BATTLE OF KURSK 1943, defensive (July 5 - 23) and offensive (July 12 - August 23) operations carried out by the Red Army in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge to disrupt the offensive and defeat the strategic grouping of German troops.

The victory of the Red Army at Stalingrad and its subsequent general offensive in the winter of 1942/43 over the vast expanse from the Baltic to the Black Sea undermined the military power of Germany. In order to prevent the decline in the morale of the army and the population and the growth of centrifugal tendencies within the aggressor bloc, Hitler and his generals decided to prepare and conduct a major offensive operation on the Soviet-German front. With its success, they linked their hopes for the return of the lost strategic initiative and a turn in the course of the war in their favor.

It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be the first to go on the offensive. However, in mid-April, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command revised the method of the planned actions. The reason for this was the data of Soviet intelligence that the German command was planning to conduct a strategic offensive on the Kursk salient. The headquarters decided to wear down the enemy with a powerful defense, then go on the counteroffensive and defeat his striking forces. There was a rare case in the history of wars when the strongest side, having the strategic initiative, deliberately preferred to start hostilities not on the offensive, but on the defensive. The development of events showed that this bold plan was absolutely justified.

FROM THE MEMORIES OF A. VASILEVSKY ON STRATEGIC PLANNING BY THE SOVIET COMMAND OF THE BATTLE OF KURSK, April-June 1943

(...) Soviet military intelligence managed to timely reveal the preparation of the Nazi army for a major offensive in the Kursk salient area using the latest tank technology on a massive scale, and then set the time for the enemy to go on the offensive.

Naturally, under the prevailing conditions, when the expected enemy strike with large forces was quite obvious, it was necessary to make the most expedient decision. The Soviet command faced a difficult dilemma: to attack or defend, and if defended, then how? (...)

Analyzing numerous intelligence data on the nature of the upcoming actions of the enemy and on his preparation for the offensive, the fronts, the General Staff and the Headquarters were more and more inclined towards the idea of ​​​​transition to deliberate defense. On this issue, in particular, there was a repeated exchange of views between me and Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov in late March - early April. The most concrete conversation about planning military operations for the near future took place over the telephone on April 7, when I was in Moscow, at the General Staff, and G.K. Zhukov was on the Kursk ledge, in the troops of the Voronezh Front. And already on April 8, signed by G.K. Zhukov, a report was sent to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with an assessment of the situation and considerations on the plan of action in the area of ​​the Kursk salient, in which it was noted: will be if we wear down the enemy on our defenses, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, by going over to a general offensive, we will finally finish off the main enemy grouping.

I had to be at when he received G.K. Zhukov's report. I remember well how the Supreme Commander, without expressing his opinion, said: "We must consult with the front commanders." Having ordered the General Staff to seek the opinion of the fronts and obliging him to prepare a special meeting at Headquarters to discuss the plan for the summer campaign, in particular the actions of the fronts on the Kursk Bulge, he himself called N.F. Vatutin and K.K. Rokossovsky and asked him to submit his views by April 12 according to the actions of the fronts (...)

At the meeting held in the evening of April 12 at Headquarters, which was attended by I.V. Stalin, G.K. Zhukov, who arrived from the Voronezh Front, Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky and his deputy A.I. Antonov, a preliminary decision was made on deliberate defense (...)

After a preliminary decision was made on a deliberate defense and on the subsequent transition to a counteroffensive, comprehensive and thorough preparations were launched for the upcoming actions. At the same time, reconnaissance of enemy actions continued. The Soviet command became precisely aware of the dates for the start of the enemy offensive, which were postponed three times by Hitler. At the end of May - beginning of June 1943, when the enemy’s plan to launch a strong tank attack on the Voronezh and Central Fronts using large groupings equipped with new military equipment for this purpose, the final decision was made on a deliberate defense.

Speaking about the plan for the Battle of Kursk, I would like to emphasize two points. Firstly, that this plan is the central part of the strategic plan for the entire summer-autumn campaign of 1943, and, secondly, that the highest bodies of strategic leadership, and not other command instances, played a decisive role in the development of this plan (...)

Vasilevsky A.M. Strategic planning of the Battle of Kursk. Battle of Kursk M.: Nauka, 1970. S.66-83.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Central and Voronezh Fronts had 1336 thousand people, more than 19 thousand guns and mortars, 3444 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2172 aircraft. In the rear of the Kursk ledge, the Steppe Military District (from July 9 - the Steppe Front), which was the reserve of the Headquarters, was deployed. He was supposed to prevent a deep breakthrough from both Orel and Belgorod, and when going on the counteroffensive, increase the force of the strike from the depths.

The German side introduced 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized divisions, into the two strike groups intended for the offensive on the northern and southern faces of the Kursk ledge, which amounted to about 70% of the Wehrmacht's tank divisions on the Soviet-German front. In total - 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2700 tanks and assault guns, about 2050 aircraft. An important place in the plans of the enemy was given to the massive use of new military equipment: the Tiger and Panther tanks, the Ferdinand assault guns, as well as the new Foke-Wulf-190A and Henschel-129 aircraft.

APPEAL OF THE Führer TO THE GERMAN SOLDIERS ON THE EVE OF OPERATION "CITADEL", no later than July 4, 1943

Today you are launching a great offensive battle that may have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war as a whole.

With your victory, the conviction of the futility of any resistance to the German armed forces will be strengthened stronger than before. In addition, a new cruel defeat of the Russians will further shake the faith in the possibility of the success of Bolshevism, which has already been shaken in many formations of the Soviet Armed Forces. Just like in the last big war, their faith in victory will disappear no matter what.

The Russians achieved this or that success primarily with the help of their tanks.

My soldiers! Now you finally have better tanks than the Russians.

Their seemingly inexhaustible human masses have thinned out so much in a two-year struggle that they are forced to call on the youngest and oldest. Our infantry, as always, is superior to the Russians to the same extent as our artillery, our tank destroyers, our tankers, our sappers and, of course, our aviation.

The mighty blow that will overtake the Soviet armies this morning must shake them to their foundations.

And you should know that everything can depend on the outcome of this battle.

As a soldier, I clearly understand what I demand from you. In the end, we will achieve victory, no matter how cruel and difficult this or that individual battle may be.

German homeland - your wives, daughters and sons, selflessly rallying, meet enemy air strikes and at the same time work tirelessly for the sake of victory; they look with fervent hope at you, my soldiers.

ADOLF GITLER

This order is to be destroyed at divisional headquarters.

Klink E. Das Gesetz des Handelns: Die Operation "Zitadelle". Stuttgart, 1966.

PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. THE EVE

From the end of March 1943, the Headquarters of the Soviet Supreme High Command worked on a plan for a strategic offensive, the task of which was to defeat the main forces of Army Group South and Center and crush the enemy defenses on the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. However, in mid-April, on the basis of army intelligence to the leadership of the Red Army, it became clear that the command of the Wehrmacht itself plans to carry out a strike under the bases of the Kursk ledge, in order to surround our troops stationed there.

The idea of ​​an offensive operation near Kursk arose at Hitler's headquarters immediately after the end of the fighting near Kharkov in 1943. The very configuration of the front in this area pushed the Fuhrer to strike in converging directions. In the circles of the German command there were also opponents of such a decision, in particular Guderian, who, being responsible for the production of new tanks for the German army, was of the opinion that they should not be used as the main striking force in a big battle - this could lead to a waste of forces . The strategy of the Wehrmacht for the summer of 1943, according to such generals as Guderian, Manstein, and a number of others, was to be exclusively defensive, as economical as possible in terms of expenditure of forces and resources.

However, the bulk of the German military leaders actively supported offensive plans. The date of the operation, which received the code name "Citadel", was set for July 5, and the German troops received at their disposal a large number of new tanks (T-VI "Tiger", T-V "Panther"). These armored vehicles were superior in their firepower and armor resistance to the main Soviet T-34 tank. By the beginning of Operation Citadel, the German forces of the Army Groups Center and South had at their disposal up to 130 Tigers and more than 200 Panthers. In addition, the Germans significantly improved the fighting qualities of their old T-III and T-IV tanks, equipping them with additional armored screens and putting an 88-mm cannon on many vehicles. In total, the Wehrmacht strike groups in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge by the beginning of the offensive had about 900 thousand people, 2.7 thousand tanks and assault guns, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars. On the southern wing of the ledge, the strike forces of Army Group South under the command of Manstein were concentrated, which included the 4th Panzer Army of General Hoth and the Kempf group. The troops of Army Group Center von Kluge operated on the northern wing; the core of the strike group here was the forces of the 9th Army of General Model. The southern German group was stronger than the northern one. Generals Goth and Kemp had about twice as many tanks as Model.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided not to be the first to go on the offensive, but to take up a tough defense. The idea of ​​the Soviet command was to first bleed the enemy's forces, knock out his new tanks, and only then, having brought fresh reserves into action, go on the counteroffensive. Needless to say, it was a rather risky plan. Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin, his deputy Marshal Zhukov, and other representatives of the Soviet high command remembered well that not once since the beginning of the war had the Red Army been able to organize defense in such a way that a pre-prepared German offensive would fizzle out at the stage of breaking through Soviet positions (at the beginning of the war near Bialystok and Minsk, then in October 1941 near Vyazma, in the summer of 1942 in the Stalingrad direction).

However, Stalin agreed with the opinion of the generals, who advised not to hurry with the start of the offensive. A defense in depth was built near Kursk, which had several lines. It was specially created as anti-tank. In addition, in the rear of the Central and Voronezh fronts, which occupied positions, respectively, on the northern and southern sections of the Kursk salient, another one was created - the Steppe Front, designed to become a reserve formation and join the battle at the moment the Red Army went on the counteroffensive.

The military factories of the country worked uninterruptedly on the production of tanks and self-propelled guns. The troops received both traditional "thirty-fours" and powerful self-propelled guns SU-152. The latter could already with great success fight the "Tigers" and "Panthers".

The organization of the Soviet defense near Kursk was based on the idea of ​​deep echeloning of combat formations of troops and defensive positions. 5-6 defensive lines were erected on the Central and Voronezh fronts. Along with this, a defensive line was created for the troops of the Steppe Military District, and along the left bank of the river. Don prepared the state line of defense. The total depth of the engineering equipment of the area reached 250-300 km.

In total, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, Soviet troops significantly outnumbered the enemy both in people and in equipment. The Central and Voronezh fronts included about 1.3 million people, and the Steppe Front standing behind them had an additional 500 thousand people. All three fronts had up to 5,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, 28,000 guns and mortars at their disposal. The advantage in aviation was also on the Soviet side - 2.6 thousand for us against about 2 thousand for the Germans.

PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. DEFENSE

The closer the launch date of Operation Citadel drew nearer, the more difficult it was to conceal its preparations. Already a few days before the start of the offensive, the Soviet command received a signal that it would begin on July 5th. From intelligence reports it became known that the enemy offensive was scheduled for 3 hours. The headquarters of the Central (commander K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (commander N. Vatutin) fronts decided to carry out artillery counter-preparation on the night of July 5. It started at 1 o'clock. 10 min. After the roar of the cannonade subsided, the Germans could not recover for a long time. As a result of artillery counter-preparation carried out in advance in the areas of concentration of enemy strike groups, German troops suffered losses and launched an offensive 2.5-3 hours later than planned. Only after some time, the German troops were able to begin their own artillery and aviation training. The attack of German tanks and infantry formations began at about half past six in the morning.

The German command pursued the goal of ramming through the defenses of the Soviet troops and reaching Kursk. In the zone of the Central Front, the main blow of the enemy was taken by the troops of the 13th Army. On the very first day, the Germans brought up to 500 tanks into battle here. On the second day, the command of the troops of the Central Front launched a counterattack against the advancing grouping by part of the forces of the 13th and 2nd tank armies and the 19th tank corps. The German offensive here was delayed, and on July 10 it was finally thwarted. In six days of fighting, the enemy penetrated the defenses of the Central Front only 10-12 km.

The first surprise for the German command both on the southern and northern flanks of the Kursk ledge was that the Soviet soldiers were not afraid of the appearance on the battlefield of new German tanks "Tiger" and "Panther". Moreover, Soviet anti-tank artillery and guns from tanks buried in the ground opened effective fire on German armored vehicles. And yet, the thick armor of the German tanks allowed them to break through the Soviet defenses in some areas and penetrate into the battle formations of the Red Army units. However, there was no quick breakthrough. Having overcome the first defensive line, the German tank units were forced to turn to sappers for help: the entire space between the positions was heavily mined, and the passages in the minefields were well covered by artillery. While the German tankers were waiting for the sappers, their combat vehicles were subjected to massive fire. Soviet aviation managed to retain air supremacy. Increasingly, Soviet attack aircraft appeared over the battlefield - the famous Il-2.

Only on the first day of fighting, the Model group operating on the northern wing of the Kursk ledge lost up to 2/3 of the 300 tanks that participated in the first strike. Soviet losses were also high: only two companies of the German "Tigers", advancing against the forces of the Central Front, destroyed 111 T-34 tanks during the period of July 5 - 6. By July 7, the Germans, having advanced several kilometers forward, approached the large settlement of Ponyri, where a powerful battle ensued between the strike units of the 20th, 2nd and 9th German tank divisions with formations of the Soviet 2nd tank and 13th armies. The result of this battle was extremely unexpected for the German command. Having lost up to 50 thousand people and about 400 tanks, the northern strike force was forced to stop. Having advanced only 10 - 15 km, Model eventually lost the striking power of his tank units and lost the opportunity to continue the offensive.

Meanwhile, on the southern flank of the Kursk salient, events developed according to a different scenario. By July 8, the shock units of the German motorized formations "Grossdeutschland", "Reich", "Dead Head", the Leibstandarte "Adolf Hitler", several tank divisions of the 4th Panzer Army of Gotha and the Kempf group managed to penetrate the Soviet defenses up to 20 and over km. The offensive initially went in the direction of the Oboyan settlement, but then, due to the strong opposition of the Soviet 1st Tank Army, 6th Guards Army and other formations in this sector, the commander of Army Group South von Manstein decided to strike east - in the direction of Prokhorovka . It was near this settlement that the largest tank battle of the Second World War began, in which up to TWO TWO Hundred TANKS and self-propelled guns took part on both sides.

The Battle of Prokhorovka is a largely collective concept. The fate of the opposing sides was not decided in one day and not on the same field. The theater of operations for the Soviet and German tank formations represented an area of ​​​​more than 100 square meters. km. Nevertheless, it was this battle that largely determined the entire subsequent course not only of the Battle of Kursk, but of the entire summer campaign on the Eastern Front.

On June 9, the Soviet command decided to transfer the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P. Rotmistrov from the Steppe Front to help the troops of the Voronezh Front, who was tasked with launching a counterattack on the enemy’s wedged tank units and forcing them to retreat to their original positions. It was emphasized that it was necessary to try to engage German tanks in close combat in order to limit their advantages in armor resistance and firepower of turret guns.

Having concentrated in the Prokhorovka area, on the morning of July 10, Soviet tanks moved to the attack. In quantitative terms, they outnumbered the enemy in a ratio of approximately 3:2, but the fighting qualities of the German tanks allowed them to destroy many "thirty-four" even on the way to their positions. The fighting continued here from morning until evening. The Soviet tanks that broke through met the German ones almost armor to armor. But this is exactly what the command of the 5th Guards Army wanted. Moreover, soon the battle formations of the opponents mixed up so much that the "tigers" and "panthers" began to expose their side armor, which was not as strong as the frontal, to the fire of Soviet guns. When the battle finally began to subside towards the end of July 13, it was time to count the losses. And they were truly gigantic. The 5th Guards Tank Army has practically lost its combat power. But German losses also did not allow them to further develop the offensive in the Prokhorovka direction: the Germans had only up to 250 serviceable combat vehicles left in service.

The Soviet command hastily transferred new forces to Prokhorovka. The battles that continued in this area on July 13 and 14 did not lead to a decisive victory for one side or the other. However, the enemy began to gradually run out of steam. The Germans had the 24th Panzer Corps in reserve, but sending it into battle meant losing the last reserve. The potential of the Soviet side was immeasurably great. On July 15, the Headquarters decided to deploy the forces of the Steppe Front of General I. Konev on the southern wing of the Kursk ledge - the 27th and 53rd armies, with the support of the 4th Guards Tank and 1st Mechanized Corps. Soviet tanks were hastily concentrated northeast of Prokhorovka and received an order on July 17 to go on the offensive. But the Soviet tankers no longer had to participate in a new oncoming battle. The German units began to gradually move away from Prokhorovka to their original positions. What's the matter?

As early as July 13, Hitler invited Field Marshals von Manstein and von Kluge to his headquarters for a meeting. On that day, he ordered the continuation of Operation Citadel and not to reduce the intensity of the fighting. Success near Kursk seemed to be just around the corner. However, just two days later, Hitler suffered a new disappointment. His plans were falling apart. On July 12, the troops of the Bryansk Front went on the offensive, and then, from July 15, the Central and Left Wings of the Western Fronts in the general direction of Orel (Operation ""). The German defense here could not stand it and cracked at the seams. Moreover, some territorial gains on the southern wing of the Kursk salient were nullified after the battle of Prokhorovka.

At a meeting at the Fuhrer's headquarters on July 13, Manstein tried to convince Hitler not to interrupt Operation Citadel. The Fuhrer did not object to the continuation of the attacks on the southern wing of the Kursk salient (although it was no longer possible to do this on the northern wing of the salient). But the new efforts of the Manstein group did not lead to decisive success. As a result, on July 17, 1943, the command of the German ground forces ordered the withdrawal of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps from the Army Group South. Manstein had no choice but to retreat.

PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. OFFENSIVE

In mid-July 1943, the second phase of the gigantic battle of Kursk began. On July 12 - 15, the Bryansk, Central and Western fronts went on the offensive, and on August 3, after the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts pushed the enemy back to their original positions on the southern wing of the Kursk salient, they launched the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev "). Fighting in all areas continued to be extremely complex and fierce. The situation was further complicated by the fact that in the offensive zone of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts (in the south), as well as in the zone of the Central Front (in the north), the main blows of our troops were inflicted not on a weak, but on a strong sector of the enemy defense. This decision was made in order to shorten the time for preparing for offensive operations as much as possible, to catch the enemy by surprise, that is, precisely at the moment when he was already exhausted, but had not yet taken up a solid defense. The breakthrough was carried out by powerful strike groups in narrow sections of the front using a large number of tanks, artillery and aircraft.

The courage of Soviet soldiers, the increased skill of their commanders, the competent use of military equipment in battles could not but lead to positive results. Already on August 5, Soviet troops liberated Orel and Belgorod. On this day, for the first time since the beginning of the war, an artillery salute was fired in Moscow in honor of the valiant formations of the Red Army that won such a brilliant victory. By August 23, units of the Red Army pushed the enemy back to the west by 140-150 km and liberated Kharkov for the second time.

The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions; about 500 thousand soldiers killed, wounded and missing; 1.5 thousand tanks; more than 3 thousand aircraft; 3 thousand guns. Even greater were the losses of the Soviet troops: 860 thousand people; over 6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns; 5 thousand guns and mortars, 1.5 thousand aircraft. Nevertheless, the balance of forces at the front changed in favor of the Red Army. It had at its disposal an incomparably greater number of fresh reserves than the Wehrmacht.

The offensive of the Red Army, after the introduction of new formations into battle, continued to increase its pace. On the central sector of the front, the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts began to advance towards Smolensk. This ancient Russian city, considered since the 17th century. gate to Moscow, was released on September 25. On the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, units of the Red Army in October 1943 reached the Dnieper in the Kyiv region. Capturing several bridgeheads on the right bank of the river on the move, Soviet troops carried out an operation to liberate the capital of Soviet Ukraine. On November 6, a red flag was raised over Kyiv.

It would be wrong to say that after the victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, the further offensive of the Red Army developed unhindered. Everything was much more difficult. So, after the liberation of Kyiv, the enemy managed to launch a powerful counterattack in the region of Fastov and Zhytomyr against the advanced formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front and inflict considerable damage on us, stopping the offensive of the Red Army on the territory of the right-bank Ukraine. The situation in Eastern Belarus was even more tense. After the liberation of the Smolensk and Bryansk regions, by November 1943, Soviet troops reached the areas east of Vitebsk, Orsha and Mogilev. However, the subsequent attacks of the Western and Bryansk fronts against the German Army Group Center, which had taken up a tough defense, did not lead to any significant results. Time was needed to concentrate additional forces in the Minsk direction, to give rest to formations exhausted in previous battles and, most importantly, to develop a detailed plan for a new operation to liberate Belarus. All this happened in the summer of 1944.

And in 1943, the victories near Kursk and then in the battle for the Dnieper completed a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War. The offensive strategy of the Wehrmacht suffered a final collapse. By the end of 1943, 37 countries were at war with the Axis powers. The collapse of the fascist bloc began. Among the notable acts of that time was the establishment in 1943 of soldiers' and commanders' awards - the Orders of Glory I, II, and III degrees and the Order of Victory, as well as the Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1, 2 and 3 degrees as a sign of the liberation of Ukraine. A long and bloody struggle still lay ahead, but a radical change had already taken place.

The Battle of Kursk (July 5-August 23, 1943) is a historical event that is often given ambiguous characteristics. There is an opinion that it was only at the cost of huge losses that the Soviet army managed to stop the enemy. However, this is a simplified view. The turning point on the Kursk Bulge became possible due to a number of factors.

Decisive moment

For the German government, the offensive operation "Citadel" was of extreme importance. A total mobilization was carried out throughout the country, a huge amount of manpower and equipment was pulled into the area of ​​the operation.

The High Command carefully developed a plan of action for the troops: literally by the hour and square meters, the movement of each unit was scheduled. Only offensive! There were no other options for the operation. By Hitler's decree, it was necessary to defeat the main forces of the Red Army and quickly deal with its scattered and demoralized remnants.

In the area of ​​the Kursk ledge, the Germans concentrated 50 divisions, about 900 thousand soldiers. Technical support was also powerful: three tank divisions (2,758 tanks), about 10,000 self-propelled artillery mounts (ACS) and 2,050 aircraft. In addition, about 10 thousand anti-tank guns and mortars were delivered to the Kursk region.

The Soviet army was superior in numbers to the Germans in all types of weapons and in terms of human resources. At eight defensive lines were at least 1 million 300 thousand soldiers (about 600 thousand in reserve), 3444 tanks, 19 thousand guns and mortars, 2172 aircraft. However, the General Staff was well aware that the technical equipment of the army was outdated, which practically nullified the numerical superiority. The ultimate success in the battle depended on whether it was possible to "cut off" the tank pincers of the German army, advancing from two sides.

Didn't lose, but moved away

German General Erich von Manstein never ceased to brag that the Wehrmacht under his command destroyed 1800 Soviet tanks, while German losses were several times less. German historians went even further, estimating that the German army on the fields of the Kursk Bulge left no more than 10% of its personnel, and irretrievable losses in tanks and self-propelled guns did not exceed 300 units.

A reasonable question arises, why, in this situation, the Wehrmacht not only did not surround the Soviet troops, but also fled? An answer has been prepared for this in German historiography. Recently, the German magazine Welt published an article in which it “irrefutably proved” that the Wehrmacht won near Kursk, since the losses of personnel and equipment in the Red Army were several times greater. And if it were not for the Allied landing in Sicily, which forced Hitler to withdraw troops from the Eastern Front, then Germany would have finally defeated the Russians.

So Manstein, one of the main protagonists of the Battle of Kursk, admitting defeat, nevertheless emphasized in his defense that the Russians managed to crush the German army only thanks to their mass and at the cost of monstrous losses.

Intelligence service

No matter how the Germans overestimated their achievements, the Soviet leadership approached the events on the Kursk Bulge fully armed. From the beginning of 1943, our intelligence regularly reported on the upcoming Operation Citadel and, in general terms, revealed Hitler's plans. On April 12, Stalin was acquainted with the exact text of Directive No. 6 “On the plan for Operation Citadel”, which Hitler signed only three days later.

There are several versions regarding the sources of information. One of them is called John Cairncross, an English codebreaker, a member of the "Cambridge Five", who collaborated with Soviet intelligence.

Former intelligence officer Lieutenant General Vadim Kirpichenko writes that “John Cairncross at the end of April, more than two months before the start of the Battle of Kursk, transmitted to Moscow information that the German offensive would begin in early July. It was the decoding of a telegram to Berlin by the German Field Marshal Maximilian von Weichs, who was preparing a German offensive south of Kursk, in the Belgorod region.

According to Kirpichenko, the telegram precisely indicated which forces the Germans would use in the offensive, which units would move from Orel and which from Belgorod, and which equipment would be deployed. The location of the German field airfields was also reflected there.

In his memoirs, Georgy Zhukov claimed that he predicted the strength and direction of German attacks on the Kursk salient as early as April 8, based on intelligence data.

defense in depth

On the eve of the German offensive, Soviet troops created a powerful defense system in depth in the Kursk direction. The command decided to conduct a defensive battle with counterattacks against the enemy forces at critical moments.

The sappers, who mined almost the entire front-line zone, had to work hard in the sweat of their brow. The reports recorded that the average density of mining in the direction of the expected enemy strikes was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines per kilometer of the front.

tanks

Without a doubt, tanks played one of the decisive roles in the Battle of Kursk. Soviet losses in technology are recognized as greater than German ones, however, German military leaders, unlike historians, call impressive numbers of their own losses. So, according to General Walter Wenck, by July 7, 1943, only one German 3rd Panzer Division had lost over 67% of its tanks. The total losses in various military units reached 70-80%. It was for these reasons, according to the reports of the German command, that the Wehrmacht was forced to slow down the advance.

After the defeat at the Kursk Bulge, where the tanks of the Ural factories and the German concern Krupp met, the head of the German company, Alfred Krupp, was called to headquarters. Hitler shouted in rage: “Your tanks are worse than the Russians, we lost the battle of Kursk because of you! You are the main culprit of our failures!”

The Fuhrer was wrong. The Ruhr steel was not inferior in quality to the Ural steel, but in some ways it was even better. Moreover, even in the third year of the war, the German tank forces were superior to the Soviet ones in their tactical and technical training. A particularly tangible advantage was planned with the release of the "Tigers" and "Panthers".

But in reality, everything turned out differently. 144 "Tigers" (or 7.6% of the total number of German tanks) took part in the battles near Kursk, but in a month and a half of fighting the Germans irretrievably lost 73 such vehicles. Soviet tankers found gaps in the seemingly invulnerable latest technology. In addition, they made full use of the speed and maneuverability of the T-34, and also used ambush tactics, which leveled the qualitative superiority of the German tank forces.

In the largest tank battle in history - the battle of Prokhorovka - about 5 thousand pieces of equipment were involved on both sides. The losses of the Germans, according to Soviet data, amounted to 80 tanks, ours - up to 180 vehicles. Nobody managed to win a clear victory near Prokhorovka. But the Soviet tankers were able to stop the enemy, albeit at the cost of a lot of blood. This made it possible for the Soviet command to strengthen its positions, pull up reserves and prepare for the offensive.

Aviation

Another important reason why the German attack bogged down is cited by historians as the Luftwaffe's inability to gain air supremacy. During the defensive operation, Soviet pilots destroyed about 1.5 thousand German aircraft, while they themselves lost about 460 aircraft.

In air battles over the Kursk Bulge, the enemy experienced the full power of Soviet attack and bomber aviation for almost the first time since the beginning of the war. The air barrier turned out to be an insurmountable obstacle for German aircraft, not only because of the quantitative superiority of technology, but also due to the dedication that Soviet pilots demonstrated in every sortie.

Tactics

The success of the defensive operation near Kursk was due to the fact that the Soviet command had an idea of ​​the plans of the Wehrmacht and was able to accurately determine the time and place of the main attacks of the enemy. In the areas of alleged military operations, the General Staff concentrated the main forces, which made it possible not only to successfully defend, but also, if necessary, to conduct a counteroffensive. The Battle of Kursk can be called one of the most successful defensive operations during the Great Patriotic War.

The defensive lines, designed primarily to repel massive tank attacks, were unparalleled in depth, the engineering equipment of positions and lanes, and the density of forces and means. The German attack literally got stuck in the layered redoubts lined up on its way.

Not succumbing to the temptation to go on the offensive earlier than the situation required, the Soviet command waited for the extreme point when the defense had already begun to crack. And instead of sending reinforcements to the defensive lines, the General Staff, unexpectedly for the German military, organized two offensive operations (“Kutuzov” and “Rumyantsev”), which resulted in a breakthrough of the front and the final defeat of the enemy.

A foregone conclusion

Despite the fact that the Battle of Kursk is recognized as a turning point in both the Great Patriotic War and World War II, many historians say that the defeat of Germany was a foregone conclusion before - near Moscow and in Stalingrad. This point of view is also expressed by some German researchers.

For example, the publicist Berthold Seewald writes that “The Battle of Kursk confirmed what had long determined the course of hostilities: the Third Reich could no longer oppose Soviet productivity. In essence, nothing has changed either since the defeat near Moscow, or since the Battle of Stalingrad.

Historian Karl-Heinz Frieser, recognized as the best German expert on the analysis of Operation Citadel, came to the following conclusion: “Although from an objective point of view, the failure of the German army was obvious for a long time, now it has become clear to ordinary infantrymen in the trenches at the forefront that the war no longer win. In this regard, Kursk can still be regarded as a kind of milestone, after which the perception of defeat acquired a different character.

and its meaning

1) Tell us about the battle on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge, describe its historical significance. What was the difference between this battle and other major operations of the USSR against the Nazi invaders?

2) What explains the successes of the Red Army in 1943-1944?

3) What were the most important operations carried out by the Red Army in the first half of 1944? How did they influence the success of the Allied landings in Normandy?

4) Describe the results of the conference of heads of state of the allied countries in Tehran?

Test on the Great Patriotic War.

Option number 1.

A1. Moscow battle has begun
A) December 6, 1941; B) November 19, 1942; C) July 6, 1941; D) April 16, 1942.

A2. Citizens of the USSR, for the first time in 1941. heard the words addressed to them: “The enemy will be defeated, victory will be ours!” in a speech
A) M.I. Kalinina on December 31; B) I.V. Stalin November 7;
C) G.K. Zhukov December 6; D) V.M. Molotov June 22.

A3. December 5-6, 1941 The counter-offensive of the Red Army began
A) Kyiv B) Moscow; B) Leningrad D) Stalingrad.

A4. In February 1945 meeting of the heads of government of the three allied powers in
A) Moscow B) Tehran; In Yalta; D) Potsdam.

A5. Supreme Commander during the Great Patriotic War was
A) G.K. Zhukov; B) I.V. Stalin; C) K.E. Voroshilov; D) S.M. Budyonny.

A6. I. Stalin's publication of order No. 227 "Not a step back!" dated July 28, 1942 was caused by a threat
A) the capture of the Crimea by the Germans; B) a new German breakthrough near Moscow;
C) the exit of the Germans to the Urals from the south; D) the surrender of Stalingrad and the exit of the German armies to the Volga.

A7. The most important reason for the failure of the German offensive plan in the Battle of Kursk was (o)
A) a preemptive strike by Soviet artillery;
B) the entry into battle of the Siberian reserve divisions;
C) the encirclement in the "cauldron" of the bulk of the German troops on the Kursk Bulge;
D) the strike of partisan formations in the rear of the Germans.

A8. The consequence of the Moscow battle was that
A) a second front was opened in Europe;
B) the German plan of "blitzkrieg" was thwarted;
C) there was a radical change in the war;
D) Germany began to lose its allies in the war.

A9. When was the Second Front opened?
A) May 1, 1944; B) August 20, 1944; C) June 6, 1944; D) January 1944

A11. The name of the operation of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad:
A) "Barbarossa"; B) "Citadel"; B) "Uranus"; D) Typhoon.

A12. The anti-Hitler coalition has finally taken shape:
A) the signing of an agreement on the union of the USSR and Great Britain;
B) the signing of an agreement on the union of the USSR and France;
C) the signing of an agreement between the USSR and the USA;
D) recognition of the USSR by Western countries.

A13. In honor of what event in Moscow was the victorious salute given for the first time:
A) the surrender of German troops in Stalingrad;
B) the failure of the German offensive on the Kursk Bulge, the liberation of Orel and Belgorod;
C) the liberation of Kyiv;
D) the surrender of the Germans in Berlin.

A14. The following decisions were made at the Potsdam Conference:
A) about the date of entry of the USSR into the war with Japan,
B) on the transfer of the USSR of the city of Konigsberg and the area adjacent to it,
B) about the management of post-war Germany,
D) about reparations from Germany.

A15. Front commanders participated in Operation Bagration:
A) Bagramyan, B) Chernyakhovsky, C) Rokossovsky, D) Konev.

A16. Front commanders in the Berlin operation were:
A) Vasilevsky, B) Zhukov, C) Konev, D) Rokossovsky.

IN 1. Match the battles with the years they took place:
1) near Smolensk A) 1944
2) near Kharkov B) 1943
3) for crossing the Dnieper C) 1942
4) for the liberation of Minsk D) 1941
D) 1945

IN 2. Match the names and facts:
1) I.V. Panfilov A) commander of the 62nd Army;
2) V.V. Talalikhin B) air ram;
3) I.V. Stalin B) division commander on the Volokolamsk highway;
4) V.I. Chuikov D) Supreme Commander of the Soviet troops.

C1. Read an excerpt from the memoirs of Marshal V.I. Chuikov and indicate what kind of battle is in question.
“... Despite the huge losses, the invaders climbed ahead. Columns of infantry in cars and tanks broke into the city. Apparently, the Nazis believed that his fate was sealed, and each of them sought to reach the Volga, the city center as soon as possible and profit from trophies there ... our soldiers ... crawled out from under German tanks ... to the next line, where they were received, united into units, supplied mainly with ammunition, and again thrown into battle.

The Battle of Kursk, in terms of its scale, military and political significance, is rightfully considered one of the key battles not only of the Great Patriotic War, but also of the Second World War. The battle on the Kursk Bulge finally established the power of the Red Army and completely broke the morale of the Wehrmacht forces. After it, the German army completely lost its offensive potential.

The Battle of Kursk, or as it is also called in Russian historiography - the Battle of the Kursk Bulge - is one of the decisive battles during the Great Patriotic War, which took place in the summer of 1943 (July 5-August 23).

Historians call the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk the two most significant victories of the Red Army against the forces of the Wehrmacht, which completely turned the tide of hostilities.

In this article, we will learn the date of the Battle of Kursk and its role and significance during the war, as well as its causes, course and results.

The historical significance of the Battle of Kursk can hardly be overestimated. If it were not for the exploits of the Soviet soldiers during the battle, the Germans were able to seize the initiative on the Eastern Front and resume the offensive, moving again to Moscow and Leningrad. During the battle, the Red Army defeated most of the combat-ready units of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, and he lost the opportunity to use fresh reserves, as they were already depleted.

In honor of the victory, August 23 forever became the Day of Russian Military Glory. In addition, the largest and bloodiest tank battle in history took place during the battles, as well as a huge amount of aircraft and other types of equipment.

The Battle of Kursk is also called the Battle of the Fiery Arc - all because of the crucial importance of this operation and the bloody battles that took hundreds of thousands of lives.

The Battle of Stalingrad, which took place earlier than the Battle of Kursk, completely destroyed the plans of the Germans regarding the rapid capture of the USSR. According to the Barbarossa plan and the blitzkrieg tactics, the Germans tried to take the USSR in one fell swoop even before winter. Now the Soviet Union gathered its strength and was able to seriously challenge the Wehrmacht.

During the Battle of Kursk on July 5-August 23, 1943, according to historians, at least 200 thousand soldiers died, more than half a million were wounded. At the same time, it is important to note that many historians consider these figures to be underestimated and the losses of the parties in the Battle of Kursk may be much more significant. Mostly foreign historians speak about the bias of these data.

Intelligence service

A huge role in the victory over Germany was played by Soviet intelligence, which was able to learn about the so-called Operation Citadel. Soviet intelligence officers began to receive messages about this operation as early as the beginning of 1943. On April 12, 1943, a document was placed on the table of the Soviet leader, which contained complete information about the operation - the date of its implementation, the tactics and strategy of the German army. It was hard to imagine what would happen if intelligence did not do its job. Probably, the Germans would still have managed to break through the Russian defenses, since the preparations for Operation Citadel were serious - they were preparing for it no worse than for Operation Barbarossa.

At the moment, historians are not sure exactly who delivered this crucial knowledge to Stalin. It is believed that this information was obtained by one of the British intelligence officers John Cancross, as well as a member of the so-called "Cambridge Five" (a group of British intelligence officers that was recruited by the USSR in the early 1930s and worked for two governments at once).

There is also an opinion that the intelligence officers of the Dora group, namely the Hungarian intelligence officer Sandor Rado, transmitted information about the plans of the German command.

Some historians believe that one of the most famous intelligence officers of the Second World War period, Rudolf Ressler, who at that time was in Switzerland, transferred all the information about Operation Citadel to Moscow.

Significant support for the USSR was provided by British agents who were not recruited by the Union. During the Ultra program, British intelligence managed to hack the German Lorenz cipher machine, which transmitted messages between members of the top leadership of the Third Reich. The first step was to intercept plans for a summer offensive in the Kursk and Belgorod region, after which this information was immediately sent to Moscow.

Before the start of the Battle of Kursk, Zhukov claimed that as soon as he saw the future battlefield, he already knew how the strategic offensive of the German army would go. However, there is no confirmation of his words - it is believed that in his memoirs he simply exaggerates his strategic talent.

Thus, the Soviet Union knew about all the details of the offensive operation "Citadel" and was able to adequately prepare for it, so as not to leave the Germans a chance to win.

Preparing for battle

At the beginning of 1943, offensive actions were carried out by the German and Soviet armies, which led to the formation of a ledge in the center of the Soviet-German front, reaching a depth of 150 kilometers. This ledge was called the "Kursk Bulge". In April, it became clear to both sides that one of the key battles that could decide the outcome of the war on the Eastern Front would soon begin over this ledge.

There was no consensus in the German headquarters. For a long time, Hitler could not work out an exact strategy for the summer of 1943. Many generals, including Manstein, were opposed to the offensive at the moment. He believed that the offensive would make sense if it began right now, and not in the summer, when the Red Army could prepare for it. The rest either believed that it was time to go on the defensive, or to launch an offensive in the summer.

Despite the fact that the most experienced commander of the Reich (Manshetein) was against it, Hitler nevertheless agreed to launch an offensive in early July 1943.

The Battle of Kursk in 1943 is the Union's chance to consolidate the initiative after the victory at Stalingrad, and therefore the preparation of the operation was treated with a previously unprecedented seriousness.

The state of affairs at the headquarters of the USSR was much better. Stalin was aware of the plans of the Germans, he had a numerical advantage in infantry, tanks, guns and aircraft. Knowing how and when the Germans would advance, the Soviet soldiers prepared defensive fortifications to meet them and set up minefields to repel the attack, and then go on the counteroffensive. A huge role in the successful defense was played by the experience of Soviet military leaders, who, in two years of hostilities, were still able to work out the tactics and strategy of warfare of the best military leaders of the Reich. The fate of Operation Citadel was sealed before it even began.

Plans and forces of the parties

The German command planned to conduct a major offensive operation on the Kursk Bulge under the name (code name) "Citadel". In order to destroy the Soviet defense, the Germans decided to inflict descending strikes from the north (the region of the city of Orel) and from the south (the region of the city of Belgorod). Having broken the enemy defenses, the Germans were to unite in the area of ​​the city of Kursk, thus taking the troops of the Voronezh and Central fronts into a complete encirclement. In addition, the German tank units were supposed to turn east - to the village of Prokhorovka, and destroy the armored reserves of the Red Army so that they could not come to the aid of the main forces and help them get out of the encirclement. Such tactics were not at all new for German generals. Their tank flanking attacks worked for four. Using such tactics, they were able to conquer almost all of Europe and inflict many crushing defeats on the Red Army in 1941-1942.

To carry out Operation Citadel, the Germans concentrated in Eastern Ukraine, on the territory of Belarus and Russia, 50 divisions with a total number of 900 thousand people. Of these, 18 divisions were armored and motorized. Such a large number of panzer divisions was common for the Germans. The forces of the Wehrmacht have always used lightning-fast attacks of tank units in order not to give the enemy even a chance to group up and fight back. In 1939, it was the tank divisions that played a key role in the capture of France, which surrendered before it could fight.

The commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht were Field Marshal von Kluge (Army Group Center) and Field Marshal Manstein (Army Group South). The strike forces were commanded by Field Marshal Model, the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force were commanded by General Herman Goth.

The German army before the start of the battle received the long-awaited tank reserves. Hitler sent more than 100 heavy Tiger tanks, almost 200 Panther tanks (first used at the Battle of Kursk) and less than a hundred Ferdinand or Elefant (Elephant) tank destroyers to the Eastern Front.

"Tigers", "Panthers" and "Ferdinands" - were one of the most powerful tanks during the Second World War. Neither the Allies nor the USSR at that time had tanks that could boast such firepower and armor. If the "Tigers" Soviet soldiers have already seen and learned to fight against them, then the "Panthers" and "Ferdinands" caused a lot of problems on the battlefield.

The Panthers are medium tanks that are slightly less armored than the Tigers and were armed with a 7.5 cm KwK 42 cannon. These guns had an excellent rate of fire and fired over long distances with great accuracy.

"Ferdinand" is a heavy self-propelled anti-tank installation (PT-ACS), which was one of the most famous during the Second World War. Despite the fact that its numbers were small, it offered serious resistance to the tanks of the USSR, as it possessed at that time almost the best armor and firepower. During the Battle of Kursk, the Ferdinands showed their power, perfectly withstanding hits from anti-tank guns, and even coped with artillery hits. However, its main problem was the small number of anti-personnel machine guns, and therefore the tank destroyer was very vulnerable to infantry, which could get close to it and blow them up. It was simply impossible to destroy these tanks with head-on shots. The weak points were on the sides, where they later learned to shoot with sub-caliber shells. The weakest point in the defense of the tank is the weak chassis, which was disabled, and then the stationary tank was captured.

In total, Manstein and Kluge received less than 350 new tanks at their disposal, which was catastrophically insufficient, given the number of Soviet armored forces. It is also worth highlighting that approximately 500 tanks used during the Battle of Kursk were obsolete models. These are the Pz.II and Pz.III tanks, which were already irrelevant at that time.

During the Battle of Kursk, the 2nd Panzer Army included elite Panzerwaffe tank units, including the 1st SS Panzer Division "Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "DasReich" and the famous 3rd Panzer Division "Totenkopf" (she or "Death's Head").

The Germans had a modest number of aircraft to support infantry and tanks - about 2,500 thousand units. In terms of guns and mortars, the German army was more than twice as inferior to the Soviet one, and some sources point to a threefold advantage of the USSR in guns and mortars.

The Soviet command realized its mistakes in conducting defensive operations in 1941-1942. This time they built a powerful defensive line that could hold off the massive offensive of the German armored forces. According to the plans of the command, the Red Army was to wear down the enemy with defensive battles, and then launch a counteroffensive at the most disadvantageous moment for the enemy.

During the Battle of Kursk, the commander of the Central Front was one of the most talented and productive army generals, Konstantin Rokossovsky. His troops took on the task of defending the northern front of the Kursk salient. The commander of the Voronezh Front on the Kursk Bulge was General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin, a native of the Voronezh Region, on whose shoulders the task of defending the southern front of the ledge fell. Marshals of the USSR Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky were in charge of coordinating the actions of the Red Army.

The ratio of the number of troops was far from on the side of Germany. According to estimates, the Central and Voronezh fronts had 1.9 million soldiers, including units of the troops of the Steppe Front (Steppe Military District). The number of Wehrmacht fighters did not exceed 900 thousand people. In terms of the number of tanks, Germany was less than two times inferior to 2.5 thousand against less than 5 thousand. As a result, the balance of power before the Battle of Kursk looked like this: 2:1 in favor of the USSR. The historian of the Great Patriotic War Alexei Isaev says that the size of the Red Army during the battle is overestimated. His point of view is subject to great criticism, since he does not take into account the troops of the Steppe Front (the number of soldiers of the Steppe Front who participated in the operations totaled more than 500 thousand people).

Kursk defensive operation

Before giving a full description of the events on the Kursk Bulge, it is important to show a map of actions in order to make it easier to navigate the information. Battle of Kursk on the map:

This picture shows the scheme of the Battle of Kursk. The map of the Battle of Kursk can clearly show how combat formations acted during the battle. On the map of the Battle of Kursk, you will also see symbols that will help you assimilate the information.

The Soviet generals received all the necessary orders - the defense was strong and the Germans were soon waiting for resistance, which the Wehrmacht had not received in the entire history of its existence. On the day that the Battle of Kursk began, the Soviet army brought a huge amount of artillery to the front to give a response artillery barrage that the Germans would not expect.

The beginning of the Battle of Kursk (defensive stage) was planned for the morning of July 5 - the offensive was to take place immediately from the northern and southern fronts. Before the tank attack, the Germans carried out large-scale bombardments, to which the Soviet army responded in kind. At this point, the German command (namely Field Marshal Manstein) began to realize that the Russians had learned about Operation Citadel and were able to prepare the defense. Manstein repeatedly told Hitler that this offensive at the moment no longer made sense. He believed that it was necessary to carefully prepare the defense and try first to repulse the Red Army and only then think about counterattacks.

Start - Arc of Fire

On the northern front, the offensive began at six o'clock in the morning. The Germans attacked a little west of the Cherkasy direction. The first tank attacks ended in failure for the Germans. A solid defense led to heavy losses in the German armored units. And yet the enemy managed to break through 10 kilometers deep. On the southern front, the offensive began at three o'clock in the morning. The main blows fell on the settlements of Oboyan and Korochi.

The Germans could not break through the defenses of the Soviet troops, as they were carefully prepared for battle. Even the elite panzer divisions of the Wehrmacht were hardly moving forward. As soon as it became clear that the German forces could not break through on the northern and southern fronts, the command decided that it was necessary to strike in the direction of Prokhorov.

On July 11, fierce fighting began near the village of Prokhorovka, which escalated into the largest tank battle in history. Soviet tanks in the Battle of Kursk outnumbered the German ones, but despite this, the enemy resisted to the end. July 13-23 - The Germans are still trying to carry out offensive attacks, which end in failure. On July 23, the enemy completely exhausted his offensive potential and decided to go on the defensive.

tank battle

It is difficult to say how many tanks were involved on both sides, since the data from various sources differ. If we take the average data, then the number of tanks of the USSR reached about 1 thousand vehicles. Whereas the Germans had about 700 tanks.

The tank battle (battle) during the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge took place on July 12, 1943. Enemy attacks on Prokhorovka began immediately from the western and southern directions. Four panzer divisions were advancing in the west and about 300 more tanks were heading in from the south.

The battle began early in the morning and the Soviet troops gained an advantage, as the rising sun shone on the Germans directly into the viewing devices of the tanks. The battle formations of the parties mixed up quite quickly, and already a few hours after the start of the battle it was difficult to make out where whose tanks were.

The Germans found themselves in a very difficult position, since the main strength of their tanks was in long-range guns, which were useless in close combat, and the tanks themselves were very slow, while in this situation much was decided by maneuverability. The 2nd and 3rd tank (anti-tank) armies of the Germans were defeated near Kursk. The Russian tanks, on the contrary, gained an advantage, as they had a chance to target the weak spots of heavily armored German tanks, and they themselves were very maneuverable (especially the famous T-34s).

However, the Germans nevertheless gave a serious rebuff from their anti-tank guns, which undermined the morale of the Russian tankers - the fire was so dense that the soldiers and tanks did not have time and could not form orders.

While the bulk of the tank troops were tied up in battle, the Germans decided to use the Kempf tank group, which was advancing on the left flank of the Soviet troops. To repel this attack, the tank reserves of the Red Army had to be used. In the southern direction, by 14.00, Soviet troops began to push the German tank units, which did not have fresh reserves. In the evening, the battlefield was already far behind the Soviet tank units and the battle was won.

Tank losses on both sides during the battle of Prokhorovka during the Kursk defensive operation looked like this:

• about 250 Soviet tanks;
• 70 German tanks.

The above figures are irretrievable losses. The number of damaged tanks was much larger. For example, the Germans after the battle of Prokhorovka had only 1/10 fully combat-ready vehicles.

The battle of Prokhorovka is called the largest tank battle in history, but this is not entirely true. In fact, this is the largest tank battle that took place in just one day. But the largest battle took place two years earlier also between the forces of the Germans and the USSR on the Eastern Front near Dubno. During this battle, which began on June 23, 1941, 4,500 tanks collided with each other. The Soviet Union had 3700 pieces of equipment, while the Germans had only 800 units.

Despite such a numerical advantage of the tank units of the Union, there was not a single chance of victory. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the quality of the German tanks was much higher - they were armed with new models with good anti-tank armor and weapons. Secondly, in Soviet military thought at that time there was a principle that "tanks do not fight tanks." Most of the tanks in the USSR at that time had only bulletproof armor and could not penetrate the thick German armor themselves. That is why the first largest tank battle was a catastrophic failure for the USSR.

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

The defensive stage of the Battle of Kursk ended on July 23, 1943 with the complete victory of the Soviet troops and the crushing defeat of the Wehrmacht forces. As a result of bloody battles, the German army was exhausted and drained of blood, a significant number of tanks were either destroyed or partially lost their combat effectiveness. The German tanks participating in the battle near Prokhorovka were almost completely disabled, destroyed or fell into the hands of the enemy.

The ratio of losses during the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk was as follows: 4.95:1. The Soviet army lost five times as many soldiers, while the German losses were much smaller. However, a huge number of German soldiers were wounded, as well as tank troops were destroyed, which significantly undermined the combat power of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front.

As a result of the defensive operation, the Soviet troops reached the line, which they occupied before the German offensive, which began on July 5. The Germans went on the defensive.

During the Battle of Kursk there was a radical change. After the Germans exhausted their offensive capabilities, the Red Army counteroffensive began on the Kursk Bulge. From July 17 to July 23, the Izyum-Barvenkovskaya offensive operation was carried out by Soviet troops.

The operation was carried out by the Southwestern Front of the Red Army. Its key goal was to pin down the Donbas grouping of the enemy so that the enemy could not transfer fresh reserves to the Kursk salient. Despite the fact that the enemy threw his almost best tank divisions into battle, the forces of the South-Western Front still managed to capture bridgeheads and with powerful blows pin down and surround the Donbass group of Germans. Thus, the Southwestern Front significantly helped in the defense of the Kursk Bulge.

Miusskaya offensive operation

From July 17 to August 2, 1943, the Mius offensive operation was also carried out. The main task of the Soviet troops during the operation was to pull the fresh reserves of the Germans from the Kursk Bulge to the Donbass and defeat the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht. To repel the attack in the Donbass, the Germans had to transfer significant aviation and tank units to defend the city. Despite the fact that the Soviet troops failed to break through the German defenses near the Donbass, they still managed to significantly weaken the offensive on the Kursk Bulge.

The offensive phase of the Battle of Kursk continued successfully for the Red Army. The next important battles on the Kursk Bulge took place near Orel and Kharkov - the offensive operations were called "Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev".

The offensive operation "Kutuzov" began on July 12, 1943 in the area of ​​​​the city of Orel, where two German armies opposed the Soviet troops. As a result of bloody battles, the Germans were unable to hold bridgeheads on July 26, they retreated. Already on August 5, the city of Orel was liberated by the Red Army. It was on August 5, 1943, for the first time in the entire period of hostilities with Germany, that a small parade with fireworks took place in the capital of the USSR. Thus, it can be judged that the liberation of Orel was an extremely important task for the Red Army, which it successfully coped with.

Offensive operation "Rumyantsev"

The next main event of the Battle of Kursk during its offensive phase began on August 3, 1943 on the southern face of the arc. As already mentioned, this strategic offensive was called "Rumyantsev". The operation was carried out by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts.

Already two days after the start of the operation - on August 5, the city of Belgorod was liberated from the Nazis. And two days later, the forces of the Red Army liberated the city of Bogodukhov. During the offensive on August 11, Soviet soldiers managed to cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway communication line of the Germans. Despite all the counterattacks of the German army, the forces of the Red Army continued to advance. As a result of fierce fighting on August 23, the city of Kharkov was recaptured.

The battle for the Kursk Bulge was already won by the Soviet troops at that moment. This was understood by the German command, but Hitler gave a clear order to "stand to the last."

The Mginskaya offensive operation began on July 22 and continued until August 22, 1943. The main goals of the USSR were as follows: to finally thwart the plan of the German offensive against Leningrad, prevent the enemy from transferring forces to the west and completely destroy the 18th Wehrmacht Army.

The operation began with a powerful artillery strike in the enemy direction. The forces of the parties at the time of the start of the operation on the Kursk Bulge looked like this: 260 thousand soldiers and about 600 tanks on the side of the USSR, and 100 thousand people and 150 tanks on the side of the Wehrmacht.

Despite strong artillery preparation, the German army put up fierce resistance. Although the forces of the Red Army managed to immediately capture the first echelon of the enemy's defense, they could not advance further.

In early August 1943, having received fresh reserves, the Red Army again began to attack German positions. Thanks to the numerical superiority and powerful mortar fire, the soldiers of the USSR managed to capture the enemy's defensive fortifications in the village of Porechie. However, the spacecraft again could not advance further - the German defense was too dense.

A fierce battle between the opposing sides during the operation unfolded for Sinyaevo and Sinyaevo Heights, which were captured by Soviet troops several times, and then they passed back to the Germans. The fighting was fierce and both sides suffered heavy losses. The German defense was so strong that the command of the spacecraft decided to stop the offensive operation on August 22, 1943 and go on the defensive. Thus, the Mginskaya offensive operation did not bring final success, although it played an important strategic role. To repel this attack, the Germans had to use the reserves, which were supposed to go to Kursk.

Smolensk offensive operation

Until the Soviet counter-offensive in the Battle of Kursk 1943 began, it was extremely important for the Headquarters to defeat as many enemy units as possible, which the Wehrmacht could send under the Course to contain the Soviet troops. In order to weaken the enemy's defenses and deprive him of the help of reserves, the Smolensk offensive operation was carried out. The Smolensk direction adjoined the western region of the Kursk salient. The operation was codenamed "Suvorov" and began on August 7, 1943. The offensive was launched by the forces of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, as well as the entire Western Front.

The operation ended in success, as in its course the beginning of the liberation of Belarus was laid. However, most importantly, the commanders of the Battle of Kursk achieved the pinning down of as many as 55 enemy divisions, preventing them from going to Kursk - this significantly increased the chances of the Red Army forces during the counteroffensive near Kursk.

To weaken the positions of the enemy near Kursk, the forces of the Red Army carried out another operation - the Donbas offensive. The parties' plans for the Donbas basin were very serious, because this place served as an important economic center - the Donetsk mines were extremely important for the USSR and Germany. There was a huge German grouping in the Donbass, which numbered more than 500 thousand people.

The operation began on August 13, 1943 and was carried out by the forces of the Southwestern Front. On August 16, the Red Army forces met serious resistance on the Mius River, where there was a heavily fortified defensive line. On August 16, the forces of the Southern Front entered the battle, which managed to break through the enemy defenses. Especially in the battles, the 67th showed up from all the regiments. The successful offensive continued and already on August 30, the spacecraft liberated the city of Taganrog.

On August 23, 1943, the offensive phase of the Battle of Kursk and the Battle of Kursk itself ended, however, the Donbass offensive operation continued - the forces of the spacecraft had to push the enemy across the Dnieper River.

Now important strategic positions were lost for the Germans and the threat of dismemberment and death hung over Army Group South. To prevent this, the leader of the Third Reich nevertheless allowed her to move beyond the Dnieper.

On September 1, all German units in the area began to retreat from the Donbass. On September 5, Gorlovka was liberated, and three days later, during the fighting, Stalino was taken or, as the city is now called, Donetsk.

The retreat for the German army was very difficult. The Wehrmacht forces were running out of ammunition for artillery pieces. During the retreat, the German soldiers actively used the tactics of "scorched earth". The Germans killed civilians and burned villages as well as small towns along their path. During the Battle of Kursk in 1943, retreating in cities, the Germans plundered everything that came to hand.

On September 22, the Germans were thrown back across the Dnieper River in the area of ​​​​the cities of Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk. After that, the Donbas offensive operation came to an end, ending with the complete success of the Red Army.

All the operations undertaken above led to the fact that the Wehrmacht forces, as a result of the fighting in the Battle of Kursk, were forced to withdraw beyond the Dnieper in order to build new defensive lines. The victory in the Battle of Kursk was the result of the increased courage and fighting spirit of Soviet soldiers, the skill of commanders and the competent use of military equipment.

The Battle of Kursk in 1943, and then the Battle of the Dnieper, finally secured the initiative on the Eastern Front for the USSR. No one else doubted that the victory in the Great Patriotic War would be for the USSR. This was understood by the allies of Germany, who began to gradually abandon the Germans, leaving the Reich even less chance.

Many historians also believe that the Allied offensive on the island of Sicily, which at that moment was occupied mainly by Italian troops, played an important role in the victory over the Germans during the Battle of Kursk.

On July 10, the Allies launched an offensive into Sicily and the Italian troops surrendered to the British and American forces with little or no resistance. This greatly spoiled Hitler's plans, since in order to hold Western Europe he had to transfer part of the troops from the Eastern Front, which again weakened the position of the Germans near Kursk. Already on July 10, Manstein told Hitler that the offensive near Kursk must be stopped and went into deep defense across the Dnieper River, but Hitler still hoped that the enemy would not be able to defeat the Wehrmacht.

Everyone knows that the Battle of Kursk during the Great Patriotic War was bloody and the date of its beginning is associated with the death of our grandfathers and great-grandfathers. However, there were also funny (interesting) facts during the Battle of Kursk. One of these cases is associated with the KV-1 tank.

During a tank battle, one of the Soviet KV-1 tanks stalled and the crew ran out of ammunition. He was opposed by two German Pz.IV tanks, which could not penetrate the armor of the KV-1. German tankers tried to get to the Soviet crew by sawing through the armor, but nothing came of it. Then two Pz.IVs decided to drag the KV-1 to their base in order to deal with the tankers there. They hitched up the KV-1 and started towing it. Somewhere in the middle of the way, the KV-1 engine suddenly started up and the Soviet tank dragged two Pz.IVs with it to its base. The German tankers were shocked and simply abandoned their tanks.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

If the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad ended the period of defense of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War, then the end of the Battle of Kursk marked a radical turning point in the course of hostilities.

After the report (message) on the victory in the Battle of Kursk came to Stalin's desk, the Secretary General said that this was only the beginning and very soon the Red Army troops would oust the Germans from the occupied territories of the USSR.

The events after the Battle of Kursk, of course, did not unfold simply for the Red Army. The victories were accompanied by huge losses, because the enemy stubbornly held the defense.

The liberation of cities after the Battle of Kursk continued, for example, already in November 1943, the capital of the Ukrainian SSR, the city of Kyiv, was liberated.

A very important result of the Battle of Kursk - change in the attitude of the allies towards the USSR. A report to the President of the United States, written in August, said that the USSR now occupies a dominant position in World War II. There is proof of this. If Germany allocated only two divisions for the defense of Sicily from the combined troops of Great Britain and the United States, then on the Eastern Front the USSR attracted the attention of two hundred German divisions.

The United States was very worried about the successes of the Russians on the Eastern Front. Roosevelt said that if the USSR continued to pursue such success, the opening of a "second front" would be unnecessary and the United States would then not be able to influence the fate of Europe without benefit to itself. Therefore, the opening of a "second front" should follow as soon as possible while US assistance was needed at all.

The failure of Operation Citadel led to the disruption of further strategic offensive operations of the Wehrmacht, which were already prepared for execution. The victory near Kursk would allow developing an offensive against Leningrad, and after that the Germans went to occupy Sweden.

The result of the Battle of Kursk was the undermining of Germany's authority among its allies. The successes of the USSR on the Eastern Front made it possible for the Americans and the British to deploy in Western Europe. After such a crushing defeat of Germany, the leader of fascist Italy, Benito Mussolini, broke off agreements with Germany and left the war. Thus, Hitler lost his true ally.

Success, of course, had to be paid dearly. The losses of the USSR in the Battle of Kursk were huge, as, indeed, were the German ones. The balance of power has already been shown above - now it's worth looking at the losses in the Battle of Kursk.

In fact, it is rather difficult to establish the exact number of deaths, since data from different sources vary greatly. Many historians take average figures - these are 200 thousand dead and three times as many wounded. The least optimistic data speaks of more than 800 thousand dead on both sides and the same number of wounded. The parties also lost a huge number of tanks and equipment. Aviation in the Battle of Kursk played almost a key role and the loss of aircraft amounted to about 4 thousand units on both sides. At the same time, aviation losses are the only ones where the Red Army lost no more than the German one - each lost about 2 thousand aircraft. For example, the ratio of human losses looks like this 5:1 or 4:1 according to various sources. Based on the characteristics of the Battle of Kursk, we can conclude that the effectiveness of Soviet aircraft at this stage of the war was in no way inferior to the German ones, while at the beginning of hostilities the situation was radically different.

Soviet soldiers near Kursk showed extraordinary heroism. Their exploits were even celebrated abroad, especially by American and British publications. The heroism of the Red Army was also noted by the German generals, including Manshein, who was considered the best commander of the Reich. Several hundred thousand soldiers received awards "For participation in the Battle of Kursk."

Another interesting fact is that children also participated in the Battle of Kursk. Of course, they did not fight on the front lines, but they provided serious support in the rear. They helped deliver supplies and shells. And before the start of the battle, with the help of children, hundreds of kilometers of railways were built, which were necessary for the rapid transportation of military and supplies.

Finally, it is important to fix all the data. Date of the end and beginning of the Battle of Kursk: July 5 and August 23, 1943.

Key dates of the Battle of Kursk:

• July 5 - 23, 1943 - Kursk strategic defensive operation;
• July 23 - August 23, 1943 - Kursk strategic offensive operation;
• July 12, 1943 - a bloody tank battle near Prokhorovka;
• July 17 - 27, 1943 - Izyum-Barvenkovskaya offensive operation;
• July 17 - August 2, 1943 - Miusskaya offensive operation;
• July 12 - August 18, 1943 - Oryol strategic offensive operation "Kutuzov";
• August 3 - 23, 1943 - Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation "Rumyantsev";
• July 22 - August 23, 1943 - Mginskaya offensive operation;
• August 7 - October 2, 1943 - Smolensk offensive operation;
• August 13 - September 22, 1943 - Donbass offensive operation.

Results of the Battle of the Fiery Arc:

• a radical turn of events during the Great Patriotic War and World War II;
• complete fiasco of the German campaign to seize the USSR;
• the Nazis lost confidence in the invincibility of the German army, which lowered the morale of the soldiers and led to conflicts in the ranks of the command.

There is only one answer to this question: in the summer of 1943, the time for retreats and defense was over, it was time to win.

military environment

By this period, German troops were no longer advancing. Their plans to take Moscow were thwarted, and the great victory at Stalingrad showed that the Red Army was strong and ready to beat the enemy. But Hitler did not believe in the power of the Soviet troops, he was not going to change plans, and even more so, he was not going to give up and gave the order to prepare a large offensive operation.

The Nazi command carefully prepared the offensive operation "Citadel". For this, a total mobilization was carried out in Germany. A huge amount of enemy equipment and manpower was pulled into the area of ​​the operation. The plan was drawn up in detail, in it, as in a good scenario, the actions of each platoon were described literally by hours and square meters. The offensive and only the offensive - no other actions were planned. Then it was necessary to strike another powerful blow, throwing part of the troops to the southwest. After that, according to Hitler, the Soviet army would have been demoralized and finally defeated. The Wehrmacht could easily cope with "finishing individual units."

The headquarters also developed a plan for the defeat of the Nazi units and an offensive. But in order to mislead the German generals, it was decided to start protracted defensive battles. The goal is to exhaust the enemy and make it possible to build the positions necessary for decisive battles on the Kursk ledge. The sappers worked without rest, mined the frontline zone. In the reports there was a figure - one and a half thousand mines for each kilometer indicated on the map.

balance of power

The Germans concentrated 50 divisions in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge, the number of soldiers reached a gigantic figure - almost 900,000. Technical support was powerful - three tank divisions, they included 324 of the latest Tiger and Panther tanks. 50 Ferdinand anti-tank guns (RT-SAU or Slon), 10,000 anti-tank guns and mortars were delivered to the Kursk Bulge. The Luftwaffe provided air support with 1,106 aircraft.

In all numerical indicators, the Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy. There were 1,300,000 soldiers and officers on eight defensive lines. There were also many more tanks, self-propelled guns and planes. But the command was aware that almost the entire technical part of the army was outdated, there were few new tanks, 80% after repair. There was an advantage, but it did not become the decisive factor in this many-day battle.

How was the Battle of Kursk?

The operation took place in three directions:

The first direction is a strategic defensive operation. It began on July 5 with a massive offensive by fascist troops. Defensive battles were heavy, the Germans managed to break through several fortifications and advance almost 12 deep into the northern positions of the Soviet troops. The first stage lasted until July 23.

The second direction and the third direction were offensive: Oryol operation began on July 12 and ended on August 18; Belgorod-Kharkov - began on August 3 and lasted until August 23.

The Germans made their first blows along the entire line of contact of the troops, starting a powerful artillery shelling, after which they went on the offensive. Attacks in the center were a distraction, the main forces were directed to the north and south. The task of these units is to split the defenses of the Soviet troops and surround the central units. Five days of stubborn fighting yielded no results. The Germans had to go on the defensive.

Battle of Prokhorovka

The Germans concentrated five tank armies and 14 tank corps on a small foothold near Prokhorovka. Separate tank regiments took part in the battle. The total number of tanks and self-propelled guns was five thousand. Tankers were supported by seven infantry divisions. (Data from the memoirs of the Chief of Staff, General F. W. Von Mellenthin)

The direction of attack has been changed. The German command decided to attack in the Prokhorovka area. Soviet tanks also pulled up to Prokhorovka. The first big clashes took place on July 11, and on July 12 the famous battle of tanks began - a terrible battle of giants and their crews. Tanks, assault guns and crews of wrecked vehicles fought to the death. No one won a definite victory in this battle. The losses of the Germans amounted to 80 tanks, that is, the tank divisions got off with little blood and could continue to participate in hostilities. The Soviet army lost almost 70% of the tanks, counting those vehicles that could still be repaired. But the tankers managed to stop the enemy and forced him to lose time to regroup, thus giving him the opportunity to strengthen his positions, pull up reserves and prepare for the offensive.

Further developments

On June 17, offensive operations began. Soviet troops advanced in several directions at once.

Mius operation started on July 17th and ended on August 2nd. Having crossed the Northern Donets, the soldiers blocked the Germans' ability to transfer fresh units to the Kursk Bulge.

Izyum-Barvenkovskaya operation- On July 17, the encirclement of the Donbass group of Germans began

Bottom line Oryol operation was the liberation of a large territory occupied by the Nazis. After the liberation of Belgorod in Moscow on August 5, 1943, the first salute was held.

Operation Rumyantsev started August 3rd. The result is the liberation of several settlements, including Kharkov on August 23.

Operation Kutuzov lasted almost two months - it began on August 7 and ended on October 2. The result - the defeat of the left flank of the Center group and the liberation of Smolensk.

Donbass operation was held from August 13 to September 22. The result is the complete liberation of the Donets Basin.

Chernihiv-Poltava the operation ended with the liberation of the entire left-bank Ukraine. Dates - the operation began on August 26, ended on September 30.

As can be seen from a simple enumeration of facts, the significance of the Kursk operation cannot be overestimated. It broke the back of the German army and showed that the Germans could never regain their lost advantage.

Losses

This is where the numbers diverge. According to the Soviet headquarters, the Germans lost at least four hundred thousand killed, they object, calling two hundred thousand the ultimate total. The total number of casualties is approximately equal to five hundred thousand killed on both sides. Terrible damage was also inflicted on equipment - tanks, self-propelled guns, trucks, guns and aircraft.

What is the result?

The transition to the offensive, which was already unstoppable until Berlin itself. A radical turning point in the war took place thanks to the Battle of Kursk.

Why won?

We won because we couldn't help but win. Also because they gained military experience and such consciously sober anger that did not allow headlong to rush into the attack. She taught how to properly calculate one's strength and protect (if possible, of course) one's own and other people's lives.

These fifty terrible days are a great feat of our fathers and grandfathers.