-5 minutes from the reset point they sharply turned, getting rid of cargo in one run. Without stopping over the place of impact, they closed the formation on the retreat and at once increased their speed, heading for Termez. They usually went back on the afterburner, accelerating to M = 1.7, and many noted with satisfaction that “only in the war did they manage to fly enough on supersonic sound” (at home it was not always possible to break the sound barrier and at an altitude not lower than 11000 m). The fighter cover, which accompanied the group in all sorties, did not keep pace with the Tu-22MZ. The MiG-23s carrying the tank and missiles had speed limits and could not keep up with the “long-range” ones, because of which one could hear the requests of the “cover” on the air: “Big, don’t drive horses, I’m behind!”

Tu-22PD jammers were also in combat formations, supplementing the work of their own airborne defense systems of the "troikas". Three Tu-22PDs from the 341st TBAP under the command of the p / p-ka V. Melnik, attached to the Long-Range Aviation Group, were based together with the Poltava residents. Their task was to disrupt possible launches of Pakistani missiles by the Krotal air defense system and, especially, F-16 attacks. When working near the border, this danger had to be taken into account, since after the drop it was necessary to carry out photo control of the results with on-board AFA-42/20 and 42/100, for which the aircraft had to be kept on a straight line for at least a minute, and the extra 15-20 km were taken to the "ribbon" itself. The tension in the cockpit was added by the sensitive SPO-15 Bereza, which continually reacted with an alarming squeak to everything in a row, whether it was the work of the PNA of neighboring aircraft, the radiation of the "cover" sights or the powerful interference of the "shumoviks".

The use of IR traps by "long rangers" differed from the accepted methodology of the FA, where the pilots immediately turned off the shooting when they left the attack. Tu-22MZ, on the move away from the target, began to pour LO-43 kilogram traps (each carrying 48 rounds), and the trailing ones opened fire from the stern guns with special projectiles from the PRLS with dipole "noodles" and radiating heat PICS. The shells, however, were soon abandoned, saving time on stuffing tapes and the troublesome replacement of cartridge boxes, which had to be hoisted to a height of five meters. Pakistani fighters already had little chance of attacking recruiters. speed“troikas”, and a train of blazing balls and tracks served as a barrier against launches in pursuit.

“Just for every fireman”, the pilots were given AKS-74U, grenades and a couple of pistols to fly, and instead of soldering and a useless rescue boat, jars of water and magazines for weapons were placed in the ejection seats moved by NAZ (as they joked, “for a complete set, there is only enough robes and skullcaps). Even on the way to the airfield, the pilots were each time accompanied by a submachine gunner to protect themselves from possible sabotage. The precautionary measure was not superfluous: in the neighboring Karshi, a Tajik soldier was detained at the airfield, unscrewing fuses from bombs in order to help fellow believers.

On the Tu-22MZ (board 74) from the 132nd TBAP, several sorties were carried out by Gen.-Mr. D.M.Dudaev

In the end, several sorties were carried out at night, once it was necessary to bomb through dense clouds covering the target. At the same time, in addition to the NK-45 and PNA inertial gyroplatforms, the A-713 automatic long-range navigation system was used, which determined the position from ground-based radio beacons (with its help, the navigation crew was often checked during flights under normal conditions). The system gave high accuracy, “up to a scale”, however, bombing with its help required good teamwork in the crew, where the commander had to perform additional turns on the commands of the navigator, taking into account all the impositions and amendments, and the operator to control. There were few failures, although the "troika" was considered rather capricious machine, mainly in terms of complex electrical equipment and electronics. Once, due to a drop in oil pressure, I had to turn off the engine on Mr. P. Androsov's plane and return on the remaining one. Another time, an airplane landing in a dust storm (the famous "Afghan") began to be blown away by the wind, and the pilot "attached" the car on the runway with a double overload.

The “extreme” sorties, which fell on December 3, 4 and 5, were carried out near Kandahar by Poltava: the airfields of the Air Force of the 40th Army were closed due to the weather, and the Afghan garrison requested urgent assistance. As a result of the trip, the commander of the 185th Guards TBAP V. Nikitin, who completed a dozen and a half sorties, received the Order of the Red Banner of War, the same awards were presented to A. Libenkov and both commanders - R. Saberov and I. Degterev. The crew commanders and pilots were awarded the Orders of the Red Star, and the navigators were awarded "For Military Merit".

In the raid on December 5, the long-distance fighters from Orsha, who arrived to replace the Poltava, took part, and on December 7, the crews and vehicles of the 402nd TBAP, commanded by p / p-k Yanin, fell on the entire amount of combat work. The group from Orsha consisted of the same two squadrons of 8 Tu-22MZ and one more spare aircraft to maintain the order of forces in case of failures and breakdowns. It also included two bombers lent to the Poltava residents, who had to work out a second term (on one of them, 35 sorties were completed in total - the largest number among all the “troikas”).

The 402nd TBAP continued the same work, the “geography” of the targets also changed little. At the same time, winter bad weather led to more frequent use of "blind" bombing methods. Most reliable there was a bombing with the help of the navigation system, which, using the data of the radar operating in the review mode, issued the “Thunder” command at the right time - a signal to reset. Gradually, sorties were increasingly carried out at night, inflicting harassing blows. At the same time, the situation did not allow the use of the PNA radar associated with the NK-45 for bombing: the snow-covered mountains looked “smooth”, there were no large buildings, bridges or clusters of equipment among the targets. Sometimes a reset was practiced along a remote radar landmark, if a characteristic contrasting object was nearby (usually they were the bend of the river or the Surubi and Darunt dams east of Kabul), according to which the heading angle and range were specified. Several times near Kabul they tried to bomb on the teams of gunners who had "balalaikas" - goniometer-range automatic radio beacons. This technique did not give much success due to the low accuracy of the impact. And the very tactics of long-range aviation, which involved dropping cargo in one run, were not suitable for target designation of the ground, when the gunner and pilots understood each other perfectly and corrected their blows.

In almost all sorties, the FAB-3000 was bombed, only once making an exception and laying “one and a half” for mining in the mountains. The increased consumption of heavy bombs even forced them to be ordered additionally from industry.

Tu-22M3 worked in tight combat formations

During night sorties, observing the blackout, they turned off the BANO, leaving only dim combat lights visible from above and illuminating the cockpit with a “mouse” - a red light lantern on the starboard side. If there were misses, then no complaints came from remote areas. Only one of the sorties ended in scandal, when during the bombing near Kandahar in December one of the dropped bombs fell near the headquarters of the Afghan 2nd Army Corps, and the other exploded right in a residential area, killing several dozen people. Governor-General of the province N. Olumi flew in with a complaint, and a joint commission of General V. Afanasyev and Afghan Kadyr arrived in Mary. It was not possible to attribute the incident to the Dushman shelling - fragments of heavy bombs were picked up at the site of the explosions, with which only “long-range” workers worked there (although “two-ton caliber bombs” that did not exist in service appeared in the case). In the end, the story was hushed up without looking for the guilty, partly because the use of Long-Range Aviation was not advertised and was presented as bombing Afghan aircraft.

In isolated cases, in addition to coordinates and squares, it was specifically said about character goals. On Saturday, January 7, a Su-25 was shot down over the Janez Gorge near Kabul, and the pilot was killed with him (this was the last loss of attack aircraft in the Afghan war). In response, heavy bombs covered the entire area around the crash site. A month later, on February 8, two Afghan crews, taking their families with them, flew on their Mi-8s to Panjshir. The hunt for hijacked helicopters that landed after running out of fuel in one of the gorges lasted three days. The Tu-22MZ was also attracted to it, without much success looking for helicopters through the "windows" in the clouds, but only the Su-25 managed to finally bomb them.

In one of the sorties, right under the formation of the Tu-22MZ, there was a scheduled Boeing, which was heading somewhere to the east. According to the navigator, senior lieutenant S.A. Novikov, “we didn’t think much about all their air corridors, observing only the echelons in height so as not to collide. The Boeing followed its own course, got out right under its nose on the catch-up and slowly floated out on the screen of the OPB-15T, when the doors of the cargo compartment were already open. It seems that it was an Indian - all decorated, the lights are burning, multi-colored, like on a Christmas tree. Maybe he purposely wanted to take a closer look at the military, but because of him I had to delay with the reset - there were still mountains below, we’ll hit more than one, so a friend.

Tu-22PD jammers covered strike groups during raids on the border areas with Pakistan

However, the "sparing regime" of the bombardment of deserted plains and mountains did not last long. In the central regions, the remaining units of the 40th Army again concentrated near the possessions of Masud, who, according to the report of General Varennikov, nevertheless "categorically forbade his formations to conduct military operations against the Soviet troops, which they strictly observed." However, the top leadership of the USSR openly accused the military of unwillingness to defeat the enemy, after which a strict order to prepare new attack on the Panjshir. Nevertheless, they managed to choose a compromise solution on the spot, and in mid-December, not the positions of Masud and the villages in the valley, but the remote area of ​​\u200b\u200bKoran-o-Munjan with lapis lazuli mines were bombed. But by the New Year, the raids had stopped, and the hint from the air remained half-hearted.

The OKSV had the last step home, and this path led through Charikar and Salang, controlled by the “Panjshir army”. On January 6, the raids resumed, and on the 10th, a Soviet government group flew into Afghanistan, after which an order was received to carry out Operation Typhoon, which became the last chord of the war. Special merit in this belonged to Kabul, according to advisers, "showing indefatigable perseverance" in trying to inflict damage on the enemy with the forces of the outgoing army. Playing politics, Najibullah convinced Moscow of Massoud's intentions to "surrender 14 northern provinces of the country to the Americans" (there were 12 in total).

Tu-22PD from the 341st TBDP two and a half years after the end of the Afghan epic. Ozernoe, 1991

The three-day operation was supposed to begin on January 24, but at the last moment it was ordered "not to delay", and the strikes began a day earlier, and the political workers were tasked with "exposing the criminal position taken by Ahmad Shah." The bombardments also took place on the Panjshir in the previous days, but during the operation they became non-stop. The withdrawal of troops was halted so that artillery and bombers could work unhindered along the roadside areas. The villages also got it, and in those days the bombers were not limited to one sortie per shift. However, the enemy once again left the bombardment. There was, in fact, no return fire, and during the Typhoon, losses were limited to three dead soldiers. From the air it was impossible to assess the successes presented in the reports, but the troops who continued on their way to the pass escorted hundreds of bodies of dead civilians carried to the road.

Long-range aviation continued to work at the same pace, although combat sorties were not counted for pilots, only later in personal files did records appear about "participation in hostilities in the DRA from the territory of the USSR." At the same time, the “bonus” was regularly accrued to the flight crew - 11 rubles determined with accounting accuracy. 78 kop. "for the combat day" on which the work fell out, regardless of the number of sorties. Together with the travel "three rubles", a tangible amount ran up, which amounted to almost one more pay in a month. She was well deserved

Current page: 2 (total book has 21 pages) [accessible reading excerpt: 14 pages]

Soviet pilots were involved in the Afghan war, in fact, even before the official start date of December 25, 1979. The fact is that military transport aircraft have been delivering military cargo to all airfields in Afghanistan since 1977.

However, the flights became especially intensive in the fall of 1979. As the adviser to the head of the Signal Corps and RTO of the Air Force and Air Defense of the DRA (1980-1981), Colonel Valentin Dmitrievich Gerasimenko, recalled, “in October 1979, arrivals of BTA aircraft to the Kabul airfield became more frequent. More often they were Il-76, less often An-22. During the days they flew in several planes and, quickly unloading, flew away. In normal mode, the Kabul airport could receive planes only during the day.

But in October, and especially in November, and at night, ten or even twenty Il-76s landed on Kabul. The planes were released from the cargo and departed before dawn. What they brought “disappeared” from the airport before dawn too.

Foreign correspondents accredited in Kabul tried unsuccessfully to reveal the nature of the night traffic. To answer their many questions, the Afghan Foreign Ministry held press conferences and briefings almost daily, at which, in response to regular questions about the night transportation of Soviet aviation, it answered that a group of transport aircraft of the Civil Air Fleet of the USSR was based in Bagram ("as you gentlemen know") (on On the sides of the An-12 there were indeed Aeroflot identification marks). During the day, they carry various cargoes at our request, and at night they work out the training tasks assigned to Afghan pilots in order to acquire the appropriate flight qualifications. With mostly night takeoffs and landings, it seems like a lot of planes are coming in.”

At the moment it is not possible to give a general statistics of sorties, I will give a chronicle of the flights of Soviet transport aviation to Afghan airfields only a few days in March 1979:

And besides, by December 1979 there were aviation units that were based directly on the territory of Afghanistan: for example, a helicopter squadron from the 280th OVP (commander - Lieutenant Colonel Belov) and the 224th separate detachment of the MGA, which consisted of eight An-12s (commander - Colonel Ishmuratov) 2
In fact, the unit was equipped with crews and equipment from the regiments of the VTA and performed the functions of an advisory squadron. The detachment was in Afghanistan from August 1979 to November 1988.

Very little is known about these units and the nature of their actions during that period. Having collected scattered information, we can state the following: the “Belov group” itself consisted of servicemen of the 280th OVP of the Army Aviation of the USSR Air Force, which was based at the Kagan airfield. The group was selected on a voluntary basis, the most trained crews, and preference was given to pilots who had experience flying in the Pamirs.

In preparation for the transfer of the squadron to Afghanistan, 12 helicopters painted over the stars and applied the identification marks of the DRA Air Force with homemade stencils. At the same time, the crews changed their regular uniforms to overalls and civilian clothes.

On August 23, 1979, the group took off under its own power from Kagan and landed at the Bagram airbase after five hours of flight. In parallel, for the delivery of technical equipment, 24 flights were made by An-12 transport aircraft and 4 flights by Il-76. Initially, the direct participation of Soviet helicopter pilots in combat operations was assumed, but the chief military adviser (to whom, in fact, the squadron was subordinate) almost immediately introduced a ban on the participation of squadron pilots in hostilities. Moreover, the Soviet crews were even ordered to refrain from returning fire while performing their tasks.

The primary tasks were defined: the delivery of goods, personnel, food to Gardez and Shindand, and most importantly, “government transportation”. One helicopter was constantly on standby to provide possible search and rescue operations. In addition to Bagram, individual crews were periodically on duty in the centers of the provinces and in Kabul.

The Afghan leadership in its own way assessed the work of the transport helicopter squadron and tried to take it also with the transportation of national economic goods. At the same time, as noted by some researchers of the Afghan problem, the squadron has become an instrument in the political and economic game of a large scale. The fact is that the USSR provided military assistance to Afghanistan almost free of charge. However, there were other economic agreements, the legal successor of which was post-revolutionary Afghanistan. Thus, for gas supplies, the USSR owed Afghanistan, according to various estimates, from 270 to 500 million US dollars. But Afghanistan did not go to pay off this debt at the expense of military supplies from the USSR. Afghanistan was offered to buy a batch of Mi-8s through Aviaexport, and it was supposed to pay for the delivered vehicles and spare parts for them. The Afghan leadership refused, having such help as a free Mi-8 squadron with Soviet crews and service. Then the Soviet leadership gave the order to send the squadron home and began to implement the plan. This forced the Afghans to shell out. But even after that, they insisted on using reliable Soviet equipment with even more reliable crews.

It should also be said that at the end of 1979 there were more than enough Soviet pilots in Afghanistan: according to intergovernmental agreements, Soviet military specialists were in all Afghan aviation units (up to the squadron level).

Advisors - senior teams of the Air Force and Air Defense of the DRA in the period 1978-1979. worked: Major General of Aviation O.G. Orlov, Major General of Aviation A.G. Arevshetyan, Colonel N.D. Orlov, Colonel N.G. Berdichevsky, Colonel E.I. Mishustin, Major V.A. Pekhotin, Lieutenant Colonel V.D. Stadnichenko, Colonel A.I. Postelnikov.

In addition, in the Main Headquarters of the Air Force and Air Defense of the DRA during this period worked: Major General of Aviation A.A. Egorov, colonels E.N. Kuznetsov, P.M. Kopachev, N.P. Kozin, O.S. Savrasenko, Yu.V. Razuvaev, V.P. Anokhin, I.I. Nesterenko, A.I. Uvarov and others.

Another little-known fact is also interesting: immediately before the entry of the Soviet contingent, Afghan aircraft arrived at the Bagram airfield after a major overhaul, which were overtaken by Soviet crews. It was no coincidence that these pilots lingered - in order to take a direct part in the hostilities.

In early December 1979, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov brought information to the leadership of the General Staff that in the near future, a political decision might be made to send a group of Soviet troops to Afghanistan in the amount of up to 75 thousand people.

On December 25, 1979, at 18:00 local time, the airlift of units of the airborne troops to the airfields of Kabul and Bagram began. So, for the transfer of personnel and equipment of the 103rd airborne division and a separate parachute regiment, 343 aircraft flights were made, including 66 An-22 flights, 77 - Il-76 and 200 - An-12. In total, 7,700 personnel, 894 units of military equipment and 1,062 tons of various cargoes were delivered to both airfields.

Here is how, for example, Soviet adviser Colonel Valentin Dmitrievich Gerasimenko described the events at the Kabul airport: “Il-76 planes landed at regular intervals, turned onto taxiways and, while still in motion, lowered the ramps, opened all the hatches. At short stops with the engines running, paratroopers poured out from the inside of the sides and jumped out from 1 to 3 infantry fighting vehicles, artillery pieces and other equipment rolled out. The planes taxied further and, as the runway was liberated, they took off and left for new personnel and equipment.

As for the invasion aviation group, it was created by mid-March 1980, taking into account the deployment and conduct of combat operations by combined arms formations and units in disparate operational areas.

Naturally, the airfield network of the Afghan Air Force was the basis for basing aviation units, which, if necessary, ensured the regrouping of aviation in order to increase its efforts in certain areas.

According to military intelligence, before the introduction of the OKSV, the country's airfield network was as follows: “There are 28 airfields on the territory of Afghanistan, including 9 with capital runways (runways), 8 of them are suitable for basing tactical aviation, their estimated operational capacity was 120–160 aircraft. The largest airfields are Bagram, Kabul (Khoja Revash), Kandahar, Herat and Shindand (Sebzevar). The airfields of Kabul and Kandahar are classified as international. All these airfields are equipped with 1-2 main runways with a width of mainly 45 m, taxiways and group concrete aircraft parking. These airfields have warehouses for various purposes, hangars, service and residential buildings. Shelters for aircraft from protective walls were built only at the Bagram airfield.

Unpaved airfields are mainly used by civil aviation. As alternate airfields for basing tactical aircraft, 6 unpaved airfields can be used - in Dehdadi, Lashkargah, Matun, Kandahar, Faizabad and Chaghcharan. Airfields with runways less than 1800 m long are used by light aircraft. The permanent deployment of the air force (Air Force) of the DRA is carried out at the most equipped airfields: Bagram, Jalalabad, Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif and Shindand. The main means of radio navigation equipment in the territory of Afghanistan are medium-wave radio beacons available at 11 airfields. The airfields of Kabul (Khoja-Revash) and Kandahar have, in addition, a short-range radio navigation system. The length of international airlines in the country is over 2 thousand km. Air transportation is carried out by one national airline, Bakhtar Afghan Airlines, which serves both domestic and international airlines. 3
"Afghans" Donetsk region. Donetsk: OOO IPP Promin, 2010. P. 495.

Thus, at the time of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, there were few airfields, and with the increase in the aviation component, the question of building new airfields almost immediately arose. In the shortest possible time, several sets of metal airfield pavement from K-1D slabs were delivered to create runways and taxiways.

The engineering and airfield service of the TurkVO Air Force was able to bring the country's airfield network to mind - by the middle of 1985, seven Afghan airfields had been built or significantly re-equipped by Soviet units: Herat, Shindand, Farah, Kandahar, Kabul International Airport, Bagram and Jalalabad. The airfields at Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, Ghanzi and Pol-i-Shakri were of no strategic importance and were subject to reconstruction to a much lesser extent.

Thus, during the war in Afghanistan, eleven airfields were able to provide round-the-clock jet flights in all weather conditions, however, Jalalabad was used only by helicopter pilots.

The key bases for basing Soviet aviation were the bases in Bagram (the largest number of Soviet aircraft and helicopters were based here) and Shindand (here, among other things, aircraft were repaired and maintained). From these airfields, mainly Su-25 attack aircraft and MiG-23 fighters made sorties.

At the base airfields of Soviet aviation, radio navigation and communication facilities were additionally installed, joint command posts were created for flight control, combat operations control, as well as air traffic of Soviet and Afghan aviation over the territory of Afghanistan.

Soviet air units, together with Afghan ones, were based at four airfields (Kabul, Bagram, Shindand and Kandahar), and four more airfields were based separately on Soviet (Kunduz, Faizabad and Jalalabad) and Afghan (Mazar-i-Sharif) units.

During the regrouping of aviation in the interests of the upcoming operations, Soviet and Afghan aircraft and helicopters were jointly based at almost all available airfields. To strengthen the security and defense of airfields, one motorized rifle (less often, parachute) battalion was allocated to each of them.

The total staffing of the Soviet aviation group in Afghanistan (VVS of the 40th Army) initially included two aviation regiments and one separate squadron, one mixed aviation and three separate helicopter regiments, three separate helicopter squadrons and one helicopter detachment. A total of 60 combat aircraft and 19 military transport aircraft, 253 combat and transport-combat helicopters. Taking into account the physical and geographical conditions and the deployment of combined arms formations and individual units of the 40th Army and the areas of combat operations assigned to them, the aviation group in Afghanistan (Air Force 40th A) was divided into four groups: “North”, “Center”, “ South" and "West".

Combat strength of the Air Force of the 40th Army as of 2.01.1980

Sometimes, during major operations, individual aviation subunits from the named groups were involved in operations in other areas, however, when planning military operations, they tried to avoid this because of the difficulties of regrouping aviation. "Worked" in the sky of Afghanistan reconnaissance aircraft, bombers from the Long-Range Aviation. Afghan airfields also visited a lot of ambulance aircraft, for which, according to the mobilization plan, Il-18s from the Ural air squadrons of the civil air fleet were converted.

With the relocation of fighters and fighter-bombers to Afghanistan at the airfields of Bagram (115th Guards IAP), Kandahar (136th Apib) and Shindand (217th Apib, then a squadron of the 136th), combat duty of Soviet aircraft was introduced in the general system Air defense of Afghanistan.

Already with the entry of troops into Afghanistan, Soviet aviation suffered its first loss - on December 25, 1979, an Il-76 crashed with paratroopers on board.

Flying as part of a trio of Il-76M from the 128th Guards Vtap (commander - Captain V.V. Gol Ovchin), while building a landing approach at Kabul airport, he collided with a mountain. The black box could not be found, because the plane crashed high in the mountains in a hard-to-reach place. Rather, the cockpit with the crew turned out to be on the other side of the ridge, where it was still possible to somehow get to, and the remains of the pilots, with great difficulty, but got it. And the salon, where there were 34 paratroopers and equipment, fell into an inaccessible gorge, and only in September 2006 they were found.

Immediately after the plane crashed, the military tried to get to the crash site. The surviving records of the search and rescue work tell how difficult it was:

“December 26, 1979. While performing a landing maneuver, an Il-76 aircraft crashed with the crew, paratroopers and equipment on board. He crashed into one of the peaks surrounding the Kabul airfield. As a result, 7 crew members and 34 paratroopers were killed.

12/27/1979. In the morning, Major General Egorov A.A. flew on a Mi-8 helicopter to the alleged area of ​​the crash, but the exact crash site was not found due to heavy snowfall.

12/28/1979. The head of the operational group of military transport aviation called a group of CSKA climbers who were training camps in the Tien Shan. For them, this was a complete surprise, and they were very sorry that they did not have with them a helicopter providing them, the crew of which was trained for landing and rescue work in the mountains. All climbers in bright down jackets stand out noticeably among the gray-green mass of troops.

12/30/1979. 8 climbers, 2 aviation engineers and 5 paratroopers were landed on the mountain. There is an agreement with the hospital to transport the bodies that died in a plane crash to the morgue.

At 16.00, the Mi-8 helicopter found the mountain ridge at the site of the Il-76 strike, one part of the aircraft on one side, the other on the other side of the ridge. The most interesting parts are located on the opposite side of the slope on which the climbers' tent is set.

01/01/1980. At 10.30 the climbers found the cockpit of the Il-76 with the remains of the body of Shishov, the assistant commander of the ship…” 4
Ablazov V.I. Over the whole of Afghanistan, a cloudless sky. Kyiv, 2005. S. 116.

Yervand Ilyinsky, head of the group of climbers, shared interesting details about these tragic events in his interview with journalists of the BBC Russian Service. 5
Il and n s k i y E. - head coach of the Kazakhstan mountaineering team and honored coach of the USSR.

: “One day, at the end of December 1979, a telephone rang in my apartment in Alma-Ata.

They called from Moscow. The conversation was short - they said that they urgently needed to fly to Dushanbe, for some kind of rescue work at an altitude of up to six thousand meters, the fourth category of complexity. I was told to gather a group and take singles there.<…>At that time, no one knew about the upcoming war - the Soviet leadership announced the introduction of troops into Afghanistan only the next day.

When landing, we stuck our faces to the windows. The runway was completely surrounded by Soviet military tents, and BMDs, airborne combat vehicles, stood right along the perimeter.

We were surprised, but took such a concentration of Soviet troops in Afghanistan simply for some kind of exercise.<…>On the morning of December 27, we were finally told about the upcoming operation, about the plane that had crashed in the mountains, the dead paratroopers and the briefcase with documentation.<…>

After that we went to the foothills of the Hindu Kush. The road went through numerous villages, and I got the strange impression that war was war, and dinner was lunch - somewhere someone fought, and in the villages life went on as usual.

Later, we transferred to a helicopter, which took us directly to the crash site, which was at an altitude of 4200 meters. The snow was very deep, the helicopter could not land and hung in the air, and we jumped down from two or three meters.

We were ordered to search for the bodies of the dead and collect their documents, which we did for several days. There were not bodies, but fragments of bodies - after all, the plane crashed into a rock at a speed of about 500 km / h. In addition, shells were scattered around - we walked, as if through a minefield. There, in the snow, among mines and human remains, we met the new year, 1980.

On the morning of January 1, one of our men found a black leather briefcase and handed it over to the authorities. After that, the work began to curtail.

APPLICATION OF AVIATION DURING THE WAR

At the first stage of the war, the combat activities of the aviation group in Afghanistan were seriously affected by shortcomings in the material and technical support of the troops. Often, on bare stones, in desert areas, pilots and technicians had to equip landing sites, parking lots for aviation and special equipment, and, together with units and subunits of the ground forces, organize their protection and defense. In view of the fact that the preparations for the entry of troops into Afghanistan were carried out hastily, the troops were largely unprepared for war. Logistic, food, clothing, and household support had many problems: for example, there were not enough elementary spare parts, there were no lights and special equipment for repairing aircraft and helicopters in the field.

According to one of the An-12 pilots, Viktor Viktorovich Istratov: “The provision of the flight crew in the unit was useless. Suffice it to say that we washed our bedding ourselves, there was no elementary shower in the module. They were saved by squatter baths and the famous "buchila" at the end of the 31st lane in Jalalabad. I remember the constantly hot compote in the flight canteen. Amazing concern for the health of the pilots - so that the throat does not hurt. They prepared disgustingly. There was always stew."

This unsettledness has led to the spread of infectious diseases. During the first year of their stay in Afghanistan, 17,000 people fell ill with the hepatitis virus alone in the troops of the 40th Army, of which 280 were pilots and 291 were engineering and technical personnel. Water sources in the country were highly contaminated, in fact, water without special treatment was practically unsuitable for consumption.

Another serious problem at the first stage was the training of flight personnel. In the early years of the war, when selecting aviation personnel for combat missions in Afghanistan, a superficial approach to their business and moral qualities was often allowed, which affected military discipline and law enforcement. So, for drunkenness and smuggling during the first four years, 346 officers and 495 ensigns were sent ahead of schedule from Afghanistan.

Experience quickly prompted the need to create a special selection committee, which was entrusted with the task of studying the moral and psychological qualities of the military personnel arriving in the Air Force of the TurkVO, their state of health, and the level of training in their specialty. In parallel, the same commission carried out explanatory work, concerning primarily the peculiarities of the presence of Soviet troops in the Republic of Afghanistan.

At the same time, traditional methods, forms and means of peacetime were used, such as: political studies, political information, political hours, conversations and lectures.

However, decades after the end of the war, it is worth admitting that political workers failed to fully explain what the international duty in Afghanistan was. Apparently, they themselves did not understand everything due to the lack of complete and objective information, clear explanations from the party-political bodies. Political workers, like everyone else, fulfilled their international duty, having mastered the main form of party political work during the Great Patriotic War - a personal example. Very often during the fighting, when the commander was killed or wounded, the political officers took command.

It is also important that in Soviet times political workers did not study such disciplines as sociology, psychology, psychodiagnostics or psychoanalysis. It was believed that the "Moral Code of the Builder of Communism", adopted in 1961 by the XXII Congress of the CPSU, would ensure the political and moral qualities of military personnel in the performance of international duty.

Work with personnel acquired a systematic approach after the issuance of a directive by the commander of the troops of the Turkestan military district. In accordance with its requirements, commanders were trained not only on the basis of an individual and differentiated approach, but their phased training was also applied in the district, army, units and subunits.

The practice of carrying out planned replacements in the composition of the Afghan regiments consisted in the fact that from the regiments that were in the Union, helicopter squadrons were sent to Afghanistan in full strength, units. That is, the regiment stationed in Afghanistan bore one constant number, but its squadrons could belong to different regiments and, at the end of the business trip, returned to their units. According to the same scheme, planned replacements took place in individual helicopter squadrons. Resupplying units with separate crews was carried out in case of combat losses or single replacements.

At the same time, a system for training aviation personnel for replacement in Afghanistan was developed. Until 1986, the flight personnel were trained for replacement in two stages in places of permanent deployment and additional training at the airfields of Afghanistan directly in the combat area. For example, a short additional training (usually it was a week) for army aviation pilots was given at the Kagan airfield.

After the organization of the 1038th Flight Personnel Training Center, preparations for replacement in units stationed at the airfields of Afghanistan were carried out in three stages, each of which consisted of theoretical and flight training.

The first stage was carried out at the airfields of permanent base, the second stage - in the 1038th TsPLS at the Chirchik airfield and the Chirchik-Gorny training ground, the third stage - at the airfields of Afghanistan.

Such training was extremely necessary, since landings and takeoffs from high-mountainous or dusty areas, at high temperatures, are one of the most difficult elements in the flight training of a helicopter pilot. Here is what the Hero of the Soviet Union, test pilot Vasily Petrovich Koloshenko recalls about this: “Engines, throwing hot gases out of the flame tubes, spin the main rotor. The main rotor throws hot air down and mixes it with hot gases coming out of the engines. This mixture, descending to the ground, spreads to the sides, raises dust, and then rises up and again falls into the propeller. Around the helicopter, such a dense veil of air, hot gases and dust is formed that even before takeoff the helicopter finds itself in a downward airflow. A helicopter with a heavy load cannot rise vertically; for this, its many thousands of horsepower are not enough.

As a result of passing the additional training program in special centers, the flight crew was generally ready to conduct combat operations using new tactics in the conditions of the Republic of Afghanistan. In the process of additional training, the unit commanders determined the composition of regular groups for various tactical purposes based on the individual characteristics of each pilot. The flight personnel, who did not master the additional training program with good quality, were seconded to their units. With this method of preparing flight personnel for combat operations, the number of combat and non-combat losses was significantly reduced.

The system of purposeful training of aviation personnel for combat operations as a whole justified itself - the personnel were included in combat operations, mostly more or less prepared in technical, tactical and moral and psychological terms.

And yet, two or three months of combat work were required to noticeably increase the quality of piloting technique, tactical thinking and combat use of the flight personnel. So, the accuracy of bombing for pilots with excellent training upon arrival in Afghanistan was 60 m, with good - 90 m and with satisfactory - 130 m. After the adaptation period, it more than doubled, the number of direct hits increased significantly. Approximately in the same progression, the results of the use of unguided missiles and small arms and cannon weapons grew.

A feature in the activities of the flight crew was also the fact that directly in the course of hostilities, the pilots had to comprehend all the combat capabilities of their helicopters. What yesterday in peaceful conditions was considered impossible and unacceptable, here it became the norm. During the war in Afghanistan, turns with a roll of 45 degrees or more, the combat use of all types of weapons at dive angles of 30 degrees or more, unique helicopter landings on mountain eaves at altitudes of three thousand meters or more, evacuation of the sick and wounded from hard-to-reach places, delivery of oversized cargo on an external sling. Life and the combat situation made it necessary to significantly expand the scope of helicopter flight operation. The statistics of more than ten thousand flights at altitudes from two to five thousand meters or more convinced that a well-trained, psychologically prepared pilot can withstand about an hour of flight in these conditions.

Operational data, which met the requirements of combat training of helicopter pilots in peacetime, ceased to satisfy them in a real combat situation. Exceeding the calculated characteristics, as a result, led to many phenomena for which both pilots and technicians were not prepared even theoretically. So, helicopter pilots were forced to get acquainted with such unusual phenomena as “dripping into a dive”, “falling”, “picking”, “vortex ring”, etc. Each such case became the subject of a thorough analysis: the actions of the pilot in each unusual phenomenon were analyzed, all flight parameters were taken into account, at what stage during the performance of which element it arose. Experience was collected bit by bit, and recommendations were processed for each specific case.

Great work in the scientific substantiation of these phenomena and the development of practical recommendations was done by: Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor Colonel A. Volodko; Candidates of Technical Sciences, Colonels A. Ustenko, M. Elkin, G. Samoilov, G. Kuznetsov, commanders and test pilots of the Center for Combat Use of Army Aviation, Heads of the Combat Training Directorate, Major General of Aviation P. Navitsky, Colonel A. Koshelev, V Seleznev, V. Tarasov, A. Shurenkov, I. Smirnov, test pilots of the State Research Institute of the Air Force and specialists of the Design Bureau named after M.L. Mil, led by helicopter designer M. Tishchenko.

Thus, there was an operating time, generalization and implementation into practice of combat experience, which was taken into account primarily in the documents for the training of flight personnel.

In the difficult conditions of mountainous and desert terrain, in order to fully use the flight tactical characteristics and combat capabilities of equipment and successfully complete combat missions, it became necessary to find new methods and methods of combat operations. Based on the characteristics of each period, the nature of the activities of the air force of the 40th Army Air Force in the performance of combat missions changed. To a greater extent, this concerned the preparation and performance of combat missions by flight personnel.

The increase in the probability of being shot down by enemy air defense systems entailed not only a change in the tactics of aviation operations, but also increased attention to the issues of moral and psychological training of flight personnel, a more substantive development of all issues of interaction between aviation and ground forces with their support, landing tactical airborne assault and providing his fighting. The transition to active combat operations at night made serious adjustments not only to the organizational work of aviation and combined arms commanders, but also led to an increase in the moral and psychological stress of the flight crew, increased clarity in the organization of search and rescue support and search and rescue operations during hostilities. .

Particular attention was paid to targeted flights of flight personnel for combat operations. Thus, the arrived pilots, under the guidance of experienced instructors, necessarily performed flights in the area of ​​​​the airfield and flights to perform individual combat operations. This was indicated by the requirements of the directive of the USSR Ministry of Defense dated May 12, 1981. It noted that the experience of the combat operations of our troops in Afghanistan showed the weakest link in their training - mountain and night training. A number of shortcomings were pointed out in solving tactical issues, fire training, and low physical endurance. The task was to radically improve the training of troops for operations in mountainous areas and at night, and, in particular, to train army aviation for operations in the mountains and at night, together with combined arms formations and units.

The main tasks that the flight crew had to solve were air support, as well as cover and escort of troops. However, in addition, Soviet pilots performed a fairly wide range of tasks.